Autoritatea de concuren din Romnia noi obiective europene ale anului 2007Competition authority of Romania new European objectives for 2007Carmen BUCUR, Jozsef Nandor NEMENYI

Autoritatea de concuren din Romnia noi obiective europene ale anului 2007Competition authority of Romania new European objectives for 2007Carmen BUCUR, Jozsef Nandor NEMENYI

Controlul ajutorului de stat n Romnia (II)State aid control in Romania (II)Reimer von BORRIES

Romnia i Uniunea European: care sunt provocrile n domeniul concurenei?Romania and the European Union: Which challenges in antitrust?Alberto HEIMLER

Ajutorul de stat i drumul ctre aderare State aid and the road to accessionKoen VAN DE CASTEELE

Extinderea din 2004/2007 - un succes incontestabil The 2004/2007 enlargement an undeniable success Gabriela DRGAN

Regimul juridic al concentrrilor economice n dreptul comunitarThe legal framework of economic concentrations in community lawMihaela Violeta TOADER

Impactul ajutoarelor de stat regionale asupra dezvoltrii zonelor defavorizateRegional aid impact on the deprived areas developmentDaniel DIACONESCUConstana DUMITRESCUAnca CRISTEA

Puterile de inspecie ale organelor administrative i protecia sediilor persoanelor juridiceInspection powers of administrative authorities and the protection of legal entities` premisesDumitru ENE Paul PRISECARU

Proceduri naionale n domeniul ajutorului de stat - competene i obligaiiNational procedures in the state aid field - competences and obligationsMihaela MARINESCU

Procesul de elaborare a tratatului instituind o Constituie pentru Europa (II)The elaboration of the treaty implementing a Constitution for Europe (II)Lilian OSTROPELRaluca BADIC

Noua reglementare a insolvenei (II)The new regulation on insolvency (II)Carmen BLTRESCU

Ordonana de urgen nr.128/2006 un act normativ discutabil care instituie noi msuri de natura ajutorului de statEmergency Ordinance no.128/2006 a questionable normative act instituting new support measures of the nature of state aidJzsef Nandr NEMENYICarmen BUCUR

Nouti n domeniul concurenei i ajutorului de statNews in the competition and state aid fieldCarmen BUCUR

CUPRINS/CONTENT

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89

1617

2627

3233

4041

4849

6061

6869

7273

8081

9091

94

95

9495

Aderarea la Uniunea European reprezint pentru autoritatea de concuren din Romnia o provocare, att din perspectiva concurenei, ct i a ajutorului de stat. n scopul ndeplinirii eficiente a responsa-bilitilor ce-i revin, Consiliul Concurenei i-a stabilit obiectivele prioritare pentru anul 2007, spernd c viitorul reformei se menine i pe mai departe.

I. n domeniul concurenei, activitatea Consiliului Concurenei se va intensifica, ntruct Consiliul Concurenei a dobndit competena de a aplica direct regulile de concuren cuprinse n Tratatul de instituire a Comunitii Europene. Consiliul Concurenei i propune, astfel, s i intensifice eforturile n vederea promovrii regulilor comunitare de concuren i a aplicrii pro - active a acestora.

n acest sens, pentru anul 2007, Consiliul Concurenei vizeaz ndeplinirea urmtoarelor obiective:

De la data aderrii, Consiliului Concurenei a dobndit competena de a aplica direct regulile de concuren comunitare. n toate cazurile care intr sub incidena legislaiei comunitare, Consiliul Concurenei va aciona n cadrul Reelei Europene a Concurenei, din care fac parte Comisia European i

1. Adaptarea rapid la noul statut de membru, cu drepturi i obligaii depline, n Reeua European a Concurenei (ECN).

autoritile naionale de concuren din toate statele membre.

Dintre practicile anticoncureniale sancionate de legea concurenei, cartelul este cel mai nociv pentru mediul concurenial. Participarea la un cartel este sancionat, att de legislaia naional, ct i de cea comunitar, cu amenzi foarte mari, care pot ajunge pn la 10% din cifra de afaceri a firmelor implicate. Pentru a facilita detectarea cartelurilor, care sunt, prin definiie, nelegeri secrete, Consiliul Concurenei a adoptat un program de clemen. Acest program ncurajeaz participanii s furnizeze Consiliului informaii n legtur cu existena unui cartel. Astfel, prima firm care furnizeaz informaii este scutit integral de amenda pe care ar fi trebuit s o primeasc pentru nclcarea Legii concurenei. Alte firme implicate n cartel pot beneficia de reduceri ale amenzilor n anumite condiii. Este de ateptat ca amenzile foarte mari aplicate de Consiliul Concurenei n ultimi ani, n cazurile de cartel, s conduc la creterea atractivitii programului de clemen i, implicit, la detectarea unui numr i mai mare de astfel de practici.

n anul 2007, Consiliul Concurenei i va intensifica

2. Concentrarea eforturilor de aplicare a Legii concurenei asupra celor mai grave practici anticoncureniale

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Redacia revistei Profil: Concurena1Dr.Carmen BUCUR2Dr. Jozsef Nandor NEMENYI

Rezumat

Odat cu accederea n clubul select al Uniunii Europene, autoritatea romn de concuren a intrat ntr-o nou etap de dezvoltare. Dac pn la 1 ianuarie 2007 prioritatea Consiliului Concurenei a vizat aspecte specifice etapei de pre-aderare, odat cu aderarea Romniei la Uniunea European, autoritatea de concuren i propune consolidarea statutului de autoritate recunoscut i puternic, deplin integrat n familia european de concuren.

Cuvinte cheie: aderare, evoluie, concuren, ajutor de stat, creterea competiiei i a competitivitii externe.

AUTORITATEA DE CONCUREN DIN ROMNIA:NOI OBIECTIVE EUROPENE ALE ANULUI 2007

AUTORITATEA DE CONCUREN DIN ROMNIA:NOI OBIECTIVE EUROPENE ALE ANULUI 2007

1Inspector de concuren, Direcia de Cercetare-Sinteze.2 Consilier de concuren.

Network, which includes the European Commission and the national competition authorities from all the Member States.

Among the anticompetitive practices sanctioned by competition law, the cartel is the most harmful for the competitive environment. The participation in a cartel is sanctioned by Community and by national legislation with very high fines, which can mount up 10% of the turnover of the involved undertakings. To facilitate the detection of cartels, which are, by definition, secret agreements, the Competition Council adopted a leniency program. This program encourages the participants to disclose information about the existence of a cartel. Thus, the first firm which discloses information is exempted from the fine it should have paid for infringing the competition law. Other firms involved in the cartel can benefit, in certain conditions, from reductions of fines. It is expected that the heavy fines applied by the Competition Council in cartel cases over the last years will increase the attractiveness of leniency program and, subsequently, will lead to the detection of such practices.In 2007, the Competition Council will intensify its activity of detecting and sanctioning the most severe infringements of the Competition law and will

2. Focusing the enforcement of Competition Law on the most severe anticompetitive practices

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3 Competition inspector, Research and Synthesis Directorate.4 Competition councellor, member of the Competition Council's plenum.5 Translated into English by Georgeta Gavriloiu and Carmen Bucur.

Editorial staff of the "Profil: Concurena" magazinePh.D. Carmen BUCURPh.D. Jozsef Nandor NEMENYI

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4

Editorial staff of the "Profil: Concurena" magazine3Ph.D. Carmen BUCUR

4Ph.D. Jozsef Nandor NEMENYI

5Abstract

After joining the select club of the European Union, the Romanian competition authority has entered into a new development phase. Before 1 January 2007, the Competition Council's priorities were the issues specific to the pre-accession period; after Romania's accession, the competition authority set as an objective to consolidate its status as a recognised and strong authority, fully integrated in the European family of competition.

Keywords: accession, evolution, competition, State aid, international relations, increase of competition and of external competitiveness

Accession to the European Union represents a challenge for the Romanian competition authority, both on antitrust and on State aid. In order to efficiently fulfill its responsibilities, Competition Council has set its priority objectives for 2007, hoping that the future of the reform will last.

I. In the field of antitrust, the activity of the Competition Council will intensify, since the Council has became competent to apply directly the antitrust rules contained by the Treaty establishing the European Community. Thus the Competition Council aims to intensify its efforts towards promoting the EC competition rules and to their pro-active enforcement.

To this end, for year 2007, the Competition Council aims at the fulfilment of the following objectives:

As of the accession date, the Competition Council became competent to apply the EC antitrust rules. In all cases falling within the scope of the Community legislation, the Competition Council will action within the framework of the European Competition

1. A rapid adaptation at the new status of fully fledged member of the European Competition Network (ECN)

COMPETITION AUTHORITY OF ROMANIA:NEW EUROPEAN OBJECTIVES FOR 2007COMPETITION AUTHORITY OF ROMANIA:NEW EUROPEAN OBJECTIVES FOR 2007

activitatea de detectare i sancionare a celor mai grave nclcri ale Legii concurenei i va continua s sancioneze cu maxim severitate att nelegerile anticoncureniale, ct i abuzul de poziie dominant.

Monitorizarea pieelor i n special a sectoarelor sensibile din punct de vedere al recurenei practicilor anticoncureniale este esenial pentru susinerea unei activiti de aplicare a legii coerente i eficiente. Aplicarea corect a regulilor de concuren n cazurile particulare nu este posibil fr o bun cunoatere a pieelor pe care activeaz firmele implicate, fr nelegerea mecanismelor i dinamicii care caracterizeaz sectoarele ecomice respective. De asemenea, n urma unor astfel de anchete sectoriale, pot fi obinute informaii eseniale despre domenii n care intervenia Consiliului Concurenei este necesar pentru restabilirea mediului concurenial normal.

Consiliul Concurenei i propune s dezvolte i s mbogeasc mijloacele specifice de analiz economic utilizate la fundamentarea deciziilor. Analiza economic aprofundat ajut la definirea corect a pieelor afectate de practicile anti-concureniale i, mai ales, la o mai bun evaluare a efectelor asupra concurenei i comerului. n acest fel se poate realiza o departajare a cazurilor care ridic, din start, probleme i celelalte cazuri (studii de impact ante i post factum).

