Crim Pro Digest 1

8/3/2019 Crim Pro Digest 1

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Criminal Procedure a2010 page 1 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales

ABBARIAO v BELTRAN468 SCRA 421

PANGANIBAN; August 31, 2005

NATURE

Administrative matter in the Supreme Court

FACTS- This stemmed from an administrative case filed byAbbariao against Judge Beltran. Beltran was chargedwith gross ignorance of the law and knowinglyrendering unjust judgment.- Abarriao was the former branch manager ofCountry Bankers Assurance Corporation. In October1992, Joseph Abraham procured 2 insurance policiesfrom him and issued a post-dated check to serve aspasyment. But the cheque was subsequentlydishonored.- Informations were filed before before Judge Beltranfor estafa and violation of BP 22.

Petitioners Claim- Petitioner claims that Beltrans ruling that there wasno valid insurance contract with Abraham waserroneous and that he had no jurisdiction over thecase in the first place.Respondents Comments- Beltran claims that there was no valid insurancecontract between Abbariao and Abraham becausethe insurance policy form of Abraham wasdisapproved.- He also claims he has jurisdiction over the casebecause the accused was arraigned in his court andthe prosecutor failed to withdraw the case.

ISSUE

1. WON the judge is guilty of rendering unjustjudgment2. WON Beltrans ruling showed gross ignorance ofthe law in terms of assuming jurisdiction over thecase

HELD1. NO, the judge must be absolved from this charge.RatioThe acts of judges pertaining to their judicialfunctions are not subject to disciplinary power,unless such acts are commited with fraud,dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. In the absence ofproof to the contrary, an erroneous decision or orderis presumed to have been issued in good faith.2. YES. Beltran had no authority to rule over the

case.

Ratio A court can only take cognizance of a casethat falls within its jurisdiction.Reasoning- April 15, 1994 is the date of effectivity of RA 7691.RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the first-levelcourts by providing that first-level courts shall have

jurisdiction over criminal cases in which the offenseis punishable with imprisonment not exceeding 6years, regardless of the amount of the fine.- January 30, 1995 was the date the information wasfiled. The case had to do with the violation of BP 22which is penalized by an imprisonment of not lessthan 30 days but not more than one year. Thuswhen the information was filed, RA 7691 was alreadyin effect.- During the tenure of the former presiding judge, theissue of jurisdiction over the case was alreadypending resolution. He also displayed indecisivenessby relying on the public prosecutors assurance thathis court had acquired jurisdiction.- Aside from this instance, there were two other

occasions when Beltran was charged and foundguilty of gross ignorance of the law (in De Austria v.Beltran andAndres v. Beltran).DISPOSITION Judge Beltran was found guilty ofgross ignorance of the law for which he is finedP20,000 as recommended by the OCA and is warnedthat a repetition of the same act would merit agraver penalty.

RIBAYA v JUDGE BINAMIRA-PARCIAAM No. MTJ-04-1547

CORNEJO; April 15, 2005

NATURE

Administrative case against Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Ligao City, Albay relative to Criminal Case No. 8617(People v. Sps. Ribaya)

FACTS- Asst Provincial Prosecutor Pedro Vega, in hispersonal capacity, filed before the MTCC, Ligao City acriminal complaint for estafa against the Spes Ribayaon November 29, 2001. The spouses, after receivingP12,000 from Vega, allegedly misappropriated theamount to the latters prejudice. The preliminaryinvestigation was then conducted by respondent

judge.- Complainant, the daughter of the accused spouses,

observed several irregularities in the conduct of thepreliminary investigation and the issuance of the

warrant of arrest. The spouses then filed a motion toquash and sought the nullification of subsequentorders. They alleged that the MTCC had no jurisdiction and authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint filedby an offended party directly with the court.

The authority to conduct a preliminaryinvestigation was vested solely on the Office ofthe City Prosecutor.- While waiting for the resolution of their motion toquash, the spouses did not post bail. On April 10,2002 Corazon Ribaya was apprehended by arrestingofficers in the public market by virtue of a warrant ofarrest issued by respondent judge.- The complainant filed this administrative caseagainst Judge Parcia. The motions basicallyquestioned respondents authority to conduct apreliminary investigation.- In her answer, respondent judge claimed thatcomplainant was not a party in Criminal Case No.8617. Respondent explained that she

conducted the preliminary investigation of thecriminal complaint against the spousesbecause the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of theOffice of the City Prosecutor was too busy todo so.- To support her claim, respondent attached theaffidavit of OIC City Prosecutor Vasquez of the thennewly-created Ligao City. Vasquez stated that theCity Prosecutors Office was still undergoingreorganization when the subject criminal complaintwas filed. It had neither enough manpower nor officespace in the Hall of Justice. Positions had not yetbeen filled. His workload as Asst ProvincialProsecutor and OIC City Prosecutor was so heavythat time constraints did not permit him to conduct

preliminary investigations. Thus, it was therespondent judge who conducted the preliminaryinvestigation.- the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) foundthat respondent erred when she conducted thepreliminary investigation of the subject criminalcomplaint even after the Municipality of Ligao, Albayhad been converted into a city. The OCArecommended that: (1) the complaint be re-docketedas a regular administrative matter; and (2) therespondent be reprimanded, directed to concentrateher time and effort on performing her judicial tasksand warned that a repetition of the same or similaroffense would be dealt with more severely.- A motion for reconsideration was filed by

respondent on October 1, 2003. This time,respondent claimed that what she conducted


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on November 29, 2001 was a preliminaryexamination to determine probable cause forthe issuance of a warrant of arrest against thespouses. Respondent also claimed that thecriminal complaint was governed by Sec. 9,Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the rule governing cases that didnot require preliminary investigation. Since theamount involved in the estafa case was P12,000, nopreliminary investigation was required.

ISSUES1. WON respondent judge had the authority toconduct preliminary investigation2. WON respondent judge is guilty of misconduct inoffice3. WON preliminary investigation was not requiredfor the estafa case4. WON warrant of arrest was valid

HELD

1. NO- Although judges of inferior courts are authorized toconduct preliminary investigation of all crimes withintheir jurisdiction, the task is essentially an executivefunction. As far back as Collector of Customs v.Villaluz, we already held that:[w]hile we sustain the power of the x x x courts to

conduct preliminary examination, pursuant to OurConstitutional power of administrative supervisionover all courts, as a matter of policy, we enjoinx x x judge[s] x x x to concentrate on hearingand deciding before their courts. x x x [Judges] should not encumber themselveswith the preliminary examination andinvestigation of criminal complaints, which

they should refer to the municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal, who in turn canutilize the assistance of the state prosecutorto conduct such preliminary examination andinvestigation.

