Italian Castillans

i

© koninklijkebrillnv,leiden,2015 | doi10.1163/9789004282766_001

BaronsandCastellans

ii

History of Warfare

Editors

KellyDeVries(Loyola University Maryland)JohnFrance(University of Wales, Swansea)

MichaelS.Neiberg(United States Army War College, Pennsylvania)FrederickSchneid(High Point University, North Carolina)

VOLUME102

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Barons and Castellans

The Military Nobility of Renaissance Italy

By

ChristineShaw

LEIDEN|BOSTON

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Shaw,Christine(ItalianRenaissancehistorian) Baronsandcastellans:themilitarynobilityofRenaissanceItaly/byChristineShaw. pagescm Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN978-90-04-28275-9(hardback:acid-freepaper)--ISBN978-90-04-28276-6(e-book) 1. Italy--History,Military--1268-1559.2. Renaissance--Italy.3. Nobility--Italy--History--To1500.4. Landowners--Italy--History--To1500.5. Castles--Italy--History--To1500.6. Italy--Politicsandgovern-ment--1268-1559.7. Italy--Socialconditions--1268-1559. I.Title. DG537.S422015 355.0092’245--dc23

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vContents Contents

Contents

Acknowledgements vii

1 Barons and Castellans in the Mid-Fifteenth Century 1

2 Lands and Fortresses 9

3 Barons in the City 51

4 Honour, Faction and Private Wars 67

5 A Life in Arms 100

6 Allegiance and Rebellion I: The Fifteenth Century 148

7 Allegiance and Rebellion II: The Italian Wars 198

8 Conclusion 249

Bibliography 255 Index 270

vi Contents

Contents vAcknowledgements viiCHAPTER 1Barons and Castellans in the Mid-Fifteenth Century 1CHAPTER 2Lands and Fortresses 9CHAPTER 3Barons in the City 51CHAPTER 4Honour, Faction and Private Wars 67CHAPTER 5A Life in Arms 100CHAPTER 6Allegiance and Rebellion I: The Fifteenth Century 148CHAPTER 7Allegiance and Rebellion II: The Italian Wars 198chapter 8 Conclusion 249Bibliography Bibliography 255Index 270

viiAcknowledgementsAcknowledgements

Acknowledgements

Ihavebeencollectingmaterialforthisbook,andthinkingabouttheissuesad-dressedinit,sinceIwrotemydoctoralthesisontheRomanbarons.MuchoftheconcentratedresearchforitwasundertakenduringmylastyearsasSeniorResearchFellowattheAHRCCentrefortheStudyofRenaissanceElitesandCourtCulturesattheUniversityofWarwick.Manyconversationswithfriendsovertheyearshavehelpedtoinformandshapemyideas.ParticularthanksareduetoLetiziaArcangeli,MarcoGentileandSusanReynolds,andtoHamishScott,whogenerouslyreadthebookbeforeitwassubmittedtothepublisher,forhisencouragementandadvice.MarcellaMulder,theeditoratBrill,showedexemplarypatienceandtactasmorethanonepromiseddeadlinefordeliverycameandwentoveranumberofyears.

viii Acknowledgements

1BaronsandCastellansintheMid-FifteenthCentury


CHAPTER1

Barons and Castellans in the Mid-Fifteenth Century

HistorianswritingaboutthesocietyofmedievalandRenaissanceItalyhaveusuallyfocusedontownsandcities.Eventhosewritingaboutruralsocietyof-tenconcentrateonthedistrictgovernedbyaparticulartown.Bankers,mer-chants, lawyers, are generally seen as constituting the most characteristicItaliansocialandpoliticalelites.Thelandednobility–notcivicnobilitiesbuy-ing land, but noble clans with fortresses and men who fought for them, forwhomsoldiering,nottradeorthelaw,wasthenaturalchoiceofcareer–hasoftenbeendisregarded.

Inrecentyears,studiesofindividualclans–suchastheRossiofEmilia,theSavorgnanofFriuli,theFieschiofLiguria,theOrsiniandColonnaofthePapalStates–havebeguntogosomewayinrestoringthemtotheirrightfulplaceinthehistoryof theregions.Yet thiswillbe the firstcomparativestudyof themilitarynobility–thesignori di castelli,lordsofcastles,astheywereknown–toencompassthelengthofRenaissanceItaly.Itsfoundationiscomparisonofthemajorfamiliesofthreeregionsinparticular,Liguria,theprovincesofthePapalStatesaroundRome,andthekingdomofNaples.AlongsidethemfigurefamiliesfromelsewhereinItaly,fromFriulitoSicily,whofeatureintheirownright,andnot justtoprovidecontextforthemilitarynobilityofthosethreeregions.TheperiodcoveredisfromonewatershedinItalianhistory,themid-fifteenthcentury,toanother,theendoftheItalianWarsinthemid-sixteenthcentury.

Themiddleofthefifteenthcenturyisagoodvantagepointfromwhichtomakeanintroductorysurveyoftheroleofbaronsandlordsofcastlesindiffer-entregionsofRenaissanceItaly,theirplaceinpoliticalsocietyandtheirmili-tary resources. In two of the major states, new dynasties were bedding in.FrancescoSforza,thegreatmercenarycaptain,madehimselfdukeofMilanin1450byforceofarms.InNaples,AlfonsoVofAragonhadwonforhimselfrec-ognition as king, and was based there rather than in his Spanish or Siciliandominions.InthePapalStates,afteralongperiodofabsencefollowedbydec-adesofschism,thepapacywasbecomingfirmlyre-establishedinRome,andthepopeswerebeginningtoassertcontrolovertheirtemporaldominions.Allthreestateswerestrongholdsofthemilitarynobility,whohadtodecidehowtodealwiththesechanges.Theconclusioninearly1455ofanItalianleaguereaffirmedthenewstandingofthesethreerulers,andrecastrelationsbetweenall the Italian states, providing a structure for the settlement of disputes by

2 Chapter1

concerted diplomacy, or concerted military action if diplomacy failed. Thisnewsystemalsoaffectedthemilitarynobility,circumscribingtheirfreedomofactioninsomeways,openingupnewopportunitiesinothers.

ThebaronsandcastellansofeachregionofItalyinthemid-fifteenthcen-tury,mouldedbytheirhomeland’sdistinctpoliticalandphysicalgeography,hadtheirownparticularcharacteristics,manyofwhichwouldpersistuntilthemiddleofthenextcenturyandbeyond.Likedogs,whosediversebreedsareabletorecognizetheybelongtothesamespecies,agreatNeapolitanbaronrulingvastestateswiththousandsofsubjectsmighthavebeenabletorecog-nizesomeaffinitywithanoblefromthenorthernApennines,hangingontoafractionofthelordshipofasinglecastleperchedonacrag–buttheywouldhaveaboutasmuchincommonasaGreatDaneandachihuahua.

FragmentationwasthekeyfeatureofthelandscapeofthemilitarynobilityofLiguria.Muchoftheregionwasunderthecontroloftheirclans.Thepassesand valleys through the Apennine mountains that loom above the narrowstripsofplainalongthecoastwerepepperedwiththeirfortresses.Manyoftheinhabitantswere their tenantsorsubjects,orboth.Theirpartisansdisputedcontrolofthecoastaltowns:clanssuchastheDoriaandSpinolahadgreaterinfluenceoversomeofthesecommunitiesthandidthegovernmentofthere-public of Genoa. Not all the territory in Liguria was under the dominion ofGenoa,evennominally.TherewereaconsiderablenumberofImperial fiefs,relicsofperiodswhentheHolyRomanEmperorshaddirectlyruledmuchofnorthernItaly.Atthisperiod,theirconnectionstotheEmpireweresotenuousthattheywere,toallintentsandpurposes,independentstatelets.SomeLigu-riannoblesheldlandsinneighbouringstates–theduchiesofMilanorSavoy,orthemarquisateofMonferrato–forwhichtheyrecognizedthelordshipoftheprinces.Noblesmightalsoplacethemselvesandotherlandstheyheldout-side the dominion of these princes under their formal protection. It wouldhavebeenimpossibletodrawclearanduncontestedstateboundariesinLigu-ria:thecomplexanduncertainpoliticalgeographyoftheregiongavelandednoblesconsiderableroomtomanoeuvre,andtobehaveasmoreorlessinde-pendentpoliticalagents.

Bythemid-fifteenthcentury,theLiguriannobleclanswerelong-established.Overthegenerations,eachtendedtosplitintoseveralbranches,aprocessen-couragedbytheprevailinginheritancecustomofthedivisionoflandsinequalsharesamongmaleheirs.Insomefamilies,onebranchbecamemarkedlymorepowerful,oratleastmoreprominent,thantheothers,althoughthiswouldnotnecessarilymakethemtherecognizedleadersoftheclanasawhole.AmongtheFieschi,onebranch,theFieschidiTorriglia,carriedmuchthegreatestpo-liticalandmilitaryweight.Theirwideestates inthemountainstothenorth


andeastofGenoaextendingintotheduchyofMilan,togetherwiththeirholdovertheGuelffactionineasternLiguria,madetheleadingFieschiofthedaythemostpowerfulindividualsofalltheLiguriannobility.Intwofamilies,theGrimaldiandthedelCarretto,suchbranchesweredistinguishedbythepos-sessionofanimportantstrongholdonthecoast,afortressoverlookingagoodnaturalharbour.FortheGrimaldi,thiswasMonaco,atthewesternextremityofLiguria,whichwasnotsubjecttoGenoaortoanyotherstate; forthedelCarretto,itwasFinaletothewestofSavona,whichwasanImperialfief,amar-quisate.

Neitherofthetwoothermajornobleclans,theDoriaandtheSpinola,hadsuchaprominentsinglebranch.Sortingoutthegenealogiesforthesemuchramifiedfamilies,asfortheFieschiandGrimaldi,iscomplicatedbytheirstatusasalberghi inGenoa.Alberghiwereformallyconstitutedassociations,takingtheirnamefromthemainfamilytowhichotherfamilygroupsandindividualshadbeenaggregated.TheDoriaandSpinolaweretwoofthelargestalberghi,bothincludingrelativelypoorandobscuremenaswellassomeoftherichestmerchantsinGenoa.ThoseDoriaandSpinolawhoheldlandsandcastles,in-cludingsomeImperialfiefs,wouldnotnecessarilybeamongtheleadingfig-ures.Somewere,infact,primeexamplesofnobleswhoselandsandlordshipbroughtthemlittleincomeandaprecariousstatus.Theywerehistoricrivals:SpinolaandDoriafactionsconfrontedoneanotherthroughmuchofthewest-ernRiviera.

TheFieschi,Spinola,DoriaandGrimaldihaddominatedthecityofGenoainthethirteenthcentury.TheGrimaldialbergowasstillinfluentialthereinthefifteenthcentury,butwassomewhateclipsedbytheotherthree;theGrimaldiofMonacoheldaloof.Asnobles,nomembersoftheseclanscouldbeelectedheadofthegovernmentasdoge.Forcontendersforthedogeship,nevertheless,thesupportofprominentmembersofoneorotheroftheclanswasvital,espe-ciallyinthefightingthatwassooftenrequiredtoachievethatpositionortokeep it. In the 1450s, the doge Pietro Campofregoso had the support of theDoria. Many Spinola, and the most powerful Fieschi, were persistently op-posed to him, making repeated assaults on the city.The opponent he mostfearedwasGianFilippoFieschi,whoclaimedtherighttoshareintheincomeandthegovernmentofthedoge.HedidnotwanttostayinGenoa,buttohavecontrol over the eastern Riviera. Agreements between Gian Filippo Fieschiandthedogesoonbrokedown;neitherreallywantedpeaceorevenatrucewiththeother,buttheyweretooevenlymatchedforeithertoachievevictory.AfterPietroCampofregosohadfinallydespairedofstayinginpowerandnego-tiatedthesubmissionofGenoatoCharlesVIIofFrancein1458,onlytorepent

4 Chapter1

ofhisrenunciation,heandGianFilippoFieschifoughtagainsttheFrenchre-gimetogether;bothmettheirdeathsdoingsoin1459.

TheLunigiana,theregionoftheApennineswhereLiguria,LombardyandTuscanymet,washometotheMalaspina,thequintessentialclanofimpover-ishedlordsofcastles.Alllegitimatemalesofthefamilyborethepersonaltitleofmarchese, inheritedalongwiththeImperial fiefsthatformedthebulkoftheirestates.Repeatedsubdivisionoftheirlandsovermanygenerationsmeantthat by the mid-fifteenth century there were literally dozens of Malaspinamarchesi, scattered throughout the mountains of the Lunigiana. The smallmountainsettlementsoverwhichtheywerelordsyieldedlittlerevenue;theirfortresses provided bases for the imposition of tolls on routes through themountains,orstraightforwardextortionofmoneyfromtravellers,orforraidsonrivalbranchesoftheirfamily.Malaspinanolongerplayedanyroleinthepoliticallifeofthesurroundingstates,butindividualslookedtoestablishlinkswiththedukeofMilanortherepublicofFlorence–bothinterestedinexpan-sionintotheLunigiana–togainprotectionfromtheirenemiesand,forthefortunate,militarycondottetoboosttheirincomeandprestige.

BycontrastwiththeLunigiana,theplainsofthePovalleyontheeasternsideoftheApenninesweredominatedbypowerfullordsofcastles,sometimesknown as castellani, castellans. Leading figures amongst the most powerfulclansinthefirsthalfofthefifteenthcenturymightstillaspiretobecomelordsnotjustofcastlesbutofcities.Suchaspirationswerenotentirelyforgottenbythe1450s,althoughtheprincesoftheregion–thedukeofMilan,themarquisofFerrara–wouldnothavebeenpreparedtotoleratetheirrealisation.Buttheprincescouldnotpreventtheseclansfromretaininggreatinfluenceinthecit-ies.Theirinfluencewasexercisednotbyholdingcivicoffices,butthroughtheirlinkstotheurbanfactionswhoparticipatedinthegovernment;somefactionswereknownbythenameofthenobleclantowhomtheylookedforleadership.

Iftheirdreamsofbecominglordsofcitieswerebecominglesslikelythanevertoberealized,themajorlandednoblesofEmiliacouldstillaimtokeeptheirindependence,fortheirlandstoconstituteaseparatestatelet.PossessionofoneormoreImperialfiefswascrucialtosuccess.ItwasthisthatenabledthelordsofCarpiandMirandola tomaintain theirstatusas independent lords,despitepressurefromtheEsteofFerrara,whowantedtosubordinatethem.IntheduchyofMilan,familiessuchastheRossiandPallaviciniwhoheldmorelandsandhadgreaterfollowingsthanthelordsofCarpiandMirandoladid,wereunabletowinacceptanceofindependentstatusfromthedukesofMilan.Francesco Sforza had to come to terms with these families, as he fought toestablishhimselfasdukeofMilaninthelate1440s.Theirmilitaryresourcesandthepoliticalcontrolandinfluencetheyhadoverareas,especiallyinthemountains, which ducal officials struggled to penetrate, made their support


indispensabletoSforza’swinningthedukedomandthenholdingontoit.Hegrantedthemprivileges,recognizingandextendingtheirjurisdiction,andgavethemcondotte(althoughthesewouldrepresentonlyafractionofthemilitaryresourcesoftheclans).Inreturn,however,heexpectedacknowledgementofhissuperiorityasduke.

IntheterritoryheldbytheVenetiansontheItalianmainland,thereweresome long-establishedclansofnoble landowners,butonly inoneprovince,Friuli,weresuchfamilies,thecastellani,reallydominant.Friuliwasanimpov-erishedregion,whoseonlytownofanysize,Udine,wasnottobecomparedtoVenetiansubjectcitieslikeVeronaandVicenza,letalonetoVeniceitself.Until1420,whenithadbeenconqueredbyVenice,Friulihadbeengovernedbyanecclesiasticalprince,thePatriarchofFriuli.Undertheruleofthepatriarchs,muchofthecontroloverthelands,resourcesandstrongholdsoftheprovincehadbeeninthehandsofthecastellans.TheVenetiansdidnottrytochallengeorchangethis,relyingheavilyinsteadonthecooperationofsomecastellans,aboveallofthesinglemostpowerfulclan,theSavorgnan.TristanoSavorgnanhadbeenatrustedfriendtoVenicebefore1420,andplayedasignificantpartintheirconquest.HiscollaborationwasimportanttotheVenetiansastheysetaboutconsolidatingtheirruleovertheirnewterritory.TheSavorgnanclaimedtherighttoaninfluentialvoiceinthegovernmentofUdine,andheldsomeof the most important fortresses in Friuli, including Savorgnan itself whichcontrolledavital river ina regionshortofwater,andOsoppo,whichdomi-natedthemainrouteintoFriulifromtheAlpinepasses.Manycastellansmain-tained close relations over the Alps with Austria and with German noblefamilies.ThiscouldmaketheVenetiansnervousastheysuspected,notwith-out cause, that these castellans would favour the lordship of the emperor,rather thantheruleofVenice. Itwasnota realproblemin the 1450s,whentheemperorwastheineffectualFrederickIII,butitwouldbeunderhismoreambitioussonandsuccessor,MaximilianI.

WithintheterritoriesoftheTuscanrepublicsofFlorence,SienaandLucca,nopowerfulclansofmilitarynobilitywereinapositiontochallengethegov-ernmentorbidtohavearecognizedshareinit.Therewereanumberofbaro-nial families, some holding Imperial fiefs, on the fringes of Tuscany; theAppiani,holdingthecoastal lordshipofPiombino,theSforzacontidiSantaFiora, the conti di Castel’ Ottieri, the Farnese, and the Orsini da Pitigliano.Theywerenotsubjectsoftherepublics,andguardedtheirindependencefromthem.Theymightservethemascondottieri,orbecometheirraccomandati,1butwouldnotconsiderthemselvesboundbyanyinvoluntarypoliticalties.

1 Seebelow,pp.150–1,179–80n.131.

6 Chapter1

TheOrsinidaPitiglianoalsohadlandsinthePapalStatesandwerepartofone of the major clans of Roman barons. Baronial families – the Colonna,Orsini, Savelli, Caetani, Conti and Anguillara – dominated the provincesaroundRome.Muchof the landwasheldby them,andtheyhadmany for-tresses.Overthecenturies,baronialfamilieshadalsobuiltupnetworksofpa-tronage and political alliances with the civic elites of towns, not just in theprovinces of the Patrimony, Sabina and Campagna Marittima where theirlandsweresituated,butinareaswheretheyhadfewifanyestates,especiallyUmbria. In Rome itself, they had many clients and partisans. They couldthreatenthesecurityofRomeitselfandputthepopeinfearforhisownsafety.Toaddto theirmilitarystrength,all thebaronial familieshada traditionofyoungmenmakingacareerascondottieri,readytoserveanystateinthepenin-sulafromVenicetoNaples,iftheopportunityarose.

UnabletoofferemploymenttoallRomanbaronialcondottieriintheirownarmies,thepopescouldnotinsistthatthebaronsmustputtheirmilitaryre-sourcesexclusivelyattheserviceofthepapacy.Theystruggledtopreventpri-vate wars among the barons, or to impose a solution in their disputes.Occasionally, they mustered the resources to punish individuals or familieswhohadbeenparticularlytroublesome.Somebaronswerehumbled,evendis-possessed,astheonce-powerfuldiVicowereinthe1430s.Majorbaronscouldpassthroughtorridtimeswhentheywereattackedbythepope,butitwasdif-ficulttocrushthempermanently.Usually,theyjusthadtoweatherthestormuntilthepopedied,andthencouldrecovertheirpositionveryquickly–theirresiliencefosteredbythedeeprootstheirfamilieshadstruckinthepoliticalsocietyofthePapalStates.

AnumberofRomanbaronsheldlandsinboththePapalStatesandNaples;somemembersofRomanbaronialclanshadmostoralloftheirestatesinthekingdom.ThesinglemostpowerfulNeapolitanbaronofthemid-fifteenthcen-tury was Giovanni Antonio Orsini, principe di Taranto, whose vast estatesdominated thesouth-eastof thekingdomandstretched towards thecityofNaples, giving him more wealth, fortresses and men at his command thansomeindependentprincesofnorthernandcentralItaly.Hedidnot,however,holdanylandsinthePapalStates.Someofthebaronswhoheldlandsonbothsides of the border, such as Onorato Caetani, conte di Fondi, concentratedtheirattentiononNaples;otherswerebasedprimarilyinthePapalStates.

Neapolitanbaronialfamilieswhodidnothaveestatesoutsidethekingdomaswelltendedtostayinit.TheydidnotsharethepracticeofRomanbaronsofservingotherstatesascondottieri.IfaNeapolitanbaronwastobefoundintheserviceofanotherstate,hewouldgenerallybeanexile.Baronsdominatedpro-vincial life throughout the kingdom. They were not grouped into cohesive,


coherentclans,althoughthereweresomenumerous,muchramifiedfamilies,notablytheSanseverino,whohadbeenprominentforcenturies.Whiletheyhadclientsanddependants,notevenlong-establishedfamilieshadnetworksofpartisansandpoliticalalliesthatcouldbeidentifiedasafactionoraparty.Manybaronshadquiteshallowrootsintheirlocalcommunities.Apartfromnaturalwastageasfamiliesdeclinedordisappearedforlackofheirs,thewarsandturmoilthathadbeenthedefiningfeatureofthepoliticallifeoftheking-domforcenturieshadfrequentlybroughtachangeoflordstoestates,andnewindividualsandfamiliesintotheranksofthebarons.Sometimes,newcomerslastedonlyagenerationortwobeforetheydisappeared.

Neapolitan barons were notorious for their violence, their feuds, and fortheirpropensitytochallengethepowerofthecrownandtorebel.EnthusiasticparticipationintheconflictsthathadtroubledtheAngevindynastyAlfonsoofAragon had displaced had nourished a military culture among the barons.Eveniftheyheldextensivelands,theywereoftenfarfromrich.Fewmadeareputation as patrons of the arts or learning. The major barons could raisecompaniesofmen-at-armsfromamongtheirvassalsandtheirclientsamongtheminorones.Manyestateswerefiefs,heldofthecrown,andcarryingtheo-reticalobligationsofmilitaryservice.Alfonso,oncehehadsecuredthethrone,didnotcallonthebaronstoprovidethismilitaryservice,butthoseholdinglandsthatwerepartoftheroyaldemesnebymilitarytenurewereexpectedtoserve intheking’sarmies, forpayment.SomeNeapolitanbaronshiredtheircompaniestothekingascondottieri.

“Barons and satraps” was how Alfonso referred to the military nobilitywhosesupportheneededifhewastomakegoodhisclaimtothecrownofNaples.2Inordertowinthemover,hehadtoofferthemnotjustcondotte,butlands,offices,revenuesandtitles.Oncehehadsecuredhisthrone,hestillcul-tivatedtheirgoodwill.Healsointroducedanotherbandofnewcomerstothebaronage,rewardingmenfromSicilyandSpainwhohadcometofightforhim.Theseincludedtwobrothers,AlfonsoandIñigod’Avalos,Castiliannobleexileswhose family would be conspicuously loyal, through several generations, tothe kings of Naples and would reap the rewards in lands and military com-mands. King Alfonso’s illegitimate son Ferrante had been recognized as hisheir,butsoonafterhisaccessioninJune1458,manybaronsrebelledagainsthim,andhehadtofacethechallengeofJeand’Anjou,whocametoclaimthethroneforhisfatherRené.Hisexperiencesduringthefirstyearsofhisreignbeforehefinallyprevailedin1464lefthimdeterminedtocutthebaronsdowntosize,andtoreducetheirmilitarypower.

2 Ryder,Alfonso,212.

8 Chapter1

IncontrasttothekingdomofNaples,fortheislandkingdomofSicilythefifteenthcenturywasaperiodofpeaceaftertheturbulenceofthefourteenthcentury,whenthegreatbaronshadfoughtforcontroloverthemonarchy.Hav-ingbeenruledasaseparatekingdombyacadetbranchoftherulingdynastyofAragon,SicilybecameassimilatedintotheCrownofAragonwhenthecadetbranchcametoanendin1401.Byandlarge,theSicilianbaronsacceptedthissituation,eventhoughitmeantthatSicilywouldnolongerhaveitsownresi-dentmonarch,butaviceroy.Thebaronsmightcompeteforthefavouroftheviceroy,andhopetohaveinfluencewithhim,buttheycouldnothopetocon-trolhim,astheymightaweakorminormonarch.Theyalsohadtomanagerelationswithakingwhowasgenerallyabsent,yetwasstilltheultimatefountoffavourandthepoliticalarbiter.TheprimaryinterestoftheSicilianbaronsinthefifteenthcentury–whethertheirfamilieshadbeenestablishedintheis-landforcenturiesorwereofIberianoriginandhadonlybeensettledinSicilyforagenerationortwo–wastheaccumulationofwealthandprivileges,andthestrengtheningoftheirpowerovertheirtenants.Militaryresourceswereofsecondaryimportancetothem.

ItisnotpossibletodelineateatypicalmemberoftheItalianmilitarynobil-ityinthemid-fifteenthcentury,otherthanbyacharacteristictheysharedwiththemilitarynobilitythroughoutEurope–powerbasedonthepossessionoflandedestates,defendedbyfortresses.Yetthesignori di castelliwho,superfi-cially,mostcloselyresembledthoseelsewhereinEurope–thebaronsofthekingdomofNaples–wereatypicalinItaly.

Many–notall–“lordsofcastles”belongedtofamilieswhichfollowedthepracticeofdividingestatesandlordshipsamongmaleheirs,leadingtomuchramifiedclans,alargeproportionofwhosememberswouldbecomparativelypoor.Many,includingsomeofthemostimpoverished,wereaccustomedtoahighdegreeofpoliticalindependence,eitherbecauseoftheirlegalstatusastheholdersofImperialfiefs,orbecauseoftheweaknessoftheircentralgov-ernment,whetherrepublicorprince.Mostwerefirmlyembeddedintheirlo-cality, and were the focus of local political networks that enhanced theirinfluenceandtheirmilitarystrength.Somemadecareersasprofessionalsol-diers.Iftheydid,aslikelyasnottheywouldnotbeintheserviceoftheirprince(iftheyhadone).Fewfelttheyowedtheirfortunes,ortheirestates,tothefa-vouroftheirprince.Nonewasreallypartofapoliticalsocietyinwhichtheywereboundbyhonouranddutytotheserviceofaprinceincounciloronthefieldofbattle.TheItalianmilitarynobilitywasnotaservicenobilityoracourtnobility–theywereindeed,firstandforemost,signori di castelli.

9LandsandFortresses

CHAPTER2

Lands and Fortresses

Possessionoflandsandfortresseswasintegraltotheidentityofthemilitarynobility,totheirownsenseofwhotheywereandtoothers’senseofwhotheywereaswell.Individualscouldbeaccountedmembersofthemilitarynobilitywhileholdingnolandsorcastles,butamanwouldstruggletomaintainthatstatusifallhisfamilyhadlosttheirs.Ontheotherhand,ownershipofalandedestate,evenonewithfortifications,wouldnotinitselfqualifyafamilytobeconsidered signori di castelli.A richmerchant,amemberofacivicnobility,couldbuyanestatewithacastleandhissoncouldgoofftobeasoldier,buttheestatescouldbesoldandthesonreturntotakeupthefamilybusinesswithoutthe family losingtheirstatus. If the landsandcastlesofa familyofmilitarynobilitywerepermanentlylosttothembythefortunesofwarorsaleorconfis-cation,thefamilyriskedfallingintooblivion,unlessoneormoreofitsmem-bers managed to retrieve the family fortunes and establish another baseelsewhere.Manyoftheestatesofthemilitarynobilitymightyieldcompara-tivelylittleincome,butcouldstillbeprizedbecauseoftheirstrategicposition,orthefightingmentheycouldsupply.Themilitaryresourcesoftheseestateswereanintrinsicpartoftheirworthtotheirlords.Menwhoinheritedonlyafractionofanestatewouldcling to it,andmaintain their right to live thererather than sell out and make what could well be a better living elsewhere.Identification with, and attachment to, estates was strengthened and deep-enedwherethefamilyfelttheyweretrulylordsofthelandsandthepeople,independentofanysuperior,princeorrepublic.

Thepreciselegalstatusofanestate–whetheritwasanallod,ownedout-right, a long-term leasehold or a fief – did not necessarily determine howstrongthesenseoflordshipoftheindividualorfamilywhopossesseditwouldbe.Someleaseholdshadbeeninplaceforseveralgenerations,forcenturies.Ifthey were held of a religious institution, the original lease might well havebeenadisguisedsaleorgrantorpost facto legitimationofanactofusurpa-tion inanycase, inorder toget roundthecanonicalprohibitionof thesaleofchurchlands.Fiefsgenerallybroughtwiththemthedelegationorgrantofpowersofgovernment,oftaxationandtheadministrationofjustice,thaten-dowedthefiefholderwithmuchgreaterauthorityoverthepeoplewholivedonthemthantheownerofanallodwouldgenerallyhave.Imperialfiefs,whentheauthorityoftheHolyRomanEmperorinItalywasweak,werede factoin-dependentstates,howeverminiscule.


10 Chapter2

Giventhepiecemealwayinwhichthepatrimoniesofmanynoblefamilieshadbeenbuiltup,sometimesoverseveralcenturies–bypurchase,grants,for-cibleseizure,inheritancefrommaternalkinorcollaterallinesofthelineage,anddowriescomingintothefamily–confusion,genuineorcontrived,overtheexactlegalstatusofaparticularestate,orthepatrimonyasawhole,wasnotsurprising.Financialorpoliticalpressures,orthefortunesofwarcouldleadtothelossoflandswhichmightthenberecoveredondifferentterms.Acknowl-edgement of changes made under one set of circumstances might be disa-vowed under another, but leave grounds for legal dispute and conflictingclaimstorightsoverlands.

Borgo Fornari, which dominated the Valle Scrivia and hence one of theroutesbetweentheduchyofMilanandtherepublicofGenoa,wasanexampleoftheambiguitiesthatcouldarise.Ithadbeenincludedintheinvestiturewiththe Valle Scrivia and much of the Val Borbera granted to Opizzino SpinolabytheEmperorHenryVIIin1313.Opizzinoalreadypossessedtheselands,andthe Imperial investiture served principally to strengthen his title to them.1Intheearlyfifteenthcentury,TroiloSpinolasoldBorgoFornaritoGenoa,tothedisgustofhisfamilywhoostracizedhimforalienatingsoimportantaplaceinthemiddleoftheirlands.ShortlyafteritwasoneoftheplacestakenbythedukeofMilan,FilippoMariaVisconti,duringawaragainstGenoa,andinordertohavethehelpoftheSpinolainhisplanstotakeGenoaforhimself,thedukeinvestedthemwithitinfiefin1421.AftertheGenoeserevoltagainstViscontiinlateDecember1435,theSpinolareceivedafreshgrantofBorgoFornariaspartoftheiragreementwiththenewrepublicangovernment.2By1447,thebehav-iouroftheSpinolawhoheldBorgoFornari,CarocciodiOddone,wassodisrup-tivethatthedoge,GianoCampofregosobegantolayplanstotakeitfromhim.Gettingwindofthis,otherSpinolaagreedtobuyitfromCaroccio,andtofore-stallanydisputeaboutthistransaction,theyaskedtheGenoesegovernmenttoratifythesale.TheGenoesewantedsomerecognitionoftheirsovereigntyoverthe place in return, but the Spinola refused, arguing it was an Imperial fief.Enquiries were made, and the Genoese concluded that in fact they had norightsoverBorgoFornari,andgavetheirapprovaltothesalewithoutanycon-ditions.3

Whentherewerenogroundsfordisputingtowhichstate,ifany,anestateappertained,therecouldstillbedoubtsaboutitslegalstatus.WhenGirolamoOrsini da Bracciano murdered his half-brother Napoleone in 1534, papal

1 LorenzoTacchella,La media ed alta Val Borbera nella Storia(Genoa,1961),58–60.2 AlessandraSisto,I feudi imperiali del Tortonese(Turin,1956),33,43–4.3 ASGenoa,AS537,ff.160v-161r,166r-168v,175r-176r.

