Consti 2 - Academic Freedom

7/28/2019 Consti 2 - Academic Freedom

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consti 2: academic freedom

Academic Freedom

ARTICLE XIV EDUCATION, SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTSEDUCATION

Sec 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shalltake appropriate steps to make such educationaccessible to all.

Sec 5(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in allinstitutions of higher learning.

J. Peter Byrne

I. INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment protects academic freedom butthere has been no adequate analysis of what academicfreedom the Constitution protects or why it protects it.Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrinefloats in the law.

Authors definition of academic freedom: non-legalterm referring to the liberties claimed by professorsthrough professional channels against administrativeor political interference with research, teaching andgovernance.

Of constitutional academic freedom: essence is theinsulation of scholarship and liberal education fromextramural political interference insulate theuniversity in core academic affairs from stateinterference

II. FIRST AMENDMENT ON CAMPUS

Concern is only with the substantive protection of academic freedom by the 1 st Amendment isolatingwhich has been difficult because 1) courts have usedlegal doctrines not based on academic freedom toprotect liberties of professors and students; 2) courtshave declined to recognize a constitutional shield formany forms of classroom speech that seem at firstblush to implicate general principles of free expression.

Central paradox: The institutional right seems to give auniversity the authority to hire and fire withoutgovernment interference those very individualsapparently granted a personal right to write and teachwithout institutional hindrance.

Nonetheless, this paradox should be seen as neithercollateral nor embarrassing; academic discoursebenefits from the tension between the independence of a scholar's judgment and the university's evaluation of her professional competence.

A. Academic Speech

Students and junior professors (considered neophytesin the field) suffer real punishment for speech deemedinadequate by the masters. Compared to general civilsociety where the 1 st Amendment opposes prior andsubsequent restraint based on determination if thespeech is valuable or not.

The First Amendment value of academic speech restson its commitment to truth (however partiallyunderstood by the discipline), its honesty andcarefulness, its richness of meaning, its doctrinalfreedom, and its invitation to criticism. society oughtto strive towards speech that is truthful.

Academic freedom resembles other free expressionvalues insofar as it protects the individual scholar'spoint of view; it is distinct insofar as it protects thosestructures that permit the individual scholar to engagewith others in collective scholarship

B. Student Speech and Extracurricular PoliticalActivity

The term "academic freedom" should be reserved forthose rights necessary for the preservation of theunique functions of the university, particularly thegoals of disinterested scholarship and teaching.

First Amendment rights w/c should not properly be apart of constitutional academic freedom:

1) no recognized student rights of free speech areproperly part of constitutional academicfreedom, because none of them has anything

to do with scholarship or systematic learning(e.g. wearing of armbands, demonstrations,etc.)

while the Constitution affords students atpublic institutions extensive civil rights, itaffords them no rights of academic freedom atall.

2) the right of a professor to participate inpolitical activity off campus and on her owntime without institutional reprisal should not beviewed as a matter of constitutional academicfreedom

academic freedom should be understood to includeonly rights unique or necessary to the functions of higher education; exist as a necessary incident touniversity's commitment to the pursuit of truth and thecontrovertibility of dogma.

C. Tenure

Tenure is not equal to academic freedom but itpromotes academic freedom since it requires publicairing of explicit and categorically neutral reasons fordismissal. does not protect academic freedom of

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BYRNE article: ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A SPECIALCONCERN OF THE 1 ST AMMENDMENT


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untenured since they will direct their scholarship tothose likely to be accepted by the tenured.

III. THE AMERICAN TRADITION OFACADEMIC FREEDOM

A. Early History and Structure

The structural elements that would give shape toacademic freedom were established early: legal controlby non-academic trustees; effective governance byadministrators set apart from the faculty by politicalallegiance and professional orientation; dependent andinsecure faculty.

B. The Rise of the Scientific Research Value

Higher education began to be seen as scientifictraining for practical jobs rather than moral training of

gentlemen for elite professions. The change isusefully, if simple-mindedly, expressed as a movementfrom a paradigm of fixed values vouchsafed byreligious faith to one of relative truths continuouslyrevised by scientific endeavor.

Changes in the structure enlarged the status of thefaculty now highly-trained professionals. Yet lowsalary and uncertain tenure remained They were nolonger dependent on the will of clergymen butanswerable to businessmen. Academic freedombecame rallying cry for professors seeking morecontrol over their professional lives.

C. Development of the Concept of AcademicFreedom

Problem was the interference by the lay board of trustees or regents. Professors demanded that noideological test be applied and evaluation done byprofessional peers.

The American concept of academic freedom emergedfrom this ideological and practical conflict betweenacademic social scientists and their lay employers.

American Assoc. of University Professors (AAUP)insisted on a clear distinction between speech that wasacademic and that which was merely political or

sectarian.

AAUPs vision of academic freedom:1) noble vision of the academic calling;2) eliminates gravest evils of lay control

over universities;3) concept of peer review according to

professional standards.

D. The Challenge of other Academic Values

Humanistic values: valuable knowledge includes ideasthat arent scientifically demonstrable and thatstudents must receive a coherent education in thetraditions of civilized thought, writing and art.

The democratic value in higher education reflects thedemands placed on our colleges and universities bythe society at large that they help fulfill broad goals of social mobility and general prosperity.

E. Professional Competence as a RegulatoryStandard

The integrity of academic freedom depends on thegood faith of the professorate and on its collectiveability to distinguish between scholars who disagreewith accepted findings and those who do notunderstand them. what defines competence? Whenthis question arises trouble develops.

Without agreement about basic paradigms,

competence loses much of the neutrality that mightordinarily be assumed, as there may be no sharedcriterion for evaluation.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOMAND THE INDIVIDUAL SCHOLAR

Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy:university freedom for teaching and scholarshipwithout interference from government is a positiveright and that the state here had failed to provide acompelling justification for questioning an academicabout the content of a lecture

the four essential freedoms" of a university--todetermine for itself on academic grounds who mayteach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, andwho may be admitted to study

Three significant oddities about the plurality andconcurring opinions in Sweezy:

1) never before had the Court suggested thatacademic freedom was protected by the 1 sAmendment.

2) Frankfurters decision looks solely to non-legalsources to describe the contents of acad.freedom

3) Although the content of acad. freedom wasdrawn from non-legal sources, they praisedacad freedom by stressing the social utility of free universities.

