The European gas market and the outlook for LNG demand in ......bcm, which represented 15.3 per cent of the global LNG market（GIINL, 2017）. Although LNG imports to Europe slowed

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The European gas market and the outlook for LNG demand in Europe

（欧州ガス市場とLNG需要見通し）

1. Europe as the residual market for LNG

　In 2016, Europe’s net imports of LNG totalled 51 bcm, which represented 15.3 per cent of the global LNG market（GIINL, 2017）. Although LNG imports to Europe slowed down in the second half of 2016, Europe is still considered to be a significant market for LNG. In 2015, eleven countries in Europe imported LNG. Currently Europe has 29 LNG import terminals in operation, with a total LNG regasification capacity of 208 bcm（Standaert, 2016）. The LNG import terminals a r e ma in l y l a rge s c a l e , bu t F l o a t i ng S t o r age Regasification Units（FSRUs）and small scale terminals are playing an increasingly important role in LNG regasification（Table 1）. 　As can be seen from the above, Europe currently has an oversupply of regasification capacity and theoretically the region could receive approximately

1 60 b cm o f add i t i o na l LNG w i th t h e ex i s t i ng infrastructure. However, there is a regional mismatch： regasification capacity is concentrated in Western Europe, along the Mediterranean and Atlantic Coasts while there is limited access to LNG in central and southeast Europe, due to the lack of LNG regasification capacity and interconnectors. Weak interconnections between EU countries are a major obstacle preventing LNG from flowing across the EU. Notwithstanding the underutilization rate, 33 additional terminals are either currently under construction or planned（Table 1）. For example, Italy’s New National Energy Strategy

（NES）lays out plans to develop an additional LNG terminal and increase storage capacity with the objective of increasing the liquidity of the Italian market and diversifying the country’s sources of

JOGMEC London OfficeOil & Gas Researcher Sangeeta Jordan

　Gas is a key source of energy in Europe’s＊1 energy supply mix. Gas is supplied to Europe either via pipeline as natural gas or as frozen gas, liquefied natural gas（LNG）, which is regasified in an LNG import（or regasification）terminal. Europe is expected to absorb the LNG surplus coming onto the market in the second half of the 2010s and early 2020s. However the region is facing many uncertainties. This paper focuses on Europe’s gas supply and demand dynamics. On the supply side, we will examine Europe’s domestic gas production, Europe’s key pipeline suppliers and the likelihood of new pipeline suppliers to Europe emerging over the next decade. In the second half of the paper, we will cover the demand side. We will focus on the sectors where demand uptake has occurred or is predicted and will show how gas demand growth in these sectors is determined to a large extent by government policies. Finally, the outlook for LNG growth in gas demand in the European market will be discussed.

Introduction

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supply（Favasuli, 2017）. Adding additional regasification capacity while terminals are practically idle has been criticised by many（Walstad, 2016）（LNG World News, 2016）. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the mere availability of a regasification terminal may enhance the importer’s competitive position vis-a-vis pipeline gas suppliers. It is hoped that the construction of terminals in Central and Eastern European countries could reduce dependency of these countries on Russian gas supplies and improve price competition. LNG terminals are also being expanded, constructed or

reopened in Europe in anticipation of the growing role LNG will play in Europe’s energy supply（Financial Times, 2017）.

2. Europe’s indigenous gas production

　The overal l trend for European domestic gas production is downwards. European gas production has fallen by 41% in the last decade and the BP Energy Outlook predicts domestic gas output to fall by 3.2% per annum until 2035 as existing fields mature and are not replaced（BP, 2017）. In 2014, European domestic g a s p r oduc t i o n s t o od a t 2 5 0 b cm , wh i ch was a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 0 p e r c e n t o f E u r o p e’s g a s requirements. However in 2016, according to Eurostat data, European domestic production only accounted for approximately 30 percent of Europe’s gas supply. Norway, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are the three largest producers of natural gas in Europe, accounting for more than 80% of the region’s total

