V7-N1-1-art8-2016 | The metaphysics of conflict: some ... · PDF fileThe metaphysics of conflict: some reflections on Schopenhauer’s politics A metafísica do conflito: algumas reflexões

The metaphysics of conflict: some reflections on Schopenhauer’s politics

A metafísica do conflito: algumas reflexões sobre a política de

Schopenhauer

Davide Ruggieri

PhD Philosophy at the University of Salento PhD Sociology at the University of Bologna

E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract: This paper argues for a new inter-pretation of Schopenhauer’s political theory in the light of the category of conflict. Accor-ding to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, The Will (to live), that inhabits any living being and always requests Will/life, cannot ever grasp itself in the “representational” side. This generates struggle, conflict, misery and sorrow. This schismatic and conflictual schema recurs in his moral, social and poli-tical arguments. Coherently with his meta-physical view, he substantially theorized the socio-political issue twofold (“political Ma-nichaeism”). On the one hand is the repre-sentational sphere - politics as an institu-tional question (the regulative function of the State); on the other hand, the metaphy-sical or inner sphere - conflict (as means) is unavoidable and solidarity (as goal) in any human social, moral and political agency re-presents the one and only irremissible pres-criptive principle.

Resumo: Este artigo defende uma nova interpretação da teoria política de Schope-nhauer à luz da categoria de conflito. De a-cordo com a metafísica de Schopenhauer, o conceito de vontade (de vida), que habita todo ser vivo e sempre requer vontade e vi-da, não pode ser captado pelo lado “repre-sentacional”; isso geraria luta, conflito, mi-séria e tristeza. Esse esquema cindido e conflitante se repete nos temas morais, so-ciais e políticos do filósofo. Coerente com sua visão metafísica, Schopenhauer teori-zou substancialmente a questão sócio-polí-tica a partir de uma dupla vertente (mani-queísmo político). Por um lado, tem-se a es-fera representacional - política como uma questão institucional (a função regulativa do Estado). Por outro lado, a esfera metafí-sica ou interna - em que o conflito (como meio) é inevitável e a solidariedade (como meta), sob qualquer forma de agir moral, político e social, representa o único e irre-missível princípio moral de tipo prescritivo.

Palavras-chave: Schopenhauer; Metaphi-sics; Conflict; Political manichaeism.

Keywords: Schopenhauer; Metafí sica; Con-flito; Maniqueí smo polí tico.

mailto:[email protected]


141Revista Voluntas: Estudos sobre Schopenhauer-Vol. 7, Nº 1. 1º semestre de 2016. ISSN:2179-3786-pp. 140-154.

1. Schopenhauer and the category of conflict

n the title of my paper I use the terms “metaphysics” and “conflict” as

the keywords to read Schopenhauer’s Politics. The former is the

framework to comprehend the various meanings of the latter: conflict,

contradiction and disagreement are not merely human actions, but the core of

metaphysical doctrine, which ethics and politics build on. So I will discuss this

issue in two steps: 1) I will argue for the category of “conflict” in Schopenhauer’s

philosophy, then, 2) I will discuss the fundamental dichotomy in Schopenhauer’s

political theory (political Manichaeism).

Schopenhauer did not write any systematic treatise on legal-political

doctrine in a strict sense. He was neither Kant, nor Fichte or Hegel: he did not take

part in political debates or strongly point out the best policy for humankind. On the

contrary, he experienced his “Zeitgeist” with a modern epicurean mood: Λά θε

βιώ σάς (Epicurus), or with the Latin locution Bene vixit qui bene latuit (Ovid).

Schopenhauer did not recognize himself in a Nation; he felt himself to be a citizen

of a higher corpus politicus. In a letter sent to the Dean of the University of Jena in

1812 - after the Napoleonic siege of Berlin - he wrote that he felt like a stranger

everywhere and all the time: he would not serve humankind by fighting with his

hands, but by writing and thinking1.