- City judges then were clearly authorized to conductpreliminary investigation and examination. Buteven then, we also held that the provisions ofRule 112 granting city judges the authority toconduct preliminary investigation did not applyto judges of cities the charters of whichauthorized the city fiscal only to conduct preliminary investigation of criminalcomplaints.- This ruling was, in fact, integrated into the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Sec. 1, Rule110, criminal actions in chartered cities are

instituted by filing the complaint only with theCity Prosecutor. The rule implies that the task ofconducting preliminary investigation in these cities isnow lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor.Consequently, inferior court judges of citieswhose charters authorize only the fiscal to

conduct preliminary investigation are nolonger allowed to perform this function.- The Municipality of Ligao was converted into a

city by RA 9008 which took effect on Feb 21, 2001.This law, also known as the charter of the City ofLigao, provides in Sec. 50 that:(a) There shall be established in the city aprosecution service to be headed by a cityprosecutor and such number of assistant prosecutorsas may be necessary, who shall be organizationallypart of the DOJ(b) The City Prosecutor shall handle the criminal

prosecution in the MTC in the city as well as in theRTC for criminal cases originating in the territory ofthe city, and shall render to or for the city such

services as are required by law, ordinance orregulation of the DOJ- Clearly, respondent judge had no more authority toconduct a preliminary investigation of the subjectcriminal complaint. The officer authorized to conductpreliminary investigations in the then newly-createdCity of Ligao was its City Prosecutor. At that time,the duty devolved upon OIC City Prosecutor Vasquez,despite the administrative difficulties he wasencountering.2. YES- We noticed the contradiction between her answerand her motion for reconsideration as to what sheactually conducted on November 29, 2001. In heranswer, she justified her authority to conduct a

preliminary investigation. In her motion forreconsideration of the OCAs resolution, however,she declared that she conducted a preliminaryexamination to justify the issuance of a warrant ofarrest-There appear just too many intriguing uncertaintiessurrounding the filing of the estafa case. Wetherefore direct our attention to respondent judgesfailure to erase our doubts over how she administers

justice in her jurisdiction.- Respondent judge must be reminded that sheshould do honor to her position not only by rendering

just, correct and impartial decisions but doing so in amanner free from any suspicion as to their fairnessand impartiality, and as to her integrity. A spotless

dispensation of justice requires not only that thedecision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the

judge rendering it must at all times maintain theappearance of fairness and impartiality.- Considering all this, respondent judge committedsimple misconduct in office. Misconduct in office hasa well-defined meaning. It refers to misconduct thataffects the judges performance of her duties and not

just her character as a private individual. Toconstitute an administrative offense, misconductshould relate to or be connected with theperformance of the official functions and duties of apublic officer.3. YES- Respondent correctly observed that it was notneeded in the estafa case. The maximum penalty forthe crime allegedly committed there (6 months and 1day to 4 years and 2 months) did not meet theminimum penalty (at least 4 years, 2 months and 1day) required to make a preliminary investigationpart of the spouses right to due process.4. YES- As long as the constitutional mandate was complied

with, that is, the warrant of arrest was issued upon afinding of probable cause personally by the judgeafter an examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce, thewarrant of arrest was valid.- Respondent judge examined the complainant PedroVega on the day the complaint was filed and she wassatisfied that probable cause existed. The warrant ofarrest she issued against the spouses Ribaya was,therefore, justified and no violation of theirconstitutional rights occurred. DISPOSITIONRespondent Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia is herebyfound guilty of simple misconduct and a fine ofP11,000 is imposed on her. She is hereby directed todevote her time and effort exclusively to discharging

her judicial functions. She is furthermore warnedthat a repetition of the same or similar act will merita more severe penalty.

TUMANG v BAUTISTA136 SCRA 682

ABAD-SANTOS; May 31 1985

NATUREPetition to review and annul orders of RTC Laguna

FACTS- Emilio Javier filed a sakdal against Enrique Tumangand his daughter Georgia Tumang.

- The sakdal was written in Tagalog and wasunaccompanied by an English translation.


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- The Tumangs prayed that Javier be ordered to file acopy of the complaint as translated in English, and acopy of the criminal complaint and Decision ofacquittal in the unjust vexation case mentioned in

Javiers complaint.- TC ruled on Oct. 21 1982 that the complaint written

in Pilipino, which is an official language, is proper andis admitted. TC also ruled that it is not absolutelynecessary that copies of the complaint and criminalcase be attached as annexes. Javier should have,however, at least stated the docket number as wellas name of the court and branch number.- The Tumangs failed to answer the sakdal and weredeclared in default. They sought to reconsider, notonly the order of default but also the order admittingthe complaint in Pilipino.- TC set aside its order of default that refused toreconsider its order of October 21, 1982.- The Tumangs filed a motion to dismiss, allegingthat the complaint did not state a cause of action andthat the venue was improperly laid. TC denied the

motion on both grounds.

ISSUEWON the sakdal should have been in English and not

Tagalog

HELDYES- In the ponentes lecture, Writing Decisions, hesaid in part:

What language should the judge use? Theconstitution says that until otherwise providedby law, English and Pilipino shall be the officiallanguages! (Art. XV, Sec. 3, Par 3.) If we are tobe guided by this provision then either English of

Pilipino can be used. But in fact English is almostexclusively used and with good reason. ForPilipino is still a gestating language. Theconstitution says so. It directs that theBatasang Pambansa shall take steps towards thedevelopment and formal adoption of a commonnational language to be known as Pilipino.

- However, petitioner cannot now raise this questionbefore the Supreme Court, As they have tacitlysubmitted to the TCs ruling that the sakdal did nothave to be translated in English; they analyzed thesakdal in arguing that it stated no cause of action.Such analysis demonstrated that they understood itscontents.DISPOSITION Denied for lack of merit.

POTOT v PEOPLE

383 SCRA 449SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; June 26, 2002

NATUREReview on certiorari on a decision of RTC ofCatarman, Northern Samar

FACTS- Dec.12,1999: Potot was charged with homicidebefore the RTC for assaulting and stabbing a certainRodolfo Dapulag with a knife, thereby causing hisdeath.- Feb.1, 2000: Upon arraignment, Potot pleadedguilty and invoked the mitigating circumstances ofplea of guilty and voluntary surrender. He was laterconvicted of homicide w/ the above stated mitigatingcircumstances.- Feb.3, 2000: Potot filed a manifestation with motioninforming the TC that he is not appealing from theDecision and praying that a commitment order beissued so he could immediately serve his sentence.- Feb.11, 2000: Private complainant Rosalie Dapulag(wife of the victim), with the conformity of the publicprosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration/retrialpraying that the decision be set aside and that thecase be heard again because of certain irregularitiescommitted before and during the trial. She allegedthat there were 2 other men involved in thecommission of the crime and that the eyewitnessdeliberately withheld the information uponsolicitation by a certain Mayor Dapulag and upon theeyewitnesses own belief that such inclusion wouldcomplicate the case and make it more difficult.- Petitioner opposed this motion, asserting that thedecision can no longer be modified or set aside

because it became final when he formally waived hisright to appeal.- May 3, 2000: The trial court granted RosalieDapulags motion, set aside its previous Decision aswell as ordered that the records of the case beremanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutorfor re-evaluation of the evidence and filing of thecorresponding charge.- Petitioner filed a MFR, contending that the trialcourt has no jurisdiction to issue the Feb.1 order asthe Decision had become final, and that the saidorder would place him in double jeopardy.- May 26, 2000: The trial court denied the MFR forthe reason that the State is not bound by the error ornegligence of its prosecuting officers, hence,

jeopardy does not attach.- Petitioner now assails the May 3rd and May 26orders with the Sol.Gen. agreeing that the challenged

orders should be set aside and that the Feb. 1Decision should be reinstated.ISSUES1. WON the trial court, upon motion by a privatecomplainant, can set aside a previous judgment of

conviction and remand the records of a case to theOffice of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation ofthe evidence and the filing of the correspondingcharge2. WON the manifestation by the accused that he isnot appealing from the trial courts Decision renderthe judgment final3. WON the trial court err in granting privatecomplainants motion for reconsideration/retrial4. WON the assailed orders violate petitionersconstitutional right against double jeopardy

HELD1. NORatio Only the accused may ask for a modification or

setting aside of a judgment of conviction which hemust do before the said judgment becomes final orbefore he perfects his appeal.Reasoning- Sec. 7 Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on CriminalProcedure, as amended, provides:

Sec. 7. Modification of judgment - A judgment ofconviction may, upon motion of the accused, bemodified or set aside before it becomes final orbefore appeal is perfected. Except where thedeath penalty is imposed, a judgment becomesfinal after the lapse of the period for perfectingan appeal, or when the sentence has beenpartially or totally satisfied or served, or whenthe accused has waived in writing his right to

appeal, or has applied for probation.- It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for amodification or setting aside of a judgment ofconviction. And this he must do before the said

judgment becomes final or before he perfects hisappeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of thefollowing ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonablyfiled by the accused, except in case of automaticreview of the decision imposing the capital penalty;(b) when he has partially or totally served hissentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right toappeal the judgment, except when the death penaltyis imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation.When a judgment becomes final, the trial court whichrendered the judgment of conviction loses

jurisdiction to alter, modify, or revoke it.2. YES


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Ratio The waiver by the accused of his right toappeal from a judgment of conviction has the effectof causing the judgment to become final andunalterable.Reasoning- It is an undisputed fact that after the promulgation

of the judgment of conviction, petitioner filed amanifestation expressly waiving his right to appealtherefrom. His intention not to appeal is furtherindicated by his prayer in the same manifestation forthe immediate issuance of a commitment order so hecould serve his sentence. Such waiver has the effectof causing the judgment to become final andunalterable. Thus, it was beyond the authority of thetrial court to issue the order of May 3, 2000 settingaside its Feb.3, 2000 Decision which had attainedfinality.3. YESRatio When the MFR of the judgment of conviction isnot initiated by the accused or at the instance of thetrial court with the consent of the accused, the same

should be denied outright.Reasoning- Sec. 1 Rule 121 of the same Rules provides:

Sec.1. New trial or reconsideration At any timebefore a judgment of conviction becomes final,the court may, on motion of the accused or at itsown instance but with the consent of theaccused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.

- Since the MFR of the judgment of conviction wasnot initiated by the accused or at the instance of thetrial court with his consent, the same should havebeen denied outright as being violative of the aboveprovision. At any rate, the records do not show anyirregularity in the preliminary investigation of thecase before the Provincial Prosecutors Office.

4. YESRatio The right against double jeopardy prohibitsany subsequent prosecution of any person for acrime of which he has previously been acquitted orconvicted.Reasoning- To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, thefollowing requisites must be present: (1) a validcomplaint or information; (2) the court has

jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused haspleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convictedor acquitted, or the case against him dismissed orotherwise terminated without his express consent.- These requisites have been established. Recordsshow that petitioner was charged with homicide

under a valid information before the trial court whichhas jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned and

pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea,petit ioner was convicted and meted thecorresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placedin jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot beprosecuted anew for the same offense, or anyoffense which necessarily includes or is necessarily

included in the first offense charged.DISPOSITION The petition is granted. The assailedorders dated May 3, 2000 and May 26, 2000 issuedby the trial court are set aside. Its decision datedFeb. 1, 2000 is reinstated.

RODRIGUEZ v PONFERRADA465 SCRA 338

PANGANIBAN; July 29, 2005

NATUREPetition for Certiorari seeking to reverse the July 27,2002 Orderof the RTC of Quezon City:WHEREFORE, the appearance of a private

prosecutor shall be allowed upon payment of thelegal fees for these estafa cases pending before thisCourt.FACTS- Honorable Assistant City Prosecutor Rossana S.Morales-Montojo of Quezon City Prosecutors Officeissued her Resolution: there being PROBABLECAUSE to charge respondent for ESTAFA underArticle 315 paragraph 2(d) as amended by PD 818and for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, it isrespectfully recommended that the attachedInformation be approved and filed in Court.- As a consequence thereof, separate informationswere separately filed against herein [p]etitionerbefore proper [c]ourts, for Estafa and [v]iolation of

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22- petitioner through counsel filed in open court beforethe [p]ublic [r]espondent an Opposition to theFormal Entry of Appearance of the PrivateProsecutor- The [p]ublic [r]espondent court during the saidhearing noted the Formal Entry of Appearance ofAtty. Felix R. Solomon as [p]rivate [p]rosecutor aswell as the Opposition filed thereto by herein[p]etitioner.- Ruling of the Trial CourtNoting petitioners opposition to the privateprosecutors entry of appearance, the RTC held thatthe civil action for the recovery of civil liability arisingfrom the offense charged is deemed instituted,

unless the offended party (1) waives the civil action,(2) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (3)

institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.Considering that the offended party had paid thecorresponding filing fee for the estafa cases prior tothe filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan

Trial Court (MeTC), the RTC allowed the privateprosecutor to appear and intervene in the

proceedings.

ISSUEWON a private prosecutor can be allowed tointervene and participate in the proceedings of theabove-entitled estafa cases for the purpose ofprosecuting the attached civil liability arising fromthe issuance of the checks involved which is alsosubject mater of the pending B.P. 22 cases

HELDYES. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing abouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminaloffenses: estafa and violation of Batas PambansaBilang 22 (BP 22). The Rules of Court allow the

offended party to intervene via a private prosecutorin each of these two penal proceedings. However,the recovery of the single civil liability arising fromthe single act of issuing a bouncing check in eithercriminal case bars the recovery of the same civilliability in the other criminal action. While the lawallows two simultaneous civil remedies for theoffended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. Inshort, while two crimes arise from a single set offacts, only one civil liability attaches to it.Reasoning- Petitioner theorizes that the civil action necessarilyarising from the criminal case pending before theMTC for violation of BP 22 precludes the institution ofthe corresponding civil action in the criminal case for

estafa now pending before the RTC. She hinges hertheory on the following provisions of Rules 110 and111 of Rules of Court.- Based on the foregoing rules, an offended partymay intervene in the prosecution of a crime, exceptin the following instances: (1) when, from the natureof the crime and the law defining and punishing it, nocivil liability arises in favor of a private offendedparty; and (2) when, from the nature of the offense,the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity,but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action,(b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suithas already been instituted. In any of theseinstances, the private complainants interest in thecase disappears and criminal prosecution becomes

the sole function of the public prosecutor. None ofthese exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence,


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the private prosecutor cannot be barred fromintervening in the estafa suit.

True, each of the overt acts in these instances maygive rise to two criminal liabilities -- one for estafaand another for violation of BP 22. But every suchact of issuing a bouncing check involves only one

civil liability for the offended party, who hassustained only a single injury.- criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only ifthe same felonious act or omission results in damageor injury to another and is the direct and proximatecause thereof. Damage or injury to another isevidently the foundation of the civil action.- Thus, the possible single civil liability arising fromthe act issuing a bouncing check can be the subjectof both civil actions deemed instituted with theestafa case and the BP 22 violation prosecution.On Election of Remedies- In its broad sense, election of remedies refers tothe choice by a party to an action of one of two ormore coexisting remedial rights, where several such

rights arise out of the same facts, but the term hasbeen generally limited to a choice by a partybetween inconsistent remedial rights, the assertionof one being necessarily repugnant to, or arepudiation of, the other. In its more restricted andtechnical sense, the election of remedies is theadoption of one of two or more coexisting ones, withthe effect of precluding a resort to the others.- no binding election occurs before a decision on themerits is had or a detriment to the other partysupervenes- it was not the intent of the special rule to precludethe prosecution of the civil action that corresponds tothe estafa case, should the latter also be filed. Thecrimes of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different

and distinct from each other. There is no identity ofoffenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in onecase may be invoked in the other. The offensescharged in the informations are perfectly distinctfrom each other in point of law, however nearly theymay be connected in point of fact- In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intendto leave the offended parties without any remedy toprotect their interests in estafa cases. Its power topromulgate the Rules of Court is limited in the sensethat rules shall not diminish, increase or modifysubstantive rights. Private complainantsintervention in the prosecution of estafa is justifiednot only for the prosecution of her interests, but alsofor the speedy and inexpensive administration of

justice as mandated by the Constitution.

