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The Term Istithnā' in Arabic Logic
Author(s): Kwame GyekyeSource: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1972), pp. 88Published by: American Oriental SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/599652 .
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BRIEF
COMMUNICATIONS
The
Term Istithna'
in
Arabic
Logic
The term
istithnd'
is a
term used
in
Arabic
logical
works which has not, as yet, been given a satisfactory
translation.
Among
the translations
of this term
which
I
have
come across
in
modern
works
are:
(a)
exclusion ,'
(b)
exception ,2
(c)
choice ,8
(d)
interpellation'
,4
(e)
particular
mention ,5
and
(f)
disjunction .6
While the first two
(a
and
b)
are the
dictionary meanings
of the term
which,
here,
are
not
helpful
towards the un-
derstanding
of
the
term as
it is used in
the
logic
of
propo-
sitions,
the next three
(c, d, e)
probably
arose
out of
an
attempt
to make sense of the
passages
in
which
the term
occurs
and,
are, strictly speaking,
not
translations
as
such.
Disjunction
does
not translate istithna'
although
we
shall find
later
that
istithnd'1
syllogisms
included the
disjunctive.
In order to determine the technical meaning of
istithnd',
I
intend, firstly,
to
examine
passages
in
the
Arabic translations of
Greek works
where
this
term oc-
curs,
and
inquire
which
Greek term
it translates.
(Often
a
search
for
a
Greek
antecedent
for a
term
used
in
Arabic
philosophy
or
logic
does
prove
fruitful
in
understanding
1(i)
Nicholas Rescher:
Al-FdrdbZ's
Short
Commentary
on Aristotle's
Prior
Analytics,
Pittsburgh, 1963,
pp.
75 ff.
This translation
has been found
to con-
tain
a
large
number
of
serious
mistakes.
See
Dr. A.
I. Sabra's
review
in
the Journal
of
the
American
Oriental
Society,
vol.
85, 1965, pp.
241-
43.
(ii)
Israel
Efros: Maimonides' Treatise
on
Logic,
American
Academy
for
Jewish
Research,
1938,
p.
45.
Efros
made his translation from an Arabic
manuscript
in Hebrew characters.
The Arabic
text was
published
in
1960
by
Mubahat
Tiirker
in
Instanbul
University:
Publications
of
the
Faculty'
1960,
vol.
3,
pt. 2, pp.
87-110.
2
S.
M.
Afnan:
Avicenna,
His
Life
and
Works,
London,
1958, p.
99.
He uses
also
exclusion ,
p.
100.
3
A.
M. Goichon:
Lexique,
pp. 32, 33,
and
Ibn
Sina,
Livre des
Directives
et
Remarques,
Paris and
Beyrouth,
1951, p.
194,
footnote
6,
and
p.
218,
footnote
3,
although
she
regards
istithnd'
propositions
as
hypothetical
propositions.
4S. A.
Kamali:
A
Translation
of
Al-Ghazali's
Tahdfut
al-Faldsifah,
Lahore,
1963, p.
145.
D.
M.
Dunlop,
Al-FarabV's
Introductory
Sections
on
Logic ,
Islamic
Quarterly,
vol.
2,
no.
4,
1955,
p.
270
(Arabic),
p.
278
(English
tr.).
6
S.
Van
den
Bergh,
translation
of Averroes'
Tahdfut
al-Tahdfut, London, 1954,
vol.
2, p.
146.
its
meaning.)
Secondly,
I
shall examine the Latin trans-
lation of Averroes'
Tahdfut
al-Tahdfut
which,
of course,
contains
the
Tahdfut
al-Faldsifah
of al-Ghazali. Two
translations of
Averroes'
work were made: one
directly
from
the
Arabic
in
1328 and
published
in
1529.
This
is
not
only incomplete
but
is
also not so much a translation
as a
paraphrase.
The
other translation of that
work
of
Averroes
was made
from the
Hebrew
and
published
in
1527.
This
is
complete
and
is
the one that
I
have
used.7
Reference will be
made
also to the Latin translation
of
the
logical
part
of
al-Ghazali's
Maqdsid
al-Faldsifah.
Finally,
I
shall
refer
to the
works
of
al-Farabi,
Avicenna,
al-Ghazali,
Nasir al-Din
Tfsi,
and
Averroes,
and then
suggest
some
other translations for the term istithnd'.
First, then,
the Arabic
translations of the Greek
works.
As far as I know the
only
Greek work on
logic
trans-
lated
into Arabic
where
the
word istithnd'
is
used to
translate
a
Greek
word
is
the De
Interpretatione
of
Aristotle. This
was translated
by Ishaq
Ibn Hunain
(d.
c.
910)
and
survives
in
three
editions.8
The Greek word
is
prostithOmi (noun:
prosthesis),
used
six
times
in the
De
Interpretatione.
In
three
places,
16al5 and
19,
17a12,
the
Arabic
word used to
translate
it
is
istathnd
(noun:
istithnd').
The Greek word means
to
add,
to add some
determining
word,
addition
(Liddell
and
Scott).
