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prevod

REFORMA REGULATIVE:

PREOSTALI IZAZOVI

Jaime CaruanaBank for International Settlements

Rezime

Uprkos značajnom napretku u ključnim oblastima posle globalne finansijske krize, globalna ekonomija i finansijski sistem ostaju ranjivi na neočekivane šokove. Ostaju značajni izazovi za finansijsku reformu: konzistentna primena već dogovorenih reformi, izgradnja otpornog finansijskog sistema, kompletiranje regulatornog sistema i obezbeđenje adekvatnog nadzora – makroprudencijalnog nadzora i proaktivnije prudencijalne supervizije.

Prevod: Dragoslav Vuković

dvukovic@sbb.rs

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REGULATORY REFORM: REMAINING CHALLENGES

Jaime CaruanaBank for International Settlements

Summary

Despite significant progress in a number of crucial areas since the global financial crisis, the global economy and financial system remain vulnerable to unexpected shocks. There remain important challenges for financial reform: consistent implementation of already agreed reforms, building of a resilient financial system, completing the regulatory system agenda and ensuring adequate oversight – macroprudential oversight and more proactive prudential supervision.

Translation: Dragoslav Vuković

dvukovic@sbb.rs

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Dobro veče. Zadovoljstvo je biti ovde u Luksemburgu. Hvala vam što ste me pozvali i dali priliku da sa svima

vama diskutujem o nekim ključnim preostalim izazovima u programu regulatorne reforme. Kao što vam je poznato, BIS predstavlja forum za saradnju između centralnih banaka i supervizora. Luksemburg je važan finansijski centar, a njegova Centralna banka već dugo aktivno doprinosi radu BIS-a, naročito u ključnim grupama kao što su Bazelski komitet za superviziju banaka i Komitet za globalni finansijski sistem. Na Godišnjoj skupštini u junu, Bord BIS-a je uvažio ovaj dugi doprinos pozivom da Centralna banka postane akcionar BIS-a. Radujemo se ovoj dodatnoj saradnji.

Idućeg meseca je četvrta godišnjica onoga što se generalno smatra početkom finansijske krize, avgusta 2007. godine. A danas, uprkos značajnom napretku u jednom broju ključnih oblasti u globalnoj ekonomiji i finansijskim tržištima, situacija je još uvek daleko od normalne. Rast je nejednak i neizvestan. Neodržive trajektorije javnog duga u jednom broju zemalja stvaraju dodatne rizike koji uzajamno deluju sa preostalim slabostima na finansijskim tržištima. Mada su cene robe nedavno snižene, mnoge su i dalje blizu istorijski najvišim nivoima i pritiskaju opšte nivoe cena naviše. Neke od novih ekonomija počinju da doživljavaju brz rast kredita i sa tim povezane neravnoteže finansijskog sektora. Tako, sve u svemu, uprkos izuzetnim merama koje su preduzete, ekonomija i finansijski sistemi ostaju ranjivi na nepredviđene šokove

i nije smanjena verovatnoća da se jave neki nepovoljni scenariji. To je važna tačka koje se treba setiti kasnije kada diskutujemo o jednom od izazova - reforma naspram oporavka.

Posle finansijske krize, među mnogim merama koje je bilo potrebno preduzeti bio je širok konsenzus za izgradnju jačeg finansijskog sistema i za primenu intenzivnijeg i proaktivnog nadzora. Danas, i pored impresivnog napretka na regulatornoj reformi i većeg usmerenja na primenu, jedan broj izazova predstavlja izgradnja robustnijeg finansijskog sistema na globalno konzistentan način i stvaranje adekvatnih struktura nadzora i procedura. Iako ne treba da gubimo iz vida dostignuća, koja su bila znatna, danas ću se usredsrediti na ove preostale izazove finansijske reforme.

Po mom shvatanju, ti izazovi spadaju u četiri šire grupe:• Prvo, konzistentna primena već dogovorenih

suštinskih reformi.• Drugo, izgradnja otpornog finansijskog

sistema pri datoj još uvek slaboj ekonomiji. Ovo znači sprovesti tranziciju kako treba - kojom brzinom treba da se krećemo prema robustnom sistemu?

• Treće, kompletirati agendu regulatorne reforme. Usredsrediću se na četiri glavna pitanja: sistemski važne finansijske institucije (SIFI), infrastrukture finansijskog tržišta, režimi reorganizovanja i bankarski sistem u senci.

• I četvrto, obezbediti adekvatan nadzor. Ovo ima dva glavna dela: makroprudencijalni nadzor i proaktivnija prudencijalna

supervizija.

Konzistentna primena dogovorenog

Kao što sam rekao, ostvaren je značajan napredak na reformisanju finansijske regulative. Bazel III je ključni regulatorni odgovor na krizu i glavni korak napred prema stvaranju jačeg i sigurnijeg finansijskog sistema. Ali dogovor o Bazelu III samo je prvi korak: naredni korak je isto toliko kritičan i to je primena.

Centralna banka LuksemburgaCentral Bank of Luxembourg

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Good evening. It is a pleasure to be here in Luxembourg. Thank you very much for inviting me and giving me the

opportunity to discuss with all of you some of the key remaining challenges on the regulatory reform agenda. As you know, the BIS is a forum for cooperation among central banks and supervisory authorities. Luxembourg is an important financial centre, and its Central Bank has long been an active contributor to the work of the BIS, especially in key groups such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Committee on the Global Financial System. At the Annual General Meeting in June, the BIS Board recognised this long-standing contribution by inviting the Central Bank to become a shareholder of the BIS. We look forward to this additional collaboration.

Next month is the fourth anniversary of what is generally considered to be the start of the financial crisis, August 2007. And today, despite significant progress in a number of crucial areas, both in the global economy and in the financial markets, the situation is still far from normal. Growth is uneven and uncertain. The unsustainable trajectories of public debt in a number of countries create additional risks that interact with remaining fragilities in financial markets. While commodity prices have retreated recently, many are still close to historically high levels and have put some upward pressure on general price levels. And some emerging economies are starting to witness rapid credit growth and related financial sector imbalances.

So all in all, despite the exceptional measures that have been taken, the economy and financial systems remain vulnerable to unexpected shocks, and the likelihood of some adverse scenarios materialising has not decreased. This is an important point to remember later when we discuss one of the challenges - reform versus recovery.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, among the many measures that needed to be taken, there was widespread consensus for building a stronger financial system, and for implementing more intensive and proactive oversight. Today, while progress on regulatory reform has been impressive, and we are focusing more on implementation, building

a more robust financial system in a globally consistent way and creating adequate oversight structures and procedures pose a number of challenges. While we should not lose sight of the achievements, which have been substantial, today I will focus on these remaining challenges for financial reform.

In my view, these challenges fall into four broad groups: • First, consistently implementing the

substantial reforms already agreed.• Second, building a resilient financial system

given a still weak recovery. This means getting the transition right - how fast should we move to a more robust system?

• Third, completing the regulatory reform agenda. I will focus on four main issues: systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), financial market infrastructures, resolution regimes, and the shadow banking system.

• And fourth, ensuring adequate oversight. This has two main parts: macroprudential oversight, and more proactive prudential supervision.

Consistent implementation of what has been agreed

As I said, there has been significant progress in reforming financial regulation. Basel III is a crucial regulatory response to the crisis and a major step forward towards creating a stronger and safer financial system. But agreeing on Basel III is only a first step: the next step is just as critical, and that is implementation. One of the most important lessons we learned from the crisis is the need for full, timely and consistent implementation and enforcement of rules.

I will not go through the details of Basel III, but let me summarise a few elements that are relevant for consistent implementation and outline what remains to be done.

Better and more capital - ensuring effective loss absorption capacity

As you all know, Basel III raises the level and quality of capital in the system. When the whole Basel III package is implemented, banks’ common equity will need to be at least 7% of risk-weighted assets. This compares to a Basel

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Jedna od najvažnijih lekcija koju smo naučili iz krize je potreba za potpunom, blagovremenom i konzistentnom primenom pravila i njihovom izvršnošću.