natural gas production in 2012. With the exception of Norway, the remaining European countries are faced with declining domestic gas production. 　Norway’s production is expected to plateau and then slowly decline post-2020. In the UK, gas production is expected to decline, though the new supply from the Culzean and Platypus fields due to come online from 2019 will slow the rate of decline. Meanwhile in the Netherlands, the Dutch government has been steadily reduc ing output from Europe’s largest f ie ld in Groningen as a result of earthquakes and seismic tremors. Currently production at Groningen has been capped to 24 bcm per annum（Reuters, 2016）, which is more than halving the production from its 2014 peak.

3. Prospects for unconventional gas in Europe

　As a result of the decline in domestic conventional gas production , European countries have made increasing recourse to unconventional gas production in an attempt to increase energy security. However, the prospects for unconventional gas production in Europe are not bright. According to Wood Mackenzie, the contribution of European shale gas production to the European supply mix will not be significant in the

long term, with estimates of only 0.5 bcm in output by 2030（Wood Mackenzie, 2016）. Unconventional gas production was touted as being a “game changer” for Poland, as the estimated volume of 768 bcm of shale reserves was considered to be sufficient to enable the country to realize its hopes of becoming energy independent of Russia（Tallents, 2011）. However after drilling 70 wells, commercial gas volumes were not

Table1 Number of LNG import terminals per type

Note：Figures may not add up due to overlap in categories.Source：Gas Infrastructure Europe

Type Operational Under Construction Planned

Large scale 24 3 23

FSRUs and others 2 0 11

Small-scale 4 4 4

Total 29 6 27


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recovered and key international players ended up exiting shale gas exploration.＊2 Other countries in the EU have imposed outright bans or moratoria on drilling and fracking.＊3 　The future of unconventional gas production in the UK is still uncertain. Geological surveys suggest that the UK has significant shale gas reserves（Delebarre et a l , 2017）and the UK government’s support for unconventional gas production is strong（Ozawa, 2015）. Currently shale gas exploration is concentrated in three areas of the UK：Cheshire, East Midlands and Yorkshire. Proponents of fracking argue that shale gas has the potential to provide the UK with greater energy security, economic growth and job creation opportunities. In an attempt to “revolutionise UK manufacturing”＊ 4 and to create energy security, the petrochemical company, INEOS, has recently expanded its shale gas licence portfolio, enabling the company to carry out exploration over approximately one million acres（400,000 hectares）. Notwithstanding INEOS’large scale acquisition of shale licenses, there is significant scepticism among many energy companies about the prospects for shale gas production in the UK. Concerns about the commercial viability of shale gas in the UK have been heightened after Engie divested all its shale gas assets in the UK（Ward, 2017）. Further, the considerable opposition to fracking by various segments of the population is perceived to be a major obstacle to the development of unconventional gas production in the UK. It is widely considered that unconventional gas production will not contribute significantly to UK’s energy mix.　With declining domestic production and an uncertain future for unconventional gas production, gas imports will rise in Europe. However, the volume, form and source of the additional imports remains unclear. On the one hand, BP Energy Outlook projects that the contribution of imported gas will increase from around 50% in 2015 to nearly 80% by 2035 and that LNG imports will supply around two-thirds of the increase in imports. Wood Mackenzie on the other predicts weak LNG imports post 2025 and an increasing reliance on pipeline Russian imports（Wood Mackenzie, 2016）. The US Energy Information Administration（EIA）2016 Wor ld Out look pred ic ts that LNG wi l l p lay an

increasingly important role in supplying the European gas market（EIA, 2016）.　Before we examine the outlook for LNG in Europe, we need to look at Europe’s current pipeline suppliers and the potential for additional gas supplies from other pipeline suppliers.　In 2015, approximately 87% of imported gas to Europe was pipeline gas while LNG represented the remaining 13%（European Commission, 2015）. In 2015, pipeline gas was supplied to Europe from Russia