11LandsandFortresses

lawyersarguedhisestatesshouldbeconfiscated,becausetheywereallodial,“burgensatiche”.TheOrsinifamilylawyersarguedtheywerefiefs,andshouldnotbeconfiscatedbutdevolvetoGirolamo’sheir,hisbrotherFrancesco,buttheystruggledtofindevidencetosupporttheircase.4

Infact,someatleastoftheOrsiniestateshadbeenformallygrantedtothemby the papacy, including Bracciano, over which Carlo, Francesco and OrsoOrsinihadbeengivenavicariateforthreeyearsbyMartinVin1419.Typically,theymaywellalreadyhavebeeninpossessionofitbefore,astheirfamilyhadbeenbuildinguplandsandrightsintheareasincethelatefourteenthcentu-ry.5Typically,too,theykeptit,althoughthegrantwasnotformallyrenewed,anddidnotrenderanypaymenttothepopestorecognizeitwasheldfromthepapacy.TheOrsinididnotpayacensusforanypropertytheyhadalreadyheldwhenitwasthesubjectofapapalgranttothem,ortowhichtheyconsideredtheyhadaclaimindependentofanygrant.Whetherinmoneyorkind,acen-suswaspaidforonlyahandfulofOrsiniestates,sometimessporadically.Otherbaronialfamilieswereevenmoreremissinfulfillingobligationsforestatesforwhichtheyhadreceivedsomepapalgrant.Nordidpapalofficialstrytochaseup payments that should have been due: memories about these obligationswereasshortandaspatchyonthesideofthepapalbureaucracyasonthatofthebarons.6

KingFerranteofNaplesarguedthattheestatesoftheRomanbarons ‘aregenerallyfreelytheirs,andnotlikethelandsandestatesofourkingdom’andthoseofothertemporalprinces.7Romanbaronswere‘lords,notfiefholdersorvicars’seekingconfirmationorinvestiturefromthepope,hesaid.8WhateverjustificationhehadforsuchviewsoftherelationshipofRomanbaronstothepope(hehadgoodreasontoplaydownitssignificance)FerrantewasarguablyoverstatingthecontrastwiththebaronsofotherItalianstates,includinghisown.Forthemostpart,theydidnotfeelbeholdentoanyonefortheirlands,orfeelanyobligationtoperformserviceforthem.

EveninsouthernItaly,wheretherewasnoquestionthatmanyestateswereheld in fief,anysenseofobligation for thegrantquicklybecameasenseof

4 PopeClementVIIdiedlaterthatyearwhilethecasewasunresolved,andtheCollegeofCardinalsdecidedbeforetheelectionofthenewpopethattheOrsinishouldhavebackthoseestatesthatwerebeingheldforthepope.(ChristineShaw,The Political Role of the Orsini Family from Sixtus IV to Clement VII(Rome,2007),45–6.)

5 FrancescaLauraSigismondi,Lo stato degli Orsini(Rome,2003),14–16.6 Shaw,The Political Role,38–45.7 FrancescoTrinchera,Codice Aragonese(Naples,1866–70),II,part1,310–11:FerrantetoAntonio

deGennaro,7Mar.1493.8 AColonna,III,BB,XXXVI/37:FerrantetoBelprato,19May1491;Shaw,The Political Role,47.

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entitlementtotheestateandtotherightsoflordshipassociatedwithit,tobedefended by force if need be. Prolonged political turbulence and war and adisputedchangeofdynasty in thekingdomofNapleshadresulted inmanyfiefsbeingconfiscatedandgrantedtonewholdersorreturnedtoformerones,insomecasesseveraltimesover.Butbaronsstillexpectedtoleavetheirfiefstotheirheirs,anditbecamecommonpracticeforgrantsoffiefstoincludetherighttopassthemtoindirectmaleheirsshouldthedirectmalelinedieout.9The king’s intervention in the proposals for the division of the inheritanceoftheprinciped’Altamurabetweenhistwodaughters,withtheaimofsecur-ing the lion’s share for his son Francesco who was married to one of them,broughtAltamuraandhisotherson-in-law,PedrodeGuevara,intotheranksofthebaronswhorebelledagainstFerrantein1485.Thedeclareddesireoftheking’sownsonandheirAlfonso,dukeofCalabria,tobringallthelandswithinaforty-mileradiusofthecityofNaplesintotheroyaldemesne,wastheothermajortriggeroftherebellion.AntonellodaSanseverino,principediSalernowouldhavebeenoneofthebaronswhowouldhavebeendispossessedbysuchamove.10

For Sicilian nobles, fiefs were an essential part of their patrimony; otherlands,howeverprofitabletheymightbe,lackedtheiressentialcachet.Yetfiefswere treated much like allodial property.They were bought, sold, alienated,giventoyoungerorillegitimatesons,eventodaughters.Nohomageorinvesti-turewasrequiredtolegitimateorconfirmtheholdingofafief.11

FiefsinsouthernItalyandImperialfiefsinnorthernItalywereregardedasbeingmoreprestigiousthanotherestates.SomeLombardlords,however,sawacceptanceoflandsinfieffromanyoneotherthantheemperorasanunwant-edacknowledgementofsubjection,andofrestrictionsonwhattheycoulddowith their property.TheVisconti and Sforza dukes of Milan had a policy oftrying,byforceorpersuasion,tomakethelandednoblesintheirstateacceptinvestiture as ducal fiefs of lands they already possessed.12 In some circum-stances, thiscouldbeameanstoregulateasituationwhere landshadbeenseizedbyanobleandthedukelackedthepowertorecoverthem,ratherthananassertionofducalpower.13Whenthedukewasabletoenforcehisrights

9 GérardDelille,Famiglia e proprietà nel Regno di Napoli(Turin,1988),45.10 ForthebaronialrebellioninNaplesin1485–6,seebelow,pp.192–6.11 HenriBresc,‘Lefiefdanslasociétésicilienne(1410–1510)’,329–33.12 Giorgio Chittolini, ‘Infeudazioni e politica feudale nel ducato visconteo-sforzesco’;

Federica Cengarle, Immagine di potere e prassi di governo. La politica feudale di Filippo Maria Visconti(Rome,2006).

13 Marco Gentile, ‘Aristocrazia signorile e costituzione del ducato visconteo-sforzesco’,142–3.


overafief,therecouldbeconsolationforthelordinbeingfreedfromthebond.ManfredodaCorreggiovaluedthestrongholdofBrescello,whichheheldinfief fromthedukeofMilan,butwhenGaleazzoMariaSforzasent troopstotakeitfromhimin1468,althoughManfredodidnotwanttoloseit,hefeltthathewouldatleasthavethesatisfactionofbeing‘afreemanandnothavingob-ligationstoanyonethroughafief ’.Holdingafief,hethought,hadmadehimseem‘amanofsmallaccount’.14

The dukes also fought to establish overlordship of lands in Liguria, bothwhenGenoawasunderthemandwhenitwasnot.BetweentheinvestitureoftheSpinolawithBorgoFornaribyFilippoMariaViscontianditsgranttothembyGenoain1435,theSpinolahadagreedtocedeittotheduke,‘sothattheywouldnolongerhavetheobligationsofthefief ’,accordingtoJacopoSpinola,oneofthebrotherswhohadboughtitofCaroccioin1447.IftheyweretoagreethattheyhelditinfieffromFrancescoSforza,heprotested,theywouldincurthehatredoftheirfellowcitizensinGenoa,andtheiraffairstherewouldsuffer.TheywouldbeputtotroubleandexpensedefendingBorgoFornari,astheGe-noesecouldnottoleratehavingacastellosoclosetothecitybeinginfieftotheduke.15

When Louis XII of France was lord of Genoa and Milan in the early six-teenthcentury,LucianoGrimaldiwasputundergreatpressuretosellMonaco,orexchangeitforafiefinFrance.Lucianowasarrestedin1507andheldpris-onerinMilanforayear.BackinMonaco,hehadanotarymakealegalrecordofhisprotestagainstanyconcessionsthatmightbeextractedfromhimthatwouldcontravenehis sovereignrights.Anycessionof the fortress,oragree-menttovassalageortothepaymentofhomage,diminishinghisprerogatives,hedeclaredshouldberegardedasnullandvoid.LouishadtogiveuptheideaofhavingMonaco,orofreceiving feudalhomagefor it fromtheGrimaldi.16NorwouldtheGrimaldirecognizeMonacotobeanImperialfief.AnerrorbyanagentnegotiatinganagreementforImperialprotectionofMonacoin1524,resulted in the insertion into it of a clause that the lord of Monaco shouldrecognize for himself, his heirs and successors, that he held it in fief fromthe Emperor and should pay homage and swear fealty. If he had wanted togive his envoy a mandate to concede this, Agostino Grimaldi protested, hecouldnothavedoneso:hewasmerelythelordofMonacoforhislifetime,and

14 Ibid.,143–4.15 ASMilan, ASforzesco, b. 409: Jacopo Spinola to Cicco Simonetta, 16 Nov. 1454, Borgo

Fornari.16 GustaveSaige,Documents historiques relatifs à la Principauté de Monaco(Monaco,1888–

9),II,LVI-LXIII,92–5.

14 Chapter2

could not inflict such damage and prejudice on his successors. The king ofFrancehadtriedandfailedtogetsuchterms,herecalled,butthathadbeenresisted,andthekingofFrance,asrulerofGenoaandMilanatthattime,hadbeenjustasimportantafiguretothelordofMonacoastheemperorwasnow.Agostinosucceededingettingtheoffendingclausecancelled,withtheImpe-rialchanceryconcedingthatitsimplementationwouldhavemeant‘irrepara-bleprejudice’tothelordofMonacoandhissuccessors.17ButItalianlords,likeItalianprincesandrepublics,hadtobeontheirguardinthesixteenthcenturyagainstattemptsbythekingsofFranceandSpainandtheEmperorandtheiragentsinItalytoassumeorimposeauthorityoverthemwhentherewerenolegalgroundsfordoingso.

The identification of members of the military nobility with the family’slands,theconsciousnessofthestatus,asmuchasthepower,thatcamewithholdingjurisdictionovermenandthepossessionoffortresses,wasreflectedinthecustomsandpracticesthatgovernedthetransmissionofestatesfromonegeneration to the next. The predominant custom in fifteenth-century Italyamongthemilitarynobilitywasforall legitimatesonstohavetherighttoashare,usuallyanequalshare,ofthepropertyleftbytheirfather.Primogeniturewasexceptional,althoughitwasbecomingmorecommon.Attemptstoestab-lishprimogeniturewerenotalwayssuccessful,despitetherecognitionofhowdivision and subdivision of estates weakened the power of the family as awhole.Fondfathersmightbeunabletobringthemselvestofavourtheireldestsonattheexpenseoftheothers.Iftheyhadnolivingsons,butdidhaveoneormoredaughters,theymightwishtopasstheirestatestotheirgirls,ratherthantothenearestmaleheirorheirs.

As a consequence of the prevailing inheritance customs, it was commonpracticeforestatestobegovernedbygroupsoflords–bytwoormorebroth-ers,byunclesandnephews,byaclutchofcousins–ratherthanbyasinglein-dividual. Key properties, such as the estates from which a lineage took itsname, might be held in common for generations. Frequently, brothers heldtheirlandsincommonuntiloneormoreofthemhadsonsoftheirowngrow-ingtomanhood.Whenestatescouldnotbedivided,becausefamilytraditionorthebindingprovisionsofawillforbadeit,orbecausethereweresomanyindividualswithasharethatitwasnotfeasibletosplitthepropertyup,theremightbeadozenormorelords.Forsmallerpropertieswherenumerouscous-inhoodsrefusedtorelinquishtheirrights,thesituationbecamealmostfarci-cal. Some villages have so many gentlemen with a share in the lordship,commentedthesixteenth-centurywriterStefanoGuazzoonMonferrato,‘that

17 Ibid.,233–8,243–7,249–52.


theyhavescarcelyaninchoflandeachandspilloutofvariousdoorsinsuchnumberstheyseemlikerabbits’.18Multiplelordsmighttakeitinturnstoexer-cisejurisdictionovertheestateandthemen,asthefourteensonsofAzzoneMalaspinadi Mulazzo didafterhisdeath in 1473.19Another solutionwas toelectoneormoreoftheirnumberas“governors”,astheFieschidiSavignonedid,enshrining the roleof the three ‘deputatialgoverno’ instatutes for thecivilandcriminaljurisdictionofSavignonein1487.20

AneloquentdenunciationofthedireconsequencesofdivisionofpropertywassetoutinthelengthytestamentofconteAntoniodaMarsciano,drawnupin1476.His lands, fortresses,armsandartillery,hisportablealtarandhis li-brary(lovinglydescribed,bookbybook),andthefamilyplateandtableorna-mentsusedforbanquetswereallentrustedtohiseldestsonRanuccio(likehisfather,acondottiereofsomerepute).Thispropertyandallthesegoodsweretobekepttogetherforthebenefitofthewholefamily;theywerenottobesoldorpledgedordividedup.Heexhortedhisninesonstoabidebyhisdispositions,andurgedthemtostayunited–‘theruinsandmisfortunesofourancestors,bornoutofdiscordsanddivisions[ofproperty]’,provedhowadvantageous,howessential,thiswas.Hegaveadetailedhistoryofthedivisionsofpropertyandthetroublestheyhadcausedthefamilyoverseveralgenerationstorein-forcehisadmonitions.21

Keeping up arrangements for joint lordship for one generation could beproblematicenough.Keepingthemgoingfortwoormoregenerationswoulddemand a high degree of mutual forbearance and willingness to cooperate.Theywereevenmoredifficulttomaintainifsharesbecameincreasinglyune-qual.Somebiologicalgoodfortunewasrequiredaswell,withenoughsonsliv-ingtoadulthoodtoensurethesurvivalofthefamilybutnottoomanyfortheavailableresourcestosustain.Soonerorlater,mostsucharrangementswouldbeendedbysubdividingtheproperty,soeachparticipanthadfullcontrolovertheirownshare.Naturally,dividingupestatescouldbreednewquarrelsandresentments.Insomeinstances,thereweresomanylordsthatsubdivisionwasnolongeranoption,andtheywouldjusthavetomakethebestofit.TheSpino-laofArquataresortedtoacompromisein1523,drawinglotstodecidewhichof

18 StefanoGuazzo,La civil conversazione,ed.AmedeoQuondam(Modena,1995),134.19 EugenioBranchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale(Pistoia,1897–8),I,232–3.20 FlaviaCellerino,‘GliStatutidiSavignone’,58.21 FerdinandoUghelli,Albero e Istoria della famiglia de’ conti di Marsciano,ed.MariaGrazia

Nico Ottaviani (Marsciano, 2003), 128–75 (Latin version); Italian translation in Appen-dice,70–117(quotation,96).

16 Chapter2

theirmenshouldobeywhichlord;anynewresidentwouldhavetopickalordwithinsixmonthsofcomingtoliveinArquata.22

Awareofthedangerthatasestateswerefragmentedbysubdivision,thepo-liticalpowerandmilitaryresourcesofthelineagewouldbeweakened,someindividuals sought to break with custom and introduce primogeniture.Thiscouldrequirethesanctionoftheprince,inLombardy,forexample,thedukeofMilan.23GianLuigiFieschiin1495obtainedagrantfromtheemperor-elect,MaximilianI,oftherighttomakehiseldestsonhisheir,withprovisionofen-tailed estates (fedecommissi) for his other sons. In his will, he left the mainblockofhisfiefstohiseldestson,Gerolamo,andmoredetachedestatestohisyounger sons.24 A petition on behalf of all the Malaspina to the EmperorCharlesVin1530broughtpermissiontoinstituteprimogenitureintheinherit-anceoftheirlands,25butdivisionsstillwenton.Thepullofcustomwasverystrong.EveninthekingdomofNaples,whereprimogeniturewasthedefaultintheeventofafatherdyingintestate,divisionbetweensonswasthenorm.In-heritancecustomsthereweredifferentaccordingtowhetherlandswereallodsorfiefs,whetherfiefshadbeeninheritedorgrantedtothetestator,andwheth-ertheywereconsideredtobesubjecttoFrankishorLombardlaws.26Thegen-eral pattern was for lands to be divided among sons, with, in the greaterfamilies,themajorfiefsgoingtotheeldestson.Themoreprestigiousthefam-ily,themoreunequalthedivisiontendedtobe.27Singlefiefsinthekingdomcouldnotbesubdivided.28

22 Sisto,I feudi imperiali,83.23 LetiziaArcangeli,Gentiluomini di Lombardia(Milan,2003),XVIII.24 Sisto,I feudi imperiali,54–6;RiccardoDeRosa,I Fieschi(Genoa,2004),20–2.25 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,I,248–9.26 Thatis,thecustomsandpracticesthatdevelopedfromthoseintroducedbytheNorman

settlersofthekingdom(Frankish),andthebodyoflawandcustomsoriginallybasedonlawsissuedbyLombard,CarolingianandGermankingsofItalyandgatheredintocollec-tions by academic lawyers (notably the Libri Feudorum), which was followed in otherareasofItalyaswell(Lombard).PrimogenitureinNaplescametobeassociatedwithius francorum (Aurelio Cernigliaro, Sovranità e feudo nel Regno di Napoli 1505–1557, 2 vols(Naples,1983),I,220–1,note156).Foradiscussionofthecomplexitiesandobscuritiessur-roundingthesebodiesoflawandtheirapplication,seeSusanReynolds,Fiefs and Vassals. The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted(Oxford,1994;1996),181–257,especially215–30,240–9.

27 Delille,Famiglia e proprietà,26–36;MariaAntoniettaVisceglia,‘Lineeperunostudiouni-tariodeitestamentiedeicontrattimatrimonialidell’aristocraziafeudalenapoletanatrafineQuattrocentoeSettecento’,inMélanges de l’École française de Rome,95(1983),393–470.

28 Delille,Famiglia e proprietà,35–6.


The circumstances in which women could inherit fiefs were complicatedin thekingdomofNaplesby thecoexistenceofLombardandFrankishcus-toms.Alegaldecisionpromulgatedin1418,forexample,laiddownthatawom-anlivingbyLombardlawcouldnotinheritfiefsifshehadalreadybeengivenadowrybyherfatherorherbrother;ifshewaslivingbyFrankishlaw,shecouldinheritafief,butnotfromherbrotherifshehadalreadybeengivenadowrybyhim.29Allnoblefamilies–andnotjustinItaly–dislikedlandspassingtoan-other family through a woman. As far as possible dowries would be paid incash;theymight,ifnecessary,besecuredonland,butdowriesinlandwouldbeexceptional.Womenneverseemtohavebeenincludedinthegroupsofjointlords.Unlesstheywerewidows,theyrarelyheldorgovernedlandsintheirownright.Theycouldactasguardiansfortheirchildren,orgovernlandsforabsenthusbandsorsons.Onoccasion,awidowmighthavedifficultyenforcingherauthority,likethewidowofLeonelloSpinolawhocouldnotgeteitherobedi-enceortherevenuesduetoherandheryoungsonfromtheirsubjectsin1453.30Others became formidable matriarchs, ruling the affairs of their family formanyyears.Costanzad’Avalos,whorefusedtoremarryafterthedeathofherhusband,FedericodelBalzowhenshewasagedonlytwenty-three,actedastheguardianofthechildrenofherbrothersIñigo,marchesedelVasto,andAlfon-so,marchesediPescara.Shegainedpossessionofextensivelands,erectedintoaduchyforherinherownright.31

If,intheabsenceofdirectmaleheirs,landswereinheritedbyfemales,thefather’sfamilywouldusuallytrytomarrytheheiresstoamemberoftheirownlineage.Testatorswhoprovidedforthepossibilityoftheirinheritancepassingto a female could specify that women married within their kin should havepreference.GiancorradoOrsinidaMugnanoinhiswillof1526, forexample,madehislegitimatesonshisdirectheirs,andiftheydiedwithoutmaleissue,another,probablyillegitimate,sonwouldinherit,providedhemarried.Onlyifherefused,orhadnomaleissue,wouldGiancorrado’sdaughtersorhismaleheirs’daughterssucceed,providedtheyweremarriedtoanOrsinidiMugnanoor,failingthat,toanOrsinidiPitigliano,themostcloselyrelatedbranchofthefamily.32Itcouldbeasserted,asAscanioColonnawoulddo,whenVespasianoColonnalefthisdaughterIsabellaashisheiressin1528,thattherightsofthemalelineshouldbegivenprecedenceoveranyrightofafemaletoinherit.Iam

29 NunzioFederigoFaraglia,Storia della Regina Giovanna II d’Angiò(Lanciano,1904),106–7.30 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.408:BernabéAdornotoFrancescoSforza,2Aug.1453,Capriata.31 ElenaPapagna, ‘Travitarealeemodelloteorico: ledueCostanzed’AvalosnellaNapoli

aragoneseespagnola’,548–63.32 Shaw,The Political Role,79.

18 Chapter2

theoneandonlyheirleftinmyfamily,hedeclared,alltherestarefromille-gitimatelines,orwomen.33ThedisputeoverIsabella’sinheritancewouldgoonfordecades.ThegreatertheinheritanceofanheiresslikeIsabella,themoredifficultyherfather’skinwerelikelytohaveinmarryingherofftooneofthem-selveswithoutencounteringopposition,letalonesuccessfullyassertarighttotakethelandsfromher.Themarriageofanheiresswasaboonthatprinceswerereadytoregardaswithintheirgift; theywantedtochoosewhoshouldhavethebride,andthelands.

In disputes about female inheritance of lands, the question of how thiswouldaffectmilitaryobligationstotheprincefortheestatewasrarely,ifever,anissue.Anobligationonfiefholderstoperformmilitaryserviceasaconditionoftheirtenuresurvivedinthemid-fifteenthcenturyonlyinSicilyandintheareaofnorth-westernItalywhichwasculturallyandpoliticallystronglyinflu-encedbyFrance.AtwarwithMilanin1449,Ludovico,DukeofSavoyissuedageneralsummonstoallhisvassalstomusterwitharmsandhorsestoserve,explicitlyreferringtotheirobligationsunderthetermsofinvestiturewiththeirfiefs,withthreatsofpenaltiesiftheyfailedtocomply.Manydidnotobey,nev-ertheless, for thenobles’ senseofobligationtoperformmilitaryservicehadweakened,andthiswasnotawarofdefence.Individualsummonsestomajornobles,askingthemtoraiseandbringacompanyofmentothearmyhadbet-terresults,notleastbecausetheywerepromisedtheywouldbepaid.Bythelatefifteenthcentury,thedukescouldnolongercountonthemilitarynobilitytoprovidesignificantnumbersofcavalry– ‘nogentlemanconsideredthisamoralobligationanymore,exceptinsituationsofabsoluteemergency’.34ThemilitaryobligationsofthefiefholdersofthemarquisateofSaluzzowereout-linedbyoneoftheirnumber,GiovanniAndreaSaluzzodiCastellar,asbeingrestrictedtoserviceforonemonthattheirownexpense,longeronlyiftheywerepaid,andthenonlytodefendthepersonorstateof themarquisortogotorecoverlandshehadlost.Theydidnothavetogowithhimifhewasgoingtowartosupportanally,andiftheydidaccompanyhimwouldexpecttheirexpensestobecovered:‘otherwisestayathomeifyoudon’twanttolookmad’.35

SicilianbaronswereexpectedtoservetheirmonarchoutsideSicily,aswhenfiefholdersweresummonedtomusteratMessinainMarch1503tocampaign

33 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1005,95:AscanioColonnatoCharlesV,19Nov.1529,campnearFlorence.

34 AlessandroBarbero,‘Isoldatidelprincipe.Guerra,StatoesocietànelPiemontesabaudo(1450–1580)’,173–4,180–1;quotation,181.

35 Ibid.,181.


againsttheFrenchinCalabriaandApulia.36Theywouldbeexpectedtoservelargelyorwhollyattheirownexpense,andsomewereforcedtosellormort-gagelandstomeetthecosts.Permissiontodothiscouldbeissuedwiththesummons,aswhenAntonioMoncada,thelargestfiefholderineasternSicily,wassummonedformilitaryserviceinDecember1524,withleavetoraise600onzebysellingorpledgingland.37Thelevelofmilitaryobligationsforfiefhold-ers–theprovisionofaman-at-armsforevery20onzeofrevenuefromtheirfief–hadnotchangedsincethefourteenthcentury;itisnotknownwhethertheimpositionsonindividualfiefshadbeenchangedastheonzebecameworthmuch less or fiefs changed hands, but it does appear to have become moreburdensome.Aswellasfightingtheking’swarsabroad,thebaronswerecalledontohelpdefendtheislandofSicilyfromtheFrench,theTurksandcorsairs.Baronsmightbeorderedtobringtheirvassalstostrengthenthedefencesofacoastalcity,ortohelppatrolastretchofcoastline;sometimestheyweregivenanofficialpositionwithsomepowersofgovernmentandpaidasalary.Bythe1520s,theinadequaciesofsucharrangementswerealltooobvious,andSpan-ishtroopsweredeployedtomanthecoastaldefences.Changestothebalanceofforcesinfieldarmiesalsomadetheheavycavalryoflessimportance,andthereweremoreeffectivewaysofrecruitingandorganizingmen-at-armsthentheslowanduncertainfeudalsummons.MilitaryservicebySicilianfiefholdersbecamemorefrequentlycommutedintoafinanciallevy.38

In the kingdom of Naples, by contrast, military obligations of fiefhold-ers had routinely been turned into a tax, the adoha, long before. In 1442,AlfonsoIhadgrantedthebaronsperpetualimmunityfromfurtherpaymentsoftheadoha,butinthesixteenthcenturyFerdinandtheCatholicandCharlesVaskedforittobepaidintimeofwar.Itbecamesubsumedintothemaindi-recttax,thedonativo.39

ElsewhereinItaly,anyclausesininvestitureswithfiefsthatdidspecifymili-taryservicewereinoperative,ifnotlongforgotten.NewgrantsoffiefsinLom-bardyandtheVenetodidnotincludesuchclauses.Whenmilitarynobleswhoheldfiefs fromthedukeofMilanortherepublicofVenicefought forthem,theydidsoascondottieriexpectingtobepaidanagreedratesetbyaregularcontract,notasfiefholdersfulfillingaduty.ImperialfiefholdersinItalywere

36 Carmelo Trasselli, Da Ferdinando il Cattolico a Carlo V. L’esperienza siciliana 1475–1525(SoveriaMannelli,1982),II,497.

37 Ibid.,504.38 Ibid.,437–9,493–507.39 AurelioCernigliaro,Sovranità e feudo nel Regno di Napoli 1505–1557(Naples,1983),I,143–6,

258–60.

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notboundtoservetheemperor,ortoprovidehimwithtroopsormoneyinlieuwhentheGermanlandsoftheEmpireagreedtodoso.Thoseinnorth-westIt-alydidfindthemselvescalledontoacceptakindofmilitaryobligationduringCharlesV’sreign,however.Theycouldberequiredtoprovidebilletsandsup-pliesforunitsofhisarmyinnorthernItaly,unwelcomeguestswhocouldbeaheavyburdenontheestates.Charles’sownofficials,desperateastheyweretofindlodgingsandfoodfortheirownmen,recognizedthattheImperialfiefsinthemountains,suchasthemarquisatesofFinaleandCevaandtheMalaspinalandsintheLunigiana,weresoimpoverishedandinfertilethatonlyinfantrywho were regularly paid (as the Imperial and Spanish infantry rarely were)couldsubsistonthem.40

Asarule,themilitaryresourcesoftheestatesofbaronsandcastellansweredevelopedandmaintainedtoprotectandfurthertheirowninterests,personalandpolitical,andthoseoftheirfamily,friendsandallies.Fortressesweretheheartoftheirestates–itwasnotfancifulforthemilitarynobilitytobedistin-guishedfromthecivicnobilitiesofItalybybeingdesignatedsignori di castelli,lords of castles.41 At one end of the scale, possession of a fortress, howeversmallorantiquated,couldhavesymbolicvalueatmost;attheotherend,somefamiliespossessedfortressesofasize,strengthorsophisticationthatenabledthemtodefythearmyofaprince.Forthosewhoaspiredtobeindependentofany prince, at least one major stronghold was an essential element of their“state”.Theotherimportantmilitaryresourcethatthemilitarynobilitycouldderivefromtheirestateswasfightingmen.Thosewhowereabletorelyontheloyaltyandsupportofthepeopleontheirestateswerenotonlystrengthenedingoodtimes,buthadamuchbetterchanceofweatheringbadtimes.Landslostinwarsorpoliticalstormscouldberecoveredmoreeasilywiththesupportofthepeople.Lordswhowereonbadtermswiththeirmenwouldnotbeabletorelyontheirhelpandmightfacearebellion,whichcouldleadtothelossoftheestate.Anappealbythepeopleofabaron’sestatestohisprince,complain-ingofoppressionandinjustice,providedagoodpretextfortheprince’sinter-vention,toasserthisauthorityoverthebaron’slands,eventoconfiscatethem.

The fortifications which characterized the estates of the military nobilityrangedfromdefensiblewallssurroundingasettlementincludingahouseforthelordandhisfamily,tofortifiedhouseswhichcouldresistassault,tocastles

40 Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, III, 1, 321: Abad de Najera to Charles V, 9 Sept. 1525,Vercelli.

41 InSicily,AlfonsoIagreedin1452toapetitionfromthebaronsmeetingintheParlamentothatonlyfiefsthathadcastlesorfortificationscouldbeconsiderednoble(E.IgorMineo,Nobiltà di stato(Rome,2001),290).


whoseprimaryfunctionwasmilitaryandwhichcouldbeusedasaresidenceonlyintimesoftrouble,tofortressesbuiltaccordingtothelatestprinciplesofmilitaryarchitectureandengineeringwhichincorporatedpalatiallivingquar-ters.Themostpowerfulbaronswouldhavemultiplefortresses,ofvaryingage,complexityandutility.PietroMariaRossihadovertwentyinEmiliain1480,severalofwhichhehadbuiltorstrengthened,includingthefancifulTorrechi-ara.42 The major lineages of Roman and Neapolitan barons could probablyhave matched, or surpassed that – leaving aside Giovanni Antonio Orsini,principediTaranto,whosetallymightwellhaverisenintothehundreds,pos-sessing as he did 400 castelli, not to mention 37 towns and cities.43 Castellocoulddesignateanythingfromawalledhamlettoamightyfortress,sounlessthefortificationsoradepictionordescriptionofthemsurvive,itisnotpos-sibletoassesshoweffectiveamilitaryassettheymighthavebeen.Evenminorbaronscouldhaveacoupleoftowersorsmallfortressesontheirlands,andasmalltowerintherightposition–perchedononeoftheinnumerablecragsinItaly’smountainchains,forinstance–couldbecapableofresistinganyattack.

A detailed survey of estates confiscated by the Spanish government ofNaplesfrombaronsaccusedofassistingtheFrenchinvasionofthekingdomin 1528 provides a glimpse of how the fortifications of the barons appearedtotheofficialssenttoappraiseandvaluetheirlands.Melfi,thecityfromwhichtheprincipediMelfitookhistitle,had‘alargecastlewithninetowersdomi-natingthecity’(asitstilldoestoday),‘andisencircledbyagoodstrongstonewallwithsmallertowers[“turriones”]’.Asitstood,andstands,thecastlehadbeen given its final form by the Angevin monarchs; the original fortresshadbeenbuiltbytheNormanrulersofthekingdomintheeleventhcentury,andwasafavouriteresidenceoftheEmperorFrederickII,whohadalsomodi-fiedit,inthethirteenthcentury.44Anothertownthatwaspartoftheprinci-pateofMelfi,Atella,hadanoldcastlewith‘foursmalltowersandagoodditch’.45Sanfele, which had 130 households to Atella’s 500, had ‘a castle on a heightjoinedtothetownship,verystrongandimpregnable,ifwellsupplied’;Forenza,with400households,hadnocastle‘becauseitisstrongandhighup’;46Rippa

42 GiorgioChittolini, ‘IlparticolarismosignorileefeudaleinEmiliafraQuattroeCinque-cento’,287,n.47.

43 MicheleViterbo,‘Aragona,OrsinidelBalzo,eAcquavivad’AragonanellaConteadiCon-versano’,335.

44 NinoCortese,‘FeudiefeudatarinapoletanidellaprimametàdelCinquecento’(1929),30;photographsofthefortressasitistodayinFlavioConti,Castelli e rocche(Novara,1999),290–1.