Schopenhauer’s political disengagement depends primarily on his private

income: he could quickly and easily move away (around the whole European area)

when he felt himself to be in peril or discomfort. This happened, for example, in

1806 when the Napoleonic troops broke into Weimar and particularly in 1848

when the revolutionary “sovereign canaille” upset Frankfurt. In a letter sent to

Julius Frauenstaedt on 11 July 1848, Schopenhauer wrote: “When the storm comes,

all the sails must be stricken”2. This political disengagement is also theoretically

meaningful: it depends on Schopenhauer’s “intransigent nominalism”, so Max

Horkheimer meant his socio-political attitude. In fact, Schopenhauer considered

the State, Justice, Law, Society and History to be just names or abstractions,

1 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Gesammelte Briefe, p. 643. 2 Idem, p. 231.

I


142 RUGGIERI, Davide

standing for nothing real or existing3. Only the individual is “real”; this is the reason

why he upheld this scepticism.

Nevertheless, he was not uninterested in political and historical events; he

just literally kept his “distance” from them. From very early on, this was his

conviction. As he noted in 1814 about society and humankind, it is necessary and

wise to maintain “a distant behaviour”4: society – he wrote, using a metaphor – is

like a flame; the wise man gets warm while keeping his distance from it, whereas

the stupid one complains that the flame burns. So let me get you into the core issue

of my presentation

Consideration of Schopenhauer’s political theory must not omit his

metaphysical doctrine. He solved ethical and political questions through

metaphysics, as testified in some letters5. In 1813, the young Schopenhauer already

noted that his philosophy should be regarded as ethics and metaphysics together,

two disciplines wrongly separated, in the same way that human beings are

wrongly divided into body and mind6.

In the second book of The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer

explains that the metaphysical feature of the whole world is conflictual.

Everywhere in nature – writes Schopenhauer – we see conflict, we see struggle, we see victory changing hands; later we will recognize this more clearly as the internal rupture that is essential to the Will. Each level of Will’s objectification is in conflict with the others over matter, space and time7.

The inner nature of Will is an irrational and unitary principle, which

objectifies itself gradually, and then Schopenhauer hypothesizes a hierarchic order

for the world structure. Each grade is a platonic Idea, which is an eternal shape that

occurs in the representation through space, time and causality. At the lowest grade

of the objectification of Will, there are natural bio-chemical and physical forces; at

3 Cf. HORKHEIMER, M. Gesammelte Schriften, p. 43; cf. SCHMIDT, A. Tugend und Weltlauf. 4 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handscrifltliche Nachlass, FM, p. 113. 5 Cf. BRINKMANN, K. Die Rechts- und Staatslehre Schopenhauers, p. 10. 6 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handscrifltliche Nachlass, FM, p. 55. 7 I quote the original text: “So sehen wir in der Natur überall Streit, Kampf und Wechsel des Sieges, und werden eben darin weiterhin die dem Willen wesentliche Entzweiung mit sich selbst deutlicher erkennen. Jede Stufe der Objektivation des Willens macht der andern die Materie, den Raum, die Zeit streitig” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 27, p. 208 [English translation of The World as Will and Representation refers to SCHOPENHAUER, A. 2010]).



the top, in human beings, there is reason, which is not at all sovereign in nature, but

simply and always enslaved to Will. Referring to Schopenhauer’s Berlin Lessons,

Sandro Barbera writes: “L’unite de la nature se pre sente comme une hie rarchie de

forces (generals, me caniques, chimiques, oeganiques, morales) qui sont toutes, a

different niveaux, des objectivations de la volonte ”8.

The universal forces in nature become real through polarization, divisions

and oppositions. Kein Sieg ohne Kampf [No victory without a struggle]9: this is

Schopenhauer’s synthetic motto, dealing with all the conflictual dynamics and the

continuous and natural struggle, which relates to many grades in the emanation of

the Will to live.

Since the higher Idea or objectification of the Will - writes Schopenhauer – can come forward only by overpowering the lower Ideas, it encounters resistance on their part. Even when the lower Ideas are quickly brought, they nonetheless keep striving to express their essence in a complete and self-sufficient manner10.

Schopenhauer directly deduces from Schelling’s doctrine the polarization in

nature as the general principle, as the “original phenomenon”, as unity structured

in polarization: Barbera argues that Schopenhauer learned from Schelling the

concept of “powers” in nature, which engage conflict to get a supreme unity11.

Barbera writes: “Les forces supe rieures sont les «puissances» (dans le sense

mathe matique du term) de celles infe rieures, et tout la dinamique des forces est

sostenue par le conflit qui en constitue le moteur et la re fe rence commune”12.