Sweezy endowed the new constitutional right of academic freedom with a legacy of triumphant rhetoricbut also with an ambiguous description of therelationship between academic custom and positivelegal right. The Court's decision not to ground its rulingon a positive right of academic freedom, moreover,presaged the Court's refusal to give this right the

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practical force that its rhetorical enthusiasmspromised.

Also in other cases, Barenblatt and Keyishian, theCourt's use of rhetoric to define the content of academic freedom increases the ambiguity alreadycreated by basing the case's holding upon vagueness.However, despite their analytical shortcomings,Sweezy and Keyishian contributed substantially to thevirtual extinction of overt efforts by non-academicgovernment officials to prescribe political orthodoxy inuniversity teaching and research.

Constitutional Academic Freedom and theState Action Doctrine: An Aside

Faculty and students at state universities enjoyextensive substantive and procedural constitutionalrights against their institutions while faculty andstudents at private institutions enjoy none. Thus, thestate action doctrine mandates judicial enforcement of

constitutional liberties against institutionalinfringements for half the nation's academics anddenies it to the other half for reasons which, if desirable at all, are very far removed from the realitiesof academic life

The Proper Scope of Judicial Intervention

Courts seem entirely ill-equipped to resolve thesedisputes. Asked to protect the academic freedom of acandidate denied tenure by faculty vote, a court wouldneed to determine what, in fact, are the requirementsfor tenure, whether the candidate met therequirements, and whether the faculty rejected the

candidate for some non-academic reason. Such aninquiry, backed by the coercive power of the state,would put the department or school into intellectualreceivership, with the court determining theappropriate paradigms of thought.

Courts then should only ascertain if theadministrators can establish that they in good faithrejected the candidate on academic grounds.

The Court has come to limit the judiciary's role toexcluding non-academics from imposing ideologicalcriteria on academic decision-making, while refusing toimpose substantive limits on academic administratorswho in good faith penalize faculty for academic speech

V. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOMAND THE PROTECTION OFINSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

While the right to institutional academic freedom hasarisen at the time in our history when universities havebeen most subject to federal regulation, no federalregulation has been invalidated under the right. As inSweezy and Keyishian, the new turn in academicfreedom has flowered in dicta and rhetoric more thanin holdings and rules

A. The Supreme Court and Institutional AcademicFreedom

Academic freedom is described by Frankfurter not as alimitation on the grounds or procedures by whichacademics may be sanctioned but as "the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a

university."

Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Widmar v.Vincent represents both a refreshing acknowledgmentthat universities must and should distinguish amongspeakers on the basis of the content of their speechand a pioneering inquiry into which universityadministrative decisions the First Amendment shouldprotect.

Thus, core academic administrative decisions--determining who may teach, what may be taught, howit shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study--cannot be interfered with by civil authorities without

impairing the unique virtues of academic speech.

When judges are asked to review the substance of agenuinely academic decision, such as this one, theyshould show great respect for the faculty's professional

judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it issuch a substantial departure from accepted academicnorms as to demonstrate that the person or committeeresponsible did not actually exercise professional

judgment.

Academic Abstention

It describes the traditional refusal of courts to extend

common law rules of liability to colleges where doingso would interfere with the college administration'sgood faith performance of its core functions. Therecognition of authority over internal affairs and theexclusion of judicial governance go hand in hand; theyamount to a substantial degree of common lawautonomy.

Institutional academic freedom can be viewed asacademic abstention raised to constitutional status, sothat judges can consider whether statutes orregulations fail to give sufficient consideration to thespecial needs or prerogatives of the academiccommunity.

State Constitutional Law

The tradition of constitutional autonomy for stateuniversities seems to have contributed to thedevelopment of the federal right of institutionalacademic freedom. At a minimum, it confirms thepersistence of the view, inherent in academicabstention, that civil authorities ought to respect thespecial needs and values of universities, even whenerected and supported by the state.

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Constitutional academic freedom can perhaps best beseen as a principle that regulation should not proceedso far as to deprive the university of control over itsacademic destiny. This principle has been fashioned bycourts, explaining why they restrain themselves fromimposing farreaching constitutional or common lawduties on the university. As such, it representsacademic abstention raised to a constitutional level.

Institutional Academic Freedom and the FirstAmendment

And what are the indigenous values served byuniversities?

1) the university is the preeminentinstitution in our society where knowledge andunderstanding are pursued with detachment ordisinterestedness.

2) The disinterested search for knowledgefosters a manner of discourse that, at its best,is careful, critical, and ambitious

3) The university aspires to instill in thoseentering adulthood a capacity for mature andindependent judgment.

Preserving the fundamental academic values of disinterested inquiry, reasoned and critical discourse,and liberal education justifies a constitutional right of academic freedom. These goals give intellectual andeducational expression to the vision of human reasonimplicit in the Constitution.

Who are do be protected by constitutional academicfreedom?

Universities that do not respect the academic freedomof professors (understood as the core of the doctrinedeveloped by the AAUP) or the essential intellectualfreedom of students (a concept barely developed)ought not to be afforded institutional autonomy.

VI. CONCLUSION Through repetition, the scope of institutional autonomyhas come to be understood as the four freedomsoffered by Justice Frankfurter: "'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may betaught, how it shall be taught, and who may beadmitted to study. The four freedoms adequatelyexpress the degree of autonomy necessary for auniversity to harbor liberal studies. The great virtue of these freedoms is that they recognize that liberalstudies involve more than the simple act of speaking--that they require "'that atmosphere which is most *340conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.

This requires security, stimulation, tolerance,generosity of mind, the hiring of competent people,and the reward of excellence. Constitutional protectioncan preserve the possibility that academics mightattain the goals of learning and scholarship. It cannotdo more; it should not do less.

FACTS:Defendant, Paul Sweezy, was convicted of contempt for failure to answer questions askedby the Attorney General of New Hampshire

In 1951 a statute was passed by the New

Hampshire legislature to regulate subversiveacts. In 1953, legislature adopted a jointresolution authorizing the attorney general tomake full and complete investigations withrespect to violations of the subversive activitiesact of 1951 which includes among othersauthorizing him to act upon his own motionand upon such information as in his judgmentmay be reasonable or reliable.

o Statute defines a person to besubversive if he, by any means, aids inthe commission of any act intended toassist in the alteration of theconstitutional form of govt by force or

violence.Sweezy was summoned to appear on twoseparate occasions in 1954 under suspicion of subversion in connection with the membershipof his wife in the Progressive Party, an articlehe wrote wherein he affirmed that he styledhimself as a classical Marxist and asocialist, and a lecture he delivered on March22, 1954 for a humanities course at theuniversity.

