Third Sector Organisations and Public Policy-making in a Devolved WalesPAUL CHANEY, CARDIFF UNIVERSITY

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Aims To examine civil society organisations’ views and experience of policy engagement

Third Sector engagement - what are the effects and implications of one-party-dominance?

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MethodData from series of projects 1999- present, inc. ESRC R000239410, L219252023, L219252016, ES/L009099/1 200+ semi-structured interviews with purposive sample of CSOs and policy actors in Wales75+ interviews CSOs 2013-15Secondary sources: inc. ‘grey’ literature of CSOs, NAfW proceedings etc.

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The “i” word Deconstruct “inclusiveness”? “if you have a political system which leads to pluralism… open up access to power and influence to all these ‘other people’ through pluralistic and open politics”.

Ron Davies – interview with Paul Chaney and Ralph Fevre 4th November 1999 Chaney, P. and Fevre, R. (2001) ‘Ron Davies and the cult of “inclusiveness”: devolution and participation in Wales’, Contemporary Wales, vol. 14, pp. 21–49. Downloadable: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/uwp/cowa/2001/00000014/00000001/art00004

‘the Assembly values volunteering as an important expression of citizenship and as an essential component of democracy… the goal is the creation of a civil society which… is inclusive and enables people to participate in all its economic, social and cultural activities’

(National Assembly for Wales, 2000, Voluntary Sector Scheme, chpt 2, para 2.7)

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“learning more about the voluntary sector seems to be at the forefront of the politician’s minds and they do recognise the third sector and what it can contribute.” “we had AMs from every party, and we had a good reception, they were interested… they are responsive.”“definitely, they are far more approachable [AMs], there’s not all this stuffy language and there’s a real interest, they don’t seem so remote.”“they [AMs] are far more open, if you approach them they are very willing to meet you.”

Chaney, P. and Fevre, R. (2001) Inclusive Governance and “Minority” Groups: The Role of the Third Sector in Wales, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 12, No. 2, 131-156.

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Civil Society Expectations (2) “If we are going to get some kind of democratic process… we are going to have to look at the costs of democracy.”

“Paper work, paper work, paper work… I don’t think they see eye-to-eye with a voluntary organization, they don’t realise that one full time worker and four part time workers um : : : they expect you to be able to move, a mountain if you like… it’s the paperwork… it is just never ending”

“It’s not going to be easy, as you can imagine, but I know these people are concerned about the contact they have with organizations they are supposed to be representing… these are big, big issues.”Paul Chaney and Ralph Fevre (2001) Inclusive Governance and “Minority” Groups: The Role of the Third Sector in Wales, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, Vol. 12, No. 2, 131-156.

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‘the lack of clarity about where the [constitutional] boundaries lie are an enduring problem… its making life pretty difficult for voluntary organisations like us but also our clients… bottom line can we explain to our clients who is to blame if they have a problem? Some areas its really obvious others it’s a real problem: it’s not clear’

(Chief Exec. 3rd sector service provider 15 Oct 2013).

Bingham Powell, G. (1989) Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1, 2, 107-130.

Accountability

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“yeah, I’d say it is pretty accessible… it wasn’t always, in the early days y’know – getting info was a bit of a nightmare… looking back I guess part of that was nobody was really sure of what it could do, what it was responsible for… I’m a bit of an old cynic so its quite something for me to say this, but yeah it is transparent, I think anyway… you’ve got the transcripts [of proceedings] and MP4s [video] of the committees… all the [policy] papers are there… Its not [former Secretary of State John] Redwood and the Welsh Office is it!”

(CSO manager, November 7, 2013)

Openness/ transparency:

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“for some reason that commitment and enthusiasm [for devolution] hasn’t translated into a really strong engagement… I was really interested when I joined the organisation but there are a lot of women that are not terribly comfortable with that [policy work/ political engagement] and I actually heard someone say “we are not a feminist organisation” – and I thought “what?!” How can you say we are not a feminist organisation?” (Chief exec, Women’s CSO 4 Dec 2013)

“there are lots of women who are involved in policy development, lots who are brilliant, but it’s still that thing about women not pushing themselves forward and not wanting to put themselves in the firing line” (Manager, Women’s CSO 16 Dec 2013)

Politicization of Voluntarism – e.g. David Sciulli (1986) Voluntaristic Action as a Distinct Concept: Theoretical Foundations of Societal Constitutionalism, Vol. 51, No. 6,.American Sociological Review; Habermas, J. (1984). Theory of communicative action, Vol. 1: Reason and the rationalization of society (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon

CSOs’ Response to WG/ NAfW

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CSOs’ response (2). “whether we have – or are “pushing the envelope” as it were is something we all have to ask ourselves – I don’t think that we have [done so] as much as we should or could have… it’s got to come from us” (Project manager CSO, Oct 18, 2013)

“I don’t really get a sense of organisations reacting as perhaps they should have as if they properly understood devolution” (CSO manager, 19 Sept 2013)

“I think they really do want a voice in it… they really do – they all do, we all do” (Women’s CSO organisation, 11 Dec 2013)

Marilyn Taylor, Diane Warburton (2003) Legitimacy and the Role of UK Third Sector Organizations in the Policy Process, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 14, 3, 321-338

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Political Opportunity Structures “I say to our colleagues in London ‘look we can probably get stuff delivered here, we can get calls delivered here that can then become drivers for change in England” (CSO interviewee 29 Nov 2013)

“Well, we can reach [NAfW committee] chairs and clerks fairly easily I’d say for one… yeah, two: they’re approachable I’d also say… there’s a definite two-way thing. They do want to engage with us… even the most hard-bitten cynic would acknowledge that… my opposite number [Westminster] was amazed at how approachable things are. Thing is, its only when someone puts it like that – that you think ‘yeah’ – ‘cos otherwise you kind of accept it… take it as a given’. (CSO interviewee 3 Feb, 2014)

McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (eds) (1996) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Demands on Civil Society/ Preparedness?

“we weren’t really used to all the policy side of things. Then ‘bam’! Its ‘can you respond to this’?, ‘can we have your views – y’know what do our members want to see on this one? [policy consultation]… and its like hold on! You know we’re not just here to fill-in forms and chat to [AMs]… it’s a mega-step-up in a way… now everyone wants to hear from us. That’s a ‘big ask’ for an organisation like ours… its clear … talking to other NGOs we’re not there yet in engaging the way we’d like – I know we’re not alone… Its not going to happen overnight is it? Like Westminster’s been going hundreds of years and they’ve still not got it right either”! (CSO manager Oct 17, 2013)

Jean Cohen (1994) Civil Society and Political Theory, Massachusetts, MIT Press, p.178 “the overload of demand…”

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CSOs’ Autonomy “this is sensitive, shall we say our colleagues in London don’t really get it… they don’t really understand there’s a growing legislature here… there’s not the awareness, I think, or the will to let us try and shape the agenda here…”

“its still predominantly our HQ that has sign-off on things… now I can challenge that… sometimes I win, but that’s not the point. It’s a drag to be honest, y’know having to constantly fight for the authority to decide how we relate to the Assembly… At the last Exec I was talking to my opposite number from Edinburgh, she couldn’t believe it… they don’t have this problem…”

“I suppose you’d call it resistance and mixed with a fair bit of ignorance too I suppose. There is a sort of feeling from colleagues in England that having a couple of policy officers – though we’ve even lost one of those now – is enough [to engage with NAfW]… I’m am telling you it is not! I keep banging on about this. They kind of look “there she goes again” – you’re seen as a troublemaker…”

Wendy Earles and Robyn Lynn (2012) Third Sector Organisations and Organising , Bremen, Europäischer Hochschulverlag GmbH & Co. KG

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NAfW – Scrutiny/ Capacity “I do think its untenable… there are more councillors in Cardiff County Council [than AMs]… it does worry me if I’m honest… we’re [CSOs] stretched and they’re stretched [opposition/ backbench AMs] … now you can’t tell me that’s a good place to be…” (CSO project officer, 15 Sept, 2013)“it was a headache before [primary powers] now it’s a real concern… you’ve got all this highly technical stuff… different [legislative] stages… [Bill] amendments and the like… can a handful of AMs cope? No, to be frank… There has been - and there’s gonna be attrition. It will only increase with more and more law-making… one proof is framework powers… now that’s wrong in my book… it allows government to do what it wants later – under the radar” (CSO Manager, 4 Oct, 2013)

E McLeay (2006) Scrutiny and capacity: an evaluation of the parliamentary committees in the New Zealand parliament, Australasian Parliamentary Review, Vol. 21(1), 158–82; L McAllister, D Stirbu (2007) Developing devolution's scrutiny potential: a comparative evaluation of the National Assembly for Wales's Subject Committees, Policy & Politics, 35, 2, 289-309

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NAfW – Capacity (2) ‘interestingly, because we work very closely with our colleagues in London, there are real advantages in Wales… you can have a direct individual relationship with a whole series of Assembly Members in a way that it is very difficult to do in Parliament so probably our lobbying is slightly more informal here in Wales than it is in Westminster and that’s purely because of scale’

(CSO Director 27 Nov 2013)

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Inclusiveness: ‘civil’ or ‘civic’ society engagement?

