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Recollection and Philosophical Reflection in Plato's "Phaedo"Author(s): Lee FranklinSource: Phronesis, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2005), pp. 289-314Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182786 .Accessed: 15/05/2014 21:24

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Recollection and Philosophical

Reflection in Plato's Phaedol

LEE FRANKLIN

ABSTRACT

Interpretations f recollection in the Phaedo are divided between ordinary inter-pretations, on which recollection explains a kind of learning accomplished by all,and sophisticated interpretations, which restrict recollection to philosophers. Asophisticated interpretation is supported by the prominence of philosophicalunderstanding nd reflection in the argument. Recollection is supposed to explainthe advanced understanding displayed by Socrates and Simmias (74b2-4).Furthermore, t seems to be a necessary condition on recollection that one whorecollects also perform a comparison of sensible particulars o Forms (74a5-7). Iprovide a new ordinary interpretation which explains these features of the argu-ment. First, we must clearly distinguish the philosophical reflection which con-stitutes the argument for the Theory of Recollection from the ordinary learningwhich is its subject. The comparison of sensibles to Forms is the reasoning bywhich we see, as philosophers, hat we must recollect. At the same time, we must

also appreciate the continuity of ordinary and philosophical learning. Plato wantsto explain the capacity for ordinary discourse, but with an eye to its role as theorigin of philosophical reflection and learning. In the Phaedo, recollection hasordinary learning as its immediate explanandum, and philosophical learning asits ultimate explanandum.

The Theory of Recollection is a theory of learning. In order to understandthe theory, or an argument for it, we must say what kind of learning is atstake. Unfortunately, there is little consensus on this question concerningrecollection in the Phaedo. Socrates claims that we recollect when we

come to have a Form in mind in response to sense perception. Since it isnot obvious what it means to have a Form in mind, it is unclear what kindof learning recollection is, or who accomplishes it. The context of theargument favors a reading on which all human beings recollect. Socrates

Accepted February 2005' Versions of this paper have been read at the Pacific meeting of the American

Philosophical Association, at Ohio State University, Brown University, and StanfordUniversity. I am grateful to the audience in all cases for questions and commentswhich improved the paper. I am especially grateful to Allan Silverman, Alan Code,Chris Bobonich, David Sedley, and the editors of this journal for many helpfulsuggestions.

? Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Phronesis L14Also available online - www.brill.nl

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290 LEE FRANKLIN

wants to show that all human souls pre-exist their location in a body.Prima facie, if recollection is restricted to a select class of learners, theargument will show the soul's pre-existence only for those who recollect.)For this and other reasons, most scholars believe that recollection in thePhaedo concerns an ordinary kind of learning, typically related to thecapacity for everyday speech and thought. I'll call this approach to rec-ollection in the Phaedo the ordinary interpretation.3

There are significant obstacles to the ordinary interpretation. In partic-ular, the prominence of philosophical sophistication in the discussion sug-

gests that recollection cannot be an act of learning achieved by all, butmust instead be restricted to philosophers. Socrates conducts the discus-sion with Simmias and Cebes, young philosophers who have studied withthe Pythagorean Philolaus (61d6-7), and who appear to be familiar withthe Theory of Forms (65d6-8, 74bl- 3).4 When Socrates asks whether 'we'have come to have a Form in mind, his immediate audience is anythingbut ordinary. Moreover, within the argument for recollection, Socratessays that he is interested in the origin of the knowledge - episteme - thathe and Simmias have of Equality (74b2-6). In light of Simmias' intellec-

tual achievement, it is most reasonable to suppose that Socrates wants toexplain the source of advanced grasp of Equality. Finally, in the processof introducing recollection, Socrates seems to say that the act of compar-ing sensible particulars to Forms is a necessary condition on recollection(74a5-7 ff.). This comparison seems to require familiarity with Forms, assuch. Since only philosophers are familiar with Forms in this way, itseems that only philosophers can compare sensibles to Forms. Consequently,only philosophers recollect. These considerations support what I will call

2 But see D. Scott, Recollection and Experience, [R&E] (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1995), 69-71.

' Adherents of the ordinary interpretation nclude J.L. Ackrill, 'Anamnesis in thePhaedo: Remarks on 73c-75c' ['Anamnesis'] in E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, andR. Rorty (edd.), Exegesis and Argument (Assen, 1974) 177-195, D. Bostock, Plato'sPhaedo, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), J. Gosling, 'Similarity in Phaedo73b. seq.,' ['Similarity'] Phronesis X (1965), 151-161, R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedo,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955), S. Kelsey, 'Recollection n the Phaedo,'in J. Cleary (ed.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy,16 (2000), 91-120. There are, of course, important differences between these accounts.

I All citations from the Phaedo are from C.J. Rowe, Plato: Phaedo, (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993). Other dialogues are cited from J. Burnet, PlatonisOpera, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907). Unless otherwise noted, translations


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RECOLLECTION N PLATO'S PHAEDO 291

the sophisticated interpretation of recollection in the Phaedo, the view thatrecollection in the Phaedo is a kind of philosophical learning.'

In this paper I present a new ordinary interpretation. I will argue thatin the Phaedo recollection describes the learning that enables ordinaryhuman speech and thought.6 Nevertheless, my reading agrees with asophisticated interpretation on several key details, including those thatseem to recommend the sophisticated interpretation most. For instance, Iagree that the comparison of sensibles to Forms involves sophisticated philo-sophical reflection. I will show, however, that this comparison is neces-

sary not for those who are recollecting, but for philosophers who seek tocomprehend the Theory of Recollection. In order to understand recollec-tion in the Phaedo, we must distinguish the philosophical reasoning thatis the argument for the Theory from the ordinary learning which is its sub-ject. At the same time, we must also see the continuity of ordinary andphilosophical learning. Plato is interested in the learning by which webecome able to speak and think ordinarily. But he is interested in thislearning because it provides the resources from which philosophical reflectionand learning develop. Thus, it is true that recollection in the Phaedo

explains sophisticated philosophical understanding, n the following way: theargument for recollection has ordinary learning as its immediate explanan-dum, and philosophical understanding as its ultimate explanandum.Altogether, the Theory of Recollection is a synoptic theory of learning,ranging from the inception of speech and thought to the acquisition ofknowledge. The argument for recollection in the Phaedo is about thebeginning of this unified process.

are from J. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works, [Complete Works] (Indianapolis:Hackett Publishing, 1997).1 The sophisticated interpretation s most thoroughly argued for by Scott, R&E. It

is also endorsed by C. Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast, [Plato's Utopia] (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2001). J.T. Bedu-Addo, 'Sense Experience and the Argumentfor Recollection in Plato's Phaedo,' ['Sense Experience'] Phronesis, XLVI, (1991)27-60, is sympathetic with Scott on some points about recollection in the Phaedo, butnot recollection overall. His is what we might call a hybrid account of recollection,identifying distinct kinds or aspects of recollection in the Phaedo. The same is true ofT. Williams, 'Two Aspects of Platonic Recollection,' ['Two Aspects'] Apeiron, 35(2002), 131-152.

61 do not hold the same view about the Meno. There recollection concerns thelearning we undergo in dialectic. Thus, on my view, there are two distinct stages of

recollection. In this paper, I will use 'recollection' to refer to the stage of learningexamined in the Phaedo. Where I intend the term to apply to the full scope of Plato'stheory of learning, I will make that explicit.


