Consti Citizenship

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G.R. Nos. 178831-32 July 30, 2009

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 179120 July 30, 2009

LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker ofthe House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines, and JOCELYN SYLIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179132-33 July 30, 2009

OLIVIA P. PARAS, Petitioner, vs. HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacityas Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON. ROBERTO NAZARENO, in hiscapacity as Secretary General of the House of Representatives; HON. RHODORASEVILLA, in her capacity as Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House ofRepresentatives; THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SYLIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 179240-41 July 30, 2009

RENALD F. VILLANDO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS andJOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PERALTA,J.:

The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner inG.R. No. 179120, seeks a reconsideration of the Courts April 1, 2009 Decision, which

granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichongs petition forcertiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The

Court dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogos petition, and reversed the Joint

Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17,

2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a

congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship

requirement.

Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain

entrenched in Philippine case law. To achieve this end, he maintained that the Courtshould reconsider its April 1, 2009 Decision. He also prayed for an oral argument, which

he posited, would help the Court in the just and proper disposition of the pending incident.


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After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same

should be denied for lack of merit.

Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments,

which we have all considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009.

Nonetheless, in order to lay to rest once and for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shall discuss

only the relevant issues and revalidate our Decision by ruling on his motion as follows:

The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for,

be elected to, and assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First

District of Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification

is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in

Section 6,1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted

for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was

eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and

responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.

Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order toensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens.2 With this

principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v. COMELEC3 that if one of the essentialqualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives is lacking,then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for arequirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence assuming, time constraintsnotwithstanding, and after proper proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that

Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the court of justice would tilt against her favor

and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to hold office. But, firstthings first.

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born

citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to

claim that the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained

finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

In our Decision, We held that:

However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in

accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:

Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in theproper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the properprovincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issuedand its registration in the Civil Register:

1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;

2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said

naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and

establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized


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remaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his former

nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie

evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:

3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from apublic or private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau

of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are

taught as part of the school curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by

neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A

certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by

the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the President] and the

Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];

5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in

violation of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a

requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis

supplied)

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judge motu

propio and not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees

of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and

cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held

that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings fornaturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is

beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon

such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by

law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5),

Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No.

473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the

Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other

words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previousinvestigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representativesdesignated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificateof naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not amatter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized

citizens descendant.

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office

requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before anytribunal or government institution. Proper proceedings must be strictly followed bythe proper officers under the law.Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on


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account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed,

for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the

House of Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom

they have put their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind theforegoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final

judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any

intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was thenqualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of

government.4

These precepts, notwithstanding, Biraogo remained firm in his belief that this Court erred

in its Decision and that the COMELEC Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying

Limkaichong should have been affirmed. He even went to a great extent of giving a

dichotomy of the said Joint Resolution by stating that it was composed of two parts, the

first part of which is the substantive part, and the second, pertains to the injunctive part.

For this purpose, the dispositive portion of the said COMELEC Joint Resolution isreproduced below:

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared

as DISQUALIFIED from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros

Oriental.

The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby

directed to strike out the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible

candidates for the said position, and the concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby directed

to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as winningcandidate, if any, until this decision has become final.

SO ORDERED.5

Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Limkaichong suspended

only the execution of the substantive relief or the first part of the above-quoted

COMELEC Joint Resolution. However, it did not suspend the execution of the injunctive

part and, accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC should not have

proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections.

His argument has no leg to stand on. We cannot take a decision or resolution on a piece-

meal basis and apply only that part which is seemingly beneficial to one's cause and

discard the prejudicial part which, obviously, would just be a hindrance in advancing one's

stance or interests. Besides, the COMELEC Joint Resolution which Biraogo dichotomized

was effectively suspended when Limkaichong timely filed her Motion for Reconsideration

pursuant to Section 13(c),6 Rule 18 and Section 2,7 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure. Hence, it cannot as yet be implemented for not having attained its finality.

Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its JointResolution. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had

taken her oath of office, and she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23,


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2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision that the House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now

assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held:

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed,taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the

COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, andqualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.8 It follows then that theproclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over

matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his

qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the

constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the

House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications.