II. n domeniul ajutorului de stat, aderarea Romniei la Uniunea European a condus la modificarea competenei de autorizare a ajutoarelor, competen ce a fost transferat ctre Comisia European. De la data aderrii, reglementrile comunitare n materie de ajutor de stat au devinit direct aplicabile n Romnia, iar acordarea oricrui ajutor de stat trebuie s fie, ca regul, precedat de obinerea unei decizii de autorizare din partea Comis ie i Europene. Aceas ta impl i c o responsabilitate sporit pentru Romnia, care va trebui s fundamenteze corespunztor, din punct de vedere juridic i economic, orice intenie de acordare a unui ajutor de stat. n fapt, n materie de ajutor de stat, prin O.U.G. nr.117/2006, au fost reglementate procedurile naionale, n vederea aplicrii art. 87-89 din Tratatul de instituire a Comunitii Europene i a legislaiei secundare adoptate n baza acestuia, direct i imediat aplicabile dup 1 ianuarie 2007.

3. Realizarea de anchete sectoriale i monitorizarea pieelor

4. Accentuarea rolului analizei economice n evaluarea cazurilor de concuren

Pentru Consiliul Concurenei, anul 2007, va marca exercitarea unui nou rol, acela de autoritate naional de contact n problematica ajutorului de stat, asigurnd interfaa ntre Comisia European, pe de o parte, i autoritile naionale iniiatoare i furnizoare de ajutor de stat, pe de alt parte. Consiliul Concurenei va folosi experiena acumulat pn n prezent pentru a sprijini iniiatorii s elaboreze programe de restructurare i finanare deplin compatibile cu regulile stricte care guverneaz, la nivel comunitar, acordarea de ajutoare de stat.

Obiectivele anului 2007 n materie de ajutor de stat vizeaz:1. Gestionarea n mod adecvat a atribuiilor ce-i vor reveni n calitate de autoritate naional de contact ntre Comisia European i autoritile naionale pe problematica ajutorului de stat. 2. Asigurarea funcionrii Registrului Ajutoarelor de Stat, care s permit evidenierea electronic a ajutoarelor acordate, cu respectarea principiilor de transparena n ceea ce privete acordarea i monitorizarea ajutoarelor de stat.3. Acordarea de asisten de specialitate autoritilor publice care au competena de a iniia sau furniza msuri de ajutor de stat. n acest sens, Consiliul Concurenei i va intensifica eforturile de susinere a furnizorilor de ajutor de stat, pentru a se asigura alinierea politicii de acordare a msurilor de sprijin financiar la obiectivele promovate n documentul Politica n domeniul ajutorului de stat pentru perioada 2006-2013.4. Consiliul Concurenei va continua rolul proactiv n domeniul ajutorului de stat prin: informarea prin mijloace diverse a iniiatorilor,

furnizorilor i beneficiarilor de ajutor de stat, precum i a publicului larg asupra regulilor europene relevante n acest domeniu; emiterea de puncte de vedere/avize privind

proiectele de acte normative naionale care pot contine ajutoare de stat; monitorizarea i inventarierea msurilor naionale

de ajutor de stat.

III. Din perspectiva culturii concurenei, anul 2007 va nsemna accentuarea eforturilor depuse de autoritatea de concuren pentru promovarea i diseminarea de informaii relevante din domeniul concurenei i ajutorului de stat. Aceste informaii sunt orientate cu precdere ctre mediul de afaceri, dar i ctre toi factorii decideni, n vederea nelegerii corecte a mecanismelor i regulilor comunitare n domeniu.

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continue to sanction very severely both the anticompetitive agreements and the abuse of dominant position.

Monitoring the markets and, especially, the sensitive sectors from the point of view of the recurrence of the anticompetitive practices is essential for sustaining an activity of a coherent and effective law enforcement. The correct enforcement of the competition rules in particular cases is not possible without a throughout knowledge of markets where the firms operate and without a throughout understanding of the mechanism and dynamics which characterize the said economic sectors. At the same time, following such sectoral inquires, essential information may be obtained about areas in which the intervention of the Competition Council is necessary for the restoration of the competitive environment.

The Competition Council aims to develop and enrich the specific means of economic analysis used for grounding its decisions. The refined economic analysis helps the correct definition of the markets affected by the anticompetitive practices and, especially, a better assessment of their effects on competition and trade. In this way, a separation can be made, from the very beginning, between the problematic cases and the rest of the cases (ante and post factum impact studies).

II. In the field of State aid, Romania's accession to the European Union determined a change of the competence of authorizing State aid; this competence was transferred to the European Commission. As of the date of accession, the community regulations in the field of State aid became directly applicable in Romania and the granting of any State aid must be, as a rule, preceded by an approval decision issued by the European Commission. This implies an increased responsibility for Romania, which would need to adequately ground, both economically and legally, any intent of granting State aid.For the Competition Council, the year 2007, will mark the exercising of a new role, as the national

3. Conducting sectoral inquires and monitoring markets

4. Enhancing the role of the economic analysis in the assessment of antitrust cases

contact authority in the field of State aid, ensuring the interface between the European Commission, on one hand, and the national authorities initiating or granting State aid, on the other hand. The Competition Council will make use of the experience acquired up to present to support the State aid initiators to draft financing programs fully compatible with the strict rules governing, at the Community level, the granting of State aids.

The objectives of 2007 in the field of State aid aim at:1. The accurate management of the attributions undertaken as a national contact authority between the European Commission and the national authorities in the field of State aid.

2. Ensuring the functioning of State aid Registry, which allows the electronic tracking of granted State aid, in accordance with the principle of transparency with regards to the granting and monitoring of State aids.

3. Providing technical advice to the public authority with competencies to initiate or grant State aid measures. In this respect, the Competition Council shall intensify the effort for supporting the State aid grantors for the alignment of policy of granting financial support to the objectives set in the State Aid Policy Paper for the period 2006 2013.

4. The Competition Council will continue to play a pro-active role in the field of State aid by: Informing, through various means, the State aid

initiators, grantors and beneficiaries, as well as to the wide public with regards to the European rules relevant in this field; Issuing points of views and binding opinions on the

draft legislative acts which may contain State aid; Monitoring and inventorying the national measures

of State aid.

III. From the perspective of the competition advocacy, the year 2007 will mark the intensification of the competition authority's efforts to promote and disseminate relevant information in the field of the competition and State aid. This information will be mainly oriented toward the business community but also to all decision - making factors, aiming at ensuring the correct understanding of the Community mechanisms and rules in the field.

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IV. Un obiectiv esenial al activitii anului 2007 l reprezint continuarea consolidrii capacitii administrative. Astfel, pentru a deveni un actor important n familia autoritilor europene de concuren, Consiliul Concurenei va continua s aloce resurse importante pentru pregtirea adecvat a etapei post-aderare. n acest sens, noul proiect de Twinning, aciunile de formare profesional organizate pentru experii naionali de alte autoriti de profil din UE, stagiile de pregtire la DG Concuren, participarea ca observator activ la reuniunile organizate la nivel comunitar vor reprezenta n continuare instrumente importante.

V. Pe plan internaional, obiectivele Consiliului Concurenei pentru anul 2007 vizeaz:La nivel bilateral, Consiliul Concurenei va urmri, n continuare, intensificarea relaiilor de colaborare existente prin schimb de documentaie i de cele mai bune practici n domeniul concurenei, dezvoltarea de contacte directe ntre experi, organizarea de seminarii i stagii de pregtire pentru experii autoritii de concuren pe tematici antitrust, cu scopul de a dezvolta abiliti n a efectua studii sectoriale, n a aplica diverse modele i analize economice cantitative, pe care se pune un accent deosebit n prezent la nivel comunitar dar i internaional.

Consiliul Concurenei i propune s continue training-ul de specialitate al experilor n culegerea de informaii n format electronic, pentru o utilizare mai eficient a inspeciilor inopinate. Dat fiind experiena dobndit n negocierile de aderare la UE ct i dinamica activitii Consiliului Concurenei din ultimii ani, un obiectiv esenial l constituie intensificarea relaiilor de colaborare i cu rile candidate la aderare, precum Turcia, Fosta Republic Iugoslav Macedonia i Croaia, mprtind astfel din experiena autoritii romne de concuren.

La nivel international, obiectivele urmrite au n vedere participarea la activitile organismelor internaionale, prin elaborarea de contribuii scrise, participarea la diverse evenimente internaionale organizate de ECN, UNCTAD, OCDE pentru a promova pe plan extern activitatea Consiliului Concurenei i de a face cunoscut poziia autoritii romne de concuren pe teme de interes la nivel comunitar dar i internaional.

Redacia revistei Profil: Concurena este ferm convins c prin nregistrarea unei creteri economice nsemnate n 2007 i asigurnd o

competitivitate superioar prin politici concureniale se dezvolt i capitalul autohton romnesc. Aceasta este o surs de baz pentru mbuntirea remunerrii forei de munc din ramurile hotrtoare ale economiei naionale.

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IV. An essential objective of the activity in 2007 will be to continue the consolidation of administrative capacity. In order to become an important actor in the family of the European competition authorities, the Competition Council will continue to allocate important resources for the adequate preparation of the post-accession period. In this respect, the new Twinning Project, the internships at DG Competition, participating as an active observer at the meetings organized at the Community level will continue to represent important tools.

V. At an international level, the Competition Council's objectives for the 2007 will aim at:On a bilateral level, the Competition Council will continue to pursue the intensification of the relations of collaboration through exchange of materials, best practices in the field of State aid, through developing direct contacts between experts, organizing seminars and internships for the competition authority's experts on antitrust matters with a view to develop abilities to perform sectoral studies, to apply different models and quantitative economic analysis, which are frequently used today both at a Community and at international level.

The Competition Council is determined to continue the specialized training for obtaining electronic information and for an efficient use of the dawn raids. Taking into account the experience acquired in the accession negotiations and the dynamic of the Competition Council's activity in the last year, an essential objective shall constitute the intensification of cooperation relations and with the candidate countries, such as Turkey, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Croatia to share from the experience of the Romanian competition authority.