DISPOSITION Petition is DISMISSED and theassailed orderAFFIRMED

CRESPO v MOGUL151 SCRA 462

GANCAYCO; June 30, 1987NATUREPetition to review the decision of the Circuit CriminalCourt of Lucena City (petitioner prays thatrespondent judge be perpetually enjoined fromenforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignmentand trail of petitioner, ordering respondent Judge todismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation ofpetitioner as purely civil.)

FACTS- Assistant Fiscal Proceso de Gala filed an informationfor estafa against Mario Crespo in Circuit CriminalCourt of Lucena City. When the case was set for

arraignment, the accused filed a motion to deferarraignment on the ground that there was a pendingpetition for review filed with the Secretary of Justiceof the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscalfor the filing of the information. The presiding judge(leodegario Mogul) denied the motion through hisorder.- The accused filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ ofinjunction. In an order (Aug 17 1977), the CArestrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with thearraignment of the accused until further orders fromthe Court- On May 15 1978, a decision was made by the CAgranting the writ and perpetually restraining the

judge from enforcing his threat to compel thearraignment of the accused in the case until the Deptof Justice shall have finally resolved the petition forreview.- On March 22, 1978, The Undersecretary of JusticeHon Catalino Macaraig Jr, resolving the petition forreview, reversed the resolution of the Office of theProvincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move forimmediate dismissal of the information filed againstthe accused. The Provincial Fiscal filed a motion todismiss for insufficiency of evidence on April 10,1978. On November 24 1978, The Judge denied themotion and set the arraignment- The accused filed a petition for certiorari,prohibition, and mandamus with petition for the

issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/ortemporary restraining order in the CA. On January 23

1979, a restraining order was issued by the CAagainst the threatened act of arraignment of theaccused. However, in a decision of October 25 1979,the CA dismissed the petition and lifted therestraining order of Jan 23,1979. The motion forreconsideration of the accused was denied in a

resolution.

ISSUEWON the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss acriminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal uponinstructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom thecase was elevated for review, may refuse to grantthe motion and insist on the arraignment and trial onthe merits

HELDYESRatio Once an information is filed in court, thecourts prior permission must be secured if fiscalwants to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that

the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion todetermine whether or not a criminal case should befiled in court or not, once the case had already beenbrought to Court, whatever disposition the fiscal mayfeel should be proper in the case thereafter shouldbe addressed for the consideration of the Court.DISPOSITION Petition dismissed

STA. ROSA MINING v ZABALA153 SCRA 367

BIDIN; August 31, 1987

NATUREMandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute

Criminal Case No. 821 of the then Court of FirstInstance of Camarines Norte until the same isterminated.

FACTS- On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint forattempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming partof the installations on its mining property at JosePanganiban, Camarines Norte against privaterespondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with theOffice of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte,then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.- The case was assigned to third Assistant FiscalEsteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who,after conducting said investigation, issued a

resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommendingthat an information for Attempted Theft be filed


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against private respondents on a finding of primafacie case which resolution was approved byProvincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. Private respondentssought reconsideration of the resolution but thesame was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolutiondated October 14, 1974.

- On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with theCourt of First Instance of Camarines Norte anInformation dated October 17, 1987 docketed asCriminal Case No. 821, charging private respondentswith the crime of Attempted Theft.- In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the privaterespondents requested the Secretary of Justice for areview of the Resolutions of the Office of theProvincial Fiscal dated August 26, 1974 and October14, 1974.- On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutorordered the Provincial Fiscal to elevate entire recordsPFO Case 577 against Garrido et al.The letter-requestfor review was opposed by petitioner in a letter tothe Secretary of Justice dated November 23, 1974

alleging, among other things, that an information forAttempted Theft had already been filed againstprivate respondents for which reason the request forreview has become a moot question as the ProvincialFiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge forattempted theft.- On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, afterreviewing the records, reversed the findings of primafacie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed saidprosecuting officer to immediately move for thedismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner soughtreconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of

Justice but the latter denied the same in a letterdated June 11, 1975.- A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was

then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the courtdenied the motion on the ground that there was aprima facie evidence against private respondentsand set the case for trial on February 25, 1976.- Private respondents sought reconsideration of thecourt's ruling but in an Order dated February 13,1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewisedenied. Trial of the case was reset to April 23, 1976.- Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge inthe Court of First Instance of Albay and respondentFiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of theProvincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte.- On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a SecondMotion to Dismiss the case. This second motion todismiss was denied by the trial court in an order

dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent fiscalmanifested that he would not prosecute the case and

disauthorized any private prosecutor to appeartherein. Hence, this petition for mandamus.- In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance ofthe writ of mandamus "commanding respondentfiscal or any other person who may be assigned orappointed to act in his place or stead to prosecute

Criminal Case No. 821 of the Court of First Instanceof Camarines Norte" There is no question that theinstitution of a criminal action is addressed to thesound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He mayor he may not file the information according towhether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient toestablish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonabledoubt. (Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil.846) and when he decides not to file the information,in the exercise of his discretion, he may not becompelled to do so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).However, after the case had already been filed incourt, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without theconsent of the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequicriminal actions actually instituted and pending

further proceedings. The power to dismiss criminalactions is vested solely in the court" (U.S. vs.Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of FirstInstance, supra).

ISSUEWON the fiscal can be compelled to prosecute thecase after his motion to dismiss has been denied

HELDYES- This court is of the view that the writ prayed forshould issue. Notwithstanding his personalconvictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed withhis duty of presenting evidence to the court to

enable the court to arrive at its own independentjudgment as to the culpability of the accused. Thefiscal should not shirk from his responsibility muchless leave the prosecution of the case at the hands ofa private prosecutor. At all times, the criminal actionshall be prosecuted under his direction and control(Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, theentire proceedings will be null and void (People vs.Beriales, 70 SCRA 361).- "In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of thepublic prosecutor to appear for the government sincean offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of theState." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so because "theprosecuting officer is the representative not of an

ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereigntywhere obligation to govern impartially is as

compelling as its obligation to govern at all; andwhose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution isnot that it shall win a case, but that justice shall bedone. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definitesense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim ofwhich is that guilt shall not escape or innocence

suffer" (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556).- Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced thata prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move forthe dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse toprosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceedand prosecute the criminal action. He cannot imposehis opinion on the trial court. At least what he can dois to continue appearing for the prosecution and thenturn over the presentation of evidence to anotherfiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his directionand control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442;U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is noother prosecutor available, he should proceed todischarge his duty and present the evidence to thebest of his ability and let the court decide the merits

of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced byboth parties.- The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had,after reviewing the records of the case, directed theprosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of thecase and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to saiddirective is denied by the trial court, is no

justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecutethe case. It is the court where the case is filed andnot the fiscal that has full control of it.- In order therefore to avoid such a situation wherebythe opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewedthe action of the fiscal may be disregarded by thetrial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far aspracticable, refrain from entertaining a petition for

review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, whenthe complaint or information has already been filedin Court. The matter should be left entirely for thedetermination of the Court."DISPOSITION petition is hereby Granted Publicrespondent or any other person who may beassigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, ishereby ordered to continue prosecuting CriminalCase No. 821 until the same is terminated.