45 Cortese,‘Feudiefeudatarinapoletani’(1929),30.46 Ibid.,31.

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Candida,with110households,hadacastledescribedas‘notverystrong’;47theuninhabitedestateofLagopesoleboasted‘afine,big,strongcastle,workedindiamondpoints’(masonrywhoseindividualblockswereshapedlikethepointofadiamond,usuallyasmuchfordecorationasfordeflectingshot),withwallsandaditch.48

All these places, and several more, had belonged to Giovanni Caracciolo,principediMelfi;thefortificationsofestatesconfiscatedfromotherreputedrebels were appraised with equal care. Old and unsophisticated systems offortificationswereassessed,suchasthoseofCellammare,nearBari,whichhad‘an old wall and a ditch and an old house for the baron’,49 or Milito, whichhadnowallsaroundthetownshipof150households,butdidhave‘asmallcas-tlewithawalledcitadeltogivesheltertothevassalsintimeofwar’.50Someformerlysignificantstrongholdswereapparentlybeingneglectedinfavourofplaceswithmoreamenities.GiacomoMariaCaetani,contediMorcone,hadtakenhistitlefromMorcone,whichwasperchedonthecrestofamountain,withacastle‘inpoorrepair’atthehighestpartofthetownship.51UnderthejurisdictionofMorconewere364householdsandfertilelands,butitwasalessattractivebaseforthecountthatanotherofhisestates,SanMarcodeliCavoti,wherethetownshipwasonahill,withwallsand‘twostrongstonetowerswithsome artillery pieces’, and a fine house for the baron, ‘where any great lordcouldstay’attheentrance,52orthenearbyestateofSangiorgiodellaMolinara,another hilltop walled township, which had a ‘beautiful house in the uppertown,new,largeandfine’.53Minorbarons,too,hadbeenbuildingorupdatingfortresses,asresidencesforthemselvesandtheirfamiliesorasdefences.SanBarbato, the sole estate listed as the former possession of Gianbattista diSanBarbato,forexample,had‘anewandwellmadecastle’andwalls,butonlyabouttenhouseholdslivedbyit;mostoftheinhabitantsoftheestatelivedinaseparatesettlement,Parolisi,whichhadastonetowerwitharavelinaboutit,although in time of war everyone took refuge in the walled village and thecastle.54

Detaileddescriptionsweregivenofsomeofthemoresubstantialfortifica-tions.Lettere,nineteenmilesfromNaplesandthreefromthesea,oneofthe

47 Ibid.,32.48 Ibid.,32.49 Ibid.,83.50 Ibid.,78–9.51 Ibid.,143.52 Ibid.,142.53 Ibid.,144.54 Ibid.,43.


properties confiscated from Carlo Miroballo, had a ‘lovely and strong castlewith four towers and a great keep; it has three gates with drawbridges, andstandsatthehighpartofthecity’;itwasimportant,theofficialnoted,placedas itwasonthehighwaybetweenNaplesandCastellammare.Quarata,nearBari,whichhadbelongedtoLançalaodeAquino,marchesediQuarata,aswellas‘goodwalls,towersandaditch’aroundit,had‘agoodcastleatoneend,withgoodlivingquartersandbigstables,withtwogateswithdrawbridgesandtow-ers,andaravelinarounditandagreatditch.’55TheprincipalestateofPietroStendardo,ArienzointheTerradiLavoro,had‘good,highwallswithagreatditch,andtheentrancetoit isbydrawbridgesandithaslargetowersatthegates,andmanytowersalongthewall,amongthemtwobigandstrongones,andanothersquaretoweroverthegateontheroadtoNaples’;therewasnocastle,but‘alargepalacewithinthetown,withagardenandagreatcistern’.56

Baronsinotherpartsofthepeninsuladidnothavethegreaturbanfortress-es that some Neapolitan barons possessed, but otherwise the wide range ofbaronial strongholds that were described in this survey could be foundthroughoutItaly.

MostofthefortressesinLiguriabelongingtothemilitarynobilityderivedtheirstrengthandimportancefromtheirsite,suchasMonacoorFinale,bothdominatinganaturalharbour.Oftentherewouldnotberoomforextensiveoutworks. One of the largest baronial fortresses in Liguria was the Fieschistronghold of Montoggio in the Valle Scrivia. Standing on a rock which fellsteeplyawayonthreesides,thecastlewasbuiltonasquare,withfourcircularcornertowers,enclosingasmallcourtyardinwhichroseahighcirculartower.Theentrancewasprotectedbyabastion,andtherewasanenclosuredefendedbyacurtainwall.57

In Friuli and the Lunigiana the characteristic baronial fortifications werecomparativelysimple,avaliddefenceagainsttheraidsofaneighbour,butin-capable of withstanding a fullscale siege. Edward Muir’s disparaging assess-ment of the military worth of the fortifications of Friuli could have beenappliedtomanyofthemilitarynobilityintheLunigianaaswell.‘Theselumpsofstoneservedthedecayingpowerofthenobleswhoprizedthemassignsofhonourandwhoseldomriskedclosingtheirgatesandmanningtheirtowersagainstattackersmoredangerousthantheirownpeasanttenantsortheircas-tellan neighbours. By the sixteenth century only a handful of the castles

55 Ibid.,78.56 Ibid.,40–1.57 MauroMinolaandBeppeRonco,Castelli e fortezze di Liguria(Genoa,2006),173–4;Dan-

ieleCalcagno,Il castello di Montoggio(Montoggio,1999),59–64..

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retainedanyauthenticmilitaryvalue,andmostcastellansquicklycapitulatedbeforetheywouldfaceasiegefromarealarmy.’58

For villages protected by a wall, or small fortresses consisting of nothingmorethanasingletower,theirpositionmightbetheirstrongestdefence.Onlowerground,watercouldbeaneffectivedefencework.SterpoinFriuli,aprop-ertyoftheColloredofamily,wassituatednearthejunctionoftwostreams;itswallsweresurroundedbyamoatconnectedtooneofthem,andapondhadbeendugoutofmarshygroundononeside.Theonlywayinwasbyabridge,throughatower.Thewallsenclosingthemodestlivingquarterswereinpartmerelyearthworks,inpartofroughstone,andontheothersideofthemoatanothercircuitofwallsformedanenclosureinwhichpeasantsandlivestockcouldtakerefuge.Unsophisticatedasitwas,thiscastleprotectedthepeopleandanimalsfromseveralvillagesduringaninvasionofFriulibytheTurksin1499.59Generally,itwasbeingsitedonaheight,onaridgeoranoutcropwherethenaturalsteepcontoursoftherockcouldbaffleallassault,thatcouldrenderevenamodesttoweravirtuallyimpregnablefortress.TheSpinolafortressfit-tinglycalledLaPietra(‘TheRock’)wasjusttwoconjoinedtowers,oneplacedhigherthantheother,wedgedbetweentwohighspursofrockoneitherside.Itstood alone, and produced no income; nevertheless, Filippo Spinola main-tainedin1459(whenaskingforMilanesehelpinkeepingitmannedandsup-plied),itwasheldinhighregard,andtherewereseverallordswhocovetedit.60La Pietra was still of sufficient importance during the Napoleonic Wars forFrench troops to disarm and burn it. Restored in the twentieth century, thefortressisstillastrikingsightinthemiddleofthewildsoftheValleScrivia.61

The rock on which stood Osoppo – the Savorgnan fortress that held outagainstImperialinvasionsofFriuliin1511,1513and1514whenalmostalltherestofFriuliwasoccupied–wasusedasastrongholdfrompre-Romantimestothetwentieth century; the fortress finally succumbed to the severe earthquakethatstruckFriuliin1976.ThesitewasdescribedbyGirolamoSavorgnanin1510asamarvellousnaturalfortress.Ofthemountain’sthreefaces,twocouldnotbeclimbed,andthethirdhadaridgewhichcouldbeusedasaroadway,guard-edbyoutcropsofrockthat,hewrote,couldnothavebeenbetterplacedfordefencebyamilitaryarchitect.Twogreatcisterns,apparentlyconstructedby

58 EdwardMuir,Mad Blood Stirring(BaltimoreandLondon,1993),24.59 Ibid.,141–2.60 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.413:FilippoSpinolatoCiccoSimonetta,9June1459.61 MinolaandRonco,Castelli e fortezze di Liguria,169–71.


theRomans,alargepondforlivestockandawoodensuredsuppliesofwaterandfuel.62

The military nobility continued to add to the rich patrimony of fortifica-tionsthey inherited, torepairandreplace fortificationsdamagedbynaturalcausessuchasearthquakesorlightningstrikesorbyanenemy,tomodernizeandextendexistingcastlesandtobuildcompletelynewones.Afavouredde-signforthosebuiltfromneworradicallyaltered,wherethesitepermitted,wasarectangleorpentagonwithlargetowersateachangle.VirginioOrsinicon-sulted the finest military architect of his day, Francesco di Giorgio Martini,about the fortress he intended to build at Campagnano and other works.63Generallythenamesofthedesignersofthefortificationsarenotknown.Inmanycases,especiallywhenthebaronwashimselfanexperiencedsoldier,hemightwellhavedesignedordirectedtheworkhimself.ThefortressofAlvianoinLazio,forinstance,wasrebuiltinthelatefifteenthcentury,andasBartolo-meod’AlvianowasentrustedwithdesigningmajorfortificationsfortheVene-tian republic when he commanded the Venetian army, the tradition thatassignsthedesignofhisnewfortresstohimisprobablywell-founded.Con-structedasaregularrectangle,withlargeroundtowersateachangle,thesameheightasthewalls,andimposingescarpments,italsohadanouter,lower,sys-temofdefenceworks.Typicalofthemilitaryarchitectureoftheday,itwasalsotypicalofthemajornoblefortressesbuiltatthistimeinbeingintendedasalordly residence, as well as a military base, with an elegant courtyard at itsheart.64

Oneofthebest-knownofthenewfortressesbuiltinthefifteenthcenturywas at nearby Bracciano, built for Napoleone Orsini and his son Virginio.Apentagonalcastlewithfiveroundtowers,itsroomsweredecoratedwithfres-coes by AntoniazzoRomano, includingone celebratingVirginio Orsini’s ap-pointmentascaptain-generalofNaples.Fineasitwas,itwasnotjustforshow;Bracciano became the principal fortress of that line of the Orsini family.Pitigliano,themainstrongholdofthatotherbranchoftheOrsinifamily,oweditsreputationforbeingimpregnabletoitspositiononavolcanicplug.IthadanothercycleoffrescoescelebratingtheOrsini,apparentlycommissionedbyNiccolòOrsiniinthelaterfifteenthcentury,intheoldsquarefortressthatwaslaterincorporatedinthepalacedesignedforhisgrandsonGianFrancescobyAntoniodaSangallo.65

62 MarinoSanuto,I diarii(Venice,1879–1903),X,353–4;Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,27–9.63 ASSiena,Balia545,14:VirginioOrsini,23Nov.1490,Bracciano.64 Conti,Castelli e rocche,200.65 CeciliaAlessi,‘LasagadegliOrsiniaPitigliano’,231–62.

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The major castellans of the region around Parma were also building finefortress-palacesforthemselves.ThemostspectacularwasTorrechiara,builtbyPietroMariaRossibetween1448and1460.Afascinatingfrescocycle,combin-inghomagetohisbelovedmistresswithdepictionsofhisestates,gracestheCamerad’Orothere.Itsfortificationsareelaborate.Fourgreatsquaretowersarelinkedbyrangesofbuildings,enclosingacourtyard.Twoothertowersabutthiscomplexbelowononeside,andthewholeissurroundedbythreecircuitsofcurtainwalls,withotherdefenceworks.Strikingandbeautifulasthiscom-plexis,fromamilitaryperspectiveitwasoutdated:itwas‘almostthesublima-tionofthemedievalcastle’,66afantasycastle.Moremodest,butstillacomplexbuildingdesignedmorewithaneyetoitsaestheticqualitiesthantothelatestprinciplesoffortressdesignisRoccaSanvitale,builtaboutthesametimeasTorrechiarabyGibertoSanvitaleinthemiddleofthetownshipofFontanellato.Themostnotableroomonthegroundfloorisnotaguardroomoranarmourybutastudy,decoratedwithfrescoesdepictingthestoryofthegoddessDianaand the hunter Acteon by Parmigianino in the sixteenth century.67 Varano,built for thePallavicini,wasrathermorepracticalandmodernasa fortress,withthetowersthesameheightasthecurtainwallsanditsmainentranceontheflankofoneofthecornertowers,andwasintendedtoformpartofasys-temoffortresses.68

New fortresses were being added to the patrimony of Neapolitan barons,suchastheonebuiltatOrtucchiointheAbruzzibyAntonioPiccolominiin1488, or that built by Virginio Orsini at Avezzano in 1490, which was trans-formedintoafortifiedpalacebyMarcantonioColonnain1520,orthecastlecompletedatFondibyOnoratoCaetaniinthemid-fifteenthcentury,linkedtoapalacebuiltatthesameperiod.69In1451LionelloAcclozamoraaddedasec-ondstoreytocompletethecastleatCelanobeguntowardstheendofthepre-viouscentury.Hiscompletionkepttotheoriginalgroundplan,anunusualoneforfortressesinthemountainousAbruzzi,whichgenerallyexploitedthepo-tential of an irregular site.The rectangular central fortress with four squaretowersatthecornershadaporticoedcourtyard,andwassurroundedbyan-otherlowercurtainwall,withseveralroundorsquaretowers,andwhich,withits heavily defended entrance, constituted the serious defenceworks of the

66 Conti,Castelli e rocche,171.67 Ibid.,166–7.68 Ibid.,174.69 Ibid.,250;LucioSantoro,Castelli angioini e aragonesi nel Regno di Napoli (Milan,1982),

227,230,233,236.


fortress.70AtVenosa,thesquarefortresswithfour largeroundtowersatthecornersandsurroundedbyastrongrampart,believedtohavebeenconstruct-edbyPirrodelBalzoaround1470,maywellalsohavebeenbasedonanearlierstructure.71AtMontesarchio,confiscatedfromGianVincenzoCaraffaaftertheFrenchinvasionof1528,thenewfortressarousedtheadmirationoftheofficialwhoassessedit–‘alarge,veryfineandstrongnewcastleontopofamountainabovethetowncalledMontercule,whichisonasitesostrongitcannotberu-inedorbombarded’.Itwasenteredbydrawbridgesandonitsweakestsidehadagreatstonetowerflankedbytwootherstrongtowers.Higherupthemoun-tainwasanother‘large,finestonetower,veryhigh,withfourturretsandcase-matesandloopholeseverywhere,withlargecisterns’,andotherdefenceworks.Withthirtymeninthecastle,andteninthetower,itwouldbeimpregnable.Apparentlyithadcost40,000ducats,withoutreckoningtheworthoftheworkdonebythevassals,voluntarilyornot.72

Thatstrong,strategicallyimportantfortressesshouldbeinthehandsofbar-onswhoseloyaltyorgoodwillwassuspect,wasanunderstandablecauseforconcerntosomeprincesorrepublics.Provenhostilityorunreliabilityonthebarons’partgave thegovernments justification forseeking to take their for-tressesfromthem,althoughitwouldnot,intheeyesofmany,justifyperma-nentconfiscation.Rulersmightrequest,ordemand,thatafortressbeplacedintheircustody,sothattheywouldbegarrisonedbymenundertheircommand,leavingtherestoftheestateandtheincomefromitinthehandsofthelord.Theycouldalsoclaimtherighttocontrolthebuildingofnewfortifications,assertingthattheirpermissionwasrequired.Ingeneral,lordsofcastlesconsid-eredtheirfortressestobewhollytheirs,andresentedandresistedanyattemptat interferencebytheirprinceor, for Imperial fiefholders,anyneighbouringpower,unlesscircumstancesmakeitexpedienttoacquiesce.

IthasalwaysbeenthecustomoftheGenoese,soAlfonsodelCarrettoar-gued in 1485, to bring nobles under their power ‘by taking from them theirfortresses,whicharetheirdefence.’73From1447to1452Genoahadwagedwaron Galeotto del Carretto, marchese di Finale. In 1449, Finale itself fell aftereighteenmonthsofsiege,andtheGenoesedestroyedthecastle,CastelGovone.AfteritwasrecoveredwiththehelpofthemarquisofMonferratobyGaleotto’s

70 Conti,Castelli e rocche,246;Santoro,Castelli angioini e aragonesi,229,232.71 Santoro,Castelli angioini e aragonesi,234,238–40.72 Cortese,‘Feudiefeudatarinapoletani’(1929),131.73 ‘riduceregentilhominiadsoadiscretionetogliendolelefortezequalesonnosoadiffen-

sione’:ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.994:AlfonsodelCarrettotoGianGaleazzoSforza,9July1485,Finale.

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brotherandheir,GiovannidelCarrettoin1457,hesetaboutrebuildingFinaleanditsfortifications,includingCastelGovone.Perhapssmallerthantheearliercastle, thenewonewasstronger,withbastionsreinforcingtheangletowersandcurtainwalls.74FinaleandMonacowereregardedby theGenoesewithparticularanimositybecauseGenoeseexilesandotherenemieswerereceivedandlodgedthere,andbecausetheirharbourscouldserveasbases forboatsthatdisruptedcommercialshipping.In1506ashort-livedpopulargovernment,hostiletothenobles,justifiedafull-scaleassaultonMonacobyaccusingthelord,LucianoGrimaldi,ofbringingdownreprisalsonGenoesemerchantsbyraidingtheshipsofothernations,andclaimedthatMonacoinanycaseright-fullybelongedtoGenoa.75ButMonacoheldoutagainstthesiege,andafter105daystheGenoesewereforcedtoabandonitinlateMarch1507.76

Inthe1490s,factionalhostilitywasbehindthesuspicionwithwhichAgos-tinoandGiovanniAdorno,governorsofGenoaforthedukeofMilan,viewedtheconstructionofafortressonthewesternRivieraatOnegliabyDomenicoDoria.TheAdornobrotherswereconcernedbecausetheDoriawereamain-stayofthefactionopposedtothem,andlinkedbymarriagetothelordofMon-aco,LambertoGrimaldi.IftheDoriahadafortressatOneglia,itwasargued,they and Grimaldi could dominate the western Riviera, to the joy of theirfriendsthereandthedespairofthefriendsoftheAdornoregime.77ButDo-menicoDoriawasatrustedcaptainofPopeInnocentVIII,anduntilthepope’sdeathhecouldignoreattemptstoprohibithisbuildingthefortress.AssoonasnewsthatInnocentwasonhisdeathbedreachedLudovicoSforza,regentofMilan,inJuly1492,hegaveordersforthefortresstobetakenbyforceifDoriarefusedtohalttheworks.Ithadreachedthestagewhereitcouldbeofuse,andexperiencehadshown‘whatitmeanstoleavefortressesofimportance,espe-ciallyonthecoast,inthehandsofpersonswhoareunfriendlytothegovern-ment, as the actions of the lord of Monaco can abundantly testify’.78 Theuncompletedfortresswasquicklysurrendered.

ThedukesofMilankeptacarefuleyeontheconstructionofnewfortressesbynoblesintheirdominions.Youknowwellthatsubjectscannotbuildafor-tress without the permission of their lord, Ludovico Sforza admonished

74 Antonino Ronco, Una guerra del Quattrocento. Il Doge di Genova contro il marchese di Finale(Genoa,2003),40–1.

75 Carlo Taviani, Superba discordia. Guerra, rivolta e pacificazione nella Genova di primo Cinquecento(Rome,2008),152.

76 EmilioPandiani,‘Unannodistoriagenovese(giugno1506–1507)’,85–207,476–521.77 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.998:CorradoStangatoGianGaleazzoSforza,1June1491,Genoa.78 Ibid., b. 1210: draft instructions to Francesco da Casate, going to Oneglia, 31 July 1492,

Vigevano.


GiovanniSpinolain1496.ItwasnoexcusetosaythathewasbuildingafortressatCarrosiosolelytohelpexactatoll:thedukecouldensurehewasabletodothatoranythingelse,withouthisbuildingafortress.79NoblesintheduchyofMilanwhowantedtobuildafortressmightaskpermission,asStefanoSanvi-taledidwhenconstructingacastleatSalaBraganzanearParmain1461.Hewasbuildingitthere,heexplained,becausethatplacewastheoldestofhisfamily’sestates,andheneededsomewheretostorecropssafelyandtotakerefugedur-ing epidemics. Having inspected the works, a ducal commissioner recom-mendedpermissionbegranted,withaconditionthatnoenclosureshouldbeerectedthatmightserveasabasefortroops.80

InthekingdomofNaples,thebaronswerefreetofortifytheirlandsastheychose, according to Antonio Caldora in 1464. Ferrante, whose army was en-gagedinacampaignagainstthelandsoftheCaldora–thefinalstageofthewarsthatfollowedhisaccessiontothethrone–hadproposedtoleavetheCal-doratheirlandsandrevenues,iftheywouldsurrendertheirfortressestohim.Hewantedtemporarycustodyoftheirfortressestomakehisrulesecure,heargued.81Refusingtoagree,theCaldoraendedbylosingtheir fortressesandtheirlands.Afterthesecondmajorbaronialrebellionagainsthimin1485–6,Ferrantesetaboutsystematicallygettingbaronialfortressesintohishands.Bygivingoverallhiscastlesandfortressestotheking,oneoftheprincipalrebels,AntonellodaSanseverino,principediSalernowastold,hewouldmakeFer-rantesecureandinducehimtoputoutofhismindwhathadhappened.82

The prince handed over some, very reluctantly, but not all; he wanted tokeepatleastSalernoitself,butbytheendoftheyearhadyieldedthattoo.Byhavingthefortressesofthebaronswhohadrebelledagainsthiminhispower,asnootherkingofNapleshaddone,Ferranteboasted,hehadgreatsecurityandauthority,andhadassuredthefidelityof thepeopleandthebaronsto-wards him.83 By holding the barons’ fortresses he felt secure, so the baronscouldfeelsecuretoo,heargued.84Ferrantemayhavefeltmoresecure,butthebaronsdidnot.Some,includingAntonellodaSanseverino,feltsaferinexile.CarlodaSanseverino,contediMileto(whowasarrestedbeforehecouldcarry

79 Ibid.,b.1217:LudovicoSforzatoGiovanniSpinoladaSerravalle,24Mar.1496,Milan.80 NadiaCovini,‘LecondottedeiRossidiParma’,p.68,n.60.81 EmilioNunziante,‘IprimiannidiFerdinandod’Aragonael’invasionediGiovannid’Angiò’,

(1898),201–2.82 LuigiVolpicella (ed.), Regis Ferdinandi Primi instructionum liber (Naples, 1916), 53: Fer-

rante’sinstructionstoLuisadiCasalnuovo,19Nov.1486.83 Ibid.,66:instructionstoFrancescoSpinello,envoytoVenice,2Dec.1486.84 Ibid.,90:instructionstoJoanNauclero,envoytoFerdinandandIsabellainCastile,17Feb

1487.

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outhisplanstofleeabroad,andwouldendhisdays inthedungeonsoftheCastelnuovoofNaples),lamentedthatwithouttheircastles,theywereconsid-eredmerebailiffsontheirownlands,andhadlosttheobedienceoftheirmen.85

Popestoo,whentheywereinconflictwithRomanbarons,mightthinktheywouldbemoresecureifmajorbaronialfortresseswereintheirowncustody,orthatoftheirrelatives,orifthefortificationsweredismantled.ThefortressesoftheColonnafamily,sitedonroutesbetweenRomeandtheNeapolitanborder,werethemostsubjecttoconfiscationanddestruction,astheColonnawereatoddswithseveralpopesinthefifteenthandsixteenthcenturies.ThefactthattheirestateswereseenasdesirableendowmentsforthefamiliesofthepopeswhomostwantedtodispossesstheColonna–SixtusIV,AlexanderVI,PaulIV–sometimeshelpedpreserve their fortresses fromdestruction,but theydidnotalwaysescape.NotonlythefortressofPalestrinabuttheentiretownwasrazedin1437duringthewaroftheColonnaagainstEugeniusIV;NicholasVgaveitbacktothemtenyearslater,withpermissiontorebuild.InretaliationfortheColonnaincursionintoRomein1526,ClementVIIorderedthewallsofseveralColonnaplacestobedismantled,andthefortressofCave,thatwassaidtobeverystrong,onadifficultsite,demolished.86

Paliano,oneofthestrongestofallColonnafortresses,becameafocusofat-tentioninthemid-sixteenthcentury.AdisputeaboutthelevyofapapalsalttaxontheestatesofAscanioColonnaescalatedintoawarin1541.Palianowasreputedtobeverystrong,situatedsothatitcouldnotbeeffectivelybesieged,anditwasimpossibletopreventmenenteringandleavingitthroughtheval-leys around it. (There were reports that Francis I had given MarcantonioColonna60,000scuditofortify it,andtwelveartillerypiecestodefendit, tofacilitatethepassageofFrenchtroopstothekingdomofNaples.)87PedrodeToledo,theviceroyofNaples,toldCharlesVthatheshouldnotletPalianoorRoccadiPapa,anotherofAscanio’sstrongholdsinthearea,fallintothehandsofthepope,butshouldgetthemintohisownhands,88butCharleswasnotreadytogotowarwiththepopetosupportAscanio.AllAscanio’slandsinthePapalStatesweretakenbythepapaltroops.ThefortressofPalianowasthelasttosurrenderinlateMay;Ascanio’sineptitudehadcompromiseditsdefences.Twoyearslater,PaulIIIorderedthefortressofPalianotobetorndown.Hehad

85 CamilloPorzio,La Congiura de’ Baroni del Regno di Napoli contra il Re Ferdinando I,ed.Stanislaod’Aloe(Naples,1859),CLXXVI.

86 ASMantua.AGonzaga,b.872,cc.35–8:CapinodeCapotoGianGiacomoCalandra, 17,20Nov.1526,Cave.

87 Ibid.,b.1911,c.91,93:NinotoCardinalErcoleGonzaga,13,14Mar.1541,Rome.88 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.103:PedrodeToledotoCharlesV,18Apr.(1541).


delayeddoingthis,heexplained,soitwouldbeevidenthewasactingnotoutofangeragainstAscanio,butwithgoodreason,knowingitwouldbringquiettoRome.89

After Paul’s death, Ascanio recovered his lands and Paliano was fortifiedonceagain,onlyforhislandstobeconfiscatedbytheCaraffapope,PaulIV.One papal nephew was made duca di Paliano in 1556, another marchese diCave.Ascanio’sson,MarcantoniowasabletogetpossessionofhisestatesafterPaulIVdied,buthadtowaitbeforehewasgivenPalianoback.AspartofthesettlementfollowingawarbetweenPaulIVandPhilipII,inwhichtheduquedeAlbahadinvadedthePapalStatesfromthekingdomofNaples,PalianohadbeenputinPhilip’scustodyandhisofficialsinItalywereinnohurrytoadvisehimtogiveitbacktotheColonna.90WhilethefateofPalianowasbeingde-batedinRome,thenewpope,PiusIVwasadvisedthatitsfortificationsshouldagainbedemolished.ItwasnotgoodthatavassaloftheChurchshouldhavesuch a stronghold, he told the Spanish ambassador, who countered this bypointingoutthatmanybarons,vassalsoftheChurch,heldcomparableplacesandtherewasnoreasonwhyMarcantonioshouldbesingledout.91PalianowasreturnedtoMarcantoniointactin1562.92

Thepopesmightarguetheyhadtherighttograntordenypermissionforbaronstoerectnewfortifications.Whethertheywouldsucceedinenforcingthisrightiftheytriedtoexerciseit,woulddependonthecalculationsofthebaroninquestionastohowsafelyhecouldignoreit.Thefourteenth-centuryConstitutiones Egidianae,statutesforthePapalStatesissuedbytheformidableCardinalAlbornozashesoughttoimposeorderthereduringtheabsenceofthepapacyinAvignon,stipulatedthatnofortificationscouldbebuiltwithoutalicencefromthepope.InvokingtheseConstitutiones,InnocentVIIIobjectedwhenVirginioOrsinihadworkdoneonhisfortressatCampagnanowithoutaskingforpermission.93TheoutrageexpressedbyoneofVirginio’sofficials–thatsuchaprohibitionhadneverbeenmadetoanyRomanbaron,andVir-giniowouldratherdiethansubmittobethefirst–indicatestherarityofsuchanattemptbythepope.94Papalpermissiontorebuildfortressesmightaccom-panyapapalgrantoflands,orpapalconfirmationofrestitutionoflands,as

89 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.1913:NinotoErcoleGonzaga,14Feb.1543,Rome.90 Nicoletta Bazzano, Marco Antonio Colonna (Rome, 2003), 67–84; Michael Mallett and

ChristineShaw,The Italian Wars 1494–1559(Harlow,2012),273–5,277–8.91 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.886,5:FranciscodeVargastoPhilipII,9Jan.1560,Rome.92 Bazzano,Marco Antonio Colonna,82–4,98–102.93 ACapitolino, AOrsini, b. 102, c. 466: Bartolomeo da Bracciano toVirginio Orsini, 3 Feb.

1491.94 Ibid.,b.102,c.329:SantidaCurcumellotoVirginioOrsini,undated.

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withNicholasV’sreturnofPalestrinatotheColonnain1447.95JuliusIIgavepermissionforthefortressofSanFelicealCirceotoberebuiltwhenconfirm-ingitsrecoverybytheCaetanifromLucreziaBorgia(whosefatherAlexanderVIhadconfiscateditfromthem).Inthiscase,thepopewantedthefortresstobebuilt:Juliushopeditwouldhelptodeterpirates.TheCaetanididnotdoit,althoughtheydiderectfourtowersontheshorein1562.96

Formanylordsofcastles,keepingtheirfortressesingoodrepairandstockedwithmunitions,letalonebuildingnewones,couldbeaconsiderabledrainonincomeswhichwereoftenlimited.Eventhosewithextensivelands,whowerepowerful enough to be independent actors in political and military affairs,mightderiveonlyalimitedcashincomefromtheirestates.Precisefiguresarehard to come by. One exception is a detailed account, perhaps compiled inthe1470s,oftherevenuesofObiettoFieschi–animportantplayerinthepoli-ticsofGenoaandathorninthefleshofthedukeofMilan–whicharrivedatatotalof4,569Genoeselire,about1,700ducats.Thevariousrevenuesfromhisprincipalestate inGenoeseterritory,Torriglia,cameto justunder2,000 lire,fromwhichtheofficialcompilingthesummarydeducted400lireforthecas-tellan.PayingthecastellanofRoccatagliatacosthalfofthe500lirehegotfromthat important stronghold. Borgo Valditaro in the duchy of Milan, muchcovetedbyotherlords,yieldedonly672lireinordinaryrevenues,andusuallytwicethatfigureinextraordinaryrevenues;therethecommunitypaidforthecastellan.97IftheseweretherevenuesofamajorlordintheApennines,itcanbeeasilyimaginedhowpoorsomeoftheminormountainlordsmightbe.TwoSpinolabrothersdescribedtheirownestateofTassarolloin1454as ‘asterileplaceandpoor,whichscarcelyfeedsusandourfamilies’.98In1560,theMalas-pinamarchesijoinedtogethertoobtainfromEmperorFerdinandIexemptionfromtheobligationtoprovide lodgings for Imperial troopsbecauseof theirverylimitedrevenuesandthepovertyofthepeopleontheirestates.99

At the other end of the scale were the major barons of the kingdom ofNaples. Accounts compiled for the guardian of the young Ferrante da San-severino,principediSalernoin1517,showedannualrevenuesof21,280ducats,notcountingaround4,000ducatsfromthesaleofgrainandotherproductsof

95 GiulioSilvestrelli,Città, castelli e terre della regione romana(Rome,1993),303.96 G.Caetani,Regesta chartarum(CittàdelVaticano,1922),VI,245;Silvestrelli,Città, castelli

e terre,36.97 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.1612,Attiescritturecamerali1450–1530:‘IntratadeleterredalR.

dno.HybletodalFiescho’.98 Ibid.,b.409:GaleottoandEttoreSpinolatoFrancescoSforza,21July1454,Tassarollo.99 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,I,569–70.


hisestates.100VespasianoColonnahadanestimatedincomeof40,000ducatsfrom his Neapolitan estates in 1528, quite apart from his lands in the PapalStates.101 In the 1550s, Francesco Ferdinando d’Avalos, marchese di Pescarashouldhavehadrevenuesofatleast60,000scudiayear,bythereckoningofanoldfamilyservant.Debtsandalienationofproperty(somecausedbyextrava-gance,someincurredintheserviceofCharlesV)hadmuchreducedthis;nev-ertheless,hethoughtthatwithbettermanagement,themarchesecouldhaveanincomeof35–40,000scudi.102ThewealthoftheprincipediTarantoacen-turybeforewouldnodoubthaveexceededthat;hisrevenuescouldprobablyhavestoodcomparisonwiththoseoftheking.