At an international level, the objectives pursued take into account the participation at the activities of the international organizations, through written contributions, the participation in different international events organized by ECN, UNCTAD, OECD in order to promote at an international level the position of the Romanian competition authority on subjects of interest at a Community and also at international level.

The editorial staff of the Profil: Concurena magazine is strongly convinced that through a significant economic growth in 2007 and by ensuring a higher

competitiveness through competition policies the domestic capital will also be developed. This is a basic source for the improvement of payment conditions for the work force in the essential branches of the national economy.

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IV. Perioada 2004 2005

Noul i impresionantul dinamism al Consiliului n domeniul ajutorului de stat a creat bazele pentru finalizarea la timp a negocierilor de aderare, n decembrie 2004, i a ndeprtat potenialele obstacole din calea aderrii.

a) n urma revizuirii legii concurenei, pe data de 17 februarie 2004 au fost numii un nou preedinte i ase noi membri ai Consiliului (inclusiv doi foti membri, ale cror mandate au fost rennoite). Trei dintre membri au preluat responsabiliti speciale n domeniul ajutorului de stat, iar ceilali trei n domeniul concurenei. Salariile experilor au fost mrite substanial. Consiliul s-a mutat ntr-o locaie mai potrivit, iar organizarea intern a fost

9modificat . b) n baza articolului 14, coroborat cu articolul 22 din

10Legea privind ajutorul de stat , Consiliul Concurenei

i-a intensificat eforturile cu privire la armonizarea legislativ, prin adoptarea unui mare numr de regulamente i instruciuni, prin care toate actele relevante ale Comisiei Europene din domeniul ajutorului de stat (regulamente, regulamente-cadru, linii directoare, comunicri), viznd att aspecte susbtaniale, ct i de procedur, au fost transpuse n legislaia romneasc (de ex. regulamentul privind ajutorul de stat pentru salvarea i restructurarea ntreprinderilor n dificultate, un regulament revizuit privind ajutorul de stat regional, regulamentul privind ajutorul de stat pentru cercetare-dezvoltare, regulamentul pentru ntreprinderile mici i mijlocii etc.). Numai n anul 2004, au fost adoptate 21 regulamente i 3 instruciuni. La finalul acestei perioade, Consiliul Concurenei avea la dispoziie un set complet de reguli precise pentru controlul ajutoarelor de stat n Romnia, reguli care corespundeau n totalitate celor aplicabile n

11Uniunea European .

8

6 Acest articol a fost publicat n European State Aid Law Quartely, nr. 3/2006. Consiliul Concurenei a obinut acordul autorului pentru publicarea articolului. 7 L.L.M Reimer von Borries a fost expert de preaderare la Consiliul Concurenei din Romnia ntre 2001 i 2002, respectiv 2003 i 2005. nainte de a se pensiona, a fost consilier ministerial la Ministerul Federal de Finane din Germania i profesor onorific la Universitatea din Osnabrck. Opiniile din prezentul articol reprezint punctele de vedere ale autorului.8 Traducerea n limba romn a fost realizat de Georgeta Gavriloiu.9 Regulamentul de organizare, funcionare i procedur al Consiliului Concurenei, Monitorul Oficial nr.64 din 10 ianuarie 2005.10 n prezent, articolele 23 i 30. 11 Totui, Romnia nu a fost de acord s aplice exceptrile n bloc, deoarce furnizorii de ajutor de stat nu erau pregtii pentru aceasta.

7Prof. dr. Reimer von BORRIES

8Rezumat

Comisia European a identificat, cu regularitate, controlul ajutoarelor de stat drept una dintre zonele cu probleme, care puteau conduce la ntrzierea ncheierii negocierilor de aderare sau chiar la amnarea datei aderrii Romniei la Uniunea European. Prin Raportul de monitorizare, publicat de Comisia European n luna mai 2006, au fost recunoscute progresele realizate de Romnia n aplicarea legislaiei ajutorului de stat i s-a decis declanarea procedurii ajutoarelor existente.

n evoluia controlului ajutoarelor de stat n Romnia pot fi identificate trei perioade distincte. Prezentarea, n numrul anterior al revistei, a primei perioade de control al ajutorului de stat (2000 2004) este urmat de o descriere a perioadei 2004 2005, caracterizat de schimbri n compoziia Consiliului, de mbuntiri organizatorice importante, de completarea cadrului legislativ, precum i de consolidarea cooperrii cu autoritile furnizoare de ajutor de stat.

Cuvinte cheie: ajutor de stat, autoritate de concuren, Consiliul Concurenei, controlul ajutoarelor de stat

6CONTROLUL AJUTORULUI DE STAT N ROMNIA (II)

IV. 2004-2005 period

The new and very impressive dynamism of the Council in the State aid area laid the foundations for the timely closure of the accession negotiations in December 2004 and removed potential obstacles to a timely accession.

a) Following the review of the Law on Competition, a new President and six new Council members were appointed on 17 February 2004 (including two former members who were reappointed). Three of the members took over special responsibilities in the State aid area, the remaining three dealt with competition. The salaries of the competition and State aid experts were substantially raised. The Council moved to a more suitable location; the

14internal organisation was reshaped .

b) On the basis of Article 14, in conjunction with 15Article 22 of the Law on State Aid , the Competition

Council intensified its efforts regarding legal harmonisation by adopting a large number of regulations and guidelines through which all relevant acts (regulations, frameworks, guidelines, communications) of the European Commission in the State aid area were transposed into the Romanian law, on both substantive and procedural issues (e.g. the Regulation on State aid for rescue and restructuring firms in difficulty, a revised Regulation on regional State aid, a Regulation on State aid for research and development, a Regulation on State aid for small and medium-sized enterprises etc.). In 2004 alone, 21 regulations and 3 guidelines were adopted. At the end of this period, the Council had available a complete set of precise rules for the control of State aid in Romania, rules which fully

16corresponded to those applicable in the EU .

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12 This article was published in the European State Aid Law Quarterly, no.3/2006 and the Competition Council received the authors' approval for publishing this article. 13 Reimer von Borries, LL.M, was Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA) at the Romanian Competition Council 2001-2002 and 2003-2005. He is a retired Ministerial Counsellor of the Federal Ministry of Finance and Honorary Professor at the University of Osnabrck. Opinions in this article are the author's personal views. 14 Regulation on the organisation, functioning and procedure of the Competition Council, Monitorul Oficial No. 64 of 19 January 2005.15 Now Articles 23 and 30. 16 However, Romania agreed not to apply 'block exemptions' as the State aid grantors were not yet ready for it.

13Prof.Ph.D. Reimer von BORRIES

Abstract

The European Commission has constantly identified the State aid control as a problematic area, which could lead to a delay in the closure of accession negotiations or even to the postponement of the date of accession. In the Monitoring Report issued by the European Commission in May 2006, Romania's progresses in the field of State aid were acknowledged and it was decided that the existing aid procedure become available for Romania.

In the evolution of State aid control in Romania three distinct periods can be identified. After the presentation of first period in the State aid control, the present article continue with the describe of second period, 2004-2005, which was characterized by changes in the composition of the Council, important organisational improvements, the completion of the legislative work, a strongly increased activism regarding the enforcement of State aid rules, a reinforced cooperation with the State aid granting authorities and a large number of competition advocacy activities.

Keywords: State aid, competition authority, Competition Council, State aid control.

12STATE AID CONTROL IN ROMANIA (II)

c) n rapoartele de progrese, Comisia a subliniat, cu regularitate, c atunci cnd se evalueaz progresele Romniei n vederea aderrii, importante sunt rezultatele aplicrii legii (enforcement record). n Raportul de progrese din 2003, Comisia a observat c n ceea ce privete ajutorul de stat, mecansimele de control sunt nc insuficiente; n Raportul din 2004, Comisia a concluzionat c rezultatele Consiliului Concurenei privind aplicarea legii n domeniul ajutorului de stat trebuie s fie considerabil mbuntit n continuare. Un aspect important al criticilor formulate de Comisie a fost reprezentat de faptul c, pn n 2004, nu existase nici o decizie negativ a Consiliului i aproape nici o investigaie ex-officio n domeniul ajutorului de stat. De asemenea, n Romnia nu existase nici o procedur

17de recuperare .

Consiliul Concurenei a rspuns acestor critici prin iniierea a numeroase investigaii ex-officio, prin emiterea, pentru prima dat, a unei decizii negative i prin declanarea primei proceduri de recuperare. n total, n anul 2004, Consiliul Concurenei a emis 90 de decizii n domeniul ajutorului de stat (dintre care 19 decizii privind ajutoare regionale, 29 decizii privind ajutoare de restructurare, 2 decizii privind scheme de ajutor pentru IMM-uri, 7 decizii privind sprijinul pentru servicii de interes economic general

18etc.) .

n plus, un mare numr de msuri de ajutor de stat existente (n special ajutor fiscal) au fost sistematic analizate prin prisma compatibilitii cu regulile de ajutor de stat; unele dintre aceste msuri au fost abrogate, altele au fost adaptate, n special legea privind zonele libere, ordonana de urgen cu privire la zonele defavorizate, precum i ordonana de urgen cu privire la parcurile industriale.

De asemenea, Consiliul a fcut eforturi pentru mbuntirea calitii deciziilor. Atunci cnd a monitorizat eforturile Romniei n domeniul ajutorului de stat, n vara anului 2004, Comisia a constatat c, n ceea ce privete aplicarea corespunztoare a legislaiei n materie de ajutor de stat i mbuntirea calitii deciziilor mai erau

19necesare progrese . Avnd n vedere necesitatea accelerrii progreselor din acest domeniu, Comisia European i Consiliul Concurenei au convenit asupra unei aa-numite proceduri de pre-consultare, ncepnd cu 14 septembrie 2004, prin care serviciile Comisiei (DG Concuren) urmau s ofere consultan Consiliului Concurenei cu privire la proiectele de decizii nainte de adoptarea lor final. n consecin, toate deciziile cu for juridic din domeniul ajutorului de stat, emise de Consiliul Concurenei ncepnd cu 14 septembrie 2004, au fost adoptate doar dup primirea unei opinii

20favorabile din partea DG Concuren .