（40%）, Norway（37%）, Algeria（7%）and Libya（2%）（European Commission, 2015）. The top three pipe suppliers of gas to Europe ramped up gas supplies in 2016 in an attempt to either maintain or increase market share（Platts, 2017）. In 2016 Russia increased shipments to Europe and Turkey with exports reaching an estimated 185 bcm. Similarly, Norway in 2016 exported close to its record high from 2015 of 115 bcm. In an interview with Platts, Norway’s energy minister, Tord Lien, stated that “we have a very good understanding on the next 20 years where we expect to export on average 100 bcm per year. That is less than today, but it’s still high. It’s going to still be more than 20% of the EU’s gas consumption.” Gas exports from Algeria grew by 13 bcm in 2016 from 38 bcm in 2015.＊5 However, in the longer term, Wood Mackenzie quest ions Norway’s abi l i ty to ma in ta in expor t l eve l s a t 100 bcm unt i l 2035 . Similarly, post 2020, Wood Mackenzie raises concerns whether Algeria will be able to maintain its present export levels as output from maturing fields decline

（Wood Mackenzie, 2016）. Thus, it can be seen that there is uncertainty over how much gas Norway, Algeria and Libya will be able to supply Europe in the future, though Russia’s ability to ramp up supplies is undisputed.　Pipeline gas imports from other sources are not expected to grow greatly, at least over the next decade. Turkmenistan, Kurdistan, Iran, Azerbaijan and the East Mediterranean area including Cyprus, Israel and Egypt could potentially supply gas to Europe. Yet most of these suppliers face internal instabilities or geopolitical tensions making it highly unlikely that the region will be a secure source of gas supply for a decade or probably longer. Wood Mackenzie’s forecast

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is bullish on gas production from Azerbaijan, Iran and the Kurdistan region of Iraq, stating in a 2016 update on key pipe exporters that the substantial gas reserves held by these 3 countries could supply Turkey and Europe with nearly 50 bcm of gas, which is just under 10% o f t o ta l European demand by 2030（Wood Mackenzie, 2017）. 　However , other ana lysts are less opt imist ic , suggesting that Azerbaijan’s imports from Gazprom in 2015 to fulfil domestic requirements is indicative of major problems of supply from old fields and cast doubt on potential export volumes to Europe（Honore, 2016）. Likewise the development of the fields in the

East Mediterranean area faces various problems. Uncertainty over pipelines remains, as a pipeline to Turkey would be politically difficult and expensive and a pipeline to Greece would be too long and technically complicated. Consequently, although Europe wishes to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, alternative sources of domestic and imported gas remain limited. As a result, LNG could potentially play a greater role in the future, with its precise impact however yet to be determined. The future role of LNG in the European gas supply is contingent on the future of natural gas demand in general, which is hard to predict.

4. Gas demand： Will it rise?

　Natural gas is a signif icant contributor to the European energy mix. According to BP Energy Outlook, gas accounted for 22% of the European energy mix in 2015 and BP predicts that the share of gas in the mix will increase to 28% in 2035（Table 2）

（BP, 2017）. Simi lar ly , industry group, Eurogas , forecasts that gas will supply approximately 30 per cent of the share of the energy mix by 2030. Market fundamentals in Europe have tightened with gas demand i n c r ea s i ng by 18 bcm i n 2 016（Wood Mackenzie, 2016）. This comes as welcome news to the gas industry, as European gas demand had fallen for 4 consecutive years beginning in 2011.　Despite European gas demand stabilising in 2015 and 2016, European gas demand remains structurally low. Forecasts for gas demand in Europe over the next 20-30 years vary considerably. Exxon Mobil’s outlook is the most optimistic, forecasting European gas demand to reach 594 bcm by 2035. Similarly, the US Energy Information Administration（EIA）forecasts gas demand in the OECD Europe region to grow from 509 bcm in 2012 to 716 bcm in 2040（EIA, 2016）. On the other hand, the International Energy Agency（IEA）is less bullish. In the IEA’s central scenario, New Policies Scenario, gas demand is forecast to reach 521 bcm in OECD Europe in 2030, which is only marginally higher