Neću zalaziti u detalje Bazela III, ali dozvolite mi da sumiram neke elemente koji su relevantni za konzistentnu primenu i izložim šta ostaje da se uradi.

Bolji i veći kapital - obezbeđenje efektivnog kapaciteta za apsorpciju gubitaka

Kao što znate, Bazel III podiže nivo i kvalitet kapitala u sistemu. Kada se bude primenio celokupan paket Bazela III, običan kapital banaka će morati da bude najmanje 7% od rizikom ponderisane aktive. Ovo se upoređuje sa nivoom običnog kapitala iz Bazela II od 2% - a to je pre nego što se uzmu u obzir izmene u definicijama i ponderima rizika, što čini efektivno povećanje kapitala još većim. Brojka od 7% uključuje amortizer konzervacije kapitala od 2,5%, iz koga se može vući u teškim vremenima. Među poboljšanjima kod obuhvatanja rizika na strani aktive, naročito bih istakao jači tretman rizika povezanih sa sekjuritizacijom i kreditnim linijama za vanrednu situaciju.

Ali šta je sa ostatkom Tier 1 i Tier 2 kapitala, koji iznosi još 3,5% od rizikom ponderisane aktive? Istina je da tokom krize deo propisanog kapitala nije funkcionisao kako je nameravano i nije apsorbovao gubitke. Javni sektor je morao da spasava jedan broj poremećenih banaka ubrizgavanjem kapitala. Ovo je imalo efekat podrške ne samo deponenata već i investitora u instrumente propisanog kapitala. Shodno tome, kapitalni instrumenti Tier 2, uglavnom subordiniran dug, a u nekim slučajevima neakcionarski instrumenti Tier 1 kapitala, nisu asporbovali gubitke u bankama koje bi bankrotirale bez podrške javnog sektora. Nedovoljno efektivan kapital i slabosti okvira za reorganizaciju ostavile su javnim vlastima bolan izbor da prepuste svojim institucijama da bankrotiraju, time dalje razarajući finansijski sistem, ili da ih spasavaju javnim sredstvima, socijalizujući na taj način gubitke i pogoršavajući moralni hazard.

Injekcije kapitala iz javnog sektora potrebne da bi se izbeglo bankrotstvo banke ne treba da zaštite investitore u instrumente propisanog kapitala od apsorbovanja gubitka

koji bi pretrpeli da javni sektor nije odlučio da spasi banku. Da bi se postigao taj cilj, BCBS je dogovorio da svi instrumenti propisanog kapitala treba da u svojim uslovima obuhvate mehanizam koji obezbeđuje da oni preuzimaju rizik u momentu kada institucija postane neodrživa, uključujući situacije kada javni sektor nastupi da rekapitalizuje banku koja bi inače bankrotirala. Konkretno, sav neakcionarski kapital Tier 1 i sav Tier 2 kapital treba da se konvertuju u običan kapital čim vlasti daju injekciju kapitala da se firma spasi. To treba da ohrabri držaoce ovih instrumenata da ocenjuju rizik bankrotiranja i da im određuju cenu u skladu sa tim, pružajući dodatni izvor tržišne discipline i smanjujući moralni hazard.

Rešavanje sistemskog rizikaŽeleo bih da prikažem elemente Bazela III

čiji je cilj da se rešava sistemski rizik u svoje dve dimenzije: vremenska dimenzija, ublažavanje procikličnosti, i poprečna dimenzija, ublažavanje međupovezanosti i rizika zaraze. Ovu drugu dimenziju ću obraditi kada budem govorio o SIFI. Dozvolite mi da sada ukratko pomenem kontraciklično pravilo Bazela III. Supervizori će biti u mogućnosti da nametnu kontraciklični amortizer svom bankarskom sistemu kada bude izgledalo da kreditni rast izmiče kontroli. Supervizori će moći da primene ovo podjednako na strane i domaće banke. Pored toga, koeficijent leveridža ograničiće mogućnost da banke akumuliraju leveridž, čak i kada ga koriste za kupovinu pretpostavljeno sigurne aktive.

Upravljanje likvidnošćuTreći element koji nije bio obuhvaćen u

Bazelu II je likvidnost. Pre krize, mnoge banke su gledale na likvidnost kao na besplatnu robu. Nisu zamišljale da čitava tržišta mogu da se zamrznu, niti su pretpostavljale produženi period nelikvidnosti. Kada je kriza izbila, centralne banke su bile primorane da nastupe i pruže novčanim tržištima i bankama iznose likvidnosti bez presedana da bi pomogle stabilizovanje tržišta. Kriza je otrkila jedan broj nedostataka u upravljanju likvidnošću u bankama i profilima rizika. Bazel III pokušava da reši ove nedostatke.

Ovo je prvi put da su postavljena detaljna globalna pravila likvidnosti, tako da nemamo

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II level of 2% common equity - and that’s before taking account of the changes to definitions and risk weights, which make the effective increase in capital all the greater. The 7% figure includes a 2.5% capital conservation buffer, which is designed to be drawn on in difficult times. And among the improvements in capturing risk on the assets side, I would especially point to the stronger treatment of risks related to securitisation and contingent credit lines.

But what about the rest of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, which amounts to another 3.5% of risk-weighted assets? The truth is that during the crisis some of the regulatory capital did not work as intended and did not absorb losses. A number of distressed banks had to be rescued by the public sector injecting capital. This had the effect of supporting not only depositors but also the investors in regulatory capital instruments. Consequently, Tier 2 capital instruments, mainly subordinated debt, and in some cases non-common equity Tier 1 instruments, did not absorb losses incurred by banks that would have failed without public sector support. Insufficient effective capital and the weakness of resolution frameworks left public authorities the painful choice of either letting their institutions fail, thereby further disrupting the financial system, or rescuing them with public funds, thereby socialising the losses and worsening moral hazard.

Public sector injection of capital needed to avoid the failure of a bank should not protect investors in regulatory capital instruments from absorbing the loss that they would have incurred had the public sector not chosen to rescue the bank. To achieve this objective, the BCBS has agreed that all regulatory capital instruments should include a mechanism in their terms and conditions that ensures they will take a loss at the point when an institution becomes non-viable, including in situations where the public sector steps in to recapitalise a bank that would otherwise fail. Specifically, all non-common equity Tier 1 capital, and all Tier 2 capital, should convert to common equity as soon as authorities make a capital injection to save the firm. This should encourage the holders of these instruments to assess the risk of failure and price them accordingly, providing an additional source of market discipline and

reducing moral hazard.

Addressing systemic risk I would also highlight the elements of Basel

III that are intended to address systemic risk in its two dimensions: the time dimension, mitigating procyclicality, and the cross-sectional dimension, mitigating interconnection and contagion risk. I will address the latter dimension when I talk about SIFIs. Here, let me briefly mention the countercyclical rule of Basel III. Supervisors will be able to impose a countercyclical buffer on their banking system when credit growth seems to be getting out of hand. They will be able to apply this equally to foreign and domestic banks. Additionally, a leverage ratio will limit banks’ ability to accumulate leverage, even if they are using it to purchase supposedly safe assets.

Liquidity management The third element that was not treated in

Basel II was liquidity. Before the crisis, many banks saw liquidity as a free good. They did not imagine that entire markets could freeze up, nor did they anticipate an extended period of illiquidity. When the crisis erupted, central banks were forced to step in and provide money markets and banks with unprecedented amounts of liquidity to help stabilise the market. The crisis exposed a number of deficiencies in banks’ liquidity risk management and risk profiles. Basel III tries to address these deficiencies.

This is the first time there have been detailed global liquidity rules, we do not have the same experience and high-quality data as we do for capital, and a number of areas which require careful potential impact assessment were identified. For these reasons, the Committee agreed to take a measured approach in adopting the standards in 2015 and 2018, and will assess the impact during an observation period. This may result in modification of some of the liquidity standards, if the Committee’s assessments yield compelling evidence and analysis to support it.