Sfaturile experilor Comisiei s-au dovedit a fi de mare ajutor pentru continuarea progreselor: n urma strnsei colaborri informale dintre Consiliu i Comisie n procesul de luare a deciziilor, Comisia a declarat, n Raportul de Monitorizare din 2005, c aceasta a condus la o mbuntire considerabil a calitii deciziilor, (dei este necesar continuarea

21mbuntirii).

Un aspect politic foarte important rmsese nc [nerezolvat n.t.], i anume cerina notificrii ex-ante. n Raportul din 2004, Comisia ceruse Guvernului Romniei s se asigure c toate proiectele de ajutor de stat, inclusiv cele din domeniile sensibile, privind privatizarea i marile companii de stat, vor deveni obiect al controlului strict al Consiliului Concurenei cu privire la ajutoarele de stat, mai ales msurile de ajutor fiscal. Potrivit Comisiei, erau necesare eforturi majore pentru a asigura notificarea ex ante a tuturor msurilor noi de ajutor de stat. n ciuda mbuntirii considerabile a cooperrii dintre furnizorii de ajutor de stat i Consiliul Concurenei (n mare msur datorit Grupului de lucru inter-ministerial pe probleme de ajutor de stat), numrul i calitatea notificrilor de la autoritile furnizoare preau a fi principalul punct slab al aplicrii legii. Comisia a insistat n mai multe rnduri ca Guvernul Romniei s mbunteasc aceast situaie. Comisarul Neelie Kroes a avertizat Romnia, ntr-un discurs rostit la Bucureti, n mai 2005, c sunt necesare eforturi pentru a se evita aplicarea super-clauzei de salvgardare din Tratatul

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17 Potrivit art. 17 i 18 (actualmente 24 i 25) din Legea privind ajutorul de stat, Consiliul nu are puterea de a emite decizii de recuperare cu for juridic obligatorie, ci trebuie s cear Curii de Apel competente s anuleze actul administrativ prin care a fost acordat ajutorul de stat i s dispun recuperarea. 18 Pentru detalii suplimentare, a se vedea Raportul anual al Consiliului Concurenei pe 2004 (n limba romn i englez). 19 A se vedea Raportul de progrese, documentul SEC (2004) 1200 din 6 octombrie 2004. Valoarea ajutoarelor de stat autorizate n 2004 a fost de aprox. 2,6 milioane EUR (a se vedea Raportul anual al Consiliului Concurenei pe 2004).20 A se vedea Raportul anual al Consiliului Concurenei pe 2004 i Raportul de monitorizare al Comisiei, documentul SEC (2005) 1354 din 25 octombrie 2005. Personalul Consiliului a fost sprijinit n aceast activitate de de experii germani n cadrul celui de al doilea Proiect de Twinning, ca parte a parteneriatului pentru aderare dintre Romnia i Uniunea European. 21 Raportul de monitorizare din 2005.

c) The Commission regularly emphasised in its Progress Reports the fact that, in the end, the enforcement record is what counts in assessing Romania's progress towards accession. In its 2003 Progress Report, the Commission observed that as regards State aid, control mechanisms are still insufficient; in its 2004 Report, the Commission concluded that the Competition Council's State aid enforcement record still needs to be considerably improved. One important point of the Commission's criticism was that, until 2004, there had been no negative Council decisions and almost no ex officio investigations in the State aid field. Also, there had been no recovery procedures in

22Romania .

The Competition Council responded to this criticism by initiating numerous ex officio investigations, issuing a negative decision for the first time and starting the first recovery proceedings. Altogether, the Council issued 90 decisions in 2004 in the State aid state aid field (19 on regional aid, 29 on restructuring aid, 2 on SME aid schemes, 7 on support for SGEI,

23etc.) .

Addition, a large number of existing aid measures (in particular regarding fiscal aid) were systematically scrutinised for their compatibility with the State aid rules; some of them were abolished, some were adapted, in particular the Law regarding free zones, the Government Emergency Ordinance on deprived areas, and the Government Ordinance on industrial parks.

The Council also made strong efforts to improve the quality of its decisions. When monitoring Romania's efforts in the State aid area in the summer of 2004, the Commission found that further progress regarding the accurate application of the State aid legislation and the quality of the State aid decisions

24was necessary . Considering the need for speeding up progress in this area, the Commission and the Council agreed on a so-called Pre-consultation procedure, starting on 14 September 2004, whereby the Commission services (i.e. DG Competition) would offer advice to the Council on

draft decisions before their final adoption. Consequently, all legally binding State aid decisions issued by the Competition Council since 14 September 2004 have only been adopted after receiving a favourable opinion from DG

25Competition .

The advice of the Commission experts turned out to be very helpful for making further progress: following the close informal cooperation between the Council and the Commission in the decision-making process, the Commission stated in its 2005 Monitoring Report that this has resulted in a noticeable improvement in the quality of decisions (though further

26improvementis necessary) .

A crucial political issue still remained regarding the ex ante notification requirement. In its 2004 Report, the Commission called on the Romanian Government to ensure that all State aid projects, including those in the sensitive areas, concerning privatisations and large State-owned companies, should become subject to strict State aid control by the Competition Council, particularly with regard to fiscal aid measures. According to the Commission, major efforts were needed to ensure complete ex ante notification of all new aid measures. Although cooperation between the State aid grantors and the Competition Council had improved considerably (due to a considerable extent to the Inter-Ministerial Working Group on State aid Issues), the number and quality of the notifications from the State aid granting authorities appeared to remain the main weak point of the enforcement record. The Commission insisted several times that the Romanian Government should improve this situation. Commissioner Neelie Kroes warned Romania, in a speech delivered in Bucharest in May 2005, that further efforts were necessary to avoid the application of the super-safeguard clause of the Accession Treaty, and called upon the Romanian Government to resolve the existing

27backlog of notifications .

Following these warnings, the Romanian Government set up a high-level Inter-Ministerial Committee for Competition to support the work of

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22 According to Articles 17 and 18 (now 24 and 25) of the Law on State Aid, the Council does not have the power to issue legally binding recovery orders but has to request the competent Court of Appeal to annul the administrative act granting the State aid and to order the recovery. 23 For further details see the 2004 Annual Report of the Romanian Competition Council (Romanian/English).24 See the 2004 Progress Report, Document SEC(2004) 1200 of October 6, 2004. The volume of State aid authorised in 2004 was about 2.6 billion (see the 2004 Annual Report of the Competition Council).25 See the 2004 Annual Report of the Competition Council and the 2005 Monitoring Report of the Commission, Document SEC(2005) 1354 of 25 October 2005. The Council staff was supported in this work by German experts in the framework of a second Twinning Project, as part of the Accession Partnership between Romania and the EU.26 2005 Monitoring Report.27 Competition in the European Union the case for Romania, Speech of 12 May 2005 at the European Institute of Romania, reported on the Website of the Commission.

de aderare i a cerut Guvernului Romniei s rezolve 28restanele existente privind notificrile .

n urma acestor avertismente, Guvernul Romniei a instituit un Comitet Interministerial pentru Concuren, la nivel nalt, pentru a sprijini activitatea Consiliului Concurenei prin garantarea faptului c, de asemenea, toate proiectele de ajutor de stat ale ministerelor erau notificate i c schemele existente erau verificate. De asemenea, Guvernul a adoptat o hotrre pentru accelerarea implementrii legislaiei de ajutor de stat, prevznd sanciuni pentru furnizorii de ajutor de stat care nu respectau obligaia

29de notificare . Astfel, au fost luate msuri pentru a se asigura o mai mare respectare a obligaiei de notificare ex-ante.

Guvernul Romniei a adoptat, de asemenea, dispoziii menite s fac mai eficient aplicarea deciziilor Consiliului Concurenei de interzicere sau

30de recuperare a ajutoarelor de stat . Cu toate acestea, Comisia a evideniat cu privire la acest aspect, c este nevoie de eforturi continue i a observat, n Raportul de monitorizare din mai 2006, c ajutor de stat n legtur cu cazurile de restructurare, a amnrilor de la plat sau a msurilor legate de privatizare nu sunt nc realizate la standardele cerute. De aceea, Comisia a concluzionat c, n aceast privin, mai rmn multe de fcut nainte de data aderrii.

Progresele Romniei n domeniul controlului ajutoarelor de stat n perioada 1 septembrie 2004 - 30 septembrie 2005 au fost evideniate de ctre Raportul de progrese din 2005. n evaluarea detaliat a eforturilor Romniei din aceast perioad, Comisia a recunoscut c Romnia a fcut progrese considerabile. n special, Comisia a declarat c alinierea legislaiei este complet, c legea privind

31ajutorul de stat a fost din nou amendat i c mai multe reguli de implementare au fost adoptate sau amendate. n ceea ce privete situaia aplicrii legislaiei, Comisia a declarat c instituirea mecanismului de pre-consultare a condus la o mbuntire notabil a

notificarea ex ante a tuturor msurilor noi de

calitii deciziilor de ajutor de stat; totui este necesar o continuare a mbuntirii calitii evalurii de ctre Consiliul Concurenei a msurilor de ajutor de stat i a analizei acestora. Mai mult, ar trebui acordat atenie implementrii n practic a deciziilor. Consiliul Concurenei ar trebui s continue, de asemenea, evaluarea ajutoarelor de stat existente.