than 2015 levels but it is an increase all the same. Even less optimistic is the IEA 450 Scenario projection, which is based on more aggressive environmental policies. In this scenario, the IEA forecasts gas demand to decrease by 33 bcm from 2020 - 2030 and d r o p b y 8 7 b cm f r om 2 0 3 0 - 2 0 4 0 （IEA , 2 0 1 6）. Likewise, the European Commission forecasts gas demand falling to 412 bcm in 2030 but increasing to 420 bcm in 2050（European Commiss ion , 2016）. Despite the optimistic forecasts mentioned above, a more realistic and generally accepted position is that gas demand in Europe is stagnating.　I t can be s een f r om the above tha t t he re i s uncertainty over how much European gas demand will

Source：BP Energy Outlook

Table2 Primary energy consumption（units in Mtoe unless otherwise noted）

Level Share（％）

2015 2016 2015 2016

Total 1,631 1,508

Oil（Mb/d） 12 9 36 30

Gas（Bcf/d） 39 45 22 28

Coal 262 117 16 8

Nuclear 194 138 12 9

Hydro 76 84 5 6

Renewables 150 300 9 20


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5. Sectors where gas uptake is predicted

（1） Power Generation

　This section will focus on the two sectors where there is gas demand uptake or where gas demand is expected to increase, namely power generation and transportation（Corbeau, A-S and Yermakov, V, 2016）

（Cedigaz, 2015）. There are few expectations of much additional gas consumption in the industrial and residential sectors（except for Germany, Turkey and in Eastern Europe）and thus these sectors will not be covered here. Eurogas forecasts the largest increase in gas consumption to come from power generation （from 136.5 bcm in 2005 to 265 bcm in 2030）. Similarly, the EIA predicts the annual growth rate in the power generation sector to be 3.6% from 2020 to 2040. The demand recovery of 2015 and 2016 from the lows of 2011-2014 has been, to a large degree, a result of increased gas consumption for power generation（Elliot, 2017）. In 2016, approximately 26% of gas was used in the power generation sector. Gas demand for power generation rose in the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Italy. The UK accounted for the largest growth with an estimated 43% of the 20 bcm of power sector demand recovery（Table 3）. The reasons for the growth in the power sector in Europe include：　•　 The environmental benefits of gas over coal as

gas emits around half the CO2 of coal when burned.

　•　 The replacement of ageing nuclear and coal-fired plants with natural gas fired and renewable capacity, which are cheaper and faster to build

（Tallents, 2011）. For instance in Europe, the overnight cost of a combined-cycle gas turbine

（CCGT） is 50% of a supercritical coal plant. 　•　 Nuclear outages in France.　•　 Coal to gas switching. The establishment of a

Carbon Price Floor has encouraged significant levels of coal-to-gas switching in the UK. Italy, Spa in , Germany and the Nether l ands are considered key potential switching markets in Europe（Timera Energy, 2016）.

　These positive trends in the uptake of gas by the power generation sector are predicted to continue until around 2024, rising to around 169 bcm, due in part to the lower LNG prices. The lower LNG prices expected in the second half of the 2010s and early 2020s will create some demand in the power sector, but according to Honore, gas prices will need to drop to very low levels to start making a real difference in the regional mix（Honore, 2016）. Gas prices would probably need to drop below $3.5/MMBtu in 2016 in Western Europe before switching from coal to gas starts to happen outside the UK. 　Despite these positive trends however, the outlook for gas demand in the power sector is uncertain for several reasons：　•　 Ineffective carbon price. According to the IEA,

carbon prices under the EU’s Emission Trading System （ETS） have been far too low and would have to quadruple from the current level of around 5 Euros/t to encourage switching to gas

（Fraser, 2016）. In a similar fashion, Stern is also critical of the failure of EU policy to raise carbon prices to effective levels and points out that national measures, such as the UK carbon support

grow. This is because gas demand growth is contingent on whether there will be strong economic growth in

European economies and the degree to which more stringent environmental policies are adopted.