The Committee has begun studying any potential unintended impacts of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR), particularly as they relate to

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ista iskustva i visoko kvalitetne podatke kao što ih imamo za kapital. Identifikovan je jedan broj oblasti koje zahtevaju pažljivo ocenjivanje potencijalnog uticaja. Iz tih razloga, Komitet je prihvatio da primeni pažljiv pristup kod usvajanja standarda 2015. i 2018. godine tako što će ocenjivati uticaj tokom perioda posmatranja. To može dovesti do modifikacije nekih standarda likvidnosti, ako ocenjivanje Komiteta daje podatke i analizu koji to podržavaju.

Komitet je počeo da proučava potencijalne nenameravane uticaje koeficijenta pokrića likvidnosti (LCR) i koeficijenta neto stabilnog finansiranja (NSFR), naročito njihov odnos sa operacijama centralne banke, novčanim tržištima i širim finansijskim sistemom. U tom cilju, Komitet već evaluira ova i druga pitanja likvidnosti, u nekim slučajevima u bliskoj saradnji sa drugim grupama baziranim u BIS-u, kao što su Komitet za globalni finansijski sistem i Komitet za sisteme plaćanja i saldiranja, kao i u bliskoj konsultaiciji sa industrijom.

Suština je da Bazel III predstavlja znatno obuhvatniji paket koji uključuje lekcije iz ove kompleksne krize. Potpuna, konzistentna i blagovremena primena u nacionalnim jurisdikcijama sada se nalazi na vrhu agende Bazelskog komiteta. U važnom narednom koraku, kroz rad svoje Radne grupe za primenu standarda, Komitet će sprovoditi ekspertske i tematske preglede da bi pomogao da se obezbedi blagovremena i konzistentna primena i oceni da li standardi proizvode željene rezultate. Sa svoje strane, Bord za finansijsku stabilnost (FSB) radi na unapređenju primene globalnih standarda kroz svoj proces ekspertskih pregleda. Jedan element koji ekspertski pregledi mogu da sagledavaju jesu razlike u izračunavanju rizikom ponderisane aktive u internim modelima.

Poslednje što bih

pomenuo u vezi sa primenom jeste da ne treba da zaboravimo da standardi Bazela III kolektivno predstavljaju skup minimalnih zahteva. Dogovoreni su na osnovu takvog shvatanja i nisu razvijeni kao repertoar opcija. Ako bi jurisdikcije odabrale samo neke od elemenata Bazela III, to bi razvodnilo efektivnost okvira. Nasuprot tome, jedna od lekcija iz krize je da su jurisdikcije sa višim kapitalnim zahtevima i aktivnijom ili, ako hoćete, nametljivom supervizijom imale bolju performansu od jurisdikcija koje su favorizovale superviziju "lakog dodira". Neke jurisdikcije su već iznad kapitalnog standarda, a druge mogu da odluče o uvođenju viših standarda. Zato mi dozvolite da naglasim ponovo da je Bazel III minimum i da je njegov kalendar takođe minimum.

Uneti snagu u još uvek krhki oporavak

Dozvolite mi da pređem na drugi skup izazova. Mnogo je urađeno na obezbeđenju izgradnje otpornijeg finansijskog sistema. Ali kako treba da izgleda ispravna tranzicija?

Tokom debata pre objavljivanja Bazela III i posle toga, neki su izražavali zabrinutost da će jačanje kapitala banaka, zajedno sa drugim merama, biti štetno po rast i da bi moglo da odloži oporavak. Ova rasprava je ponovo

izbila u diskusijama o tome kako rešiti SIFI i u kontekstu slabljenja osećaja urgentnosti u pogledu reforme. Ti rizici moraju da se analiziraju da bi se izbegla mogućnost da se kritični elementi finansijske reforme odlažu, slabe i ne ostvaruju u potpunosti.

Od početka, ovo pitanje su donosioci politike uzeli vrlo ozbiljno i pažljivo ga analizirali. Dve studije obavljene prošle godine pod okriljem BIS-a našle su da će rast troškova, u tranziciji i u stabilnom

BIS BazelBIS Basel

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central bank operations, money markets and the broader financial system. To that end, the Committee is already evaluating these and other liquidity topics, in some cases in close cooperation with other BIS-based groups, such as the Committee on the Global Financial System and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, and in close consultation with the industry.

The bottom line is that Basel III is a much more comprehensive package that incorporates the lessons from this complex crisis. Full, consistent and timely implementation by national jurisdictions is now at the top of the Basel Committee’s agenda. In an important next step, through the work of its Standards Implementation Group, the Committee will conduct peer reviews and thematic reviews to help ensure timely and consistent implementation and to assess whether the standards are producing the desired results. For its part, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is working to promote implementation of global standards through its peer review process. One element that the peer reviews may look at is differences in the calculation of risk-weighted assets in the internal models.

To come to my last point on implementation, we should not forget that the Basel III standards collectively represent a set of minimum requirements. They were agreed based on this understanding and were not developed as a menu of options. If jurisdictions were to choose only certain elements of Basel III, it would dilute the effectiveness of the framework. On the contrary, one of the lessons of the crisis is that jurisdictions with higher capital requirements and more active or, if you want, more intrusive supervision performed better than those which favoured “light-touch” supervision. Some jurisdictions are already above the capital standard and others may decide to impose higher standards. So let me emphasise once again that Basel III is a minimum, and that its calendar is also a minimum.

Building strength in a still fragile recovery

Let me now turn to the second set of challenges. A lot has been done to ensure the

building of a more resilient financial system. But what should be the right transition?

Both during the debate before the publication of Basel III and since, some have expressed concerns that strengthening bank capital, together with other measures, would be harmful to growth and could delay recovery. This discussion has emerged again in the discussion on how to address SIFIs, and in the context of a waning sense of urgency regarding reform. These risks need to be analysed to avoid the possibility that critical elements of financial reform could be delayed, weakened or not fully carried through.

From the beginning, this question has been taken very seriously by policymakers, and has been analysed carefully. Two studies conducted last year under the auspices of the BIS found that the growth costs, both in the transition and in the steady state, are likely to be modest, and far outweighed by the benefits.

The Macroeconomic Assessment Group, or MAG, a group of modelling experts formed by the FSB and the Basel Committee, concluded that, while banks may attempt to raise credit spreads and to reduce lending growth in the transition to higher capital levels, this is likely to have a modest impact on the real economy. Their analysis made use of a suite of models, including both established forecasting models and more innovative techniques. And while their results differed - economists always differ - almost all of them pointed in the same direction. The MAG group found that the impact of higher credit spreads and lower loan growth will be rather small, in the order of a 3 to 5 basis point reduction in annual growth rates, during the time that the extra capital is being built up. Once the banks have completed their adjustment, growth accelerates until it is back to its trend path. The longer the transition period, the lower the costs - this is because banks will have more time to accumulate capital through retained earnings, and will have less need to cut back on their lending or to raise costly new capital on the public market.

So far at least, predictions that the transition to stronger capital requirements would have a significant impact on growth have not been borne out. Many banks have increased their capital ratios ahead of schedule, without a

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stanju, verovatno biti skroman i da će ga daleko nadmašiti benefiti.

Grupa za makroekonomsko ocenjivanje, ili MAG, grupa eksperata za modeliranje koju su osnovali FSB i Bazelski komitet, zaključila je da, iako u toku tranzicije ka višim nivoima kapitala banke mogu da pokušaju da podignu kreditne spredove i smanje rast kredita, to verovatno može imati skroman uticaj na realnu ekonomiju. Njihova analiza koristila je niz modela, uključujući etablirane modele za prognoziranje i inovativnije tehnike. Mada su se njihovi rezultati razlikovali - ekonomisti se nekad ne slažu - skoro svi su bili usmereni u jednom pravcu. Grupa MAG je našla da uticaj viših kreditnih spredova i niži rast kredita tokom perioda u kome se izdvaja ekstra kapital može biti prilično mali, reda veličine 3 do 5 baznih poena smanjenja godišnjih stopa rasta. Kada banke završe svoje prilagođavanje, rast se ubrzava dok ne bude ponovo na svojoj putanji. Što je duži tranzicioni period, niži su troškovi - to je zbog toga što će banke imati više vremena da akumuliraju kapital kroz zadržani prihod i manju potrebu za smanjenjem kreditiranja ili za mobilisanjem novog skupog kapitala na javnom tržištu.