It
is
interesting
to note
that
in
three other
places
two
Arabic
words
used
to translate the Greek
are
ictdfa
16b29
and
zdda 21b2
and30.
These
two Arabic words
mean
to add.
Again,
in
the Anal. Post. 87a35 and
91b27
zdda
is
used
to
translate
prostithemi.9
What we learn at this
stage,
is
that
istithnd'
(as
noun:
prosthesis)
means
addition ,
addition of a
determinant .10 But
prostithemi
is a
syn-
onym
of
proslambano
from
which
is derived
proslepsis
(i.e.,
additional
assumption )
which
was
used
by
the
7
1 am
grateful
to
Emeritus
Professor
Harry
A.
Wolf-
son
(of
Harvard)
for
the
information about
the
Latin
and
Hebrew translations from
the
Arabic.
8
(a)
I. Pollak:
Die
Hermeneutik
des Aristoteles
in der
Arabischen
Uebersetzung
des
Ishak
b.
Honain,
Leipzig,
1913.
(b)
'Abd al-Rahman
Badawi:
Organon
Aristotelis
in
Versione
Arabica
Antiqua,
vol.
I,
Cairo,
1952, pp.
59-
99. (c) W. Kutsch and S. Marrow: al-Fdrabi's Commentary
on Aristotle's De
Interpretatione,
Beyrouth,
1960.
9
The Arabic translation of the
Anal.
Post.
is contained
in
'Abd al-Rahman
Badawi,
op.
cit.,
vol.
2.
Badawi's
text has
rdda
(in
91b27),
but
this
obviously
must be
zada.
10
Thus,
Ross translates
Aristotle's
prosthesis
as
ad-
dition of a
determinant
(e.g., Metaphy.
1029b30, 1030b15,
1031a4).
88
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Brief
Communications
Stoics
to
refer
to the minor
premise
of
the
conditional
syllogism:
An
argument,
according
to the followers
of
Crinis,
consists of
a
major
premise
(lemma)
a
minor
premise (proslepsis),
and
a
conclusion,
such as
for
ex-
ample
this: 'If it is
day,
it is
light;
but it is
day,
therefore
it is
light'.
Here the sentence
'If it
is
day,
it
is
light'
is
the
major premise,
the clause
'(but)
it
is
day'
is the
minor
premise
(proslepsis),
and
'therefore it
is
light'
is the
con-
clusion.
Alexander
says
that what
the
Stoics
called
proslepsis
the
Peripatetics
called
metalepsis.l2
Sir W.
D.
Ross
in his edition of the
Prior
Analytics
brackets
proslepsis
which
occurs
in
58b9
because
it is
foreign
to
Aristotle and
belongs
to
Theophrastus .
It does
not
oc-
cur
in
the
Arabic
translation
of
that
passage.
(It
must
be
pointed
out that the use of
proslepsis
to
designate
the
minor
premise
of
a
conditional
syllogism
is
entirely
dif-
ferent
from the use of the same
word
by
Theophrastus
to
designate
a
syllogism
different from
the
categorical
and
the conditional.
This
was
correctly
noted
by Lejewski
in
his article on
Prosleptic Syllogisms .)13
Yet
in
another
passage, 17a36,
istithnd' is used not
to
translate
prosthesis
but
prosdiorismos
which
means
further
condition .14 This is a
second
meaning
of
istithnd',
and
we
must bear
it
in
mind,
as
we
shall
come
to
a
passage
where
Nasir
al-Din
Tius
says
that
istithnd'Z
syllogisms
are
conditional
syllogisms .
The use of
the
word
here is thus
different from
its other use as the
addi-
tional
or minor
premise
of
a
conditional
syllogism.
Now let us turn to the Latin
translation of Averroes'
Tahdfut
al-Tahdfut16
(which
contains
al-Ghazall's
Tahafut al-Falasifah).
Istithnd' occurs several
times in
the text.
The Latin
word
used here is
reiterare
(noun:
reiteratio):
to
re-iterate,
repeat .
The
Hebrew word
which was translated
by
the Latin
reiteratio
was,
accord-
ing
to
Professor
Wolfson
who
kindly
made this
search for
me,
hishshanuth which means
repetition .
The
Hebrew
word reflects the
root
of
the Arabic
word
th-n-y:
two,
double. The minor
premise
proslepsis
=
al-mustathndt)
is,
of
course,
a
re-assertion
(or
repetition)
of
one of
the
two
parts (i.e.,
either
the
protasis
or
the
apodosis)
of
the
11
Diogenes
Laertius:
Lives
of
Eminent
Philosophers,
vol.
2:
7,
76.
See
also
Sextus
Empiricus,
Outlines
of Pyr-
rhonism,
2:149,
9.
12
Alexander:
In
Ar.
Anal.
Priora,
Wallies, p.
324,
lines
17,
18.
13
C.
Lejewski,
On
Prosleptic
Syllogisms ,
Notre
Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 2, 1961, p. 170.
14
This
Greek
word
was
rendered
by
the
Latin
deter-
minatio,
adiectio.
(See
Indices
of
the
books
referred to
in
Footnote 17
below).
