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Aquinas and the Cry of RachelJohn F. X. Knasas

Suffering and Hope ConferenceUniversity of St. Thomas

November 10-13, 2005I examine Jacques Maritains critique of a Thomistic explanation of suffering from his1942 Marquette Aquinas Lecture,St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil.1 In sum, atSummaTheologiae I, 48, 2c, Aquinas argues that God permits evils for the perfection of theuniverse. Evils are the concomitant of corruptible things. And corruptible things belongto the perfection of the created order which requires every grade of goodness. Using theBiblical personage of Rachel, who has lost her children to the soldiers of King Herod,Maritain poignantly observes that Aquinas reason would never satisfy a mother sufferingthe loss of her child. What can be the value of the perfection of the universe incomparison to the loss of a young and innocent human being? And so, according to

Maritain, one must balance 48, 2, with Summa Contra Gentiles III, 112, in whichAquinas describes the rational creature as a person.2 This description means that therational creature is more like a whole than a part thereof. Hence, in the perspective of thehuman as person, Martian concludes that human suffering is an utter anomaly3 that isbetter understood as the unfortunate result of the rational creatures free refusal of divinelove, i.e., as a result of original sin.

In my opinion, neither of Maritains two reasons hold. First,SCG III, 112, never ascribesto humans the exalted sense of person used by Maritain. Rather, Aquinas characterizesthe rational nature as: a principle part (partes principales), closer to a whole(maiorem affinitatem ad totum), closest to existing always (maxime accedunt ad hocquod sint semper).4 Also, the chapter concludes with Aquinas insisting that the rationalcreature is still divinely ordered to the perfection of the universe, the very context of48, 2.5 Finally, at SCG IV, 52, natural and spiritual defects are so much natural defectsfollowing upon matter that they, contraMaritain, are no sure sign of original sin.6

1 Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1942), 5-19. For an indexing of Maritains treatment of evil, see Charles Journet,The Meaning of Evil (New York:P. J . Kenedy and Sons, 1963). J ournet describes Maritains work . . . to be rich and coherent, traditionalyet full of innovation, and containing the most penetrating teaching on evil written in our own times fromthe Christian viewpoint. Ibid., 14.2SCG III, 112, is not cited in St. Thomas and the Problemof Evil but in MaritainsThe Person and theCommon Good(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), 19, n. 8.3

Maritain, St. Thomas and the Problemof Evil, 12.4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, 112; trans. Vernon J. Bourke, Summa Contra Gentiles(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975, vol. 3, pt. I, 116-7, paras. 4, 5, 7 respectively.5 Ibid., Bourke trans., 118, para. 8.6 University of Notre Dame trans. by Charles J. ONeil, vol., 4, 218, para. 2. Aquinas goes on to say thatwith these defects in mind the existence of original sin can be judged with probability enough (satisprobabiliter). Yet a reader would be wrong to understand this characterization to mean that a probablephilosophical argument exists for original sin. Crucial is the arguments understanding of divineprovidence:for every perfection God has contrived a proportionate perfectible. For various reasons areader knows that this understanding of divine providence is not philosophical. First, as mentioned in

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Because Maritains perspective is a bit artificial, the problem of evil is more dramatic forhim. Maritain regards the human person simply from the spiritual side. That arbitraryviewpoint casts the human as a whole such that death is an utter anomaly. But forAquinas our nature genuinely possesses a material side and from that perspective evil is anatural defect. The concept which better summarizes Aquinas thinking about the human

is principle part. The humans materiality makes the human a part of the whole ofcreated nature but the humans rationality gives the human a dignity so that the human isnot a mere part but a principle part.

Would the perspective of a principle part satisfy Rachel as she looks at her slain child?Does it not seem that God still loves the perfection of the universe more than he loves aninnocent child? It seems that Rachel is the better parent.

But Aquinas does not share this view that the parent must preserve the life of the child nomatter what. In hisDe Veritate, 5, 3c, Aquinas remarks that Gods providence is like theprovidence by which a father of a family rules his household in which the common good

has primacy over the good of the individual. Hence, the father must pay more attention towhat is good for the family than to what is good for the individual. This point is a bitterpill to swallow, but I think that we all reluctantly know that it is true. No child can expectparental care to the extent of ruining the entire family.