The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section

2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over

election contests relating to its members.

10

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitutionprovides:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an ElectoralTribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall becomposed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be

designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or

the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of

proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizationsregistered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the

Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

x x x x

Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that

Limkaichongs proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent

the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to

have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. 11 The

Court has shed light on this in the case ofVinzons-Chato,12to the effect that:

In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed

and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth

Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over

petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the

canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are

matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET.Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not

divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:


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x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning

candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised,

that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it

avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies,

with due regard to the people's mandate.

Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest againstrespondent Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.

In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET

from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a members qualification to sit in

the House of Representatives.

The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election

protest or a petition forquo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives.

In our Decision, we ruled that the ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules

does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship, because qualifications for publicoffice are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time ofappointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. 13

Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution requires that Members of the House of Representatives

must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their entire

tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of

it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.

In fine, we hold that Biraogo had not successfully convinced us to reconsider our Decisionand grant his motion for reconsideration.

In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision dated

April 1, 2009 is a complete turn-around from the ruling embodied in the Decision written

by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which, although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by

fourteen (14) Associate Justices and approved by the Court en banc on July 15, 2008. He

decried the absence of an explanation in the Decision dated April 1, 2009 for the said

departure or turn-around.

Such a position deserves scant consideration.

The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections,14 held that a decision must not only be

signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated tobe considered a Decision, to wit:

[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated.Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to

speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is always

understood to be subject to confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is to bepromulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus confirmed by the Justice casting it.

The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they have cast

their votes, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have to


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sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the

best fruit of their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice,

before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions statedduring and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices,binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may servefor determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a

member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision bindingunless and until signed and promulgated.

We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the

ponente. Indeed, if any member of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he

may still withdraw his concurrence and register a qualification or dissent as long as the

decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation signifies that on the date it wasmade the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to support it.

Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the

confidential internal deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A

decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.15 Until such operative act

occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have

already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of

signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation

and had signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby

preserving one's freedom of action.

In sum, we hold that Biraogos Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument

must be denied. This Court did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who mayassail Limkaichong's disqualification based on citizenship is to file before the HRET the

proper petition at any time during her incumbency.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by

petitioner Louis C. Biraogo in G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182701 July 23, 2008


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EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSand TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

REYES, R.T.,J.:

A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position inthe Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreigncitizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on Civil

Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution1 and (2) Omnibus Order2 of the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as

Barangay Chairman.

Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman ofBarangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and

Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.

On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition3 before the

Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of

petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for

any public office. In his Answer,4 petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and

at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise

known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.5

He returned to thePhilippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the

qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman.

After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.6

On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for

disqualification, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is

GRANTED and respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from runningas Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.

SO ORDERED.7

In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his

Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able

to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and

sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner failed to do.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the present

petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for

disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.


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We dismiss the petition.

Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections,8 petitioner argues that his filing of a

certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles are

substantially different from the present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind YbascoLopez, was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil.9 Lopez was born of Filipino

parents in Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus soli. As a result, she

acquired Australian citizenship by operation of Australian law, but she was also

considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law. She did not perform any act to swear

allegiance to a country other than the Philippines.

In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought Americancitizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by

re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.

More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment

of R.A. No. 922510 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before

those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines.

Section 5 of the said law states:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire

Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be

subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines

and the following conditions:

x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for

holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at thetime of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and swornrenunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized toadminister an oath. (Emphasis added)

Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new lawexplicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a

personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public

officer authorized to administer an oath."

Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval theCOMELEC observation on this point:

While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual

Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of thePhilippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough

to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates that a

candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and


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all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is

no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A.

No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of

Barangay Bagacay.

For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before

an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must state in clearand unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to beeffective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to renounce his Americancitizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leadsthis Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive mandate of law.For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States,

this Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in thePhilippines.11 (Emphasis added)

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the

functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect of his candidacy.Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualifiedcandidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions ondisqualification is not a matter of popularity.12

In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner

as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M.


