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C O N S T I T U T I O N A L L A W 1

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SENATE

ARTICLE VITHE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1.The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senateand a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative andreferendum.

Section 2.The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualifiedvoters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

Section 3.No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of theelection, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippinesfor not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

Section 4.The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by

law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than twoconsecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as aninterruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Section 5.

1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unlessotherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, andon the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through

a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.2. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives

including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection orelection from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and suchother sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

3. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least onerepresentative.

4. Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment oflegislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Section 6.No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except theparty-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for aperiod of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Section 7.The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shallbegin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member

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of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of theoffice for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full termfor which he was elected.

Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the Members of the House ofRepresentatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

TERM AND TENURE

Dimaporo v. Mitra

202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859

October 15, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur

during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of

Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately

following elections. Upon being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary

of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of

Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code which states:

Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a

permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office

upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed

his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he

did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operat ive underthe present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives,

as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the

Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives

and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7,

Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which

shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He

asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to

these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman's term of office on a ground not

provided for in the Constitution.

Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another

office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another

office or employment.

ISSUE:

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1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE

ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY

PREVENTING HIM FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HISRIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of

abuse of facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this

chapter on accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987)

on "Accountability of Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,

serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead

modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the

people, not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of

elective public officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such

officials serve out their entire term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby

cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former

position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmostloyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another

office, an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to

have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing

of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the

certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted

official. The law does not make the forfeiture dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of

shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of

Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on

impeachment All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by

impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the

Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the

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constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from

prescribing other grounds

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify

the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and

argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was

their duty to remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P.

Blg. 881. When the COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate

of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and

unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty

on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might

seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the

constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared

unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to

obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and

benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose

and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner

seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be

extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office

(tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter thanthe term or it may not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio

Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any

subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or

subsidiaries;

b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;

c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,

d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
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NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section 14 of

Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881

(The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:

SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office.Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any office

other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be

considered ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

FACTS:

The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals

Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the

Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep.

Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.

They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of

media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus

Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a

permanent capacity by considering them as ipso factoresigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy.

The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject

matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.

The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the

Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof

which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:

SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position.Any person holding a public appointive office or position,

including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-ownedor controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of

candidacy.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section

67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered ipso

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facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as

they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has been

retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso factoresigned from their

offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.

The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its enactment

into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which

provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution,

as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes effective.

Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should not have

been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the

Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,

serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest

lives.

Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who

ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso factoresigned therefrom, upon the filing of

their respective certificates of candidacy.

ISSUES:

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.

W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due

process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes

effective.

HELD:
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To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall

be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to

cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title

should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enoughreasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and

means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title

need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible

Elections through Fair Election Practices.

The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include

the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of

Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.

The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective

officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which

deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not violate the one subject -one

title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any

number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the

general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of

carrying out the general subject.

The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or discrimination that

had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of

the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe that

the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But policy matters are not the

concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the

government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether

an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to

achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised

in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not

suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 bythe ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitraupholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the

same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on

its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election lawsthe fair, honest

and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congressis achieved.

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Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office

by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed

therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their

designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and

are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect immediately

upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this

Court laid down the rule:

... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication

itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective

immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-

period shall be shortened or extended.

Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its

express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general

circulation.

In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do

not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the

legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole

function of the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative

power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.

Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto

resigned from their positions.

FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the

COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto

resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of

R.A. 9369.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:

NO.

In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code

(OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court

upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal

protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum

since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid

classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirementthat it must be germane to the purpose of

the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones

candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at

promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of

official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also

justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in

neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to

their office work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they

occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as

ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is

unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in

character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state

interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.

QUALIFICATIONS

Pundaodayaversus- Comelec & Noble, G.R.179313, Sept.17, 2009

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Facts:Petitioner ran against Noble for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007

elections.Pundaodaya filed a petition for

disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the residencyqualification. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble

is a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Noble averred thathe is a registered voter and resident of Barangay

Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. In a resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled and

disqualified Noble from running as mayor. Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. In the meantime,he garnered the highest

number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to AnnulProcla

mation. The COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and declared Noblequalified to run for

the mayoralty position. Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue: Should residenceand domicile beconstrued as referring to dwelling?Did Noble effectively change his

domicile?