15
Latin:
Aristotelis
Opera
cum
Averrois
Commentariis,
vol.
9,
Frankfurt
am
Main,
1962.
Arabic:
Averroes'
Tahafut
al-Tahdfut,
ed.
M.
Bouyges,
Beyrouth,
1930,
Arabic, pp.
436,
548,
562
=
Latin
pp.
107b
(and
108b),
137a,
141
,
143b.
major
premise.
I shall refer
to the Hebrew translation
again
later.
The word
istithna' occurs
several times
in the
logical
part
of
al-Ghazali's
Maqdsid.
In the Latin
translation,16
the verb
istathnd was
rendered
by
the
Latin
ponere:
to
posit, lay down, assert,
while the
noun
istithnd' was
rendered
by categoricum.
Etymologically, ponere
is
more
akin
to
the Greek tithemi
than to the
Arabic
istathnd.
And
it does
not, strictly speaking,
translate
prostithemi
(to add).
It seems
the use of
ponere
was an
attempt
to make sense
of istathnd
and hence
should be
put
in the same
category
as translations
c, d,
and
e in
my
opening paragraph.
The Latin
apponere (adponere)
would
correspond
more to
the Greek as I
have seen it
used
elsewhere to
translate
prostithemi.17
(On
adponere
as a
translation of
istathnd see
p.
91
below).
Now,
on
to the Arabic
authors themselves.
First,
al-
Farabi. The term
istithnd' occurs
in his work which
deals
with the
subject-matter
of Aristotle's
Prior
Analytics,
although
there is
additional material which is not
found
in
this
work of
Aristotle.18
Although
the term is used in
the Arabic
translation of Aristotle's
De
Interpretatione,
yet
al-Farabi never
uses
it
in
the
commentary-section
of
this work of
Aristotle. 9 The
fact that
al-Farabi uses
other
terms in
commenting
upon
passages
where
istithnd'
occurs
is of
much
help
to us
in
getting
at
his
own under-
standing
and
interpretation
of this term.
Al-Farabi
states
a
conditional
syllogism
as
follows:
If the world
is
created,
then it has a
creator,
but the
world is
created. It
follows
from
this
that
the
world has
a
creator. Then he
says
that the
major premise
is the
statement: If
the
world
is
created,
then
it
has a
creator .
The
first
part
of
the
major premise
is
called the ante-
cedent
(al-muqaddam),
and
this
is
the
statement: If
the
world is
created . The second
part
is
called
the conse-
quent
(al-tdal),
and
this is
the
statement: the
world
has a
creator . The minor
premise,
he
says,
is
a
cate-
gorical
(hamliyya)
statement
to
which
a
particle
of
ex-
ception
(harf
al-istithna';
here
istithna'
must be
taken
as
in
grammar)-which
in
the
above
syllogism
is
the
par-
ticle
but 20-is
attached.
The
minor
premise
is
itself
6
The
Latin
translation
of
the
Logical
part
of
the
Maqdaid
was
edited
and
published
by
Charles
H.
Lohr,
S. J. in
Traditio,
vol.
21,
1965, pp.
223-90.
17
Ammonius,
In
De
Interp.
(A.
Busse)
pp.
165,
173
=
Latin
tr. ed.
by
G.
Verbeke,
Louvain, 1961, pp.
311,
325.
18
This is the work that has been given the title al-
Farabi's
Short
Commentary
on
Aristotle's
Prior
Analyt-
ics
and
translated
by
N.
Rescher. See
Footnote
l(i).
The
Arabic
text
was
edited
by
Mlle.
Mubahat Turker
in
Revue
de
la
Faculte
des
Langues,
d'Histoire,
et
de
Geographie
de
l'Universite
d'Ankara,
vol.
16,
1958.
19
See
Footnote
8(c)
for
complete
title
of
this book.
20
Dr. Nabil
Shehaby
of
McGill
University
has
sug-
gested
that it is
because
the
particle
but
(ldkin)
pre-
89
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Journal
of
the American
Oriental
Society,
92.1
(1972)
one
of two
parts
of the
major
premise,
and it
is
called the
additional
premise (al-mustathndt
:
proslepsis, prosthesis).
Sometimes
it
is
the
antecedent,
sometimes
the
conse-
quent,
which is
postulated
as the
additional
premise.21
Here,
we
only
note that
al-mustathnat,
which is the word
used
to denote
the
minor
premise
of a
conditional
syl-
logism,
is
obviously
the
equivalent
of
the Stoic
proslepsis
(=
prosthesis):
additional
assumption .
For
al-Farabi's
own
understanding
of
the term
we turn to his
com-
mentary
on
the
De
Interpretatione.
Commenting
on
16a9-19
where
Aristotle
says
that
a
singular
term
(al-Farabi:
al-ma'qul
or
al-lafz
al-mufrad)
by
itself has
no
truth-value unless
is
or
is not
is
added,
(ean
me
to einai
e
me
einai
prostethe:
md
lam
yustathnd
ma'ahu
bi-wujudin
aw
ghayri
wujfdin)
al-
Farabi
says:
An
instance of
this
(combination
or
separa-
tion)
is
the word 'man' or
'white'.