PEREZ v HAGONOY327 SCRA 588

DE LEON; March 9, 2000

NATURE:Review on Certiorari


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FACTS- Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. ownsthe Hagonoy Money Shop which employed petitionerCristina O. Perez as Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and

Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as Bookkeeper, and Cristina

Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/FieldManagers.- For the period starting August 3, 1992 up toDecember 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado andCompany, an independent management, consultancyand accounting firm, conducted an audit of thefinancial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop andfound anomalies in more or less twenty-eight (28)savings accounts consisting of withdrawals whichwere recorded in the subsidiary ledgers of the moneyshop but not in the passbooks which were in thepossession of the depositors. The audit also revealedthat to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fakedeposits were recorded in the money shop'ssubsidiary ledgers whenever the remaining balance

in a particular savings account went below theamount of legitimate withdrawals made by adepositor.This prompted the private respondent tofile an affidavit-complaint for estafa against theaforementioned employees of the money shop andtwo outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas.Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang(hereinafter "prosecutor"), issued a resolution findingprima facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-employees had committed the crime of estafa thrufalsification of commercial documents, andrecommending the filing of the correspondinginformation against them with the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges againstSusan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however,

dismissed.- Perez filed a petition for review with the Secretaryof Justice praying for the dismissal of the chargesagainst her. On the other hand, private respondentmoved for a reconsideration of the portion of thesame resolution dismissing the complaint againstSusan Jordan.- The prosecutor granted private respondent's motionfor reconsideration.8 Hence, on April 27, 1994, aninformation for estafa thru falsification of commercialdocuments was filed against herein petitioner,Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina Medina andSusan Jordan,- On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice,Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution No. 696, series

of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause thedismissal of the information against herein petitioner

on the ground of insufficient evidence. The privaterespondent filed a motion for reconsideration of theorder of the Secretary of Justice, which motion,however, was denied with finality by thelatter.Pursuant to the said resolution, the prosecutorfiled a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of

the case against herein petitioner and the admissionof an amended information excluding petitioner asone of the accused which motion was granted by theRTC. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of thecase against the petitioner in a motion forreconsideration filed in the RTC which motion wasdenied by the RTC after finding that the privaterespondent, as private complainant, had no legalpersonality to question the dismissal of the criminalcharges against the petitioner.

ISSUES1. WON Judge Masadao, presiding judge of RTCBranch 9, Malolos, Bulacan, committed grave abuseof discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to

dismiss the criminal case against petitioner withoutan independent assessment of the sufficiency orinsufficiency of the evidence against the latter2. WON the private respondent, as privatecomplainant, in a criminal case has the legalpersonality to question the dismissal by the trial

judge of the criminal charges against hereinpetitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor

HELD1. YES, Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion in granting the prosecutor's motion todismiss the criminal charges against the petitioneron the basis solely of the recommendation of theSecretary of Justice.

Reasoning- As aptly observed by the Office of the SolicitorGeneral, in failing to make an independent finding ofthe merits of the case and merely anchoring thedismissal on the revised position of the prosecution,the trial judge relinquished the discretion he wasduty bound to exercise. In effect, it was theprosecution, through the Department of Justice whichdecided what to do and not the court which wasreduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of theruling in Crespo v. Mogul..2. YESRatio While it is only the Solicitor General that maybring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or represent the People or State in

criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Courtand the Court of Appeals, the private offended party

retains the right to bring a special civil action forcertiorari in his own name in criminal proceedingsbefore the courts of law.Reasoning- In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,we heldthat:

"In a special civil action for certiorari filed underSection 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it isalleged that the trial court committed grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or onother jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that thepetition may be filed by the person aggrieved. Insuch case, the aggrieved parties are the State andthe private offended party or complainant. Thecomplainant has an interest in the civil aspect of thecase so he may file such special civil actionquestioning the decision or action of the respondentcourt on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, thecomplainant should not bring the action in the nameof the People of the Philippines. The action may beprosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant."

- Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Courtof Appeals allowing the private offended party to filea special civil action for certiorari to assail the orderof the trial judge granting the motion to dismiss uponthe directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. Itfollows, therefore, that if the private respondent inthis case may file a special civil action for certiorari,then with more reason does it have legal personalityto move for a reconsideration of the order of the trialcourt dismissing the criminal charges against thepetitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civilaction will not lie unless a motion for reconsiderationis first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow itan opportunity to correct its assigned errors.

PEOPLE v BUBANGR No. 166895

VELASCO, JR; January 24, 2007

NATUREPetition for review decision of CA

FACTS- Romeo Buban is accused of raping his then 12 yearold daughter 5 times, on separate occasions. Themedical examination of the girl reveals that she wasindeed raped.- Although the girls sworn statement mentioned fiveoccasions of rape, the Complaint mentioned only the

5th

incident. The charges of rape committed on otheroccasions were not supported with the required


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complaints in accordance with Section 5, Rule 110 ofthe 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.- RTC found the accused guilty (sentence: deathpenalty plus moral damages, civil indemnity,exemplary damages) but only with regard the 5th

incident only. The other 4 charges were dismissed for

lack of legal basis to convict. The dispositive portionof the RTCs decision was not specific as to whichcharge it found the accused guilty, but the body ofthe decision implies the dismissal of the other 4charges, thus it can be deduced that the convictionpertains to the 5th incident only. CA affirmed.

ISSUES1. WON CA erred in finding the accused guiltydespite the alleged insufficiency of evidence2. WON the accused may be convicted for the othercounts of rape, where the complaint mentions onlyone instance of rape

HELD

1. NORatio there is no error in the appreciation ofevidence by the court.Reasoning- the argument of the accused that the testimony ofthe girl is not reliable for inconsistencies isuntenable.People v. Antonio: Discrepancies and inconsistenciesin the testimony of a witness referring to minordetails, and not in actuality touching upon the centralfact of the crime, do not impair her credibility. If atall, they serve as proof that the witness is notcoached or rehearsed.2. As can be gleamed from the case, the complaintshould contain all instances of the crime charged.

The other 4 counts of rape were dismissed becausethe complaint did not specify the same, and onlymentioned the last instance of rape, despite theinclusion of the other 4 in the sworn statement of thegirl. The prosecution did not question anymore thedismissal of the other 4 counts, so the court did notdiscuss it further.DISPOSITION judgment affirmed with modification.Sentence changed to reclusion perpatua (pursuant toRA 9346, abolishing the death penalty) and higherdamages.

TAN, JR v GALLARDO73 SCRA 308

ANTONIO; October 5, 1976

NATUREOriginal action for certiorari and prohibition

FACTS- Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant

Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and SolicitorEduardo L. Kilayko for respondents.Estanisloo A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro &Associate as private prosecutors.- petitioners seek the annulment of respondent

Judge's Orders in the Criminal Case People of thePhilippines v Jorge Tan, Jr, Cesar Tan, TeofanisBondoc, Osmundo Tolentino, Mariano Bartido andLibrado Sode for frustrated murder and DoubleMurder of the son and uncle of Mayor InigoLarazzabal.- Judge Pedro Gallardo made the two life sentencesto death penalty allegedly after meeting with MayorLarazzabal and receipt of other paraphernalia suchas whisky and wine according to the court

stenographer.- Jan 14, 1976 - SolGen, on behalf of the People ofthe Philippines, submitted his Comment to thepetition. They are "persuaded that there are basesfor stating that the rendition of respondent Judge'sdecision and his resolution on the motion for newtrial were not free from suspicion of bias andprejudice therefore, they interpose no objection tothe remand of the aforementioned criminal cases"for the rendition of a new decision by another trial

judge."- Jan 30, 1976 - private prosecutors submitted theirComment in justification of the challenged Orders ofthe respondent Judge and objected to the remand ofthis case.

- Feb 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike outthe "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the"Comment" of the private prosecutor on the groundthat the latter has "absolutely no standing in theinstant proceedings before this Honorable Court and,hence, without any personality to have any paper ofhis entertained by this Tribunal- private prosecutors now contend that they areentitled to appear before this Court, to take part inthe proceedings, and to adapt a position incontravention to that of the Solicitor General.