Held:The Court found that Noble failed to convince that he successfully effected a change of domicile. Toestablish a

new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of thatintention. It

requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make itones fixed andpermanent place of abode.

In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term residence is to be understood not in

itscommon acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is,the

place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may befound

at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

VILANDO VS HRET GR NO 192147

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the March 24, 2010

Decision[1]of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal(HRET)dismissing the petitions for quo warrantoand

declaring private respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as Member of the House of

Representatives representing the First District of Negros Oriental and its Resolution[2]dated May 17, 2010, denying

the motion for reconsideration.

In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of

Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.

On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the

basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8062 [3]issued on May 18, 2007.
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On July 23, 2007, she assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed

before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)which reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis

Biraogo (G.R. No. 179120);[4]Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33);[5]and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 179240-

41).[6] These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos.

178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases against

her.

On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of

the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by

way of a petition for Quo Warranto.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando),as taxpayer; and Jacinto

Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warrantoagainst

Limkaichong before the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the

eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and

ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose

naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time

of her marriage to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs

citizenship, which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

For her defense, Limkaichong maintained that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. She averred that the

acquisition of Philippine citizenship by her father was regular and in order and had already attained the status of res

judicata. Further, she claimed that the validity of such citizenship could not be assailed through a collateral attack.
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On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared Limkaichong not disqualified as Member

of the House of Representatives. Pertinent portions of the HRET decision reads:

By and large, petitioners failed to satisfy the quantum of proof to sustain their theory that

respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified as Representative of theFirst District, Negros Oriental. This being so, their petitions must fail.

WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSESthe instant petition for lack of merit and declaresthat respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House ofRepresentatives representing the First District, Negros Oriental.

As soon as the Decision becomes final and executory, notice of copies thereof shall be sentto the President of the Philippines, the House of Representatives through the Speaker, theCommission on Audit through the Chairman, pursuant to Rule 96 of the 2004 Rules of the House ofRepresentatives Electoral Tribunal. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Chairman,Commission on Elections, for his information and appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.[7]

The petitioners sought reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but it was denied by the HRET in its

Resolution dated May 17, 2010.

Hence, this petition for certiorari filed by Vilando anchored on the following

GROUNDS:

THE ONE-SIDED RESOLUTION OF THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTOAND THE UTTER FAILURE OF THE HRET TO DISQUALIFY LIMKAICHONG AS MEMBER OFTHE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DESPITE MANIFEST EVIDENCE THAT SHE IS NOT ANATURAL-BORN FILIPINO CITIZEN IS WHIMSICAL, CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARYBECAUSE:

1. THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO DOES NOT OPERATE AS ACOLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF LIMKAICHONGS FATHER

FOR THE REASON THAT HER FATHERS CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION

IS OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, HENCE, THEREIS ACTUALLY NOTHING BEING ATTACKED OR ASSAILED BY THE SAME.

2. LIMKAICHONG CANNOT DERIVE PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FROM HERMOTHER GIVEN THAT AT THE TIME OF HER BIRTH, HER MOTHER IS NOTALREADY A FILIPINO CITIZEN AS A RESULT OF HER MARRIAGE TO HER
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FATHER AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 1 (7) OF COMMONWEALTH ACTNO. 63 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 2 (1) CHAPTER II OF THE CHINESE REVISEDNATIONALITY LAW OF FEBRUARY 5, 1959.

3. HAVING THE PLENARY, ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TODETERMINE, AMONG OTHERS, THE QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE HRET CAN LOOK INTO THE ELIGIBILITYOF LIMKAICHONG EVEN IF, AS AN INCIDENT THERETO, IT WOULD MEANLOOKING INTO THE VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.[8]

It should be noted that Limkaichongs term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental

from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office has

been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no

longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.[9]Thus, the petition may

be dismissed for being moot and academic.

Moreover, there was the conduct of the 2010 elections, a supervening event, in a sense, has also rendered

this case moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by

virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline

jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.[10]

Citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, however, may be

questioned at anytime.[11] For this reason, the Court deems it appropriate to resolve the petition on the merits. This

position finds support in the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is capable of

repetition, yet evading review.[12]The question on Limkaichongs citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again,

as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.

In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that

Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.