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I. The Introduction of Recollection: 73cl-74a3In this section, I examine Socrates' introduction of recollection in orderto say what kind of learning it is. Socrates introduces recollection byappealing to the ordinary experience of remembering. From this broad andfamiliar experience, he presents a number of conditions and exampleswhich serve to characterize a more specific mental activity (avaijivqai;tt;, 73el). As we shall see, this strategy has its limitations; by themselves,Socrates' conditions and examples do not clearly favor either an ordinaryor a sophisticated interpretation. To identify the learning that is recollec-tion, we must read Socrates' introduction in the light of the broader con-text of the Phaedo.

Socrates' first condition is this: 'If someone recollects something, it isnecessary for him to have known it before' (73c1-2). This condition comeseasily out of the way we ordinarily think about remembering. We do notsay that someone has remembered something unless what she called tomind is something she has experienced or thought of before. Another con-dition is stated in Socrates' general formulation of recollection: knowledgeof the item recollected must be different from that of the item that inspiresrecollection (73c7-8). This seems to require that grasp of the item thatinspires recollection does not include grasp of the item we recollect. If wemust think of one item, A, in order to grasp something else, B, then ourcoming to think of A from B does not constitute recollection. If we werethinking about B, we already had A in mind too.7 Read in this way, thesecond condition on recollection is also derived from ordinary notions ofwhat it is to be reminded of one thing by another. Socrates then presentsa few familiar examples of remembering: thinking of a boy from seeinghis cloak or lyre, thinking of Simmias from seeing his brother Cebes,

thinking of Simmias from his picture (73d5-10). Along the way, he addsthat recollection takes place most clearly when we call to mind objectslong forgotten (73el-3), and that recollection can take place from itemsboth similar and dissimilar to the item recollected (74a2-3).

It is hard to tell from these introductory remarks what Socrates has inmind. There is little to show decisively that he is thinking of either an ordi-nary act or a philosophical one. This ambiguity is compounded by the ter-minology; in the span of 20 lines or so (73c I-dl 1I) Socrates employs a variety

I See Ackrill, 'Anamnesis' 184-5, A. Nehamas, 'Plato on the Imperfection of theSensible World,' ['Imperfection'J in Virtues of Authenticity, (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1999) 148, Bostock, Plato: Phaedo, 63-64.


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of words for mental states and their objects: xTaGOTcyt; perception (73c7);YI'vOCiKrtV - to know, be aware of, or perceive (73c7, d7); ?intatwxOaLto know, and ?inta1oR - knowledge (73c2, 4, 8, d3); CvvoCtv to havein mind, and 'evvota - conception (73c8, c9); 8tavoia - thought (73d7);and finally 80o; - image or, in Plato's technical use, Form (73d8). Thediversity of terms serves to multiply rather than restrict the possibilitiesfor what recollection might be. The precise significance of these condi-tions and terms will come to light only once we have established firmergrasp on what recollection is.8

At this point, one might object that I have left out the most decisive ofSocrates' introductory remarks: the claim that a person recollecting anitem from things similar to it must also consider whether the latter aredeficient in their similarity to the former (74a5-7). Since this condition isto be applied to the recollection of Forms from sensible particulars, t appearsto require a comparison of particulars to Forms. Moreover, since such acomparison requires familiarity with Forms as such, this remark seems toshow by itself that recollection is an act of philosophical learning. I willaddress this passage at length in the next section, and argue that it does

not belong to the introduction of recollection, and does not present a nec-essary condition on recollection of Forms. Instead, Socrates' remarkeffects a transition from the introduction of recollection to the core of theargument. For now, I leave it aside.

Socrates' appeal to the familiar experience of remembering does notsuffice to identify the more specific act he has in mind. For this, we mustread the introduction of recollection against the broader background of thedialogue. The least ambiguous feature of Socrates' introduction is the fol-lowing pattern. Socrates consistently uses perceptual terms to describe the

way we grasp the items that inspire recollection. Socrates describes theinspiration of recollection as a moment in which 'someone seeing, or hear-ing, or having some other perception is not only aware of that thing. . .'(73c6-7). Likewise, in each of Socrates' examples, the object that inspiresrecollection is grasped perceptually, usually by sight (73d5, e5, 7, 9, 74b5,d13-el). Not all remembering is inspired by perception, but Socrates' lan-guage indicates that recollection has such a source.9 In contrast, Socrates

8 For more discussion of Socrates' introduction, ee Ackrill, 'Anamnesis,' 181-191,Gosling, 'Similarity,' 151-157, Hackforth, Plato: Phaedo, 65-68, D. Gallop, Plato:Phaedo, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) 115-118, Bostock, Plato's Phaedo,63-66, Scott R&E, 55 ff.

I Twice, Socrates uses the verb ytyvdmeCtV to describe the grasp we have of itemsinspiring recollection (73c7, d7). We could translate this as 'recognizing' to suggest


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uses cognitive terms to describe the way we grasp the item recollected. Itis here that Socrates uses Evvo_iv, to have in mind, think of, or consider(73c8, 9). Finally, in his examples Socrates says that the recollecting lover'takes up in thought (Cv Tfn 8tavota) the image (E'Y5o;) f the boy...'(73d7-8). Whatever recollection is, it begins in perception and ends inthought. This basic structure is confirmed by Socrates' later remark that'as long as the sight of one thing makes you think of another, whether itbe similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity be recollection' (74c13-d2).

Socrates has not yet revealed that he is interested specifically in the rec-

ollection of Forms from sensible particulars. For this reason, the pattern Ihave just pointed out seems unimportant; the items involved in our famil-iar experience of remembering are objects of both perception and thought,ordinarily construed. The pattern akes on greater philosophical significance,however, in light of Socrates' remarks about the difference between sen-sibles and Forms elsewhere in the Phaedo. In the next argument (78b4-80c 1), Socrates describes two classes of beings (6i5o r'& 6iV Ov Totv, 79a6-7).One contains perceptible, changing, and unintelligible particulars accessi-ble to us only through the body (78dl0-e4, 79c4-5, 80b3-6). The other

contains Forms, which are unchanging, imperceptible, intelligible realities,grasped only by our souls (79al-4, cl-8, 80bl-3). Most striking about thisdistinction is that it is mutually exclusive; what is intelligible is imper-ceptible, and what is perceptible is unintelligible - avo;TTo; 80b4). Primafacie, Socrates' distinction suggests that recollection is a moment inwhich, from the mere perception of sensible particulars - perception is theonly apprehension we can have of sensibles - we come to think aboutForms, since Forms are the only items we can think about. But this is toosevere, I think. Given that we do ordinarily think about sensible particu-

lars, and that Socrates appeals to this ordinary experience, we cannot takeSocrates' distinction between the perceptible and intelligible at face value.It cannot be his view that the only way we can apprehend particulars isthrough unthinking perception, and that the only things we can think aboutit in any sense are Forms.

that our grasp of the items that inspire recollection is not merely perceptual. Takenthis way, Socrates seems to require that the recollector have some grasp of the iteminspiring recollection as an item of a particular kind. For instance, we recognize thelyre as a lyre before thinking of the boy to whom it belongs, see Ackrill 'Anamnesis,'182-183, Scott, R&E, 57, esp. n. 2. But we do not need to take ytyvcIvIv to havethis cognitive force. rtyv6aietv can mean perceive or be aware of, and Socrates' useof it here should be taken along these lines, especially in light of his statement at74c 13-d2.