Again, in the fourth book of his masterpiece, Schopenhauer repeats that in each

grade of the objectification of Will there is a steady struggle [ein beständiger

Kampf] among individuals of every species, and this is the expression of an

“intimate conflict of the Will to live against itself”13.

8 BARBERA, S. Une philosophie du conflit, p. 99. 9 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 27, pp. 203-204. 10 “Indem die höhere Idee, oder Willensobjektivation, nur durch Überwältigung der niedrigeren hervortreten kann, erleidet sie den Widerstand dieser, welche, wenn gleich zur Dienstbarkeit gebracht, doch immer noch streben, zur unabhängigen und vollständigen Äußerung ihres Wesens zu gelangen” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 27, p. 207). 11 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftilche Nachlass, FM, § 548; cf. BARBERA, S. Une philosophie du conflit, pp. 106-107. 12 BARBERA, S. Une philosophie du conflit, pp. 101-102. 13 SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 61, pp. 430-431.



In this sense, there cannot be any “struggle for recognition” [Kampf um

Anerkennung], as pointed out by Axel Honneth14. The conflictual issue does not

deal in fact with consciousness and its instances, so that we can consider that

political and multi-layered society derives from “ethical life” [Sittlichkeit].

Schopenhauer’s theory of conflict is deeper than the Hegelian scheme of

contradiction: Schopenhauer’s model involves all living beings and the category of

conflict explains the way the Will to live arises. It basically concerns a

“metaphysical grammar” of the conflict, therefore it is possible to argue for the

moral and socio-political sphere. Barbera argues:

Dans le conflit, qui suppose la présence de forces supérieures et de forces «résistantes», toutes les individualités sont manitenues et se reconnaissent réciproquement, sur l’example d’une dialectique valet (ou esclave)-maître, dans laquelle il est evident que le forces se modifient sur la base d’un modèle sociale. Schopenhauer parle de «domination» (Überwältigung) et de «résistance» (Widerstrand), et ce sont les même termes que Nietzsche emploiera pour indiquer le rapport commander-obéir qui constitue la structure profonde de la volonté de puissance, qu’il entend dans l’aphorisme 19 du Au-delà du bien et du mal et dans les fragmentes posthumes de la période comme un «affect du commandement»15.

Julius Bahnsen, one of the most original disciples of the “Schopenhauer-

Schule” (Fazio 2009a; 2009b), theorized a conflictual re-elaboration of

Schopehauer’s metaphysics, Realdialektik. In his work Der Widerpruch im Wissen

und Wesen der Welt, published in 1880, he used the term and the concept of conflict

to describe the metaphysical and internal contradiction of the Will, which is to be

found among individuals and inside the individual16. Bahnsen argued for the “real

negativity of the Will” and the core of his metaphysics is the self-contradictoriness

of Will. He sustained that “the antithesis is the whole, whereas the thesis and the

synthesis don’t stand at all”17. The Realdialektik is the “science of the real

contradiction”: real is the self-parting of Will into “otherness”, real are the

individuals and their contradictions. Bahnsen theorized a strong theory of

14 Cf. HONNETH, A. The struggle for recognition. 15 BARBERA, S. Une philosophie du conflit, p. 110. 16 Cf. BAHNSEN, J. Der Widerpruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt, p. 48; p. 225. 17 BAHNSEN, J. Das Tragische als Weltgesetz und der Humor als ästhetische Gestalt des Metaphysischen, p. 1.



contradictory dialectics without any kind of redemption (aesthetic or ethical).

Schopenhauer on the contrary argued for a way to escape from conflict in nature or

at least to catch it without suffering.

The struggle of material shapes in nature [Kampf der Formen um die

Materie], described by Schopenhauer, is only an epiphenomenal aspect of Will in

itself: it is the necessary mediation through the representational sphere. This order

doesn’t represent any plan of a higher entity: there is no teleological plan at all,

since every part finds its raison d’être inwards, due to the fragmentary character of

the world and life. He felt very close to Ho lderlin’s conviction in Hyperion about the

coming of the spiritual night and the absence of Gods. Schopenhauer reversed the

Western teleological perspective and theorizes the end of any rational and human

meaning (τε λος) in history and society. The only finalism he could accept does not

depend on human categories: so finalism is just the name of what we are able to

grasp about the realization of Will.