Do sada barem, predviđanja da će tranzicija ka jačim kapitalnim zahtevima imati značajan uticaj na rast nisu se ostvarila. Mnoge banke su povećale svoje kapitalne koeficijente pre roka bez vidljivog uticaja na kreditne spredove ili na pooštravanje kreditnih uslova.

Dok je MAG imao zadatak da ispita tranziciona pitanja, posebna grupa je istraživala troškove i benefite zahteva na duži rok. Ta Grupa za dugoročni uticaj na ekonomiju (LEI) našla je da dodatni trajni troškovi BDP-a treba da budu mali, dok će benefiti smanjenja rizika od krize biti znatni. Troškovi će biti niski zbog toga što će, kako nas ekonomska teorija uči, eventualni investitori uvažavati da su dobro kapitalizovane banke manje rizične i prihvatati niži prinos na kapital. To ograničava bilo koji dugoročni rast kreditnih spredova. U isto vreme, potencijalni benefiti će se dobijati od smanjenja rizika finansijske krize i rezultirajućih trajnih gubitaka u BDP-u. Grupa LEI je našla da je raspon kapitalnih koeficijenata u kojima benefiti premašaju troškove prilično širok. Predloženi minimum Bazela III od 7% na nižem

je kraju ovih raspona - kapitalni koeficijenti mogu da odu nešto iznad ovog nivoa pre nego što troškovi počnu da prevazilaze benefite.

Analiza MAG-a i LEI dala je kalibraciju kapitalnih amortizera i tranzicione putanje po Bazelu III. Supervizori su odlučili da postave propisane minimume znatno iznad onog gde su sada, ali su dozvolili dug tranzicioni period da bi se izbegli troškovi prilagođavanja iz banaka koje pokušavaju da postignu više koeficijenta kapitala suviše brzo.

Neki posmatrači su sugerirali da u postojećem globalnom okruženju regulatorna reforma treba da se povuče da bi se rešavali urgentniji problemi kao što su slab globalni rast, rizici od inflacije i suvereni rizici. Nasuprot tome, sugerirao bih da upornost ranjivosti i izgledi za dalja pogoršanja govore u prilog unosa snage sada. Umesto korišćenja maksimalno dogovorenog vremena za postizanje minimalne snage kapitala, gde je to moguće, vlasti i banke treba da idu brže i dalje.

Snažan oporavak zavisi od postojanja sigurnog finansijskog sistema. Privreda i domaćinstva neće obnoviti poverenje da planiraju, investiraju i inoviraju dok ne budu uvereni da finansijski sistem nije izložen riziku sledeće krize.

Završetak agende regulatorne reforme

Moja treća tačka jeste da treba da uradimo više na smanjenju verovatnoće i oštrine finansijskih kriza. Kao što sam rekao na početku, izuzetan napredak je već ostvaren i agenda finansijske reforme se kretala napred neverovatnom brzinom uz postizanje sporazuma o Bazelu III. Banke su već znatno povećale svoju kapitalnu bazu. To nisu mala dostignuća i nijedno od njih nije bilo izvesno pre godinu dana.

Ali potrebno je uradi više na završetku agende regulatorne reforme. Bazelski proces, naročito FSB i razni povezani donosioci standarda, kreće se punom brzinom uz podršku BIS-a da se jača finansijska regulativa u mnogim oblastima, naročito u vezi sa SIFI, infrastrukturom tržišta, režimima reorganizacije i bankama u senci.

Okvir za SIFIDozvolite mi da počnem sa sistemski

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noticeable impact on lending spreads or a tightening of lending terms.

While the MAG was tasked with examining transitional issues, a separate group studied the costs and benefits of the requirements over the long run. This long-term economic impact (LEI) group found that additional permanent GDP costs should be small, while the benefits of reducing crisis risks will be substantial. The costs will be low because, as economic theory teaches, eventually investors will recognise that well capitalised banks are less risky, and will demand a lower return on equity. This limits any long-term rise in credit spreads. At the same time, potential benefits will be gained from reducing the risk of financial crises and the resulting permanent losses to GDP. The LEI group found that the range of capital ratios at which the benefits exceed the costs is quite wide. The proposed Basel III minimum of 7% is at the lower end of this range - capital ratios could go quite a bit above this level before the costs start to exceed the benefits.

The MAG and LEI analysis informed the calibration of the capital buffers and the transition paths under Basel III. Supervisors chose to set the regulatory minima at levels substantially above where they are now, but they allowed a lengthy transition period to avoid the adjustment costs from banks trying to achieve higher capital ratios too quickly.

Some observers have suggested that, in the current global environment, regulatory reform should take a back seat to addressing more immediate concerns, such as weak global growth, inflation risks and sovereign risks. On the contrary, I would suggest that the persistence of vulnerabilities and the prospect of further setbacks argue in favour of building strength now. Instead of taking the maximum agreed time to achieve the minimum capital strength, where possible, authorities and banks ought to go faster and further.

A sound recovery is contingent on having a secure financial system. Businesses and households will not regain the confidence to plan, to invest and to innovate until they have been reassured that the financial system is not at risk of another crisis.

Completing the regulatory reform agenda

My third point is that we need to do more to reduce both the probability and the severity of financial crises. As I said at the outset, tremendous progress has been already made, and the financial reform agenda has moved forward incredibly rapidly with the agreement reached on Basel III. Banks have already increased their capital base significantly. These are no mean achievements, and not one of them was assured just a year ago.

But more needs to be done to complete the regulatory reform agenda. The Basel Process, in particular the FSB and the various associated standard setters, is moving full speed with the support of the BIS to enhance financial regulation in many areas, especially concerning SIFIs, market infrastructure, resolution regimes and shadow banking.

The SIFI frameworkLet me start with SIFIs. The strengthening of

capital and liquidity that will take place under Basel III is an important and necessary part of the regulatory agenda. But it is not sufficient to address the negative externalities posed by SIFIs in general and, in particular, to protect the wider financial system from the spillover risks stemming from those institutions that are systemically important at the global level (the “G-SIFIs”). The rationale for adopting additional measures, including higher loss absorption capacity for G-SIFIs, is based on the negative cross-border externalities they create and which current regulatory policies do not fully address.

The framework for SIFIs being developed by the FSB - and by the Basel Committee for those SIFIs that are banks (called global systemically important banks, or G-SIBs) - comprises three main components: greater loss absorbency, more intense supervision and stronger resolution. These complement each other, and aim at a common set of objectives.

We know that the distress or failure of certain institutions has a greater impact on the system than the distress of others. So we want to do more to reduce the probability of such a failure, by insisting that these institutions

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značajnim finansijskim institucijama - SIFI. Jačanje kapitala i likvidnosti koje će se odvijati po Bazelu III važan je i neophodan deo agende regulatora. Ali nije dovoljno baviti se negativnim eksternalijama koje predstavljaju SIFI generalno i, konkretno, zaštititi širi finansijski sistem od rizika prelivanja koji proizilaze iz tih institucija koji su sistemski značajne na globalnom nivou ("G-SIFI"). Razlog za usvajanje dodatnih mera, uključujući veći kapacitet apsorpcije gubitaka za SIFI, zasniva se na negativnim prekograničnim eksteralijama koje one stvaraju i koje sadašnja politika regulatora ne pokriva u potpunosti.