GiosiaAcquaviva,whosesonwouldmarrytheprince’sdaughter,ontheoth-erhand,appearedtotheMilaneseambassadortobea‘verypoorlord’.103Greattitlesdidnotnecessarilygowithgreatwealth.TheduchyofAmalfihadanes-timatedincomeof5,000ducatsayearin1461,whenitwasgiventoPiusII’snipote,AntonioPiccolomini;by1528hissuccessorAlfonsoPiccolominiwases-timatedtohave18,000ducatsayear.104TheducadiSanPietro,ontheotherhand,‘althoughhehasthetitleofduke,hasnomorethan2,000ducatsincomeinall’,asaSpanishofficialinNaplesremarked.105Manybaronshadconsider-ablylessthanthat.Amongtherebelswhoseestateswereconfiscatedin1528–9wereseveralwhoseestatesyieldedonly200ducatsayear,orevenless.106Thestyle of life even of those who had much larger revenues did not impress agreatLombardlord.Lookingforasuitablematchforhisniece,FerranteGonza-gacastacriticaleyeoversomeoftheoldestbaronialfamiliesinthekingdom,concludingthat‘theselordsmaycallthemselvesdukesandmarquises,yettheyarenodukeofUrbinoorofMantua,butstayprivatelyontheirlands,andmanyofthemliveworsethanagentlemanofourareawhohas2,000scudiayear’.107

Onlythepoorestlordsofcastleswouldhavenotbeeninapositiontoraiseatleastsomerevenuebysalesofsurplusproducefromtheirlands,eitherfrom

100 RaffaeleColapietra,I Sanseverino di Salerno(Salerno,1985),125.101 Sanuto,I diarii,XLVII,col.166.102 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.1927,cc.240–1:MarcantonioEttonedePreserytoErcoleGon-

zaga,1Mar.1555,Naples.Scudiwereworthroughlythesameasducats.103 Nunziante,‘IprimiannidiFerdinandod’Aragona’,(1893),15.104 Sanuto,I diarii,XLVII,cols166–7.105 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1006,42:BishopofBurgostoCobos,10Sept.1530,Naples;thelist

inSanuto,I diarii,XLVII,col.167,givesthesamefigure.106 TommasoPediò,Napoli e Spagna nella prima metà del Cinquecento (Bari, 1971),274–89;

Pediò’s list was based in part on the information in the surveys published in Cortese,‘Feudiefeudatarinapoletani’,(1929),28–150,(1930),41–102.

107 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.1913:FerranteGonzagatoErcoleGonzaga,27Dec.1543,Molfetta.

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landstheyfarmeddirectlyorfromduesinkindfromtheirtenantsandvassals.Suppliesfromtheirestatescouldformasignificantpartofthestocksofbasicfoodstuffs,wineandoilonurbanmarkets;baronswhoheldtownsthemselveswereobviouslybestplacedtomakethemostofthisopportunity.TheprincipediTarantotookagreatinterestinthecommercialexploitationofhisvastes-tates,tothebenefitnotjustofhisownrevenuesbuttheentireregion.Greatbaronslikehim,ithasbeenargued,hadasignificantroleinthefifteenthcen-turycreatingmarketsbeyondthetraditional,localonesfortheproductsoftheareastheydominated.108AmongthecitiestheprincecontrolledweretheportsofBariandMonopoliandhetradeddirectlywiththeeasternMediterranean,exportingagriculturalproductsandimportingarms,slavesandsilver,amongothergoods.Hehadafleetofboatsandsmallshipsengagedincoastaltrade.109Sicilian barons were also directly concerned in trading the produce of theirlandsoutsidetheisland.Theylikedtohavetheirownportsthroughwhichtoexporttheirgoods,partlytoavoidtheregulationofexportsbythecentralgov-ernment.110

In the duchy of Milan, a ducal licence was required for the sale of someproductsofthenobles’estates,suchasgrain,saltorwood.Nevertheless,thepossessionofportsontheriverPowasamajorasset forthefortunate lordswhohadthem,suchasthemainbranchofthePallavicini.Themostpowerfulmember of that lineage in the fifteenth century, Rolando Pallavicini, had asmallfleetofboatstohelphimexploitthecommercialpossibilitiesofhisriverports.(Hereckonedhisincomeas10,000ducatsayearinthemid-century,hissonsthoughtitconsiderablyhigher.)111SomeofthelordsinEmilia,suchasthePiodaCarpiandtheCorreggio,preferredto foregothefinancialadvantagestheywouldderivefromlinkingtheirlandstothecommercialhighwayofthePobyconstructingnavigablewaterways,infavourofthegreaterpoliticalsecu-rityofmaintainingtheir isolation.112 InLiguria, theharboursof the lordsofMonacoandFinalewereusefulnotsomuchfortradingintheproduceoftheirownlandsasforenablingtheirsubjectstoearnalivinginthecoastaltrade,andprovidingabase for theirownboatsandgalleys toenforcethetwopercenttolltheyclaimedonvesselsusingtheirportorpassingthroughitswaters.113

108 Giuseppe Galasso, Il Regno di Napoli: Il Mezzogiorno angioino e aragonese (1266–1494)(Turin,1992),750.

109 CarmelaMassaro,‘Territorio,società,epotere’,289–97.110 Bresc,‘Lefiefdanslasociétésicilienne’,338–9.111 LetiziaArcangeli,‘Unlignaggiopadanotraautonomiasignorileecorteprincipesca:iPal-

lavicini’,35–8.112 Chittolini,‘Ilparticolarismosignorile’,263–4.113 Saige,Documents historiques,II,pp.XXI-XXII,CLI.


Lordsofcastlesoninlandroutescouldalsoexploittheopportunitiespre-sentedby the travellersandgoodspassing throughtheir lands,by imposingtolls,orprovidingfacilitiesandprotectionformarkets.Forthosewhoselandslayinthemountainsandwerenotveryproductive,thesecouldbeimportantassets.Varese,situatedwheretraderoutesbetweenthePovalleyandtheLigu-riancoastmet,wasfosteredbytheFieschi,whobuiltthevillageonacircularplan,withcontinuousporticoesthatprovidedshelterforthemarket,andsur-roundeditwithawallandaditch.114ItbecameakeypointoftheFieschies-tates.OsoppowasimportanttotheSavorgnan,notjustbecauseofitsstrength,butbecauseofitspositiononaroutebetweenAustriaandFriuli.AmongtheprivilegesofImperialfiefholderswastherighttoimposetolls;howmuchad-vantagetheycouldtakeofthiswoulddependonwheretheirfiefwassituated,andwhethertheyhadthestrengthtoenforcepayments.Anothereconomicopportunitywaspresented to thosewhocouldprovideseasonalpasture forlargetranshumantflocks,assomeofthelordsinthemountainsoftheterritoryofParmacould.115ThemajorseasonalmigrationroutesforlivestockwereinsouthernTuscany,thePapalStatesandthekingdomofNaples,givingRomanandNeapolitanbaronswhoselandsweretraversedbytheflocksandhadpas-ture tooffer thechancetoraisesomerevenuesand, in timeofwar,aneco-nomicweapon.

If they wanted to continue to enjoy this source of revenue in peacetime,theywouldevidentlyhavetousesomediscretioninhowtheymightthreatentosequesterflocksorinterrupttheirmigrationintimeofwar.Similarly,thosewholeviedtollswoulddowell tokeepthemata levelthatwouldnotbesovexatiousastodrivemerchantsandtravellerstoseekotherroutes.Suchpru-dentialconsiderationsdidnotstopsomebaronsturningtorobberyorpiracy,oriftheydidnotdothisthemselves,allowingthemenfromtheirestatestodoso.Thiscouldbedangerous;nothingwasmore likelytoarouseprotestsandthreatsofretributionfromgovernments,princelyorrepublican.Quiteapartfrom the harm to their own economic interests, it was a touchstone of anygovernment’sauthoritythattheroadsandwaterwaysoftheirstateshouldbesafefortravellers.Robberyandpiracy–unlesstheycouldbepresentedasanactofwarorareprisal–weregenerallytherecourseofthedesperateorthereckless.

A common element of the revenues of lords of castles throughout Italywouldbeincomederivedfromtheirpowersofjurisdictionoverthepeopleon

114 Description, plans and an aerial photograph in Paolo Marchi, ‘Immagine dei borghimedievali’,123–5,132–3.

115 AngeloPezzana,Storia della Città di Parma(Bologna,1971),II,528.

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theirestates,fromfeesfortheuseofthetribunalstheyprovided,fromfinesandfromforfeituresofproperty.Manyhadpowerstodealwitheventhemostseriouscrimessuchasmurder,andcouldexecutethosefoundguiltyofthem.Havingpowersofjurisdictionwasnotonlyasourceofincome,butalso,inanimportantsense,characterizedtherelationshipofthelordstothosewholivedon their estates, who were often referred to as their vassals (although fewwouldformallyholdfiefsfromthem)ortheirsubjects.Therelationshipthatmatteredmostwasthatbetweenlordandman,ratherthanlordandtenant.

Beingsubjecttoabaronneednotmeanbeingsubjecttoarbitraryoppres-sion and exploitation; it might well be preferable to being a countrydwellersubjecttothejurisdictionofacivicgovernmentorthetenantofalandholdingtownsman.Itcouldmeanalightertaxburden,agreatertoleranceofeverydayviolence, less harsh punishments of those found guilty by the courts. Con-temptforpeasants,theideathattheywerestupidyetcunning,everreadytocheatandevadetheirobligations,bruteswhoneededtobekeptintheirplacewithafirmhand,randeepinthecultureofItaliantownsandcities.Amongtheruralnobility, too, therewouldalwaysbethegreedy, thestupid, thevicious,whooverburdenedthosesubjecttothem.Buttheywerenotthenormthrough-outItaly.Manylordsofcastlessawtheirmenasanassettobenurtured,seeingtheirloyaltyandwillingnesstofightforthemasworththesacrificeofsomeadditional income that might have been squeezed from them. There wassomeregionalvariationinthepatternofrelationsbetweenthemilitarynobil-ityandtheirmen.Insomeareas,theprevailingethoswasoneofmutualsup-port;inothers,lordsgaveprioritytotherevenuesandservicestheycouldgetfromtheirmen.

Romanbaronshadalongtraditionoffosteringthegoodwilloftheirmen.Backinthethirteenthcentury,allthemenwholivedontheirestateshadtotakeanoathtothem,onreachingtheageoflegalmajorityoriftheycameasadultstolivethere.Theoathwasmodelledonthatofavassaltoanecclesiasti-callord,stressingfidelity,thedutytogiveaidandcounselandsupportagainsttheenemiesofhislord,andtohelphimvindicatehishonourorrecoverprop-erty lost tohim, rather thanduesand labourservices.116Norecordsof suchoathsinthefifteenthcenturyhavecometolight,butthenatureofthebondbetweentheRomanbaronsandtheirvassalsseemstohavebeenthesame.ThevaluebaronsplacedonthesupportoftheirsubjectsisillustratedbyVirginioOrsini,retaininghis‘superiorità’(overlordship)overthepeopleoftheestatesofViano,RotaandIschiawhenhegavetheselands,thefortressofVianoandalltheduesandjurisdictiontoaRomanpartisanandcaptaininhisservice,

116 SandroCarocci,Baroni di Roma(Rome,1993),205–6,255.


GiorgioSantacroce,in1493.TheinhabitantswouldstillbeobligedtobeloyaltoVirginioandhisheirs,tofollowthem[‘prestaresequellam’]‘astheirothervassalsandsubjectsareboundtodo’.Virginio’senemiesweretobetheirene-mies,hisfriendstheirfriends,theyweretoreceivehistroops,tosupportwhat-evertendedtothehonourandutilityofhimandhisheirs.117

Supportandaidrenderedtothebaronsbytheirvassalscouldtaketheformof standing surety for them, giving them counsel, even acting as arbiters infamily disputes, but above all it meant being prepared to take up arms forthem.Occasionally,thismightmeanfollowingtheirlordsinattacksonrivals,orgoingtoRomeiftroublewasbrewingtherebetweenthebaronialfactionsafterthedeathofapope.InSeptember1526,ColonnavassalstookpartwithSpanishtroops in the incursion intoRome ledbyCardinalPompeoandAs-canioColonnaandCharlesV’senvoy,UgodeMoncada; theywere included,withtheColonna,inthepardonMoncadanegotiatedwithPopeClement.118

TheOrsiniandColonnacouldraisethousandsofmenfromtheirlands,butthesemenwouldonlybeavailableforafewdays,andwouldprobablyexpecttheirlordstofeedthem,andperhapspaythemsomething.Somemighthaveservedasprofessionalsoldiersunderthecommandofbaronialcondottieri,andothersmighthavereceivedsometraininginhandlingweapons.Colonna‘peas-ants’trainedintheuseofthecrossbowwereamongtheforcesengagedinaprivatewarbetweentheColonnaandtheContifamiliesin1493.119Untrainedpeasantscouldbeusefulpioneers,diggingtrenchesandsiegeworks.Neverthe-less,althoughmanyoftheRomanbaronswerethemselvescondottieri,theydidnottrytomaketheirmenintoaprivatearmy.

Raidsandambushesanddefenceofthevillagesandfieldsthatweretheirhomesaswellasbeingthebarons’estates,weretherealforteofbarons’sub-jectsasfightingmen.Ifprofessionalsoldierswerepreferredorneededtomansomefortresses,theymightstillberecruitedfromamongthevassals:thecas-tellanoftheOrsinistrongholdofBraccianowasorderedin1520topayonlyvassals,‘ashadalwaysbeenthepractice’.120Baronsplacedgreatrelianceonthefidelityoftheirsubjectsintimeofwar.Thisdidnotalwaysmeantheywouldexpectthemtofighttothelast.Insomecircumstances,ratherthanholdoutatallcosts,theywouldsurrendertheirlandsandfortressestopreventtheruinof

117 ASRome, Archivio del Collegio de’ Notari Capitolini, b. 176 (Camillo Beneimbene),ff.820r-823r;Shaw,The Political Role,64–5.

118 Calendar of State Papers, Spanish,IIIi,927–8.119 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.849,c.334:GianLucidoCattaneotoFrancescoGonzaga,27Sept.

1493,Rome.120 ACapitolino,AOrsini,b.93,c.274:“Jo.daColli”toFeliceOrsini,26July1520,Bracciano.

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theirvassals,aswellastheirestates.ExplainingtotheColonna’ssupportersinRomewhytheyhadlettheirlandsbeoccupiedbythetroopsofAlexanderVIin1501,ProsperoColonnasaidthatheandhiscousinFabriziohadnotjudgeditexpedienttohavewarathome,‘totheundoingoftheirvassals’,whiletheywerefightinginthekingdomofNaples.121Romanbaronscoulddothis,intheconfidencethat,whentheopportunityarose,theywouldbewelcomedbackby theirvassalsandthuseasily recover their lands–as indeedtheColonnawere,anddid,whenAlexanderdiedin1503.

The bonds between the long-established families of Roman barons andtheir men could be very strong. After the death of Marcello Colonna in1482,theirsubjectsassuredhisbrothersoftheirdevotiontothefamily,saying(itwasreported)thatifonlyacatofthefamilyremained,theywerereadytofollowthat.122But itcouldnotbe taken forgranted.Goodwilldidnotauto-matically extend to all members of the family. Niccolò Orsini da PitiglianofearedthatthemenofFiano,whichhadcometohimasthecollateralheirofOrsoOrsini,ducad’Ascoli,mightrebeliftheillegitimatesonsofOrso,towhomtheywereveryattached,shouldbefreedfromtheirimprisonmentbyFerranteofNaplesandclaimtheestates.123DuringthefeudamongthesonsofGian-giordanoOrsinidiBraccianothatsplitthefamilyinthe1520sand1530s,theeldestsonNapoleone,wildandunpredictableashewas,hadagreatercarefortheirvassalsthandidhishalf-brotherFrancesco,whoacquiredareputationformistreatingthem.InconsequenceNapoleonehadthesympathiesofthemenofVicovaro,wholovedhimandhatedhisbrothers.124InthecourseofafamilyquarrelamongtheCaetaniin1516,GuglielmoCaetanidiSermonetawassaidtobesounpopularwithhisvassalsthat‘noonewouldmakeamovetosupporthim’.125Agenerationlater,asthefamilyfeudpersisted,BonifacioCaetanifelthecouldnolongertrustthepeopleofSermoneta,becauseofthepunishments

121 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.854:GianLucidoCattaneotoFrancescoGonzaga,3 June[forJuly?]1501,Rome.

122 ASMilan, ASforzesco, b. 91: Bishop of Como and Antonio Trivulzio to Gian GaleazzoSforza,4May1452,Rome.

123 ASModena,Cancelleriaducale,Carteggio,Ambasciatori,Firenze,b.6:AldobrandinoGui-donitoErcoled’Este,23Oct.1488,Florence.

124 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.881,c.562:FabrizioPeregrinotoFedericoGonzaga,17Sept.1532,Rome.ForFrancesco’sreputationformaltreatmentofhisvassals,ibid.,b.1907:NinotoErcole Gonzaga, 19 Nov. 1538, Rome. Napoleone could treat the vassals harshly too, aswhenheimprisonedsomemenofBraccianoin1522forsellinggrainontheordersofhisstepmotherFelice(Shaw,The Political Role,66–8).

125 MariaAntoniettaVisceglia,‘“Farsiimperiale”:faidefamiliarieidentitàpoliticheaRomanelprimoCinquecento’,496.


hehadmetedouttothoseinvolvedinaplotagainsthim–aplotincitedbyImperial agents, he told the French ambassador as he appealed for militaryaid, but the main agents had been the Caetani di Maenza, Imperial sym-pathizers.126 The eccentricities of Ascanio Colonna in the 1530s and 1540sseverelytestedtheloyaltyofhisvassals,buttheywerereadytowelcomehisson,Marcantonio,whenhecamewiththedukeofAlba’stroopsin1556,andtotakeuparmstohelphimrecoverhisestatesfromtheCaraffain1559.127

CastellansinsouthernLombardyandEmiliaalsovaluedthewillingnessoftheirmentofollowthemandtofightforthem,andwereconsciousthattheirsideofthebargainwastoofferprotectioninreturn.Protectioninthisregionincluded helping their subjects to ward off the fiscal demands and judicialclaims of the cities, whose governments were frustrated by the immunitiesfromcivicjurisdictionthattheinhabitantsofthecastellans’estatescoulden-joy, and which attracted men to live there.128 A proposed tax reform whenParmawasunderpapalgovernmentinthesixteenthcentury,thatwouldhaveendedthefiscalimmunityofcitizensofParmalivingontheestatesofthecas-tellans,arouseddeterminedresistancefromthelords.Theystressedhowthesemencouldhelppreservethemandtheirlands,andhowthecompany,aswellas the services, of gentlemen and other citizens who lived on their estatesmadetheirownlivesmorepleasant.129PaoloTorelli,contediMontechiarugo-lo, even pledged in 1540 that if the reforms were adopted he would pay themoneythatwouldbeclaimedhimself,‘becauseitmeansmoretometohavemeninthiscastello…thananykindofrevenue,stillmorewhentheyareasfaithfulandlovingtomeandmyfamilyastheyare’.130

Menwhohadchosentoliveonthecastellans’estatescouldbeexpectedtoservetheminarms,justlikethosewhohadbeenbornandbredthere.SoatleastthesonsofRolandoPallavicinireckoned,astheydiscussedthedivisionoftheselandsaround1457.Alisthadbeendrawnupof4,773menontheirestates,towhichtheyagreedshouldbeaddedthe“incomers”(forestieri),becausetheytooobeyedthem,andtheirjudicialofficials,‘andliketheotherswhoarecalled

126 Ibid.,502–3.127 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1049,166:GiovanbernardoCarboneto?,19Aug.1559,Paliano.128 GiorgioChittolini,‘IlluogodiMercato,ilcomunediParmaeimarchesiPallavicinidiPel-

legrino’,138–42;idem,‘La“signoria”degliAnguissolasuRiva,GrazzanoeMontesantofraTreeQuattrocento’,200–18;idem, ‘Ilparticolarismosignorile’,264–5;MarcoGentile,‘LaformazionedeldominiodeiRossitraXIVeXVsecolo’,35;FrancescoSomaini,‘Unastoriaspezzata:lacarrieraecclesiasticadiBernardoRossi’,133–4.

129 LetiziaArcangeli,‘Principi,hominese“partesani”nelritornodeiRossi’,298–300.130 LetiziaArcangeli,‘Conflitti,paci,giustizia:feudataripadanetraQuattroeCinquecento’,

58.

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“terrieri”takeuparmsatourrequest’.131LiketheRomanbarons,themilitarynobilityofLombardywereoftenprofessionalsoldiers,condottieri,whowouldhavetrainedtroopsundertheircommand,someofthemtheirsubjects,someofthemnot.Manyoftheirsubjectswouldbeprincipallyusefulasauxiliaries,butinthekindoflocalwarsandfactionfightingforwhichtheywouldbecalledupontheycouldbeveryuseful indeed,constructingsiegeworksormanningfortifications,raidingandlayingwastecrops.132

TheFieschi,accordingtoaMilaneseenvoyinJuly1477,hadveryfewsub-jects,derivingtheirstrengthfromtheirfollowingonthecoastoftheeasternRiviera.133Perhapshemeantfewsubjectscomparedtothenumbersoftheirpartisans, for they could probably raise thousands of men from their lands.NervousMilanesecastellansholdingtheFieschifortressofSavignoneatthattimereckonedtheFieschidiSavignone,whowerenotthemajorbranch,couldputtogetherthreetofourhundredmenfromthelandsundertheir jurisdic-tion.134TheFieschihadoccasiontocallontheirmentofightforthemquitefrequently in the fifteenth century, and it appears the men were generallyready to do so. Gian Filippo Fieschi in 1448 was warned against asking toomuchofthem:hehadmadeuseofthemalotinthepastandmightwellhavetocallonthemagaininthefuture;heshouldholdtheminreserveforwhenheneededthem.135

Theloyaltyoftheirmenwastestedinthefifteenthcentury,astheFieschiformuchofthetimewereatoddswiththedogeofGenoaorthedukeofMilan,orwererivenbyfamilydisputes.WhatspirittheycouldshowinfightingfortheFieschi was illustrated by the efforts of the men ofVarese and the territoryaroundtohelpGianLuigiFieschirecovertheselandsfromManfredoLandi,the widower of Antonia Fieschi, in 1478.136While they attacked the fortressLandihadbuiltatVareseandspreadouttotakepossessionofthesurroundingvillages,thosewhocouldnotfight,togetherwithwomenandchildren,wereontheheightsaroundVarese,lightingfiresandshoutingbattlecries,includingtheFieschirallying-cryof“Gatto,gatto”.RumoursthatGianLuigiFieschiwasonhiswayspurred themon,andencouraged thegarrisonof the fortress to

131 Arcangeli,‘Unlignaggiopadano’,83.132 NadiaCovini,L’esercito del duca. Organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza

(1450–1480)(Rome,1998),121–2.133 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.1572:GianPietroPanigarola,11July1477,Genoa.134 Ibid.,b.971:GiangiorgioCapelloandPietroCrivellitotheDuchi,4June1477,Savignone.135 ASGenoa,AS1790,f.230r:GianoCampofregosotoGianFilippoFieschi,6Apr.1448.The

dogewasdissuadinghimfromrespondingtoacallforaidfrom‘thatmarchese,yourrela-tive’.

136 Seebelow,p.82,forthisfamilydispute.


surrender.Acrowdofmenandwomen,wavingsheetstolooklikebannersandmakingasmuchnoiseastheycould inthewoodlandaroundacompanyofMilanesesoldiers,putthemtoflightin1479,leadingtothefallofthestrong-holdofMonteTanànotoFieschi.137Theirsubjects’devotiontothefamilyheldfirm until the end, when the failure of a conspiracy by Gian Luigi Fieschi’sgrandson,alsocalledGianLuigi,againstAndreaDoriain1547ledtothefinallossofthefamilylands,andtheendoftheirpowerinLiguria.138MostofthedefendersofthelastFieschistronghold,Montoggio,whowerecapturedwhenitfellinJune1547,werefromtheirlands,fromBorgoValditaro,Torriglia,SantoStefano,Roccatagliata,VareseandotherplacesaswellasfromMontoggioit-self.139

TheloyaltyofthemenofMonaco,MentonandRoquebrunetotheGrimaldiwasalsotestedbyfamilyquarrels,onwhoseoutcomestheirviewsandinter-ventionscouldhaveadecisiveinfluence.WhenPomellina,thewidowedmoth-erofCatalanoGrimaldiwasgiventherighttogovernMonacountilherdeathbythetermsofherson’swill,pressurefromthemenoftheestateshelpedtoforce her to relinquish this uncustomary extension of the common widow’sposition as guardian of her child’s interests. They supported the claims ofLamberto Grimaldi, who was betrothed to Catalano’s young daughter, Clau-dine,toashareofthegovernmentinrightofhisfuturewife.Theirproctorsswore to observe the terms agreed in October 1457 between Pomellina andLamberto,whichincludedastipulationthathewastohavechargeofallmat-terstodowithsoldiersorwitharminggalleys.140ThemenofMonaco,Mentonand Roquebrune helped to repel the force sent to assassinate Lamberto inMarch1458,asPomellinaplottedagainsthimwithanotherlineofthefamily,theGrimaldidiBeuil.Insolemnceremonies,theysworehomagetohimasthelegitimateadministratorofClaudine,promisingtobe‘liege[ligios]andfaith-fulmen’tothecoupleandtheirheirs.Inreturn,Lambertopromisedtoobservetheirprivileges,togovernthemwithjusticeandtokeepthematpeacewithGenoa‘sofarashecan’.141LivingatMenton,PomellinadidmanagetoincitearebellionagainstLambertothereandatRoquebrunein1466,andhehaddiffi-cultyrecoveringandholdingontotheseplaces.

137 BarbaraBernabò,‘FieschieLandifraValdiVaraeValdiTaronelXVsecolo’,368–71.138 Seebelow,pp.94,226–7.139 List of those captured in Massimiliano Spinola, L.T. Belgrano and Francesco Podestà

(eds),‘Documentiispano-genovesidell’ArchiviodiSimancas’,157–9.140 Saige,Documents historiques,I,CLXIII-CLXVII,268–86.141 Ibid.,CLXVII-CLXIX,288–94.

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ButthepeopleofMonacowereconsistentlyloyaltoLambertoandhisheirs,recognizingLucianoGrimaldiastheirlordafterhehadkilledhiselderbrotherGiovanni,acceptinghisclaimhehadacted inself-defence,andstandingbyhimwhenMonacowasbesiegedbytheGenoesein1506–7.FollowingLuciano’sassassinationbyhisnephew,BartolomeoDoriainAugust1523,thepeopleofMonacohelped tosurroundBartolomeoandhis followers,negotiate the re-leaseofLuciano’swifeandchildren,anddriveoffhundredsofDoriasupport-erswhocamebylandandseatooccupyMonaco.142

Adecadelater,ontheordersofCharlesV,aSpanishenvoytriedtopersuadeStefanoGrimaldi,theguardianofLuciano’sheir,Onorato,toreplacethevas-salswhoguardedthefortressofMonacowithoutsiders.Stefanorepliedthathecouldnotbebetterservedthanbyvassals,forhewassureoftheirloyaltytotheirlord.Therewereanumberofreasons,theenvoyobserved,whythevas-salswouldresentbeingreplacedbytroopsfromSpainandotherpartsofItaly,as the emperor wanted.They would not want to lose the money they werepaid,andtheywouldnotliketofeeltheywerenottrusted;therewasrivalrybetweenthemenfromMonacoandthosefromMentonandRoquebrune,andcompetitionastowhocouldservebest;andaboveall,hehadneverseenvas-salswholovedtheirlordsowell.143EventuallyStefanoturnedtheenvoyoutofMonaco,havingsecuredanoathofloyaltyfromthepeopletohimselfasgover-norforOnorato,andrefusedtoallowtheenvoytoaddressanassemblyofthepeopleonbehalfofCharlesV.144

LoyalasthesubjectsandvassalsofthecastellansinLiguriacouldbe,pre-paredastheymightbetoidentifywiththeirlords’interests,theyexpectedtobetreatedwithameasureofconsiderationandrespectinreturn,andneededtobehandledcarefully.CenturiesofdevotionofthepeopleofFinaletothedelCarrettowerevitiatedbytheavariceandoppressionofAlfonsoII,andtheyroseupagainsthimin1558,consideringeventhegovernmentofGenoaprefer-abletohis.Intheend,theSpanishestablishedagovernorthere,andFinalewaslosttothedelCarretto.145

NeithertheDorianortheSpinolapossessedany individualstrongholdasimportant as Monaco or Finale.Their political weight in the Riviere and inGenoawasfoundedratheronthenumbersoffightingmentheycouldrally.Aswith the Fieschi, many of these men would be partisans, members of their

142 Ibid.,II,CIX-CXVI.143 Ibid.,II,627–32:FrancescoValenzuelatoCharlesV,31August1533,Monaco.144 Ibid.,716–23:StefanoGrimalditoNiccolòGrimaldi,29Apr.1534,Monaco.145 EmilioMarengo,‘AlfonsoIIodelCarretto,marchesediFinaleelaRepubblicadiGenova’,

1–141.


faction,ratherthantheirvassalsandsubjects.Theyexpectedtheirmentobepreparedtofightforthem,buttheyseemtohavehadmoredifficultythantheothermajorfamiliesinkeepingongoodtermswiththem.