For
these
two
are
names,
one
being
the name
of
a
substance,
the other the
name of
an
accident. When
something
which
is
predicated
of
it
or attached to it has not been
added
(as
a
condition,
or
conditioning
factor)
it
(i.e., 'man',
or
'white')
is as
yet
neither true
nor
false .22
He
says (p.
28)
that the
word
goat-stag
is
neither
false nor
true unless
we
add
(as
a
condition:
nashtarit)
that
it
exists or it
does not
exist .
In
commenting
on
17a12,
al-Farabi,
again,
uses
ishtarata
as an
equivalent
of istathnd and
in
explaining
the statement
animal
is
a
walking thing
or
animal
is , he
says
(p.
57,
line
1)
that Aristotle
tells
us
that
'is a
walking
thing'
and
'is'
are
a
condition
(shart)
or
a
predicate
of animal .
So,
that which
is
added
(yustathna)
to
a
singular
term
is
the
predicate
which
is,
in
turn,
the
condition
of the truth-value of
the
statement.
In
17
36,
where
Aristotle discusses
the conditions of contradic-
tion
and
where
istithnd'
is
used to
translate the
Greek
prosdiorismos:
further
condition ,
al-Farabi
under-
stands
istithnd' to
mean condition
(shart)
for
he talks
of the
conditions
(al-shard'it)
of
affirmation
and
nega-
tion
(p. 62).
For
al-Farabi,
therefore,
istithnd'
means
ishtirdt
(or
shart),
a
condition
or
something
added
as
a
condition .
From
this we
can
gather
that al-mustathndt
which
is
used to
denote the
minor
premise
of
a
conditional
syl-
logism
is
so called
because it
is
the
minor
premise
which
conditions
or
determines
both
the conclusion
and
its
quality.
For
if
we
say:
if
A,
then
B
and
stop there,
we
cedes the
minor or the additional
premise
in a conditional
syllogism that the syllogism is called istithnd'i and the
minor
premise
al-mustathndt. While this
suggestion
seems
interesting,
it
does not
help
us
in our translation
of
istithnd'
and,
more
importantly,
istithnd'
occurs
also
in
passages
which
are
not related to
syllogisms.
(See,
e.g.
below,
pp.
91-92.)
21These
statements
are found
on
p. 257,
lines 9-20
of
the
Arabic
text
mentioned in Footnote
18
above.
22
Kutsch
and
Marrow,
op.
cit.
p.
27,
lines 2-4.
have
no
conclusion. But when
we add
(nastathni),
But
A,
or
but
not
B ,
we
get
the conclusion: therefore
B ,
or
therefore not
A
(modus
ponens
and
modus
tollens).
It
may
be surmised
that
the
fact that
al-Farabi
him-
self
never uses istithnd'
in
his
own
explanations indicates,
probably,
that this word
appeared
obscure
to him. His
copious
use of the
word
in
his Prior
Analytics
which
must
post-date
the De
Interpretatione
indicates,
it
seems,
that
by
the time he came to
write
on the
Analytics
the word
istithnd'
had
gained
some
currency
in
the
logical
termi-
nology
of
the
time. We
must
bear
in
mind al-FarabT's
understanding
of
istithnd'
as
ishtirdt
as
we
come
to
dis-
cuss
istithnd'i
propositions
in
Avicenna.
Avicenna,
as
we
know,
has a kind of
syllogism
he
calls
istithnd'1
syllogism.23
He does
not
tell what the word
istithnd' itself
means,
but
on
the
basis of the
examples
that he
gives
there
is
no
denying
that
his istithnd'i
syl-
logisms
are
conditional
(or
hypothetical) syllogisms.
One
of his
examples
is as follows:
If
the
sun has
risen,
then
the
stars
are
obscured;
but
the
sun has
risen;
therefore
the stars
are obscured .
Avicenna
says
that the
gen-
erality
of
logicians
directed their
attention
to
the cate-
gorical [syllogisms]
only,
and considered the
conditional
(shartiyydt)
to be
nothing
but
istithnd'T .24
It
follows
from
this
that
istithnd'z
syllogisms
are,
at
least,
a
species
of
conditional
syllogism.
For
the characterization
of
istithnd'i
syllogisms
as
conditional
syllogisms,
we
turn to
the
evidence
of Nasir
al-Din Tusi
in
his
commentary
on
Avicenna's
al-TanbThat
wa-l-ishdrdt.
Tusi
says:
I
say:
logicians
divide
syllogism
into
what
is
composed
of
categorical
or conditional.
They
characterize the condi-
tional
as
istithnd'iyydt..
.and
the
istithnd'iyydt
is
that
branded
as
the
conditional;
that's all. 25
In
his
commentary
on
Porphyry's Eisagoge,26
com-
menting
on
Porphyry's
statement: But
in
genealogies
they (i.e.,
some
Greek
tribes)
generally
ascend to
one
origin,
such
as
Zeus ,
Ibn
al-Tayyib
says:
The reason
for
his
(i.e.