Okvir za SIFI koji razvijaju FSB - i Bazelski komitet za one SIFI koje su banke (nazvane globalne sistemski značajne banke, ili G-SIB) - obuhvata tri glavne komponente: veću apsorpciju gubitaka, intenzivniju superviziju i snažniju reorganizaciju. Ove komponente dopunjuju jedna drugu i usmerene su na zajednički skup ciljeva. Znamo da poremećaj i bankrotstvo izvesnih institucija imaju veći uticaj na sistem od poremećaja drugih institucija. Zato želimo da učinimo više da bismo umanjili verovatnoću takvih bankrotstava insistiranjem na tome da te institucije imaju više kapitala za apsorbovanje gubitaka i jačanjem sposobnosti supervizora da na vreme uočavaju potencijalne probleme. Dopunjujući to mogućnošću da se zatvori ili restrukturira takva institucija bez uzrokovanja ekscesnog poremećaja ostatka finansijskog sistema, čak i kada njene aktivnosti prelaze nacionalne granice, želimo da učinimo više da bismo smanjili uticaj poremećaja ili bankrotstva SIFI. Želimo da razvijemo okvir koji

umanjuje verovatnoću uticaja bankrotstva SIFI bez povećanja moralnog hazarda ili davanja implicitne subvencije po osnovu "suviše velika da bi propala" bankama koje su predmet okvira.

Grupa guvernera i šefova supervizije, nadzornog tela Bazelskog komiteta na dan 25. juna 2011. godine već je dogovorila specifične mere za G-SIB. To predstavlja važan korak napred u SIFI agendi. Konsultativni dokument biće objavljen krajem jula 2011. godine posle diskusije sa FSB, koordinatorom ukupnog skupa mera za smanjenje moralnog hazarda koje predstavljaju sve G-SIFI, bilo da su banke ili ne.

U Sporazumu o G-SIB nalaze se sledeći važni elementi:• Metodologija za ocenjivanje sistemskog

značaja G-SIB koja sadrži pristup zasnovan na indikatorima i obuhvata pet kategorija: veličinu, složenost, prekograničnu aktivnost, koliko je institucija povezana sa drugim igračima u sistemu i da li institucija pruža jedinstvenu i neophodnu finansijsku aktivnost.

• Dodatni zahtevi za apsorbovanje gubitaka koji će se ispunjavati progresivnim zahtevom za običnim kapitalom Tier 1 (CET1) u rasponu od 1% do 2,5%, zavisno od sistemskog značaja banke. Plus dodatno terećenje od 1% da bi postojala destimulacija za banke koje se suočavaju sa najvišim terećenjem da značajno povećavaju svoj globalni sistemski značaj.

• Uvešće se viši zahtevi za apsorpciju gubitaka paralelno sa amortizerima Bazela III za

konzervaciju kapitala i kontracikličnost, tj. između 1. januara 2016. i kraja 2018. godine, sa stupanjem na snagu 1. januara 2019. godine.• Konačni element bilo je korišćenje instrumenata kapitala za vanaredne situacije, takozvanih coco. Sporazum će nastaviti da revidira ulogu coco-a kao mehanizma za pružanje dodatne apsorpcije gubitaka i podržaće korišćenje kapitala za

Izuzetan napredak je već ostvaren i agenda finansijske reforme se kretala napred neverovatnom brzinom uz postizanje sporazuma o Bazelu III. Banke su već znatno povećale svoju kapitalnu bazu. To nisu mala dostignuća i nijedno od njih nije bilo izvesno pre godinu dana.

Tremendous progress has been already made, and the financial reform agenda has moved forward incredibly rapidly with the agreement reached on Basel III. Banks have already increased their capital base significantly. These are no mean achievements, and not one of them was assured just a year ago.

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have more capital to absorb losses and by strengthening the ability of supervisors to spot potential problems early. Complementing this, we want to do more to reduce the impact of a SIFI’s distress or failure, by making it possible to close or restructure such an institution without causing excessive disruption to the rest of the financial system, even if its activities cross national borders. And we want to develop a framework that reduces the probability and impact of a SIFI’s failure without increasing moral hazard or providing an implicit too-big-to-fail subsidy to the banks that are subject to the framework.

On 25 June 2011, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee, already agreed on specific measures for G-SIBs. This represents an important step forward on the SIFI agenda. A consultative document will be issued around the end of July 2011 after discussion by the FSB, which is coordinating the overall set of measures to reduce the moral hazard posed by all G-SIFIs, whether they are banks or not.

The G-SIB agreement contains important elements:• The methodology for assessing the systemic

importance of G-SIBs is based on an indicator-based approach and comprises five broad categories: size, complexity, cross-border activity, how interconnected the institution is with other players in the system, and whether the institution provides a unique and necessary financial activity.

• The additional loss absorbency requirements are to be met with a progressive Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital requirement ranging from 1% to 2.5%, depending on a bank’s systemic importance. Plus an additional 1% surcharge to provide a disincentive for banks facing the highest charge to increase materially their global systemic importance.

• The higher loss absorbency requirements will be introduced in parallel with the Basel III capital conservation and countercyclical buffers, ie between 1 January 2016 and year-end 2018, becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019.

• The final element was the use of contingent capital instruments, the so-called cocos.

The agreement was to continue to review the role of cocos as vehicles for providing additional loss absorbency and to support the use of contingent capital to meet higher national loss absorbency requirements than the global minimum, as “high-trigger” contingent capital could help absorb losses on a going-concern basis.The choice among the different instruments

is determined by how they meet the objectives stated above relating to the probability-impact of failure, cost-effectiveness and the right incentives to bank management. So-called “early-trigger” or “high-trigger” cocos, which convert to common equity well before a bank has become non-viable, seem to work better in this respect. They can provide a measure of market discipline, since market participants will be keen to price them to reflect the forward-looking risk that a bank will get into trouble. At the same time, it is not clear that they are more cost-effective or provide better signals than conventional common equity. “Late-trigger” cocos, which convert when a firm is no longer viable, are better understood in the context of strengthening resolution, which I will come back to in a moment.

I should emphasise that this is just the global framework, which is to be applied to the world’s largest banks. A number of countries are likely to supplement these rules with additional loss absorbency requirements and other rules applicable to banks which may not be systemic on a global scale, but are systemic within their national financial systems.

Finally, I should note that, while most of the recent discussions have related to systemically important banks, there are other financial institutions that, although different in nature, are potentially systemic, such as insurance companies, asset managers and providers of market infrastructure. Discussions on how to strengthen the regulation and supervision of these entities are ongoing. But the underlying principle is the same: that the risks potentially posed by these institutions to the broader financial system call for more intensive supervision and for measures to reduce both the probability and impact of distress or failure.

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svaku eventualnost za ispunjenje viših nacionalnih zahteva za apsorpcijom od globalnog minimuma, jer kapital za svaku eventualnost sa "visokim okidačem" može da pomogne apsorbovanje gubitaka na osnovu "going concern".Izbor između raznih instrumenata određen

je time u kojoj meri oni ispunjavaju ciljeve navedene napred u pogledu verovatnoće bankrotstva, troškovne efikasnosti i prave stimulacije za menadžment banke. Takozvani coco "rani okidači" ili "visoki okidači", koji se konvertuju u običan kapital pre nego što banka postane neodrživa, izgleda da dejstvuju bolje u tom smislu. Oni mogu da pruže meru tržišne discipline, jer će učesnici na tržištu biti zainteresovani da im određuju cenu koja odražava budući rizik da banka uđe u poteškoće. U isto vreme, nije jasno da li su oni u većoj meri troškovno efikasni ili da li pružaju bolje signale od konvencionalnog običnog kapitala. Coco sa "kasnim okidačima", koji se konvertuju kada firma više nije održiva, bolje se shvataju u kontekstu jačanja reorganizacije, na šta ću se vratiti za koji trenutak.

Treba da naglasim da je ovo samo globalni okvir, koji će se primenjivati na najveće banke u svetu. Jedan broj zemalja će verovatno dopuniti ova pravila dodatnim zahtevima za apsorpciju gubitaka i drugim pravilima primenljivim na banke koje ne moraju da budu sistemske na globalnom planu, ali su sistemske unutar nacionalnih finansijskih sistema.