Petitioner answered most of the questions butdeclined to answer certain questions about hisknowledge regarding the Progressive Party in

his 1st

appearance and about the lecture hedelivered and his opinions or beliefs in his 2 ndappearance stating only that he hat neverbeen a member of the Communist Party.Because of his continuous decline to answer hewas cited in contempt.

ISSUE: W/N the investigation deprived Sweezy of dueprocess of law under the 14 th Amendment

HELD: Yes.

It is recognized that the right to lecture orassociate are civil liberties guaranteed by the

Constitution but they are not absolute rights.o In this case, it is believed that there

was an unquestionable invasion of thepetitioners liberties in the areas of academic freedom and politicalexpression areas in which thegovernment should be extremelyreticent to tread.

To impose any strait jacketupon the intellectual leaders inour colleges and universities

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would imperil the future of ourNation.

In this case, the record does no reveal whatreasonable or reliable information led theAttorney General to question petitioner (noshowing of probable cause) therefore, if theinterrogation of the Attorney General was in

fact entirely unrelated to the object of thelegislature in authorizing such inquiry, the DueProcess Clause would preclude theendangering of constitutional liberties and canbe treated as an absence of authority toconduct the inquiry. Because of this there canbe no showing of a sufficient state interest toinfringe the constitutional rights of thepetitioner.

Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter:

Whether the Attorney General of NewHampshire acted within the scope of the

authority given him by the state legislature isnot for the US SC to determine but is a matterfor the decision of the courts of that State.

Petitioner as mentioned answered most of thequestions asked of him, making it known thathe had never been a Communist, never taughtthe violent overthrow of the Government,never knowingly associated with Communistsin the State, but was a socialist believer inpeaceful change

He refused to answer questions regarding: 1) alecture given by him at the University of NewHampshire, 2) activities of himself and others

in the Progressive political organizations, and3) opinions and beliefs, invoking theconstitutional guarantees of free speech

SC stated that: For societys good if understanding be essential need of societyinquiries and speculations into the naturalsciences, into anthropology, economics, law,etc. must be left as unfettered as possibleexcept for reasons that are exigent andobviously compelling. exclusion of governmental intrusion into the intellectual lifeof a university.

Cites a quote from the Open Universities inSouth Africa:

In a university knowledge is its own end, notmerely a means to an end A university ischaracterized by the spirit of free inquiry, itideal being the ideal of Socrates to follow theargument where it leads. This implies the rightto examine, question, modify or rejecttraditional ideas and beliefs Freedom toreason and freedom for disputation on thebasis of observation and experiment are thenecessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge It is the business of a

university to provide that atmosphere which ismost conducive to speculation, experiment andcreation. It is an atmosphere in whichprevail the four essential freedoms of auniversity to determine for itself onacademic grounds who may teach, whatmay be taught, how it shall be taught,and who may be admitted to study.

The inviolability of privacy belonging to acitizens political loyalties has sooverwhelming an importance to the well-being of our kind of society that it cannotbe constitutionally encroached upon onthe basis of so meager a countervailinginterest of the State as may beargumentatively found in the remote, shadowythreat to the security of New Hampshireallegedly presented in the origins andcontributing elements of the Progressive Partyand the petitioners relations to these.

Epicharis (wat a name) Garcia vs. The FacultyAdmission Committee represented by Fr. Lambino

1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admittedPetitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology;2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted toenroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter he had writtenher, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar herfrom re-admission in their school;

reason in the letter: Pet.s frequent questionsand difficulties had the effect of slowing downthe progress of the class although she ahd therequisite intellectual capability

3. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19,1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground forexpulsion, for they neither present any violation of anyof the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct;4. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much timeand effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at acompromise that would not duly inconvenience theprofessors and still allow her to enjoy the benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, butall in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, theschool's Director, that the compromises she wasoffering were unacceptable, their decision was final,and that it were better for her to seek for admission at

the UST Graduate School;5. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in saidschool, as to the possibilities for her pursuing hergraduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and shewas informed that she could enroll at the USTEcclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have tofulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate inPhilosophy in order to have her degree later in

Theology which would entail about four to five yearsmore of studies whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refusedreadmission, it would entail only about two years more;

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6. Considering that time was of the essence in hercase, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunityfor gaining knowledge necessary for her life's work,enrolled as a special student at said UST EcclesiasticalFaculties, even if she would not thereby be creditedwith any academic units for the subject she wouldtake;7. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to thePresident of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with theFirst Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with theSecretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day forregistration; ... " 8. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purposeof allowing her to enroll in the current semester

Issues: WON the Faculty Admissions Committee hadauthority and discretion in allowing Pet. to continuestudying or not?

Held: Yes. Being a particular educational institution(seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit

Ratio:1.Pet. cannot compel the res by mandamus to admit

her into further studies since the respondent had noclear duty to admit the pet.

-That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J.,and/or the Loyola School of Theology thru itsFaculty Admission Committee, necessarily hasdiscretion as to whether to admit and/or tocontinue admitting in the said school anyparticular student, considering not only academicor intellectual standards but also otherconsiderations such as personality traits andcharacter orientation in relation with otherstudents as well as considering the nature of

Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.

- technical aspect of admissions:

the Chairman of the Faculty AdmissionCommittee of the Loyola School of Theology,which is a religious seminary situated in LoyolaHeights, Quezon Cityis in in collaboration withthe Ateneo de Manila University, the LoyolaSchool of Theology allows some lay students toattend its classes and/or take courses in saidLoyola School of Theology but the degree, if any,to be obtained from such courses is granted bythe Ateneo de Manila University and not by theLoyola School of Theology; For the reason abovegiven, lay students admitted to the Loyola Schoolof Theology to take up courses for credit thereinhave to be officially admitted by the AssistantDean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo deManila University in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program

Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admittedby respondent to take some courses for creditbut said admission was not an admission to a

degree program because only the Assistant Deanof the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School canmake such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Deanof the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School wasgiven, so that she was not accepted to a degreeprogram but was merely allowed to take somecourses for credit during the summer of 1975;

Being admitted to the school is a privilege andnot a right.

