Roche.pdf

CHILDREN: RIGHTS, PARTICIPATION ANDCITIZENSHIP

475

JEREMY ROCHESchool of Health and Social Welfare,

The Open University

Key words: children, citizenship, participation, rights

Mailing address:Jeremy Roche

School of Health and Social Welfare,The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton

Keynes, MK7 6AA, UK[email: [email protected]]

Childhood [0907-5682(199911)6:4]Copyright 1999 SAGE Publications

(London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi)Vol. 6(4): 475493; 010225

This article considers the possibility ofrethinking citizenship so as to include children.Much current discussion of children and societyis marked by a series of interlocking discourseswhich serve to problematize and marginalizechildren. This dominant negative agendathrives untouched by recognition of the manycomplex and demanding responsibilitiesaccepted by children or of the many degradingsocial forces that bear down equally on childrenand adults such as poverty and racism. To thinkanew about citizenship and children can promptus to consider the similarity of concernsconfronting child and adult, and to recognize theinterdependence of our lives and how suchinterdependency is best fostered. What mightsuch a rethinking of citizenship entail? Thearticle argues that, in addition to reconsideringwhat we think it is to be a child (for instanceideas about incompetence and irrationalityassociated with childhood), we need to rethinkthe value of the language of rights and the socialsignificance of this language. Rights are not justabout statecitizen relations but about how civilsociety should imagine itself; in this context theimagery of social conversation and participationis central to the rethinking of citizenship. Thelanguage of citizenship, rights and participationis fragmentary and yet the contestation aroundthese ideas is intensifying and opening up newpossibilities of social organization and dialogue.By way of conclusion, the requirements of such avision of citizenship are considered what willbe needed to make it a social possibility.

Child6.4RocheFILM 29/9/99 6:46 pm Page 475

IntroductionIn this article I explore the value and potential purchase of the language ofcitizenship in considering the position of children in society today. This lan-guage can be used to critically analyse the ways in which children aretreated and positioned in contemporary society; and by the same token it canbe used to imagine a different condition of childhood. At present children arenot citizens in a constitutional sense because, for example, they do not havethe right to vote and they can be, and are, discriminated against. However,the issue is what citizenship could mean for children and society. Once wemove away from an exclusive concern with stateindividual or statecivilsociety relations and consider a more horizontal dimension of citizenship,which looks at relations within civil society and how children are positioned,then new relations are revealed and new questions of power, requiring justi-fication, emerge.

I consider the problematizing discourses surrounding children today(Griffin, 1993) and how, despite being social actors (Alanen, 1994), includ-ing the taking on of considerable responsibility in a range of contexts, chil-dren are often rendered silent and invisible by the attitudes and practices ofadult society I use the example of young carers to illustrate this (Liddiardet al., 1997). I then go on to explore the developing citizenship debate,including the contribution of feminist and anti-racism scholars who havechallenged and unmasked traditional notions of citizenship. Next I considerthe growing importance of the idea of participation within debates on chil-drens rights and citizenship and the United Nations Convention on theRights of the Child (UNCRC), which can be seen as seeking to promote aninclusive politics for children. I conclude by considering the requirements ofa child-friendly citizenship. I see the exclusion of children as operating tothe detriment of all; a redrawn image of citizenship might serve to promoteall our interests through its recognition of mutual needs and concerns.

Out of sight and out of mind

Jus cause weve not got a vote or anythin were not goin to come in for anyof it. What about shorter hours an more money an all the rest of it for us? I betwe could do with a bit of freedom from want an fear, same as anyone else. . . .This Beveridge mans grown-up . . . so he only cares about grown-ups. Wevegotter do somethin for ourselves if we want anythin done at all. (William inThe Outlaws Report, Crompton, 1997)

Williams assessment of this Beveridge man could be seen as irrelevantand misplaced. After all, the thing about being a child is that by definitionthere is little that the child can do for him- or herself. This is an observationon how children are seen, as well as a critical comment about the way soci-ety operates. Children are not seen as fully rational beings and as lacking in

C H I L D H O O D 6 ( 4 )

476


wisdom (because they have not had sufficient experience of life). In a criti-cal sense they cannot know their own best interests (as if for adults this isunproblematic). Thus they need looking after, they need protecting (evenfrom themselves) and they need to have their needs met rather than theirrights upheld.

The not-yet-fully-formedness of the child is not the only obstacle inthe way of a respectful recognition of children as social actors. Ennewobserves that modern childhood constructs children out of society, mutestheir voices, denies their personhood, limits their potential (Ennew, 1994:125) the sociability of the street has given way to the privacy of the family,the filling up of childrens time and the scheduling of their lives (Ennew,1994: 143). Often this is out of a concern to protect a commitment to thewelfare of children in a world that is perceived as being increasingly hostileand dangerous. When children are visible it is more often than not as asource of trouble or as in trouble. The overwhelming imagery surroundingchildren and young people is negative; they either need to be better protected(better policed from the evils of the adult world) or better controlled(because of the failure of certain families to police properly their children).