Vilandos argument, that the quo warranto petition does not operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of

Limkaichongs father as the certificate of naturalization is null and void from the beginning, is devoid of merit.
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In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To

prove his point, he makes reference to the alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which,

however, is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. In our jurisdiction, an

attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.[13]

The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should be in accordance with

Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. As held in Limkaichong v. Comelec,[14]thus:

As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico,[15]where the Court of First Instance judge motupropioand not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees ofcertificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled theircertificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held that:

x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that theproceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or

otherwise,but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court toinquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked inaccordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is thecancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth ActNo. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings bythe Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." Inother words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably afterprevious investigation in each particular case.

Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representativesdesignated by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate ofnaturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may beraised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant.

Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the

plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the

certificate of naturalization.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility

on the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole

judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is

likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule 14 thereof restates this duty, thus:

Rule 14. Jurisdiction.The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

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Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.[16] The

power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained

originally in the legislature.[17]Such power is regarded as full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any

authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same.[18]

Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to

delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise

would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not permissible. The

HRET properly resolved the issue with the following ratiocination:

xxx We note that Jocelyn C. Limkaichong, not the father Julio Ong Sy, is the respondentin the present case. The Tribunal may not dwell on deliberating on the validity of naturalization ofthe father if only to pursue the end of declaring the daughter as disqualified to hold office.

Unfortunately, much as the Tribunal wants to resolve said issue, it cannot do so because itsjurisdiction is limited to the qualification of the proclaimed respondent Limkaichong, being a sittingMember of the Congress.

Evidently, there is no basis to oblige the Tribunal to reopen the naturalization proceedingsfor a determination of the citizenship of the ascendant of respondent. A petition for quo warrantoisnot a means to achieve that purpose. To rule on this issue in this quo warrantoproceeding will notonly be a clear grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction, but also ablatant violation of due process on the part of the persons who will be affected or who are notparties in this case.[19]

Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)wrote that a collateral attack against a judgment is generally

not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. [20]Under

the present situation, there is no evidence to show that the judgment is void on its face:

As to the Order of the CFI, Negros Oriental dated July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959

that were offered in evidence, far from proving an invalid oath of allegiance and certificate ofnaturalization, being public records, they do in fact constitute legitimate source of authority for theconferment of status of the father of respondent as naturalized Filipino. Absent any contrarydeclaration by a competent court, the Tribunal presumes the validity of the CFI Orders of July 9,1957 and September 21, 1959, and the resulting documentations of Julio Sys acquisition ofFilipino citizenship by naturalization as valid and of legal effect. The oath of allegiance andcertificate of naturalization are themselves proofs of the actual conferment of naturalization.[21]
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The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21,

1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI)Negros Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a

naturalized Filipino absent any evidence to the contrary.

Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The governing law

is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution, the pertinent portion thereof, reads:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

xxx

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age ofmajority, elect Philippine citizenship.

xxx

Indubitably, with Limkaichongs father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that

she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father.

Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of certificate of

naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born to a

Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET is, thus,

correct in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen:

Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose fathers are citizens ofthe Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the father

acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmissionthrough the father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with therequirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural -born Filipino citizen.

Likewise, the citizenship of respondent Limkaichong finds support inparagraph 4, Section1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution.

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Having failed to prove that Anesia Sy lost her Philippine citizenship, respondent can beconsidered a natural born citizen of the Philippines, having been born to a mother who was anatural-born Filipina at the time of marriage, and because respondent was able to elect citizenshipinformally when she reached majority age. Respondent participated in the barangay elections as ayoung voter in 1976, accomplished voters affidavit asof 1984, and ran as a candidate and waselected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These are positive acts of election of

Philippine citizenship. The case of In re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship ismanifested in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent hadinformally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which time the 1973 Constitutionconsidered as citizens of the Philippines all those who elect citizenship in accordance with the1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution provisions, i.e., Section 1(3), Article [IV] and Section 2,

Article [IV]were enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father andan alien mother was automatically accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, while one born of aFilipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship yet if so elected,was not conferred natural-born status. It was the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitutionto treat equally those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenshipupon reaching the age of majority either before or after the effectivity of the 1973Constitution. Thus, those who would elect Philippine citizenship under par. 3, Section 1, Article [IV]

of the 1987 Constitution are now, under Section 2, Article [IV] thereof also natural-bornFilipinos. The following are the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution:

Article IV

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of theadoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers,who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens ofthe Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect theirPhilippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance withparagraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.[22]

Vilandos assertion thatLimkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter

became a Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of Commonwealth Act No.