TheDoriahadparticulartroublewiththemenoftheValled’Oneglia.Twothousandmencouldberaisedinthevalley,accordingtoaMilanesecommis-sionerwritingin1492.146EachhouseholdthathadatleastonemanwasobligedbytheDoriastatutesforthevalleytokeepaswordandashieldofwoodandleather,andsomemenwerealsoobligedtoequipthemselveswithahelmetandsomebodyarmour,andadaggeraswell.147Butthemenofthevalley,asthe commissioner noted, were ‘very free’, their dues to their lords from thewholevalleyamountingtonomorethan40ducatsayear.148Fromtheperspec-tiveofafriendoftheDoria,themencouldappearnotsomuchindependentas ‘volatile and of ill-will and disobedient to their lords because they don’twanttosubmittothelaw…Thereisnotapeasantinthisvalleywhowillobeythemanymorethantheyfeelinclined.’149Attimes,theDorialostcontrol.In1445theyaskedtheGenoesetohelpthemasserttheirrights.150TheGenoesegovernment then was ready to exhort the men to obey their lords, as DogePietroCampofregosoalsodidmorethanonceinthe1450s.151Butlettersalonewouldnothavemucheffect,andtheGenoesedonotseemtohavebeenwillingtosendtroopstohelptheDoriaenforcetheirauthority.AtleastoncetheDoriatriedtakinghostages,whowereheldinGenoa,toquelltheirrebelliousmen,152buttheydonotseemtohavetriedusingforceagainstthem.Itwasprobablynotarealisticoption.

Noneof theSpinolahadsuchconsistentproblemswith theirmenas theDoriaoftheValled’Onegliadid,butthereweresomerebellionsagainstthem.ElianoSpinolacomplainedin1451thatthepeasantsoftheValBorbera‘havealwaysbeenriotousandrebels’.153In1485abitterconflictbetweenFrancesco

146 ASMilan, ASforzesco, b. 1210: Giovanni Pietro Raymondo to Gian Galeazzo Sforza,26December1492,Oneglia.

147 FrancescoBiga,La Valle d’Oneglia negli Statuti dei Doria(Imperia,1991),57.148 ASMilan, ASforzesco, b. 1210: Giovanni Pietro Raymondo to Gian Galeazzo Sforza,

26December1492,Oneglia.149 Ibid.,b.992:TommasoCampofregosototheDuchiofMilan,13July1480,Portomaurizio.150 ASGenoa,AS536,f.47r-v:21June1445.151 Ibid.,AS1791,f.293r:PietroCampofregosotomenofupperValled’Oneglia,11Feb.1451;

AS1794,ff.485v-486r:PietroCampofregosotomenofValled’Oneglia‘whoarecontuma-ciousorrebelsagainstthenobleNiccolòDoria’,19Jan.1454.

152 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.992:theDuchiofMilantotheDoriaofValled’Oneglia‘superiore’,28July1480,Milan.

153 Ibid.,b.407:ElianoSpinolatoFrancescoSforza,16Feb.1451,Genoa.

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SpinolaandthemenofCamporeachedsuchapitchthatheconcludedtherewasnohopeofanyagreement,‘forsuchistheirinsolencethateveryonewantstobehavejustashechooses,withnoregardforanything,noteventheirhon-our’,andhefelthewouldhavetoleave.154TheSpinolathemselvessuggestedtheyhaddifficultycontrollingtheirmenbecauseofhowsubdividedtheircas-telliwere, so that theirsubjectsweresplitup, if ‘united innot letting them-selvesbepunished’forthehighwayrobberytheSpinolawerebeingaskedtocontrol.155AdilemmatheSpinolasharedwithotherlordswhoseestateslayontheroutesthroughthemountainsbetweenLiguriaandLombardywasthatiftheytriedtodisciplinetheirmentopreventthemfromsupplementingtheirearnings by robbery or smuggling, they would lose their goodwill andtheirmenwouldnotbereadytofollowtheirlordswhentheywereneeded.Ontheotherhand,ifthelordscouldnotkeeptheroadsthroughtheirlandsse-cure,theywereliabletoannoythegovernmentsofbothGenoaandMilan.Andthere was always the temptation for the more reckless to supplement theirownincomebyjoiningtheirmeninpreyingontravellers.ThereweresimplytoomanySpinolalords,manyofthempoor,competingforashareoftherev-enuesfromlandsandmenwhowerenotthemselvesprosperous.

TheMalaspinainLunigianawereinthesameposition.Assessmentsoflia-bilitytoduesleviedontheirImperialfiefsin1554indicatedhowsmallsomeofthe much-divided Malaspina marquisates had become: 140 households(“hearths”)forthemarchesediMadrignano,90forMorello,marchesediMon-ti,110forLeonardo,marchesediPodenzana,180forFloramonte,marchesediBastia.156Withsuchreduceddomains, individualMalaspinamarchesicouldnotmusterfromtheirlandsenoughmentomakethemamilitarypowerintheLunigiana,letalonebeyond.

The most substantial Malaspina marquisate in the sixteenth century hadbeenfoundedwhentheFlorentinescededMassatoAntonioAlbericoMalaspi-nadiFosdinovoin1442.SoassiduouswashissonJacopoinbuyingupfiefsthatthe Florentines suspected him of nursing the ambition to become lord ofalltheLunigiana.157Despitefiercefamilyquarrelsineachgeneration,thebulkofthelandswaskepttogether,andin1568Jacopo’sgreat-grandson,Alberico,wasmadeaprinceoftheHolyRomanEmpirebytheemperorwithMassabe-ing elevated to a principate and Carrara a marquisate.158 Alberico’s elder

154 Ibid.,b.994:copyFrancescoSpinolatoPaoloCampofregoso,22Aug.1485,Campo.155 Ibid.,b.410:‘FamiliaSpinulorumdeL[uccul]otoFrancescoSforza,22Aug.1455,Genoa.156 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,I,569,II,469,571,704.157 Ibid.,III,759–61,766.158 Ibid.,800.


brotherGiulio(whohadquarrelledwiththeirmother,Ricciarda,theheiresstotheestates,andtakencontrolofthemin1546)raisedathousandmenin1547,whenheorderedeverymanbetweentheagesof15and60,onpainofdeath,tomuster inarmstogowithhimtosupportAndreaDoriaagainst theFieschi.Other Malaspina marchesi raised a total of around another thousand men.Only300wereselectedbyGiuliotogowithhimtoGenoa,andtheothersweresenthome.159

SuchaforayoutsideLunigianabyaMalaspinamarcheseattheheadofaforce of their subjects was exceptional. Most of the fighting the Malaspinacalledontheirmentodowasinsupportofthefamily’sprivatequarrels,moreoftenthannotinheritancedisputeswithotherMalaspina.Afavouritegambitintheprosecutionofsuchquarrelswastotrytoinducethemenofarivaltorebelagainsthim.WhenthemarchesidiSantoStefanoplottedin1520againsttheircousin,Ghisello,alegitimatedsonwhohadinheritedhisfather’sfiefofGambarointhePiacentino,theywantedhisvassalstokillhim.Theyplannedthentocometoclaimthelandsasthelegitimateheirs,promisingtheywouldpardonthosewhotookpartinthemurderandhalvetheexactionsfromthefief.UnpopularasGhisello’sbehaviourhadmadehim,thevassalshungbackfromtakingtheinitiative,buttwohundredofthem,armedwithswordsandarquebusesdidjoinLeonardoMalaspinainattackingthecastleofGambaro,afterherenewedthepromisetoalleviatetheburdensonthem.Heletthemsackthecastle,andtheysworefidelitytohim.Ghisellowaskilled,andhiswifeleftfordead;hissonGaspareVincenzo,whohadnotbeenthere,managedtorecoverGambaro,buttooknoreprisalsagainstthevassals.160

TheepisodeatGambarowasonlyoneofseveralinstancesinthefirsthalfofthesixteenthcenturyofMalaspinavassalsrebellingagainsttheir lords.161WererelationsbetweentheMalaspinalordsandtheirmendeteriorating,be-causeoftheever-increasingpressureonthemencausedbytherepeatedsub-divisionofthefiefs?Didtheyfeel,asthemenofanotherfamilyofApenninelords, the Vallisnera, did, that the impoverishment of some of their lordsbecause of the subdivision of their fief had led to misgovernment andoppression?162Whateffectdidthehardshipscausedbytheoverspillintothe

159 Seebelow,p.79,forthefamilyfeud;LuigiStaffetti,‘GiulioCybo-Malaspina,marchesediMassa’,2(1892),14.

160 GiorgioFiori,I Malaspina(Piacenza,1995),143–6.161 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,I,518–22,II,256–7,277,353–4.162 The men were petitioning the captain of Reggio that the fief should be confiscated

fromtheVallisnera.Oneofthelordsmaintainedthatthemenhadbeentreatedtoowellsothattheyhadbecomeproudanddidnotwanttobegoverned.(MarcoFolin,‘Feudatari,cittadini,gentiluomini.FormedinobiltànegliStatiestensi fraQuattroeCinquecento’,45–6.)

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LunigianaofthecampaignsinLombardyinthe1520shaveontheattitudeofthe Malaspina vassals to their lords? Information about the internal affairsofthefiefsistoosparsetoenableanyjudgementtobemade.Butacomparisonbetweentheattitudeofthemenofone,Ponzano,totheMalaspinainthemid-fifteenthandmid-sixteenthcenturiesissuggestive.PonzanoandotherestateshadbeentakenfromtheMalaspinabyLudovicoCampofregosoin1449,whenhewasdogeofGenoa.HeclaimedtheyhadsubmittedvoluntarilytohimandhismotheraftertheMalaspinahadleftthemfreetodoso;themensaidtheirsubmissionhadbeenforced.In1463themanofPonzanorebelledagainsthim,andwelcomedtheMalaspinamarchesidiLusuoloback.Ludovicowassaidtohave treated the men badly, and they protested they would rather burn theplacedownthanreturntohislordship.ButtheylikedtheirMalaspinalords,especiallyJacomoAmbrogio,‘becausethemenbehaveasthoughtheywerehisbrothers,andtomakethemhispartisans’,heallowedthemtorobandtocom-mitothermisdeeds.163In1540,bycontrast,themenofPonzanodroveouttheirlord,themarcheseAntonio,demolishinghiscastle,exceptforonehightower.Ratherthantrytorecoverit,hesoldittotheCasadiSanGiorgioofGenoa.164

ThecastellansofFriuliingeneralwerenotongoodtermswiththeirtenants.Aformofserfdom,“masnada”,disappearedonlyinthemid-fifteenthcentury,andthepeasantsofFriulistill fearedtwoorthreegenerationslaterthatthecastellanswishedtorestoreit.Politicalloyaltiesamongthepeasantswerefo-cusedontheirowncommunities,ratherthantheirlords.Manyvillagesweresplitamongmorethanonecastellanfamily,asthecastellans’estatesweretyp-icallydispersedparcels,notcoherentblocksofland.Theredoesnotseemtohavebeenanyexpectationthatthemenofmostlordswouldwillinglysupportthemintheirfeuds,oridentifywiththeircause.

ThenotableexceptiontothispatternwastheSavorgnan,especiallytheSa-vorgnandelMonte.Disputeswiththeirtenantswereresolvedbydiscussionswiththecommunity,respectingestablishedusagesandcodesofpractice.Indi-vidualSavorgnanwerecalledupontoarbitratedisputesinvillageswheretheyhadnolands,andSavorgnanfamilylawyerswoulddefendgroupsofpeasantsaccusedofviolence.VeniceappointedSavorgnantocommandthemilitiaoftheprovince,enablingthemtoforgelinkswiththepeasantsofothercastel-lans,whounderstandablyresentedthefactthattheirmenwouldreadilyfight

163 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.315:AntoniodaDexiotoFrancescoSforza,24July1463,Ponzano;thereareanumberofotherlettersaboutthisaffairinthisfile,includingAntoniodaDexioto Francesco Sforza, 4, 12, 29, 31 July, Ponzano and Giangiorgio and Jacomo AmbrogioMalaspinatoFrancescoSforza,5July1463.

164 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,II,256–7.


under the leadershipof theSavorgnan.Traininggivento themilitia inhan-dlingweaponsandtheexperienceoffightingasaunitcouldbeputtousebythepeasantsintheirowncauseagainsttheirlords.165

Violencebypeasantsagainstcastellansreachedapeakin1511,inthemostseriousrebellionofruralcommunitiesagainsttheirlordsinRenaissanceItaly.Castellanshadbeenawaretroublewasbrewingforsometime.In1508oneofthem,FrancescoStrassoldo,intheParlamentoofFriuliwarnedofgatheringsofuptotwothousandpeasantsinvariouspartsoftheprovincesinwhich,heclaimed,threatshadbeenmadeabout‘cuttingtopiecesprelates,gentlemen,castellansandcitizens’.166Anuprisingin1509bythetenantsoftheColloredofamilyatSterpo,reinforcedbyhundredsofmilitiamen,resultedinthecaptureanddestructionoftheColloredofortressthere.167Thewaveofattacksonthecastellans in 1511 followed faction-fighting inUdine, inwhichcastellansandtheirfamiliesweremassacredbysupportersoftheSavorgnan.168Militiaunitshadtakenpartinthefighting.

TheattacksoncastellanpropertyinthecountrysidewerenotdirectedorledbytheSavorgnan,althoughtheywerenearlyalldirectedagainsttheirri-vals.Manyweretheworkoftenants,attackingthecastlesandfortifiedhouseswheretheypaidtheirrentsanddues.Estaterecordsandthecastellans’prop-ertywerethetargets;nocastellanswerekilledbytheirmen.Somepeasantsjoinedinattacksonotherfortressesaswell.169Acontemporaryhistorianoftheevents of 1511, Gregorio Amaseo, wrote of a force numbering thousands ofpeasants,‘armedasifforbattlewiththeartillerytostormfortresses,followedbythethrongoftheirfamiliesincarts,foreasierlooting’.170Inmostplaces,thefightingwasoverwithinaweek;insome,itlastedformonths.Retaliationbycastellanswhojoinedforcesresultedinthedeathsofdozensofpeasants,buttheywereheldbackbyVenetianofficialsconsciousofthepoliticalcrediten-joyedbytheSavorgnaninVenice,andoftheImperialsympathiesofmanyofthe castellans who had been attacked.171 Other troubles – an earthquake, a

165 FurioBianco,‘Mihi vindictam:aristocraticclansandruralcommunitiesinafeudinFriuliinthelatefifteenthandsixteenthcenturies’,258–63;GiuseppeTrebbi,Il Friuli dal 1420 al 1797. La storia politica e sociale(Udine,1998),84–6;Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,121–3.

166 Bianco, ‘Mihi vindictam’, 265; Angelo Ventura, Nobiltà e popolo nella società veneta del Quattrocento e Cinquecento(Milan,1993),140,n.51,datesthisspeechto1503.

167 Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,146–7.168 ForthefactionsinFriuli,seebelow,pp.97–8.169 Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,169–88;SergioGobet,‘Larivoltacontadinadel1511:lecauseegli

avvenimenti’,128–9.170 Bianco,‘Mihi vindictam’,250.171 Ventura,Nobiltà e popolo,146–8.

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plague, an invasion by Imperial troops – diverted attention from repressingandpunishingparticipantsintheuprisings.

Neapolitanbaronswerenotrenownedforenjoyingclosetiestotheirsub-jectsandvassals.Theycouldnotwintheirgratitudebyofferingthemarefugefromtaxation,asthelordsofEmiliacoulddo.Indeed,manyofthebaronshadbeengrantedtheprivilegeoftakingtheproceedsofcertaintaxesofthecrownforthemselves.BaronialestatesinNapleschangedhandsmoreoftenthaninotherareasofItaly,inthewakeofrebellionanddynasticchange,andtheproc-essacceleratedinthefirstdecadesofthesixteenthcentury.Newbarons,par-ticularlythosewhohadboughttheirestatesfromtheprofitsofoffice-holdingortrade,mightwellhavelittleinterestincultivatingtheloyaltyoftheirsub-jects.172Oneofthebest-knowninstancesofabaronbeingkilledbyhismenwasthatofGianCarloTramontano,whohadmadehisfortuneintheserviceofthecrownandboughtthetownofMaterafromaFrenchmanwhohadbeengrantedittwoyearsbefore.Tramontanobuiltuphugedebtstryingtobethe“grandseigneur”,includingtheconstructionofacastlemodelledontheCastel-nuovoofNaples,andhisattemptstoextractthemoneyfromhisvassalspro-vokedtherebellionagainsthiminDecember1514.173

Howvexatiousthebaronscouldbetotheirmenwasoutlinedbyareportonthekingdompreparedbyanofficialin1521:forcingthemtopayunjusttolls;takingmostoftheprofitstheirsubjectsmadefromsalesofproduce;forcingthem,iftheywantedtoselltheirland,tosellittothelordatapricebelowthemarketvalue;placingrestrictionsonwhatlivestocktheycouldkeep,orwhattrade they might engage in; directing who their sons and daughters shouldmarry.174Evidenceofwhat thebarons’vassalsandsubjects thoughtof theirlordsistobefoundmainlyinrecordsoftheircomplaints,andtherequestsofcommunitiestobetakenintothecrowndemesneandnotgrantedtoanotherbaron.Someoftheevidenceofsuchrequests–likeKingFerrante’sassertionthatthepeopleofthecountyofAriano,wearyofbeingrobbedbyPedrodeGuevara, had declared they did not want a lord any more (‘non volere piùsignore’),175couldbeviewedastendentious.Butthereweretoomanytestimo-nies from different sources to what a Florentine ambassador to Naples de-scribedin1485as‘thecommondesireoftheestatesofthebaronstocomeinto

172 CarloDeFrede,‘RivolteantifeudalinelMezzogiornod’ItaliaduranteilCinquecento’,4–7.173 Ibid.,14–17;Santoro,Castelli angioini e aragonesi,235,237.174 Pedìò,Napoli e Spagna,461–2;seeErnestoPontieri, ‘Dinastia,regnoecapitalenelMez-

zogiornoaragonese’,55–9,foranaccountofthebarons’powersovertheirvassals.175 Volpicella,Regis Ferdinandi primi instructionum liber,63–6.


thedemesne’,todoubtthatthevassalsofmanyNeapolitanbaronshadlittlelovefortheirlords.176

Baronsfromlong-establishedfamiliesinthefifteenthcenturymight,how-ever, think of their relations with their vassals as good and feel they couldcountontheirsupport.177TheSanseverinoinvolvedorimplicatedintherebel-lionof1485–6wereconfidentthat,so longastheywerepersonallysafe, theloyaltyoftheirsubjectswassuchthattheycouldrecovertheirlandssometime,astheyhaddonebefore.178WhenAntonellodaSanseverino,principediSaler-no,wassurrenderinghisfortressestoKingFedericoin1498,someofhissub-jects were reported to have wept and kissed his garments, crying that theywantednootherlordbuthim.179FerrantedaSanseverinocouldraise60men-at-armsfromamonghisvassalsin1525.180Buthowmanyofhisothertenantswouldhavefoughtforhimifhehadwantedtoleadtheminrebellionagainsttheking,likehisgrandfatherAntonello?

Thestrengthoftheattachmentofbaronsandcastellanstotheirestateswasnotdeterminedbythelegalstatusofthelands,betheyfief,allodorleasehold;inanycase,theexactlegalstatuswasoftenunclear.Onlyaminority–perhapsquiteasmallminority–derivedgreatwealthfromtheirestates,buttheworthoftheirlandstothemwasnotmeasuredonlyintermsofrevenue.Fortressesandjurisdiction,controlovermenandtheclaimtotheirloyaltythatthees-tatesbroughtwerevaluedashighly.Insomeregions,theloyaltyoftheirmenandtheirmilitarycapabilitieswereassetsthatmeritedthesacrificeofsomepotentialincometomaintain.Notallbaronsfeltthisway.Thoseoftheking-domofNaplesandofFriuliwerenotusuallyknownfortheirbenevolencetothemenontheirestates,althoughtherewereexceptionsevenamongthesegroups.Possessionoffortressesgenerallybroughtexpenseratherthanincome(unless theycouldbeused toenforce theexactionof tolls),but theyaddedgreatlytotheimportancebaronsattachedtothepossessionofparticulares-tates.Inestimatesofthepowerofabaronorinafamily’sestimateoftheassetstobesharedwheninheritancesweredivided,estateswithfortresseswerethekeyassets.Fortressesvariedwidelyinsize,sophisticationandstrength.Somefortificationsincorporatedpalatialresidenceswithelegantcourtyardsorgar-dens;astout,plaintowerintherightpositionmightultimatelyofferastronger

176 Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli,II,Corrispondenza di Giovanni Lan-fredini 1485–1486(Naples,2002),455:G.LanfredinitoXdiBalia,28Dec.1485,Naples.

177 ErnestoPontieri,‘LaCalabriadelsceoloXVelarivoltadiAntonioCenteglia’,83–4.178 Porzio,La Congiura de’ Baroni,ed.d’Aloe,CCXII,CCXV.179 Sanuto,I diarii,I,cols855–6.180 G.deBlasiis,‘ProcessocontroCesareCarrafainquisitodifellonia’,767.

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defence. New fortresses were being built, old ones enlarged and updated.Princes and republican governments alike could assert the right to grant orwithholdpermissiontodothis.Theymightalsoasserttherighttotakecustodyoffortressestheyfeltconstitutedathreattotheirsecurity.Baronsandcastel-lansbuiltandmaintainedtheirfortressesandothermilitaryresourcestoservetheirowninterests,notthoseofanysuperiortheymightacknowledge.Evenfiefholdershadnoobligationtoperformmilitaryserviceforthem,exceptinnorth-western Italy, where the tradition was weakening and in Sicily, whereinthesixteenthcenturythedutytoservewithaspecificnumberofmenwasoftencommuted.

Itmaybethatbythemid-sixteenthcentury,baronsandcastellanstendedtohavelessoccasiontocallontheirmentofightforthem,andwereincreasinglytemptedtoseethemprimarilyasasourceofincome;thatsomefortressesusedasresidenceswouldhavemoreofthecharacterofapalacethanofamilitaryinstallation,thatprimogeniturewasunderminingthestructureofsomecastel-lanfamilies–butthesewereasyetmerelychangesindegree.Thefundamentalnatureoftherelationofthemilitarynobilitytotheirlandsandtheirfortressesremainedunchanged.

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CHAPTER3

Barons in the City

Traditionally,thelanded,militarynobilityofmedievalandRenaissanceItalywasseenbyhistoriansasstandingapartfromurbanandciviclife–asdisrup-tive,oppressiveforcesthathadtobekeptout,controlledandrepressediftheurbaneconomyandcivicsocietyandcultureweretoflourish.Manylocalstud-iesofItaliantownsandcitiesarenowpresentingaratherdifferentpicture,oneofmembersofthelandednobility–lordsofcastles,notjustfamiliesofthecivic elite who had become landowners – having an influential, sometimesdominantvoiceintheaffairsofItalianurbancommunities.Insomecases,thequestion arises whether, rather than urban communities taming the landednobilityof thesurroundingcountryside, itwouldnotbenearer themarktothinkofthelandednobilitycontrollingthetown.Itwouldbeanexaggerationtosuggestthiswasthegeneralpattern,anditisfarfrombeingestablishedasthe new prevailing paradigm. In fact, it is no great exaggeration to say thatgeneral interpretationsoftherelationsbetweenthelandednobilityandthecityinRenaissanceItalystilltendtostartfromMachiavelli’scondemnationof‘gentlemen…wholiveidlyontheirrevenues’asbeing‘perniciousineveryre-publicandeveryprovince’,withthosewhoalso‘havecastlesattheircommand,andsubjectswhoobeythem’beingmoreperniciousstill.BecausethekingdomofNaples, the landsaroundRome,theRomagnaandLombardywerefullofsuch men, Machiavelli argued, there had never been any republic or ‘viverepolitico’(fully-fledgedcivicgovernment)inthoseregions,because‘thesekindsofmenarewhollyenemiestoallciviclife(civiltà)’.1

ThislineofinterpretationhaslongheldswayamonghistoriansofsouthernItaly,preoccupiedwithexplainingtheproblemoftheMezzogiorno:whyforsolongtheregionhasbeenpoorerandmore“backward”thantherestofItaly.Fortheperiodfromthelatethirteenthtothesixteenthcentury(whentheblamecouldbegintobelaidontheSpanish)thefavouredexplanationhasbeenthedominanceofthebarons–whohavebeenregardedashostiletotownsjustastheywerehostiletothemonarchy,ortoanythingthatmightcurbtheirpowerorconflictwiththeirinterests.SouthernItalywaspoorandbackwardbecausetherewasnostronglocalbourgeoisiethatcouldhavealliedwiththemonarchyagainst the barons.That towns were natural allies of the crown against the

1 NiccolòMachiavelli,Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio,BookI,Chap.55.


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landednobilityisanideafamiliarfromthehistoriographyofmuchofmedi-evalEurope,althoughnotonethatstillprevails,atleastinsuchastarkform.

Theroleof themilitarynobility inthedevelopmentof thecommunes inmedieval Italy is one of the most debated aspects of Italian urban history.Inbroadoutline,thelong-standingpicturecouldbedescribedlikethis.

Withtherevivaloftradeintheeleventhandtwelfthcenturiescamethere-vivaloftowns,mostnotablyinnorthernandcentralItaly.Townsmentookonthegovernmentoftheirowncommunities,establishingcommunes,andcom-munalgovernmentsassertedtheircontroloverthesurroundingcountryside.Townsgrewandprosperedinpartthroughconqueringandtamingthelandednobilityaroundthem.Someruralnoblesmigratedintothetowns,oftenbeingcompelledtolivetherebythecommunalgovernmentsforatleastpartoftheyear,sotheycouldbemoreeffectivelycontrolled.Buttheybroughtwiththemtheir violent ways, their feuds with other families, their contests for power.Theybuiltimposinghouses,withloftytowersthatcouldbeusedfordefence,asa refugeduring fightingandasvisiblesymbolsof the family’spowerandprestige.

Inthelatetwelfthandearlythirteenthcenturies,thepoliticalandjudicialinstitutionsofthecommunesdevelopedandchangedineffortstocontainthethreattopublicorderfromunrulynobles.Thecitizens,notablymerchantsandtradesmen,coalesced intoassociationsgenericallyknownas thepopolo, thepeople. The institutions of the popolo attained increasing prominence inthegovernmentofthecity,andformedmilitiaswhichcouldtakeonthevio-lentnobleclans.Thefortifiedhousesofthenobles,withthetalltowersasso-ciated with them, could be demolished if their owners caused too muchtrouble;sometimesthetowerswerejustcutdowntosize,sothattheynolongerstood high above the rooftops, as symbols of noble power. In many towns,therewaslegislationagainstthe“magnates”,directedagainstthosepowerfulclanswhoviedfordominanceanddisdainedthepopolo;theirexclusionfromgovernment curbed their political influence. In some urban communities,however,particularlyinLombardyandtheRomagna,thenobleswereeithernotrepressedortheycontainedthechallengeofthepopolo,andtheycontin-ued to be a disruptive presence. Unable to break their power, the popolo inthesecommunitiesacquiescedintheriseofsignori,lords–sometimesknownastyranni,despots–surrenderingthepossibilityofbeingtheirownpoliticalmastersinthehopeofgreatersecurityandpublicorder.

Challengestovariousaspectsofthisclassicpicturehavebeengatheringim-petus over the last thirty years or so.2 The economic basis of the revival of

2 PhilipJones,The Italian City-State from Commune to Signoria(Oxford,1997),bringstogetherevidenceandargumentsfromamyriadofstudies;forthenobilityinparticular,seeRenato

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towns,itisargued,wasnotconnectedtotherevivaloflong-distancetrade,buttotherevivalofagricultureandthegrowthoftheruralpopulation.Thisim-pliesthattheruralnobilityandtheirlandsmusthavebeenofmoreintegralimportancetothedevelopmentofthetowns,andthatruralnobleswouldhavehadamuchmoredirectinterestintheurbaneconomy–notjustparasiticallyexactingtollsontrade.Somemembersofnoblefamiliesfromthecountrysideengagedintrade,whilesomemenwhohadmadetheirwealthintradeboughtlandandsomeboughtorbuiltfortresses.Wherethishappened,weretheystillrecognizablydistinctsocialgroups?Theterm“nobles”asitwasusedincon-temporary sources in relation to towns was generally just shorthand for so-cially prominent families, who might have lands, fortresses and jurisdictionovermeninthedistrictaroundthetown,butbynomeansalwaysdid.Eveniftheydidnot,themenfromsuchfamilieswereoftentrainedintheuseofweap-ons,andabletofightonhorsebackas“milites”.3

Ontheotherhand,rural families thathadmigratedtothetowns,even ifthey engaged in trade and banking, kept the social customs and attitudesforgedinthefiercecompetitionforlandandpowerinthecountryside,includ-inghabitsofviolenceandfeud.Typically,theybuiltenclaves,withtheirhousesclusteredtogetherandthehousesoftheirdependentsgroupedaroundthem,positionedsothattherewouldbelimitedaccesstothecomplexfromoutsideanditwaseasilydefensible.Theseenclaveswouldbelikesomanyprivatefor-tresses within a town; often they would be situated in the part of the townnearesttotheroutestotheirlands.4Theydidnotbecomeabsenteelandlords,interestedonlyintherevenuestheirlandsmightyield;themilitarystrengthandpotentialoftheirestateswasvalued,andnurtured.

Interpretationsoftherelationbetweenthepopoloandthenobleshavealsobecome more nuanced. Opposition to noble violence was indisputably onespurtotheformationofanorganizedpopoloinmanytowns.Butavarietyofsocial organizations might come together to form the political entity of thepopolo, including bodies regulating the affairs of neighbourhoods, craft and

Bordone,GuidoCastelnuovoandGianMariaVaranini,Le aristocrazie dai signori rurali al patriziato(RomeandBari,2004).

3 Ithasbeenarguedthatinthetwelfthcenturythe‘milites’werearelativelyopensocialgroup:onceamancouldaffordahorseandtheequipmenttofightonhorseback(probablyfromthesecondorlatergenerationofanaffluentfamily,notthefirst),hecouldberegardedasbelong-ingtothe‘milites’.Bythelatetwelfthcentury,theywerebecomingamoreexclusivegroup,andtobedescribedasnobles;theleading‘milites’wouldbeliabletobeclassedasmagnates.(Jean-ClaudeMaireVigueur,Cavalierie cittadini. Guerra, conflitti e società nell’Italia comunale(Bologna,2004).

4 JacquesHeers,La città nel medioevo in Occidente. Paesaggi, poteri e conflitti(Milan,1995),227–32.

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tradeassociations(arti),andreligiousconfraternities.Noblescouldbemem-bersofanyorallofthese.Thepopolowasnothostiletonoblesasaclass.Anti-magnatelegislationwasdirectedagainstthosewhothreatenedtodisruptthecommunity,whetherold-establishedfamiliesthathadbeenpowerfulforgen-erationsor“new”families,whohadusedtheirwealthtobuildupafollowingofclients and dependents, and had assimilated socially to the “old” nobility. Ifmagnate families behaved with restraint, they could maintain their prestigeandsocialpositionandwouldjustbeexcludedfrominstitutionsderivedfromtheorganizationofthepopolo,whileremainingeligibleforotherpublicoffic-es.Itwasthosefamiliesandindividualswhorefusedtoadapttothemoresofanorderlyurbansocietythatwouldbepersecutedunderanti-magnatelegisla-tion.5

Thegreatmajorityofsignoricamefromnoblefamilieswithextensivelands,and they retainedstrong links to thecountrysideafter theyhadestablisheddominionovertheirtowns.6Theirbackground,theirwayoflife,theirvalueswere closer to those of the rural nobility than to those of the citizens theyruled,althoughgenerallytheyalsohadpropertyandconnectionsinthetownsbeforetheymadetheirbidsforpower.Usually,theywereleadersofnoblefac-tions–notofnoblesrangedagainstthepopolo,butoffactionswithintheno-bility,dividedbydisputesoverpropertyandbypersonalquarrelsaswellasbycontestsforpower.Thosefactions,eveniftheywerecentredononeormorenoble clans, might involve many members of the popolo as well. Not onlywealthypopolariwhohadassimilated thevaluesof thenobleswouldbeat-tractedintotheirorbit:therewouldalsobeclients,dependentsandservantsofthenobleclans,perhapsneighbourswhohadbeendrawnundertheir“protec-tion”.