Eforturi continue sunt necesare pentru asigurarea notificrii ex ante a tuturor msurilor noi n legtur cu cazurile de restructurare, amnrile la plat i

32msurile legate de privatizare. n anexa Raportului , Comisia a reiterat faptul c situaia aplicrii legii nu a atins (nc) un nivel suficient de satisfctor pentru aplicarea procedurii interimare prevzut de Tratatul de aderare. De aceea, Comisia a cerut Romniei s continue eforturile pline de succes i a concluzionat c, dac Romnia va continua pe calea nceput n 2004, un nivel satisfctor al aplicrii legii ar putea fi atins n anul 2006 i c ndeplinirea obligaiilor din Tratatul de aderare cu privire la instituirea unui

33control efectiv al ajutoarelor de stat este posibil . *

O privire asupra valorii ajutoarelor de stat acordate n Romnia poate prezenta interes. n primvara anului 2006, Comisia a publicat, cu ocazia actualizrii valorilor din Tabloul ajutoarelor de stat (State aid scoreboard) pentru perioada 2002 2004, cteva valori, pe baza datelor transmise de autoritile

34romne . a) Volumul total al ajutoarelor de stat acordate n Romnia n ultimele decenii este considerat a fi destul de ridicat. n perioada 2002 2004, valoarea ajutoarelor de stat acordate anual n Romnia a fost estimat la 981 milioane EUR (exclusiv ajutoarele pentru agricultur, pescuit i transport). Aceast sum reprezint 1,86% din PIB-ul Romniei (comparativ cu 0,40%, media UE-25, i 1,35%, media celor zece noi state membre) i corespunde la 118 PPS per capita (comparativ cu 161 PPS per capita n cele zece noi state membre).

b) Distribuia ajutoarelor de stat ntre obiective orizontale i anumite sectoare din Romnia prezint un interes deosebit. Potrivit Tabloului din primvara

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28 Concurena n Uniunea European cazul Romniei, discurs din 12 mai 2005 la Institutul European din Romnia, prezentat pe website-ul Comisiei.29 Ordonana Guvernului nr. 490/2005 din 26 mai 2005, Monitorul Oficial nr. 500 din 14 iunie 2005. Aceasta este o dispoziie unic i interesant, dar se pare c, pn n prezent, nu a fost niciodat aplicat.30 Ordonana de Urgen a Guvernului nr. 129/2005, Monitorul Oficial nr. 887 din 4 octombrie 2005.31 Legea privind ajutorul de stat a fost amendat prin Ordonana Guvernului nr.94/2004, amendat i aprobat prin Legea nr.507/2004 i republicat n august 2005.32 A se vedea, de asemenea, anexa detaliat cu privire la Progresele Romniei n domeniul politicii de concuren. 33 Un capitol special se ocup cu restructurarea industriei siderurgic romneti.34 A se vedea, de asemenea, rapoartele anuale ale Consiliului Concurenei, precum i informaiile furnizate pe pagina de Internet a acestuia, la adresele: www.competition.ro i www.consiliulconcurentei.ro.

the Competition Council by ensuring that all State aid plans of all Ministries were notified and that existing schemes were also scrutinised. The Government also adopted a decision on measures for accelerating the implementation of the State aid legislation, including sanctions on State aid grantors

35who failed to observe the notification requirement . Thus, measures were taken to ensure greater respect of the ex ante-notification obligation.

The Romanian Government also adopted provisions designed to make the enforcement of decisions of the Competition Council prohibiting State aids and

36recovery more effective . However, the Commission emphasised that in this regard, continued efforts are required and observed in its Monitoring Report of May 2006 that ex ante notification of all new aid measures in relation to restructuring cases, payment deferrals or measures connected with privatisation are not yet carried out up to the requisite standard. The Commission therefore concluded that in this regard some work still remains to be done before accession.

Romania's progress in the area of State aid control during the time period 1 September 2004 until 30 September 2005 was highlighted by the 2005 Progress Report. In the detailed assessment of Romania's efforts during this period, the Commission acknowledged that Romania had made considerable progress. In particular, the Commission stated that legislative alignment iscomplete, that Romania's

37State aid Law was further amended , and that many implementing rules have been issued or amended. As regards the State aid enforcement record, the Commission stated that a noticeable improvement in the quality of these decisions had resulted following the establishment of the pre-consultation mechanism; however, further improvement in the quality of the Competition Council's assessment of aid measures and their analysis is necessary. Furthermore, attention should be given to the actual implementation of decisions. The Competition

Council should also continue with the assessment of existing aid measures. Major continued efforts are required to ensure the ex-ante notification of all new aid measures in relation to restructuring cases, payment deferrals and measures in connection with privatisation. In the

38Annex to the Report , the Commission still maintains that the enforcement record has (not yet) reached a level which is sufficiently satisfactory to allow the application of the interim procedure under the existing aid mechanism provided for in the Accession Treaty. The Commission therefore urged Romania to maintain further its successful efforts and concluded that if Romania continues on the path taken since autumn 2004, a satisfactory level of enforcement could be reached during 2006, and the fulfilment of the Accession Treaty obligations with regard to the establishment of an effective State aid

39control is likely .

It may be interesting to look at the volume of State aid granted in Romania. Recently, the Commission published some figures for the period 20022004 in the Spring 2006 Update of its State aid Scoreboard for the period 2002-2004, based mainly on the

40figures forwarded by the Romanian authorities .

a) The volume of total aid spent in Romania during the last few decades is seen to be rather high. During 2002-2004, total State aids granted annually in Romania were estimated as 981 million (excluding aid for agriculture, fisheries and transport). This amount represents 1.86% of the Romanian GDP (as compared to 0.40% EU-25 average, and 1.35% average of the 10 new Member States) and it corresponds to 118 PPS47 per capita (as compared with 161 PPS per capita in the ten new Member States).

b) The distribution of State aid between horizontal objectives and particular sectors in Romania is of

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35 Government Ordinance No. 490/2005 of 26 May 2005, Monitorul Oficial No.500 of 14 June 2005. This is an interesting and unique provision, but it seems that up till now it has never been enforced.36 Government Emergency Ordinance No. 129/2005, Monitorul Oficial No. 887 of 4 October 2005.37 The Law on State aid was further amended by the Government Ordinance No. 94/2004, amended and approved by Law No. 507/2004, and republished in August 2005 (see above footnote 11).38 See also the detailed Annex to the Report dealing specifically with 'Romania's progress in the area of competition policy'.39 A special chapter dealt with restructuring of the Romanian steel industry. 40 See also the Annual Reports of the Romanian Commission Council and the information provided on its website under www.competition.ro and www.consiliulconcurentei.ro.

anului 2006, 851 milioane EUR (=87% din totalul ajutoarelor de stat) au fost acordate, n medie, n fiecare an, pentru obiective sectoriale (UE-25: 32%, noile state membre: 77%). Pentru obiective regionale, au fost utilizate 130,3 milioane EUR (=13%, comparativ cu 68%, n UE25, i 23%, n noile state membre).

c) Ponderea diferitelor instrumente n totalul ajutoarelor de stat este, de asemenea, interesant. n

Romnia, instrumentul de ajutor de stat cel mai utilizat n perioada 2002 2004 a fost amnarea la plata impozitelor (45,4%), urmat de scutirile de taxe (29,4%) i granturi (23,7%). n Rapoartele de progrese, Comisia a criticat, n mod repetat, faptul c, n Romnia, msurile fiscale au fost utilizate drept o form frecvent de ajutor de stat i a recomandat Romniei s se orienteze ctre alte instrumente, mai transparente.

14

special interest. According to the spring 2006 Scoreboard, 851 million (= 87% of State aid) were granted on annual average for sectoral purposes (EU 25: 32%, new Member States: 77%). For horizontal objectives, 130.3 million were spent (=13%, as compared with 68% in the EU 25, and 23% in the new Member States.

c) The share of the various aid instruments in total aid

is also interesting. In Romania, the most widely used aid instrument during the period 2002-2004 was the tax deferral (45.4%), followed by tax exemptions (29.4%) and grants (23.7%). In its Progress Reports the Commission had repeatedly criticised the fact that tax measures were being used as the most common form of aid in Romania, and recommended that Romania should turn to other, more transparent, instruments.

15

I. Evoluia politicii de concuren n Romnia

Autoritatea italian de concuren a fost prezent n Romnia ncepnd cu 2001. n aceti ase ani, o revoluie tcut s-a produs n domeniul concurenei.

n noiembrie 2002, la ncheierea primului Proiect de Twinning, n Raportul final, sugeram:1) semnarea unui memorandum de nelegere ntre Consiliul Concurenei i Oficiul Concurenei cu privire la alocarea cazurilor; 2) crearea posibilitii de accesare a Internetului de ctre personal: 3) eliminarea obligaiei companiilor care ncheie acorduri care intr sub incidena unui regulament de exceptare pe categorii de a notifica la Consiliul Concurenei respectivul acord (exceptat);4) introducerea unui nivel mai ridicat de confidenialitate, mai ales n cazul deciziilor privind efectuarea de inspecii inopinate;5) publicarea deciziilor; 6) consolidarea activitilor de promovare a culturii concurenei.

Toate aceste sugestii au fost fcute n urm cu doar patru ani, dar parc s-ar fi ntmplat acum cteva secole.

Dac evoluia din domeniul concurenei este un exemplu reprezentativ pentru schimbrile care au aprut n acelai interval, ar trebui s fii mndri de ceea ce ai realizat. Exist, ntr-adevr, dovezi indirecte c aa stau lucrurile. Dac n anii 60, un vizitator ajungea de la aeroport n oraul Huston cu cte 5 minute mai devreme n fiecare lun, activitatea de constucii fiind att de intens nct oraul se extindea foarte rapid, un vizitator ajunge n centrul Bucuretiului cu zece minute mai trziu n fiecare lun din cauza traficului n continu cretere. Mainile sunt un semn bun al creterii economice i al

progresului social, chiar dac nu este n mod necesar mai bine pentru mediu! In orice caz, sunt bucuros c sediul Consiliului s-a mutat n cldirea Presei Libere, ceea ce-l face mai accesibil. Altfel, nu a fi reuit s ajung la timp la ntlnirea de ieri de la Consiliu.