However, in this hierarchic and complex order in nature, human beings find

their place at the top: the human species is able to overwhelm the others and to

submit nature as a whole. Nature is considered, in fact, as a “product at human

disposal”: this idea, very familiar to Heidegger and Jonas, is the key for

Schopenhauer to explain that our natural disposition for struggle is reflected inside

human nature. Human hegemony over the animal, plant and mineral kingdom

becomes a hegemony over our neighbours: homo homini lupus, as Schopenhauer

directly refers to Hobbes. The same contention and overwhelming in the lower

grades of the objectification of Will recurs in human relations18.

For Schopenhauer, conflict between individuals is the most terrible in

nature. In his masterpiece Schopenhauer writes: “At the highest level of

consciousness, which is to say human consciousness, egoism (like cognition, pain

and joy) must have reached the higher level as well, and the conflict between

individuals (that it conditions) must be at its most terrible”19. Thus, Egoism is the

18 Cf. BARBERA, S. Une philosophie du conflit, pp. 103-104. 19 “In dem auf den höchsten Grad gesteigerten Bewußtseyn, dem menschlichen, muß die Erkenntniß, der Schmerz, die Freude, so auch der Egoismus den höchsten Grad erreicht haben und der durch ihn bedingte Widerstreit der Individuen auf das entsetzlichste hervortreten” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 61, p. 432 [see also SCHOPENHAUER, A. On the basis of morality]).



“starting point for all struggle” [Ausgangspunkt alles Kampfes] in human agency20

and the real “longing to existence and well-being”21, as Schopenhauer affirms in On

the basis of morality. It is the first fact of moral consciousness: “egoism is colossal, it

towers above the world” (KS, § 14: 553). Anybody can recognize inwards the inner

centre of the world (WWII, § 47: 698), but looking outside we feel just like a “drop

in the sea”. The difference from the other is “absolute” (KS, § 22: 622). So, reason

builds the State to prevent the consequences of universal egoism, which is then the

first moral stimulus to fight through the real “cardinal virtue”, that is justice

[Gerechtigkeit]. In On the basis of morality, Schopenhauer writes: “In war we must

first recognize the enemy; in the impending struggle, egoism, as the chief force on

its own side, will be the principal opponent of the virtue of justice, which in my

opinion is the first and really cardinal virtue”22.

The justice mentioned above is not providence and it is not related to

human deeds in the course of history. If we expect to find a trail or a sign of a

higher plan (rational, divine or simply finalist) in historical events, we’re destined

to fail. In Parerga und Paralipomena Schopenhauer argues about his philosophy of

history. In a short and illuminating paragraph (Chapter 12), he says that:

History shows us the life of nations and we cannot find in it

nothing but wars and outrage [Kriege und Empörungen]; the years

of peace appear here and there only as short pauses, as intervals

between the acts. And in the same way, the life of the individual is

a perpetual struggle, not merely metaphorically with want and

boredom but actually with others. Everywhere he finds an

opponent, lives in constant conflict, and dies weapon in hand23.

This is Schopenhauer’s statement, which he previously noted in 1822 in his

20 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 61, p. 431. 21 “[…] der Drang zum Daseyn und Wohlseyn” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, KS, § 14, p. 552). 22 “Inzwischen ist im Kriege das Erste, daß man den Feind rekognoscirt. In dem bevorstehenden Kampfe wird der Egoismus, als der Hauptmacht seiner Seite, vorzüglich sich der Tugend der Gerechtigkeit entgegengestellen, welche, nach meiner Ansicht, die erste und recht eigentliche Kardinaltugend ist” (idem, KS, § 14, p. 555). 23 “Die Geschichte zeigt uns das Leben der Völker, und findet nichts als Kriege und Empörungen zu erzählen: die friedlichen Jahre erscheinen nur als kurze Pausen, Zwischenakte, dann und wann ein Mal. Und eben so ist das Leben des Einzelnen ein fortwährender Kampf, nicht etwan bloß metaphorisch mit der Noth, oder mit der Langenweile; sondern auch wirklich mit Andern. Er findet überall den Widersacher, lebt in beständigem Kämpfe und stirbt, die Waffen in der Hand” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, PP II, p. 265).



Berliner Manuscripts, explicitly citing Voltaire24.