-There are standards that must be met. Thereare policies to be pursued. Discretion appears tobe of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld'sterminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than aright. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime andindispensable requisite of a mandamusproceeding. Such being the case, there is no dutyimposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In arather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately did not havecounsel, an attempt was made to dispute thecontention of respondent. There was a laboredeffort to sustain her stand, but it was notsufficiently persuasive. It is understandable why.It was the skill of a lay person rather than apractitioner that was evident. While she pressedher points with vigor, she was unable todemonstrate the existence of the clear legal rightthat must exist to justify the grant of this writ.

2. the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom.

-It is more often identified with the right of afaculty member to pursue his studies in his particularspecialty and thereafter to make known or publish theresult of his endeavors without fear that retributionwould be visited on him in the event that hisconclusions are found distasteful or objectionable tothe powers that be, whether in the political, economic,or academic establishments

- For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a rightclaimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and asinvestigator, to interpret his findings and tocommunicate his conclusions without being subjectedto any interference, molestation, or penalizationbecause these conclusions are unacceptable to someconstituted authority within or beyond the institution

- philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version:"What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is thefreedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire,discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it inthe field of their competence. It is subject to no controlor authority except the control or authority of therational methods by which truths or conclusions aresought and established in these disciplines

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3. Court further discusses academic freedom that itsreference is to the "institutions of higher learning" asthe recipients of this boon.

- Former President Vicente G. Sinco of theUniversity of the Philippines, in his Philippine PoliticalLaw, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grantsthe right of academic freedom to the university as aninstitution as distinguished from the academic freedomof a university professor."

- Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the Universityof Dijon, France, "It is a well-established fact, and yetone which sometimes tends to be obscured indiscussions of the problems of freedom, that thecollective liberty of an organization is by no means thesame thing as the freedom of the individual memberswithin it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not evennecessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore,between the autonomy of the university, as acorporate body, and the freedom of the individualuniversity teacher." (2 types)

- "the four essential freedoms" of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds whomay teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,and who may be admitted to study.

4. The decision is not to be construed as in any wayreflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner.

There was on the part of respondent dueacknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, forreasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, itwas deemed best, considering the interest of theschool as well as of the other students and her ownwelfare, that she continue her graduate workelsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in suchappraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant. Itcould be that on more mature reflection, evenpetitioner would realize that her transfer to some otherinstitution would redound to the benefit of allconcerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only thelegal aspect of the controversy was touched upon inthis decision.

FACTS:

Petitioner Isabelo was a criminology student inPerpetual Help College of Rizal (PHCR). Being the PROand acting Secretary of the student council, he wasasked to sign Resolution No. 105, which would increasetuition payments by 20%. He refused to sign and askedfor a 2-week period to talk it over with his fellowofficers. After they met on the matter, the councilpresented a 9-point proposal. With an assurance thatthe request of the student council would be consideredfavorably, the petitioner finally signed Resolution No.

105. PHCR then announced that its application toincrease school fees was approved by DECS. Thestudent council then filed a motion for consideration.DECS then put the implementation on hold pendingtalks on the matter.

In the meantime the CMT commandant gave a list of students with CMT deficiencies, with petitioner Isabelobeing on the list. As such, he was expelled and notallowed to enroll for the next semester on the followinggrounds:

* Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECSOrder No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S.1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;

* No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminologycourse;

* Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;

* Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and22) which are docketed in the registration card.

Not being allowed into the school premises, Isabelosent a letter to DECS. Director Rosas of DECS thenissued Order No. 9 which stated:

. . . concerning the dropping from the rolls without dueprocess of the students petitioners . . . , ManuelitoIsabelo, Jr., . . ., please be advised that pendingresolution thereof, the propriety of allowing thestudents to continue attending their classes to protecttheir interest as well as that of the school, is herebyenjoined.

In this connection, it is hereby directed that the above-

named students be re-admitted to classes and beallowed to take all examinations that they have missedpending final resolution of this case/issue.

PHCR did not comply with the directive.

Petitioner claims that the reason why he was not beingadmitted was due to his being against the increase ontuition payments. Respondent school invokes academicfreedom in the expulsion of Isabelo.

ISSUE:

WON Isabelos expulsion was within the schoolsacademic freedom.

HELD:NO

RATIO:

Here the court sites Garcia v. Faculty AdmissionCommittee, which upheld the rule that admission to aninstitution of higher learning is discretionary upon theschool and that such an admission is a mere privilege,rather than a right, on the part of the student. Like anyother right, however, academic freedom has never

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been meant to be an unabridged license. It is aprivilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise itresponsibly.

With regards to contracts, the court said that thecontract between student and school is not one that isonly on a semestral basis, but the student has a rightto be enrolled for the entire period in order to completehis course.

Finally the court says that the punishment of expulsionappears to us rather disproportionate to his having hadsome deficiencies in his CMT course. There is, however,an administrative determination to be made whetherpetitioner does indeed deserve to be a senior in PHCR.

Case remanded to DECS for further proceedings.

FACTS:

Respondent-students as then applicants to theUniversity of the Philippines College of Medicine(UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile inthe NMAT which was the cutoff score prescribed foracademic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in itsmeeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by theUniversity Council (UC) on April 8, 1986.

However, their scores were lower than the 90percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Facultyin its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective foracademic year 1987-88. Upon appeal of someconcerned Pre-Med students, the BOR in its 996 thresolution reverted to the NMAT cut-off score of 70percentile.

The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed theBOR directive for them to admit the students. Thisprompted the students to file a petition for mandamuswith the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of preliminaryinjunction for their admission.

After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction,the BOR in its 1001st meeting resolved that "the act of fixing cut-off scores in any entrance examinationrequired in any college of the University is within theauthority of the College Faculty. Any questionregarding the exercise of such act should be elevatedand resolved finally by the University Council of theautonomous campus."

In the interim, the RTC's order was questioned beforethe SC by the UPCM Committee on Admissions, whichwas dismissed. Hence, the students were admitted tothe UPCM and passed three years in the college.

Before the onset of school year 1990-91, the students,upon advice of the U.P. President and burdened with

"three agonizing years of uncertain relationship in theCollege" as well as the BOR's 1001 st resolution, wrotea letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifestedthat they never intended to question the Faculty's rightto academic freedom; that they believed the issue wassimply on the question of observance of the properprocedure in implementing admission requirements;that they felt they no longer have any moral right topursue the court action; that they would leave to theFaculty the determination of humanitarianconsideration of their case; that they apologized foroffending the Faculty and that they would like toappeal for a chance to remain in the college.