Porphyry's
addition
(istithnd')
of
(the word)
'generally'
is
because
a
section
of the
Greeks ascend
to
another
father
different
from
Zeus;
he
is
Poseidon .
To translate
istithnd'
in the
above sentence with
ex-
ception
or exclusion
or
choice
would
be
senseless.
Again
commenting
on
Porphyry's
absolutely
(or
23
Avicenna: al-Tanbihdt
wa-l-ishdrdt,
ed.
Mahmud
Shahabi,
pp.
47
ff;
S.
Dunya's
edition
(1960),
vol.
1,
pp. 425 ff. Al-Najdt, Cairo edition, 1938, pp. 32, 50-51.
24Mahmud
Shahabi, op.
cit.,
p.
48;
S.
Dunya,
op.
cit.,
p.
427.
25
S.
Dunya, op.
cit.,
p.
425.
26
Bodleian
M. S.
Marsh
28,
Fol. 43a
The
edition,
trans-
lation
and a
study
of
this
manuscript
of Ibn
al-Tayyib's
commentary
on
Porphyry's Eisagoge
constituted
the
subject
of
my
Ph.D.
thesis
at
Harvard,
completed
in
June,
1969.
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Brief
Communications
simply : haplos)
Ibn
al-Tayyib
has
this to
say (among
other
things):
The word
'absolutely'
is used
in
three
senses:
(a)
in
the
sense of
particularity,
(b)
in
the
sense
of
universality,
and
(c)
in
the
sense
of
preciseness....
As
to
its sense of
preciseness
it
is
like
when
we state
it
without
addition,
(istithnd')
just
as we
say:
man
is
animal
'absolutely',
meaning
that he is not an animal
in
virtue of
something
else. That
which
is
asserted
with
addition
(istithnd')
is
such
as we
way:
If the sun
is
above
the
earth,
the
atmosphere
is
illuminated. 27
What
Ibn
al-Tayyib
is
saying
is that when we
say
A
is
B
we
mean,
surely,
that
A's
being
B is
not
in
virtue
of
something
else;
it
is
not
dependent
or
conditional
upon
any
other
thing, i.e.,
A is
absolutely
B ,
and it
cannot
be
not-B.
On the
other
hand,
when we
say
If
A,
then
B ,
the
statement is not
absolute
or
unconditional,
and
its
definitive conclusion
is,
unlike the
previous
categorical
assertion,
in
virtue of
something
else
(i.e.,
some
other
premise)
being
added
to it.
Al-Ghazali
also
says:
The
syllogism
is divided
into
what is called
categorical
(iqtirdni)
and what is
called
conditional
istithnd') 28.
He
opens
a
chapter
entitled
On istithnt'i
syllogism
by
saying:
The
istithnda'
syl-
logism
is
of two kinds:
(A)
conjunctive
conditional
(shartZ
muttasil),
and
(b) disjunctive
conditional
(shartz
munfasil. 29
Then he
goes
on to
give
examples
of
both
kinds of
the
conditional,
but
apparently
taking
the
meaning
of the
word istithnd'
for
granted,
he makes no
attempt
to
explain
it. Averroes
in
his
Tahafut
al-Tahdfut
uses the
word,
but
he
also
takes its
meaning
for
granted.
Simplicius
(fl.
about
A.D.
500)
wrote
a
commentary
on
the
beginning
of
Euclid's
Elements which
is
preserved
in
al-Fadl Ibn
TIatim
al-Nayrizi's
commentary
also
of the
Elements.
(Al-Nayrizi
died about
A.D.
922).
Simplicius
is
quoted by
al-Nayrizi
as
saying:
As for the
philosopher
'Aghanis',
he
defined
parallel
lines
(al-khutut
al-muta-
waziyah)
as
those
(lines]
in
the same
plane.
Thus he
said:
'Parallel lines
are
those
which
are in
the same
plane,
and when
they
are
eternally30
produced
without
limit
in
both
directions,
the
distance between
them
would al-
ways
be
the
same'. 31
(This
definition
of
parallel
lines
is
27
Ibid.
Fol.
28b.
28
Al-Ghazlil:
Maqdsid
al-Faldsifah, Cairo,
p.
29. This
sentence
was
rendered
in
Latin as:
Syllogismus
autem
dividitur in
categoricum
et
hypotheticum
(Lohr,
op.
cit.,
p. 259).
29
bid.,
p.
40.
30
The
Arabic
word is
dd'iman which
normally
means
permanently
or
eternally .
Perhaps
we could
also
use
infinitely
to
translate
the
Arabic
word
in
the
pres-
ent
context.
31
The
Arabic
text
is
found in
Codex Leidensis
399,
1.
Euclidis
Elementa ex
interpretatione
al-Hadschschadsch
cum
commentariis
al-Narizii,
Arabice
et Latine
ediderunt
....
0.
Besthorn
et
J.
L.
Heiberg,
pt.
i,
fasc.
i, Copen-
hagen,
1893, p.
8.
found
in
Elements,
Book
One,
Definition
23).