Running alongside this policing of children the dominant researchtradition on children (rather than with them) constructs them as problematic.With reference to older children (or youth) Griffin refers to three mainproblematizing discourses: of dysfunction, of deficit and of deviance (Grif-fin, 1993). In short, youth is perceived as a time of trouble and this percep-tion shapes adult research agendas. Youth comes to occupy an intermediatephase between childhood and adulthood; a critical (stormy and stressful)transition (Griffin, 1997). These discourses set youth apart from children andadults and serve to consolidate in the adult imagination the distinctiveness ofadulthood.1

Increasingly a new kind of work with and writing on children is beingdone. There is much literature which explores how children and young peo-ple see the world (Stainton Rogers et al., 1997), their values and prioritiesand the ways in which they feel themselves marginalized: the child hasbecome a research subject.2 A useful illustration comes from research intoyoung carers.3 Liddiard, Tatum and Tucker in their research comment asfollows on the role of the social services:

Usually, young carers are not considered by social workers or case managers inany assessment process, asked for their opinions, or included in discussionsabout the provision of care. Generally young carers believe that they shouldreceive recognition for their work and efforts, and their parents feel that theirchildrens needs are largely ignored by social welfare personnel. (Liddiard etal., 1997: 17)

Why is it that where children take on very serious responsibility they are rendered invisible and mute by adults. It has been estimated that thereare 50,000 young carers in the UK today.4 The work they do at home is

R O C H E : R I G H T S , P A R T I C I P A T I O N A N D C I T I Z E N S H I P

477


emotionally and physically demanding and often results in social isolationwith the young carer unable to participate in extracurricula activities atschool (if not actually truanting) or to engage in leisure activities with his orher peers. As Aldridge and Becker argue, the discussion of young carersposes fundamental challenges to conventional wisdom and understanding ofthe nature of caring, childhood, dependency, citizenship and childrensrights (Aldridge and Becker, 1995: 120). They later observe:

In particular, child carers may experience some of the harshest, yet most invisi-ble forms of poverty and exclusion . . . they are denied the rights of social citi-zenship that pertain to adulthood . . . and yet they take (adult) responsibility, and(adult) accountability, for the primary care of others, often with no help or sup-port from professionals paid to care. (Aldridge and Becker, 1995: 124)

It is ironic that those children who act in that highly responsible way (theway in which it is most often regretted they do not act) in relation to theirfamily are made to disappear by adult practice. Why should this be? Anumber of perhaps interconnecting explanations spring to mind. First, manyadult professionals are just not able (or used?) to dealing with children aspartners. Practices of speaking with children, listening to them and involvingthem in the process of coming to a decision is unknown to too many profes-sionals.5 Second, the ideology of family privacy results in family membersbeing seen to volunteer to do a range of tasks such that it is not really apublic matter so long as the family is able to function reasonably; what theyoung carers are doing does not really have to be taken seriously, they arejust helping out (Tatum and Tucker, 1998). Third, it is a consequence ofwhat Dalrymple and Burke refer to as adultism the oppression of childrenand young people by adults which they see as having the same powerdimension in the lives of young people as racism and sexism (Dalrymple andBurke, 1995: 1412; Barford and Wattam, 1991). The parallel is helpfulinsofar as it alerts us to the question of power. One constant theme in muchwriting around childrens rights is the deep sense of powerlessness andexclusion felt by children and young people (Lansdown, 1995). Dalrympleand Burke (1995) argue that, in order for progress to be made, adults, andthey are talking primarily of adult professionals, will have to be prepared togive up power.6

In order to make these points I have not acknowledged fully the waysin which children do resist and challenge adult practices, though not neces-sarily in obvious or constructive ways. However, the choices available tochildren, as a relatively powerless group in society, differ from those avail-able to the relatively powerful. Jackson, writing on power and domination,has observed:

It should be immediately apparent that the exercise of exclusionary social clo-sure can command the full resources of the state, the courts, and other institu-tions of law and order, while usurpationary strategies are much more likely tobe considered illegitimate, if not downright illegal. This is one reason why

C H I L D H O O D 6 ( 4 )

478


resistance often takes a symbolic rather than a directly instrumental form. (Jack-son, 1989: 54)

Children often have little choice but to engage in such symbolic politics ofprotest when faced with an unlistening and prejudging adult world. Childrenhave to start from where they are socially positioned. This means that theyhave to make their own space in spaces not of their making. We need toreinterpret the way in which adolescents use local places as social actors intheir own right . . . to understand their actions as contingent upon their socialand environmental circumstances (Percy-Smith, 1998). As Gittins (1998:202) argues narratives of children abound but real children are disturbinglyabsent. Because of adult practice the child appears for public consumptiononly as victim and a source of trouble. We need to escape this obstructedvision.

The combined effect of the problematizing discourses surroundingchildren, especially young people, adultism and the relative powerlessnessof children is to marginalize their views and perspectives. And yet Zelizer(1985) argues that the 20th century has witnessed the transformation of thechild with an economic value to the priceless child.7 This pricelessness ofthe 20th century child developed hand in hand with the expulsion of thechild from the public sphere including the world of paid work. Now chil-dren properly belong in the private worlds of play, domesticity and school.Does this mean that any reimagination of citizenship, which does not engagewith the economic exclusion of children, is doomed. I would argue not. Ifwe consider the different meanings invested in the notion of citizenship andthe debates surrounding the concept from the mid-1980s onwards we can seethe possibility of a politics inclusive of children despite their socioeconomicmarginalization.

Rethinking citizenshipThe traditional model of citizenship was firmly linked with the question ofproperty: in the West it was white men of property who had the vote.Women, slaves and children were excluded. I am not equating these exclu-sions; the terms of exclusion were different and often multiple. The storyof citizenship over the past 150 years has been one of struggles for inclusionand that these struggles are unfinished is evidenced by the enduring brutali-ties of racism and sexism (see Donald and Rattansi, 1992; Evans, 1994;Sachs and Wilson, 1978). Much of these struggles were precisely aboutmaking a public issue of what had been seen as a private matter: aboutredefining the public and the private.8 The demand that children be includedin citizenship is simply a request that children be seen as members of societytoo, with a legitimate and valuable voice and perspective.