Najzad, treba da napomenem da, mada su se nedavne diskusije odnosile na sistemski važne banke, postoje druge finansijske institucije koje su, mada različite prirode, sistemske, kao što su osiguravajuća društva, menadžeri aktive i provajderi infrastrukture tržišta. Diskusije o tome kako jačati regulativu i superviziju tih subjekata su u toku. Ali osnovni princip je isti: rizici koje potencijalno predstavljaju te institucije širem finansijskom sistemu zahteva intenzivniju superviziju i mere za smanjenje verovatnoće i uticaja poremećaja ili bankrotstva.

Uloga infrastruktura finansijskih tržištaDrugo značajno pitanje odnosi se na rizike

koje predstavlja obavljanje transakcija na finansijskim tržištima, koje, kao što znate, mogu da idu preko organizovanih berzi ili izvan berze

(OTC). Saldiranje se tipično obavlja preko infrastruktura finansijskih tržišta kao što su veliki platni sistemi, sistemi za saldiranje hartija od vrednosti i centralni partneri (CCP).

Način na koji su koncipirane infrastrukture tržišta i kako funkcionišu ima značajne implikacije za finansijsku stabilnost jer mogu da deluju kao kanal kroz koji poremećaj može da se širi među učesnicima na tržištu. Otuda, ove infrastrukture mogu da služe kao značajna sredstva za ublažavanje rizika koji nastaju iz međupovezanosti učesnika na tržištu i mogu da umanje zarazu rizikom. Finansijska kriza je otkrila zapanjujuću slabost u načinu na koji su značajni OTC derivati bili procesovani u post-trgovinskoj fazi. Mnoge od tih transakcija bile su neadekvatno prikazane i bilateralne izloženosti između partnera bile su nedovoljno kolateralizovane.

U takvoj situaciji, vlasti širom sveta zalažu se za dve značajne promene u post-trgovinskoj infrastrukturi OTC derivata. Obe treba da se primene do kraja 2012. godine.

Prvo, OTC derivati će morati da se prijavljuju trgovinskom repozitorijumu (TR), koji je elektronski registar u kome se čuvaju svi relevantni detalji transakcije sa OTC derivatom tokom njenog trajanja. Ako se sve trgovine prijave TR-u i te informacije budu dostupne relevantnim supervizorskim vlastima, te vlasti će imati mogućnost da dobiju potpun uvid u tržišta OTC derivatima, uključujući najvažnije (bruto i neto) pozicije koje su uzeli veliki dileri na tim tržištima. Da su TR postojali pre krize, gomilanje ogromnih derivatnih pozicija, kao što su one kod Američke međunarodne grupe (American International Group - AIG), bilo bi primećeno znatno ranije.

Drugo, kliring OTC derivata kroz CCP umesto bilateralno može doneti nekolike benefite iz ugla finansijske stabilnosti. CCP se postavlja između dva originalna partnera u finansijskoj transakciji. Drugim rečima, CCP izoluje originalne partnere jednog od drugog ako bi jedan od njih bio u neizvršenju. Na taj način se smanjuje međupovezanost finansijskih institucija. Međutim, pošto se rizici koncentrišu na CCP, sam CCP mora da bude izuzetno robustan: mora da se štiti od neizvršenja jednog ili više svojih članova. U tom cilju, CCP zahteva od svojih članova da redovno prilagođavaju

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The role of financial market infrastructuresAnother important issue relates to the

risks posed by the conduct of transactions in financial markets, which, as you know, can be through organised exchanges or over the counter (OTC). Settlement typically takes place in financial market infrastructures like large-value payment systems, securities settlement systems and central counterparties (CCPs).

The way market infrastructures are designed and how they function has important implications for financial stability because they can act as a channel through which disruptions can spread among financial market participants. Hence, these infrastructures can serve as an important means to mitigate the risks arising from the interconnectedness of market participants and can reduce the risk of contagion. The financial crisis revealed a striking weakness in the way important OTC derivatives, in particular credit default swaps, were processed in the post-trade phase. Many of these transactions were inadequately reported, and the bilateral exposures between counterparties were insufficiently collateralised.

Against this background, authorities from around the world are pushing for two significant changes in the post-trade infrastructure for OTC derivatives. Both should be implemented by the end of 2012.

First, OTC derivatives will need to be reported to a trade repository (TR), which is an electronic registry that keeps a record of all relevant details of an OTC derivative transaction over its lifetime. If all trades are reported to a TR, and the information is made available to the relevant supervisory authorities, then these authorities will be able to gain an overall view of the OTC derivatives markets, including the most important (gross and net) positions taken by the major dealers in these markets. If TRs had existed before the crisis, the build-up of huge derivative positions, such as those at American International Group (AIG), would have been observed much earlier.

Second, clearing OTC derivatives through a CCP instead of bilaterally can bring about several benefits from a financial stability perspective. A CCP interposes itself between the two original counterparties of a financial transaction. In other words, the CCP isolates the

original counterparties from each other should one of them default. Thus, it makes financial institutions less interconnected. However, since risks become concentrated in the CCP, the CCP itself needs to be highly robust: it must protect itself against the default of one or more of its members. To that end, the CCP requires its members to regularly adjust their collateral at the CCP.

The international community is carefully monitoring the progress made towards implementation of OTC derivatives market reforms. In particular, the FSB has been tasked to review how the various G20 commitments concerning standardisation, central clearing, exchange or electronic platform trading, and reporting of OTC derivative transactions to TRs are being implemented in an internationally consistent and non-discriminatory way.

Strengthening resolutionAs I’ve noted, another critical element

of the global effort to address SIFIs is the strengthening of resolution frameworks. They reduce the possibility that authorities will find themselves forced to bail out institutions in order to prevent a disorderly wind-down of a failed firm. Here progress is slow, but steady; a number of countries have taken steps to improve their domestic processes, while on cross-border aspects experts are isolating issues and developing solutions.

A sound resolution regime needs to have a number of key elements. Among other things, the powers of designated authorities to initiate the wind-down of a troubled institution need to be clear. There need to be mechanisms for coordination and information-sharing across agencies within a jurisdiction, as well as across borders. There needs to be advanced planning, both for the immediate management of a crisis situation and for the longer process of winding down a closed entity. There needs to be financing available to support the operations of an institution that is legally bankrupt but still operational, and to support the transfer of viable operations to other entities. And there need to be mechanisms for safeguarding the assets of depositors and other clients.

The Dodd-Frank Act in the United States provides important new mechanisms whereby

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svoje kolaterale koji su kod CCP-a.Međunarodna zajednica pažljivo monitoriše

progres koji se čini u pravcu primene reformi OTC tržišta derivata. Konkretno, FSB je dobio zadatak da pregleda kako se primenjuju različite obaveze G20 u pogledu standardizacije, centralnog kliringa, trgovine na berzi ili na elektronskoj platformi i izveštavanje CCP-a o OTC derivatnim transakcijama na međunarodno konzistentan i nediskriminatoran način.

Jačanje reorganizacijeKao što sam napomenuo, još jedan kritični

element globalnog napora u pogledu SIFI je jačanje okvira za reorganizaciju. Ti okviri smanjuju mogućnost da vlasti budu primorane da iskupljuju institucije kako bi se sprečilo haotično zatvaranje bankrotirane firme. Ovde je napredak spor, ali stabilan. Jedan broj zemalja je preduzeo korake da poboljša domaće procese, dok stručnjaci za prekogranične aspekte izoluju pitanja i razvijaju rešenja.

Dobar režim za reorganizaciju mora da ima jedan broj ključnih elemenata. Pored drugih stvari, ovlašćenje određenih vlasti da iniciraju zatvaranje poremećene institucije mora biti jasno. Potrebno je da postoje mehanizmi za koordinaciju i zajedničko korišćenje informacija među agencijama unutar jurisdikcije, kao i preko granica. Potrebno je da postoji poboljšano planiranje za promptno upravljanje kriznom situacijom i za duži proces razrešenja zatvorene institucije. Potrebno je da postoji raspoloživo finansiranje koje će podržati operacije institucije koja je zakonski bankrotirala ali koja još uvek funkcioniše i podržati transfer održivih operacija na druge subjekte. Isto tako treba da postoje mehanizmi za očuvanje aktive deponenata i drugih klijenata.