Source：Timera Energy, Sandbag/Agoda Energiewende

Table3 Top power markets driving 2016 gas demand recovery（bcm）

UKDenmarkFranceItalyNLOther EU28

8.53.32.51.91.22.2

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price and the emission performance standards （EPS）will have to be play a stronger role （Stern, 2017）.

　•　 Competition from renewables. Costs of renewables are decreasing and will continue to decrease making renewables competitive against gas in the energy sector. The European Commission’s 2030 Energy Strategy foresees a share in consumption of at least 27 percent for renewable energy while Wood Mackenzie forecasts that renewables could reach approximately 44% of the European power mix by 2030（Wood Mackenzie, 2016）.

（2）Transportation

　The transportation sector is viewed by many as a promising new sector for the use of gas. Cedigaz forecasts natural gas consumption, both compressed natural gas （CNG） and LNG, in this sector to grow six-fold by 2035（Cedigaz, 2015）. With the objective of decarbonising the transport sector, natural gas usage in this sector is actively supported by EU policy. The Clean Power for Transport （CPT） package, which underpins European policy, recognises that natural gas

will play a major role in both road and maritime transport. According to the European Commission’s Alternat ive Fuels Infrastructure , which is the cornerstone of the CPT package, member states are r e qu i r e d t o d e v e l o p a p l a n （Na t i o n a l P o l i c y Framework） to establish a network of refuelling stations for natural gas vehicles in cities, ports and along the Trans-European- Network for Transport

（TEN-T）（European Commission, 2014）. 　Table 4 shows the LNG infrastructure in Europe. The European Natural & bio Gas Vehicle Association

（NGVA Europe）, e s t imates tha t there w i l l be approximately 400,000 gas-fuelled trucks on EU roads by 2030. Presently there are around 1,300 LNG fuelled trucks in Europe, of which nearly half were in the UK（Le Fevre , 2016）. In regards to marine transport, 81 per cent of all LNG fuelled ships are in Norway and at present only Norway and Sweden have small-scale LNG terminals for bunkering purposes. The International Maritime Organization’s regulations on sulphur limits will further incentive LNG usage as a marine fuel, though the volume of LNG absorbed by shipping will not be very significant（Honore, 2016）.

6. The outlook for LNG in Europe

　From the previous sections, it can be seen that the European gas market is characterised by declining domestic production and low gas demand growth. At the same time, Europe has the necessary infrastructure

to absorb LNG supplies, albeit not uniformly. Corbeau suggests that ironically LNG demand may grow in Europe where total gas demand is stagnating, because r i s i n g g l o b a l LNG supp l y l e ad s t o i n c r e a s ed

Source：Le Fevre, 2016

Table4 LNG infrastructure in Europe

Operational Under construction Planned

LNG terminals Re-loading Transhipment Bunker ship loading Truck loading Rail loading Liquefaction Bunkering for ships Bunker ships Refuelling for trucks