Dup 2001, n afar de creterea numrului de maini, Romnia a obinut foarte multe n domeniul concurenei. n decembrie 2003, Oficiul Concurenei a fost desfiinat, iar Consiliul este acum singura autoritate de concuren din Romnia. Numrul membrilor plenului a fost redus de la zece la apte. Legea a fost amplu revizuit: au fost eliminate notificrile care nu erau necesare, au fost majorate pragurile de notificare n cazurile de concentrare economic, a fost prevzut obligaia publicrii deciziilor, au fost majorate sanciunile pentru firmele care refuz s coopereze cu Consiliul, a fost permis adoptarea sanciunii prin aceeai decizie prin care era constat nclcarea regulilor de concuren. n fine, necesitatea obinerii unei autorizaii judectoreti pentru inspeciile inopinate a fost eliminat.

Ca rezultat al acestor schimbri, eficiena activitii de aplicare a legii concurenei s-a mbuntit. nainte de orice, numrul investigaiilor a crescut de trei ori, de la 10, n anul 2000, la 33 n 2004. Mai mult, Consiliul a reuit s descopere cteva carteluri hard core (n sectorul cimentului i al serviciilor portuare), aplicnd amenzi totale n valoare de peste 30 milioane EUR. n final, creterea substanial a salariilor a oprit fluctuaiile rapide de personal, care mpiedicau Consiliul s devin o instituie funcional. mbuntiri similare au avut loc i n privina activitii de promovare a culturii concurenei. Dup cum am menionat deja, n anul 2001 autoritile de concuren nu erau implicate n procesul de reform legislativ i nici nu participau la deciziile privind

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41 Traducerea n limba romn a fost realizat de Georgeta Gavriloiu.42 Director al Departamentului de Cercetare i Relaii Internaionale, Autoritatea de Concuren din Italia.

ROMNIA I UNIUNEA EUROPEAN: CARE SUNT PROVOCRILE N DOMENIUL CONCURENEI?41

ROMNIA I UNIUNEA EUROPEAN: CARE SUNT 41PROVOCRILE N DOMENIUL CONCURENEI?

42Alberto HEIMLER42Alberto HEIMLER

I. The evolution of Romanian Antitrust

The Italian Competition Authority has been in Romania since 2001. In these six years a silent revolution has taken place in antitrust.

In November 2002 at the conclusion of the first Twinning Project we suggested in the final Report: 1) the signing of an memorandum of understanding between the Competition Council and the Competition Office on case allocation, 2) the possibility of Internet access for the staff, 3) the elimination of the obligation for companies entering into agreements covered by a block exemption regulation to notify their (exempted) agreement to the Council, 4) the introduction of a greater degree of protection of confidentiality especially in the case of decisions on dawn raids, 5) the publication of decisions, 6) the strengthening of competition advocacy.

It is only four years ago when these suggestions were made, but it looks ages ago.

If the evolution in antitrust is a representative example of the changes that have occurred in Romania in the same time span, you should be very proud of what you have accomplished. Indeed there are indirect signs that this is actually the case. While in the 1960's a visitor to Houston would arrive to town from the airport five minutes earlier month after month because the building activity was so intensive that the town would expand very rapidly, a visitor arriving to Bucharest would arrive to the centre of town ten minutes later month after month because of the ever increasing traffic. Cars are a good sign of economic and social progress, even though they are

not necessarily good for the environment! In any case, I am lucky that the Council moved to the building of Palatul Presei Libere which makes it much easier to arrive. Otherwise I would have never shown up in time for yesterday's SC meeting.

Since 2001, besides the increased number of cars, Rumania has achieved a lot in antitrust. In December 2003, the Competition Office was abolished and the Council is now the only antitrust authority in Romania. The number of commissioners was reduced from ten to seven. The law has been revised extensively, eliminating unnecessary notifications of exempted agreements, increasing the turnover thresholds for merger notification, making it mandatory the publication of decisions, increasing the sanctions for companies refusing to co-operate with the Council, allowing for sanctions to be adopted with the same decision that has identified a violation of the competition rules. Finally, the necessity of a Court authorization for dawn raids has been eliminated. Putting them one after the other, this is a very impressive list.

As a result of these changes, the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement has improved. First of all, the number of investigations increased by a factor of three, from 10 in the year 2000 to 33 in 2004. Furthermore the Council was able to discover a few hard core cartels (in cement and in harbour services), totalling more that 30 million EUR fines. Finally the substantial increase in salaries has allowed stopping the very quick personnel turnover that was impeding the Council from becoming a well functioning institution.

Similar improvements have taken place with respect to competition advocacy. As I have already mentioned, in 2001 competition authorities were not involved in the process of regulatory reform, nor

17

43 Head of the Research and International Relations Directorate, Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e dell Mercato, Italy.

ROMANIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: WHICH CHALLENGES IN ANTITRUST? ROMANIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: WHICH CHALLENGES IN ANTITRUST?

43Alberto HEIMLER43Alberto HEIMLER

privatizarea. Ordonana de Guvern a conferit Consiliului Concurenei competena de a emite aviz conform cu privire la proiectele de legi care pot avea impact anticoncurenial. Drept rezultat, Consiliul Concurenei se afl astzi n centrul reformei legislative n Romnia, iar concurena a dobndit un statut preeminent, de standard pentru reglementarea optim. Dintre jurisdiciile care mi sunt cunoscute, doar n Mexic, autoritii CFC i-au fost conferite competene similare. n alte jurisdicii, autoritile de concuren pot doar s formuleze opinii.

Dac Romnia a ajuns pn aici, atunci pentru ce mai este necesar acest proiect de twinning? Ce altceva ar mai putea Romnia s realizeze?

Se tie, chiar i n 2001, c proiectele de twinning erau, prin natur, cooperative i c fiecare partener se situa pe acelai poziie cu cellalt. ntr-adevr, toate etapele procesului trebuie s fie agreate de ambii parteneri. Nici mcar Comisia nu ne-a spus ce ar trebui s facem n practic. Rolul acesteia a fost mai mult de a garanta faptul c intele pe care ncercam s le atingem erau bine exprimate i c abaterile de la obiectivele ce trebuiau atinse puteau fi msurate. Acum, c Romania s-a alturat Uniunii, Consiliul Concurenei a devenit mai egal dect nainte. Acum, att autoritatea italian de concuren, ct i cea din Romnia, aplic aceleai reguli (articolele 81 i 82 din Tratatul CE), sunt inute de aceeai jursipruden i particip la aceleai dezbateri. Aceasta va ajuta Consiliul Concurenei s aplice mai bine legislaia concurenei.

Autoritile de concuren, att Departamentul de Justiie, ct i Comisia Federal de Comer, au fost primele instituii strine care au oferit asisten Consiliului Concurenei. Aceasta a fost o foarte bun alegere pentru Romnia. ntr-adevr este mai mult dect am preluat noi, europenii, de la Statele Unite. Nu dispoziiile legale, care i au originea n tradiia german ordoliberal care, nc din anii 1920 facuse o distincie ntre mpedimentele concurenei (care trebuiau interzise), cum sunt preurile de ruinare, discounturile de loialitate i boicoturile, i concurena bazat pe performan, care includea toate comportamentele care fceau o firm mult mai atractiv pentru consumatori (care trebuiau favorizate). Tradiia ordoliberal a fost bazat n special pe form. Dar n mod sigur, datorit

II. La ce servete politica de concuren?

dezvoltrilor aduse de Statele Unite, analiza economic are acum un rol n cretere n interpretarea acestor reguli. Definiia pieei rele-vante, abordarea restriciilor verticale, modul de analiz al concentrrilor, programele de clemen, toate acestea au o clar orgine american. Cel puin pn acum, convergena realizat este n mod clar antrenat de ctre Statele Unite.

Muli susin c aplicarea legii concurenei se face, n principal, ex post. Situaia este similar celei a amenzilor de circulaie, care sunt aplicate ex-post, dar regulile trebuie s fie cunoscute ex-ante, pentru ca acestea s aib vreun efect descurajator. Dac aceste prevederi legale sunt standarde, spre deosebire de reguli, efectul descurajator poate fi garantat doar prin jurispruden, linii directoare i comunicri. i, ntr-adevr, n ultimii zece ani, atunci cnd critica din partea [colii de la - ad.tr.] Chicago a

44depit de-acum nvechita paradigm a SCM , ageniile de concuren au emis un numr impresionant de linii directoare i comunicri, mai ales n privina controlului concentrrilor econo-mice, dar i cu privire la restriciile verticale, transferul de tehnologie, acordurile de cercetare-dezvoltare etc. Analiza economic i accentul pus de aceasta pe eficiena economic, a oferit ochelarii prin care sunt interpretate dispoziiile legale.

Eficiena este adeseori interpretat drept obiectivul brutal al politicii economice. Muli dintre criticii acesteia sugereaz faptul c, urmrind eficiena, politica de concuren, a uitat de solidaritate. Eu nu sunt de acord. Efienciena nu este probabil cel mai potrivit termen. Concurena on the merrits ar fi mai potrivit. Aceasta implic faptul c aplicarea regulilor de concuren garanteaz faptul c cel mai bun ctig. O asemenea aplicare a regulilor de concuren reprezint, n acelai timp, un standard moral. Spiritul olimpic este cel evocat de concurena on the merits. Nu ctigi Olimpiada prin solidaritate. Exist multe alte instrumente pentru a se obine solidaritate (n special politici fiscale).

Problema este ce nelegem de fapt prin concurena on the merits. Comitetul de Concuren al OCDE a organizat, n anul 2005, o mas rotund pentru discutarea concurenei on the merits. Cu toate c unele agenii pstreaz n continuare o abordare formalist, multe altele s-au orientat ctre o abordare bazat pe efecte. ntr-adevr doar lund n calcul efectul unei anumite practici, responsabilitatea

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44 SCM Supply Chain Management.

did they participate in the privatisation decisions. The 2003 Government Ordinance gave the Competition Council the power to give binding opinions on draft laws which may have an anticompetitive impact. As a result, the Competition Council is now at the centre of regulatory reform in Romania and competition has achieved a primacy status as the standard for optimal regulation. Among jurisdictions that I know, only in Mexico the CFC was given a similar power. In all other jurisdictions competition authorities can only advocate.