The students filed with the RTC a motion to dismissand attached was the letter to the UPCM Faculty. TheRTC dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of thisdevelopment, the UPCM Faculty held an emergencymeeting where it denied the appeal of the students bya vote of 86 on the ground that they were not qualifiedfor admission to the UPCM. The students filed with theRTC a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. The

RTC issued an order for the admission of the studentsto the college.

The BOR in its 1031 st meeting resolved to approve theadmission of the students in the interest of justice andequity and to order the petitioners to admit them.

The petitioners questioned the said BOR order with theCA. The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused tofollow the BOR directive. Consequently, the UPPresident issued a formal charge of Grave Misconductagainst them and later, issued an Order for theirPreventive Suspension. The CA dismissed the petitionof the petitioners. The petitioners brought the issue

before the SC.

ISSUE:

WoN the BOR violated the academic freedom of thepetitioners.

NO. The BOR could validly direct the petitioners toadmit the students to the college of medicine.

RATIO:

1. The powers vested in the BOR and the UC bythe UP Charter (Act No. 1870) are clear: to theBOR belongs the governance and the generalpowers of administration of the university andto the UC the power to fix the admissionrequirements to any college in the university.

The University Code grants to the CollegeFaculty the power to determine the entrancerequirements of the college subject to theapproval of the autonomous UC .

2. Any entrance requirement that may beimposed by the College Faculty must bear the

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UC's approval. Otherwise, the same becomesunenforceable.

3. At the time the students took the NMAT, thenew UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off score of 90 percentile was without the UC'Sand University Presidents approval.

4. Under the UP Charter, the power to fixadmission requirements is vested in theUniversity Council of the autonomous campuswhich is composed of the President of theUniversity of the Philippines and of allinstructors holding the rank of professor,associate professor or assistant professor(Section 9, Act 1870).

5. The UC has the final say in admissionrequirements provided the same conforms withlaw, rules and regulations of the university. Inthe event the power is abused or misused, itbecomes the duty of the BOR, being thehighest governing body in the university, tostep in and to correct the anomaly.

6. The questioned order of the Board of Regentsin upholding the admission requirementapproved by the University Council in 1986 issupportive of right of the University Council tofix or approve admission requirements, againstthe UPCM faculty and Dean who changed theadmission requirements approved by theUniversity Council without following theprescribed rules and procedures of theUniversity.

7. We are, likewise, unconvinced by petitioners'arguments that the BOR's 1031 st is contrary to

justice and equity because the studentsthemselves judicially confessed that they haveno right to admission. In their letter to theFaculty, The student's aforesaid feeling doesnot amount to a categorical admission of theabsence of a legal right. Considering suchantagonistic conditions, We can empathizewith the students' mental anxiety andemotional strain in their three years in collegein the company of some professors who lookeddown on them as academic pretenders.Furthermore, the students were pressed fortime as they have only one more year beforegraduation. These circumstances combinedwith the advice of the U.P. President undulyinfluenced the students to write this reconcilingletter.

FACTS:

Petitioner UP questions, in this petition for review oncertiorari the Order of the lower court denying themotion to dismiss the complaint for damages filedagainst two of its professors for alleged derogatorystatement uttered concerning the Tasadays, the cave-dwelling inhabitants of the rain forest of Mindanao.

August 15-17, 1986: The "International Conferenceon the Tasaday Controversy and Other UrgentAnthropological Issues" was held at the PhilippineSocial Science Center in Diliman, Quezon City. JeromeBailen, Professor of the University of the Philippines(UP) Dept of Anthropology was the designatedconference chairman. He presented therein the"Tasaday Folio," a collection of studies on Tasadaysdone by leading anthropologists who disputed theauthenticity of the Tasaday find and suggested thatthe "discovery" in 1971 by a team led by formerPresidential Assistant on National Minorities (PANAMIN)Minister Manuel Elizalde, Jr. was nothing more than afabrication made possible by inducing Manobo and

T'boli tribesmen to pose as primitive, G-stringed, leaf-clad cave dwellers.

In the same conference, UP history professor, ZeusSalazar, traced in a publication the actual genealogy of the Tasadays to T'boli and Manobo ethnic groups. Helikewise presented ABC's "20/20" videotaped televisiondocumentary showing interviews with natives claimingto have been asked by Elizalde to pose as Tasadays.

Almost a year later or in July 1988, UP allegedly sentSalazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the12th Intl Congress of Anthropological andEthnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen

reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax. Their allegations were widely publicized in severaldailies.

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege the ff causes of action:1. defendants' conduct and statements that the

Tasadays were nonexistent or frauds deprivedthem of their peace of mind and defiled the

Tasadays' dignity and personality2. defendants' contention that Elizalde caused the

Tasadays to pose and pretend was defamatory andpictured the plaintiffs as dishonest and publicity-seeking persons, thereby besmirching theirreputation and causing them serious anxiety

3. defendants' "concerted efforts to publicly denyplaintiff Tasadays' personality and their existenceas a distinct ethnic community within the forestarea reserved under the Proclamation (No. 995)unjustly becloud or tend to becloud their rightsthereunder

4. defendants' "deliberate and continuing campaignto vex and annoy" the Tasadays and the use of "false and perjured 'evidence' to debase andmalign" them, caused them to incur attorney's feesand expenses of litigation.

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The plaintiffs invoked Art. 26 of the Civil Code andpegged their claims for moral and nominal damages atthe "amount equivalent to defendants' combinedsalaries for two (2) months, estimated at P32,000.00."

Procedural crap:Plaintiffs (defendants herein) filed a complaint fordamages and declaratory relief against the UPprofessors stating the above causes of action. UP fileda motion to intervene, stating that the UP profs wereunder their supervision. Salazar and Bailen filed amotion to dismiss, which was denied. With the MFRdenied in the lower court, they filed a petition forcertiorari for gadalej, which was dismissed by the SC.Meanwhile, UP filed a motion to dismiss in the lowercourt, but it was struck off the record. In the CA,everything else was denied, because petitionersallegations were not stated in the complaint. Hence,this instant petition.

ISSUE HELD:1. WON res judicata applies as regards the denial of

the UP profs petition for certiorari NO2. WON the UP professors are covered by theprotective mantle of Academic Freedom YES, butUP should have defended its profs in the course of the trial case, instead of trying to terminate theproceedings prematurely

Hence, the CAs denial of the profs motion todismiss is AFFIRMED and the case is remanded.