Human nature reflects the intimate core and essence of the Will to live: we

learn from history that progress is a useful illusion for human facts, which are

characterized by blood and wars. According to Schopenhauer, we pay very dearly

for our welfare. The argument of the “original Sin” in Schopenhauer deals with the

idea that the joys of humankind are paid for through countless pains and sorrows.

Justice through injustice; peace through war; good through evil. We should be

aware of the fact that we are guilty; that is, we are part of a “collective” sin25. The

inequality in modern society is the product of a struggle between those few who

use violence or cunning as means to prevail, and those who suffer this condition:

Schopenhauer explicitly refers to proletarianism, poverty and slavery. “The whole

unnatural condition of society”, he says, [is] “the universal struggle to escape from

misery” and he considered the diminishing of luxury, or even the abolishment of it

altogether as the most effective way to alleviate human misery26.

2. Schopenhauer and the flourishing politics from the metaphysics of Will

The World as Will The World as Representation

The Political (socio-moral agency through

conflictual/sympathetic participation)

The Politics as Polity (the State with regulative

function)

Metaphysical perspective Subjective perspective

Active Sphere/Agency Passive Sphere/patire

Conflict Negotiation/Regulation

Liberty Necessity

Eternal Justice Temporal Justice

As the world is the result of an eternal contradiction due to its twofold

configuration, I suggest we consider Schopenhauer’s political theory by observing

this metaphysical schema: the representational side (phenomenal, symbolic,

illusionary) that concerns the world as it appears; and the metaphysical one

(noumenical, substantial, real) that concerns the world as it is. We can count in fact

a twofold political discourse in Schopenhauer: I call it “political Manichaeism”. It is

not intended as a struggle between Good and Evil; rather, it is a metaphor to

24 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, BM, § 122. 25 Cf. HORKHEIMER, M. Gesellschaft im Übergang, pp. 167-168. 26 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, PP II, § 125, pp. 223-224.



identify an irreducible dichotomy between two levels in his political theory. I put

forward the distinction between politics as representation and politics as will: this

distinction refers to a widely shared opinion in contemporary political

philosophy27 about the difference between “politics” and “political”. I refer

particularly to Lefort’s paradigm and to the distinction between the symbolic and

normative sphere of the “politics” (la politique) and the essential and trans-

normative one of the “political”(le politique).

On the one hand, Schopenhauer recognizes that conflict is the core of any

moral, social and authentic political agency (that is the political); on the other

hand, he sustains the necessity of a monarchic political body (that is the polity) to

naturally sedate pluralistic conflict, then to neutralize conflictual instances. In the

‘40s he proved himself very sceptical about revolutionary and democratic

movements: looking at the political events in France in 1848, he explicitly felt much

closer to Napoleon III than to the revolutionary crowd.

Schopenhauer’s political theory is grounded in moral issues and branches

out into a philosophy of law and a theory of justice. In his Dresden manuscripts, he

explicitly wrote that the “concept of the Right is properly moral” and it literally

means: the property of an individual Will - in its phenomenal appearance - to not

deny the Will in other bodies28. The individual is damaging when their own

affirmation is the negation of another “embedded” Will. He considers the Right

theory as a “moral upside down”. The question deals with “doing of wrong to

someone” or “suffering of wrong by others”: in other words, to cause and to suffer

sorrow. Political institutions are born to remedy the second instance, that is,

protecting individuals from their “suffering of wrong by others”29. This concept is

remarked on by Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation, when he

sustains that “suffering injustice” [das Unrechtleiden] refers to the “the conflict of

the Will to live with itself, resulting from the plurality of individuals and egoism”30.

The origin of the “social contract”, that is the law, deals with renouncing to egoistic

pleasure in causing injustice. In the Republic of Plato, Schopenhauer finds this first

27 Cf. LEFORT, C. Democracy and political Theory; cf. MOUFFE, C. Deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism; cf. MACHART, O. Post-foundational political thought; cf. HABERMAS, J. The “political”. 28 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, FM, § 535. 29 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, FM, § 567. 30 SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 62, p. 444.



political postulate, much before Hobbes, Spinoza and Rousseau. “Schopenhauer

sees the realization of the purpose of the state (the well-being of everyone) only in

the negative, that is to say as an institute that guarantees protection”31.