To this
al-
Nayrizi
said:
Perhaps
that which
is
added
(ustuthniya
bihi)
in
their
definition,
namely,
that
the two
lines are
in
the
same
plane,
is not
necessary.
For if the
distance
between
them
(i.e.
the two
lines)
is
the
same,
one of
them
would
definitely
not
tend
towards the
other,
because both
are
surely
in
the
same
plane .32
The Latin
translation
of the
latter
passage
reads as
follows:
Et
fortasse
hoc,
quod
appositum
est in
diffinitione,
scilicet,
'in
una
super-
ficie',
non
tantum
est
necessarium,
quoniam,
cum
spa-
tium,
quod
inter
eas,
sit
equale,
et una in
alteram
omnino
non
inclinat,
sequitur,
quod
sint
in
una
superficie. 33
We
must
note
here
that the
Latin
apponere
(to
add)
was
used
by
Gerard to
translate
istathnd.34
Thus
far,
we
know that the
term
istithnd' translates
the
greek
prosthesis
and
prosdiorismos;
it was
translated
by
the
Latin
adponere.
As
such
istithnd'
means addi-
tion ;
and
as
prosthesis
is a
synonym
of
proslepsis,
istithnd'
must also
mean
additional
assumption
(i.e.,
the
minor
premise
of
a
conditional
syllogism
when it
often
appears
in
the form
al-mustathnat;
and
istithnd'i
syllogisms
are
conditional
(or
hypothetical)
syllogisms.
But
the
question
that still
requires
to
be
resolved is
this:
why
was
the
Arabic
istathnd used
to
translate the
Greek
prostithemi,
seeing
that the
dictionary
meanings
(i.e.,
exclusion ,
exception )
of
this Arabic
word
have
nothing
to
do
with
the Greek
it
was
supposed
to
translate?
The
following
suggestions
may
be
offered.
We
would
recall an
earlier
statement
(p.92)
that
repe-
tition
used in
the
Hebrew
translation
for
istithnd',
namely,
hishshanuth,
reflects the
root of
the
Arabic
word
th-n-y
(two, double).
Indeed,
another form of
the
word,
namely,
th-nn-y
(i.e.,
the
second
form ,
as
it
is
called in
English
books
on
Arabic
grammar
and
morphology)
means:
to
repeat ,
to do
twice
(Wehr).
We
know,
of
course,
that
the
minor
premise
(i.e.,
the
additional
assumption:
proslepsis,
prosthesis,
al-mustathndt)
is a
repetition
of
one
part
of
the
major premise.
Now
let us
turn
to
an
interesting
statement made
by
John
Philoponus
in
his
commentary
on
the
Prior
Analyt-
ics.
Philoponus
states a
hypothetical
syllogism
thus:
If it is
day,
then the
sun is
over
the
earth: but
it
is
day,
therefore
the
sun
is
over
the
earth .
He
then
says:
The
32
Ibid., p.
10.
33
Anaritii
in
decem
libros
priores
Elementorum
Euclidis
commentarii,
ex
interpretatione
Ghereradi
Cremonensis..
.Edidit
Maximilianus Curtze, Leipzig,
1899.
Euclidis
Opera
omnia,
ediderunt
J.
L.
Heiberg
et
H.
Menge,
Supplementum, p.
26,
lines
17 ff.
34
1
am
most
grateful
to
Dr.
A.
I.
Sabra
of the
Warburg
Institute,
London,
who
not
only
called
my
attention
to
the
above
passages
in
al-Nayrizi's
text,
but
also
under-
took to
copy
both the
Arabic and
the
Latin
passages
and
sent
them
to
me. He read
both the
first draft
and
then
the
revised version
of
this
article
which
is
an
appendix
to
my
Ph.D.
thesis
referred
to at
Footnote
26
above.
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Journal
of
the American
Oriental
Society,
92.1
(1972)
ournal
of
the American
Oriental
Society,
92.1
(1972)
Peripatetics
call 'but
it
is
day'
the
minor
premise
(metalepsis)
because
it
is
taken
a
second time
(dia
to
metalambanesthai
ek
deuterou),
for
it
was
already
taken
in
the
antecedent
(hegoumenon) 36.
In
al-Tahanawi's
Dictionary
of Technical
Terms ,
we
have the
following
said
of istithnd':
The word
is
(thus)
used
because the
passage
indicates
a
repetition
(takrTr)
of
something
twice
(marratayn),
or it
makes it follow
in
succession. The word
istithnd'
is
[thus]
used
in
a
chapter
on
syllogism,
for its
mention
is
repeated
(yuthanna) again
(marratayn).36
It
seems,
therefore,
that
when
a
translator used
istithnd',
he
was
not
necessarily
using
it in the sense of
exclusion
or
exception ,
but
in another
sense:
that
is,
the
sense of
thand
(or
thanna).
In other
words,
exclusion and
ex-
ception
are
not the
only
meanings
of
istithnd'. Of
course,
to
repeat
is not
the
same
as
to
add ,
but to
repeat
implies
adding, and,
in the context of the condi-
tional
syllogism,
as I have said
before,
what is added
as
the
additional
assumption
is a
repetition
of
a
part
of
the
major premise.