If Romania has gone so far what then is this twinning project for? What else could Romania achieve?

We know, even back in 2001, that Twinning projects are cooperative in nature and that each partner is put on an equal footing with the other. Indeed all steps in the process have to be agreed by both partners. Even the Commission does not tell us what we should do in practice. Its role is more to make sure that the target we are trying to achieve is well expressed and that deviations from objectives to be achieved could be measured. Now that Romania has joined the Union, the Competition Council has become more equal than before. Now, both Italian and Romanian competition authorities apply the same rules (articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty), are subject to the same case-law and participate to the same debates. This will help the Council to better enforce the antitrust law.

The US antitrust authorities, both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, were the first foreign institutions to assist the Competition Council. And it has been a very good choice for Romania. Indeed there is much that we Europeans took from the US. Not the legal provisions, that originate from the ordoliberal German tradition which already in the 1920's had distinguished impediment competition (to be prohibited), such as predatory pricing, loyalty rebates and boycotts, from performance competition which included all conduct that made a firms product more attractive to

II. What is antitrust for?

consumers (to be favored). The ordoliberal tradition was mostly based on forms. But certainly, thanks to US developments, economic analysis is now having an increasing role in interpreting these rules. The definition of the relevant market, the treatment of vertical restraints, the way to analyse mergers, leniency programs have a clear US origin. The achieved convergence is clearly US driven at least up until now.

Many argue that antitrust enforcement is mainly ex-post. This is like traffic tickets being ex-post, but the rules have to be known ex-ante, in order for them to exercise any deterrence at all. If these legal provisions are standards, as opposed to rules, deterrence can be guaranteed only by case law, guidelines and communications. And indeed in the last decade, when the Chicago critique was overcoming the now

45obsolete SCM paradigm , antitrust agencies have issued quite a number of guidelines and communications, especially on merger control, but also on vertical restraints, on technological transfers, on R&D agreements etc. Economic analysis, and its insistence on efficiency, has provided the glasses through which to interpret the legal provisions. Efficiency is very often mostly interpreted as a brutal objective of economic policy. Many of its critics suggest that by pursuing efficiency antitrust has forgotten solidarity. I disagree. Efficiency is probably not the best term to use. Competition on the merits is better. It implies that antitrust enforcement makes sure that the best wins. As such antitrust represents a moral standard as well. It is the Olympic spirit that competition on the merits evokes. You do not win the Olympics with solidarity. There are many other instruments to achieve solidarity (fiscal policy in particular).

The problem is what we actually mean by competition on the merits. The OECD Competition Committee held a roundtable discussion on competition on the merits in 2005. Although some agencies continue to maintain a form based approach, many others are moving towards an effect based one. Indeed only by considering the effect of a given practice the special responsibility of dominant companies can have a meaning. In particular such a

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45 SCM Supply Chain Management.

special a firmelor dominante poate avea sens. n special, aa cum sugereaz Comisia European n Documentul de discuii privind aplicarea articolului 82, o astfel de responsabilitate special nseamn c o firm dominant nu ar trebui s adopte strategii care ar exclude concurenii la fel de eficieni i, de asemenea, ar vtma consumatorii. ntr-adevr, potrivit documentului de discuii, identificarea unui asemenea abuz ar trebui s fie n mare parte bazat pe efectele poteniale de excludere ale practicii, mai mult dect pe efectele reale.

Prin aceasta, Comisia transmite un mesaj pentru Statele Unite unde, n schimb, accentul este pus mai ales pe efectele produsse. n Statele Unite, n absena efectelor vizibile i tangibile, instanele tind s concluzioneze c nu exist nclcare a legii. Punctul meu de vedere (i al Comisiei) este acela c existena unor diminuri ale concurenei, dac au fost legate direct de un abuz prin preuri, ar trebui s fie suficient (n msura n care concurenii nu sunt mai puin eficieni dect firma dominant). A cere o excludere efectiv, precum jurisprudena din Statele Unite, poate fi o sarcin adiional nejustificat. Bineneles, dovezile contrarii, cum ar fi creterea profitabil a cotei de pia a concurenilor, ca n Michelin II sau n Virgin, ar ngreuna considerabil sarcina probei.

Se vor mai ntmpla multe n lunile care urmeaz. Consiliului Concurenei i se va cere, de asemenea, s contribuie.

Voi prezenta pe scurt cteva dintre caracteristicile dezbaterii asupra articolului 82 cu privire la care Comisia a publicat, nc de anul trecut, un document de discuie foarte influent. M voi concentra asupra a dou ntrebri foarte generale: definirea dominanei i rolul intenei n dovedirea unui abuz. Cu privire la aceste puncte, ca i la oricare altul, orice autoritate din Uniune poate furniza un input i poate identifica o soluie. Spre deosebire de trecut, cnd Consiliul putea doar s preia acquis ul comunitar, acum cnd Romnia este stat membru, i Consiliul poate contribui la elaborarea legislaiei. Noul proiect de twinning i propune s ajute la consientizarea acestui aspect. Iniiativa Comisiei de a i revizui politica de aplicare a articolului 82 trebuie s fie apreciat. Este pentru prima dat cnd un asemenea efort, cu privire la un subiect foarte interesant din politica de concuren este ntreprins nu numai la nivel european, dar i n

III. Agenda european: documentul de discuii referitor la articolul 82 din Tratatul CE

ntreaga lume. Dispoziiile legale privind abuzul de poziie dominant contituie un element central al legii concurenei i att teoria economic ct i practica (cazurile) subliniaz dificultile care sunt implicate n obinerea unor concluzii rezonabile n cazurile de abuz.

mprtesc total punctul de vedere din document c o trecere la o analiz pe baza efectelor este necesar i c, de asemenea, consecvena i eficiena presupune faptul ca firmele s fie mai bine informate cu privire la ceea ce constituie sau nu un abuz de poziie dominant.

Determinarea faptului c firma (firmele) investigat deine o poziie dominant depinde de doi factori principali: cota de pia a firmei dominante i condiiile legate de intrarea [pe pia n.t.]. Noiunea de putere de pia substanial citat n paragraful 23 al documentului este un pic scolastic, de vreme ce exist un numr de companii care sunt dominante (pota, calea ferat, reeaua de ap etc.) dar care, din cauza reglementrilor sau al faptului c sunt deinute de stat, nu au o putere de pia substanial (nregistreaz pierderi structurale). n continuare (paragraful 27), documentul de discuie pare s mprteasc acest punct de vedere, dei se refer doar la pierderile pe termen scurt, n timp ce pentru aceste firme, pierderile pot fi pe termen lung.

Ct despre evaluarea cotelor de pia, documentul de discuie mprtete opinia c dominana poate fi ntlnit la cote de pia de peste 25% (nu este exclus posibilitatea existenei dominanei chiar i la cote de pia sub 25%). Abordarea Comisiei este prea precaut. Dominana ar putea foarte bine s fie exclus la cote de pia sub 35% i considerat ca posibil la peste 65%, cazurile intermediare necesitnd o evalaure mai aprofundat, realizat de la caz la caz.

Mai mult, Comisia opineaz c exist un singur grad de dominan, fr s ia n considerare faptul c exist o diferen, n termeni de putere de pia, ntre dominana existent la o cot de pia s spunem de 40% i dominana existent la 95%. Acest aspect nu este lipsit de consecine. n cazurile de practicare a unor preuri de ruinare, Comisia susine c dovedirea recuperrii nu este necesar pentru c este implicit definiei dominanei, n timp ce chestiunea gradului de dominan ar trebui s fie considerat n dovedirea cazului (aa cum sugereaz Curtea de

Definiia dominanei

20

special responsibility, as the European Commission suggests in the discussion paper on the application of article 82, means that a dominant company should not adopt strategies that would exclude equally efficient competitors and also harm consumers. Indeed, according to the discussion paper, the identification of an abuse should be mostly based on the potential exclusionary effects of the practice, more than on its actual effects.

In this, the EC has a message for the US where, on the contrary, the emphasis is mainly on realized effects. In the US in the absence of visible and tangible effects, the courts tend to conclude that there is no violation. My point (and the Commission's point) is that the existence of sustained losses by competitors, if directly linked to a pricing abuse of the dominant firm, should be sufficient (in so far as competitors are not less efficient than the dominant firm). Requiring actual exclusions, as in the US case law, may be an unjustified additional burden. Of course, the contrary evidence, that is the profitable increase of competitors share, like in Michelin II or in Virgin, should significantly increase the burden of proof.

There is going to be much more on this in the months to come. Also the Competition Council will be asked to contribute.

I will briefly discuss with you some of the features of the debate on Article 82 on which the Commission has, now a year ago, issued a very influential discussion paper. I will concentrate on two very general questions: the definition of dominance and the role of intent in proving an abuse. On all of these points, as well as on very other one, every authority in the Union can provide an input and identify a solution. Contrary to the past when the Council was only a taker of the acquis communautaire, now when Romania is a member State, also the Council can contribute to law making. This twinning project is trying to create this new awareness.

The Commission initiative of reviewing its policy on

III. The European Agenda: The discussion paper on Article 82 of the EC Treaty

the application of Article 82 is to be welcome. It is the first time that such an extensive work, on a very challenging subject in competition policy, has been conducted, not only at the European level but worldwide. Legal provisions regarding abuse of a dominant position are a central element of competition law and both economic theory and case experience underline the difficulties that are involved in reaching sound conclusions in abuse cases. I fully share the view of the paper that a shift towards an effect based analysis is needed and that consistency and effectiveness imply that firms are better informed on what is and what isn't an abuse.

Establishing whether the firm(s) under investigation occupy a dominant position depends on two main factors: the market share of the dominant firm and entry conditions. The notion of substantial market power cited in paragraph 23 of the paper is a bit scholastic, since there are quite a number of companies that are dominant (post office, rail, water etc.) but, because of regulation or State ownership, do not have a substantial market power (they incur structural losses). Further on (paragraph 27) the Discussion Paper seems to take this view, although it only refers to short-run losses while for these companies the losses may well be long run. As for the assessment of market shares, the Discussion Paper takes the view that dominance can be found with shares above 25% (even below 25% the possibility of finding dominance is not ruled out). The approach of the Commission is too cautious. Dominance might well be excluded with market shares below 35% and considered likely above 65%, with the middle range requiring a stronger case by case assessment.