If the first fundamental instance deals with suffering injustice, the second deals

with committing it: so Schopenhauer argues for a “criminal” code as strategic

means to deter crime, violence and injustice. It can be realized only inside the State,

as right to punish [Strafrecht] in a “positive law”32.

The principal aims of the State are: a. First of all, protection directed outwards; it deals with protection against the natural forces. This is the international legitimation of natural law. b. Protection directed inwards; that is, protection of the members of the State against one another, and consequently the safeguarding of private law. But the granting of this twofold protection brings about the need for a third. c. Protection against the protector, and thus a guarantee of civil law. It is necessary to keep the division of power into three, that is, legislative, executive and jurisdictional33.

The State (polity) is then a protective institution primarily against the

“consequences of egoism”, then against the “consequences of other people’s

egoism”, as Schopenhauer noted in his early manuscripts34.

The politics is a particular kind of art; that is, managing the original nature

of our essence: according to Schopenhauer, the authentic state of nature is

characterized by “force” and “might” [Gewalt]35, then polity substitutes might with

law through the legitimation in a new employment of it. The primary task of polity

is to submit and then enslave physical might to intellect. Rationality is then the new

name of that which governs above disorder and plurality. The most inner

disposition of human nature is, in fact, the intellect and rationality, the “head” that

leads our body. It is useful maybe to recall the original cover of Hobbes’ Leviathan,

where the monarch is represented as the head of a plurality of persons.

Schopenhauer in Parerga und Paralipomena holds that, because of our

31 GODART-VAN DER KROON, A. Schopenhauer's Theory of Justice and its Implication to Natural Law. 32 SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 62, p. 450. 33 SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV II, § 47, pp. 691-692. 34 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Der handschriftliche Nachlass, JM, § 535. 35 “Von Natur herrscht die Gewalt: statt dieser dem Rechte zur Herrschaft zu verhelfen, dies ist das Problem der Staatkunst” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, PP II, § 127, p. 227).



“intellectual” nature, the best natural polity for humankind should be

constitutional monarchy. Schopenhauer argues that the people are sovereign, but

they must be under constant protection because of their minority36. The monarch

corresponds to our brain, which leads and governs the parts of our body: so he

affirms, using the Greek language, that the brain is literally ηγεμονικον. According

to Schopenhauer, the planetary system is “monarchic” too.

Schopenhauer’s political Manichaeism cannot escape from self-

contradiction: the sphere of polity fills the symbolic space of politics through

hegemony and might; that is, through the same forces and means it claims to fight

in a moral sense. Thus, it contains, condemns and neutralizes conflict, which is the

natural, metaphysical issue in human deeds. This brings us to Laclau’s assertion in

Emancipation(s): “universal is no more than a particular that at some moment has

become dominant”37.

However, for Schopenhauer the State cannot be the condition of liberty in

the moral sense38 on the contrary to Hegel’s feature. Schopenhauer criticizes Kant’s

doctrine too, since he derived the institution of the State as moral duty from the

categorical imperative. As Schopenhauer says: “The State is set up in the correct

assumption that pure morality (that is, correct conduct on moral grounds), is not to

be expected; otherwise it would be superfluous”39. “Real” liberty is beyond

phenomenon and representation, and this holds a fortiori beyond every human

institution40.

In the chapter Zur Rechtslehre und Politik of Parerga und Paralipomena,

Schopenhauer states his negative political model: he argues again that Rights,

justice and liberty are negative concepts, whereas injustice, on the contrary, is

positive41. His foundation of morality has a negative connotation too: Naeminem

laede, imo omnes, quantum potes, iuva. In the third part of On the basis of Morality,

Schopenhauer explains this idea. We perceive the multiplicity of the world, but we

should go beyond it, because the “principle of individuation” is theoretically an

36 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. PP II, § 126, p. 226. 37 LACLAU, E. Emancipation(s), p. 26. 38 Cf. GODART-VAN DER KROON, A. Schopenhauer's Theory of Justice and its Implication to Natural Law. 39 “[Der Staat] errichtet unter der richtigen Voraussetzung, daß reine Moralität, d.h. Rechthandeln aus moralischen Gründen, nicht zu erwarten ist; außerdem er selbst ja überflüssig wäre”. 40 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 62, p. 448. 41 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, PP II, § 121, p. 219.



illusion. There is no real difference between individuals or living beings.