RATIO:1. Super daming procedural crap nakakahilo.While it is true that the instant petition and theprevious case revolve around the issue of WON thelower court correctly denied the motion to of the UPprofs, there is an aspect of the case which takes it outof the ambit of the principle of res judicata (final

judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction isconclusive upon the parties in any subsequentlitigation involving the same cause of action) . The saidprinciple applies when there is, among others, identityof parties and subject matter in two cases. Concededly,the fact that UP is the petitioner here while Salazar andBailen were the petitioners in the previous case is not ahindrance to the application of res judicata becausethe situation is akin to the adding of other parties to acase which had been finally resolved in a previous one.UP was not an original party-defendant in the originalsuit, but it intervened and made common cause withBailen and Salazar in alleging that the case should be

dismissed in order to hold inviolate academic freedom,both individual and institutional. There is, therefore, aresultant substantial identity of parties, as both UP, onthe one hand, and Bailen and Salazar, on the otherhand, represent the same interests in the twopetitions.

However, the requisite of identity of subject matter inthe two petitions is wanting. Private respondentsidentify the subject matter as "the trial judge's refusal .. . to dismiss the complaint against Bailen and Salazar.It should be noted, however, that two motions todismiss the same complaint were filed in this case and

they were separately resolved. The first was the onefiled by Bailen and Salazar. The second motion todismiss was filed by UP but on February 15, 1989, thelower court struck it off the record. Thus, to hold thatres judicata applies to herein facts would be stretchingto its limits the requirement of identity of subjectmatter.

2. Academic FreedomUP has no cause of action because there areinsufficient allegations in its new complaint. It cannotinvoke the same allegations in its original complaintbecause that has been previously struck off the recordby the lower court. On its face, herein complaint,however, does not allege any right or interest of thepetitioner that is affected by the complaint simplybecause it was not an original defendant. As correctlyobserved by the lower court, the complaint does noteven show that petitioner authorized Bailen andSalazar to conduct a study on the Tasaday. Neitherdoes it even appear that the trip to Zagreb, Yugoslaviaof Bailen and Salazar was sanctioned or sponsored bythe petitioner. Hence, by filing the motion to dismissthe complaint against Salazar and Bailen or by allegingdefenses in its answer which amounted to invokinglack of cause of action as a ground for dismissal, thepetitioner confined itself to the allegations of thecomplaint.

On the other hand, a cause of action against Bailen andSalazar can be made out from the complaint: their actsand utterances allegedly besmirched the reputation of the plaintiffs as they were shown therein to havestaged a fraud.

This is not to say, however, that UP's intervention wasimproper. Coming to the defense of its faculty

members, it had to prove that the alleged damagingacts and utterances of Bailen and Salazar werecircumscribed by the constitutionally-protectedprinciple of academic freedom. However, it shouldhave championed the cause of Bailen andSalazar in the course of the trial of the case. Iterred in trying to abort the proceedings at itsinception through the device of filing the motionto dismiss. This procedural lapse, notwithstanding, noirremediable injury has been inflicted on the petitioneras, during the trial, it may still invoke and prove thespecial defense of institutional academic freedom asdefined in Tangonan v . Pao and in Garcia v . TheFaculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology .

Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and therebyforfeited their right to notice of subsequentproceedings and to participate in the trial, petitioner'sanswer in intervention shall be the gauge indetermining whether issues have been joined. Withrespect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgmentdeclaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a distinct ethniccommunity within the territory defined underPresidential Proclamation No. 995" the lower court iscautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a

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judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which maynot be granted in a petition for declaratory relief.

The issue of WON Bailen and Salazar infringed onplaintiffs' civil and human rights when they maliciouslyand falsely spoke and intrigued to present plaintiffs

Tasaday as fakers and impostors collaborating in ahoax or fraud upon the public with and under thesupervision of plaintiff Elizalde, is not within theprovince of the court to make pronouncements on forthese are matters beyond its expertise.

The basic issue of the case is whether or not a personwho failed the National Medical Admission Test(NMAT) thrice, in violation of the three-flunk rule ,is entitled to take it again.

FACTS:Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a graduate of the

University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. He took the NMAT THREE timesand flunked all of them [Court found that he actuallyfailed FOUR times a misplaced persistence like ahopeless love]. When he applied for the FIFTH time,the DECS and the Director of Center for EducationalMeasurement rejected his application on the basis of the three-flunk rule :

MECS [Minister of Education, Culture and Sports]Order No. 12, Series of 1972:

A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances totake the NMAT. After three (3) consecutive failures, astudent shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for thefourth time.

San Diego went to the RTC to compel hisadmission to the test. Through a petition formandamus, he invoked his rights to academic freedomand quality education. He also raised the issues of dueprocess and equal protection. By agreement of theparties, he was allowed to take the NMAT.

RTC declared the Order invalid because itdeprived San Diegos of his right to pursue a medicaleducation through an arbitrary exercise of policepower.

Angles of the Case :

1. MECS Order No. 12 creating the three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power.

- In Tablarin v. Gutierrez , which upheld theconstitutionality of the NMAR in limiting the admissionto medical schools to those that initially proved their

competence and preparation for a medical school, Justice Florentino Feliciano raised the following point:

- The test is the reasonable relation between thelawful method , which is prescribing the passing of the NMAR as condition for admission to medicalschools, and the lawful subject the securing of thehealth and safety of the general community.

- The regulation of the practice of medicine in all itsbranches has long been recognized as a reasonablemethod of protecting the health and safety of thepublic.

- The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes also covers the admission to thepractice.

- For MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 , the lawfulsubject is the improvement of the professional andtechnical quality of the graduates of medical schools

by upgrading through selectivity in the process of admission like limiting admission to those who passedthe NMAT ( lawful method ).

- Furthermore, the use of admission tests is widelyused in the United States (Medical College Admission

Test) and in other countries with more educationalresources than that of the Philippines.

- Ultimately, the measure contributes to the protectionof the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance that could infiltrate themedical profession.

- Test for the valid exercise police power involves theconcurrence between:

a. the interest of the of public generally, asdistinguished from those of a particular class,require the interference of the State;

b. the means employed are reasonably necessaryto the attainment of the object sought to beaccomplished and not unduly oppressive uponindividuals.