15391902226570

22780

n.a5414

1241154222619


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requirements, and countries opt for LNG instead of pipeline gas for political, supply diversification, and flexibil ity reasons（Corbeau, 2016）. Indeed the European Commission views LNG supplies as integral to diversifying sources of supply and improving energy security in the region. In the European Commission’s strategy for LNG and gas storage, countries that have access to LNG are considered to be significantly more resilient to possible supply interruptions than those dependent on a s ing le gas supp l ier（European Commission, 2016）. Thus, the European Commission has included LNG infrastructure projects in the Baltic, central-eastern and south-eastern European regions in the list of projects to be accelerated and eligible for financial support. LNG import terminals will enable these regions to have the capacity and flexibility to receive LNG cargoes at short notice, whenever the price is competit ive, thereby enhancing energy security. 　The European gas market has been referred to as the “clearinghouse for LNG”（Schmers, 2017）, “the dumping ground for the world’s LNG”（Flowers, 2016）, “the swing market for LNG”（Corbeau, A-S and Yermakov, V, 2016）, “the residual market for LNG”

（Honore , 2016）and the “market of last resort”（Clemente, 2016）. In other words, the role of the European market has been to absorb LNG that cannot be absorbed by markets e l sewhere . This was il lustrated in 2015 when the slowdown in Asian demand resulted in Asian bound LNG being rerouted to Europe. However, contrary to expectations, the European market did not function as a sink for LNG in 2016. The UK, Belgium and the Netherlands recorded declines in LNG imports. In fact in the UK, pipeline gas displaced LNG imports. 　In 2016 Europe sourced LNG mainly from Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, Norway and Peru.＊6 Europe’s main LNG supplier has been Qatar, although supplies from Qatar dropped 4.4 bcm in 2016 from 28.4 bcm in 2015. It is doubtful whether Qatar will increase export volumes to Europe given its growing domestic demand,

commitments to the Asian markets（Clemente, 2016） and competition from US LNG suppliers（Elliot, 2016）. Qatari LNG supplies will increasingly face competition from US LNG suppliers as shale gas production soars in the United States. To date LNG shipments from the United States to Europe have been less than predicted with only 8 cargoes shipped to Europe（Elliot, S and Reale F., 2017）, totalling 0.23 million tonnes （GIINL, 2017）. In 2015, the majority of US LNG cargoes were delivered to South America（Table 5）. Nevertheless Europe is expected to absorb greater volumes of US LNG as more US LNG projects come on stream in the second half of the 2010s and early 2020s.＊7 Cheniere, the first US LNG exporter, estimates approximately half of its total LNG exports will head to Europe in the future. This forecast is supported by Wood Mackenzie and Platts. 　Wood Mackenzie projected that 55% of US LNG volumes, or about 42 million tonnes per year, would be sent to Europe by 2020（Shiryaevskaya , 2016）. Similarly, the IEA, in the World Energy Outlook, forecasts that US LNG will fill the gap created by the decline in Norwegian output and the drop in Russian gas imports（IEA, 2016）. However Russian industry players and analysts predict that the anticipated growth of US LNG imports wil l not material ize

（Aksyutin, 2017）.

Source：Platts

Table5 US LNG Export Destinations as of November 16 2016

Country Cargo

ChileBrazilArgentinaIndiaMexicoJordanKuwaitSpainUAEChinaDom RepPortugalTurkey

9444322111111

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7. Challenges for US LNG in Europe

　With g loba l LNG product ion on the verge o f significant increases, interest in Europe’s underutilised regasification capacity and its liquid and well developed gas trading hubs is growing. In a surplus global LNG market in 2015-2020, the region could be the recipient of substantial LNG supplies. LNG could solve Europe’s energy security issues as Europe’s indigenous gas production continues to decline and LNG could help Europe to diversify energy supplies. Further, the political will to import LNG will also be a major driver in LNG uptake. For these reasons Europe’s LNG imports could grow. However the outlook for US LNG

in Europe is unclear and contingent on two main factors, namely：　•　 What happens in other countries? LNG is “price

sensitive” and LNG will go to markets where it can be sold most profitably. For instance, despite an increase in gas demand in the second half of 2016 in Europe, LNG shipments to Europe in 2016 were scarce as LNG was del ivered to higher paying markets in Asia.

　•　 How Russia responds. Russia has a surplus capacity and could send additional gas to Europe at prices competitive to LNG.