Marshall (1950) analysed citizenship as constituted by three elements:civil, political and social. The civil element is concerned with such matters


479


as the rule of law and personal liberties including freedom of speech. Thepolitical element relates to rights associated with participation in the formalpolitical process, e.g. the right to vote. The social dimension of citizenshipembraces not only basic issues of economic welfare but the right to share tothe full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being accord-ing to the standards prevailing in the society. Marshall defined citizenshipas a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. Allwho possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties withwhich the status is endowed (Marshall, 1950: 14). Citizenship, thus con-ceived, carried within it the implication of formal equality.

It is clear from Marshalls writing that his vision of citizenship islinked with concerns around rights. The social element of citizenship (orsocial rights) is necessary to the exercise of civil and political rights by thosewho are socially marginal and disadvantaged in terms of power andresources (Lister, 1997: 16). Marshall recognized that without such rightspeople would not be in a position to be effective social agents.9 However,Marshalls inclusive notion of citizenship, an ideological argument for thepostwar welfare state, excluded children. Marshall saw in the childs right toeducation evidence of the childs social citizenship yet he also observedthat:

Fundamentally it should be regarded not as the right of the child to go to schoolbut of the adult to have been educated. (cited in Yeatman, 1994: 73)

Children seem to be rhetorically central to much of the developments in thehealth and education systems, and issues such as bullying at school, whichdirectly concern children, are now taken more seriously and in someinstances dealt with in a way which connects with their concerns and per-spectives. However, there is much evidence to suggest that the social citizen-ship of many children has been eroded over the past 20 years by a dramaticincrease in poverty (NCH Action for Children, 1997). This said, in relationto civil citizenship, today children have some direct access to the legal sys-tem, they enjoy new avenues of complaint in a range of settings and newrights to information and services (see Timms, 1995). However, it could beargued that such a development is to be expected within a New Right poli-tics. The New Right thinking of the 1980s and early 1990s downplayedsocial citizenship and emphasized a highly individualistic form of civil citi-zenship. And as Cooper points out, the Citizens Charter of the last BritishConservative government had little room even for the active citizen(Cooper, 1993).

It is not surprising, given the history of women and children and thelinkages that connect them, that feminists have entered the debate aroundchildrens rights (Firestone, 1970).10 I do not review this literature here andwhat follows should not be read as indicating that a consensus exists withinmodern feminisms on this question. Much recent writing, while conscious ofthe contribution made by Marshall to a 20th-century understanding of

C H I L D H O O D 6 ( 4 )

480


citizenship have attacked the traditional image of citizenship. Feminist andanti-racism scholars (Lister, 1997; Yeatman, 1994; Williams 1991, 1995)have transformed our understandings of rights and citizenship since Mar-shalls seminal contribution almost 50 years ago. They have unmasked thestandard citizen as male, white and provider. But this unmasking has not justbeen a matter of exposing a constitutional or legal bias; it has entailed anexploration of a range of social discourses, practices and attitudes that inhib-ited and obstructed the participation of women in the public life of theircommunities.

While women have struggled for, and won, inclusions over the past150 years, children have experienced multiple exclusions from the publicworld invariably in the name of their welfare and this shift had huge con-sequences for women with particular constructions of the public/private andthe confinement of women in the private sphere. Feminist scholarship hasanalysed and explored the fictional unity of family life which served as acover for male supremacy (ODonovan, 1993) and the ideological and mate-rial consequences of the public/private divide. The struggle for citizenshipon the part of women has entailed a struggle to redefine the boundarybetween the public and the private and the rights that women enjoy in bothspheres.

Historically, the social position and treatment of women has beenlinked with their role as mothers and the child question has been part offeminists concern with the family.11 However, Alanen, having described theways in which first and second wave feminisms addressed the issue of chil-dren,12 suggests ways forward for feminist research into childhood as part ofa recognition of the distinctiveness of the child question: it cannot be merelysubsumed under the woman question. She argues (Alanen, 1994: 37):

. . . parallel to a gender agenda we can also imagine a generational agendabeing at work a particular social order that organizes childrens relations tothe world in a systematic way, allocates them positions from which to act and aview and knowledge about themselves and their social relations.

But are women and children caught in identical histories? Women were onceseen as irrational and too emotional. There was a sociobiological warrant forthe presumption of their inferiority: they were fitted for the home:13 todaysuch attitudes seem absurd. In relation to children, in part because of theundifferentiated nature of childhood, the same ideas have currency. Coles(1997) has consistently argued that the reasoning and moral capacities ofmany 9-year-olds are as sophisticated as those of many adults. Aldersonchallenges head on the presumption of childhood incompetence, arguing:

Treating children with respect can markedly increase their competence. . . .Anne Solberg has done research with hundreds of 12-year-olds. She found thatwhen parents expected them to be responsible, the children responded in suchadult ways that they were given more and more responsibility, and coped with itwell. (Alderson, 1992: 175)


481


If older children are no longer to be distinguished from adults on the basis ofa presumed intellectual and cognitive inferiority, on what basis can we rou-tinely exclude children from full participation in the life of the community towhich they belong? How can we justify practices, which presuppose thenon-participation of children? Is there not a need to rethink those traditionalways of dealing with children, which are predicated on a denial of theirintelligence and agency. In the following section, I argue that just as womenhave altered understandings of citizenship and belonging, a politics inclusiveof children will produce a further shift in understanding.