2. Right to quality education is not absolute- While every person is entitled to aspire to be adoctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be adoctor A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who want tobe a lawyer may prove better a plumber, he should beso advised and advised.

- San Diego must yield to the rule and the fact thatthere are other people who are more prepared thanhim, considering the crowded medical schools that wehave today.

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3. The order does not violate the equalprotection clause

- A law does not have to operate with equal force on allpersons or things. There are substantial distinctionsbetween medical students and other students who arenot required to take the NMAT and not subjected to thethree-flunk rule. The medical profession have adelicate responsibility towards society that warrantsa different treatment towards them.

Holding: The three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power. Court said that San Diegos intellectualcapacity is not depreciated, rather, he may be meantfor another calling. The rule is intended to avoid anation of misfits square pegs trying to fit into roundholds.

The decision of the RTC declaring MECS OrderNo. 12 invalid is reversed.

FACTS:

Teresita Tablarin and other students, in theirbehalf and in behalf of other applicants for admissioninto the Medical Colleges who have not taken or takenbut failed the NMAT during 1987-88 and for the futureyears to come, wants to be admitted into schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However,

Tablarin and company either did not take or failed theNMAT which is required by the Board of MedicalEducation (Board) and conducted by the Center forEducational Measurement (CEM).

The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretaryof Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of MedicalEducation and the CEM from:

a. enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic ActNo. 2382 , as amended by Republic Acts Nos.4224 and 5946 , known as the Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of its objectives thestandardization and regulation of the medicaleducation. It created the Board of MedicalEducation composed by representatives fromeducation government institutions, private medicalspecialty societies, association of medical schoolsand dean of the UP College of Medicine. The one of

the administrative functions of the Board is toprescribe requirements for admission withnecessary rules and regulations for properimplementation.

The Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of the minimum requirements is certificate of eligibility given by the Board.

b. requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as acondition for securing certificates of eligibilityfor admission. MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985provided a uniform admission test called the NMAT

as an additional requirement for the issuance of the certificate of eligibility.

c. proceeding with accepting applications for takingthe NMA, and

d. administering the NMAT.

The petition was denied by the RTC and theNMAT was conducted and administered. It was notedthat the petitioners were not able to present a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome thepresumption of constitutionality.

Angles of the case:

1. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 ,as amended [Medical Act of 1959] , and MECSOrder No. 52, s. of 1985 do not violate theprovisions of the 1987 Constitution presented bythe petitioners .

- The petitioners cited State Policies which includeArticle II, Section 11 on the dignity of every humanperson and human rights, Article II, Section 13 onthe vital role of the youth in nation building, Article II,Section 17 on the priority to education. They alsocited Article XIV, Section 1 giving emphasis to thephrase right of ALL citizens to quality education.Furthermore, the NMAT requirement is challenged as aviolation of the fair, reasonable and equitableadmission and academic requirements stated byArticle XIV, Section 5 (3) .

- Court said that the petitioners did not demonstratedhow the measures provided by the Board collide with

these relatively specific State policies. In short, theywere not able to present a prima facie case withregards to the State Policies angle.

- About the right of all citizens to quality education,this phrase should not be construed as compelling toState to make quality education available across theboard. Quality education, will be shouldered by theState in so far that the citizens were able to qualityunder fair, reasonable and equitable admission andacademic requirements.

2. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 ,as amended [Medical Act of 1959] , is not an

undue delegation of legislative power .

- The general principle of non-delegation of powers (delegates non potest delegare or delegati

potestas non potest delegare a delegated power maynot be further delegated by the person to whom suchpower is delegated) flows from the fundamental rule of the separation of and allocation of powers among thethree great departments of government. However, thisrule was made to adapt to the complexities of themodern government referred to by Justice Laurel inPangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The

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Public Service Commission . This is known as theprinciple of subordinate legislation .

- Standards for subordinate legislation may beexpressed or implied . The body of the statute andthe goal to standardize and regulate the medicalprofession satisfy the necessary standards required.

3. The NMAT is not an unfair, unreasonable andinequitable requirement which results in adenial of due process .

- The petitioners did not specify what factors in theNMAT support their claim. If they are questioning theburden imposed by the NMAT, which would pertain tothe utility and wisdom of the NMAT, then these arematters that should be addressed by theadministrative and legislative bodies not by theCourt.

4. The provisions questioned are part of the valid

exercise of the police power of the State.

- Police power is the pervasive and non-waivable powerof the sovereign to promote the important interestsand needs the general order of the generalcommunity.

- The provisions pass the test for the valid exercise of police power: concurrence test between lawfulsubject and lawful method .

5. The flexible cut-off score that can be changedby the Board after consultation with theAssociation of Philippine Medical Colleges doesnot violate the equal protection clause.

- The measure is not arbitrary or capricious. It is aflexible measure that takes into consideration changesof different factors that would merit a commensuratechange in the cut-off score like: number of studentswho reached the cut-off score in the previous year,available slots, average scores, level of difficulty of theexamination. Setting a permanent cut-off scores wouldresult to unreasonable rigidity .

HOLDING :

Prescribing the NMAT and requiring to passsuccessfully pass it as requirements for enteringmedical schools are not unconstitutional impositions.

Decision of the RTC DENYING the petition for awrit of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.

FACTS: Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not

allowed to re-enroll because they participatedin student mass actions against their schoolthe preceding sem

On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continuedtheir rally picketing, even though without anyrenewal permit, physically coercing studentsnot to attend their classes, thereby disruptingthe scheduled classes and depriving a greatmajority of students of their right to be presentin their classes

Together with the abovementioned fact, thelower court considered that in signing theirenrollment forms, they waived the privilege tobe re-enrolled. The Mabini College reservesthe right to deny admission of students xxx

whose activities unduly disrupts or interferewith the efficient operation of the college xxx In addition the students signed pledges saying

they respect their alma matter, that they willconduct themselves in a manner that wouldnot put the college in a bad light.

Judge Dames decision considering these factssaid that what the students assert is a mereprivileges not a legal right. Respondent MabiniCollege is free to admit or not to admit thepetitioners for re-enrollment in view of theacademic freedom enjoyed by the school.

ISSUE/HELD:

WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as itallowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. The re-admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. YES

RATIO: In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a

written contract for one semester andcontracts are respected as the law between thecontracting parties. At the end of each sem,the contract is deemed terminated.