Theambivalentpositionoftherural,militarynobilityintownsandcitiesthatcanbeobservedinthethirteenthandfourteenthcenturieswasstillevi-dent in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Even in states such as Genoa,wheremembersoftheoldest,mostprestigiousnoblefamiliesengagedintradeand banking, there remained a sense that nobles were different from mer-chantsandothercitizens.Theymighthaveextensivepropertyinatown,manyclientsanddependentsand“friends”,theymightwanttoshareinitsgovern-ment,perhapsnurseambitionstobesignorioverit,yettherewasstillasensethatsuchfamiliesstoodapartfromtheurbancommunity.Romanbarons,forinstance,calledthemselves ‘baroniromani’,andwereseenasRomanbythe

5 SeeCarolLansing,‘Magnateviolencerevisited’,foraconsiderationoftherecentliterature.6 PhilipJones,‘Communesanddespots.Thecity-stateinlatemedievalItaly’remainstheclassic

analysisoftheseprocesses.

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peopleofRome,buttheyneverwhollyidentifiedthemselveswiththecityandtheyremainedclearlyseparatefromthecivicnobilityofRome.Theintricacyofthetiesthatcouldbindlandednoblestourbancommunities,andthesensethatneverthelesstheyweredistinctfromthem–thattheywereintegral,butnotintrinsic,elementsofurbansociety–thathaddevelopedduringthethir-teenthcentury,continuedtocharacterizerelationsbetweenthelandednobil-ityandthetowns.

Inthefirsthalfofthefifteenthcentury,lordsofcastlesmightstillaspiretobecomesignoriof townsandcities. InthecollapseofViscontipower intheduchyofMilanafterthedeathofGianGaleazzoViscontiin1402,PietroRossisaw an opportunity to make himself lord of Parma. His ambition would bethwarted by another member of the local landed nobility, OttobuonoTerzi.TheyagreedtosharethedominionoverParma,andinearlyMarch1404Rossibroughtseveralhundredofhisfollowers,andTerzisixhundredhorse(proba-blyofhiscondottierecompany)intothecity,tocriesof‘VivalaparteGuelfa’,‘LonglivetheGuelfparty’.Itwasasfactionleadersthattheytookoverthecity,andoneoftheirfirstactswastoordermembersofrivalsquadre(astheurbanfactionsinParmawerecalled)todisarm.Theywereformallyinvestedasjointsignoribythecitizens,buttheircondominiumwasbrief.TerzihadthestrongerforcesandPietroRossifeltitprudenttoleaveinlateMay.Hisfollowerswereviolently persecuted; many were expelled, their property destroyed. In thecountryside, the Rossi fought on, raiding and burning Terzi’s estates. TerziwouldhavelikedtohavePiacenzaaswell,butonlyhadtheforcestosackit,notholdit.HedidsucceedintakingReggio,whichGiovanniMariaViscontigrant-ed him, with other lands, as a county. His progress brought him into directcompetitionwithanother,well-established,lord,NiccolòIIId’Este,MarquisofFerrara,whoarrangedameetingwithhiminMay1409,atwhichTerziwasas-sassinated.Niccolòd’EstetookoverParmahimself,rulingituntilDukeFilippoMariaViscontirecovereditin1420.7

Only in conditions of exceptional political turbulence, such as afflictedLombardyafterthedeathofGianGaleazzoVisconti,couldsuchaspirationsbyanoblefromthecountrysidetoseizepoweroveracityberealizedinthefif-teenthcentury,andthenonlytemporarily.Ifacityortownwassusceptibletotheassumptionofpowerbyalocallandednoble,therewouldbeother,morepowerful,alreadyestablishedsignorireadytomovein,asNiccolòd’EstedidatParma,oraprinceorrepublicwithaclaimtosovereigntyovertheplacewhowouldbeunwillingtosanctionacoup.Asthesystemofregionalstates,seeking

7 MarcoGentile,Terra e poteri(Milan,2001),28–31,99–102;Pezzana,Storia della Città di Parma,II,43–119;AndreaGamberini,‘Principiinguerra:OttobuonoTerzieisuoinemici’.

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firmercontrolovertheareastheysoughttogovern,becamebetterdefinedinthefifteenthcentury,therewaslessandlessroomfornewcomerstotheranksofsignori.

Thebestchanceforamemberofanoblefamilytobecomelordofacityinthefifteenthcenturywasasacondottiere.Powerfulcondottiericouldattainthisstatusbyconquest,orbymoreorlessvoluntarygrantfromemployersasareward,ortocoverarrearsofpay.OttobuonoTerzi’sruleoverParmawasrecog-nizedbytheunwillingdukeofMilan,andhisconquestofReggiosanctioned,becausehewasowedsomuchbackpayforhisservicetotheViscontiasacon-dottiere.Buttheyrarelyheldontotheprizefor long. Ifacondottiere retiredfromhisprofessiontoconcentrateongoverning,hewouldbeunabletosustainthemercenarycompanyonwhichhispowerwasbased;ifhecontinuedtoleadhis company on campaigns, he would have difficulty keeping hold over hisstate.8

The case of Perugia illustrates the problems. Braccio Fortebracci, lord ofMontananearPerugia,oneofthemostrenownedcondottieriofhistime,tookPerugia,fromwhichhewasformallyexiledalongwithothernobles,byforcein1416;itwasonlypartoftheextensivesignoriahewascarvingoutforhimselfin Umbria. He managed to keep his hold over Perugia until his death inbattlein1424,buthisrulewaschallengedbyrebellionsthereandintherestofhisUmbriandominions.9AthreatfromhissonCarlo,afterthirtyyearsservingVeniceasacondottiere,toenterPerugiain1477andmakehimselfheadofthegovernment aroused some disquiet. But he had nothing like the militarystrengthofhisfather,anddidnotattempttotakethecitybyforce;thetempo-ralgovernmentofthepapacywasmuchmoreeffectivethanithadbeeninhisfather’slifetime.10

Another noble family, the Baglioni, did succeed in establishing a kind ofdominanceoverPerugia,sealedwhentheydrovetheirmainrivals,thedegliOddi,intoexilein1488.Theywereneveracknowledgedassignoriofthecity,andtherewasstillapapalgovernor.Theirpositionwasfoundedonleadershipofafaction,supportedbytheextensivelandsandfortressesinPerugianterri-torythatgavethemgreaterreservesoffightingmentodrawonthantheirri-vals.Theirdominancewasalsosupportedbythewealthandreputationseveral

8 ForadiscussionoftheroleofcondottieriintheItalianstatesysteminthefirsthalfofthefifteenthcentury,seeAnnKatherineIsaacs, ‘Condottieri,statieterritorinell’Italiacen-trale’,23–60.

9 R.Valentini, ‘Braccio da Montone e il comune di Orvieto’, 25 (1922), 65–157; 26 (1923),1–199.

10 Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere(Florence,1977-),II,376–81,386–7,389–92,398–401,416–20.

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membersofthefamilyearnedascondottieri,mostnotablyGianpaoloandhisson Malatesta. Their prowess as soldiers and the political connections theymade with other powers helped maintain their power, despite murderousquarrelsthatsplit thefamilyandsentoneorothergroupintoexile,andin-creasinghostilityfromthepopes.GianpaoloBaglionimanagedbytimelysub-missiontowardoffthethreatofexpulsionfromPerugiawhenPopeJuliusIIhimselfledhisarmytoassertcontrolofthecityin1506.ButhewouldmeethisdeathinRomein1520,wherehehadgoneinresponsetoasummonsfromLeoX,onlytobearrested,imprisoned,torturedandthenexecuted.Nevertheless,itwasnotuntiltheendof1534thatapope,PaulIII,wasfinallyabletoordertheBaglionitoquitPerugia,andtheywerenolongerabletodefyhim.11

Alateexceptiontotheruleofthevanishingchancesofacondottieresettinghimselfupasthelordofacitywas,ofcourse,FrancescoSforza,whowasnotamemberofanestablishedbaronialfamily.Hisfather,MuzioAttendolo(whosenickname, “Sforza”,becamethe familynameofhisdescendants), fromrela-tivelyhumbleoriginsbecameapowerfulcondottiere.Onhisfather’sdeathin1424,Francescosucceededtothecaptaincyofhiscompany,andprovedhim-selftobeasgreatasoldierashisfatherhadbeen.Tosecurehissupportin1431FilippoMariaViscontibetrothedhisyoung,legitimateddaughter,BiancaMa-ria,toFrancescoandgrantedhimsomelandsintheduchyofMilannearAles-sandria.Ontheirmarriagetenyearslater,BiancabroughttoFrancescoasherdowrylordshipoverthecityofCremona.In1444heconqueredmuchoftheprovinceoftheMarcheinthePapalStatesforhimself,butFilippoMariawasasunhappyattheformationofthisincipientcondottierestateaswasthepope,and Sforza could not hold it for long against their combined forces. WhenFilippoMariadiedin1447andthecitizensofMilanformedtheirAmbrosianRepublicnamedafterthepatronsaintofMilan,Sforzafirstserveditandthenfought it, bidding to become the new duke. He succeeded in 1450, and wasacclaimedasdukebytheMilanese.Hisrulewasfoundedonmilitaryconquest,although he and his successors would present themselves as heirs to theVisconti. His abilities as a politician were as formidable as his abilities as amilitary leader; it was this combination which enabled him to pass on theduchytohisheirs.12

AndreaDoriawasaccusedbyhisenemiesofactinglikethelordofGenoainthe“newrepublic”establishedthereunderhisaegisin1528;hewastheémi-nence griseinthegovernmentandpoliticallifeofthecityforthreedecades.Buthewasneverdoge,althoughunderthenewconstitutionmembersof“old”

11 C.F.Black,‘TheBaglioniastyrantsofPerugia,1488–1540’,245–81.12 FrancoCatalano,Francesco Sforza(Varese,1984),1–43.

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noblefamiliesliketheDoria,formerlyexcludedfromthedogeship,wereeligi-bletoserveatwo-yearterm.Thetitleofprincethatheborecamefromhises-tatesinNaples;CharlesVhadmadehimprincipediMelfiforhisservicesasadmiral.ItwasfromhispositionasCharlesV’sadmiral,andastheintermedi-arybetweentheemperorandGenoa,thathisinfluencederived.13ThebranchoftheDoriafromwhichhecamewerelordsoftheValled’Oneglia,buthisfa-therCevahadheldonlyaminorshareinthissignory.Afterhisdeath,Andreahadsoldhissharein1488,asotherDoriawhowerejointlordsofthevalleydid,to themostpowerfulof theircousins,DomenicoDoria, thencaptainof thepapalguard.14AndreaDoria’sgalleys,notlandsandfortressesinGenoeseter-ritory,underpinnedhispowerinthecity.

Iftheycouldnotbecomelordsofatown,baronsandcastellanswouldgen-erallynotbeinterestedinholdingofficeinthecivicgovernmentthemselves,even if theywereeligible(for inmanytownstheywerestillnot).Generally,theypreferredtoexercisepoliticalinfluenceincitiesindirectly,throughtheirfactionsandclients.InParma,forexample,thesquadre,thefactionswhohadsetshares in thecivicgovernment, tooktheirnames frommajor familiesofruralnoblessuchastheRossiandSanvitale,andthosefamiliesandtheiralliesandagentshadadecisivevoice inappointments tooffices,committeesandcouncils,butthemenofthefamiliescouldnotthemselvesholdanyoftheof-ficesorsitonanyofthecommittees.Wherenosuchprohibitionbarredtheirway,theprospectofbeingclosetedformonthsonendinthegovernmentpal-ace–andinsomeplacesmembersofthemajorexecutivecommitteesevenhadtoresideinthepalacethroughouttheirtermofoffice–doesnotseemtohaveappealedtothem.Hearingpetitions,sortingoutdisputes,dispensingpo-liticalpatronagetothemenofthetown,wasonething;sittingsidebysidewiththem,dealingwiththeroutinebusinessofcivicgovernmentquiteanother.15Nevertheless,thefamiliesofthemilitarynobilitytookprideintheirassocia-tionwiththefactionsthatboretheirnames,whichwereseenaspartoftheirinheritance.Discussionsaboutwhethertodoawaywiththe‘nameoftheDoria

13 ArturoPacini,La Genova di Andrea Doria nell’Impero di Carlo V(Florence,1999).14 Biga,La Valle d’Oneglia,213–4.15 Civicgovernmentscouldcauseruralnoblesmuchvexation,bychallengingtheirjurisdic-

tionovertheirlandsandthosewholivedinthem,orseekingtoimposeonthemtaxesandtollsfromwhichthenoblesmightclaimexemption,ortryingtorestricttheirfreedomtoselltheproducefromtheirlandsorthepricesatwhichitcouldbesold.Inordertohavesomeinfluenceoversuchmatters,ruralnobilitydidnotneedtositonthecouncilsandcommitteesofurbangovernmentsthemselves:itwouldbeenoughforthemtohavementheycouldtrust–friends,relatives,clients,dependents,partisans–whocouldhelptoprotecttheirinterests.

59BaronsintheCity

partyandtheSpinolaparty’inSavona,sothattheyshouldnolongerbemen-tioned‘inofficesorinanythingelse’,broughtprotestsfromtheDoriaagainstthethreat‘thatinourtimetheirname,whichtheyhavehadforthreehundredyears,shouldbeextinguished’.16

TheSavorgnanwereunusual inbecomingpersonally involvedintherou-tinegovernmentofatown,Udine,ofwhichtheywerenotlords(althoughthefamilydidoriginatethere,beforetheyacquiredlands).Notcontentwithexert-inginfluencebyproxy,themostpowerfulmembersoftheclan,AntonioandthenGirolamoSavorgnan,wouldsitoncommittees–theyclaimedtherighttohaveamemberofthefamilysitwiththemajorexecutivecommittee,theSevenDeputies–andmakeproposalstocouncils.AntoniousedhisinterventionsasawayofbuildingupafollowingamongtheartisansandpoorofUdine,cham-pioning their interests, inparticular,byproposingmeasures toensure therewereadequatesuppliesofwholesomefoodavailableforthemtobuy.17

TheimportancetheSavorgnanattachedtotheirroleinUdinewasshownbytheprotestsGirolamoSavorgnanmadeaboutreformstothecivicgovern-mentintroducedandencouragedbytheVenetians.Thepopularassembly,thearengo,wherethevotesoftheartisanshadhelpedtheSavorgnantoswaythedecisions,wasabolishedin1513; in1518theintroductionofsecretballots, inplaceofspokenvotes,intothecitycouncilfurtherreducedtheircapacitytoinfluenceaffairs;andtheirrighttonominatethechancellorofthecommunewasnullified.TheirrighttositwiththeSevenDeputieswasalsochallenged.InalongmemorandumdrawnupbyGirolamoSavorgnanin1519andpresentedtotheVenetianCouncilofTen,heassertedthat‘ourfamilyhasalwayshadandstillhasaverycloseconnectionandunionwiththetownofUdinewhich,intruth, is the head of all the Patria [of Friuli].This connection is public andmanifesttoall’inthreeways.Firstly,theircoatofarmswasplacedwiththatofthecommuneonallthepublicbuildingsofUdine;secondly,theypaidtheirextraordinarytaxeswiththecommunityofUdine,ratherthanwiththeothercastellans;andthirdly‘alwaysandopenlywehavehadthispositionofsittingwiththeDeputiesofthetown’.18Girolamocontinuedtotrytodefendhisfam-ily’sprivilegesinUdine,buttonoavail.19

16 ASGenoa, AS1793, f. 914, no. 428: Lodovico Campofregoso to Tommaso Campofregoso,16Apr.1449.

17 Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,120–1.18 LauraCasella,I Savorgnan(Rome,2003),285;thewholedocumentisprintedthere,279–

317.19 Ibid.,85–97,foradiscussionofGirolamo’sdefenceofhisfamily’sposition.

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Udinewasasmallcity,poor,amarketandadministrativecentreforanim-poverished rural province. Genoa was a great commercial city, its economybased on international maritime trade, but there, too, powerful families oflandednobilityclaimedpoliticalprivilegesandtookpartinroutinecivicgov-ernment.MembersoftheDoria,Spinola,FieschiandGrimaldifamiliesservedonthemajorexecutivecommittee,theAnziani,onthefinancialcommittee,theUfficiodellaMoneta,andonextraordinary(buttime-consuming)commis-sionsdealingwithparticularproblems.Theyalsotookpartinthegovernanceofthemajorpublicfinancialinstitution,theCasadiSanGiorgio.Apparently,though,therewasadivisionoflabourwithintheseclans.SomememberswerebasedinGenoa,workingaslawyers,bankersandmerchantsandtookpartinthecivicgovernment,whileothersstayedintheRiviereandthemountains.Ofcourse,someoftheindividualswhoappearedwiththesesurnamesinthegov-ernmentregisterswouldnotbemembersof theclans,butofother familieswhohadjoinedthealberghi,andtakentheirsurname.Butnotall:themajorfamilieswerenotparticipatinginthecivicgovernmentatarm’slength.Ratherthan sit on committees, some preferred to hold offices in Genoese territory.Appointmentstopositionsascastellansorvicarsofsubjectplaces,andespe-ciallyascaptainsoftheRiviere,alwaysappealedtothem.

Politically,theDoriaandSpinolaclanshadestablishedasignificantroleforthemselves in thecontestsamongaspiringdoges. Individualswhohopedtobecomedogeinthefifteenthcenturywouldstruggletorealisetheirambitionunlesstheysecuredthebackingofatleastasubstantialpartofoneorotheroftheseclans.TheDoriatendedtobeassociatedwithCampofregosodoges,theSpinolawiththeAdorno.Onceinoffice,adogecouldcontinuetobereliantonthe continued support of his backers, with some individuals acting as closeadvisers,whilethebackersofhisrivalswouldoftenabsentthemselvesfromthe city. Spinola rarely appear in lists of officeholders under CampofregosodogesorDoriaunderAdornodoges.Shouldthedogetrytoemancipatehimselffromwhatmightattimesfeelliketutelageratherthansupport,asPietroCam-pofregoso did when he experimented with basing his power on an alliancewiththeartisansin1454,20heriskedundermininghisownposition.Theofficeofdogebroughtcommandof fewmilitaryresources–apalaceguard,somegarrisontroopsforthefortressesofthecommune,perhapsagalleyortwotoguardagainstpirates.Anythingmorethanthatwouldnotbeunderhisper-sonalcontrol;hewouldalwaysbeflankedbyacommittee,whosemembershe

20 Christine Shaw, Popular Government and Oligarchy in Renaissance Italy (Leiden, 2006),156–7; Antonia Borlandi, ‘Ragione politica e ragione di famiglia nel dogato di PietroFregoso’,358–60,377–84.

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couldnotchoose.Dogessometimesmadegreateffortstopersuadeotherpow-erstopayforextratroopstosupporttheirposition–afewhundredinfantryundertheircommandcouldmakeall thedifference–butrarelysucceeded.ThemilitaryresourcesoftheDoriaandtheSpinolacouldnotbeleftoutoftheequationsofGenoesepoliticsinthefifteenthcentury.21

ThoseequationschangedradicallyduringtheItalianWars.WithGenoabe-ingclaimedfortheFrenchcrown,thequestionofwhoshouldruleinGenoabecameamatterofconcernfortheenemiesandrivalsofFranceaswell.ForCampofregosoorAdornolookingforbackingforanattempttooverthrowthegovernmentofGenoa,andbecomedogeorgovernorforanotherpowerthem-selves,securingthesupportofthekingofFranceorSpain,orperhapsthepopeortheSwiss,wasthecrucialmatter;DoriaandSpinolasupportcouldstillbeusefulbutwasnotasessentialasithadbeenbeforetheWars.NomentionwasmadeoftheSpinola,forexample,intheagreementmadebetweenAntoniottoandGirolamoAdornoandCardinalSchinner,whowasactingonbehalfoftheHolyLeague,inOctober1513.22After1528,AndreaDoria’sdominancebroughta prominent role for his nearest relatives, but not for the whole Doria clan.Underthenewconstitution,withdogeselectedfortwo-yeartermsfromamongallthefamilieseligibleforpoliticaloffice,theDoriaandtheSpinolawerenolongerdogemakers.

Inthe fifteenthcentury, theFieschialsohadappreciableweight indeter-miningwhowouldbedoge.TheyweremoreinclinedtosidewiththeCampo-fregoso,butwouldonoccasionbackanAdorno.TheleadingFieschiclaimedaright to a share in the power of a doge to whom they gave support, but onaratherdifferentbasisfromtheSpinolaandDoriawhoactedasadviserstothedoge.TheheadoftheFieschiwouldgenerallynotcaretoberesidentinGenoa,tobeatthedoge’sside.Whattheyvaluedwasashareinthepatronageofthedoge,andbeinggivencommandoftheterritoriesofthecommuneofGenoainthe eastern Riviera, such as Recco, Chiavari and Portofino. This would givethemandtheirpartisanscontrolofthecoastbythemountainsinwhichtheFieschilandswereconcentrated.Whattheirsharewouldbewasamatterfornegotiation,whichwouldberecordedinwrittenagreements;itwasapersonal,politicalarrangementbetweentheFieschiandthedoge,notaninstitutionalone.

21 For theparticularethosofGenoesepolitical life in the fifteenthcentury, seeChristineShaw,‘Principlesandpracticeinthecivicgovernmentoffifteenth-centuryGenoa’.

22 Albert Büchi (ed.), Korrespondenzen und Akten zur Geschichte des Kardinals Matth. Schiner,(Basel,1920,1925),I,504–8.

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GianLuigiFieschi’sroleinthegovernmentofGenoafrom1488to1499wasunusual,inthathespentquitealotofhistimeinGenoa,regularlyparticipat-ingindiscussionsanddecision-makingwithAgostinoandGiovanniAdorno.LodovicoSforzaandhisrepresentativeinGenoatreatedthemasthoughtheywerevirtuallyatriumvirate,althoughwellawareofthejealousiesandrivalrybetweenGianLuigiandtheAdornobrothers.WhenLouisXIIbecamelordofGenoain1499,theAdornobrotherswereforcedtoleaveGenoa,butGianLuigienjoyedgreatfavourfromtheFrench,andwasmadegovernorofeasternLigu-ria.TheextentofhisprivilegescausedresentmentinGenoa,andwasoneoftheunderlyingcausesoftherevoltagainsttheFrenchin1506.Afterhisdeathin1510,hissonsdidnotenjoythesamepowerandinfluenceastheirfatherhadhad.Theconstitutionalchangesof1528sealedthelossofthetraditionalFies-chiroleinGenoesepoliticsandgovernment.23

Genoawastheonlyindependentrepublicinwhichthemilitarynobilityhadsuchan importantpoliticalrole. Intheothersurvivingrepublics–Florence(until1530),Venice,LuccaandSiena–theruralnobilityhadnodistinctinflu-enceintheaffairsofthecapitalcity,nofactionsorpartisanstoprojecttheirpowerorprotecttheirinterests.Inthecapitalcityofaprincelystate,howanoblestoodwiththeprince,ratherthanthecontactshehadamongthepopu-lationofthecity,wouldgenerallybewhatcountedmost.Thisconsiderationdidnotturnthemilitarynobilityoftheprincelystatesintocourtiers.Princesweremoreinclinedtowishtoseethemajorbaronsandcastellansoftheirstatelivinginthecapitalcitythanthemilitarynobilitywereinclinedtodoso,cer-tainlyonaregularbasis,evenforpartoftheyear.

OnlyRome,ofalltheprincelyseatsofgovernmentinItaly,wasthepoliticalcentre of an important constellation of barons. The Roman barons were asconcernedwiththeirrelationswiththepeopleofRome,especiallywiththecivic nobility, as they were with their relations with the pope. For much ofthethirteenthandfourteenthcenturies,Romehadbeengovernedbysenatorschosenfromarestrictedgroupofbaronialfamilies,usuallyservinginpairs.Nobarontriedtomakehimself lordofRome.Theonly lordcouldbethepope,however ineffectualhispowermightbe.By themid-fourteenthcentury, thebarons seem to have lost interest in the task of governing the city, but notintheaffairsofRome,andtheymaintainedlinksoffriendshipandclientagewiththecitizenfamilieswhotookoverthegovernment.Bythemid-fifteenthcentury, with the popes once again resident in Rome, and a papal gover-norexercisingmorepower in thecity than thecivicgovernment, therewasno sufficiently prestigious role to tempt the barons to participate in the

23 Seebelow,pp.225–6.

63BaronsintheCity

administrationofthecityasitgrewandflourishedoncemore.ThereseemstohavebeenaninformalarrangementthatcivicofficesshouldbeevenlydividedbetweenpartisansoftheColonnaandtheOrsini.24Thebaronskeptongoodtermswiththecivicnobility,andwouldonoccasionjoinwiththemindefend-ing the interests of the Romans against the ecclesiastical government. Mostfamously,in1511whenJuliusIIlaygravelyill,someOrsini,Colonna,SavelliandAnguillaratookpartinmeetingswiththeofficialsofthecommuneandmanycitizens.Theysworetoputasidethequarrelsbetweentheirfamilies,anduniteindefenceofthe“RomanRepublic”andtherightsandprivilegesthathadbeengrantedtoitbythepope.25

Bycontrast,thecityofNapleshadnotraditionofstrongmunicipalgovern-ment,andthebaronsofthekingdomhadnevercompetedtocontrolit.InthefifteenthcenturytheydidnotspendmuchtimeinthecityofNaples,unlesstheywereamongthemonarch’sclosestadvisorsandcompanions.Thosewhodidhavehousesthereoftenletthemout.Inthesixteenthcentury,encouragedbytheSpanishviceroys,moremajorbaronsbegantobuildfinepalacesinNa-ples,ortoputafinefacadeonanexistingbuilding.26Buttheystillhadnointer-est in participating in the civic government of Naples. Under the viceroys,minorbaronsbecamemoreinclinedtoseekadmissiontotheseggi,theasso-ciationsofnobleswhosedelegatedrepresentativesformedthemajorcommit-teeofthecivicgovernment.Theirprimarymotivefordoingsowasprobablytoenhancetheirsocialstandinginthecapital,ratherthantohaveadirectvoiceinitsgovernment.27

Thistrendwasalsoevidentinprovincialtownsthathadseggi,too.BaronsalreadyhadacloseassociationwithtownsthroughoutthekingdomofNaples.Inthesecondcityofthekingdom,L’Aquila,thecitizensseemedreadiertode-fertothecontidiMontoriothantoofficialssenttherebytheking.Whatevercaptainormagistratehesentthere,Ferrantecomplained,wouldhavetodoasthecountwishedinmattersofjusticeoritwouldbetheworseforhim;andwhoevercommittedacrimecouldfindsanctuaryinthecount’shouse.Taxes

24 CorporalswerebeingelectedfortheRomanmilitia,and‘inaccordancewiththeprovi-sions for other officials, they should be two Colonna and two Orsini’. (ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.841,c.62:BartolomeoBonattotoLudovicoGonzaga,1May1461,Rome.)

25 C.Gennaro,‘La“PaxRomana”del1511’,53.26 Gérard Labrot, Baroni in città. Residenze e comportamenti dell’aristocrazia napoletana

1530–1734(Naples,1979),36–51.27 GiuseppeGalasso, ‘LafeudalitànelsecoloXVI’, 119;MariaAntoniettaVisceglia,Identità

sociali. La nobiltà napoletana nella prima età moderna(Milan,1998),29–39,90–103.

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couldonlybeexactedinfullifthecountwaswilling.28Manytownsweregov-erneddirectlybybarons,asaconstituentpartoftheirestates.Somewerebaro-nialfoundations,otherswereheldasgrantsfromthecrown.GiovanniAntonioOrsini,principediTaranto,wasreputedtobelordofsevenarchiepiscopalcit-iesand30episcopalcities.29Giventhefrequencywithwhichestateswerefor-feitorconfiscatedandgrantedoutagain,sometownssuchasTeramoandAtrifoundthemselvesalternatingbetweensubjectiontoabaronanddirectsubjec-tiontothecrown.Townsmightpetitionthekingthattheyshouldnotbeplacedunderbaronialrule,althoughoncetheyweredealingwithroyaltaxcollectorsand judicial officials, their preference for regal over baronial lords mightchange.Civicgovernmentseemstohavegoneonunderthebaronsandunderthecrowninmuchthesameway,withthesamekindsofciviccouncilsandexecutivecommissionsascouldbefoundinnorthernItaliantowns.30

Unless theyownedthe towns,baronsdidnothave fortresses in them(asRomanbarons,forexample,hadhadinearliercenturies).31Buttownhousesorpalaces might be constructed in such a way that they could easily be heldagainstanattack,orusedasabaseforconsiderablenumbersofarmedmen.Particularlywhereclansofruralnobilityhadalongassociationwithatown,thehousesofthedifferentlineagesstilltendedtobegroupedtogether,some-times around a piazza that was regarded as their common space, one thatcouldbebarricadedanddefendedifneedbe.Wherethemedievalstreetplanandmuchofthefabricsurvives,somesenseofhowsuchfamilyenclavescouldproject the image of family power, defining and dominating the neighbour-hood,canstillbefelt:theDoriahousesinGenoagroupedaroundthepiazzabeforethefamilyparishchurchofSanMatteo,oneofthemwithafifteenthcentury carved relief of a triumphal procession, ‘TheTriumph of the Doria’over its portal;32 the dour Orsini palace on Monte Giordano in Rome, sur-roundedbynarrowtwistingstreets.

Often, like the palace of Monte Giordano, these family palazzi would bemoreimposingfortheirbulkandtheimpressionofstrengththeygavethanforanyarchitecturalmerit.Somebuildings,ontheotherhand,weredesignedtoimpress by their splendour rather than their strength, such as the Fieschi

28 GiuseppePaladino,‘Perlastoriadellacongiurade’Baroni;documentiineditidell’ArchivioEstense,1485–1487’,44(1919),355:BattistaBendedeitoErcoled’Este,2July1485,Naples.

29 Viterbo,‘Aragona,OrsinodelBalzo’,335.30 Galasso,Il Regno di Napoli. Il Mezzogiorno angioino e aragonese,847–908.31 BuiltintoandontotheremainsofancientRomanmonuments.32 ASpinolapalacehasasimilarrelief.TheSpinolaareaofGenoawaslarger;onefocalpoint

hasbeenchangedbythecreationofthepiazzaFontaneMarose,ononesideofwhichisthe Palazzo Spinola “dei Marmi”, built in the mid-fifteenth century by Jacopo Spinola,withfivestatuesofillustriousmembersofthefamilyinnichesonthefacade.

65BaronsintheCity

palaceatViaLataontheedgeofGenoa,famousforitsbeauty,itsluxuryanditsgardens,acontrast totheFieschi familypalacesgrouped inthedarkstreetsnearthecathedral.ThepalaceinNaplesoftheSanseverinoprincipidiSalerno,builtin1470,wasintendedtosurpasstheresidencesofotherbarons,andtovyewiththeroyalresidencesinthecity,bytherichnessofitsfurnishingsratherthanitsscale.33Themoretypicaltownhousesoftheruralnobilitywouldbeanagglomerationofdifferentbuildingsacquiredorconstructedoveranumberofgenerations,oftenheldincommonbyseveralmembersofthefamily.Whenestatesweredivided,thetownhousewouldfrequentlybesomethinginwhichallwouldwanttokeepashare,andtherecouldbelegalrestrictionsonitsdis-posal,withtestatorsbindinglatergenerationstokeepitundividedinthefam-ily.Nobleswhospentlittletimeinthetownmightstillwanttohaveahouseorpartofahousethere,forconvenienceandforprestige.Ashareinafamilypal-acemightbenomorethanacoupleofrooms,butthatsharewasasymbolofanoble’spartinthepastgloriesandthepresentpowerofhisfamily.Themoreinsignificanttheindividual,perhaps,themoreimportancehemightattachtokeepingthoserooms.