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DACANAY, petitioner.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA,J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave toresume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he

migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He

subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid

program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-

Acquisition Act of 2003),petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he

took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine ConsulateGeneral in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intendsto resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M.

Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine

citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule

138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicantfor admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at leasttwenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and

must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,

and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending

in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his

reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the

qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It

recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and

responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain

modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affectedwith public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to

control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of

morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the


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mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good

standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer

of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the

courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member

of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule,

and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance

with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to

practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that anapplicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years

of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce

before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against

him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the

Philippines.6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory

proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking

the lawyers oath9

and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court ofthis Court a certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a

continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment

of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12

compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful

observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to

judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law

in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be

limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a

requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine

bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the

loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the

Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizenof another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all

Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have


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lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino

lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his

Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he isalso deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic

right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines andhe reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the

proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise,

before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resumehis law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this

is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws

and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties andresponsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to

maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of thePhilippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such

compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the

Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro,

JJ., concur.Quisumbing, J., on leave.

G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008


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NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution1 dated 28 September 2007 of the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the

Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division2 disqualifying him

from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007

National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal

renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen

of the US on 13 December 1989.3

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,

otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request

for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the

Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG

issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval4 of petitioners request, and on the same

day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice

Consul Edward C. Yulo. 5 On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued

Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the

Philippines.6

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the

Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. 7

On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification 8 before the

COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed

to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225,

which reads as follows:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire




x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for

holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at thetime of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation

of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an

oath.


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In his Answer9 dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper10 dated 8 May 2007, petitioner

countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the

Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an

effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner

garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution11

disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,

Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The

COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege

to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of

Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC

Second Division did not consider Valles v. COMELEC12

and Mercado v. Manzano13

applicable to the instant case, since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth,

unlike the petitioner who lost his Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The

COMELEC, thus, decreed in the aforementioned Resolution that:

ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the positionof Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and Local

Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said

municipality by virtue of such disqualification.14

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that

his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and

his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective renunciation of his US

citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the

United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" dated 27 June 2007,

wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship.15 The COMELEC en banc

dismissed petitioners Motion in a Resolution16 dated 28 September 2007 for lack of merit.

Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action for

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, where he presented for the firsttime an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All

Foreign Citizenship"17 dated 7 February 2007. He avers that he executed an act of

renunciation of his US citizenship, separate from the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines he took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his Certificate of

Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of the case during the appeal. He attributes the

delay in the presentation of the affidavit to his former counsel, Atty. Marciano Aparte,

who allegedly advised him that said piece of evidence was unnecessary but who,

nevertheless, made him execute an identical document entitled "Oath of Renunciation of

Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" on27 June 2007 after he had already filed his Certificate of Candidacy.18

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:


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I

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH

THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "CITIZENSHIP

RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003," SPECIFICALLY SECTION

5(2) AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLICOFFICE;

II

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH

THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS

THE PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND

III

WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT

WOULD RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF

CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.19

The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is

disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure

to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not

substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign

citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different

purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of thePhilippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the

following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retaintheir Philippine citizenship:

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine

citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby

deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of

allegiance to the Republic:

"I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution

of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the


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duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and

accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance

thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental

reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become

citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking theaforesaid oath.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the

Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has

dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his

foreign citizenship.

The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in theCertificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run forpublic office in Philippine elections. Such an oath reads:

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution

of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the

laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the

Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily,

without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the facts stated

herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.

Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire




x x x x


holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the

time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation


oath.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained

their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn

renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized toadminister an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.20

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who


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have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired orretained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in thePhilippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and allforeign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of

their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn

renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing

themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that

which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to

the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral

Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill

No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon.

Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon.

Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from therenunciation of foreign citizenship:

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. "Those seeking elective public office in the

Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the

Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,

make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any

public officer authorized to administer an oath." I think its very good, ha? No problem?

REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.

x x x x

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your problem, Boy? Thoseseeking elective office in the Philippines.

REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano

CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.

REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When heruns for office, he will have only one. (Emphasis ours.)


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There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos

reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take

their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce

their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify

as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely,

Philippine citizenship.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which

is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does

not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic

Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general

requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the

renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have

retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek

elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one

citizenship.

Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles21 and Mercado,22 wherein the filing

by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of

allegiance, was already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The ruling of this

Court in Valles andMercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now specially

governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated on 29 August 2003.

In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private respondent

Manzano was sought under another law, Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,

which reads:

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for

any elective local position:

x x x x

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term "dual citizenship" vis--vis theconcept of "dual allegiance." At the time this Court decided the cases of Valles and

Mercado on 26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000, respectively, the more explicitly worded

requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by our

legislature.23

Lopez v. Commission on Elections24 is the more fitting precedent for this case since they

both share the same factual milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born

Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He

later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No. 9225. Thereafter,Lopez filed his candidacy for a local elective position, but failed to make a personal and

sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. This Court unequivocally declared that

despite having garnered the highest number of votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless


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disqualified as a candidate for a local elective position due to his failure to comply with

the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.

Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari,

an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign

Citizenship,"25 which he supposedly executed on 7 February 2007, even before he filed his

Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said Affidavit, petitioner putsforward in the Petition at bar a new theory of his casethat he complied with the

requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship before

filing his Certificate of Candidacy. This new theory constitutes a radical change from the

earlier position he took before the COMELECthat he complied with the requirement of

renunciation by his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the

Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy, and that there was no more need for

a separate act of renunciation.

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in theproceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the

attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be

considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late

stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule.26 Courts have

neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial

haphazardly.27

Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. 28 Petitioner

should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the

COMELEC.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence

of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court

in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect."

Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission

of evidence not formally presented:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been

formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had

no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to

due process. 29 Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with

orderly justice.30

The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an

identical document, "Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and

Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship" executed on 27 June 2007, subsequentto his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said

Oath of 27 June 2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. The

COMELEC en banc eventually refused to reconsider said document for being belatedly


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executed. What was extremely perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that petitioner did

not submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the proceedings before

the COMELEC, considering that it could have easily won his case if it was actually

executed on and in existence before the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, in

compliance with law.

The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presentingthis crucial piece of evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February

2007 was in existence all along, petitioners counsel, and even petitioner himself, could

have easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the

requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for

petitioner to submit as much evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of

presenting too little for which he could lose.

And even if it were true, petitioners excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7

February 2007 will not change the outcome of petitioners case.

It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence, and

mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result

might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.31 The only exceptions to

the general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court

finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of

due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of

ones property through a technicality.32 These exceptions are not attendant in this case.

The Court cannot sustain petitioners averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in

deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the

proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a

witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense

or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue

the case -- unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his

case -- do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer

be bound by the acts of their counsel.33

Also belying petitioners claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the factthat petitioner continuously used his former counsels theory of the case. Even when the

COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court

that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG

and in his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign citizenship

which the law requires. Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner

only demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by

his former counsel, despite the formers incongruous allegations that the latter has been

grossly negligent.

Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was

inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier

and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC,


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instead of waiting until a decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued

dismissing his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame

on his former counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the

consequences of his former counsels acts, because, otherwise, it would render court

proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere

subterfuge of replacing counsel. 34

Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,35 where therein petitioner De Guzman was

unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to

evidence, despite the Sandiganbayans denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful

insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman

of any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the

case in the Petition at bar.

Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended

his suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence onpetitioners behalf. Moreover, petitioners cause was not defeated by a mere technicality,

but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case

lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients

are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel.36

Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the

position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a

candidate, who must comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and

failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not

dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such requirement.37 The will of the people as

expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they

mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship

qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the

Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and

renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.38 The application of the constitutional

and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.39

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September2007 of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner isDISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14May 2007 National and Local Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of

Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification. Costs against

petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180088 January 19, 2009

MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIMES. TY, Respondents.


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D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rules 641 and 652 of the Revised Rules of

Court seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution3 dated 31 July 2007 of the First

Division of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Resolution4

dated 28 September 2007 of COMELEC en banc, in SPA No. 07-568, for having been

rendered with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were

candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern

Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May 2007.