However, this case is not a simple case about aschool refusing re-admission. The refusal toreadmit or to re-enroll petitioners was decidedupon and implemented by school authorities asa reaction to student mass actions

This is a case that focuses on the right tospeech and assembly as exercised by studentsvis--vis the right of school officials todiscipline them.

The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate. Inprotesting grievances disorder is more or lessexpected because emotions run high. That the

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NON vs. JUDGE DAMES


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protection to the cognate rights of speech andassembly guaranteed by the Consti is similarlyavailable to students is well-settled in our

jurisdiction. Right to discipline cannot overrideconstitutional safeguards. Citing Malabananand Villar the court reiterated that the exerciseof the freedom of assembly could not be abasis for barring students from enrolling. Underacademic freedom, students my be barredfrom re-enrollment based on academicdeficiencies.

Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school.Constitutional freedom of free speech andassembly also not absolute. However,imposition of disciplinary sanctions requiresobservance of procedural due process andpenalty imposed must be proportionate to theoffense committed. (procedural due process:right to be informed in writing, right to ans thecharges, right to be informed of the chargesagainst them, right to adduce evidence, and for

this evidence to be duly considered) The nature of contract between a school andits students is not an ordinary contract but isimbued with public interest. The Consti allowsthe State supervisory and regulatory powersover all educational institutions. [see art XIVsec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to par 107 and 137 of the respondent schools manual, a student isenrolled not just for one sem but for the entireperiod necessary for the student to completehis/her course. BP blg 232 gives the studentsthe right to continue their course up tograduation.

Academic freedom not a ground for denyingstudents rights. In Villar, the right of aninstitution of higher learning to set academicstandards cannot be utilized to discriminateagainst students who exercise theirconstitutional rights to speech and assembly,for otherwise there will be a violation of theirright to equal protection.

School said most of them had failing gradesanyway. In answer students say they aregraduating students and if there are anydeficiencies these do not warrant non-readmission. Also there are more students withsores deficiencies who are re-admitted. Andsome of the petitioners had no failing marks.

The court held that the students were denied

due process in that there was no dueinvestigation. In fact it would appear from thepleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing grades was amere afterthought.

Discipline may be warranted but penalty shldbe commensurate to the offense committedwith due process.

But penalty, if any is deserved should notanymore be enforced. Moot and academic.

Theyve already suffered enough.

Justice Paras:

FACTS: Students and some teachers of PSBA ralliedand barricaded the school because theywanted to admin to hear their grievances withregards to not being able to participate in thepolicy-making of the school, despite theregulations set by the admin with regards toprotest actions

During the regular enrollment period,petitioners and other students similarlysituated were allegedly blacklisted and deniedadmission for the second semester of schoolyear 1986-1987.

court ordered the school authorities to create aspecial investigating committee to conduct aninvestigation, who made recommendationswhich the school adopted

a lot of procedural crap, petitioners andrespondents fil ing and answering thecomplaints

petitioners claim that they have been deprivedof due process when they were barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers whoseservices have been terminated as facultymembers, on account of their participation inthe demonstration or protest charged byrespondents as "anarchic" rallies, and aviolation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.

Petitioners allege that they have been deprivedof procedural due process which requires thatthere be due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due process which requires thatthe person or body to conduct the investigationbe competent to act and decide free from biasor prejudice.

ISSUE:

A. Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process ?

B. WON there was contempt of Court by therespondents

HELD:

A. NO. there was no deprivation of due process.

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1. There is no existing contract between the twoparties. Par 137 of Manual of Regulations for PrivateSchools states that when a college student registers ina school, it is understood that he is enrolling for theentire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual,that the "written contracts" required for collegeteachers are for 'one semester. after the close of thefirst semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existingcontract either with the students or with theintervening teachers. It is a time-honored principle thatcontracts are respected as the law between thecontracting parties The contract having beenterminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter intoanother contract with said students andteachers . "The courts, be they the original trial courtor the appellate court, have no power to makecontracts for the parties."

2. The Court has stressed, that due process indisciplinary cases involving students does notentail proceedings and hearings similar to those

prescribed for actions and proceedings in courtsof justice.

Standards of procedural due process are:

a. the students must be informed in writing of thenature and cause of any accusation against them;b. they shall have the right to answer the chargesagainst them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:c. they shall be informed of the evidence againstthem;d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence intheir own behalf ande.the evidence must be duly considered by the

investigating committee or official designated by theschool authorities to hear and decide the case.

3. Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C.were distributed at the beginning of each school

Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual innature and upon admission to the School, theStudent is deemed to have agreed to bindhimself to all rules/regulations promulgated bythe Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports.Furthermore, he agrees that he may be required towithdraw from the School at any time forreasons deemed sufficiently serious by theSchool Administration.

Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by theschool with regard to the protest actions. Necessaryaction was taken by the school when the court issued atemporary mandatory injunction to accept thepetitioners for the first sem & the creation of aninvestigating body.

4. The Court, to insure that full justice is done both tothe students and teachers on the one hand and theschool on the other, ordered an investigation to be

conducted by the school authorities, in the resolutionof November 12, 1986.

Findings of the investigating committee:

1. students disrupted classes2. petitioners involved were found to be

academically deficient & the teachers arefound to have committed various acts of misconduct.

5. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized bythis Court Thus, the Court has ruled that theschool's refusal is sanctioned by law . Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considersacademic delinquency and violation of disciplinaryregulations vs as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view would doviolence to the academic freedom enjoyed by theschool and enshrined under the Constitution.

Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factualfindings of administrative tribunals, unless :

1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence;2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, impositionor collusion;3. where the procedure which led to the factualfindings is irregular;4. when palpable errors are committed; or5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, orcapriciousness is manifest.

investigation conducted was fair, open,exhaustive and adequate.

.B. No. The urgent motion of petitioners andintervenors to cite respondents in contempt of court islikewise untenable.

1. no defiance of authority by mere filing of MORcoz respondent school explained that the intervenorswere actually reinstated as such faculty membersafter the issuance of the temporary mandatoryinjunction.

2. respondent school has fully complied with itsduties under the temporary mandatoryinjunction The school manifested that while theinvestigation was going on, the intervenors-facultymembers were teaching and it was only after theinvestigation, that the recommendations of theCommittee were adopted by the school and the lattermoved for the dismissal of the case for having becomemoot and academic

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Documents

Consti 2 - Academic Freedom