Atownhouseorpalacecouldalsobeanimportantsymbolofthepoliticalweightandinfluenceofafamilyinthetown.Iftheytendedtobeoccasional,ratherthantheprimary,residencesoftheirowners,theycouldstillbeacentreforthenobles’partisansandclientsinthetown,foragentsandofficialsofthefamilymightberesidentthereortransactbusinessthere.Whenpoliticalcon-flictturnedviolent,thehouseswouldbethenaturalbase,refugeandrallying-pointforthefamily’ssoldiers,servantsandsupporters,and,conversely,aprimeobjectforattackbytheirenemies.Survivingmedievaltowerscouldbecalledintouse,asduringfightinginPiacenzain1514.34Hundreds,thousandsofmencouldbebroughtinfromoutside,fromtheestatesofthenobles,soldierstheyhadhiredorwhowerealreadyintheirservice,mensentbyfriendsandallies.Menbroughtinfromoutsidethetownswouldhaveoutnumberedthetowns-mentakingpartinsomeoftheseconflicts.Urbanpartisanscouldbeanimpor-tantelementinthem,butitisgenerallyimpossibletoisolateindescriptionsofstreetbattleswhat,ifany,distinctiveparttheywouldplay.

Whenbaronsandtheirsupportersfoughtincitystreets,itwasrarely,ifever,becauseofaquarrelsparkedbytrivialincidents,aninsultingwordorgesture.Therewasusuallyanunderlyingpoliticalreason,oftenonelinkedtofactionalloyaltiesandrivalries.EvenwhentheSpinola,DoriaandFieschifoughtinGe-noatooverthrowadoge,itwasasmuchabattlebetweentheirfactions,asabattle over the dogeship.With the partial exception of Genoa, it was much

33 RobertoPane,‘ArchitetturaeurbanisticadelRinascimento’,375–81.34 DanieleAndreozzi,Piacenza 1402–1545(Piacenza,1997),145.

66 Chapter3

rarer for the barons and their men to fight against government troops incitystreets.AsColonnapartisansdefendedtheColonnapalaceatSantiApos-toliinRomeagainstpapaltroopsandOrsiniforcesin1484,theyweretryingtopreventOddoneColonnabeingarrested,justasOrsinipartisansweredefend-ing Monte Giordano and its neighbourhood when they resisted the papaltroopsandColonnapartisanssentagainstthemin1485.35Inbothinstances,partisans would have been fighting their rivals as much as fighting againstthesoldiersofthepope.ButwhentheRomanbaronswerefightingagainstthepopeascondottieriservinghisenemies,theygenerallydidnottrytoencouragetheir urban supporters to rebel against him.The Romans were taken abackwhentheColonnaledtheirmenintoRomein1526,accompaniedbytheImpe-rialambassador, tothreatenClementVIIandattackedtheVatican: theydidnotexpectthebaronstoattackthepopeinRome,andtheydidnotjoinin.36Thestreetbattlesinwhichthebaronsandcastellansbecameengagedarebestseenandunderstoodinthecontextoftheirwiderpoliticalaimsandinterests.

The violence that barons and castellans could bring to the streets of thetownsandcitiesofItalywasnotaproofofMachiavelli’sdictumthattheywereenemiesofallciviclife.Althoughtheyusuallydidnotliveintownsorcities,theyhadmultiple,peacefulconnectionstothem,tiesofproperty,ofpoliticalandpersonalcontactsandalliancesandinfluence.Inmanytowns,thefactionsthatplayedsoprominentaroleinsocietyandpubliclifetooktheirnamesfromfamiliesofmilitarynobilityandlookedtothemforsupport,ifnotleadership.Thepoliticalinfluenceofbaronsandcastellansinciviclifewasusuallyexer-cisedthroughallies,clientsanddependents,notdirectly.Sometownsmenstillsawthelocalruralnobilityascompetitorsforcontrolofeconomicresourcesand jurisdiction in the surrounding territory.This did not necessarily meanthattheywouldnotstillbesusceptibletotheattractionoftheirsocialprestige.Thesightofagreatbaron, ridingwithhis retinuethroughthestreets tohisancestral townhouse,mightnotbea familiaronetocitydwellers,but itwasmorelikelytoarouseadmirationthanfear.

35 PaoloCherubini,‘Traviolenzaecriminedistato.LamortediLorenzoOddoneColonna’,359–61;StefanoInfessura,Diario della città di Roma(Rome,1890),111–18;GasparePontani,Il diario romano(CittàdiCastello,1907–8),30–1;AntoniodiVascho,Il diario della città di Roma(CittàdiCastello,1911),507–9,531;Shaw,The Political Role,143.

36 Shaw,The Political Role,195.

67Honour,FactionandPrivateWars

CHAPTER4

Honour, Faction and Private Wars

Baronsandlordsofcastlesdidnotmaintaintheirfortressesandarmtheirsub-jectsandvassalsinordertomakethemavailabletotheirpoliticalsuperiors,whatevertheymighttellprincesorrepublicangovernmentswhentheywereaskingforsupportorsubsidies.Theprimarypurposeoftheirmilitaryresour-ceswastodefendthemselves,theirfriendsandallies,andtoadvancetheirin-terests.Keepingweapons tohandandbeingpreparedtouse themtoattainpersonalendswas,ofcourse,hardlyadistinctivecharacteristicofthemilitarynobility–menatallsociallevelsdidso.Attemptsbyauthoritiestorestrictthepossessionandcarryingofpersonalweaponstoprivilegedgroupswerediffi-culttosustain.Brawls,violentquarrels,personalfeudsthatresultedininjuryanddeathwerenotthepreserveofthemilitarynobilityandtheirfollowers.Whatwasdistinctive,wasthescaleoftheresourcestheycouldbringtocon-flict,includingthoseofawiderangeofallies,fromotherfamiliesofmilitarynobilitytopartisansfromurbanfactionsormountainvalleys,tothegovern-mentsofotherstates.Whentheirdisputesturnedviolenttheycouldescalateintoveritableprivatewars.Sometimessuchprivatewarswerepartofawiderwarbetweenstates,sometimestheyaroseandrantheircoursealone.

Whetheratthelevelofassaultsonindividualsorthedeploymentofsmallarmieswithcavalry,infantryandartillery,theuseofviolencebymembersofthemilitarynobilitytopursuetheirprivateconflictsandrivalrieswasnotaneverydayoccurrence.Thosewhogainedareputationforturningtooreadilytopersonalassaultswereliabletoberegardedastroublesomeandunreliablebytheirownfamilies,letalonetheirfamilies’friendsandallies.Attheotherendof the scale, very few barons would have the resources to engage in privatewarswithanydegreeofintensityforprolongedperiods.Subjectsandtenantswhofoughtforthemcouldnotbekeptawayfromtheirusualoccupationsin-definitely;neithercouldthepartisanswhocametofightforthem.Attheleast,whethervolunteersorconscripts,suchmenwouldhavetobeprovidedwithfoodandwine,somewitharmsandmunitions,perhapsclothingtoo.Evenvol-unteersmightwellexpecttobepaidfortheirservices.Professionaltroops,cav-alry and skilled infantry would certainly have to be paid, unless they weresuppliedbyanallypreparedtobearthecost.Wagingprivatewarswasanex-pensivebusiness,evenwhenmostofthefightingtooktheformofraidsandskirmishes,andattemptstotakestrongholdsbysurpriseorashortinvestment.Encountersthatmightproperlybecalledbattles–likethatbetweentheOrsini


68 Chapter4

andColonnanearPalombarainApril1498,whichwastheclimaxofawarbe-tweenthemthatlastedforseveralmonths1–wereveryrare.

Violencebyindividualsagainstothermembersofthemilitarynobilitywasmorelikelytobedirectedagainsttheirownrelativesthanagainstrivals.Gener-ally,therootofthequarrelthatledtoviolencewasadisputeoverinheritanceortheassociatedproblemofhowpropertyshouldbedividedamongco-heirs.JeronimoMalaspina,whohadapparentlyonlybeenassignedahouseinMu-lazzo,thevillagefromwhichhisbranchofthefamilytookitsname,whilehislandswereintheterritoryofPiacenza,in1508tookthedrasticstepofattempt-ing to wipe out his uncles and cousins who held Mulazzo, along with theirwomenandchildren.SomechildrenatleastescapedtheslaughterbyJeroni-mo’smen(whetherhetookparthimselfisnotclearfromthebriefsurvivingrecordofthemassacreinalocalchronicle),andhewasnottoenjoybeinglordofMulazzoforlong.2Anearlierattempt,sometimebefore1506,againstthissamegroupofMalaspinawasmadebytwooftheirco-lordsofMulazzo,Anto-nioandAlessandro,whothoughtthat,astheirfatherhadbeenthefirst-bornsonofthefounderofthebranch,Azzone,theyshouldhaveallormostofthelands;howmanyoftheirrelativestheykilledisnotknown.3

Thesewereexceptionallyruthlessattemptstostakeapreferentialclaimtofamilyproperty.TheseMalaspinawerenotuniqueamongthemilitarynobilityinbeingpreparedtokillseveralmembersoftheirownfamily–GiulioSpinola,forexample,murderedGilbertoSpinolaandhisbrothersin1559,seizingtheirlands,andonanearlieroccasionhehadkilledanotherrelative,AntonioSpi-nola4–butsuchactswentwellbeyondwhatanyoftheirpeerswouldconsiderareasonableorjustifieduseofforce.Forinheritancedisputestoresultinthemurderofevenasingle familymemberwasrare,andscandalous.GirolamoOrsinimighthaveclaimedhehadbeenprovokedintohismurderousassaultonhishalf-brotherNapoleonein1534,thatitwasrevengeforwhenNapoleonehadkidnappedhimandheldhimprisonertwoyearsbeforeasabargainingchip in a dispute over the division of their inheritance from their fatherGiangiordanoOrsinidiBracciano.5Inlife,NapoleoneOrsinihadbeenavexa-tiousnuisance,and fewwouldhavemournedhimifhehaddiedofnatural

1 Shaw,The Political Role,108–9.2 Hisultimatefateisunknown;hisownlandscameintothehandsofhisbrother.Branchi,Storia

della Lunigiana feudale,I,515–6.3 Ibid.,236.4 Tacchella,La media ed alta Val Borbera,73–4.5 Shaw,‘Theexemplarycareerofarogueelephant:NapoleoneOrsini,abatediFarfa’,359–

60;Shaw,The Political Role,196–7.


causesorfightinganenemy.Thatheshouldhavemethisdeathatthehandofhisbrothermadehimanobjectofpity.Notallfratricideswereconsideredin-excusable, however. When Luciano Grimaldi killed his brother Giovanni inMonacoinOctober1505heclaimedhehadactedinself-defence,afterthehot-temperedGiovanniattackedhimwhenLucianoreproachedhimfornegotiat-ingtosellMonacotoVenice.HisfamilyacceptedLuciano’sversionofevents,and he governed Monaco until he was himself assassinated by his nephew,BartolomeoDoria.NotinthelineofsuccessiontoMonaco,theunstableanddissoluteDoriahadlittleornochanceofbecominglordtherehimself.ItwassuspectedthathehadbeensetonbyAndreaDoria,whowouldhavelikedtohaveMonacoasabaseforhisgalleys.6

TheassassinationbyGaleottoPicodellaMirandolaofhisuncleGianFran-cescoandhiscousinin1533wastheculminationofoverthirtyyearsofbitter,sometimesviolentdisputes,duringwhichMirandolachangedhandsseveraltimes, followingthe institutionofprimogeniturebyGianFrancesco’s father.Galeotto’s father,Lodovico,hadbeenoneofGianFrancesco’s twoaggrievedyoungerbrothers,andafterLodovico’sdeathin1509hiswidowFrancescaTriv-ulziohadkeptthefamilyfeudalive,incitinghersonagainsthisuncle.7Mem-bers of other families of military nobility in Lombardy excluded from whattheysawastheirrightfulinheritancebytheinstitutionofprimogenitureoftenrespondedwithviolence.8

Inthesixteenthcenturytherewereanumberofnotoriousmurdersofwom-en of the military nobility by their male relatives, in what could be seen as“honourkillings”.Vindicationofthefamily’shonourwasnottheonlyreasonwhywomenmightbemurderedbytheirmenfolk.FearsfortheirinheritanceswereprobablymixedwithdesireforvengeancewhenNiccolòOrsinidaPiti-glianokilledhisfather’smistress,Penellain1466aftershehadhadhiselderbrother,Ludovico,poisoned,andwhentwosonsofGiulianodegliAnguillarakilledtheirstepmother,GirolamaFarnesein1504,excusingtheiractbyaccus-ingherofadultery,butinfact,itwassaid,concernedthatthechildshewascarryingmightbeason.9Honourwasmoreclearlytheprimarymotivebehindthe murder of the widowed Giovanna, duchessa di Amalfi and her lover,

6 Saige,Documents historiques,II,XL-XLII,CIX-CXVI.7 AngelantonioSpagnoletti,‘Donnedigovernotrasventura,fermezzaerassegnazionenell’Italia

dellaprimametàdel’500’,325–8;AngelantonioSpagnoletti,Le dinastie italiane nella prima età moderna(Bologna,2003),20–1;FeliceCeretti,‘FrancescaTrivulzio’,103–76.

8 Gentile,‘Aristocraziasignorile’,146.9 GiuseppeBruscalupi,Monografia storica della Contea di Pitigliano(Florence,1906),252–4;

AlessandroLuzioandRodolfoRenier,Mantova e Urbino(Rome,1893),161–2;EmiliaPiatoIsabellad’Este,21Dec.1504,Urbino.

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possiblyherclandestinehusband,AntonioBologna,aNeapolitangentlemanin her service, by her brothers around 1510. She was the daughter of Enricod’Aragona,anillegitimatesonofKingFerrante,andherbrothers,Carlo,mar-chese di Gerace and Cardinal Luigi d’Aragona, were outraged when theylearnedoftheaffairandthatshehadbornechildrenbyhim.Seizedwithtwoofthosechildren,Giovannawastakentooneofherbrother’scastles,wheretheywereallkilled;Antonio,whohadescapedtheambush,wastrackeddowntoMilanandassassinatedthere.10IsabelladeMorra,whosepoetryexpressedherlongingtoescapefromherfamily’sisolatedcastleofFavaleintheNeapoli-tanprovinceofBasilicata,waskilledbythreeofherbrothersin1545or1546,togetherwiththemanwhowasgivingherlettersfromaSpanishnobleman,DiegoSandovaldeCastro,whohimselfwrotepoetryinItalian.Theletterswereprobablyinnocent,butthebrothersbelievedthemtobeevidenceofaguiltyliaison;thefamilypursuedtheirvendettabykillingSandovaltoosomemonthslater.11

AmongtheaccusationslevelledagainstGiovanniCaraffa,ducadiPalianoafterthedeathofhisunclePopePaulIV(whohadgivenhimsomeconfiscatedColonnaestateswiththistitle),wasthekillingofMarcelloCapace,hiswife’slover,stabbedrepeatedlybythedukeafterconfessingtotheadulterousaffairunder torture, and of his wifeViolante, strangled by her own brother someweekslaterinthepresenceoftwoCapuchinfriars,whohadbeenbroughttogivehertheconsolationsofreligion.12Somemonthsearlier,SciarraColonnahadstrangledhiswidowedsister,Isabella,becauseshehadbeensleepingwithoneofherservants.Herloverhadbeenkilledafewdaysbefore,ashadhisfa-ther,achamberlainoftheColonna,whoknewoftheaffair,andanotherac-complice,afemaleservant.Thebodyofthefatherwassuspendedupsidedownfromthegallowsatthegateofthecastle,withaplacardnearbyreading“Pertraditore”(“Asatraitor”).13Thesewerenospontaneouscrimesofpassion;inthemindsofthenobleswhoperformedororderedthem,theywerejudicialacts.LikeGiovanniCaraffa,however,SciarraColonnawouldbecalledtoac-countbypapaljustice.Sixyearslater,thecourtofthepapalgovernorofRomeheardthecaseandsentencedhimtoexileandtheconfiscationofhisproperty.14

10 DeFrede, ‘Rivolteantifeudali’,7;MatteoBandello,Le Novelle,ed.DelmoMaestri (Ales-sandria,1992–6),I,26.

11 BenedettoCroce,Vite di avventure, di fede e di passione(Milan,1989),299–334.12 OttaviaNiccoli,Rinascimento anticlericale. Infamia, propaganda e satira in Italia tra Quat-

tro e Cinquecento (Rome and Bari, 2005), 134–6, 144–9; Stendhal wrote a novella, La Duchesse de Paliano,aboutthisepisode.

13 Niccoli,Rinascimento anticlericale,139–41.14 Ibid.,150.


Anotherfamouscase,thatbecamethebasisforJohnWebster’splayof1612,The White Devil,andotherlaterdramas,15wasthemurderofIsabellade’Medi-cibyherhusband,PaoloGiordanoOrsinidiBraccianoin1576.HerliaisonwithanotherOrsini,Troilo,hadgoneonforadecade.Ratherthanliveonherhus-band’sestates,shestayedinFlorenceatthecourtofherfather,DukeCosimoI,andher father’s loveprotectedherduringhis lifetime;hehadtriedtoputastoptotheaffairbysendingherloverawayondiplomaticmissions.Itwastheangerofherbrothers,DukeFerdinandoandCardinalFrancesco,atthescandalshecausedthatseemstohavefinallypromptedPaoloGiordanotostranglehiswife.ThistookplaceinaMedicivilla,andherbrotherscolludedintheofficialexplanationofherdeathastheresultofanepilepticseizure.16Theirhonour,asmuchasPaoloGiordano’s,wasvindicatedbyherdeath.

InthekingdomofNaplesinthesixteenthcentury,arguedCarloDeFrede,thebarons,livingidlyintheirfortressesbecausetheyhadlosttheirpoliticalstrength,becameharsh,vindictiveandinclinedtoviolence,includingviolenceagainstmembersoftheirownfamily.17Certainly,SpanishviceroysandtheirofficialscommentedontheviolentproclivitiesofNeapolitanbaronsandno-bles,butwhetherthesewereworsethanbeforeisopentoquestion.VerylittleisknownaboutthedomesticrelationsoftheNeapolitanorothermilitaryno-bilitiesofItalyinthefifteenthcenturyorbefore,butitisunlikelythatwomensuspectedofadulteryweretreatedwithmuchgreaterforbearancethaninthesixteenthcentury.Farmorerecordssurvivefromthesixteenthcentury,includ-ingmuchmoreprivatecorrespondence.Itcouldbethatbaronswouldbemoreliabletobecalledtoaccountfordomesticmurdersbythecourts,orthatjudi-cialrecordshavebeenbetterkept,preservingaccountsofproceedingsagainstthemthatwouldhavebeenlostforearlierperiods.Suchconsiderationsneedtobebroughtintoplaybeforethefullweightofexplanationisplacedonputa-tivechangesinsocialmoresorculturalnorms,suchastheenhancementofasenseofpersonalhonourthathadtobedefendedandvindicated.Themilitarynobilityhadnoneedofhumanisttreatisesontheimportanceofpersonalhon-ourandtheneedtodefendit,byviolenceifneedbe,tovindicatetherighttobeconsideredagentleman.Theyhadnodoubtsoftheirstatus,orthatoftheirfamily.

Thismaybepartoftheexplanationforwhythemilitarynobilitywerenotearly exponents of the practice of duelling, as it burgeoned in the mid-six-

15 GabrielleLangdon,Medici Women. Portraits of Power, Love and Betrayal(Toronto,2006),194.

16 Ibid.,165–6,291.17 DeFrede,Rivolte antifeudali,6–7.

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teenthcenturyinItaly.Orrather,werenotearlyexponentsofduellingincivil-ian life,18 for those who fought as professional soldiers would have beenfamiliarwiththeduelasanaspectof themilitarycodeofhonour.Twoepi-sodes inwhichVirginioOrsiniwaschallengedtoduels in the later fifteenthcenturyshowhowmuchoftheethosandpracticeofthecodeofduellingwasalreadycurrent.Thefirstbeganwithaprotestbythepapalcondottiere,Agos-tinoCampofregoso,overtwomountedcrossbowmenwhomheclaimedhadleft his company without leave to joinVirginio. AfterVirginio suggested themattershouldbereferredtoAgostino’scommander, itturnedintoadisputeaboutwhetherthePrefectofRomecouldberegardedasVirginio’scommanderaswell. Indenyingthis, itwassaidthatVirginiogavehimthelie,19andthatAgostinowantedtorefutehiswords‘withhisperson’,asthecustomorpracticeofarmsallowed.20Enquiriesweretobemadewhether‘militarypracticeallowsthatthesewordscanbeupheldbyaduelornot’,21butapparentlyVirginiodidnotacceptthechallenge.Indeed,hewasreportedtohavethreatenedthatifAgostinodidnotmindhisownbusiness,hewouldarrangetohavehislegscutfromunderhimintheCampode’Fiori(anOrsiniareaofRome),andhavehimthrownintheriver.22Ayearlater,anargumentaboutahorsetakenfromanenvoyVirginiohadsenttotheenemycommander,RobertodaSanseverino,23

18 Sicilianbaronsmighthavebeenanexception.Duellingwasofsufficientconcerntothegovernmentoftheislandinthemid-fifteenthcenturyforittobeforbiddenbyadecree,andtechnicallyitconstitutedanoffenceoflèse-majesté.Butthebaronsstillfoughtduels,asdidAlfonsoVentimigliawithPietrodeBenedictis,afterPietrohadinsultedhim;Alfon-so’sbrotherswereprosecutedin1475forrevenginghisdeathintheduelbyassassinatingPietro’sfather.Oneofthosebrothers,EnricoVentimiglia,marchesediGerace,foughtaduelwithPietroCardona,contediGolisano,around1481,inadisputeabouttherestitu-tionofadowry.In1485,FerdinandofAragonorderedtheprammaticaagainstduellingtobere-issued.(SimonaGiurato,La Sicilia di Ferdinando il Cattolico. Tradizioni politiche e conflitto tra Quattrocento e Cinquecento (1468–1523)(SoveriaMannelli,2003),69–71,101–2,117.)

19 ASMantua, AGonzaga, b. 847, c. 288: Gian Pietro Arrivabene to Francesco Gonzaga,18June1485,Rome(‘respondacheelsementeperlagola’).

20 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.97:AscanioSforzatoGianGaleazzoSforza,24June1485,Rome(‘comportandosi cosi el mestero de la Arme voleva aprovare cum la persona sua, nonesserebendicte’).

21 Ibid. (‘Lacosapendehora invederes’elexercitiomilitarevolcheperduellumsipossiiustificaredicteparole’).

22 ASMantua, AGonzaga, b. 847, c. 291: Gian Pietro Arrivabene to Francesco Gonzaga,24June1485,Rome.

23 Virginio was captain-general of the men-at-arms of the league of Milan, Florence andNaples,RobertodaSanseverinothecommanderofthepope,InnocentVIII,withwhom


resulted in Roberto’s son, Antonio Maria, challenging Virginio, threateningthatifhehadnotreceivedaresponsewithinfourdays,hewouldhavedefama-tory paintings of him displayed in the ‘shameful areas’ of his camp and inRome.InVirginio’sestimation,theonlypersonintheenemycampofequiva-lentstatustohimselfwasRoberto.HecouldfightRoberto,butifAntonioMa-riapersistedinhischallenge,VirginiowouldputupPaoloOrsini–ayoungerman,thenaturalsonofCardinalLatinoOrsini–tofighthim.IfdefamatorypicturesofVirginioweredisplayedinRome,hewouldretaliatewithdefama-torypicturesofRoberto.24

Bytheturnof thecentury,membersof themilitarynobilitywere issuingchallengestoeachotherthatdidnotinvolveallegedbreachesofthemilitarycode.DuringaprivatewaramongtheRomanbarons,GianbattistaContiandFabrizioColonnaagreedinMarch1498tomeetinsinglecombat,butitwouldbestagedasaduel,ratherthanasafightbetweenchampionsoftheopposingfamilies.ThedukeofMilanwastobeaskedtoprovidea‘secureground’fortheduel,whichprobablynevertookplace.25Aletterwrittenin1528bythewifeofProsperoColonnadaCavetoLuigiGonzaga,sharplycriticizinghisinterven-tioninthedisputeovertheinheritanceofVespasianoColonna(Gonzaga’ssis-terwasVespasiano’swidow),broughtachallengefromLuigitoherhusband.HewaswritingtoProspero,heexplained,becausethematterwasnothiswife’sbusiness,itwashis.IfProsperohadinstigatedthewritingoftheletter,hewasresponsiblefortheliesitcontained;ifithadbeenwrittenwithouthisknowl-edgebuthehadnotrebukedhiswifeforherpresumption,thatwasaninsult.AsProsperomightnotbereadytoacceptthechallengeinpersonbecausehewastoooldandnotaprofessionalsoldier,asLuigiwas,thenhecouldproposesomeonetofight inhisstead,providedthesubstitutewouldbeofsufficientstatusforLuigitobeabletofighthimwithhonour.26Again,noduelisknowntohaveresultedfromthis.

Norwasthereaduelafterageneralchallengeissuedonplacardsin1533byGianpaolodegliAnguillaradaCeritoanygentlemanorGhibellinelordwhowouldmaintainthatGianpaolohadwantedtohaveCamilloColonnaorPirroBaglionidaSipicciano(knownasPirroColonnabecauseofhisdevotiontothatfamily)killed.Achoiceoffourtypesofcombatwasoffered,twoonfoot,two

theleaguewasatwarbecauseofhissupportfortherebelliousNeapolitanbarons.24 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.99:GianFrancescoOlivatoGianGaleazzoSforza,10May1486,

Bracciano.25 Ibid.,b.1303:NiccolòOrsinitoLudovicoSforza,13Mar.1498,Ghedi.26 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.877,cc.63–4:FrancescoGonzagatoFedericoGonzaga,3Apr.

1528,Orvieto.

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onhorseback.Acceptingthechallenge,Pirrochosetofightonfoot,inashirt(that is, without body armour), with sword, dagger and cape. Gianpaolo’sagreementtothis,andstipulationthattheduelwouldtakeplaceatBomarzoor Stigliano (both Orsini estates) was signed by three witnesses as well asGianpaolo.27Theseelaboratepreliminaries,withpublishedexchanges,wereinaccordancewiththedevelopingritualsoftheduel;typical,too,wastheappar-entlyjustifiedgeneralscepticismthatanyfightwouldtakeplace.

Notallexchangesofwrittendefiancesandchallengesbetweenmembersofthemilitarynobilityfailedtoendinaduel.Afatalduelin1568inwhichbothparticipants, Federico Savorgnan andTroiano d’Arcano, were killed, was thefinalactofviolenceinthefeudamongFriulanicastellansthathadbeenrun-ning foroverhalfacentury,sincethesupportersofAntonioSavorgnanhadmassacredmembersoftheColloredoandDellaTorreclansduringtheCarni-valinUdinein1511.FedericohadbeenasignatoryofapublishedtractsettingouttheSavorgnanversionofthehistoryofthefeud,includingtheaccusationthatitwasTroianod’Arcano(arelativebymarriageoftheColloredo)whohadkilled Federico’s uncle Francesco Savorgnan in an encounter in a street inUdinein1561.Federicohadalreadyfoughtanotherduel,againstMarzioCol-loredoinJune1564,onabeachinLiguria,whilethewitnessestheyhadbroughtwiththemwatchedfromtheboatthathadbroughtthemallfromGenoa.Afterbothhadbeenwounded,theirsecondslandedtoseparatethemandpersuad-edthemtomakepeace.Astheycouldnotagreeonhowtheirreconciliationwastobemadepublic,however,theirquarrelpersisted.

Originally,MarzioColloredohadissuedachallengetoanotherSavorgnan,Niccolò,andFedericohadputhimself forwardtodefendthe familyhonourafterNiccolòhadrefusedtoacceptit.HisrefusalhadbeengroundedontheclaimthatMarziohadbeenpursuingthevendettabydishonourablemeans,includingsendingexplosivedevicesintheboxesprotectingthesealsofletterstoUrbanoandTristanoSavorgnan.Federico’sdeathintheduel,andthedeathfromnaturalcausesofNiccolòandTristanoSavorgnan,whohadbeentheoth-erprincipalsinvolvedintheexchangesofwrittendefiances,helpedtopreparethegroundforthelastingpacificationofthefeudbytheinterventionoftheVenetianauthoritiesin1568.28

27 Ibid.,b.882,cc.52–3,57–8:FabrizioPeregrinotoFedericoGonzaga,23,25May1533,Rome(atc.57thereisacopyofGianpaolo’sreplytoPirro);c.56:AcceptanceofthechallengebyPirro.

28 Casella,I Savorgnan,122–30;Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,262–72.


In one of the tracts he published, Marzio Colloredo had listed seventeenseparate epsiodes of violence between his family and the Savorgnan.29 Thevendettathatbeganin1511haddieddownforacoupleofdecadesbeforebeingrevivedinthe1540s.Marzio’sfather,Gianbattistawaskilledin1549,togetherwithAlviseDellaTorre,inoneofthemostnotoriousoftheattacksthatpro-pelled thevendetta,whenthegondola inwhichtheywere travellingontheCanalGrandeinVenicewasassailedbyagroupofmenledbyTristanoSavorg-nan.TheywereinVenicetobidfarewelltoGirolamoDellaTorre,whohadbeensentencedtotenyears’exileinCreteforhispartinastreetfightinPadua,inwhichGiovanniSavorgnanhadbeengravelywounded,andTristanohades-capedwithhislifeonlybytakingrefugeinahouse.TheassaultontheCanalGrandewasTristano’srevenge.Amidtheconfusiononthecanal,heandhismenmanagedtoflee,buttheoutrageearnedhimasentenceofperpetualexilefromVenetianterritoryandtheritualdestructionofhishouseinUdineasamarkofinfamy.30

AmbushesandstreetfightssuchasthesepunctuatedthefeudbetweentheSavorgnanandtheircastellanenemies,butsuchepisodes,especiallythestreetfights,wereanuntypicalexpressionof rivalriesamongthemilitarynobility.Thisbehaviourwasmorecharacteristicofrivalurbanfactions,whoseenmitiescouldsometimesbeventedinviciousandvindictiveattacks.Sharingthesamestreetsandsquaresandpublicbuildingsonadailybasisbroughtmembersofopposing factions into frequent contact with each other, making it easy forcasualremarksor insultinggesturestostokethefiresofenmity.Baronsandcastellanswholivedontheirestateswouldrarelymeettheirrivalsfacetoface,andtherewouldbefeweropportunitiesforthekindofpersonalencountersthatcouldeasilyfosterhatreds.ThebloodfeudbetweentheSavorgnanandtheColloredoandDellaTorrefamiliesofFriuliwasexceptional.PietroMariaRossiwasreputedtohavepreservedtheheadofaformidableenemyofhisfamily,OttobuonoTerzi,asatrophyfourdecadesafterTerzi’sdeathandshownitofftovisitors,butitisdoubtfulwhetherthismacabretalewastrue.31Fewlordsofcastleswouldfeelthattheyhadtobeonperpetualguardagainsttheirrivals.

Nordidlordsofcastleslivingontheirestatestendtospendtheirtimeinastateofpermanentconflictwiththeirneighbours.Boundarydisputesbetweenneighbouringlordsmightbecomeviolentiftheneighbourswerealreadyrivals;beingneighbourswouldnotnecessarilybesufficientinitselftocreaterival-

29 Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,267.30 Ibid.,248–50.31 Terzi had not been killed by a Rossi, but by Muzio Attendolo, the father of Francesco

Sforza(Somaini,‘Unastoriaspezzata’,126).