63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, must likewise

fail.
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As aptly pointed out by the HRET, Vilando was not able to offer in evidence a duly certified true copy of the

alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that Limkaichongs mother indeed lost her Philippine

citizenship. Verily, Vilando failed to establish his case through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a

reversal of the HRET ruling.

Also, an application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of

Philippine citizenship. It is well to quote the ruling of the HRET on this matter, to wit:

An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not aFilipino citizen. It is obtained only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency andcontains a declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and

physical details that identify the applicant. It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, norproof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied forregistration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration underthe Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.

Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and muchless like other public records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate ofregistration is not a public document that would beprima facie evidence of the truth of factscontained therein. On its face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself toregistration. Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. This is especially sowhere the declarant has in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or herstatus as such.[23]

Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original

citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has

consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting

renunciation of Philippine citizenship.[24]For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must

be express.[25]Such express renunciation is lacking in this case.

Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter.

Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only

instance where this Court may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a

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determination that the decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with

grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a

denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such

grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse .[26] In this case, there is no showing of any

such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed the quo

warrantopetition.

In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which resolved the issue of

citizenship in favor of Limkaichong.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the

HRET declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the

First District, Negros Oriental.

LIMBONA VS COMELEC GR NO 186006

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, assailing the

Resolution[1]dated November 23, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) and the

Resolution[2]of the Comelec En Bancdated January 14, 2009 in SPA No. 07-621.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona and her husband, Mohammad

Exchan Limbona, each filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. On April 2, 2007,

private respondent Malik Bobby Alingan filed a disqualification case against Mohammad before the ProvincialElection Supervisor of Lanao del Norte. On April 12, 2007, Alingan also filed a petition for disqualification against

petitioner.[3]Both disqualification cases were premised on the ground that petitioner and her husband lacked the one-

year residency requirement and both were not registered voters of Pantar.[4]
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On April 17, 2007, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy,[5]which was

subsequently approved by the Comelec.[6]Petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss the disqualification case against

her for being moot and academic.[7]

On election day, May 14, 2007, the Comelec resolved to postpone the elections in Pantar because there

was no final list of voters yet. A special election was scheduled for July 23, 2007.[8]

On May 24, 2007, the Comelec First Division promulgated a Resolution disqualifying Mohammad as

candidate for mayor for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement.[9]Petitioner then filed her

Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate on July 21, 2007. On July 23, 2007, Alingan filed a petition for

disqualification against petitioner for, among others, lacking the one-year residency requirement (SPA No. 07-621).[10]

In a Resolution in SPA No. 07-621[11]dated November 23, 2007, the Comelec Second Division ruled that

petitioner was disqualified from running for Mayor of Pantar. The Comelec held that petitioner only became a resident

of Pantar in November 2006. It explained that petitioners domicile of origin was Maguing, Lanao del Norte, her

birthplace. When she got married, she became a resident of BarangayRapasun, Marawi City, where her husband

was BarangayChairman until November 2006. BarangayRapasun, the Comelec said, was petitioners domicile by

operation of law under the Family Code. The Comelec found that the evidence petitioner adduced to prove that she

has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City two years prior to the elections consisted mainly

of self-serving affidavits and were not corroborated by independent and competent evidence. The Comelec also took

note of its resolution in another case where it was found that petitioner was not even a registered voter in Pantar.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[12]

The Comelec resolved the motion in an En Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2009,[13]affirming the

Second Divisions Resolution disqualifying petitioner. The Comelec said that the issue of whether petitioner has

complied with the one-year residency rule has been decided by the Supreme Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v.

Commission on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alinganpromulgated on June 25, 2008. The Comelec noted that, in

said case, the Supreme Court upheld the Comelec First Divisions Decision in SPA No. 07-611 disqualifying

petitioner from running for mayor of Pantar for failure to comply with the residency requirement.
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Comelecs ruling inNasser A. Macauyag v. Mohammad Limbonais not binding on petitioner because she was not a

party to the case.[21]

We dismiss the Petition.