Furthermore, the Commission takes the view that there is a single degree of dominance, without taking into account that there is a difference, in terms of market power actually exercised, between dominance established at a market share let's say of 40% and dominance established at 95%. The issue is not without consequence. In predation the Commission argues that proving recoupment is not necessary because it is implicit in the definition of dominance, while the question of the degree of

The definition of dominance

21

Justiie). Documentul de discuie se refer pasager la factorul gradul de dominan (paragraful 59), dar nu reuete s i recunoasc pe deplin importana.

n luarea n considerarea condiiilor de intrare pe pia, discutarea barierelor la intrare n literatura economic tradiional a creat nenelegeri extinse i nu ofer o baz solid pentru implementarea unei politici.

Literatura s-a concentrat pe barierele la intrare n contextul concentrrilor economice i pe faptul dac intrarea pe pia de noi concureni este de natur s mpiedice exercitarea puterii de pia pe termen scurt sau mediu (poate doi ani).

n timp ce n analiza concentrrilor, dominana poate rezulta din capacitatea prilor care se concentreaz de a crete preurile (i din condiiile de intrare pe pia sau de extindere care pot mpiedica aceasta), n cazurile de abuz, dominana este definit drept capacitatea de a menine preurile peste nivelul concurenial pentru o perioad de timp substanial, fr a atrage intrri pe pia. Bineneles, nu este suficient orice intrare, ci o intrare la o scar i intensitate suficiente pentru a disciplina presupusa putere de pia a firmei dominante.

n cazurile de abuz, n absena barierelor la intrare de natur administrativ sau legal, accentul trebuie s cad pe costurile irecuperabile (spre exemplu, activele corporale specializate) care ntrzie sau mpiedic intrarea de noi competitori sau pe tranferul costurilor ctre consumatori, care face dificil ca un nou entrant pe pia s devin un competitor viabil. Acestea sunt, totui, dou considerente speciale care se aplic n cazurile de abuz. Mai nti, n definirea pieelor relevante, evaluarea condiiilor de intrare ar trebui s in cont de teoria cazului. Barierele care ar putea fi ineficiente dac preurile sunt crescute peste nivelurile prevalente pot s fie totui relevante n evaluarea impactului practicilor de excludere care mpiedic preurile s coboare sub nivelele actuale.

n al doilea rnd, n cazurile de abuz, chiar comportamentul investigat poate s fie principalul element care descurajeaz noile intrri. ntr-adevr este recunoscut din ce n ce mai mult faptul c abilitatea (capacitatea) firmelor de a descuraja intrarea pe pia prin bariere comportamentale spre deosebire de barierele structurale aceasta este, ntradevr, esena multor abuzuri sau cazuri de monopolizare. Comportamentele care descurajeaz

intrarea pot include multe dintre practicile care care sunt tratate drept abuzuri (spre exemplu, preurile de ruinare, clauzele contractuale de excludere i utilizarea mrcilor cu pre redus (fighting brands). Ca o semnificaie a acestui fapt, cazurile valide de abuz pot implica uneori piee pe care exist puine sau (n principiu) nicio barier n sensul mai tradiional, structural, de active corporale specializate. Acest aspect este inclus, chiar dac n mod implicit, n Raportul Grupului Economic Consultativ n Politica Concurenei, dar este ignorat de Comisie.

n al treilea rnd, n special cu privire la abuzurile de excludere , o analiz a pieei este necesar pentru a verifica dac intrarea pe pia s-a produs n trecut i dac concurenii erau capabili s creasc. Dac rspunsul este da, atunci dominana ar putea fi, n mod rezonabil, exclus, cu excepia situaiei n care intrarea pe pia s-a produs atunci cnd practica abuziv nu exista. n anumite cazuri, lipsa de capacitate poate s fac foarte dificil pentru o companie s i majoreze cota de pia. Totui, acesta nu este, n mod necesar, un semn c firma nu este dominant sau c practica n cauz nu este abuziv pentru c practicile abuzive de excludere pot permite meninerea artificial a cotelor de pia existente, chiar dac lipsa capacitii poate s nu i permit firmei s creasc.

Atunci cnd analizeaz cadrul general pentru evaluarea comportamentelor abuzive, documentul de discuie accentueaz faptul c obiectivul articolului 82 este protecia concurenei ca un mijloc de cretere a bunstrii consumatorului. Comisia continu declarnd c ceea ce trebuie s fie protejat este concurena i nu concurenii ca atare. Cu toate ace s t ea , a tunc i c nd vo rbe t e de sp re comportamente de excludere, documentul de discuie spune c acesta este un comportament care, prin forma sau natura sa, este n msur s nchid piaa pentru concuren. Totui, n evaluarea preurilor de ruinare, documentul de discuie consider dovada direct a strategiei de ruinare ca fiind suficient pentru a reine faptul c firma dominant a nclcat art.82. Chiar i dovezi indirecte, dar concludente ale inteniei de ruinare fac inutil demonstrarea faptului c orice efect de excludere este posibil s apar. Un asemenea accent pe intenia de ruinare din partea firmei dominante este nepotrivit. n timp ce intenia firmei este ntr-adevr relevant pentru stabilirea amenzii, ceea ce ar trebui s conteze

Rolul inteniei n definiia unui abuz

22

dominance should be recognized in proving the case (as the Court of Justice by the way suggests). The Discussion Paper shortly refers to the degree of dominance factor (paragraph 59) but fails to fully recognise its importance.

In considering entry conditions, the discussion of "barriers to entry" in much traditional economic literature has created extensive misunderstandings and does not provide a sound basis for policy implementation. The literature has focussed on barriers to entry in merger control and whether entry by new competitors is likely to prevent the exercise of market power in the short-to-medium-term (e.g., perhaps two years).

While in merger analysis dominance may result from the ability of the merging parties to increase prices (and entry/expansion conditions matter for preventing it), in abuse cases dominance is defined as the ability to keep prices above the competitive level for a substantial period of time without attracting entry. Of course, not any entry is sufficient, but entry at a scale and intensity sufficient to discipline the market power of the alleged dominant company.

In abuse cases, in the absence of regulatory/legal impediments to entry, the focus will be on "sunk costs" (for example, specialized physical assets) that delay or impede entry by new competitors and on switching costs by consumers that make it difficult for a new entrant to actually become a viable competitor. There are, however, two special considerations that apply in abuse cases. First, as in defining relevant markets, assessment of entry conditions should take into account the theory of the case. Barriers that would be ineffective if prices were raised higher than prevailing levels may still be relevant in assessing the impact of exclusionary practices that prevent prices from falling below current levels.

Second, in abuses cases, the conduct under investigation itself may constitute the principal deterrent to new entry. The ability of firms to deter entry through behavioural as opposed to structural barriers is increasingly recognized indeed, it is the essence of many abuse or monopolization cases. Entry-deterring conduct may include many or most

of the practices that are typically dealt with as abuses (e.g., predatory pricing, exclusionary contractual provisions, tying requirements and use of fighting brands). The significance of this point is that valid cases of abuse may sometimes involve markets in which there are few or (in principle) no barriers in the more traditional, structural sense of specialized physical assets. This point is made, although implicitly, in the Report by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, but is ignored by the Commission.

Third, especially with respect to exclusionary abuses, a market analysis is necessary in order to check whether entry occurred in the past and whether competitors were able to grow. If the answer is yes, dominance could be reasonably excluded, unless entry occurred when the abusive practice was not in place. In some cases, the lack of capacity may make it very difficult for a company to increase its market shares. However this is not necessarily a sign that the company is not dominant or that the practice is not abusive because the exclusionary abusive practice may make it possible to artificially keep existing market shares, even though the lack of capacity may not allow the company to grow.

When analysing the general framework for the assessment of abusive conduct the Discussion Paper stresses the fact that the objective of Article 82 is the protection of competition on the market as a mean to enhancing consumer welfare. The Commission goes on stating that it is competition and not competitors as such that is to be protected. When speaking about exclusionary conduct, however, the Discussion Paper says that it is a conduct that, by its form or nature, is capable to foreclose competition on the market. However, in the assessment of predatory pricing, the discussion paper considers direct evidence of a predatory strategy as sufficient to hold that the dominant firm has been infringing article 82. Even indirect but conclusive evidence of the predatory intent renders superfluous to show that any exclusionary effect is likely to occur. Such emphasis on the predatory intent of the dominant undertaking is misplaced. While the intention of the firm is indeed relevant for the

The role of intent in the definition of an abuse

23

pentru a dovedi o nclcare a articolului 82 este impactul comportamentului pe pia. Pentru a pune sub semnul ntrebrii strategia de preuri a firmei dominante, Comisia ar trebui s dovedeasc c:i) un asemenea comportament poate avea n practic un efect de excludere i ii) consumatorilor le va fi mai ru, din moment ce firma dominant va putea s i recupereze pierderile prin preuri mai ridicate.

De aceea, ar trebui s fie clar precizat c, atunci cnd s e f a ce r e f e r i r e l a f o rma s au na tu r a comportamentului, chestiunea inteniei nu este luat n calcul. Altfel, conceptul responsabilitii speciale a firmei dominante ar fi reintrodus, subminnd abordarea bazat pe efect pe care dorete s o promoveze Documentul de discuie. Evaluarea comportamentului unei firme dominante ar trebui s urmreasc dovedirea efectelor de excludere, actuale sau poteniale, independent de ceea ce firma a vrut s obin de fapt.

Orice document interpretativ, fie acesta o comunicare sau linii directoare, are o aplicare mai existins dect cea prevzut. n special, aceasta afecteaz direct autoritile naionale, mai ales acum

De ce este relevant pentru autoritile naionale s discute asemenea chestiuni?

cnd, din cauza Regulamentului nr.1/2003, aplicm cu toi