8. Conclusion

9. Notes

　The future of natural gas demand in Europe remains unclear. There is no consensus of views regarding European gas demand growth. Some forecasts predict a decline in demand by 2030, though most projections predict European gas demand will grow, albeit slowly. The region will face a decline in domestic production, which will increase the need for imports. It would seem that Russia is the only pipeline gas supplier with the ability to provide Europe with guaranteed volumes or an increase in volumes if required. Russia will be the main competitor to LNG in Europe. Russia has a

surplus capacity and could send additional gas to Europe at prices competitive to LNG, in order to maintain its market share. What happens in the Asian markets will determine how keen the LNG suppliers are to send LNG to Europe. LNG enables Europe to access world supplies and to have flexibility in gas supplies. Diversification of gas supplies and flexibility are strongly encouraged by the European Commission and thus it would appear that LNG supplies to Europe will grow in the future.

＊1： Europe in this paper applies to the region consisting of 35 countries （EU28 + Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey）.

＊2：Conoco Philips, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total and Marathon exited shale gas exploration.＊3： France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria imposed bans or moratoria on

fracking.＊4： Quote from Jim Ratcliffe, INEOS Chairman. Found at INEOS Shale website：

http://www.ineos.com/businesses/ineos-shale/our-business/


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10. Bibliography

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outlook-2017.pdf [Accessed 23 March 2017].03. Cedigaz, 2015. Medium and Long Term Natural Gas Outlook. [Online] Available at： www.cedigaz.org/documents/2015/CEDIGAZProspects2015.pdf [Accessed 23 March 2017].04. Clemente, J., 2016. Forbes. [Online] Available at： https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/06/19/europes-rise-in-natural-gas-demand-

means-more-lng/#6ebac34e5d8a [Accessed 26 February 2017].05. Corbeau, A-S and Yermakov, V, 2016. Will There Be a Price War Between Russian Pipeline Gas and US LNG

in Europe?, Saudi Arabia： The King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Centre.06. Corbeau, A.-S., 2016. Conclusion： LNG Markets - The Great Reconfiguration. In： LNG Markets in Transition：

The Great Reconfiguration. New York： Oxford University Press, pp. 554-577.07. Delebarre et al, 2017. Briefing Paper： Shale gas and fracking. [Online] Available at： researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06073/SN06073.pdf [Accessed 3 March 2017].08. EIA, 2016. International Energy Outlook 2016. [Online] Available at： https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/ [Accessed 15 March 2017].09. Elliot, S and Reale F., 2017. US LNG vs pipeline gas： European market share war? Natural Gas Special Report,

London： Platts.10. Elliot, S., 2016. Intense competition expected in European gas market： IEA's Birol, London： Platts.11. Elliot, S., 2017. Outlook 2017： European gas supply, demand to remain robust. [Online] Available at： http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/london/outlook-2017-european-gas-supply-demand-

to-remain-26631430 [Accessed 25 Febuary 2017].12. European Commission, 2014. Directive 2014/94/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 October

2014 on the deployment of alternative fuels infrastructure. 13. European Commission, 2015. Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets.14. European Commission, 2016. EU Reference scenario 2016 Energy, transport and GHG emissions Trends to

2050. Luxembourg： Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport.15. European Commission, 2016. Liquefied Natural Gas and gas storage will boost EU's energy security. [Online] Available at： www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-310_en.htm

＊5：58.8 bcm supplied to Europe from Algeria includes LNG. Source： Export, Gazprom Investors Day （2017）.＊6：Small amounts of LNG were also imported from Angola, Australia, Egypt, Trinidad and the US.＊7：By 2020 US LNG export capacity is estimated to reach about 60 million tonnes. Source： LNG World News