The issue of petitionersdisqualification for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement has been

resolved by this Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alingan.[22]This

case stemmed from the first disqualification case filed by herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as SPA No.

07-611. Although the petitioner had withdrawn the Certificate of Candidacy subject of the disqualification case, the

Comelec resolved the petition and found that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement, and

was, therefore, disqualified from running as mayor of Pantar.

A unanimous Court upheld the findings of the Comelec, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 4, 2007Resolution of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitionerNorlainie Mitmug Limbona from running for office of the Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and theJanuary 9, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. In view of thepermanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall SUCCEEDas

Mayor. The temporary restraining order issued on January 29, 2008 is orderedLIFTED.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The Court found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. It held:

The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residencyrequirement. The term residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile,which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,

coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest intent of the law in fixing aresidence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions andneeds of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve thatcommunity.

For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. There isno hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually resides. Three rules are,however, well established: first, that a man must have a residence or domicile
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shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.(Emphasis ours)

Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence fromher husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of theFamily Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience.

Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to runfor the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x x.[24]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision was denied with finality on March 3,

2009.[25]Petitioner filed another Motion for Reconsideration,[26]which the Court treated as a Second Motion for

Reconsideration and, consequently, denied in a Resolution dated June 2, 2009 .[27]Of late, petitioner has filed a

Manifestationthat raises yet again the issues already resolved in the petition and which the Court has, accordingly,

merely noted without action.[28]Thus, our ruling therein has now attained finality.

Consequently, the issue of petitioners compliance with the one-year residency requirement is now settled.

We are bound by this Courts ruling in the earlierLimbonacase where the issue was squarely raised and

categorically resolved. We cannot now rule anew on the merits of this case, especially since the present Petition

merely restates issues already passed upon by the Comelec and affirmed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSEDand the Resolution dated

November 23, 2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections and the Resolution of the Commission on

Elections En Bancdated January 14, 2009 in SPA No. 07-621 are AFFIRMED.

MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)

Facts:

When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent

Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories,the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative as a domiciliary

of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for three (3) terms immediately before the elections of

2010.
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common denominatorthe material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly

affected, as well as of the people therein; 3.) a voters sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the

entire citys Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only

allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 4.) a voter was also arbitrarily

denied his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and

5.) government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro

City.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro

City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit. Whether or not it violates the

equality of representation doctrine.

HELD: Legislative apportionmentis defined by Blacks Law Dictionary asthe determination of the number of

representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body.It is the allocation of seats

in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population

and voting power among the districts.Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in

legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement ofequality of representation. RA 9371 does not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political

and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is

merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in

the Sangguniang Panglunsod.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of

approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now

effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. This easily means better

access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000. The

fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in

the Sanggunian. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the

halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling

its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and

proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress. Bagabuyo further contends that

RA 9371 violates the equality in representation doctrine as it appears that one district has a higher number of voters

as compared to the other and that one is urbanized the other is rural. This is the clarification; the law clearly

provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitantsof a city or a province, not the

number of registered voterstherein

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Mariano vs Comelec

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

Facts:

Two (2) petitions assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of

Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati as unconstitutional.

They contend that section 51 collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution where

elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are

prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall

acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective

officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51

favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive

terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming

elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his

previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said

section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

Issue:

Whether petitioners arguments are tenable for litigation

Held:

No. The court dismissed the petitions.

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The court cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can

challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy;

(2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised

at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the

determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many

contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected

in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that

these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to

an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper

parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which

this Court has no jurisdiction.

Aquino v COMELEC G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995.

07/17/2010

0 Comments

Facts: On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-

NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that

the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the

1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995

elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the

Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate of

candidacyamending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that

he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (1) year and thirteen (13) days.

After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution
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dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads: respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him

ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution

with the COMELEC en banc.

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend

Proclamation of petitioner.Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's

Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of

petitioner.

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The dispositive

portion of the order reads: hereby directed to complete the canvassing of election returns of the Second District of

Makati, but to suspendthe proclamationof respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of

votes for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for

reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the Commission.

On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent

Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among

others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged

exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987

Constitution.

Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order on

June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof reading:

Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the CommissionRESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion,

and to allow the parties to be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be

studied with more reflection and judiciousness.

On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second

Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as

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