36
John
Philoponus:
In Anal.
Prior
(Wallies),
p. 242,
lines 35
ff.
86Al-Tahanawi:
Kashf
istildhdt
al-Funun,
vol.
1,
Istanbul,
1317, p.
201.
Peripatetics
call 'but
it
is
day'
the
minor
premise
(metalepsis)
because
it
is
taken
a
second time
(dia
to
metalambanesthai
ek
deuterou),
for
it
was
already
taken
in
the
antecedent
(hegoumenon) 36.
In
al-Tahanawi's
Dictionary
of Technical
Terms ,
we
have the
following
said
of istithnd':
The word
is
(thus)
used
because the
passage
indicates
a
repetition
(takrTr)
of
something
twice
(marratayn),
or it
makes it follow
in
succession. The word
istithnd'
is
[thus]
used
in
a
chapter
on
syllogism,
for its
mention
is
repeated
(yuthanna) again
(marratayn).36
It
seems,
therefore,
that
when
a
translator used
istithnd',
he
was
not
necessarily
using
it in the sense of
exclusion
or
exception ,
but
in another
sense:
that
is,
the
sense of
thand
(or
thanna).
In other
words,
exclusion and
ex-
ception
are
not the
only
meanings
of
istithnd'. Of
course,
to
repeat
is not
the
same
as
to
add ,
but to
repeat
implies
adding, and,
in the context of the condi-
tional
syllogism,
as I have said
before,
what is added
as
the
additional
assumption
is a
repetition
of
a
part
of
the
major premise.
36
John
Philoponus:
In Anal.
Prior
(Wallies),
p. 242,
lines 35
ff.
86Al-Tahanawi:
Kashf
istildhdt
al-Funun,
vol.
1,
Istanbul,
1317, p.
201.
Now,
as
to
why
in
some
places
of
the De
Interpretatione
prostithemi
was
translated
by istathnd,
the
following
explanation may
be
given.
In
16a16-19, 6b29,
17a13
Aristotle
says
that
a
single
word
like man
or
goat-stag
has no
truth-value
unless
is
or is-not
is
added.
When is
is
added to
man ,
we have two words which
have
truth-
value:
thus,
the word
man
is doubled
by
the
addition
of is .37 In
16b29
he
says:
But the
single
(mia) syllables
of
'man'
signify
nothing
....
In
double words
(diplois),
as we
said,
a
part
does
signify
... .
The Arabic
th-n-y
corresponds
on all fours
with the Greek
diplos:
two-
fold ,
double
(the
Greek verb
diploo
also
means
to
repeat ):
and
doubling
implies adding.
This could well
have been the reason
why
istathnd
was used to translate
prostithemi,
the
tenth
form istathnd thus
being
taken
in
the
sense
of
th-n-y.38
KWAME GYEKYE
UNIVERSITY
OF GHANA
Now,
as
to
why
in
some
places
of
the De
Interpretatione
prostithemi
was
translated
by istathnd,
the
following
explanation may
be
given.
In
16a16-19, 6b29,
17a13
Aristotle
says
that
a
single
word
like man
or
goat-stag
has no
truth-value
unless
is
or is-not
is
added.
When is
is
added to
man ,
we have two words which
have
truth-
value:
thus,
the word
man
is doubled
by
the
addition
of is .37 In
16b29
he
says:
But the
single
(mia) syllables
of
'man'
signify
nothing
....
In
double words
(diplois),
as we
said,
a
part
does
signify
... .
The Arabic
th-n-y
corresponds
on all fours
with the Greek
diplos:
two-
fold ,
double
(the
Greek verb
diploo
also
means
to
repeat ):
and
doubling
implies adding.
This could well
have been the reason
why
istathnd
was used to translate
prostithemi,
the
tenth
form istathnd thus
being
taken
in
the
sense
of
th-n-y.38
KWAME GYEKYE
UNIVERSITY
OF GHANA
37
Obviously it is not the word 'man' which is actually
doubled,
but the
original single
element
of
the
potential
proposition.
38The Tenth
Form
in
Arabic
grammar
denotes,
also,
the
idea contained
in
the
root verb
(in
this case
the
idea of two
or
being
two).
See
Wright's
Arabic
Grammar,
vol.
1, pp.
44-45.
37
Obviously it is not the word 'man' which is actually
doubled,
but the
original single
element
of
the
potential
proposition.
38The Tenth
Form
in
Arabic
grammar
denotes,
also,
the
idea contained
in
the
root verb
(in
this case
the
idea of two
or
being
two).
See
Wright's
Arabic
Grammar,
vol.
1, pp.
44-45.
Siiulengge
-
suilengge
Mongol
siiilengge,
uiilengge,
name of
a
functionary,
attested as
early
as
the
1550's,
may
well be much older than that. This time factor precludes a borrowing from the Manchu
sulinge
'district
functionary'.