Sectoral Share of Expert Witnesses to NAfW Subject Committee in each of First Three Assemblies 1999-2011 (N=4,594).* data compiled by R. Rumbul

* data compiled by R. Rumbul

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Gender Split: Percentage Female Expert Witnesses from CSOs (green) / All committee attendees (blue) Each of the first three Assemblies 1999-2011 (N=11,861)

* Data compiled by R. Rumbul

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Changing Political Culture“Politics has become more male, certainly [it] has become male-dominated… is that just a gentle shift? Will it move back? We have moved from an Assembly that was consensual – now we have law-making powers, a government and opposition – it’s more oppositional – is that part of the reason why we’ve had the shift [back towards male-dominated politics]?” Chief exec CSO, 15 Nov 2013

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Third Sector engagement - what are the effects and implications of one-party-dominance?

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Why this is deserving of study? Why does this matter?Health of democracy - benefits of third sector engagement in work of government > trust, accountability and participationType of party elected to govt. shapes patterns and processes of NGOs’ engagement in public policy-making/ service deliveryAbsence of turnover presents potential threats to democracy – or, ‘a danger of the three A’s setting in – arrogance, apathy, and atrophy (Jackson, 1994, p. 270)

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“Pathologies”?Compares human body and the body politic

uses language of medical pathology to investigate the disorders and challenges some governments experience in making and implementing public policy

Hogwood, B. and Peters, B. G. (1985) The Pathology of Public Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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OPD – One Party DominanceDuverger (1954, p.308-9) alludes to a dominant party as one whose ‘influence exceeds all others for a generation or more’Butler (2009, p.159): “protracted electoral and ideological dominance of a single party in a representative democracy. It requires, but suggests more than, a series of electoral successes. OPD implies institutions that translate electoral success into political power”

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Research context: past 150 years, Welsh politics = one party dominance. period to WW1 one-party domination under the Liberal Party Since WW2 Labour Party pre-eminent political force - always had a majority of Welsh MPs Constitutional reform: Labour continuously held government office since National Assembly for Wales created in 1999.

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Table 1. Exploring the Potential Pathologies of One-Party-Dominance on Third Sector Policy Engagement in Liberal Democracies.

Engagement Factor

Degree Potentially Problematic Potential Effects on NGO policy engagementRegular Turnover OPD

Strategic bridging Low High OPD greatly increases power/ influence of incumbents. NGOs have no alternative but to deal with key individuals over successive electoral cycles

Collective Incentives

Low High Collective incentives for NGOs to engage opposition parties in policy-making much diminished owing to perception they are unlikely to form future govt. The incentive of future policy gains from such actions is lessened/ removed.

Trust Medium High OPD introduces greater uncertainty – whether parliamentarians concerned with issue – or put party interest first

Neo-corporatism/Resource dependency

Medium High Problematic in both types of system. Exacerbated under OPD as NGOs forced into ever closer relation with party over successive electoral cycles

Blurred Party-CS boundaries

Low High NGOs’ criticality of govt. lessened under OPD owing to fear party figures in third sector will report negative comments to ministers jeopardising state-funding.

NGO Action Repertoires Low High Change of governing party catalyst for shifts in NGO repertoire of contention/ heightened accountability – absent under OPD

Legitimization versus legitimation

Medium High All governments may use neo-corporatist structures to further legitimation. Heightened under OPD.

Party system institutionalization

Low High Under OPD there is a significant risk and costs (declining criticality/ lack of openness/ innovation etc.) arising from party system institutionalization

Cognitive locks/Ideological turnover

Low High Change of ideology/ strategic policy aims limited under OPD

Informal/ extra-parliamentary politics’

Medium High NGOs’ critical engagement with government routinely takes place outwith legislative channels through internal party contacts/ networks

Veto Players Low High The smaller pool of actual and potential ministers, their alignment to one ideological position and endurance in the government elite heighten the significance of veto players under OPD

Party Politicization Low High OPD means conflation of incumbent party with government as institution – thus to criticise government is seen as criticism of the party

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Strategic Bridging, Veto Players and Collective Incentives (1.)

Strategic bridging is a concept allied to Charles Tilly’s work > individual agency and co-working between policy actors in civil society and parliamentarians. (Bridging social capital)

Key question: whom to engage? OPD skews political dynamic reduces value of alliance building with opposition party members undermines scrutiny and accountability & accentuates political power of members of the dominant party

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Strategic Bridging, Veto Players and Collective Incentives (2.)