Dodd-Frank Act u Sjedinjenim državama pruža važne nove mehanizme sa kojima američke vlasti mogu da dejstvuju brzo na zatvaranju propale institucije - čak iako je ona velika i složena - minimizirajući poremećaj ostatka sistema. Još jedan značajan doprinos će predstavljati predlog Evropske komisije u pogledu EU okvira za reorganizaciju banaka, koji treba da se objavi ovog leta.

Pomoć u emisiji obveznica koje mogu da se otpišu u slučaju reorganizacije - takozvane "bail-in" obveznice - mogu biti deo rešenja.

Investitori u bančin dug moraju da priznaju i odrede cenu gubitaka kojima će biti izloženi u bankrotstvu, upravo onako kao neobezbeđeni kreditori u bilo kojoj industriji. Eksplicitno isticanje ovoga putem "bail-in" klauzula jedan je od načina da se suzbija percepcija o postojanju implicitne javne garancije za takav dug. Kapitalni instumenti koji se konvertuju iz duga u akcionarski kapital u tački neodrživosti, coco "kasnog okidača" koji sam pomenuo ranije, može isto tako da obavlja tu funkciju. Međutim banke mogu da odgovore na takve odredbe pomeranjem svog finansiranja na osnovu obezbeđenja, ostavljajući malo ili nimalo aktive za neobezbeđene kreditore, uključujući deponente. Da bi se ograničio prostor za banke da tako postupaju "bail-in klauzula" treba da bude praćena limitima za terećenje aktive.

Izrada svih elemenata ovog okvira u ključnim jurisdikcijama će potrajati. Veća aposorpcija gubitaka SIFI može u međuvremenu da umanji naše oslanjanje na netestirane režime reorganizacije.

Banke u senciDalji kritični element reformske agende

je monitorisanje i, gde je to odgovarajuće, rešavanje rizika koji mogu da se jave iz bankarskog sistema u senci. Prošlog aprila, FSB je objavio kratku notu "Bankarstvo u senci: sagledavanje pitanja", kojim se pokreće ova aktivnost. Bankarstvo u senci se opisuje kao "kreditno posredovanje koje obuhvata subjekte i aktivnosti izvan regularnog bankarskog sistema". Ono može da obavlja vredne funkcije, uključujući pružanje alternativnih izvora finansiranja i likvidnosti i davanje bankama i investitorima niza mehanizama za upravljanje kreditnim rizikom, rizikom likvidnosti i ročnosti.

Međutim, kao što je finansijska kriza pokazala, bankarski sistem u senci može da doprinese sistemskom riziku, direktno i kroz međupovezanost sa regularnim bankarskim sistemom. Može da stvara prilike za arbitražu koja potkopava strože bankarske propise i da vodi do gomilanja dodatnog leveridža i rizika u sistemu.

Zato je važno jačati nadzor i ispitivati potencijalno regulisanje bankarskog sistema u senci u oblastima gde zabrinutosti za sistemski

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the US authorities can act quickly to shut down a failing institution - even a large, complex one - while minimising disruption to the rest of the system. The European Commission’s proposal for an EU bank resolution framework, which is due this summer, will be another important contribution.

Fostering the issuance of bonds that can be written down in the event of resolution - so-called “bail-in bonds” - can also be part of the solution. Investors in bank debt need to recognise, and price, the losses they will be exposed to in bankruptcy, just like unsecured creditors in any industry. Making this exposure explicit through bail-in provisions is one way to combat the perception that there is an implicit public guarantee of such debt. Capital instruments that convert from debt to equity at the point of non-viability, the “late-trigger” cocos I mentioned before, can also perform this function. However, banks may respond to such provisions by shifting their financing to a secured basis, leaving few or no assets for unsecured creditors, including depositors. To limit banks’ scope to do so, bail-in needs to be accompanied by limits on asset encumbrance.

Working out all of the elements of this framework in key jurisdictions will take time. Higher loss absorbency for SIFIs can in the meantime reduce our reliance on untested resolution regimes.

Shadow bankingAnother critical element of the reform

agenda is to monitor and, where appropriate, address the risks that may come from the shadow banking system. Last April, the FSB published a brief note entitled “Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues”, which starts this kind of work. Shadow banking is described as “credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system”. It can perform valuable functions, including facilitating alternative sources of funding and liquidity and providing banks and investors with a range of vehicles for managing credit, liquidity and maturity risks.

However, as the financial crisis has shown, the shadow banking system can also contribute to systemic risk, both directly and through its interconnectedness with the regular banking system. It can also create opportunities for arbitrage that might undermine stricter bank regulation and lead to a build-up of additional leverage and risks in the system.

Therefore, it is important to enhance the oversight and examine the potential regulation of the shadow banking system in areas where systemic risk and regulatory arbitrage concerns are inadequately addressed.

To be sure, this is a large and complex issue. It is complex because this is a rapidly evolving area of the financial system, and thus we need to

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rizik i regulatornu arbitražu nisu adekvatno rešeni.

Budimo sigurni, ovo je veliko i važno pitanje. Kompleksno je jer je to oblast finansijskog sistema koja se ubrzano razvija i zato smo prinuđeni da proaktivno monitorišemo finansijske inovacije koje uspostavljaju nove kanale dovodeći do rizičnih povećanja leveridža, neusklađenosti ročnosti i likvidnosti, da bismo odredili da li postoji i kakva je potreba za reagovanjem.

Važno je priznati da su aktivnosti bankarstva i bankarstva u senci snažno međusobno povezane i da su u prošlim periodima buma imali tendenciju brzog zajedničkog rasta. Banke su često deo lanca bankarstva u senci ili pružaju implicitnu podršku subjektima bankarstva u senci i tipično izvlače znatan prihod iz aktivnosti bankarstva u senci. Kada su banke ograničene kapitalom u vremenima kreditnog rasta ili zbog propisa, aktivnosti bankarstva u senci imaju podsticaj da rastu većom brzinom.

Mere politike moraće da budu fleksibilne da bi evoluirale zajedno sa sistemom. Predlozi koji se sada razmatraju u FSB imaju dva glavna pravca:• Preporuke za monitorisanje bankarstva u

senci na osnovu određenih visokih principa (obuhvatnost, regularnost, fleksibilnost, kapacitet za prikupljanje podataka, itd) i proces monitoringa od tri koraka, počev od širokog obuhvata svih nebankarskih posredovanja do uskog usmerenja na osnovu ključnih sistemskih rizika i slučajeva višeg potencijalnog rizika.

• Inicijalne preporuke da se strukturira rad na potencijalnoj regulativi i obelodanjivanju. Jedan kanal za rešavanje rizika bankarstva u senci će na taj način biti strože regulisanje tradicionalnih banaka putem viših pondera rizika za sekjuritizovanu aktivu i za kreditne linije za svaku eventualnost. Isto tako ima mnogo da se uradi u drugim oblastima, kao što su jačanje regulative fondova novčanog tržišta i repo tržišta. Imajući u vidu globalnu prirodu mnogih aktivnosti bankarstva u senci, ovi napori moraju da budu koordinisani na međunarodnom nivou i, kao što sam rekao, oni su u ranoj fazi.

Proaktivni nadzor finansijskog sistema

U svojim napomenama do sada naglasio sam, prvo, da je već mnogo ostvareno i da je sada vreme za primenu; drugo, postavili smo tranzacioni period; i treće, potrebno je da kompletiramo agendu reforme i završimo posao.

Ali moja četvrta tačka odnosi se na to da regulativa nije dovoljna i da je neophodno ostvariti napredak na razvoju institucija i procesa koji će obezbediti da se ciljevi novog regulatornog okvira postižu konzistentno i efektno. Ukazaću na dva momenta.