Partial citizenshipWalby has observed, in the context of womens involvement in nation-stateformation:

In many countries citizenship did not arrive at one moment for all people, butdifferent groups gained different aspects of this in different periods. . . . Thewinning of civil citizenship, while completed for most First World men beforepolitical citizenship, is barely completed for women in these countries, sinceonly recently have women won control over their own bodies, the ability to dis-engage from marriage and the right to engage in all forms of employment. Thatis for First World women political citizenship is typically achieved before civilcitizenship the reverse of the order for men. (Walby, 1992: 901)

This quotation introduces the notion of unfolding citizenship or incremen-tal citizenship14 (Cockburn, 1998) and serves to render problematic the tra-jectory of the acquisition of citizenship.15 One explanation for the distinctivetrajectory of First World womens struggle for citizenship (in which they hadto gain political citizenship before they could more substantially advancetheir social and civil citizenship claims) is that the practices and values ofcivil society assumed or justified the exclusion of women. A critical piece inthe exclusionary jigsaw was the public/private divide. Womens inferiority inmatters public was assumed alongside a placing of their role and interestsfirmly in the private sphere.

The idea of incremental citizenship carries with it suggestion of a lin-earity, a process of progress from exclusion to inclusion. At one level this isunobjectionable in that contestation around citizenship has produced changefor the better. But the image of linearity does not catch the uneven and con-tested character of citizenship; it is for this reason that I prefer the term par-tial citizenship (Bulmer and Rees, 1996: 2756). Bulmer and Rees point outthat the idea of partial citizenship permits an avoidance of the zero-sumthinking that characterizes some writing in this field. They argue that societydoes not comprise two classes of social beings citizens and non-citizens but that there are several groups that may better be viewed as part in, andpart out, of citizenship (Bulmer and Rees, 1996: 275). They object to the

C H I L D H O O D 6 ( 4 )

482


language of inclusion and exclusion as compounding the all or nothingview of citizenship.

Whatever else can be said about the child, childrens rights and citi-zenship, there are two practical reasons why childrens claims to citizenshipwill be distinctive. First much literature around children increasingly drawsa distinction between the younger child and the young person. The worldand experiences of the average 15-year-old are closer to those of an adultthan that of a 15-month-old baby yet both are children. The arguments forthe increased participation of children in decision-making affecting theirlives are both practically and theoretically more compelling the older thechild is. In England and Wales the Children Act 1989 requires a court, mak-ing any decision regarding a childs upbringing, to consider the ascertain-able wishes and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light ofhis age and understanding) (Section 1(3)(a) of the Children Act 1989;emphasis added). Simply put, the older the child is the more objectionable itis to fail to consult or take into account their wishes and feelings.16 This isnot to say that they become the decision-maker, merely that they must beallowed (and perhaps assisted) to play a part in the decision-making process.

Second, there is the linked and thorny issue of representation. Therational, autonomous individual is central to modern liberal thought. It is therights-bearing adult individual who is endowed with citizenship. I candecide for myself what action to take on a whole range of matters includingwhether or not to invoke the formal legal process in order to assert myrights, to make a public issue out of a private trouble: children are not insuch a position. Children should not and cannot be seen as unproblemati-cally represented by the significant adults in their lives, usually their parents.This said, often it is adults who claim citizenship rights for children and doso on their behalf. So when is it legitimate for others to speak for the childand which others? The older child may well be able to speak for themselvesand may attempt to do so. It is interesting to note that the Scottish Law Com-mission recommended that parents be under a duty to consult with theirchild on any major decision relating to their child. Section 6 of the Children(Scotland) Act 1995 created such a duty providing that children aged 12 orover are presumed to be capable of forming a view.17 The very young childwill perhaps only acquire an effective voice through being represented, nor-mally by his or her parents. Whether others should speak for the child orwhether the child is able to speak for him- or herself in any effective waywill depend upon the context and the attitudes and practices of the adultsinvolved.18 The argument about children and citizenship is, on one level, partof a symbolic and practical reordering of what it is to be a child, an adult anda citizen.


483


The UNCRC, rights and participationThe UNCRC can be seen as a bringing together under the umbrella of onedocument a range of commitments to the human rights of children; it can beseen as signalling a recognition that children have civil, political and socialrights. These human rights for children are not just concerned with theirwelfare though many of its provisions are concerned with their protection(e.g. from abuse) and the adequate provisioning of childhood. The UNCRCwith its three overarching and interconnected principles19 can be seen as pro-viding a framework for a broader vision of citizenship for children. Article12 of the UNCRC is the provision that most clearly gives expression to amodel of citizenship, which includes children.

De Winter, having referred to the importance of recognizing the poten-tial capacities of children and the contributions they make to society, makesexplicit the linkage between participation and citizenship in the followingterms:

In practice this comes down to regarding children and youngsters as fellow citi-zens, people whose share in society is appreciated and stimulated because of theconstructive contribution they are able to make. Participation, which we mayprovisionally define as opportunities for children and young people to beactively involved in [the decision making on] their own living environment is amajor condition. (De Winter, 1997: 24)

Of course, both in the UK and in the international context children are socialparticipants participating in homeworking, child labour, political protest,caring, keeping the family on the road, etc. However, often (as noted ear-lier) these activities are either redefined by concerned adults as simplyexploitative and requiring action to protect better the child or denied throughnot talking about them/non-recognition. In Elsthains words children arenever spared politics. Participation is about being counted as a member ofthe community; it is about governing and being governed. The traditionalresponse to children traps them in the position simply of being governed.The complexity and sophistication of the welfare project firmly rooted in theproblematizing discourses referred to earlier leaves little space for respectfor the agency of children. In contrast, participation and the language of chil-drens rights presupposes and encourages their agency, the expression oftheir self-defined needs and interests. The idea of rights presupposes a moreactive role for the young person. Once we have to consider what young peo-ple themselves think and feel about a situation and act on them many thingswill be different. To act in a manner consistent with this version of rightsobviously requires new approaches and skills as well as a clear understand-ing of how the rights of young people can be advanced. In our argumentsabout childhood, childrens rights and citizenship we are arguing about our-selves and our place in the world: it is an argument about politics and howwe want to be and live our lives. Held writing on citizenship has argued:

C H I L D H O O D 6 ( 4 )

484


If citizenship entails membership in the community and membership impliesforms of social participation, then citizenship is above all about the involvementof people in the community in which they live; and people have been barredfrom citizenship on grounds of class, gender, race and age among many otherfactors. Accordingly, the debate on citizenship requires us to think about thevery nature of the conditions of membership and political participations. (Held,1991: 20)

There is a need to rethink the language of rights as part of the citizenshipproject. Minow has urged that we rethink rights in such a way that they areno longer seen as just being about statecitizen relations or autonomousindividuals but about our interdependencies. She has written in the followingterms:

Autonomy, then, is not a precondition for any individuals exercise of rights.The only precondition is that the community is willing to allow the individual tomake claims and participate in the shifting of boundaries. (Minow, 1987: 1885)

And later:I find something terribly lacking in rights for children that speak only of auton-omy rather than need, especially the central need for relationships with adultswho are themselves enabled to create settings where children can thrive.(Minow, 1987: 1910)

It is about recognizing the interconnectedness of our lives as adults, parentsand children and no longer seeing the relationships between adult and childas naturally and necessarily hierarchic. In a subsequent text Minow (1990:2978) observed:

Including children as participants alters their stance in the community, fromthings or outsiders to members . . . by signalling deserved attention, rightsenable a challenge to unstated norms, to exclusion, and the exclusive perspec-tives. Rights discourse implicates its users in a form of life, a pattern of socialand political commitment.

Once we see rights as expressing, in particular and contested forms, socialrelations (Nedelsky, 1993), the childrens rights movement can be seen as anattempt to rethink the relations of civil society and the public/private divide:as a challenge to accepted ways of thinking about adultchild relations andfamily life.20

ConclusionBy way of conclusion I want to revisit three aspects of the children and citi-zenship debate. As Cockburn points out, traditional notions of citizenshipwill have to change to accommodate children (Cockburn, 1998: 112). But,whatever else such an accommodation might entail, promoting childrensrights can only be part of the story.


485


Moving away from problematizing childrenIt is central to the citizenship project, whatever forms it takes, that childrenare not seen simply as trouble or in trouble. This is a denial of any realagency in the world. However, more will be needed. It is not sufficient toinsist upon the full recognition of the contributions (positive and negative)that children make to their worlds and society but we also need to escapefrom the language of futures. Cockburn captures this nicely when heobserves: This constant referencing of children to their future potentials andpossibilities belittles their present actions (Cockburn, 1998: 107).

We need to have proper regard to the contributions and insights ofchildren in the here and now. Davis and Jones in the context of planningtransport policy and the involvement of children in such decision-makingprocesses draw out the significance of this way of thinking about childrenand how it contrasts with the child of the welfare discourse:

If children are seen as having empowering rights then they will have a call onadults time, and can question adult centred thinking and planning, whereasrights to protection do not enable children to take responsibility for themselves,they are rather a means of ensuring a baseline of protection to be administeredand policed by adults. At worst they work to protect adults or adult social orderagainst disturbances from the presence of children. Empowerment, on the otherhand, requires adults to share power. (Davis and Jones, 1996: 1314)21

However, this is not necessarily a neat either/or issue. Moves to promote thewelfare of children, which include a commitment to the childs view of theirwelfare, can be supportive of a practice, which is respectful of the rights ofchildren. The context will often shape the extent to which the childs voicewill be determinative. However, the fact of adult power is and will beinescapable and this raises the issue as to how can adults best include andfoster the participation of children.

Practices of listeningTo listen to children properly will involve significant change in many socialand institutional practices. The Children Act 1989 contains many provisionsrelating to the duty to consult not just those with parental responsibility butwith children themselves. The following definition of the processes involvedin consultation was provided by a lawyer (Sedley QC in R v Brent LBC exparte Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168):

First . . . consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formativestage. Secondly . . . the proposer must give sufficient reasons for any proposalto permit of intelligent consideration and response. Thirdly . . . adequate timemust be given for consideration and response and, finally, fourthly . . . the prod-uct of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising anyproposals.22

Defined in this way not only can we see how participatory such consultationcan be; it is not a case of consulting the child or young person in order to

C H I L D H O O D 6 ( 4 )

486


persuade him or her of the rightness or inevitability of a certain outcome. Itis also clear that a number of other issues emerge, as I have argued else-where (Roche, 1997: 57):

To be committed to a practice with children and young people in which they areprovided with proper information, in which they are able to express theirthoughts and feelings on the matter in question at an appropriate time and place,in which the various possible courses of action are fully explored with them,and in which their views, whatever their social origins or location, are listenedto and treated seriously, will be to transform the experience of child and profes-sional.