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Instead, the distinction between perception and thought aims to teaseapart distinct aspects of ordinary human experience. Near the end of theargument or recollection, Socrates says that recollection xplains our abil-ity to refer sensibles to Forms (75b6-7, 76d 9-e2). These remarks showthat Socrates s not concerned with our ability to think about Forms apartfrom sensible particulars, ut to invoke Forms in thinking about particu-lars. This may happen ordinarily when, perceiving a particular, we becomeaware of the kind of thing it is, and predicate a property of it in eitherspeech or thought. n strictly distinguishing erception rom thought, Plato

demarcates erception s an aspect or level of our ordinary xperience whichis pre-cognitive. Perception may trigger a transition o thought. But whenit does, we come to have in mind an entity distinct from the sensible par-ticular: he property we predicate of it. For we could not predicate a prop-erty of a sensible item if we did not, in some sense, have the property nmind.'0 According o Plato, Forms are the properties we have in mind inordinary predicative peech and thought. Thus, I do not take Socrates tomean that particulars re unintelligible out court, but only that they can-not be thought about by themselves. Sensible particulars an be thought

of only by reference o Forms. This analysis permits a more precise read-ing of the second condition on recollection, which says that knowledge ofthe item inspiring recollection must be distinct from that of the item rec-ollected (73c7-8). We took this condition to mean that our grasp of thefirst item cannot include grasp of the second. In the case of recollectingForms from sensible particulars, his condition highlights a way of grasp-ing particulars which does not involve Forms at all and which, for thatreason, is not yet thinking.

In the argument for recollection in the Phaedo, having a Form in mind

describes the way properties are present to our thinking when we predi-cate them in ordinary speech and thought. That Forms play this role inordinary speech and thought is confirmed irst by the terms of Socraticinquiry. When Socrates asks the 'What s F?' question, he implies that theitem picked out by the answer will be the same as that predicated by theterm 'F' in the interlocutor's rdinary usage. Consider, or instance, whatSocrates says to Meno by way of instructions or defining Shape: 'whatis this which applies as much to the round as to the straight and whichyou call Shape?' (Meno, 74d7-8). The item attributed n Meno's ordinary

use of the term 'shape' is the very item that will be picked out by his

1n See Kelsey, 'Recollection in the Phaedo,' 96-97.


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successful answer to Socrates' question. In the Phaedo, Socrates makesclear - within the argument or recollection that Forms are the itemspicked out by answers to the 'What is F?' question (75c7-d5). It followsthat Forms are the properties we predicate n ordinary peech and thought,and which we investigate n dialectic.

Further onfirmation s found in the Phaedo where Socrates says thatsensible particulars re named after the Forms; hey have the homonymsor eponyms of the Forms (78e2, 102b2). There is no hint that theseremarks apply to a restricted lass of speakers; t isn't only philosophers

who call sensibles by the names of the Forms. Rather, properly under-stood, the descriptive erms we use ordinarily re the names of Forms, andthey derive their content when applied to anything else from this namingrelation.'2 One of Socrates' introductory xamples is especially relevanthere, that of remembering Simmias from seeing his picture (73e9-10).'3On its face, this example calls to mind an instance n which we first den-tify Simmias in the picture, and then begin to think about Simmias him-self, apart from the picture. Another way to read the example, however,is as an account of how we identify Simmias in the picture n the first

place. We have a sense impression of the picture, t triggers he memoryof Simmias, and as a result we're able to say of the picture, That's Simmias.'We apply Simmias' name to the picture derivatively, n virtue of its resem-blance to Simmias himself. We could not do this if we were not alreadacquainted with Simmias and f we did not, n some sense, have him n mind.In like fashion, Plato thinks that the ordinary predication f properties osensible particulars nvokes the Forms, with similar requirements.'4

We must be careful not to conflate two possible points of emphasis nthis example. One concern we might have is with the ability to identify a

I Since a sophisticated nterpretation estricts Forms to the minds of philosophers,it must claim that ordinary predications make no reference to Forms. This raises ques-tions about the possibility of communication between philosophers and ordinary peak-ers. For responses to this problem, see Scott, R&E, 65 and Bobonich, Plato's Utopia,309 if.

12 This raises the vexing question of whether all meaningful terms in our languagecorrespond to Forms. See n. 34.

13This is generally recognized to be the most important of Socrates' examples,since it is most clearly an example of recollection rom similars. See Gosling, 'Similarity,'154 ff., Ackrill, 'Anamnesis,' 189-90, Kelsey, 'Recollection in the Phaedo,' 110 ff.,Bostock, Plato's Phaedo, 65.

14 See Kelsey, 'Recollection in the Phaedo,' 96-7, 110-113.


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picture as a picture. This ability requires hat we be aware of a generaldistinction between pictures and their objects, such that we can identifyan item as one or the other. The analogous comprehension with respectto Forms and particulars s understanding f the metaphysical relationbetween them such that one could, on beholding a particular, ecognizethat it is merely an image of, or participant n, a Form. Another concernwe might have is with the ability to identify pictures of a certain indi-vidual as that individual, perhaps without the ability to say that it ismerely an image of him. The analogous ability with respect o Forms and

particulars s the capacity to identify the Forms n particulars, .e. to clas-sify particulars y reference o the Forms they instantiate. Plato's view isthat ordinary peech and thought requires he second of these abilities, butnot the first. We are acquainted with the Forms and refer to them in ordi-nary discourse, without necessarily knowing that we do so.

It has been argued hat ordinary predications equire mplicit awarenessof the distinction between sensibles and Forms.'5 That Plato has this inmind is purportedly hown by the example of Simmias' picture. In thatcase, if we were not aware that what we identified was only a picture of

Simmias, we would have 'mistaken t for Simmias himself. 6 Analogously,if we are not at least implicitly aware of the difference between Formsand sensible particulars, we will be confusing the latter with the formerin our ordinary predications. But Plato thinks that ordinary peakers makeprecisely this mistake. Consider what Socrates says about the lover ofsights and sounds in Republic V. The lover of sights and sounds believesin and pursues beautiful hings, but is unaware of, or does not admit, theexistence of Beauty itself. Socrates asks, 'Don't you think he is living ina dream rather han a wakened state? Isn't this dreaming: whether asleep

or awake, to think that a likeness is not a likeness but rather the thingitself that it is like?' (Republic, 476c5-7). Because he takes sensible par-ticulars o be the most genuinely beautiful entities, the lover of sights andsounds confuses them with the Form of Beauty. In the Allegory of theCave the same mistake s attributed o all non-philosophers ho, becausetheir sight is restricted, believe that they behold what is most real and donot know that they are looking at mere shadows (Republic, 515a5-d7).

'5 This claim is central to an ordinary nterpretation which accepts that comparingsensibles to Forms is a necessary condition on recollection. See Kelsey, 'Recollectionin the Phaedo,' 117-118, and Williams, 'Two Aspects,' 145.

16 Kelsey, 'Recollection in the Phaedo,' 117-118. Cf. Gosling, 'Similarity,' 159-160.


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Most people have no idea that the items of the sensible world are imagesof Forms. This is an awareness granted only by philosophical eflection.Nevertheless, what all people can do is classify sensible particulars y ref-erence, in most cases unknowing reference, o the Forms. According toPlato, our ability to do this requires hat we are acquainted with the Formitself, and that we have it in mind whenever we predicate t.