OPD increases the likelihood and role of veto players (Tsebelis, 1995) These may block third sector claims Collective Interest Model (Finkel et al, 1998) Research findings show how OPD is potential pathology because …. It undermines the collective incentives – because of the concentration of power in the hands of the dominant party/ veto players.

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Interviewees’ Comments: We try to be strategic about it… [but] If you don’t get on with [the minister] like, if she’s not interested in what you’re campaigning on, it’s like a road block, a show-stopper… (Participant 42). “really there is only one show in town, [the] Labour [Party].We’re massively stretched resource-wise, there’s only two of us here… you have to ask yourself ‘can it [engaging opposition parties] be justified?’ ‘Where’s the pay-off’? That’s the challenge we face…” (Participant 23).

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Neo-Corporatism Managerialist approach to government engagement with exogenous policy interests e.g. government-sponsored policy networks (Mansbridge, 1999) Inherent dangers: civil society derives its legitimacy from ability to act independently… more formal/ regulated civil society–state relations may subvert this (De Jager, 2005) Increased power of political patronage of dominant party Core potential pathology alluded to by interviewees was co-option and loss of independence and freedom to criticise government

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Neo-Corporatism“we don’t want to alienate [ministers] but also we don’t want to be in the pocket of the minister and it’s that balance which is difficult” (Participant 71). “we are afraid to say ‘the emperor has no clothes’ … we are afraid to show when failure is happening… there are conflicts of interest…” (Participant 32).

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Blurred Dominant Party - Civil Society Boundaries; and ‘informal’ politics (1)

Existing studies often point to political parties and civil society as largely discrete entities.

Some critics highlight blurred boundaries (Mair, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

Recent research OPD in South Africa resonates with the present case study (Cf. Friedman, 2003).

Civil society organisations’ criticism of the dominant party limited > citizens’ loyalty to the party as well as a shared sense of identity (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2012)

Interviewees spoke of ‘toning-down’ or avoiding criticism of government > fear that some third sector managers - who were also dominant Party figures, may pass on comments to ministers > jeopardise their government funding/ access to decision-makers

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Blurred Dominant Party - Civil Society Boundaries; and ‘informal’ politics (2)

“you do have to stop yourself. … I thought hold-on [uses own name] watch yourself! ‘cos I know a couple of policy people there are strong Party [people]” (Participant 36). ‘an awful lot is done via personal relationships – and that’s how stuff gets done. It’s not right, it’s not proper, it means that the better your relationships the more influence that you have, I don’t agree with it but it’s a paternalistic, party system where, if you have those networks, you will get policy through and that’s how things happen… it’s a network thing. I don’t agree with it but I will use it when I have to (Participant 68).

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NGO Action RepertoiresInterviewees referred to way OPD shaped NGOs’ repertoire of contention (Tilly 1995); in other words, varied means by which they advance their policy demands on those in power. A notable finding > interviewees’ claim of deliberate element of tactical coordination and a differentiation of modes of engagement between organisations across policy sectors in an attempt to address potential OPD pathologies.

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NGO Action Repertoires (2). “I see the environmental movement as being on a bit of a continuum, [named organisation] are going to be able to do some of the ‘far out there – really critical stuff’, others like [named NGO] keep mainly to new media stuff, whereas we [named organisation] are more mainstream – and we are going to be more “in the tent”’ (Participant 47).

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Legitimacy versus Legitimation

Political legitimacy aims for a public basis of justification and appeals to free public reason (Rawls, 2003, p. 171) . Legitimation involves communicative actions aimed at managing the public’s perception that government actions are effective in promoting their desired ends, whether that is in fact true’ (Moore, 2001, p.712). Interviewees revealed issues and tensions between legitimization and legitimation that are compounded by one-party-dominance.

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Legitimacy versus Legitimation (2)

“they dine out on us and whenever they [ministers] are asked questions in plenary [sessions of the National Assembly] about what are they doing to engage the [third] sector in policy they say we’re funding organisations like us” (Participant 28). “on the surface at least, it looks like there’s engagement. When you chip away at it, it’s artificial… it’s basically democratic cover if you like” (Participant 57).

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Cognitive locks “Cognitive locks” from literature of historical institutionalism (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). ‘intellectual path dependency in policymaking’ (Forestiere and Allen, 2011, p.381) . Once established, they become a guiding set of ideas or ‘ideological mantra to be repeated and applied no matter… [what] the actual conditions of a situation’ (Blyth, 2002, p.229). A pathology under OPD > change or reversal of government policies as a result of exogenous pressure – what Hirschman (1970, p. 30) calls ‘voice’ – is limited or absent.