And what are the costs of not listening to children? It is, and will be, chil-dren who bear the costs most heavily. Commenting on pindown,23 Levyand Kahan noted:

Pindown, in our view . . . involved elements of isolation, humiliation and con-frontation to varying degrees. . . . We have no doubt that children were humili-ated in many ways. . . . In addition during confrontational meetings numerouschildren were harangued and referred to in grossly abusive terms. . . .Pindown . . . was intrinsically unethical, unprofessional and unacceptable.(Levy and Kahan, 1991: 127)

Yet this practice continued for almost 6 years, despite resistance and com-plaints from some of the children involved and till the end, brought about bya High Court injunction, some of the professionals involved could not seewhat the fuss was about. Perhaps the failure to properly address questions ofchildrens rights and to listen with respect is part of the explanation.24

Participation, rights and citizenshipIt is the very inequality and the continuation of this inequality between childrenand adults which gives children, so to speak, a right to rights. Children haverights because they do not have, and cannot expect to have, full citizens rights.(King, 1997: 170; emphasis in the original)

A few lines earlier King had argued that children cannot expect to haveequal rights to adults. This is the crux of the children/citizenship argument.Save for the child liberationists (Archard, 1993), no one is arguing thatchildren are identical to adults or that they should enjoy exactly the samebundle of civil and political rights as adults. What is being argued is thatchildren are social beings too, they are social actors and have much to con-tribute here and now. Much research is now geared to finding out what chil-dren think, how they see the world, how they view issues ranging fromplanning, transport policy to the politics of peace in Northern Ireland (Percy-Smith, 1998; Davis and Jones, 1996; Democratic Dialogue, 1997). From thisstandpoint the language of childrens rights is the beginning not the end(McGillivray, 1994), it is about respecting and valuing the contribution chil-dren make and have to make to the world children and adults share: a worldhitherto defined and imagined primarily in adult terms it is about power.


487


In order to be able to provide the kinds of support needed by childrenin different social locations adults will need to do things differently. Strate-gies will have to be thought through whereby children are empowered25in arange of settings and this will require at the very outset a recognition of therelations of power at issue and positive action to address these imbalances.26However, the acquisition of a voice in itself is not enough. We need to getbeyond the culture of disrespect if not outright hostility towards young peo-ple in particular. Williams (1995: 93) has observed, in the context of heranalysis of racism, that

. . . if women enter environments where men have only been talking to men, theconversation is bound to change. If blacks enter spaces where whites have onlybeen talking to other whites, the conversation is bound to grow somewhat moreencompassing.

With no disrespect to the struggles that women and people of colour havehad to wage for inclusion (and are continuing to have to do so), the inclusionof children in such spaces and conversations would also change things. Par-ticipation must not be limited to those of a particular class or ethnic groupand agendas for discussion must not be so shaped as to exclude certain ideasor values. The participants, in particular the more powerful ones, must havegenuinely open minds as to what might best be done. Participation is aboutmaking sure that children do not simply become exhibits in a show of con-cern or fear.

And yet this ideal of participation is not new. In some educational cir-cles there has been a long history of commitment to emancipation through ahighly participatory pedagogy (Freire, 1973). Janusz Korczaks progressiveorphanages in Poland in the early years of the 20th century were designed asjust communities. The Declaration of Childrens Rights derived by Liftonfrom Korczaks writings on children provided, among other things, that thechild has a right to respect, the right to make mistakes and the right to betaken seriously (Lifton, 1989). This links with earlier observations about thechilds competence and while the young child is different in some ways fromthe older child this does not mean that the discussion about participation andcitizenship is confined to older children. De Winter (1997: 163) writes:

What children can handle at a certain moment in their development is not a con-stant factor, but is partly the result of the space for learning and experiencingoffered to them. By widening the field of development, for instance by involv-ing children from a very early age in the organisation of the world in which theylive, their repertoire of behavioural capabilities grows.

He goes on to observe that if we take this view children turn out to be capa-ble of much more than adults think. Robert Coles (1997: 5) reminds us:

We grow morally as a consequence of learning how to be with others, how tobehave in this world, a learning prompted by taking to heart what we have seenand heard. The child is a witness; the child is an ever-attentive witness ofgrown-up morality or lack thereof.

C H I L D H O O D 6 ( 4 )

488


Childrens rights, like all human rights, are symbolically and practicallyimportant.

An increasingly inclusive politics for children will require not only theproper resourcing of practices which are supportive of childrens citizenshipclaims and of those institutions which contribute to such claims. We need tothink through the terms on which participation is being offered, to be awareof the context in which children are being invited in and the risk of respon-sibility for making a decision being thrust upon children in circumstancesnot of their choosing. The languages of participation and empowerment arecosy but we need to be more critical of the circumstances of inclusion andthe kinds of adult support (e.g. advocacy and representation) that childrenmight need. In this sense the childrens rights project and emerging demandsfor inclusion as citizens involves a redrawing of what it is to be an adultand a child. Ultimately the childrens rights project is not just about makinga better world for children (King, 1997), it is about making a better world forall of us.

Notes1. Children are different from adults though as Freeman (1992) reminds us not as differ-ent as some would have us believe, and they are affected by the same social forces that besetand constrain adults.2. Recently the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) launched a programmeon children, which emphasized the importance of treating the children as research subjects andavoiding the dominance of the problematizing discourses, which Griffin analyses.3. Young carers have been defined as children and young people who are placed in aposition of responsibility for the care of a disabled relative at home (Heal, 1994).4. The Guardian (6 May 1998: 12). The Report also stated that fewer than 10 percent ofyoung carers who cared for a sick or disabled family member had had their own needsassessed under the Carers (Recognition and Services) Act 1995. 5. Including social workers, a professional group, which readily acknowledges the valueof strategies of empowerment when working with other client groups.6. Of course when people start talking about giving up power they are usually talkingabout other people giving up power.7. Zelizer (1985: 6) notes: In the first three decades of the twentieth century, the econom-ically useful child became both numerically and culturally an exception. Zelizer refers to thesacralization of childrens lives the cultural process by which children came to be seenalmost exclusively in sentimental as opposed to economic terms. It must be emphasizedthat Zelizers account of the transformation of the value attached to children is confined tothe USA (and even then class specific); it cannot not be argued that the shift she identifies is auniversal or even one. 8. The fact that these struggles are continuing is illustrated, for example, by campaignsaround motherhood (parenthood!), domestic labour, childcare and employment, domestic vio-lence, policing and immigration.9. Most recently articulated in the debates around the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. 10. Firestone described the oppression of women and children as intertwined and mutuallyreinforcing.11. See Olsen (1992: 192), who argued in the context of child protection:


489


Feminists also have a complex and ambiguous relationship to legal protectionfor children . . . the neglect and abuse of children is often part and parcel of theneglect and abuse of women. As the predominant caretakers of children, womenare greatly influenced by the role and status of children. Where conditions aregood for children, they are generally good for women.