In this way, Forms play a role akin to that of concepts.'7 ust as chil-dren and non-philosophers can possess a concept without giving anythought o concepts as such, so Plato thinks we can have a Form n mind

without knowing it. Plato's aim in the argument or recollection is toexplain our capacity to have Forms in mind in this way. Importantly,although we have a Form n mind whenever we predicate t, this does notmean that we recollect the Form anew every time we predicate t. In theargument or recollection, Plato is interested n the way we first come tohave Forms in mind in this life (75a5-8, 75b4). Thus, Plato is interestedin what we might call concept acquisition.'8

II. A Necessary Consideration: 74a5-7

Near the end of his introductory emarks, Socrates makes a distinctionbetween recollection rom items similar o the item recollected, and itemsdissimilar to it (74a2-3). This distinction eads to the following remark:'But whenever someone recollects something rom the similar tems, isn'tit necessary (ouKc ivayKaiov) for him to experience this in addition(npoair6oXriv): o consider whether t falls short n any way of that whichhe recollects, with respect to their likeness?' (74a5-7, my translation).will call the consideration described n this remark he Necessary Con-

sideration, or NC. Two questions are most pressing about NC. First,exactly what kind of comparison s it? As the reader s about to learn, hekind of recollection Socrates has in mind is the recollection of Forms romsensible particulars 74c7-9). Moreover, since this may be conceived ofas recalling he Form from items similar o it (74d4-e4), Socrates' remarkseems to require a comparison of sensible particulars o Forms. Is this aphilosophical comparison, or one performed more ordinarily? Second, isit genuinely a necessary condition on the act of recollection?

17 Akin to, but not identical, since Forms are not merely mental entities, and havemetaphysical roles beyond those typically assigned to concepts.

IS This description of recollection will be qualified somewhat below, p. 309.


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Before proceeding, let me briefly address the impression that, at leastwith respect to the second question, the answer is obvious: Socrates' com-ment clearly presents a necessary condition on remembering one thingfrom items similar to it. Indeed, Socrates' wording - Otav YE emphasizesthat one must make the comparison at the moment, or immediately after,one recollects. The worry is that it is hard to see why such a comparisonwould necessarily accompany our remembering in ordinary circum-stances. 9 If I call a Michelangelo sculpture to mind from seeing a Rodinsimilar to it, it is not necessary for me to reflect on the superiority of the

former. Nor does the condition make more sense when applied to philo-sophical realizations. If a philosopher, upon witnessing a virtuous act,calls Virtue Itself to mind, why must she also note the deficiency of theact? Why can't she simply contemplate the Form? Indeed, there is a prob-lem with taking NC to be a necessary condition on recollection and aphilosophical consideration at the same time. Since recollection is inspiredby perception, it would turn out to be a kind of philosophical learning inwhich the senses play an integral role. This conflicts with Socrates' stead-fast assertion that perception has no role in philosophical inquiry (66a5-

6, 79c2-8). For these reasons, before we accept NC as a necessary conditionon recollection, let us more look carefully at the way it is introduced.

There is a subtle break in Socrates' introductory remarks. After pre-senting the initial conditions on recollection and a few examples, Simmiasappears to understand what Socrates has in mind, responding confidently(iauv, Thv oUv) when Socrates asks whether he has described 'a kind ofrecollection' (73el-4, my translation). Socrates then signals that he ismaking a new point (ti &), and presents another series of examples (73e5-10). These examples differ from the earlier ones, however, in that they all

involve remembering something from a picture (yEypa%tgu,vov). ocratesthen makes the further points that we can recollect from both similars anddissimilars, and that in the former case we must perform NC. It is crucialto see that these two points are restricted to the narrow class of remem-bering something from a picture. In the first, Socrates prefaces his remarkwith the phrase 'in all of these cases' (vxat\ larvTQa Tabra) meaningspecifically cases of remembering something from a picture (74a2). In thesecond, he addresses remembering 'from the similars' (&no6 &ov 'ofocov),

See Gosling, 'Similarity,' 152 ff., Ackrill, 'Anamnesis,' 190-191, Bostock,Plato's Phaedo, 65-66, Nehamas, 'Imperfection,' 149. Even Scott, who relies so heav-ily on this reading, acknowledges its implausibility, R&E, 63 n. 12.


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i.e. not just any items similar to what is recollected, but similar pictures(74a5). Thus, Socrates is not characterizing ecollection generally; sinceSimmias already seems to understand what Socrates has in mind, furtherclarification of what recollection is appears to be unnecessary. Rather,Socrates s making the following narrow points. First, we can remembersomething either from a picture that depicts it, or one that does not.Second, when we recall an item from a picture that depicts it, we mustcompare he picture o the original.

To discern Socrates' purpose, et's examine what he does with the com-

parison he has introduced. Here is what Socrates says immediately afterSimmias agrees with the statement ntroducing NC: 'Look then ((@IC6lt8') if these things hold in this way (otox). We say, I suppose, that theEqual is something' (74a9, my translation). Typically, the adverb OiVT();looks backward to something that has already been presented.20 hus,Socrates s instructing immias to undertake he consideration e has justintroduced, NC. But the discussion that follows is an investigation of thedifference etween ensible quals and Equality tself (74a9-d3). Accordingly,Socrates' and Simmias' discussion of Equality and sensible equal partic-

ulars s a special instance of NC applied o sensible particulars nd Forms.Socrates' concluding remark confirms his: 'Well then. .. do we experi-ence (n&acXoj.ev) omething ike this in the case of equal sticks and theother equal objects we just mentioned? Do they seem to us to be equal inthe same sense as what is Equal itself? Is there some deficiency n theirbeing equal such as the Equal, or is there not?' (74d4-e4).3 Simmiasagrees that equal particulars re deficient. After comparing ensible equalsto Equality, Socrates and Simmias have answered precisely the questionNC asks; they have discovered hat sensible equals are deficient n their

similarity to Equality. Moreover, n describing this discovery, Socratesechoes the language rom his original presentation f NC. There Socratessaid that one must experience in addition (ipoona'crXv) the considera-tion. At the end of the discussion of equal particulars and Equality,Socrates notes that he and Simmias are experiencing nataX1tv) hat very

20 The use of &i also supports this by framing Socrates' instruction as a naturalresult of Simmias' agreement that the consideration is necessary, see H.W. Smyth,Greek Grammar, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) ??1245, 2846.

21 See Scott R&E, 60 and Ackrill, 'Anamnesis' 192 on the use of the first personplural here as a complication for an ordinary nterpretation. f NC is part of the argu-ment for recollection, as I am arguing here, these worries dissolve.


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thing (74d4, e6).22The comparison Socrates and Simmias perform on sen-sible equals and Equality s NC.

As a result, we may learn about NC, as applied to sensible particularsand Forms, by investigating he discussion of sensible equals and Equalityfrom 74a9-e6. But we needn't go into that discussion n detail - as I willin the next section - to see that it requires philosophical ophistication.At the start of the discussion, Socrates introduces he Form of Equality:'there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stickor a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind, but something else beyondall these, the Equal Itself' (74a9-12). Simmias' emphatic response showsthat he is familiar with such entities, and recognizes their distinction romsensible equals (74bl-3).23 Moreover, most interpreters gree that in thisdiscussion Socrates articulates a central metaphysical or epistemologicaldifference between sensible particulars nd Forms.24 We needn't specifythat difference o see that any discussion n which it is put forward nvolvesadvanced philosophical reflection. Since this discussion is NC, when NCis applied to sensible particulars nd Forms, t is a kind of philosophicalreflection, requiring amiliarity with Forms as such.