The paradox is that the real realization of the authentic political in moral

sense always aims at the extra-politics; that is, overcoming the representational

side. It is really close to an utopian spirit. The only authentic moral principle that

can be followed is in fact solidarity, compassion [Mitleid], which is beyond any kind

of individualism and egoism, then any struggle too. The individual must renounce

their individuality.

Schopenhauer considered the core of his theory of Justice as a great

“mystery”: it deals with the concept of “compassion” [Mitleid]. It is the capacity to

identify with another’s suffering, with the aim of nullifying it. If the individual is

able to neutralize the difference from the others, that is, he can go beyond the

“representational” sphere, he grasps the “basis of any spontaneous and free justice

and any genuine love for humankind”42. This is the only real basis, which can be

considered as value of morality. Solidarity is, in fact, as Schopenhauer says, “the

only source of non-egoistic agency, which has the right to be a moral value”43.

Compassion is then the moral key to gain access to “eternal Justice”:

Schopenhauer divided it from “temporal Justice”, which finds a place only within

the State and “can repay or punish the crime” through human institutions and time.

Eternal Justice is still beyond them, because it goes beyond the principium

individuationis: if we look, in fact, into the essence of the World, we are able to bear

any suffering, injustice, abuse and offence, because we feel that they are moved

against our own44. He who elevates above space, time and causality is able to grasp

that the tormenter and the tormented are one. The theory of justice in

Schopenhauer turns into mysticism. He finds in fact in the Upanishad precept of

“Tat twam asi” (“You are that”) the ethical and legal solution for egoism and

individualism.

In conclusion, the only way to overcome the dichotomy between conflict and

identification with others is to accept it. It is irreducible. The aim of good for the

community might be realized only in this conflictual dialectics in the

representational sphere. On the one hand, conflict, struggle, competition and

42 SCHOPENHAUER, A. Werke in fünf Bände, KS, § 17, p. 565. 43 Idem, KS, § 22, p. 621. 44 Cf. SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 63, pp. 456-457.



difference are necessary and unavoidable; on the other hand, solidarity and

compassion are desirable and pursuable. It is then possible to draft a new

“recognition political theory” based on this dichotomy. The meaning of recognition

deals first with the acceptance of the human metaphysical condition; that is,

finiteness and misery. “A good conscience comes from the fact that unselfish deeds,

arising out of the immediate recognition of our own essence in other appearances,

confirm the recognition that our true self does not exist in the single appearance of

our own person, but in every living thing”45.

We can accept then the recognition conception as a “transcendental

condition” in the moral and political sphere, as Axel Honneth sustains in his social

theory. But with Schopenhauer we learn more: recognition is also the “immanent

condition”, because of the reflecting logic between the Self and other living beings.

Thus, Schopenhauer uses the verb wiedererkennen to mean “recognize” the same

essence into other appearance. It is not simply an Anerkennung, which is literally

legitimation-through-recognition into a normative paradigm. I would translate and

understand Schopenhauer’s Wiedererkennen as identifying-once-again the other in

myself and myself in another. It is very similar to the aesthetical experience

described by Schopenhauer. As the pure subject of knowledge stands in front of

and reflects on the eternal shape of the Will (the Idea), so the Ego should

completely fade away into other, forgetting its individuality: that is, becoming a

pure subject in front of another pure subject (to paraphrase a well-known

quotation in The World as Will and Representation).

Bibliographical references

BAHNSEN, Julius. Das Tragische als Weltgesetz und der Humor als ästhetische Gestalt des Metaphysischen. Lauenburg, 1877; now in Das Tragische als Weltgesetz und der Humor als ästhetische Gestalt des Metaphysischen. hrsg. von W.Müller-Seyfarth. Berlin: VanBremen VerlagsBuchhandlung, 1995. ______. Der Widerpruch im Wissen und Wesen der Welt. Princip und Einzelbewährung der Realdialektik, 2 vol. Leipzig, 1882.

45 “[Das gute Gewissen] entspringt daraus, daß solche That, wie sie hervorgeht aus dem unmittebaren Wiedererkennen unseres eigenen Wesens an sich auch in der fremden Erscheinung, uns auch wiederum die Beglaubigung dieser Erkenntniß giebt, der Erkenntniß, daß unser wahres Selbst nicht bloß in der eigenen Person, dieser einzelnen Erscheinung, da ist, sondern in Allem was lebt” (SCHOPENHAUER, A. WWV I, § 66, pp. 481-482).