But some would object that we do not have an analogy here between God and the earthlyfather. Unlike an earthly parent, our divine parent has the resources to careboth for theperfection of the created whole and individual rational creatures at the same time. Thecare of one does not mean the demise of the other. That is true. For example, in the stateof innocence in which Adam and Eve were created, God preserved our first parents fromall physical harm.7 Later God protected the will of Mary, the Blessed Mother, from all sinor fault.8 Also, I suppose that God could continually create food in the bellies of beastsso that they would not devour other animals or humans. Likewise, God could continuallycreated more matter in the universe so that its taking up into the divinely protected higherspecies would not bring the universe to a grinding halt. But the one who proposes all ofthese scenarios fails to realize that though God has done some and could do all of them,they are all supernatural scenarios and so are not things that in our natural condition weare in any position to demand of God or to fault God if they are unrealized. Just as thechild is in no position to demand of the father an assistance that would ruin the family, so

chapter 52 this providence is Aquinas basis for knowing Gods special and supernatural benefaction. Butas pointed out by Aquinas at De Ver. VI, 2c, what is supernatural depends upon Gods gratuity and notupon his justice. Hence the above mentioned providence should beyond philosophical knowledge. Also,

elsewhere Aquinas presents this providence as known by revelation. InS.T. I, 95, 1c, Aquinas again coversthe subjections of chapter 52 but his starting point is the text of Eccles. 7. 30: God made man right. Aquinassays that the subjections are not from nature since they do not remain after sin. Rather, they are asupernatural endowment of grace. Finally, this divine providence was the reason for innocent mansmastership over the animals, clearly a supernatural state. Hence, the penal character of death is argued onlyon a theological basis, and then the argument is probable enough. Unlike Maritain, Aquinas does notseem to look upon death as such an utter anomaly to philosophically known human nature that death andother evils would enable the philosopher to prove original sin.7De Ver. 24, 9c andS.T. I, 97, 1c.8De Ver. 24, 9, ad 2m.

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more palpable by the realization that our natural corruptibility would mean that we haveonly one life to live. For some Thomists the separated soul has no natural means toconduct operations and so would be inert. 12 For other Thomists the separated soul wouldnaturally operate but at such an imperfect level that its life here and now would bebetter.13 This first possibility for the existence of evil is a call to resolutely accept our

being to death and to do good without counting the cost. At this point one could discusssome similarities between Aquinas and Heidegger.

But other possible explanations continue to appear to the philosopher. Evil may beexisting because of an original transgression that took place in an environmentsupernaturally protected from evil. This second explanation is the traditional Judeo-Christian account of Original Sin of which Maritain made much. Spurred by revelation,the philosophical imagination would certainly be capable of grasping the possibility ofthis religious teaching. Nothing in his metaphysical principles forces the philosopher toeliminate Original Sin from the realm of possible events in creation. Original Sin is notlike a square-circle or a mountain heavier than God can lift. Both of these are logically

opposed to having real existence. They not only will not be but also cannot be.The philosophical imagination could also entertain a third possibility for the fact of evil evil may be existing because evil is somehow meant to be a crucible to another andsupernatural life. As mentioned, the disembodied soul has little or no natural means ofoperating. Yet, the philosopher could imagine the Creator supernaturally bringing aboutoperation in the disembodied soul. According to some Thomists with whom I agree, thispossible activity could extend all the way to the level of the Beatific Vision and include aresurrection of the dead.14

In the light of so many possible explanations for the fact of evil, what should be thephilosophers final attitude? The answer is obvious. First, the philosopher should behumble and circumspect. Hence, the philosopher should not push too strongly the abovefirst scenario as it includes the hard truth that this life may be the only one that we haveto live. Second, in the wake of the realization that he lacks the definitive explanation forthe existence of evil, the Thomist philosopher should be open to further information fromreligion. Beside the above possibilities, the philosopher would also be able to discern thepossibility of religion. Characteristic of religion is the claim to have information from anabsolute being about its designs for humans. The Thomist metaphysicians understandingof the deep structure of reality would certainly present this possibility. Reality doescontain a creator who is personal and who possesses the power and knowledge tocommunicate in human history. Moreover, some religions, viz., those in the Judeo-Christian tradition, describe their God in terms strikingly similar to this philosophically

12 Joseph Owens, Soul as Agent in Aquinas,The New Scholasticism48 (1974), 40-72. Also, JosephOwens, Towards a Philosophy of Medieval Studies,The Etienne Gilson Series 9 (Toronto: PontificalInstitute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), 11-13.13 Mary Rousseau, The Natural Meaning of Death in the Summa Theologiae, Proceedings of theAmerican Catholic Philosophical Association52 (1978), 87-95.14 William OConnor,The Natural Desire for God(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1948), 36, andJacques Maritain, The Immortality of Man, eds. Donald and Idella Gallagher, A Maritain Reader(Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1966), 208.

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knowable creator. Has the creator spoken to us in these religions? That is the question towhich Aquinas philosophy brings us. Though no religion can prove its truth as thephilosopher can prove the truth of a creator, some religions can still offer the intellectpowerful motives for credibility. These motives set the remote context for conversion.Hence, not as a philosopher but as a believer, the human will find the explanation of evil.

John F. X. KnasasProfessor

Center for Thomistic StudiesUniversity of St. Thomas

Houston, Texas