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Piracy  processes prior to GoA tr ansit Helge Olsen, SVP Ship Management

OLSEN Prosesser Forut en GoA Transit

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Page 1: OLSEN Prosesser Forut en GoA Transit

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Securing of Odfjell managed ships

67 GoA transits in 2009 with own ships,35 GoA transits with T/C ships

(operated by Odfjell), totally 102 transits.

The formal basis for securing Odfjell managed ships is ourShip Security Plan (SSP) and other related QMS documentation.

Specific situations may at times require additionalmeasures, info or guidelines.These may surface and escalate quickly and weare therefore also using Odfjell CompanySecurity Officer (CSO) security notes tocover such situations.

 –  CSO Notes mainly developed for GoA and Indian Ocean

 –  CSO notes - requirements and recommendations – but• Each ship and Master dif ferent  – and has overr iding

authority 

• Other l ike Far East / West Af ri ca - SSP &Risk Assessment 

These notes are numbered and dated andfiled in the SSP.

CSO SECURITY NOTE  –  No 8

Unit: QD/ Risk Management

To: Odfj el l Managed Shi ps From: Toralf Sørenes CSOC c: O ps , J HM J D L, H O L, A T K, J S, M SI D at e : 3 0. 0 6. 09

Subj.: PIRACY - Gulf of Aden & Somalia - Security Measures& Info

RESTRICTED

1. General

The formal basis for securing our ships is ourShip Security Plan (SSP)and the requirementstherein must be known and followed. Specific situations that requireadditional measuresmay,however, surface and develop quicklyand to cover such situations, wehave established CSO

securitynotes. The formal basis forthese notesare the SSP and theywill benumbered, dated andshall befiled in Chpt4 in the SSRB. Thisnote replacesCSO NoteNo 2 and it appliesfromreceipt so preparationsin relation to equipment etc must bedone without delay. Although some

of the contentsin thisnote are general in relation to protectinga ship against piratesand otherintruders, it mainlycovers piracyin theGulf ofAden (GoA) and eastern Indian Ocean.

Therisk ofsailing in thesepirate infested areasis high and causes concern amongour crewandour management. Themotivation behind the attacks in the abovementioned areas is economicand reportedly negotiations and paymentsare normallycarried out without aggression resulting

in seriousi njuries to crews held hostage. Injuries and also a fatality have, however, beenreported. Both livingconditions fort he crewand time in captivity have also varied significant.Thescope, intensityand successrate ofattacks varyand the main reasons forthis aremost likely

increased navypresence and the Monsoon which peaksin Jan-Feb (NE) and July-Aug(SW -strongest). After a significant increase in attacks and hijackings within GoAlate autumn 2008Odfjell decided to route their ships around Cape of Good Hope. Thefrequency of attacks and

hijackings came down again towardsthe end of 2008 and regular sailingsthrough GoA wereresumed in February 2009 and must be prepared fora new increase in activity when theMonsoon endsin early September. We then sawanotherpeak in attacksand hijackingsin April

2009. Thenumberof successful attackson ships that arewell prepared in the GoAor which sailsoutsidethe boundaries wehave set in the Indian Ocean was, however, still verylow and wearethereforecontinuing ourregular tradein theseareas.

On 22 August 2008, Combined MaritimeForces (CMF)established aMaritime SecurityPatrolArea(MSPA), the “Corridor ”, in the GoA. Theboundarieswerelater adjusted, a “convoy” or

group transit system established and asignificant number ofcoaliti on and national naval vesselsarenow present in the area. Thesevessels havegradually become betterco-ordinated and moreeffective and supportive towards merchant ships and yet, pirate activity continues andcommercial ships aresti ll beingattacked and also seized. It is thereforeimportant to followbest

 practices and makethe vesselsless vulnerable to attacks and boarding.

In thisnote wehave listed the main contact details. Thesemay changeand should thereforeonly

 be used as general guidance. Updated contact, reporting or other relevant details should beobtained from the MarineManager/MSI or BA Chart No 66090 prior to transit. We have alsolisted drills, briefings, equipment and other preventive measures and some of these are

mandatory, othersrecommended. The mandatorymeasurescan onlybe deviated from after

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Piracy Issues - preparations• Activity varies greatly with Monsoon seasons  –  2 peaks

• Sailing restriction divided as per monsoon seasons

• We follow the Maritime Security Centre  –  Horn of Africa

(MSCHOA) reporting/sailing guidance & Best Management

Practise 2 (BMP2)

• Use of Group Transits and National Convoys now equal

•  National convoys in GOA preferred by ships

& customers. Frequency now acceptable,

 but may cause extra off hire

• Group transit support has improved inInternational Recommended Transit

Corridor (IRTC).

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• Passive protection/defence has matured – implementation takes time

 –  Delay boarding as much as possible – GoA

 –  Keep distance Closest Point Approach (CPA) 7 nm to othervessesl/sea targets and AIS off – Indian Ocean

 –  Stay outside no-go areas – Indian Ocean (different requirements)

 –  Use of steam, razor wires, blocking of entrance to accommodationareas/bridge

 –  Consider “Citadel” approach – but needs planning

• Remote operation of 2 water cannons suggested

• No use of private armed guards or arms onboardArmed protection & right to self defence was a hot issue last year andare frequently requested by some Captains. IMO & Flag States vagueon the issue

Pre briefings for worst case – behaviour if hijacked

Piracy Issues - preparations

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Passive protection 1

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Passive protection 2

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Other Issues• Activity spreads south and deeper into the Indian Ocean

• Piracy on the high seas always get high media attention

Action plans onboard and ashore.

• Ship and crew taken hostage need special follow-up.

Stress/concern for Crew/Next of Kin.

There is always a risk of injury if attacked or hijackedLong time in captivity is a burden for most

• Plan for release of the ship

After a time/ransom crew & ships are released “unharmed”

Fuel, supplies and medical support may be needed

• Extra costs

 – Added insurance premiums

 – Crew bonus in ”high risk area”

 – Off-hire, fuel, security teams, deviations, etc

 – Time spent on planning, preparations & extra watch