At the same time, the context indicates hat NC may be necessary, butnot as a condition on the act of recollection. It is Simmias who performsNC, and Simmias is not currently xperiencing ecollection of the sort atstake in the discussion.25 Within the comparison of sensible equals andEquality, Socrates asks Simmias if it is from perceiving sensible equalsthat he called Equality o mind (74a4-6, c7-9). Socrates s asking whether

22 The use of racrXetv to describe a philosophical consideration is strange. For a

parallel, see 73b7.23 See 65d6-8, and Scott, R&E, 56. For a contrasting reading see Williams, 'Two

Aspects,' 142-3.24 Nehamas, 'Imperfection,' 151 ff., A. Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence: Plato's

Metaphysics, [Dialectic of Essence] (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) ch. 3,especially 51-54, Bostock, Plato's Phaedo, 72-85. Kelsey, 'Recollection in thePhaedo,' 101-110.

25 This is not to say that Simmias is not recollecting in any way. If philosophicallearning is another kind of recollection, as I think it is, then there is a sense in whichSimmias currently recollects. This is strongly suggested at 73b7. Notice, however, thatif we wish to interpret Simmias' current learning as recollection, then we must dis-

tinguish two kinds of recollection. For Simmias' recollection consists in understand-ing the proofs for the claim that some other moment of learning is recollection. If wedo not make such a distinction, then we must entertain the absurd claim that there issome moment of learning which consists in realizing that that very learning dependson recollection.


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it was from the perception f sensibles that Simmias recollected he Form.But Socrates employs aorist and perfect verb forms here, indicating hatSimmias has called Equality o mind prior o the comparison he currentlyperforms. More generally, Socrates' argument ims to explain the way wefirst come to have Forms in mind in this life. Simmias' easy familiaritywith Forms at the beginning of the discussion shows that he is beyondthis stage of learning. Instead of experiencing he kind of recollection atissue, Simmias is inquiring nto it as a philosopher. Socrates is givingthe argument or recollection because Simmias asked to see the proofs

(a&co&?itet;) f the theory (73a4-6). The importance f NC is based on itscontribution o Simmias' philosophical nquiry nto recollection. Socrateshas not described a consideration ecessarily part of, or subsequent o, theact of recollection. Instead, NC is a consideration one must take up inorder to reach understanding bout the doctrine of recollection; n orderto understand he reasons for the claim that we recollect, Simmias mustcompare sensibles to Forms.

NC, and the passage in which it is brought orward, ffect a transitionfrom the introduction f recollection to the argument showing that we

recollect. Socrates introduces amiliar examples of remembering ome-thing from its picture, because in these cases a comparison of image tooriginal comes easily to light. After all, if we did not compare a pictureto its original, and note the deficiency, we would be mistaking t for theoriginal. Once this comparison has been introduced, ocrates urns mme-diately to perform t in the specialized case of sensible particulars ndForms. But, as we noted above,26 here s an important ifference betweenremembering person rom his picture and recollecting a Form from oneof its participants. For while a comparison of image to original may be

necessary n the former case, Plato does not think such a comparison ec-essarily accompanies he ordinary recollection or predication of Forms.Thus, Socrates' attribution f simultaneity and necessity in the introduc-tion of NC (o5TOv E... &voyicxiov, 4a5-6) applies only to the familiarexamples he has used to introduce he comparison; t does not apply tothe recollection of Forms from sensible particulars.

We do not need to strain o come up with interpretations f what seemsto be an implausible ondition on remembering omething rom items sim-ilar to it. Socrates' statement t 74a5-7 is a plausible condition on remem-

bering something rom its picture, and no more. This reading explains twoother features of the argument s well. The first s the following sequence.

26 Pp. 297-8.


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At 74a2-3 Socrates says that recollection can be inspired by items bothsimilar and dissimilar to the item recollected. NC is then introduced.Subsequently, near the end of the discussion of sensibles equals and Equality,Socrates dismisses the distinction between recollection from similars anddissimilars saying, 'It makes no difference. As long as the sight of onething makes you think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, thismust of necessity be recollection' (74c13-d2). On a sophisticated readingof the argument, it is hard to understand why Socrates dismisses the dis-tinction between recollection from similars and dissimilars, if that distinctionwas related to a key condition on recollection. If the distinction betweenrecollection from similars and dissimilars is needed only for the transitionto the argument, however, it makes sense for Socrates to discard it. Thesecond feature is that the necessary correlation between recollecting Formsand comparing them to sensibles, purportedly introduced at 74a5-7, isnever appealed to again. On a sophisticated reading, the claim that recol-lection of Forms requires a comparison of sensibles to Forms plays a cen-tral role in the argument. If this were right, then we should expect Socratesto refer to the simultaneity of recollecting Forms and comparing sensiblesto them explicitly in the argument. But, as I will show in the final sec-tion of this paper, he does not. Like the distinction between recollectionfrom similars and dissimilars, this aspect of NC disappears. This is pre-cisely what we should expect if NC is part of the argument for recollec-tion, rather than a necessary condition on recollection.

As I have argued, the act of recollection and NC are different mentalacts, diverse in character, and distant in time. Unfortunately, Socrates'wording makes it difficult to keep this distinction clear. He uses the sameverb for both: ?vvoriv, to have in mind. Nevertheless, there is a consistent

difference in the way Socrates presents the two acts. Recollection is con-sistently described as having an object in mind; in these cases, the gram-matical object of ?vvoriv is a noun or pronoun - ?vvo?tv rt (73c8, 74b6,c8). But the use of ivvociv that describes the comparison of sensiblesto Forms has a proposition or question as its object: Evvoriv r'_Y1C or oI(74a5-7, d9). This terminological distinction will be crucial in our read-ing of the argument for recollection from 74d9-b8. Recollection is theordinary learning by which we come to have a Form in mind - EvvoEiv

- from the perception of its sensible participants. But it is only by con-

sidering he deficiency of the sensible particulars ivvociv 6'rt xa a'YYomxa?v8?t Tl - that we, as philosophers, recognize that this learning needsexplanation.


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III. The Deficiency of Sensibles: 74a9-d8Plato wants to explain our ability to have Forms in mind in the wayrequired or ordinary peech and thought. To see that this learning equiresrecollection, he must show that we cannot come to have Forms in mindon the basis of sense perception alone. This is the role of NC. By show-ing that sensible equals are deficient compared o Equality, Plato intendsto show that perception annot bring us, by itself, to have Forms n mind.The discussion is difficult, and the source of much debate concerningPlato's metaphysics n the Phaedo. I will not be able to resolve all of thecontroversies oncerning he text, much less Plato's middle-period meta-physics.27 Nevertheless, by showing how the discussion provides he rea-sons why we cannot call Forms to mind from sense perception alone, Ihope to shed ight on the metaphysical rounds f the Theory of Recollection,and its scope as a theory of learning.

Socrates begins by asking whether Simmias admits he existence of theEqual, not some particular hings equal to one another, but above andbeyond these, 'the Equal itself' (74a9-12). Simmias agrees that he andSocrates know what the Equal s (Fi'lct6lasr8a rbo 6o Tiv; 74b2-3). Next,Socrates asks whether they have acquired heir knowledge of the Equalfrom sensible equals, whether from these things (sensible equals) we havecalled it (the Equal itself) to mind' (74b4-6). Before Simmias answers,though, Socrates backtracks o re-examine he question whether he Equalitself is genuinely distinct from sensible equals. The argument s highlycompressed. Socrates argues hat there s a characteristic ossessed by sen-sible equals that is not possessed by the Equal itself. Sensible equals'appear to be equal to one thing and unequal to another' (74b7-9). TheEqual tself, n contrast, ever appears o be unequal, r Inequality 74c 1-2).From this difference, Socrates nfers that sensible equals are not the sameas the Equal itself (74c4-5).