There
is
every
reason
to
believe
that the
Manchu word
derives
from
the
Mongol
sialengge,
which
itself
is
derived
from
the Chinese
expression shou-ling
(b)
'head
and
neck, leader',
and
was
even
re-transcribed
into
Chinese
as
shou-ling-ko.
Siiulengge
-
suilengge
Mongol
siiilengge,
uiilengge,
name of
a
functionary,
attested as
early
as
the
1550's,
may
well be much older than that. This time factor precludes a borrowing from the Manchu
sulinge
'district
functionary'.
There
is
every
reason
to
believe
that the
Manchu word
derives
from
the
Mongol
sialengge,
which
itself
is
derived
from
the Chinese
expression shou-ling
(b)
'head
and
neck, leader',
and
was
even
re-transcribed
into
Chinese
as
shou-ling-ko.
In
this
paper
an
attempt
will
be made to elucidate
the
origin
of the
Mongol
word
siiilengge:
until recent
times
this
term
was used
among
the
Buriat-Mongols,
the
Oyirad
of
Western
Mongolia,
and the
Qalqas,
to
indicate
a
low
ranking
official
in
the
administration;
the
functions
of
this
official
evidently
may
have differed
from time
to
time
or
from one
area to another.
Recently
the
word
seems
to
have
disappeared
from
the
language:
modern
Qalqa
and Buriat
dictionaries,
as
far
as
I
know,
no
longer
list it.
The
word
spelled
siilengge
or
suilengge
in the
written
language
has
been
mentioned
and
explained
by
various
authors.
In Pallas'
days,
the
siilengge
among
the
Volga
Kalmuck
was
responsible
for
a
group
of
forty
families:
Bey
den
Soongaren
wurden
diese
Aufseher
fiber
vierzig,
so
wie
izt
noch
bey
den
Mongolen,
Schuliinga genannt. '
In
this
paper
an
attempt
will
be made to elucidate
the
origin
of the
Mongol
word
siiilengge:
until recent
times
this
term
was used
among
the
Buriat-Mongols,
the
Oyirad
of
Western
Mongolia,
and the
Qalqas,
to
indicate
a
low
ranking
official
in
the
administration;
the
functions
of
this
official
evidently
may
have differed
from time
to
time
or
from one
area to another.
Recently
the
word
seems
to
have
disappeared
from
the
language:
modern
Qalqa
and Buriat
dictionaries,
as
far
as
I
know,
no
longer
list it.
The
word
spelled
siilengge
or
suilengge
in the
written
language
has
been
mentioned
and
explained
by
various
authors.
In Pallas'
days,
the
siilengge
among
the
Volga
Kalmuck
was
responsible
for
a
group
of
forty
families:
Bey
den
Soongaren
wurden
diese
Aufseher
fiber
vierzig,
so
wie
izt
noch
bey
den
Mongolen,
Schuliinga genannt. '
P.
S.
Pallas,
Samlungen
historischer
Nachrichten
.
S.
Pallas,
Samlungen
historischer
Nachrichten
In
the title of a
Buriat
manuscript
dating
from
1877,
the
Russian
word
golova
'head,
headman'
(written
in
Mongol transcription)
is
put
in
apposition
to
siilengge,2
again showing
that
siilengge
was
the
name
of
some offi-
cial
in
the tribal
administration.
B.
Rincen,
discussing
a
Xori-Buriat
text
in
which the term also
appears,
says
nothing
of
its
specific meaning
among
the
Buriat,
but
in a
note
he
explains
that until recent
times
sifilengge
was
a
term in the administration of the lay subjects (sabinar) of
the
Qutuytu
of
Urga.3
From the
Qalqa
Jirum,
however,
In
the title of a
Buriat
manuscript
dating
from
1877,
the
Russian
word
golova
'head,
headman'
(written
in
Mongol transcription)
is
put
in
apposition
to
siilengge,2
again showing
that
siilengge
was
the
name
of
some offi-
cial
in
the tribal
administration.
B.
Rincen,
discussing
a
Xori-Buriat
text
in
which the term also
appears,
says
nothing
of
its
specific meaning
among
the
Buriat,
but
in a
note
he
explains
that until recent
times
sifilengge
was
a
term in the administration of the lay subjects (sabinar) of
the
Qutuytu
of
Urga.3
From the
Qalqa
Jirum,
however,
iuber
die
Mongolischen
Volkerschaften,
I,
St.
Petersburg,
1776,
p.
190.
2
L.
S.
Puckovskii, Mongol'skie
Rukopisi
i
Ksilografy
Instituta
Vostokovedeniya,
I,
Moskva-Leningrad,
1957,
p.
107.
3
B.
Rincen,
Ob odnoi
Xori-Buryatskoi
Rodoslovnoi
iuber
die
Mongolischen
Volkerschaften,
I,
St.
Petersburg,
1776,
p.
190.
2
L.
S.
Puckovskii, Mongol'skie
Rukopisi
i
Ksilografy
Instituta
Vostokovedeniya,
I,
Moskva-Leningrad,
1957,
p.
107.
3
B.
Rincen,
Ob odnoi
Xori-Buryatskoi
Rodoslovnoi
922