ISSUES1. WON private prosecutors have the right tointervene independently of the Solicitor General and

to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter

2. WON respondent Judge should be disqualifiedfrom further proceeding with the criminal cases

HELD1. NORatio Private prosecutors cannot intervene

independently of and take a position inconsistentwith that of the Solicitor General.Reasoning- Participation of the private prosecution in theinstant case was delimited by this Court in itsResolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaboratewith the Solicitor General in the preparation of theAnswer and pleadings that may be required by thisCourt." To collaborate means to cooperate with andto assist the Solicitor General. It was never intendedthat the private prosecutors could adopt a standindependent of or in contravention of the positiontaken by the Solicitor General.- Since a criminal offense is an outrage to thesovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the

representatives of the State should direct and controlthe prosecution.

> Suarez v Platon: the prosecuting officer "'is therepresentative not of, an ordinary party to acontroversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligationto govern impartially is as compelling as itsobligation to govern at all; and whose interest,therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that itshall win a case, but that justice shall he done. Assuch, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense theservant of the law, the twofold aim of which is thatguilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He mayprosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, heshould do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much

his duty to refrain from improper methodscalculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it isto use every legitimate means to bring about a justone."> People v Esquivel: that there is an absolutenecessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "beforethe court the pertinent facts at their disposal withmethodical and meticulous attention, clarifyingcontradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes intheir evidence, to the end that the court's mindmay not be tortured by doubts, that the innocentmay not suffer and the guilty not escapeunpunished. Obvious to all , this is theprosecution's prime duty to the court, to theaccused, and to the state."

- It is for the purpose of realizing the aforementionedobjectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed


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under the direction, control, and responsibility of theprosecuting officer.- Role of the private prosecutors is to representthe offended party with respect to the civil action forthe recovery of the civil liability arising from theoffense. This civil action is deemed instituted with

the criminal action, unless the offended party eitherexpressly waives the civil action or reserves toinstitute it separately. Thus, "an offended party mayintervene in the proceedings, personally or byattorney, specially in case of offenses which can notbe prosecuted except at the instance of the offendedparty The only exception to this is when the offendedparty waives his right to civil action or expresslyreserves his right to institute it after the terminationof the case, in which case he lost his right tointervene upon the theory that he is deemed to havelost his interest in its prosecution. in any event,whether an offended party intervenes in theprosecution of a criminal action, his interventionmust always be subject to the direction and control

of the prosecuting official."> Herrero v Diaz: "intervention of the offendedparty or his attorney is authorized by section 15 ofRule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to theprovisions of section 4 of the same Rule that allcriminal actions either commenced by complaint orby information shall be prosecuted under thedirection and control of the Fiscal."

- the position occupied by the offended party issubordinate to that of the promotor fiscal because,as the promotor fiscal alone is authorized torepresent the public prosecution, or the People of thePhilippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders,and to control the proceeding, and as it isdiscretionary with him to institute and prosecute a

criminal proceeding, being at liberty to commence itor not or to refrain from prosecuting it or not,depending upon whether or not there is, in hisopinion, sufficient evidence to establish the guilt ofthe accused beyond a reasonable doubt, exceptwhen the case is pending in the Court of FirstInstance, the continuation of the offended party'sintervention depends upon the continuation of theproceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscaldesists from pressing the charge or asks thecompetent Court of First Instance in which the case ispending for the dismissal thereof, and said courtgrants the petition, the intervention of the personinjured by the commission of the offense ceases byvirtue of the principle that the accessory follows the

principal. Consequently, as the offended party is notentitled to represent the People of the Philippine

Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or tocontrol the proceeding once it is commenced, and ashis right to intervene therein is subject to thepromotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be statedthat an order of dismissal decreed upon petition ofthe promoter fiscal himself deprives the offended

party of his right to appeal from an order overrrulinga complaint or information, which right belongsexclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of theprovisions of section 44 of General Orders, No.58. To permit a person injured by the commission ofan offense to appeal from an order dismissing acriminal case issued by a Court of First Instance uponpetition of the promoter fiscal, would be tantamountto giving said offended party of the direction andcontrol of a criminal proceeding in violation of theprovisions of the above-cited section 107 of GeneralOrders, No. 58.- from the nature of the offense, or where the lawdefining and punishing the offense charged does notprovide for an indemnity, the offended party may not

intervene in the prosecution of the offense.- Solicitor General represents the People of thePhilippines or the State in criminal proceedingspending either in the Court of Appeals or in thisCourt. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478,"Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office ofthe Solicitor General", provides:

SECTION 1. Function and Organization, (1) TheOffice of the Solicitor General shall represent theGovernment of the Philippines, its agencies andinstrumentalities and its officials and agents in anylitigation, proceeding, investigation or matterrequiring the services of a lawyer. * * * The officeof the Solicitor General shall constitute the lawoffice of the Government, and as such, shall

discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer.It shall have the following specific powers andfunctions:(a) Represent the Government in the SupremeCourt and the Court of Appeals in all criminalproceedings; represent the Government and itsofficers in the Supreme Court, the Court ofAppeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civilactions and special proceedings in which theGovernment or any officer thereof in his officialcapacity is the party.(k) Act and represent the Republic and/or thepeople before any court, tribunal, body orcommission in any matter, action or proceedingwhich, in his opinion, affects the welfare of the

people as the ends of justice may require.

It is evident, therefore, that since the SolicitorGeneral alone is authorized to represent the Stateor the People of the Philippines the interest of theprivate prosecutors is subordinate to that of theState and they cannot be allowed to take a standinconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for

that would be tantamount to giving the latter thedirection and control of the criminal proceedings,contrary to the provisions of law and the settledrules on the matter.

2. It is already moot because the judge is no longerin the judicial serviceDISPOSITION SC grants the petition and herebyremands the case to the trial court in order thatanother Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion fornew trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on thebasis of the evidence

PEOPLE v DELA CERNA390 SCRA 538

CORONA ; October 9, 2002NATUREAutomatic review of decision of Cebu City RTC

FACTS- Ernesto dela Cuesta was charged on May 16, 1997with raping his minor daughter, Irene, seven timesover a period of eight years beginning 1989 whenthe victim was seven years old.- The victim testified in open court about theincidents of rape. However, prior to the rendering of

judgment, the victim, on July 3, 1998, filed anaffidavit of desistance stating among others that shewas no longer interested in pursuing the case and

that she had already forgiven her father.- The SC noted that the rape incidents in this caseoccurred prior to the effectivity of RA 8353, TheAnti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October22, 1997. Under this statute, the crime of rape wasclassified as a crime against person. It should befurther noted that the law at the time the crimeswere committed treated rape as a private crimecovered by Article 344 of the RPC. As provided for inthe said article, offenses of seduction, abduction,rape, or acts of lasciviousness shall not beprosecuted except upon a complaint filed by theoffended party or her parents, grandparents, orguardian, nor in any case, the offender has beenexpressly pardoned by the above named persons.

- The trial court found the defendant guilty andsentenced him to the supreme penalty of death.


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- In his appeal, the offender claimed that he shouldno have been found guilty considering that theaffidavit of desistance created a reasonable doubt asto his guilt.

ISSUE

WON the trial court erred in convicting the defendant

HELDNO- The affidavit did not in fact contain any retractionon the claim of rape. Hence the guilty verdict wasproper considering that the testimony of the victimwas considered by the trial court as credible andbelievable. There was as such no reasonable doubtto speak of.- Even using the old statute which considered rape asa private crime and the forgiveness of the victim orthe parents, grandparents, or guardian asextinguishing the crime, the Supreme court held thatthe pardon or forgiveness must be prior to theinstitution of the criminal action. After the case hasbeen filed the control of the prosecution is removedfrom the offended partys hand and any change ofheart by the victim will not affect the states right tovindicate the atrocities committed against itself.- The Court also ruled that the death penalty is notapplicable in this case as the prosecution was notable to establish beyond reasonable doubt thealleged minority of the victim. It cited its previousrulings to this effect.

PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ384 SCRA 375

DAVIDE; July 11, 2002

FACTS- Upon a complaint signed by JONALYN with theassistance of her aunt Carmelita Borja, twoinformations were filed by the Office of the ProvincialProsecutor before the RTC of Malolos chargingBienvenido Dela Cruz with rape. BIENVENIDOentered a plea of not guilty.- When JONALYN was presented as its first witness,the prosecution sought to obtain from the trial courtan order for the conduct of a psychiatric examinationto determine her mental and psychological capabilityto testify in court. Trial court allowed the prosecutorto conduct direct examination on JONALYN so that ifin its perception she would appear to be suffering

from mental deficiency, the prosecutor could bepermitted to ask leading questions. Noticing that

JONALYN had difficulty in expressing herself, the trialcourt decided to suspend the proceedings to give theprosecution sufficient time to confer with her.- Trial court allowed the prosecution to put on thewitness stand a Medical Officer of the NationalCenter for Mental Health. Dr. Tuazon testified that

she found that JONALYN was suffering from amoderate level of mental retardation and thatalthough chronologically the latter was already 20years of age, she had the mental age of an 8-year-old child under the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale.- The trial court issued an order allowing leadingquestions to be propounded to JONALYN. Thus,

JONALYN took the witness stand. She declared inopen court that BIENVENIDO raped her twice. Shestated that BIENVENIDO placed himself on top of herand inserted his private part into her womanhood.- The defense filed a demurrer to evidence, whichwas granted. It admitted that it could have moved toquash the information but it did not because thecomplaint on which the information was based was

on its face valid, it having been signed by JONALYNas the offended party. However, the undeniabletruth is that JONALYN had no capacity to sign thesame considering her mental deficiency orabnormality. The defense also insisted on assailingthe competency of JONALYN as a witness. It claimedthat JONALYNs testimony, considering her mentalstate, was coached and rehearsed.- The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence andset the dates for the presentation of the evidence forthe defense. Trial court convicted BIENVENIDO ofthe crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96,but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 forinsufficiency of evidence.

ISSUES1. WON the complaint for rape filed was valid2. WON Jonalyn was competent to testify3. WON Jonalyn was credible as a witness4. WON leading questions should have been allowedto be asked to Jonalyn

HELD1. YES- The pertinent laws existing at the time the crimeswere committed were Article 344 of the RevisedPenal Code (prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353which took effect on 22 October 1997) and Section 5of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.- The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts

of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted exceptupon a complaint filed by the offended party or her

parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case,if the offender has been expressly pardoned by theabove-named persons, as the case may be.- Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of CriminalProcedure states: The offenses of seduction,abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be

prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by theoffended party or her parents, grandparents, orguardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has beenexpressly pardoned by the above-named persons, asthe case may be. In case the offended party dies orbecomes incapacitated before she could file thecomplaint and has no known parents, grandparents,or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminalaction in her behalf. The offended party, even if shewere a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecutionfor the above offenses, independently of her parents,grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetentor incapable of doing so upon grounds other than herminority. Where the offended party who is a minorfails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents

or guardian may file the same.- A complaint of the offended party or her relatives isrequired in crimes against chastity out ofconsideration for the offended woman and herfamily, who might prefer to suffer the outrage insilence rather than go through with the scandal of apublic trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to letthe aggrieved woman and her family decide whetherto expose to public view or to heated controversies incourt the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurringin the family.- The complaint in the instant case has complied withthe requirement under the Revised Penal Code andthe Rules of Criminal Procedure, which vest upon

JONALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute

the criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, thecomplaint started the prosecutory proceeding. Theassistance of JONALYNs aunt, or even of her mother,was a superfluity. JONALYNs signature alonesuffices to validate the complaint.- If a minor under the Rules of Court can file acomplaint for rape independently of her parents,

JONALYN, then 20 years of age who was found tohave the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, couldlikewise file the complaint independently of herrelatives. Her complaint can be rightfully consideredfiled by a minor.2. YES- The determination of the competence of witnessesto testify rests primarily with the trial judge who sees

them in the witness stand and observes theirbehavior or their possession or lack of intelligence,


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as well as their understanding of the obligation of anoath.- The prosecution has proved JONALYNs competencyby the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding of thetrial court, as supported by the testimony of Dr.

Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of an 8-

year-old child, does not obviate the fact of hercompetency. Its only effect was to consider hertestimony from the point of view of an 8-year-oldminor.

3. YES- The foregoing narrative has established not only

JONALYNs competency but also her credibility.Considering her feeble mind, she could not havefabricated or concocted her charge againstBIENVENIDO. Also, no improper motive was shownby the defense as to why JONALYN would file a caseor falsely testify against BIENVENIDO.- Complainant has made herself clear about thesexual molestation she suffered in the hands of the

accused. Plain and simple her testimony may havebeen, unembellished, as it is, with details, yet, it is inits simplicity that its credence is enhanced.4. YES- It is usual and proper for the court to permit leadingquestions in conducting the examination of a witnesswho is immature; aged and infirm; in bad physicalcondition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomedto, court proceedings; inexperienced; feeble-minded;confused and agitated; terrified; timid orembarrassed while on the stand; lacking incomprehension of questions asked; deaf and dumb;or unable to speak or understand the English orimperfectly familiar therewith.- The leading questions were neither conclusions of

facts merely put into the mouth of JONALYN norprepared statements which she merely confirmed astrue.DISPOSITION RTC decision finding accused-appellant BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty of the crimeof rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with themodification that accused-appellant is ordered to paythe victim JONALYN YUMANG civil indemnity in thereduced amount of P50,000 and moral damages inthe amount of P50,000.

PEOPLE v QUITLONG292 SCRA 360

VITUG ; July 10, 1998

NATUREAppeal from the decision of the RTC

FACTS- Calpito was a student from Baguio city. One time,he wanted some fishballs so he and Gosil bought

some fishballs worth P15. When Calpito counted hischange, he found out that he only received P35 forhis P100. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, thefishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito. The 3 men kept arguing. Momentslater, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosiland Calpito. Calpito got stabbed and fell to theground.- The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlongand Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing of

Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly afterthe filing of the information, submitted a motion forreinvestigation alleging that it was a certain JesusMendoza who stabbed the victim. The trial courtacted favorably on the motion. The City Prosecutor

filed a motion to admit an amended information onthe basis of affidavits. The information, as amended,included Jesus Mendoza among the named accused.But unlike accused-appellants who were immediatelyarrested after the commission of the crime, JesusMendoza remained at large. At their arraignment,the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crimecharged.- On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following hisevaluation of the respective submissions of theprosecution and the defense, including their rebuttaland sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assaileddecision.

ISSUES

1. WON the RTC abused its discretion and/oracted in excess of or without jurisdiction infinding that there was conspiracy betweenand among the accused-appellants

2. WON the RTC gravely abused its discretionand/or acted in excess of or without

jurisdiction in finding the accused-appellantsguilty of the crime of Murder instead ofHomicide

HELD1.YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2are only accomplices.2. NO, the crime was qualified The crime committed

was qualified by abuse of superiority. Whilesuperiority in number would not per se mean

superiority in strength, enough proof was adduced,however, to show that the attackers had cooperatedin such a way as to secure advantage of theirsuperiority in strength certainly out of proportion tothe means of defense available to the personattacked.

- Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, inparticular, mandates that no person shall be heldanswerable for a criminal offense without dueprocess of law and that in all criminal prosecutionsthe accused shall first be informed of the nature andcause of the accusation against him. The right to beinformed of any such indictment is likewise explicit inprocedural rules.- object of informing an accused in writing of thecharges against him: First. To furnish the accusedwith such a description of the charge against him aswill enable him to make his defense; and second, toavail himself of his conviction or acquittal forprotection against a further prosecution for the samecause; and third, to inform the court of the facts

alleged, so that it may decide whether they aresufficient in law to support a conviction, if one shouldbe had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542).In order that this requirement may be satisfied, factsmust be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crimeis made up of certain acts and intent; these must beset forth in the complaint with reasonableparticularity of time, place, names (plaintiff anddefendant), and circumstances. In short, thecomplaint must contain a specific allegation of everyfact and circumstance necessary to constitute thecrime chargedDISPOSITION appellant Ronnie Quitlong is foundguilty of the crime of murder for the killing of

Jonathan Calpito. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and

Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as accomplices inthe commission of the crime.

ROCO v CONTRERAS461 SCRA 505

GARCIA; June 28, 2005

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Court the decision dismissing appeal andresolution denying motion for reconsideration of theCourt of Appeals

FACTS


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- Domingo Roco, engaged in buying and selling ofdressed chicken, purchased his supply from privaterespondent Cals Poultry Supply Corporation (Cals)- As payment for his purchase, petitioner drew 5checks payable to Cals against his account withPCIB. PCIB dishonored the checks for having been

drawn from a closed account. Cals then filed acriminal complaint for violation of BP22- Before trial could commence, Roco filed with theBIR a denunciation letter against Cals in that it failedto issue commercial invoices. BIR found no primafacie evidence of tax evasion.- Trial for Rocos violation of BP 22 commenced. Afterthe prosecution rested, the MTCC declared the casessubmitted for decision on account of petitionersfailure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later,MTCC rendered a judgment of convictionagainst petitioner.- Petitioner went to appeal to the RTC contendingthat he was deprived of due process. RTC agreed andvacated the MTCC decision.

- Pending the remanded cases, petitioner filed withthe MTCC a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad

Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum,requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both ofCals Corporation or their duly authorizedrepresentatives, to appear and testify in court andto bring with them certain documents, records andbooks of accounts for the years 1993-19991.Prosecution did not object.- Acting Judge Geomer C. Delfin, issued an ordergranting petitioners request and accordinglydirected the issuance of the desired subpoenas.-Cals counsel manifested that it was improper forthe trial court to have directed the issuance of therequested subpoenas, to which the Roco countered

by saying that Judge Delfins had become final andhence, immutable. Nonetheless, the trial courtissued an order allowing the prosecution to file itscomment or opposition to petitioners request for theissuance of subpoenas. They argued that Deocampohad earlier attested that the documents, records and

1Sales Journal for the year 1993;

Accounts Receivable Journal for the year 1993;Sales Ledger for the year 1993;Accounts Receivable Ledger for the year 1993 (in its absence,Accounts Receivable Ledger for the years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,1998 or 1999);Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996,1997, 1998 and Income Statements as of February 1999;Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997,1998 and pBalance Sheet as of February 1999; andIncome Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.

books of accounts were already burned, they did notmaintain the requested sales ledger and that otherdocuments could not be produced because of therecent computerization of records was still in theprocess of completion. They also maintained that thedocuments requested are immaterial and irrelevant

to the crimes for which the petitioner was beingprosecuted.- In a resolution, the MTCC, thru its Judge Edward B.Contreras, denied petitioners request on thefollowing grounds: (a) the requested documents,book ledgers and other records were immaterial inresolving the issues posed before the court; and (b)the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delaythe hearing of the criminal cases.- Judge Contreras similarly denied the MFR. RTCdenied due course to petition for failure to provegrave abuse of discretion. Similarly, it denied MFR.Petitioner went to CA via certiorari. The petition wasstill dismissed. MFR was still dismissed.Petitioners claim

The denial of the request for the issuance ofsubpoena ad testificandum and subpoena ducestecum is violative of his constitutional rights

ISSUEWON the lower courts erred in denying the subpoenarequested by Roco

HELDRatio NO. Before a subpoena duces tecum may

issue, the court must first be satisfied that thefollowing requisites are present: (1) thebooks, documents or other things requestedmust appear prima facie relevant to the issuesubject of the controversy (test of

relevancy); and (2) such books must bereasonably described by the parties to bereadily identified (test of definiteness).

Reasoning- A subpoena is a process directed to a personrequiring him to attend and to testify at the hearingor trial of an action or at any investigation conductedunder the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking ofhis deposition. The first, subpoena ad testificandum,is used to compel a person to testify, while thesecond, subpoena duces tecum, is used to compelthe production of books, records, things ordocuments therein specified.- The books and documents that petitioner requestedto be subpoenaed are designated and described in

his request with definiteness and readily identifiable.The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this

case. However, in the matter of relevancy of thosebooks and documents to the pending criminal casesthat petitioner miserably failed to discharge hisburden.- Based on the records below and as correctlypointed out by the CA, petitioner had been issued by

Cals with temporary receipts in the form of yellowpad slips of paper evidencing his payments, whichpad slips had been validated by the corporationitself. It is clear that the production of the books anddocuments requested by petitioner are notindispensable to prove his defense of payment.DISPOSITION the instant petition is DENIED andthe challenged decision and resolution of the Court ofAppeals AFFIRMED.

ASTORGA v PEOPLE437 SCRA 152

YNARES-SANTIAGO.; Aug 20, 2004

FACTS- Three (3) private offended parties who aremembers of the Regional Special Operations Group(RSOG) of the DENR Tacloban City, together with two(2) members of Philippine National Police RegionalIntelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram,Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations onpossible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18meters in length and 5 meters in breadth beingconstructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There theymet petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram,who turned out to be the owner of the boats. Aheated altercation ensued between petitioner andthe DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements

and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men,some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. TheDENR team was then brought to petitioners house inDaram, where they had dinner and drinks. The teamleft at 2:00 a.m.- On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner wascharged with and convicted of Arbitrary Detention bythe Sandiganbayan.- SC affirmed the conconviction of Daram.Defendant filed MFR denied with finalityFiled an Urgent Motion for Leave to File 2nd MFR granted

ISSUESProcedural

WON filing of 2nd

MFR is properSubstantive


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WON the guilt of the accused was proven beyondreasonable doubt

HELDProcedural

YES

Ratio While a second motion for reconsideration is,as a general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is withinthe sound discretion of the Court to admit the same,provided it is filed with prior leave wheneversubstantive justice may be better served thereby.Reasoning-The rules of procedure are merely tools designed tofacilitate the attainment of justice. They wereconceived and promulgated to effectively aid thecourt in the dispensation of justice. Courts are notslaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicialdiscretion. In rendering justice, courts have alwaysbeen, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided bythe norm that on the balance, technicalities take abackseat against substantive rights, and not the

other way around. Thus, if the application of theRules would tend to frustrate rather than promote

justice, it is always within our power to suspend therules, or except a particular case from its operation.SubstantiveNORatio When the guilt of the accused has not beenproven with moral certainty, the presumption ofinnocence of the accused must be sustained and hisexoneration be granted as a matter of right. For theprosecutions evidence must stand or fall on its ownmerit and cannot be allowed to draw strength fromthe weakness of the evidence for the defense.Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecutionis concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense

is also weak, the accused must be duly accorded thebenefit of the doubt in view of the constitutionalpresumption of innocence that an accused enjoys.When the circumstances are capable of two or moreinferences, as in this case, one of which is consistentwith the presumption of innocence while the other iscompatible with guilt, the presumption of innocencemust prevail and the court must acquit. It is betterto acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocentman.Reasoning- No sufficient evidence to show that petitionerinstilled fear in the minds of the private offendedparties. It appears that Darma merely extended hishospitality and entertained the DENR team in his

house.

DISPOSITION REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorgais ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on

the ground of reasonable doubt.

Documents

Crim Pro Digest 1