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Nemo Judex in causa sua LEGAL MAXIM By- VIKASH KUMAR

Nemo iudex in causa sua

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Nemo Judex in causa sua

LEGAL MAXIMBy- VIKASH KUMAR

Nemo judex in causa sua (or nemo judex in sua causa) is a latin phrase that means, literally, "no-one should be a judge in his own cause." It is a principle of natural justice that no person can judge a case in which they have an interest. The rule is very strictly applied to any appearance of a possible bias, even if there is actually none: "Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done".

May also be called: nemo judex idoneus in propria causa est nemo judex in parte sua nemo judex in re sua nemo debet esse judex in propria causa in propria causa nemo judex

The legal effect of a breach of natural justice is normally to stop the proceedings and render any judgment invalid; it should be quashed or appealed, but may be remitted for a valid re-hearing.

Issues Involved: Applicability of Principles of Natural JusticeIn order to understand the arguments raised by both the parties, it is necessary to understand the scope of principles of natural justice. In a phrase it can be described as “judicial fairness in decision making” and its main aim is to secure justice or prevent miscarriage of justice. It is a branch of public law and is held to be a very formidable weapon that can be wielded to secure justice. The definition of the term ‘natural justice’ is difficult to be given but its essential characteristics can be enumerated in two maxims namely- (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in causa sua .

 

The second phrase literally means that “No man shall be a judge in his own cause”. This maxim ensures that the adjudicator must not have any interest or bias in the case which he is deciding. As the famous saying goes “justice should not only be done but must be seen to have been done” In case of a judicial body, the independence and impartiality of the judge is an absolute condition, because without these qualities the public confidence which is their real strength would weaken.

ANALYZING THE JUDGEMENT

The Court held that the basic principle of nemo judex in causa sua was violated by appointing Naquishbund as a member of the selection board. Though he did not participate in the deliberations of the board when his name was being considered yet the very fact that he was a member of the selection board and that too holding the post of the post of the Chairman had a significant impact on the decision of the selection board. Also, he participated in the deliberations when the claims of his rivals i.e. Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered. He was also present when the list of selected candidates in order of preference was being made. Hence, it is very clear that from the very inception of the selection process, at every stage of his participation in the selection process, there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under such circumstances, the Court could not believe that Naquishbund could have been unbiased.

CONCLUSION

• Therefore what emerges from this case is that although the Courts are making distinctions between the Quasi-Judicial and Administrative powers but at the same time there is one common element of fair procedure in both the cases which can be referred to as the ‘duty to act fairly’. This duty arises from the same general principles, as do the rules of natural justice.

Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. APSRTC

• The order of the government nationalizing road transport was challenged in this case. One of the grounds for challenge was that the Secretary of the Transport Department who gave the hearing was biased, being the person who initiated the scheme and also being the head of the department whose responsibility it was to execute it. The court quashed the order on the ground that, under the circumstances, the Secretary was biased, and hence no fair hearing could be expected.• The problem of departmental bias arises in different context- when the functions

of judge and prosecutor are combined in the same department. It is not uncommon to find that the same department which initiates a matter also decides it, therefore, at times, departmental fraternity and loyalty militates against the concept of fair hearing.

Hari v. Dy. Commr. of Police.

• This problem came up before the Supreme Court in Hari v. Dy. Commr. of Police. In this case an externment order was challenged n the ground that since the police department which initiated the proceedings and the department which heard and decided the case were the same, the element of departmental bias vitiated administrative action. The Court rejected the challenge on the ground that so long as the two functions (initiation and decision) were discharged by two separate officers, though they were affiliated to the same department, there was no bias.

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