12. For Alanen, first wave feminism focused on the importance of recognizing the specialcontribution women as mothers made and that this required that they take their rightful placein the public sphere. Second wave feminism has conceived the motherhood question in a verydifferent way; as a social institution, which has contributed to the imprisonment of women.13. The fact that women have been and are described as childlike is further evidence ofthe deep disregard society has for childrens capacities and standpoint as well as the strugglefor inclusion women continue to have to engage in. To compare women to children was and isabusive because it is intended as such. However, the insult is predicated upon a set of beliefsabout children and practices towards them, which are now coming under increasing challenge. 14. Neither term on the face of it catches the sense of struggle which is part of the citizen-ship project. With perhaps the exception of the granting of full citizenship by postcolonialstates at the point of liberation (which was hugely symbolically important) citizenship hasbeen won through struggle, e.g. the black civil rights movement in the USA.15. In the 19th and 20th centuries, there was no neat and distinct gaining of political citi-zenship for women followed by a civil and social citizenship, which had hitherto been denied.There were overlapping campaigns, which fed into each and supported other and gave rise tofurther demands and struggles: the struggle for the vote was a key one. These struggles werenot linear, did not unfold or evolve but were promoted and contested in many ways.16. In part Lord Scarmans judgement in the House of Lords decision in Gillick v WestNorfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1986) AC112 can be seen as concerned to recog-nize the developing capacities of the mature minor. Lord Scarman said:

I would hold as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether or nottheir minor child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminated ifand when the child achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence toenable him or her to understand fully what is proposed. It will be a question offact.

17. The Scottish Law Commission in its deliberations as to whether to include in the Chil-dren (Scotland) Act 1995 a duty on parents to consult with their children on important mattersnoted:

The question as we saw it was whether a parent or other person exercisingparental rights should be under a similar obligation to ascertain and have regardto the childs wishes and feelings as a local authority was in relation to a childin its care. . . . There are great attractions in such an approach. It emphasisesthat the child is a person in his or her own right and that his or her views areentitled to respect and consideration. . . . On consultation there was majoritysupport for a provision requiring parents in reaching any major decision relatingto a child, to ascertain the childs wishes and feelings so far as practicable andgive due consideration to them having regard to their age and understanding. . . .Many respondents clearly regarded such a provision as an important declarationof principle. (Scottish Law Commission, 1992: paras 2.6264)

18. The law has begun to give children rights traditionally associated with citizenship, e.g.rights of access to lawyers and the courts.19. These are the primacy of the childs welfare (Article 3), the non-discrimination princi-ple (Article 2) and the participation principle (Article 12).

C H I L D H O O D 6 ( 4 )

490


20. Certainly the practice of hitting and smacking children might be seen differently.21. However we can see in some of the participation literature such a welfarist emphasis,e.g. Schofield and Thoburn (1996). 22. Three things are made clear in this quotation. First, the young person must feel they arebeing listened to, that they and what they have to say will be taken seriously. Second, theyoung person will need to have access to information to allow her to respond in a way of herchoosing. Third, the outcome will have to make sense to the young person.23. Pindown was a system of punishments and rewards operated by social workers look-ing after children in some residential homes in Staffordshire and, among other things, involvedthe confining of children to their rooms, the denial of contact with their families and the denialof access to education.24. See also the recent enquiry into the appalling catalogue of abuse of children in residen-tial care in North Wales: here too the complaints of children were not heard or listened to.25. This might entail the provision of a safe place to talk, a commitment to treating as con-fidential the confidences of children (see Roche and Briggs, 1990), providing advocacy ser-vices to children, representing them and supporting them in speaking for themselves indifferent settings (see Lansdown, 1995; Dalrymple and Burke, 1995).26. However, as noted earlier, even consultation and participation can keep within what isfundamentally a welfarist agenda even though a number of texts in the process have chal-lenged traditional notions of childhood incompetence and irrationality (Alderson and Mont-gomery, 1996). The test is whether we are able to listen properly to children and young peoplewhen they are saying things, which are new and unfamiliar.

ReferencesAlanen, L. (1994) Gender and Generation: Feminism and the Child Question , in J.

Qvortrup, M. Bardy, G. Sgritta and H. Wintersberger (eds) Childhood Matters SocialTheory, Practice and Politics, pp. 2742. Aldershot: Avebury.

Alderson, P. (1992) The Rights of Children and Young People, in A. Coote (ed.) The Welfareof Citizens Developing New Social Rights. London: Institute for Public PolicyResearch/Rivers Oram Press.

Alderson, P. and J. Montgomery (1996) Health Care Choices Making Decisions with Chil-dren. London: IPPR.

Aldridge, J. and S. Becker (1995) The Rights and Wrongs of Children Who Care, in B.Franklin (ed.) The Handbook of Childrens Rights Comparative Policy and Practice,pp. 11930. London: Routledge.