This brief argument s meant to articulate a difference between twoways of being equal. This is indicated ater by Socrates' recap of his con-clusion: 'Do [equal sticks] seem to us to be equal in the same sense(11O?p) as what is Equal tself?' (74d5-7). The difference s between beingan equal thing, i.e., being characterized y equality, and being the Equal

27 The reading I present here has been greatly influenced by Silverman, Dialecticof Essence, especially ch. 3. For opposing views, see Nehamas, 'Imperfection,' Kelsey'Recollection in the Phaedo,' and T. Irwin, 'The Theory of Forms,' in G. Fine (ed.),Plato, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 145-172.


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itself, the property or relation common to and responsible for equalthings.28 Both equal things and Equality can be said to be equal, but notat all in the same sense. Equal things are equal to some one thing or other,in a specific respect, and in a specific magnitude. For instance, one stickis equal to another by having the same length, 14 inches. But the verysame stick will also be unequal n length to many other things, and prob-ably unequal o the other stick in other respects. Indeed, the very dimen-sions that make he stick equal o one thing will make t unequal o somethingelse. For this reason, being characterized y equality to one thing neces-sarily involves inequality o others. The fact that equal sticks and stonesare also unequal highlights the fact that they are merely characterized yequality.

The Form, however, is not characterized y equality; t is not equal toanything, n any specific respect, or magnitude. Rather, t is equality itself,the single property r relation which is common to and responsible or allequal pairs. That the Equal has this status s bound up with its role as theentity picked out by the answer to the question What s Equal?' Socratesemphasizes this role first by asking whether Simmias knows the Equal'what it is' (74b2, my translation), nd then more subtly in the shift fromasking whether the Equal ever appears unequal, to the question whetherit ever appears o be Inequality 74c1-2). Finally, at the end of the argu-ment, Socrates explicitly extends the argument o concern, all those thingsto which we can attach the word 'itself,' both when we are putting ques-tions and answering hem' (75dl-3). The Equal's failure to be unequal nany way signals the fact that it is not characterized y equality, but isequality tself.29 Thus, in this argument, Socrates uses the compresence ofopposites to point to a deeper difference between being characterized y

a property and being that property.Once we grasp this difference, we can see why the perception of equal

particulars s insufficient o bring us to have Equality in mind. A stickmanifests one way of being equal, but it does not manifest Equality tself,the property r relation common to absolutely all equal things. Coming to

28 See Silverman, Dialectic of Essence, 90 ff.29 One question that comes up in accounts of Plato's metaphysics is whether self-

predication statements ike 'The Equal itself is equal,' should be read as identity state-ments, or whether the copula expresses some other predication relation. Since theconsiderations that distinguish these accounts do not arise within the argument forrecollection, I take no stand on such questions here. See Silverman, Dialectic ofEssence, 93 ff.


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behold the Form, F-ness, is coming to grasp what-it-is-to-be-F. No singleact of perception could ever communicate this essence to us. Indeed, onPlato's account, no collection of perceptions could bring us to grasp thisessence. Thus, the deficiency of sensible particulars has the result that sen-sible particulars are epistemologically impoverished: we can't grasp whatForms are from particulars alone. The argument is very compact, and forthat reason somewhat unsatisfying. We would like to hear Plato's thoughtsabout the insufficiency of abstraction, or problems of underdetermination.Still, the emphasis on the Forms' role as the objects of the 'What is F?'

shows that Plato is interested in the difference between what we graspthrough the senses and what we come to know through dialectic. The for-mer cannot bring us to grasp the latter.

We may reconstruct the argument in two steps. First, Plato makes usaware that sensible equals and the Form of Equality are equal in differ-ent ways. That is, he calls our attention to the metaphysical differencebetween being an equal thing and being the Equal itself. Then, havingbrought this difference to our attention, he enjoins us to consider what weapprehend when we grasp sensible equals in comparison to grasp of

Equality itself. This is why Socrates focuses not just on whether sticksand stones are both equal and unequal, but whether they appear to be so(74b8, ci ). The former would be sufficient if Socrates were concerned onlywith the metaphysical difference. But Socrates is ultimately interested inthe epistemological consequences of the metaphysical difference. Once wegrasp the kinds of being that distinguish sensible equals and Forms, weare in a position to see that perception of the former could never bring usto grasp the latter.

As further evidence, here is what Socrates says immediately after Simmias

agrees that sensible equals are distinct from the Form of Equality: 'But itis definitely from the equal things, though they are different from thatEqual, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality?'(74c4-9). Immediately after articulating the difference between sensiblesequals and Equality, Socrates reminds Simmias that we come to haveEquality in mind in response to sensible equals. Socrates prefaces hisquestion with the strongly adversative expression akka lv ... yr (74c6).In this way, Socrates expresses the conundrum that even though sensibleequals are different from Equality in such a way that one could not come

to have Equality in mind from them alone, we nevertheless do come tohave Equality in mind in response to the perception of sensible equals.Socrates moves directly from the difference between sensible equals andEquality, to query how, in light of this difference, sensible equals canserve as the source or trigger for our grasp of Forms.


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Generalized to apply to all Forms (cf. 75c10-d2), Socrates' questionexpresses the puzzle that recollection aims to solve: even though sensibleparticulars are deficient compared to Forms, it is nevertheless in responseto them that we come to have Forms in mind. The difference betweenForms and sensible particulars shows that sensible perception, by itself, isinsufficient to bring us to have Forms in mind. Thus, by comparing sen-sible equals to Equality itself, Socrates and Simmias come to see that sen-sory experience alone cannot bring us to have Forms in mind. If wenevertheless do come to have Forms in mind in response to perception,

we must be relying on resources already in us when we began to sense;we must be recollecting. In the argument to come, the comparison of sen-sibles to Forms - NC - plays precisely this role. It provides philosophi-cal reasons for concluding that we recollect when we come to have a Formin mind in response to sensory experience.

Before taking up the argument, we must consider a potential challengeto my reading. On my view, recollection explains the grasp involved inpredicating a Form in ordinary speech and thought. In explicating thedeficiency of sensibles, however, I have appealed to the role of Forms as

the objects specified by answers to the 'What is F?' question, and graspedthrough dialectical inquiry. It is because we cannot grasp what a Form isfrom perception that recollection is necessary. On my account, then, itseems that recollection is needed because we cannot develop knowledgefrom perception alone. Prima facie, this has no bearing on whether wecan develop ordinary concepts from perception. On my interpretation, Plato'sargument for recollection seems to involve a fatal confusion between thegrasp involved in ordinary speech and thought and the understandingdeveloped through philosophical inquiry.

Infact,

this is nota confusion, but a central feature of Plato's theoryof learning. In arguing for recollection, Plato is motivated by views con-

cerning the relationship between the content of ordinary speech andthought, and the objects of philosophical inquiry. Briefly put, Platobelieves that what we predicate and have in mind in ordinary speech andthought must be the same as what we come to grasp fully through philo-sophical inquiry. As I have already pointed out, the terms of Socraticinquiry indicate that Forms are the properties we predicate in ordinaryspeech and thought.30 Thus, in order to predicate a property in ordinaryspeech and thought, we must have that very property - what it is - in

. Pp. 295-6.


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mind, if only in an inchoate way.3' This view is a result of two commit-ments. The first is optimism about inquiry; Plato is confident hat dialec-tic can generate real learning and knowledge. This confidence s capturedin Cebes' description of another argument or recollection, according owhich 'when men are interrogated n the right manner, hey always givethe right answer of their own accord...' (73a7-9).