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[Accessed 3 March 2017].16. Favasuli, S., 2017. Interfax Global Energy.17. Flowers, A., 2016. Workshop given by Andy Flowers. Barcelona： World LNG Summit.18. Fraser, P., 2016. Global gas market outlook. European gas conference, Vienna： IEA.19. GIINL, 2017. International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers. [Online] Available at： Annual Report 2017. http://www.giignl.org/publications [Accessed 10 March 2017].20. Honore, A., 2016. LNG Demand Potential. In： LNG Markets in Transition： The Great Reconfiguration. New

York： Oxford University Press, pp. 307-326.21. IEA, 2016. World Energy Outlook 2016.22. Le Fevre, C., 2016. LNG as a Transport Fuel. In： LNG Markets in Transition： The Great Reconfiguration.

New York： Oxford University Press, pp. 442-468.23. LNG World News, 2016. LNG World News. [Online] Available at： http://www.lngworldnews.com/ceer-current-lng-infrastructure-in-europe-sufficient/ [Accessed 10 March 2017].24. Ozawa, D., 2015. Drill UK Drill （Prim and Properly Please....）. JOGMEC, 49（3）, pp. 40-55.25. Platts, 2017. US LNG vs Pipeline Gas： European Market Share War? Natural Gas Special Report. 26. Reuters, 2016. Dutch government lowers Groningen gas output cap to 24 bcm. [Online] Available at： http://uk.reuters.com/article/netherlands-energy-groningen-idUKL8N19G55U [Accessed 10 March 2017].27. Schmers, C., 2017. How will greater volumes of LNG impact European gas pricing and trading?. Vienna：

European Gas conference.28. Shiryaevskaya, A., 2016. More than half of US LNG is destined for Europe, WoodMac Says. Bloomberg.29. Standaert, K., 2016. European LNG infrastructure： from large-scale to small-scale status and outlook. Hamburg,

LNG Congress.30. Stern, J., 2017. The Future of Gas in Decarbonising European Energy Markets, Oxford： OIES.31. Tallents, A., 2011. European gas supply and demand, and the outlook for shale gas. Jogmec, pp. 43-63.32. Timera Energy, 2016. Timera Energy. [Online] Available at： http://www.timera-energy.com/gas-vs-coal-switching-in-europe-key-markets/ [Accessed 15 March 2017].33. Walstad, A., 2016. EU LNG terminals still hardly used - GIE data. [Online] Available at： http://interfaxenergy.com/gasdaily/article/20360/eus-lng-terminals-are-much-needed-but-little-used [Accessed 5 March 2017].34. Wood Mackenzie, 2016. Europe falls in love with cheap Russian gas： Europe gas markets long-term outlook

H2 2016. Press Release： Wood Mackenzie.35. Wood Mackenzie, 2017. Key pipe exporter updates. [Online] Available at： https://www.woodmac.com/ [Accessed 15 February 2017].


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執筆者紹介

Sangeeta Jordan（サンギータ　ジョーダン）［学歴］ Australian National University, BA in Asian Studies Hokkaido University, MSc in Agricultural Economics Hokkaido University, PhD in Bioresources and Product Science

［職歴］2015年10月、JOGMECロンドン事務所調査員（石油・天然ガス部門）となり、現在に至る。

Global Disclaimer（免責事項）本稿は石油天然ガス・金属鉱物資源機構（以下「機構」）調査部が信頼できると判断した各種資料に基づいて作成されていますが、機構は本稿に含まれるデータおよび情報の正確性又は完全性を保証するものではありません。また、本稿は読者への一般的な情報提供を目的としたものであり、何らかの投資等に関する特定のアドバイスの提供を目的としたものではありません。したがって、機構は本稿に依拠して行われた投資等の結果については一切責任を負いません。なお、本稿の図表類等を引用等する場合には、機構資料からの引用である旨を明示してくださいますようお願い申し上げます。

Documents

The European gas market and the outlook for LNG demand in ......bcm, which represented 15.3 per cent of the global LNG market（GIINL, 2017）. Although LNG imports to Europe slowed