Archard, D. (1993) Children Rights and Childhood. London: Routledge.Barford, R. and C. Wattam (1991) Childrens Participation in Decision Making, Practice

5(2): 93102.Bulmer, M. and A.M. Rees (eds) (1996) Citizenship Today The Contemporary Relevance of

T.H.Marshall. London: University College London Press.Cockburn, T. (1998) Children and Citizenship in Britain, Childhood 5(1): 99117.Coles, R. (1997) The Moral Intelligence of Children. New York: Random House.Cooper, D. (1993) The Citizens Charter and Radical Democracy: Empowerment and Exclu-

sion within Citizenship Discourse, Social and Legal Studies 2(2): 14971.Crompton, R. (1997) The Outlaws Report, in Just William at School. London: Macmillan. Dalrymple, J. and B. Burke (1995) Anti-Oppressive Practice Social Care and the Law. Milton

Keynes: Open University Press.Davis, A. and L. Jones (1996) Children in the Urban Environment: An Issue for the New Pub-

lic Health, Health and Place 22: 10313.


491


De Winter, M. (1997) Children as Fellow Citizens Participation and Commitment. Abingdon:Radcliffe Medical Press.

Democratic Dialogue (1997) Politics: The Next Generation, Report 6. Belfast: DemocraticDialogue.

Donald, J. and A. Rattansi (eds) (1992) Race Culture and Difference. London: Sage.Ennew, J. (1994) Time for Children or Time for Adults, in J. Qvortrup et al. (eds) Childhood

Matters. Social Theory, Practice and Politics, pp. 12543. Aldershot: Avebury.Evans, M. (ed.) (1994) The Woman Question, 2nd edn. London: Sage.Firestone, S. (1970) The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution. London: Jonathon

Cape.Freeman, M.D.A. (1992) Taking Childrens Rights More Seriously, in P. Alston, S. Parker

and J. Seymour (eds) Children, Rights and the Law, pp. 5271. Oxford: ClarendonPress.

Freire, P. (1973) Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York: Seabury Press.Gittins, D. (1998) The Child in Question. Basingstoke: Macmillan.Griffin, C. (1993) Representations of Youth: The Study of Youth and Adolescence in Britain

and America. Cambridge: Polity Press.Griffin, C. (1997) Representations of the Young, in J. Roche and S. Tucker (eds) Youth in

Society, pp. 1725. London: Sage.Heal, S. (1994) An Introduction to the Issues in Respect of Young Carers. London: Carers

National Association.Held, D. (1991) Between State and Civil Society, in G. Andrews (ed.) Citizenship, pp.

1925. London: Lawrence and Wishart.Jackson, P. (1989) Maps of Meaning. London: Unwin Hyman.King, M. (1997) A Better World for Children. Explorations in Morality and Authority. Lon-

don: Routledge.Lansdown, G. (1995) The Childrens Rights Development Unit, in B. Franklin (ed.) The

Handbook of Childrens Rights Comparative Policy and Practice, pp. 10718. London:Routledge.

Levy, A. and B. Kahan (1991) The Pindown Experience and the Protection of Children. TheReport of the Staffordshire Child Care Enquiry 1990. Staffordshire County Council.

Liddiard, P., C. Tatum and S. Tucker (1997) Young Carers Research Project. Study of theCommon Experiences of Young Carers in Two Different Communities. Milton Keynes:School of Health and Social Welfare, the Open University.

Lifton, B. (1989) The King of Children. London: Pan.Lister, R. (1997) Citizenship Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan.Marshall, T.H. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.McGillivray, A. (1994) Why Children Do Have Equal Rights, International Journal of Chil-

drens Rights 2: 24358.Minow, M. (1987) Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, Yale Law Journal 96(8):

18602017.Minow, M. (1990) Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law. Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press.NCH Action for Children (1997) 98 Factfile. London: NCH Action for Children.Nedelsky, J. (1993) Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, Review of Constitutional Studies

1(1): 126.ODonovan, K. (1993) Family Law Matters. London: Pluto.Olsen, F. (1992) Childrens Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations Con-

vention on the Rights of the Child, in P. Alston, S. Parker and J. Seymour (eds) Chil-dren, Rights and the Law, pp. 192220. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Percy-Smith, B. (1998) Marginalisation of Children and Youth in Urban Neighbourhoods:Implications for Citizenship, paper presented to the Children and Social ExclusionConference, Centre for the Social Study of Children, Hull University, March.

C H I L D H O O D 6 ( 4 )

492


Roche, J. and A. Briggs (1990) Allowing Children a Voice: A Note on Confidentiality, Jour-nal of Social Welfare Law 3: 17892.

Roche, J. (1997) Childrens Rights: Participation and Dialogue, in J. Roche and S. Tucker(eds) Youth in Society. London: Sage.

Sachs, A. and J.H. Wilson (1978) Sexism and the Law. Oxford: Martin Robertson.Schofield, G and J. Thoburn (1996) Child Protection The Voice of the Child in Decision Mak-

ing. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.Scottish Law Commission (1992) Report on Family Law, Scot. Law Com. No.135. Edinburgh:

HMSO.Stainton Rogers, W., R. Stainton Rogers, J. Vyrost and L. Lovas (1997) Worlds Apart: Young

Peoples Aspirations in a Changing World, in J. Roche and S. Tucker (eds) Youth inSociety, pp. 2634. London: Sage.

Tatum, C. and S. Tucker (1998) The Concealed Consequences of Caring, Youth and Policy61: 1227.

Timms, J. (1995) Childrens Representation. London: Sweet and Maxwell.Walby, S. (1992) Woman and Nation, International Journal of Comparative Sociology

XXXIII(12): 81100.Williams, P. (1991) The Alchemy of Race and Rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.Williams, P. (1995) The Roosters Egg on the Persistence of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Har-

vard University Press.Yeatman, A. (1994) Postmodern Revisionings of the Political. London: Routledge.Zelizer, V. (1985) Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Value of Children. New York:

Basic Books.


493


Documents

Roche.pdf