Cebes' account s almost certainly an allusion to the argument or rec-ollection in the Meno, which concerns the possibility of philosophicalprogress through nquiry nto the 'What is F?' question. Plato wants toexplain how philosophical understanding an develop from the resourcesavailable at the beginning of inquiry, when we do not yet have knowl-edge. Meno's Paradox asks how we could develop knowledge rom suchimpoverished resources (Meno 80dS-e5). Socrates' interrogation ofMeno's slave-boy is supposed o show how it is possible (Meno 82a7 ff.).Accordingly, t is worth pointing out the entirely ordinary omprehensionMeno's slave brings to the interrogation, level of grasp attributed moreor less to the boy's ability to speak Greek (Meno 82b4). This leads to thesecond commitment, which is Plato's view of the role played by ordinarydiscourse in philosophical nquiry. In another paper, I have argued thatthe sole prerequisite or participation n dialectic is ordinary inguisticcompetence with the name of the property ne investigates. This ordinarycompetence s the resource rom which philosophical understanding evel-ops. In dialectic, we improve our grasp of a property y reflection on ordi-nary statements and beliefs about that property nd its bearers.3' n orderfor such reflection o promote genuine earning and eventually knowledge,Plato thinks ordinary inguistic competence must embed grasp of the veryentities we come to know through dialectic.33 hat s, we could not achieve

31 An alternative to saying that we grasp Forms completely but inchoately is thatwe grasp them partially. There are two main problems with this alternative. First, inthe Phaedo we're told that Forms are uniform, govoei6rn;, (78d5, 80b2), and non com-posite, aouvOFetov 78c3), i.e. that they do not have parts at all. Second, if our graspof a Form enables us to predicate it in speech and thought, then what we grasp mustbe the Form entire, if we are to predicate it entire, and not just a part of it.

32 L. Franklin, 'The Structure of Dialectic in the Meno,' Phronesis XLVI (2001),41 3-439.

3' This issue contains a very serious problem for a sophisticated interpretation,according to which ordinary concepts and beliefs have no basis in Forms. (See Scott,R&E, 18-23, 38-52, 68-69.) For, if genuine learning is an improvement n our under-standing of Forms, reflection on our ordinary statements and beliefs could never pro-mote genuine earning. t then becomes hard o see how, on such a view, a non-philosopher


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learning and knowledge through dialectic, if ordinary linguistic compe-tence were not grounded in Forms. Or, as Cebes puts it, 'they could notdo this if they did not possess knowledge and the right account insidethem' (73a9-10).

Thus, we may say that the argument for recollection in the Phaedoexplains concept acquisition, but we must be careful to add that these areconcepts of an extraordinary kind. Plato believes that reflection on ourordinary concepts will, under the right conditions, yield philosophicalunderstanding of explanatory essences.34 Recollection in the Phaedo aims

to explain ordinary speech and thought, but with an eye to the role ofordinary discourse as the resource from which we develop philosophicallearning and knowledge. If this is right, then the presence of philosophi-cal understanding within the argument for Recollection does not require asophisticated interpretation. Simmias and Cebes are both familiar withForms, and Simmias is said to have knowledge - episteme - of Equality.The argument for recollection is supposed to explain the origin ofSimmias' knowledge (74b2-4, c7-9). This does not mean, however, thatrecollection in the Phaedo is directly responsible for the kind of knowl-

edge Simmias has achieved. Rather, it means that recollection in thePhaedo is a stage at the beginning of a learning process which may even-tually result in the kind of understanding enjoyed by Simmias. From ourordinary capacity for speech and thought we may develop philosophicalunderstanding of properties and relations such as Equality. Indeed, fromthis origin, we may develop higher level insights such as the Theory ofForms and the Theory of Recollection. The argument for recollection inthe Phaedo explains how this process begins.

could ever begin to engage in inquiry that promotes understanding of Forms. Whatare the terms in which this inquiry is conducted, and how are they introduced to ourdiscourse?

3 This naturally raises the question whether Plato also believes that we have a Formin mind for every ordinary concept. On one hand, it seems he must if he intends theTheory of Recollection to provide a general account of ordinary concepts and ordi-nary discourse. On the other, it would be foolish to suppose that every ordinary con-cept will yield a successful philosophical inquiry. There is tension, then, between therole of Forms as the objects of the 'What is F?' question and philosophical under-

standing, and their role as the grounding for ordinary speech and thought. In the mid-dle period, Plato displays little awareness of this problem. I believe that when herecognizes this problem in his later writings (Phaedrus 265el-266c5, Statesman262clO-263bl 1) he abandons the Theory of Recollection as a model of learning, evenas he retains the insights about philosophical reflection that inspire it.


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IV. The Argument for Recollecition: 74d9-75b8

We come, finally, to the argument for recollection itself. Since the argu-ment is dense, it will be useful to state the results of the discussion so far.Recollection takes place when, upon perceiving one or more sensibleitems, we come to have a Form in mind. This learning enables us to pred-icate the Form of sensible particulars in ordinary speech and thought. Thisactivity is described as coming to have a Form in mind - ?VVo06V Ti - inresponse to sense perception. There is a second mental activity at work in

the argument, described as thinkingthat sensible particulars fall short of

the Form - Evvoeiv 0X1i Ta ciXna tL v& tl. This mental activity is theconclusion of NC, a philosophical comparison of sensible particulars toForms, but it is not part of recollecting. Rather, it is the philosophicalreflection by which we see that we must recollect. In addition, Plato thinksof the first act, recollection, as the distant origin of the understanding ofEquality which enables us to perform the second act, the philosophicalcomparison. Socrates' argument represents both the distinction and thecontinuity between these acts.

Socrates and Simmiasagree that what they are currently experiencing

is the consideration that sensible particulars are deficient compared toForms (74d4-7). Socrates then asks whether he and Simmias agree thatsomeone entertaining this line of thought must have known the Formbeforehand. Simmias agrees that this is the case (74d9-e4). As a result, itis necessary for Socrates and Simmias 'to have known the Equal prior tothat time when we first, seeing equal things, thought that all these desireto be such as the Equal, but are deficient' (74e9-75a2, my translation).Socrates here asserts that prior to the time he and Simmias consideredwhether sensible equals are deficient compared to the Form, they musthave known the Equal itself. Socrates goes on to add 'But we also agreeto this, that we have not called it to mind (wowt ?vvevo0iFvua) from anyother place, nor is it possible to call it to mind (lnh& &vvaoOv ivat Evvoilcoai)except from seeing or touching or from some other perception. I mean thesame thing by all these' (75a5-8, my translation).

It is easy to suppose that Socrates is talking about the same mentalactivity in these passages, or at least two closely related mental activities.On such a reading, the first instance of thinking that sensible equals aredeficient compared to the Form is identical to, or necessarily correlatedwith, the moment when we first came to think of the Equal itself fromour perception of sensible equals. The repeated use of ?vvo6iv, and thesimilar references to perceiving in both passages strongly suggest such an


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interpretation. On the other hand, the first passage has a proposition asthe object of consideration ?VVOriv 0X-r), namely the claim that sensibleequals are deficient, whereas in the second passage a Form is the object(a&6 evvevorpcevat). Thus, two very different points are being made here.The first is that we came to know the Equal Itself prior to performing NC,i.e. prior to engaging in philosophical reflection on the character of Formsin comparison to that of sensible particulars. This is seen in the waySocrates and Simmias undertake NC; they know the Equal Itself at thebeginning, and rely on this understanding in their comparison (74b2 ff.).