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Cognitive locks (2). “I don’t think there’s enough space in civil/ civic society in Wales about what kinds of policies we want, what types of things do we want to achieve, the existing voices come from the Left-of-centre, they come from a socialist campaigning background… that imposes challenges in terms of tone, and positioning our messages, you can’t be seen as being market-driven by tooth and claw, you’ve got to try and package your message in a particular way” (Participant 68).

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Implications/ significance? 12 potential pathologies related to third sector-state nexus emerge from accounts of NGO policy actors OPD systems have considerable implications for third sector interest representation, co-working, criticality and ‘voice’ For the body politic pathologies collectively self-sustaining > over time, may diminish 3 sector engagement / further strengthen the dominant party. Empirical support for theorising that absence of governing party turnover may threaten democratic ‘health’ of the polity

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Impact? Oes gennym ddylanwad?

Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013

2007 Kidney Wales Foundation petitioned NAfW to increase no. organ donors in Wales. NAfW Petitions Committee referred matter NAfW Health, Wellbeing and LG Committee, requesting that they consider the issue of presumed consent 2008, Kidney Wales Foundation “Opt for Life Cymru” alliance (People Like us Cymru, the Welsh Kidney Patients Association, the British Heart Foundation, the British Lung Foundation, Diabetes Cymru, Cystic Fibrosis and the British Medical Association) Campaign to change law in Wales to 'soft opt-out' system of organ donation Committee report, Inquiry into Presumed Consent for Organ Donation (C. July 2008) Minister (Hart) rejected committee's main recommendation against change (“it did not reflect the weight of public opinion”)

http://gov.wales/docs/dhss/consultation/121203responsesen.pdf

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Impact? Oes gennym ddylanwad?

Nationwide public debates, Oct. 2008 – Jan. 2009 - gauge public opinion WG public consultation ‘Options for Changes’ (May 2009) concluded public opinion favoured soft opt-out system. LCO process superseded (post-referendum) White Paper & Bill introduced to NAfW Bill given royal assent 10 September 2013, becoming the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 2013

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Gender Pay Gap 2007 Equalities Manifesto demand “Closing the gender pay

- gap across the public and private sector in Wales”

The Equality Act (2010) – Statutory Duties (Wales)

Regulation 7. duties on authorities - must be arrangements identifying & collecting information about any difference between pay of any person (or persons) who has (or share) one or more of the protected characteristics and those who do not and the causes of such differences

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1st July, 2008 Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg submitted NAfW public petition #P-03-157 Coleg Ffederal Cymraeg'We call upon the Assembly Government to keep its 'One Wales’ agreement promise of establishing a Welsh-language Federal College. A Federal College must include the following elements: Statutory status and an independent constitution; An independent charter and terms of reference that includes responsibility for all Welsh-language higher education in Wales…’ etc.“The political context of the petition was that the Welsh-language movement was disappointed that the pledge to have a Welsh-language daily newspaper had not been delivered by the Government. In that climate, we were concerned that some of the other 'One Wales’ promises regarding the language would also be broken, or that the Government would say that it had delivered a pledge when it had simply moved the goalposts” (Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg –evidence to Petitions Committee, 6 November 2008).

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New Publications

◦ Chaney, P. (2015) Exploring the Pathologies of One-Party-Dominance on Third Sector Public Policy Engagement in Liberal Democracies: Evidence from Meso-Government in the UK,

◦ VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations.

◦ Impact Factor 1.238, Social Issues, 20/39; SCImago Journal Rank Geography, Planning and Development 84/468.

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New Publications◦ Chaney, P. (2015) ‘Getting Involved: Public Policy-Making and Political Life in Wales’ Chapter 9 in ‘A Tolerant Nation? Revisiting Ethnic Diversity in a Devolved Wales’ Charlotte Williams, Neil Evans, Paul O’Leary (eds) University of Wales Press. Paperback: 320 pages, (March 15, 2015). ISBN-10: 1783161884. ISBN-13: 978-1783161881 http://www.amazon.com/Tolerant-Nation-Revisiting-Diversity-Devolved/dp/1783161884

◦ Chaney, P. (2016) ‘Women and Policy-Making: Devolution, Civil Society and Political Representation’, Chapter 11 in Mannay, D. (ed) Our Changing Land: Revisiting Gender, Class and Identity in Contemporary Wales, Cardiff, University of Wales Press