Prvo, zemlje osnivaju tela za makroprudencijalni nadzor i okvire koji će podržavati i dopuniti ove u suštini mikroprudencijalne mere. Bazel III uključuje važne makroprudencijalne elemente, na primer kontraciklični kapitalni amortizer. Ali mogu biti potrebne diskrecione mere u nekom momentu i još rada je potrebno u jednom broju oblasti, kao što su razvoj tehnika za anticipiranje sistemskog rizika, prikupljanje konzistentnih globalnih podataka potrebnih da se daju takve ocene i jačanje prakse herkata i margina na tržištima hartija od vrednosti.

Drugo, napore da se primene nova pravila treba da podrži snažna i pojačana supervizija pojedinačnih banaka. Snažna supervizija je potrebna da bi se obezbedilo da banke posluju sa kapitalnim nivoima, amortizerima likvidnosti i praksom upravljanja rizicima koje su proporcionalne uzetim rizicima. Moraju se isto tako rešavati posledice finansijskih inovacija ili rizika regulatorne arbitraže koje regulativa ne može u potpunosti za pokrije i, uopštenije, rešavati posledice na nivou firme nastalih rizika i ekonomskog razvoja. Nacionalne vlasti moraju da nadziru intenzivnije i nametljivije, naročito najveće i najsloženije banke. Isto tako je važno da se pojačaju mikro i makroprudencijalne dimenzije supervizije i način njihove interakcije.

Zaključak

Privatni sektor mora da pruži doprinos postizanju nove ravnoteže pri kojoj je finansijski sistem otporniji i može da apsorbuje šokove, a ne da ih pojačava. To zahteva bolje upravljanje

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proactively monitor financial innovations that establish new channels that may be facilitating risky increases in leverage, maturity or liquidity mismatches, in order to determine whether and how there is a need to respond.

It is important to recognise that banking and shadow banking activities are strongly interrelated and that in past booms they tended to grow rapidly in tandem. Banks are often part of the shadow banking chain or provide implicit support to shadow banking entities, and typically draw substantial income from shadow banking activities. When banks are capital-constrained during times of credit growth or due to regulation, shadow banking activities have the incentive to grow much more rapidly.

Policy measures will need to have the flexibility to evolve as the system does. The proposals currently being considered by the FSB comprise two main directions:• Recommendations for monitoring shadow

banking on the basis of some high-level principles (comprehensiveness, regularity, flexibility, capacity to collect data, etc) and a three-step monitoring process, starting with a broad sweep of all non-bank intermediation to narrow the focus on the basis of the key systemic risks and the cases of higher potential impact.

• Initial recommendations to structure the work on potential regulations, including data disclosure. One channel for addressing shadow banking risks will thus be through stronger regulation of traditional banks, such as higher risk weights for securitised assets and for contingent credit lines. There is also much that we can do in other areas, such as strengthening the regulation of money market funds and repo markets. Given the global nature of many shadow banking activities, these efforts need to be coordinated at the international level and, as I said, they are at a very early stage.

Proactive oversight of the financial system

So, in my remarks so far today I have emphasised that, first, a lot has already been achieved, and now it’s implementation time;

second, we have put a transition period in place; and third, we need to complete the reform agenda and finish the job.

But my fourth point is that regulation is not enough, and progress will need to be made in developing the institutions and processes that will ensure that the goals of the new regulatory framework are achieved consistently and effectively. I’ll make two points.

First, countries are putting in place macroprudential oversight bodies and frameworks that will support and complement these essentially microprudential measures. Basel III includes important macroprudential elements, for example the countercyclical capital buffer. But discretionary measures may be needed at some point in time, and more work is needed in a number of areas, such as developing techniques to anticipate systemic risk, gathering the consistent global data needed to make such assessments, and strengthening haircutting and margining practices in securities markets.

Second, efforts to implement the new rules need to be supported by strong and enhanced supervision of individual banks. Strong supervision is needed to ensure that banks operate with capital levels, liquidity buffers and risk management practices that are commensurate with the risks taken. It must also address the consequences of financial innovation or risks of regulatory arbitrage that regulation cannot fully capture and, more generally, address the firm-level consequences of emerging risks and economic developments. National authorities must supervise in a more intensive and more intrusive fashion, especially for the largest and most complex banks. It will also be important to reinforce both the firm-specific and macroprudential dimensions of supervision and the way they interact.

Conclusion

The private sector has to contribute to reach a new equilibrium in which the financial system is more resilient, is able to absorb shocks and not amplify them. This requires better risk management and governance and aligned incentive structures, but also a new approach to risk-taking which recognises existing

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rizicima i korporaciono upravljanje, kao i usaglašene strukture podsticaja, ali i novi pristup uzimanju rizika koji uvažava postojeće neizvesnosti, ograničenost našeg znanja i složenost sistemskog rizika. Može, na primer, da zahteva od investitora da traže niži prinos na kapital. Oprezniji pristup prema riziku najbolja je polisa osiguranja od repnih rizika: prihodi mogu biti skromniji i stabilniji u dobrim vremenima, ali će u metežu gubici biti znatno manji.

Svi ovi raznovrsni elementi moraju da se u potpunosti i konzistentno primene u svim važnim jurisdikcijama. Cilj je da se smanje rizici naredne krize nezavisno od toga koliko je ozbiljno data zemlja bila pogođena nedavnom

krizom. Mislim da vlasti ne dobijaju nikakvu prednost sporom ili slabijom primenom - naprotiv, time povećavaju izloženost svoje ekonomije ozbiljnim rizicima, naročito ako završe privlačenjem rizičnih aktivnosti sa leveridžom iz drugih finansijskih centara.

Završetak agende regulatorne reforme i staranje da se ona primeni predstavljaju kritične zadatke za vlasti u toku nastavka oporavka od krize. To je deo šireg izazova pružanja okvira za makroekonomsku stabilnost, zajedno sa vraćanjem duga na održive nivoe i normalizovanje monetarne politike. Sva tri elementa politike - fiskalni, monetarni i prudencijalni - moraju da dejstvuju zajedno da bi pružili snažan, održiv globalni rast.

Napomene

Kreditni spred - credit spreadRazlika između prinosa na hartije od vrednosti Trezora i obveznica sa rejtingom A. Firma emitent mora da ponudi viši prinos zbog slabijeg rejtinga od rejtinga vlade.

Eksternalije - externalitiesGubitak ili dobrobit jedne strane koja proizilazi iz aktivnosti druge strane, bez kompenzacije za stranu koja trpi gubitak. Eksternalije su značajan element u cost-benefit analizi.

Co-CosNovembra 2009. godine Lloyds Banking Group (LBG), najveća ritejl banka u Britaniji, objavila je da će konvertovai postojeći dug u otprilike GBP 7.5 milijardi (USD 12.3 milijardi) “eventualnog jezgra Tier 1 kapitala - contingent core Tier-1 capital” (nazvane CoCos). To je vrsta duga koji se automatski konvertuje u akcije ako bančin amortizer akcionarskog kapitala padne ispod 5%.

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uncertainties, limitations in our knowledge and the complexity of systemic risk. It may, for example, require investors to demand a lower return on equity. A more prudent approach towards risk is the best insurance policy against tail risks: returns may be more modest and stable in good times, but in turmoil losses would be much smaller.

All of these disparate elements will need to be fully and consistently implemented in all major jurisdictions. The objective is to reduce the risks of the next crisis, no matter how seriously a given country was affected by the recent crisis. I think that authorities do not gain any advantages through slower or

weaker implementation - rather, they increase the exposure of their economy to serious risks, especially if they end up attracting risky, leveraged activities from other financial centres.

Completing the regulatory reform agenda and seeing that it is implemented are thus critical tasks for authorities as we continue to recover from the crisis. They are part of the broader challenge of providing a framework for macroeconomic stability, along with bringing debt back to sustainable levels and normalising monetary policy. All three elements of policy - fiscal, monetary and prudential - will need to work together to deliver strong, sustainable global growth.