On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing before the COMELEC a

Petition5 to disqualify and/or cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of

material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur,

Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to

spouses Ang Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty

eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and became a citizen thereof.

Ty had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of

Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of

Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May

2007, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty

may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actuallyresided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one

year immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of Republic

Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact, even after

filing his application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make

trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006 lasting until 20

January 2007. Moreover, although Ty already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic

of the Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by

his travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by

Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and ReacquisitionAct of 2003, or related laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC

order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the cancellation of the

latters Certificate of Candidacy.

In his Answer6 to Japzons Petition in SPA No. 07-568, Ty admitted that he was a natural-

born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized

American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for

the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28

March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1) with the enactment of Republic

Act No. 9225, granting dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the

Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the

reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath of


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Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the

Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a

Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was at

A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. Tys application

was approved and he was issued on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March

2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) from the

Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at Barangay 6,Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was

registered as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,

Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein his

address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty

executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Given

the aforementioned facts, Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and

renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident of the Municipality of

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007

elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzons Petition in SPA No. 07-568.

Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Position Papers in SPA No. 07-

568, the 14 May 2007 elections were already held. Ty acquired the highest number of

votes and was declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,

by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.7

Following the submission of the Position Papers of both parties, the COMELEC First

Division rendered its Resolution8 dated 31 July 2007 in favor of Ty.

The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the requirements of Sections3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,

and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien,

i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country

or a unit of territory thereof. Evidences revealed that [Ty] executed an Oath of Allegiance

before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles,

California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship

on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is [Ty] acandidate for or occupying public office nor is in active service as commissioned or non-

commissioned officer in the armed forces in the country of which he was naturalized

citizen.9

The COMELEC First Division also held that Ty did not commit material

misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of

Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the

elections on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that:

Although [Ty] has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S.citizen in 1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts thereof

proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern


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Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented

in his certificate of candidacy[.]

As held in Coquilla vs. Comelec:

"The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to

dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the placewhere a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter

where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus

manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place

where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition

of new domicile (domicile of choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen

after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when

he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in

the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or

as a resident alien.

Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen.

Title 8, 1427(a) of the United States Code provides:

Requirements of naturalization: Residence

(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless

such applicant, (1) year immediately preceding the date of filing his application fornaturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent

residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years

immediately preceding the date of filing his petition has been physically present therein

for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within

the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the application

for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the

date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all period

referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character,

attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the

good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by

virtue of a greencard, which entitles one to reside permanently in that country,

constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does

naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Records showed that after taking an Oath of Allegiance before the Vice Consul of the

Philippine Consulate General on October 2, 2005, [Ty] applied and was issued a

Philippine passport on October 26, 2005; and secured a community tax certificate from theMunicipality of General Macarthur on March 8, 2006. Evidently, [Ty] was already a

resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for more than one

(1) year before the elections on May 14, 2007.10 (Emphasis ours.)


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The dispositive portion of the 31 July 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division,

thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.11

Japzon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution of the COMELEC

First Division. On 28 September 2007, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution12

denying Japzons Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the assailed Resolution of the

COMELEC First Division, on the basis of the following ratiocination:

We have held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains foreign citizenship, and

subsequently spurns the same, is by clear acts of repatriation a Filipino Citizen and hence

qualified to run as a candidate for any local post.

x x x x

It must be noted that absent any showing of irregularity that overturns the prevailing statusof a citizen, the presumption of regularity remains. Citizenship is an important aspect of

every individuals constitutionally granted rights and privileges. This is essential in

determining whether one has the right to exercise pre-determined political rights such as

the right to vote or the right to be elected to office and as such rights spring from

citizenship.

Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus presumed that every person is a citizen of the

country in which he resides; that citizenship once granted is presumably retained unless

voluntarily relinquished; and that the burden rests upon who alleges a change incitizenship and allegiance to establish the fact.