BARBERA, Sandro. Une philosophie du conflit. Études sur Schopenhauer. Paris: PUF, 2004. BRINKMANN, Karl. Die Rechts- und Staatslehre Schopenhauers. Bonn: E. van Hippel, 1958. FAZIO, Domenico M. La Scuola di Schopenhauer: testi e contesti. Lecce: Pensa MultiMedia, 2009a («Schopenhaueriana», 2). ______. Die “Schopenhauer-Schule”. Zur Geschichte eines Begriffs. In: Schopenhauer und die Schopenhauer-Schule. Beiträge zur Philosophie Schopenhauers. hrsg. von D. Fazio, M. Koßler, F. Ciracì. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009b, pp. 15-41. GODART-VAN DER KROON, Annette. Schopenhauer's Theory of Justice and its Implication to Natural Law. Jahrbuch der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft, vol. 84, 2003, pp. 121-146. HABERMAS, Jürgen. “The Political”. The rational meaning of a questionable inheritance of political Theology, in The Power of Religion in the public Sphere. ed. by J. Butler, J. Habermas et al. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 15-33. HONNETH, Axel. The struggle for recognition. The moral grammar of social conflicts. Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1996. HORKHEIMER, Max. Gesellschaft im Übergang: Aufsätze, Reden und Vorträge 1942-1970. Hrsg. von W. Brede. Frankfurt: Athenäum-Fischer Verlag, 1972. ______. Schopenhauer und die Gesellschaft (1955). In: Vorträge und Aufzeichningen 1949-1973, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 7. Hrsg. von G. Schmid Noerr. Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, 1985. LACLAU, Ernesto. Emancipation(s). New York: Verso, 1996. LEFORT, Claude. Democracy and Politcal Theory. University of Minnesota Press 1989. LÜTKEHAUS, Ludger. Die Ausfahrt des Buddha? Die Reisetagebüchers Schopenhauers. Jahrbuch der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft, vol. 69, 1988, p. 615-626. MACHART, Oliver. Post-foundational political thought: political difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007. MOUFFE, Chantal. Deliberative democracy and Agonistic Pluralism. Wien: Institüt für Höhere Studien (IHS), 2000 («Reihe Politikwissenschaft», 72). (https://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_72.pdf ). ______. On the Political. New York: Routledge, 2005. NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. Jenseits von Gut und Böse. Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft. Leipzig: Druck und Verlag von C. G. Naumann, 1886 (eKGWB: www.nietzschesource.org, 2009). SCHMIDT, Alfred. Tugend und Weltlauf. Vorträge und Aufsätze über die Philosophie Schopenhauers (1960-2003). Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004.

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SCHOPENHAUER, Arthur. Reisetagebücher aus den Jahren 1803bis 1804. Hrsg. von Ch. Von Gwinner. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1923. ______. Gesammelte Briefe. Hrsg. von A. Hübscher, Bonn: Bouvier, 1978. ______. Der handschriftliche Nachlass. Hrsg. von A. Hübscher. München: DTV [1966-1975], 1985: I. Fruhe Manuskripte (1804-1818). [FM] II. Kritische Auseinandersetzungen (1809-1818). [KA] III. Berliner Manuskripte (1818-1830). [BM] IV.1. Die Manuskriptbucher der Jahre 1830 bis 1852. [JM] IV.2. Letzte Manuskripte; Gracians Handorakel. [LM] V. Randschrifter zu Buchern. ______. On the Basis of Morality. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1995. ______. Werke in fünf Bände. Hrsg. von L. Lütkehaus. Zürich: Haffmans Verlag, 1999. I. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I [WWV I] II. Die Welt als Wille und Vorselltung II [WWV II] III. Kleinere Schriften [KS] IV. Parerga und Paralipomena I [PP I] V. Parerga und Paralipomena II [PP II] ______. Parerga and Paralipomena. 2 voll. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. ______. The World as Will and Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Recebido: 22/12/15 Received: 12/22/15

Aprovado: 30/03/16

Approved: 03/30/16

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