This naturally raises the question of how we came to have the Equal inmind in the first place. This question is answered in the second passage,which reiterates that our initial grasp of the Equal came from our per-ception of sensible equals. In fact, Socrates makes the much stronger claimthat this is the only possible inspiration (gii 'aXkko0ev... grn& 6uva-r6vrlvat, 75a5-6) for our original grasp of the Equal.

Socrates is working backwards from the philosophical position he andSimmias now occupy. By performing NC, he and Simmias have realizedthat sensible equals are deficient compared to the Form. In order to make

such a discovery, they must have had grasp of the Equal as a Form priorto their investigation. But they have also agreed that their initial grasp ofthe Equal came from nowhere other than the perception of equal things.Socrates traverses quickly back through a learning process that includesdialectical reflection on what Equality is. This reflection developed out ofour ordinary statements and beliefs about equal things. Socrates is inter-ested in the beginning of this long and differentiated process: how did wedevelop the ordinary grasp of Equality that enabled us to speak and thinkabout equal things in the first place? It is in response to sensible equals

that we first came to have Equality in mind.Having located the original grasp of Equality in an earlier act of learn-

ing, Socrates can employ the conclusion of NC to analyze that act,inspired by sense perception. Socrates' next statement is this: 'But cer-tainly from perceptions (eisic xxv ai9aG eawov) t is necessary to think that(ivvo6iv 6rt) all these items in the perceptions desire that which is whatis Equal but fall short of it' (75a1 1-b2, my translation). Once again, thereference to perceptions and the use of cvvoEv might lead us to think thatSocrates s describing he act of recollection. But the object of iVVOEiV iS

a proposition: the claim that sensibles are deficient with respect to Forms.Socrates thus reiterates the conclusion of NC, the comparison of sensibleequals to the Equal itself. In that discussion, sensible equals were shownto be deficient compared to the Equal because of the way each appeared.


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It is because of the way sensible equals appear to be both equal andunequal hat we know them to be different rom and deficient n compar-ison to the Equal itself. It is in this sense that the realization omes fromthe senses (Es,Kye TCv aiatijaNav).35 Socrates is not describing recollec-tion, but reminding Simmias of the metaphysical deficiency of sensibles.

This deficiency entails that although t is in response o perception hatwe come to grasp the Equal itself, our perceptions are not sufficient orthat grasp to come about. This requires that something more than per-ception is taking place when we become able to perform ordinary predi-cations in speech and thought; we must be recollecting. This is exactlythe conclusion Socrates draws: Then, before we began to see and to hearand to have the other perceptions, omehow we took up the knowledge ofit, the Equal, what it is, if we were going to refer the equals from per-ception to it, since all such things desire to be such as it, but are deficientcompared o it' (75b4-8, my translation).36 he crucial inference s madeexplicitly here. Since sensibles are deficient compared o Forms, our com-ing to have Forms n mind in response o sensibles requires hat we wereacquainted with them prior to perception. Socrates' conclusion capturesthe different roles of the two mental acts distinguished arlier. The first,coming to have Forms n mind, requires ecollection o be explained. Thesecond, NC, provides he philosophical eason for this conclusion. This isexpressed by the fact that the conclusion of NC is the content of a oTIclause: since sensibles are deficient, we must have known Forms beforewe began to sense.

My translation s unorthodox. n the passages previous o this, 0lt hasalways been preceded by Evvoe6v, ndicating hat it introduces he propo-sitional content of a thought. For this reason, presumably, early all inter-preters and translators have read the OtI in Socrates' conclusion as arecurrence f this use, as follows: 'Then it is necessary that, before webegan to see and to hear and to have the other perceptions, omehow wetook up the knowledge of it, the Equal, what it is, if we were going torefer the equals from perception o it, thinking hat all such things desireto be such as it, but are deficient compared o it.'37 As my italics high-light, this translation uggests that the moment of recollection s also amoment n which we see that sensibles are deficient compared o Forms.Such a translation s essential for a sophisticated nterpretation f the argu-

1s Socrates attributes a similar realization to the senses at Republic 523b9-524a4.36 Adapted from G.M.A. Grube in J. Cooper (ed.), Complete Works.3 Grube's translation rom J. Cooper (ed.), 'Complete Works,' 66.


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ment. On that interpretation, Plato appeals to recollection because themoment we call Forms to mind is also a moment in which we comparethem to sensibles. Since sensibles alone cannot bring us to see their owndeficiency compared o Forms, we must be recollecting.38 ut Socrates'remark at 75b4-8 is the only part of the argument hat could be construedto assert the simultaneity f recollection and a comparison f sensibles toForms.39 And this passage can be read to make such an assertion only ifo6t introduces he content of a thought concurrent with recollection. If itdoes not, a key premise is missing from the argument, as interpreted ythe sophisticated nterpretation.

The text does not support the sophisticated interpretation however.Typically, in order to introduce a propositional lause, ott must be intro-duced by a verb of thinking or saying. The use of OtI in 75b7 lacks anysuch verb. Instead, translators nd editors of Plato's text have suppliedone in their translations.' But there is no need to emend the text in thisway. We can read it as it stands f we take 6lt to introduce causal clause,a clause stating he reason or what has just been asserted.4' What s statedin the 6-ri. lause is the conclusion of NC, the philosophical discussion nwhich Socrates and Simmias compared sensible equals and Equality. Itsrole here is to provide the reasons for the thesis that we recollect.

The argument or recollection s a model of philosophical conomy. Itis also, for that reason, a source of much controversy. Plato's argumentrequires us to be clear about the difference between the act of recollec-tion and philosophical eflection about hat act. At the same time, the argu-ment requires us to see the connections between ordinary earning and

38 Scott, R&E, 62-63, Rowe, Plato: Phaedo 172-73. For similar reasons, it is alsoessential for any ordinary interpretation which takes a comparison of sensibles toForms to be implicit in ordinary predications, such as Williams, 'Two Aspects,' andKelsey, 'Platonic Recollection.'

31 Indeed, 74d9-e4 contradicts such a claim.I See Rowe, Plato: Phaedo, 173, Hackforth Phaedo, 70, J. Burnet, Plato: Phaedo,

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911) 75, Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, 22, 229-30. OnlyR.S. Bluck, Plato: Phaedo, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955) translatesin a way that might assign a causal role to the o-n clause: 'on the ground that theyall do their best to be like [the Equal] although they are inferior,' 69. Bluck's com-

mentary, however, indicates that he does not confront the possibility of my reading, 63.4' See H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, ?2240. This is not the most common use of

OTI for Plato, but a survey limited to Platonis Opera I discovers numerous parallels:Phaedo 102c4, 7, Euthyphro 10c2-4, 11 (note the proximity here to another 6oit intro-ducing a 'that' clause), Theaetetus 185b2, Sophist 252d.


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314 LEE FRANKLIN

philosophical eflection, ince Plato's reasons for the Theory of Recollec-tion are based on the role of ordinary discourse as the origin of philo-sophical reflection, earning, and knowledge. Ultimately, the latter pointis more important or our understanding f Recollection as a coherent he-ory of learning. Recollection explains both ordinary and philosophicallearning, not because Plato saw a way to solve two unrelated problemswith one theory, but because he saw that an explanation of philosophicalunderstanding ust also explain he ordinary esources rom which t springs.

Department of PhilosophyThe University at AlbanyState University of New York

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