Our review of the Motion for Reconsideration shows that it does not raise any new or

novel issues. The arguments made therein have already been dissected and expounded

upon extensively by the first Division of the Commission, and there appears to be no

reason to depart from the wisdom of the earlier resolution. We thus affirm that [Ty] did

not commit any material misrepresentation when he accomplished his Certificate of

Candidacy. The only ground for denial of a Certificate of Candidacy would be when there

was material misrepresentation meant to mislead the electorate as to the qualifications of

the candidate. There was none in this case, thus there is not enough reason to deny due

course to the Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent James S. Ty.13

Failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the

instant Petition for Certiorari, relying on the following grounds:

A. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT

CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY DISREGARDED THE

PARAMETERS SET BY LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE ACQUISITION OFA NEW DOMICILE OF CHOICE AND RESIDENCE.14

B. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF


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DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT

CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY REFUSED TO CANCEL

[TYS] CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY, AND CONSEQUENTLY DECLARE

[JAPZON] AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF GEN. MACARTHUR, EASTERN

SAMAR.15

Japzon argues that when Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile oforigin. Ty did not establish his residence in the Municipality of General Macarthur,

Eastern Samar, Philippines, just because he reacquired his Philippine citizenship. The

burden falls upon Ty to prove that he established a new domicile of choice in General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar, a burden which he failed to discharge. Ty did not become a

resident of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by merely executing the Oath of Allegiance

under Republic Act No. 9225.

Therefore, Japzon asserts that Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for

running as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The one-year

residency requirement for those running for public office cannot be waived or liberally

applied in favor of dual citizens. Consequently, Japzon believes he was the only remaining

candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern

Samar, and is the only placer in the 14 May 2007 local elections.

Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and

28 September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a

new resolution denying due course to or canceling Tys Certificate of Candidacy; and to

declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,

Eastern Samar.

As expected, Ty sought the dismissal of the present Petition. According to Ty, the

COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the

Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May 2007

local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without

violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on

the Court. Ty disputes Japzons assertion that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion in rendering the assailed Resolutions, and avers that the said Resolutions were

based on the evidence presented by the parties and consistent with prevailingjurisprudence on the matter. Even assuming that Ty, the winning candidate for the Office

of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, is indeed disqualified

from running in the local elections, Japzon as the second placer in the same elections

cannot take his place.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the position that Ty failed to

meet the one-year residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty

candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The OSG opines that Ty was unable to

prove that he intended to remain in the Philippines for good and ultimately make it his new

domicile. Nonetheless, the OSG still prays for the dismissal of the instant Petition

considering that Japzon, gathering only the second highest number of votes in the local

elections, cannot be declared the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General


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Macarthur, Eastern Samar, even if Ty is found to be disqualified from running for the said

position. And since it took a position adverse to that of the COMELEC, the OSG prays

from this Court to allow the COMELEC to file its own Comment on Japzons Petition.

The Court, however, no longer acted on this particular prayer of the COMELEC, and with

the submission of the Memoranda by Japzon, Ty, and the OSG, it already submitted the

case for decision.

The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.

There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He was born and raised in the

Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work

in the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty

reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of

the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in

Los Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No.

9225.16 At this point, Ty still held dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was

only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary public

and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-

born Filipino may reacquire or retain17 his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a

foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A

close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of

residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No.

9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine

citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippinecitizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,

Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical

and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a

natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships,

he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is

also a citizen.

Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with

dual citizenship decides to run for public office.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire




x x x x


holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the

time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation


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oath.

Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or

retained his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office,

he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the

Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any andall foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond question. On 19 March 2007, he

personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the

time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of

General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had already effectively

renounced his American citizenship, keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 pertains to the

qualifications required by the Constitution and existing laws.

Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress to enact a local government

code which shall provide, among other things, for the qualifications, election, appointment

and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all

other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, the Local

Government Code of 1991, Section 39 of which lays down the following qualifications for

local elective officials:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the

Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the

case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or

sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least

one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write

Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

x x x x

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component cities,

component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on

election day.

The challenge against Tys qualification to run as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of

the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, centers on his purported failure to

meet the one-year residency requirement in the said municipality.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to"dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place

where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter

where he may be found at any given

Documents

Consti Citizenship