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ries.Theirsubjectsandtenantsweremorelikelytotakeuparmsoverrightstowoodlands or water or straying livestock. Roman barons habitually settledsuchdisputesbyagreementorarbitrationratherthanbyfighting.32Judgingbythepaucityofevidenceforviolentdisputesoverthiskindofproblembetweenneighbouringlordsinotherareas,themilitarynobilityelsewhereinItalywerenomoreinclinedtoexpendtheirforcesonthem.BoundarydisputesbetweentheirsubjectsfedintothewarsamongthelordsofEmiliainthe1450s,33be-causeseveralimportantestatesintheregionhadrecentlychangedhands,andtherewereothercausesoftensionamongthem.InotherregionsofItalywherecastellan families were divided by rivalries centuries old, they did not fightoversuchmatters.Thelandsofhistoricrivalscouldbelargelyorwhollyindif-ferentareas;theymightwellhavefew,ifany,mutualboundariesoverwhichtheir lords could quarrel, as in the case of the Orsini and Colonna estatesaroundRome,andthoseoftheDoriaandSpinolainLiguria.Themilitaryno-bilitywerenotinaconstantstateofarmedalert.Eveninremoteareaswherenoprinceorrepublichadthepowerorfelttheobligationtomaintainorder,privatewarsbetweenlordsofcastleswerenotendemic.

TheeclipseofthestrongcentralauthorityintheduchyofMilanafterFilip-po Maria Visconti’s death in 1447 encouraged a spate of small wars aroundParma, involving the castellan families pursuing their own private interests.ThesewereplayedoutinthecontextofthewiderwarsbetweentheAmbro-sianRepublicthathadbeenformedinthecityofMilanandtherepublicofVenice, bent on expansion of its mainland territories, with the condottiereFrancesco Sforza complicating the picture by switching from captain of theAmbrosianRepublictoaspiranttothedukedom.AnotherspateoffightingbycastellanfamiliesaccompaniedthewarsbetweenSforzaandVenicethatre-commencedin1452.TheCorreggioattackedlandsoftheRossi,defyingFran-cescoSforza,aswellasthoseoftheGonzaga;theRossiandPallaviciniorganizedmilitaryoperationsagainsttheCorreggio, fortheirownbenefitaswellas insupportofMilaneseforces,whilePietroMariaRossialsotooktheopportunitytopursueinarmsdisputeswithotherlordsoverboundariesandrightsofjuris-diction.Publicandprivatewarsbecameinextricablymixed.34

32 Shaw,The Political Role,99, 105.Oneexceptionto thiswas fightingamongtheCaetanifamilyoverissuessuchasfishingrightsintheearlysixteenthcentury,butthiswasinacontext in which there was already bad blood between the Sermoneta and Maenzabranchesbecauseofdisputesoverthedivisionofproperty(Visceglia,‘“Farsiimperiale”’,493).

33 Covini,‘LecondottedeiRossi’.64–5.34 Ibid.,63–76;GiorgioChittolini,‘Guerre,guerricciole,riassettiterriorialiinunaprovincia

lombardadiconfine:ParmaeilParmense,agosto1447–febbraio1449’,221–49.


A similar situation arose in the Papal States as the civil war in the king-dom of Naples during the early years of Ferrante’s reign spilled over there,becauseofPiusII’ssupportforFerrante.ThemostturbulentofalltheRomanbaronsofthemid-fifteenthcentury,EversodegliAnguillara,foughtonthesideoftheAngevinchallengerstoFerranteinthekingdom,andthepopeclaimedhe plotted against his life. Everso was in conflict with Napoleone Orsini, asbothlaidclaimtotheinheritanceofNapoleone’suncle,GianAntonioOrsini,conte di Tagliacozzo. He also used force in disputes over the possession oflands with the heirs of the once powerful diVico family, and with his ownnephews, from whom he took Anguillara itself in 1460.35 The Colonna hadtheirsightsonTagliacozzoaswell,havingbeenpromiseditbyFerranteinabidfortheirsupport,andhadanotherfeudontheboil,withtheConti.MixedinwiththeraidsandskirmishesamongthebaronialfamilieswasacampaignbypapaltroopsagainsttheSavelli,consideredrebelsbyPius.36Attemptstonego-tiatepeaceamongthebaronswerescupperedbythismultiplicityofconflicts.Thesebaronsarelikethehydra,commentedaMantuanenvoy;ifoneheadiscutoff,sevenarecreated,andifonedifferencebetweenthemissettled,twomoreemerge.37

Asarule,baronsandcastellansengagedinprivatewarsoverthepossessionoflandsandcastles,eitherindisputesovertheinheritanceordivisionofes-tates,orineffortstorecoverbyforcelandsthathadformerlybeenheldbytheaggressor’s family.Bothpartiesgenerallyhadat leasta semblanceofa legalclaimtothedisputedlands,andneitherwouldbeindulginginastraightfor-ward land grab of property to which they had no kind of title at all. PietroMariaRossicameneartoitwhenhismentookthetownshipofNocetofromthe Sanvitale in 1448, on the pretext that his half-brother Rolando, a knightof the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, claimed it belonged to the order.Hemanagedtoholdontothisprize,whichwasasignificantadditiontohisestates.38CristianoMalaspinadiBagnone’sonlyclaimtoVirgoletta,whichhetook from his neighbour Galeotto Campofregoso in 1471, was that Galeottohadtakenitin1449,withotherlands,fromanotherbranchofthefamily,the

35 V.Sora, ‘IcontidiAnguillaradalla loroorigineal 1465:EversodiAnguillara’,70–87,76.GianAntonioOrsinidiedin1456;hisonlydaughter,Maria,wasmarriedtoEverso’sson,Deifebo(Ibid.,76).

36 Seebelow,p.181.37 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.841,c.198:BartolomeoBonattotoLodovicoGonzaga,30Sept.

1461,Tivoli.38 Pezzana,Storia della Città di Parma,II,670–4,678.

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MalaspinadiVillafranca.39BykillingGaleotto,araccomandatoofthedukeofMilan,CristianoMalaspinamadeagraveerrorofjudgement,forthedukesenttroopstooccupyhislandsaswellasVirgoletta.Whentheduchess-regentofMilan,Bona,returnedVirgolettatotheMalaspinain1478,shehandeditovertotheMalaspinadiVillafranca.40

Amongthefamiliesmostdeterminedtorecoverlandstheyfeltwereright-fullytheirsweretheColonna.Theycouldnotforgetthatestatesthathadbeengranted to them during the pontificate of the Colonna pope, Martin V, andthentakenfromthembyhissuccessor,wereheldbytheConti,andtheyfoughtthe Conti on several occasions in their efforts to recover them – during thepontificateofPiusII,thirtyyearslaterin1493,andagainin1497to1498andyetagainin1522.In1498,theconflictbetweentheColonnaandtheContibecamesubsumedintoawarbetweentheColonnaandtheOrsini,asdidaviolentdis-puteamongtheSavelli,withtheOrsinihelpingTroianoSavellidiAriciabe-siegeTroiloandGiovanniSavelliintheirfortressofPalombara.ThebattleinwhichthiswarculminatedwasfoughtnearPalombarainApril1498,endinginthedefeatoftheOrsini.41

BoththeOrsiniandtheColonnahadclaimstothecountiesofTagliacozzoandAlbibasedongrantsbytheking.HavingbeengrantedthecountiesbyFer-rantein1480,theColonnarefusedtosurrenderthemafewyearslaterwhenthekingaskedthemto,refusingallhisoffersofcompensationbecausetheyknewhewantedtogivethembacktotheOrsini–thekingwantstotakeourestatetogiveittoourenemies,protestedGiovanniColonna.42VirginioOrsini,nephewoftheformerOrsinicount,claimedtobetheheirandhehadthebackingofGirolamoRiario,thepowerfulnephewofPopeSixtusIV.NotuntiltheColonnawerefightingforsurvivalagainsttheonslaughtofthepapaltroopsin1484didVirginioOrsinigetthecounties,occupyingthembyforce.FabrizioColonna,accompanyingKingCharlesVIIIofFranceonhisconquestofthekingdomofNaplesin1495,wonpossessionofthecounties,andkeptthem.AlaterFrenchinvasionofthekingdomin1528,whenithadcomeundertheruleoftheSpan-ishking,providedVirginio’sgrandson,NapoleoneOrsiniwithanopportunitytoseizethecounties,whichtheOrsinistillconsideredshouldbetheirs,butthe

39 The Campofregoso were aspiring to become a dynasty of lords of castles as well as adynastyofdogesofGenoa,andhadbeenencroachingonMalaspinalandsintheLuni-gianafordecades.

40 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,II,66,76–9.41 Shaw,The Political Role,108–9.42 Giovanni Albini, De gestis Regum Neapolitanum ab Aragonia (Naples, 1589), 250–5:

GiovanniColonnatoGiovanniAlbino,15Mar.1483,Albi.


defeatofLautrec’sexpeditionmeanttheOrsinihadtorelinquishthemtotheColonnaagain.43

Disputeswithinfamiliesoverproperty,overtheinheritanceanddivisionoflands,couldalsoleadtofighting,toraidsandskirmishesandassaultsonfor-tresses. Such fighting tended to involve more modest forces than fights be-tweenrivalfamilies,unlessoneorbothpartiescoulddrawinoutsidesupport.Iftheyhadtorelyontheirownresources,lordsofcastleswouldhavetheback-ingoftheirservants,clientsanddependentsclosesttothem,andwhatmentheycouldaffordtopay.Theirsubjects,partisansofthefamily,theirfactionalalliesapparentlypreferredtoavoidbecominginvolvedortakesidesinquarrelswithinthefamiliesofthemilitarynobility,unlessanindividualhadmadehim-selfsounpopularwithhisownmenthattheywerereadytoturnagainsthim.

WhenGiulioCiboMalaspinachallengedhismotherRicciarda’sdetermina-tiontokeepthegovernmentoftheestatesintheLunigianainheritedfromherfatherinherownhandsforherlifetime(eventhoughshepreferredtoliveinRome),his firstattempttoforcetheissuefailedbecausetheirsubjectshesi-tatedtobecomemixedupinthequarrelbetweenmotherandson.WiththehelpoftwentyarquebusierslentbyGaleottoMalaspinadiOlivola,hetriedtodetainhismotherwhenshewasvisitingoneoftheestates,Carrara,in1545,butsheretiredtothekeepofthefortressandGiuliogaveupandleft.Ricciarda,whowasnosaint,declaredbothGiulioandherestrangedhusbandrebelsandoutlaws,commandinghersubjectstokillthem,butthisdecreeonlyincreasedherownunpopularity.Giuliohadsomerightonhisside–theImperialinvesti-turehismotherhadobtainedinherownnamein1529contradictedthetermsofherfather’swillwhichmadeGiuliohisheirunderRicciarda’stutelage.HegotthesupportofCosimode’Medici,whowasalwaysalerttoopportunitiestoextendhisinfluenceintheLunigiana.WiththehelpofFlorentinemilitiasentbyCosimohequicklywoncontrolofalltheestates,exceptforthefortressofMassa,inSeptember1546.Tosetsiegetoit,Giuliobeganwith1,800infantryandfourpiecesofartillery.Themilitiabegantodriftaway,butwiththehelpofadditionalartillerysentbyAndreaDoria,hewasabletoforcethesurrenderofMassainafortnight.44

Bycontrast,inadisputeamongtheMalaspinaoverthefortressofMalgratein1490,onlythefamily’sownforceswereinvolvedinthefighting.ThedisputebeganwhenMalgratoMalaspinarenegedonadealforanexchangeoflandswithLudovicoMalaspinadiFosdinovo.TogetherwithhisuncleGabrieleandTommaso Malaspina di Villafranca, Ludovico attacked Malgrate with a

43 Shaw,‘TheRomanbaronsandthepopes’,115–8;Shaw,The Political Role,110–1.44 Staffetti,‘GiulioCybo-Malaspina’,1(1892),147,173–6,196–8,216–40.

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substantial force, taking control of the village and investing the fortress, towhich the inhabitants had retreated. Rather than choose between MalgratoandLudovico,thepeopledecidedtoraisethebannersofFlorence.45Thepeo-pleofthePallavicinistrongholdofZibellowerelessfortunatewhentheybe-camecaughtupinafamilyquarrelin1515.Thesixteen-year-oldGianFrancescoPallavicinidiZibello,dyingin1514,leftawillnominatinghissistersashisheir-esses,orshouldtheybeconsideredunabletoinheritland,hisbrother-in-lawGianLudovicoPallavicinidiCortemaggiore,buthispaternalunclesclaimedtherightofsuccession.GianLudovicotookpossessionofZibelloanddefend-editagainsttheuncles’forces,whobesiegeditfromMaytoJuly1515,ravagingtheinhabitants’crops.WhenZibellofell,theysackedit,wreckingthefortressandthe familypalacethere.TheunclesRolandoandBernardinoheldontoZibello,andGianLudovico,hiswifeandhersisterswereunabletoreclaimit.46

GenerationsofthePicodellaMirandolaweredividedbyfeudsthatresultedinepisodesoffighting.Atissuewasnotsomuchthedivisionofthepropertyasthepracticeofsharinginthelordship.Personalconnectionswithneighbour-ingprincelyfamilies,andthestrategicimportanceofMirandolaintheregionmeantotherpowerstookanactiveinterestintheirquarrels,andattimesbe-cameinvolvedmilitarily.Anamicabledivisionofpropertyamongthreebroth-ers, Galeotto, Antonio Maria and Giovanni in 1469, was soon followed by adisputebetweenGaleotto,whowantedtogovernMirandolaalone,andAnto-nioMaria(Giovanni,theyoungest,destinedforanecclesiasticalcareer,con-centratedonthephilosophicalstudiesthatwonhimlastingfame).AccusingAntonioMariaofconspiracyagainsthim,Galeottoimprisonedhim,releasinghimin1472.DuringtheWarofFerrara,AntonioMaria,whowasapapalcondot-tiere,helpedtobringafamilystronghold,Concordia,underthecontroloftheleaguein1483,whileGaleottofoughtontheoppositesideforVenice.AntonioMariaheldontoConcordiaafterthewar,withthehelpofartillerylentbytheMarquisofMantua.InJanuary1488,GaleottotriedtotakeitbysurprisewhileAntonioMariawasaway,butwasdrivenoffwiththelossof25men.47

HavingsecuredImperial investiturewithMirandolaforhimselfalone,to-gether with a stipulation that only his eldest son, Gian Francesco, should

45 TheFlorentinesheldMalgrateforamonthortwo,beforecedingittothedukeofMilan,whohadMalgratoinhisprotectionandafterayearandahalfgavethefortressbacktohim(Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,III,303–4).

46 LetiziaArcangeli, ‘Un’aristocraziaterritorialealfemminile.DueotrecosesuLauraPal-laviciniSanvitaleelecontessevedovedelparmense’,602,612–4;UmbertoBenassi,Storia di Parma(Bologna,1971),II,136–7.

47 FeliceCeretti,‘IlconteAntonmariaPicodellaMirandola:memorieedocumenti’,239–48.


succeedhim,Galeottoforcedhisyoungerson,Lodovico,bythreatsandbeat-ingstorenouncehisrighttoshareinthelordship,buthiswife,BiancaMariad’Esterefusedtomakesucharenunciationinthenameoftheiryoungestson,Federico.OnthedeathofGaleotto,in1499,GianFrancescogotconfirmationfromMaximilianofhisinvestiture,withaninjunctiontohisyoungerbrotherstoacquiesceinthis.Buttheyrefusedtodoso,andinJune1502,supportedbythed’Este,theGonzagaandexiles,attackedtheestateswitharound3,000men;theywerealsosenttroopsbyLodovico’sfather-in-law,GianGiacomoTrivulzio.Afifty-daysiegeofMirandolaendedon6AugustwiththefallofthefortressandthecaptureofGianFrancesco.Hewasreleased,leavinghissonsashos-tages.InOctober1503,hisattempttoenterMirandolawasfoiledwiththehelpof Mantuan cavalry and bombardiers. Francesco Gonzaga switched his sup-porttoGianFrancescothefollowingyear,butLodovico.throughhisconnec-tiontoTrivulzio,hadFrenchprotection,andkeptholdofMirandolauntilhisdeathin1509.48

ThreegenerationsofthemainbranchoftheFieschiwerealsodividedinthemid-fifteenthcenturybyintractablequarrelsovertheinheritanceanddivisionoffamilylandsandpower.Acomplicateddisputeoversharesinearlierinheri-tancessetGianAntonioFieschiagainsthisuncleGianLuigi.49Onthedeathin1447ofGianAntonio,inwhichGianLuigiandhissonGianFilippomayhavehadahand,GianFilipposeizedhisestates–aidedbythefactthatGianAnto-niohadbeenanenemyoftheincumbentdoge,andthathissonandheir,Nico-losino,wasonlyabouteightyearsold.AstheboygrewuphewasperceivedtobeathreattoGianFilippo(theheadofthefamilyafterhisfather’sdeathin1451), forhewasboldandintelligentandtherewasmuchsympathyforhimamongthesubjectsandpartisansoftheFieschi.50BythetimeNicolosinowasagedaroundsixteen,thedogePietroCampofregososawhimasausefulinstru-mentagainstGianFilippo.ThesympathyfeltforhimbymanyassociatesoftheFieschi did not mean they were necessarily willing to take up arms for himagainst Gian Filippo. Nicolosino was dependent on the doge to providehimwithmilitarybacking,andthedogealsoofferedasweetenerofaducatandapairofstockingswiththebadgeofNicolosinotoanymanwhowouldswitchsides.51SayingthathewantedNicolosinototakeGianFilippo’splacein

48 FeliceCeretti,‘LodovicoIPico’,95–109,121–9,147–63,181–2.49 ThepointsatissueweresetoutbyGianLuigiinapetitiontotheDogeandAnzianiof

22October1440(ASGenoa,AS3032,234).50 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.408:SvevadaCurtetoFrancescoSforza,14Mar.1453,Genoa.51 Ibid.,b.411:GiovannidellaGuardiatoFrancescoSforza,16Feb.1456,Genoa.

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the eastern Riviera,52 Campofregoso sent him there with galleys and troopsand the captain of Genoa, Pietro’s brother Pandolfo (who was betrothed toNicolosino’s sister).They had some success in driving Gian Filippo into themountains,capturinghisbrotherRolando,whowasimprisonedinchainsinGenoa.Butsoon,withthehelpoftheAdornoandofthecaptainoftheNea-politangalleys,BernatVilamari,GianFilippobegantorecoverlostground,andNicolosino’schallengefaded.

AfterGianFilippo’sdeathin1459,anotherquarreldevelopedbetweenhisbrothersObiettoandRolando(whodiedlaterthatyear)andtheirnephewJa-copone,withGianFilippo’swidow,AntoniaMaria,anheiressinherownrightofherfatherAntonioFieschi’slands,becominginvolved.Shegavecustodyofher landsto Jacopone,andthenmarriedhimin1460.ThefightingwasonalesserscalethanduringNicolosino’schallengetoGianFilippo,becausenoout-sideforcestookpart.Itlargelytooktheformofviolentseizuresoffortressesandvillages,bystratagemsorsurpriseassaults;neithersidecouldmountafull-scalesiege.TheFieschiwereunabletomusteranythingliketheforcesthatthefamilycouldrallytoattackthedogeordefendthemagainstexternalaggres-sors;theirmanypartisansseemtohavekeptoutofthequarrel.ItendedwiththedeathofJacopone;hewassaidtohavebeenkilledwhenObiettobroughtfiftymentoVaresetoseizehim,andJacoponewascutdownasheescapedhiswould-becaptors,havingwoundedObietto.53

Baronsandcastellanswhohadstrongconnectionstofactions54coulddrawongreaterresourcestofightwith;theycouldalsobecomeengagedinanotherkindofsemi-private,semi-publicwarfare,insupportoftheirfactionalallies.Someofthemostpowerfulfamiliesofmilitarynobility,includingtheFieschi,OrsiniandColonna,owedagoodproportionoftheirpowertotheirbeingattheheadoffactions.InmuchofItaly,notablyinthePapalStates,LiguriaandmuchofLombardyfromtheAlpinepassestoEmilia,factionalnetworkswereone of the most significant elements in political society. It is only in recentyearsthathistorianshaveceasedtoseethemprimarilyassourcesofdisorder

52 ASGenoa,AS1794:PietroCampofregosotoPandolfoandGaleottoCampofregoso,21Feb.1456.

53 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.412:GaleazzodeCoconate[?]toSacramoroVisconti,24June1467,Chiavari. A local chronicle gave a different account of the circumstances of his death,placingitin1469,inanambushbypartisansofObietto’sbrother,GianLuigiFieschi(Ber-nabò,‘FieschieLandi’,362).

54 Theterm‘faction’isusedheretocoverabroadrangeofentities,toavoidconfusioninthecomparisons;historiansstudyingspecificsituationssometimesdistinguishbetween,forexample,‘faction’and‘party’(asIhavedonemyself:seeShaw,The Political Role,126),buttherearenoagreeddefinitions.


andviolence,survivalsofanagewhengovernmentswere lesspowerfulandsecure,thatneededtobeeliminatedifastable,orderlystatewastobeformed.Nowithasbeenrecognizedwidely,ifnotyetgenerally,thatatalocallevelthefactionshadbecomethebasisofpoliticalorder,indeedofpoliticalauthority,andgovernmentswouldfinditfareasierandsimplertoworkwiththemthanto try toeliminate them.55Familiesofmilitarynobilitywereoften the focalpointoflocalnetworks,andcouldlinkthefactionsofdifferentregions,some-timesstraddlingstateboundaries.

Inmanyareas,factionswereidentifiedaseitherGuelforGhibelline–labelsthatcouldbeofgreatimportatlocallevel,andcouldalsobeinvokedtoiden-tify connections, “natural” or historic alliances, between groups or familiesfromdifferentregions.Theyhadlosttheconnectiontotheconfrontationbe-tweenpopeandemperorthathadintroducedthetermsintothepoliticalvo-cabularyofItalyinthethirteenthcentury.56Localpowerstruggles,jealousies,personalgrievancesmight leadto individualsor familiesswitching factions,butthiswasnotalwayspossible.Forbaronialandcastellanfamilieswithhis-toricassociationswithaparticularfaction,identificationasGuelforGhibel-linewassolong-establishedthatforthemitwasvirtuallyimpossibletochangesides. Some families, such as the Malaspina, had both Guelf and Ghibellinebranches,butindividualshadnochoice,anymorethantheyhadachoiceastowhich branch they belonged to.There had been Ghibelline branches of theOrsini, but by the mid-fifteenth century the Orsini were firmly identified asGuelf and the Colonna as Ghibelline. In Liguria, the Fieschi and GrimaldiwereGuelfs,theDoriaandSpinolaGhibellines.InthecaseoftheDoriaandSpinolatheirsharedGhibellineidentitywasexpressedinrivalryforleadershipofthelocalGhibellines.

Thelong-standingassociationsbetweenfamiliesofmilitarynobilityandlo-calfactionswerestrongandresilient:thesewerenotopportunisticortempo-rary associations. A new family, or one new to a particular area, howeverwell-connectedtheymightbe,wouldnotautomaticallybecomeleadersofthelocalfactions,asthebranchoftheGuelfSanseverinoimplantedintheValLu-ganobyFilippoMariaViscontifound,whilethefamilytheywereintendedto

55 See,forexample,theessaysinMarcoGentile(ed.),Guelfi e ghibellini nell’Italia del Rina-scimento (Rome, 2005), especially those by Letizia Arcangeli, Marco Gentile, MassimoDellaMisericordia,andChristineShaw.

56 DuringtheItalianWars,thekingsofFranceandtheemperorrevivedthissenseofacon-nectionbetweenGhibellinesandtheemperor,andGuelfsandtheFrenchking(asheirto the Angevins, who had been brought to Italy to help the thirteenth century popesagainsttheemperor).

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replace,theGhibellineRusca,whokeptthetitlecontediLugano,maintainedtheirassociationwiththeirfactionthere.57Typically,thefactionsthatlookedtobaronsandcastellanswereconstitutedinlargepartoftheclientsandde-pendantsoflocalnotables,ruralandurban,includingminorfamiliesofmili-tarynobility.Havingapowerfulbaronialfamilyattheheadofafactionhelpedtogiveitcohesion,checkingcompetitionamongthelocalnotablestobecometheleadersthemselves.Families,ratherthanindividuals,werethefocusofloy-alty.Theheadofabaronialfamilymightalsoipso factoberegardedastheheadofthefaction,butallmembersofthebaronialfamilywouldbetreatedwithrespect,astosomedegreeparticipatingintheleadership,andcouldfeelag-grievediftheywerenot.58

Thefamiliesattheheadofthefactionswereexpectedtogivejobstomem-bersoftheirfactionintheirestateadministrations,intheirhouseholdsortheirmilitarycompanies,iftheyhadany,andtheywereexpectedtousetheirinflu-ence to get them appointments to other jobs or to ecclesiastical benefices.Theymightbecalledontohelpfactionmembersembroiledinjudicialpro-ceedings,andgiverefugeontheirestatestooutlaws,orthosewhohadfledintoexileafterbeingdefeatedinfaction-fighting.Theycouldbecalledupontoactas intermediariesbetweencentralgovernmentanditsofficialsandtheindi-vidualsandcommunitiesintheirfaction,topersuadefactionmemberstodoasthegovernmentorderedordesired,ortopersuadetheprinceorrepublicangovernmentortheirofficialstomitigateorforgotheirdemands.

Sucharoleasintermediarywasonethat,iffulfilledsuccessfully,enhancedthestanding,statusandpowerofthebaronsandcastellans,andwasoneofthemajor benefits they received from leadership of a faction. The goodwill ofthefaction,oftheiramici,wasasmuchapartofthefamilyinheritanceaslandsandfortresses,andvaluedaccordingly.Ifhecouldnotprotecthisfriendsfromvexatiousclaimstojurisdictionoverthem,itwouldbetotheeternalshameofhimandhisfamilyanddiminishtheirstatusandreputation,PietroMariaRos-sideclaredin1454.Noothertreasureonearthwassovaluableasthetreasureoffriendshipacquiredovermanyyearsbyhisforebears,tothegreathonourofhis house.59 All the Orsini of earlier generations ‘have esteemed the friends

57 Massimo Della Misericordia, ‘La “coda” dei gentiluomini. Fazioni, mediazione politica,clientelismonellostatoterritoriale:ilcasodellamontagnalombardaduranteildominiosforzesco(XVsecolo)’,326–58.

58 Forexample,ChristineShaw,‘TheRomanbaronsandtheGuelfandGhibellinefactionsinthePapalStates’,479.

59 Marco Gentile, Fazioni al governo. Politica e società a Parma nel Quattrocento (Rome,2009),234–7.


andpartisansoftheirhousenolessthantheestateofthefamilyitself ’,oneofVirginioOrsini’schancellorsremindedhimin1488.60ThefriendsoftheFieschiweredescribedas‘thegloryofmyhouse’byGianFilippoFieschi.61

Intrinsictothereputation,thehonour,theglorythatbaronsandcastellansfelttheyderivedfromtheirleadershipoffactionswastheunderstandingthat,ifneedbe, their friendswouldtakeuparmsto fight for them;theywereanimportantpartof theperceivedmilitary resourcesof the family.Ultimately,thiswaswhatthefactionscoulddoforthebaronsinreturnforthefavoursandprotectiontheyprovided.Ifthepatronageandaffectionofourfatherandofallmyhousehaseverbeenofusetoyou,andif inthefutureyouhope,asyoushould,toreceivethesamefromus,nowisthetimetoshowwhatyouwilldoforusinexchange,AscanioColonnaexhortedtheGhibellinecommunalgov-ernmentofTerniwhenhewasaskingthemtogatherallthementheycould.62Themilitaryaidthefactionscouldsupplywasusuallyonlyavailableforshortperiods–weeksratherthanmonths–unlessthemenweretobeformallyre-cruitedandpaidasservingsoldiers,butcumulativelycouldamounttothou-sandsofmen.Themilitaryaidthelordsmightlendtotheirfactionalallieswaslesssubstantial,andonlylentwhenimportantissueswereatstake.Ingeneral,theywouldnotbecomeinvolvedinpetty,everydayskirmishesbetweenlocalrivals.Butifthecontrolofatownwasatstake,iftherewasaquestionofafac-tionbeingforcedintoexile,orofexilesseekingtoforcetheirwaybackhome,thenthemilitarynoblesmightwellsendacoupleofhundredmentosupporttheirside.

Romanbaronswereespeciallyreadytoprovidesuchsupport.Quiteapartfromthecitiesruledbysignori,townsandcitiesthroughoutthePapalStates,eventhosenearRome,weregovernedbylocalnotablesandfactionsasthoughthey were more or less independent political entities. Factions had muchgreaterweight in theirpolitical lives thanpapalofficialsdid.Romanbaronshad connections with a wide swathe of towns in the western, central andsouthernPapalStates,fromOrvietoandViterbotoPerugia,SpoletoandRietiinUmbria,toTivoliandAnagninearRome.Therewasnoquestionoftheirtry-ingtotakeoversuchtownsthemselves,buttheywerequicktorespondtocallsforaid,ortoofferhelpbeforetheywereaskedforit.WhenGuelfexilesmadea

60 ACapitolino,AOrsini,b.101,c.235:AntonelloSinibaldotoVirginioOrsini,20Dec.1488,Naples.

61 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.407:GianFilippoFieschitoFrancescoSforza,6Aug.1452,Recco.62 ASTerni, Riformanze 1665, f. 7v: Ascanio Colonna to Consoli, Priori and Banderarii of

Terni,9Jan.1522,Rome;seeShaw,‘TheRomanbaronsandtheGuelfandGhibellinefac-tions’,481,fortheoriginalquotation.

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violentincursionintoRietiinJanuary1505,brieflygainingcontrolofthecity,the Ghibellines were able to drive them out again (killing over a hundred)withthehelpofalliesfromTerniandlocallords,thePoianiofPiediluco.MuzioColonnawassentbyFabrizioandCardinalGiovanniColonnatooffertroops,moneyandadviceonsecurity.Askedtostayuntilalldangerhadpassed,andtoseetotheguardingofthestrongholdofRoccaSinibalda,hemadefiftymount-ed troopsavailable tohelpdefendthecityagainsta renewedassaultby theGuelfs.63

As in this instance, it was usually younger barons, or those from minorbranchesofthefamilyor fromlesserbaronial families inthefaction,ratherthantheheadsofthegreaterfamiliesandthemajorcondottieri,whobecamedirectlyinvolvedinfaction-fightinginthetowns.Evenifnobaronswereper-sonallyinvolvedascommanders,theymightlendtroopstotheirallies,suchasthelighthorsetheOrsinisentin1499tohelpexilesfromViterbointheirraid-ing.64

BeforeBartolomeod’Alvianoestablishedhisreputationasoneofthebestandboldestcondottieriofhisgeneration,hewasanenthusiasticparticipantinfaction-fightinginthePapalStates.SometimeshecameupagainstAntonelloSavelli,whowasalsomakinganameforhimselfasamilitarycommanderbe-forehediedofwoundssustainedinthebattlebetweentheOrsiniandColonnainApril 1498.Hearrivedtoo late inFebruary 1489to join in theroutofAn-tonelloSavelliandtwoofhisbrothersatOrte,wheretheyhadbroughtabout40horseand400infantry,includingmenfromtheGhibellinetownofAmelia,toattacktheGuelfswhohadexpelledtheGhibellinesfromOrtetheyearbe-fore.UlisseOrsinidiMugnano,whoseestateswerenearby,hadalreadycometotheaidoftheGuelfswithmenfromhisownlandsand200mensentfromtheGuelftownofNarniathisrequest.65

Both were involved in an outbreak of faction-fighting in 1497. In Mayd’Alvianorespondedtoacall forhelpbytheexiledGuelfsofTodi, leadingamassacreoftheGhibellinesthereandrestoringtheGuelfs.66HeundertooktofightforGuelfSpoletoagainstGhibellineTerni,whichtheSpoletanswerebentoncrushing.LeadersoftheColonnafaction,ProsperoandFabrizioColonna

63 MicheleMichaeli,Memorie storiche della città di Rieti(Rieti,1897–9),IV,41–3.64 ASFlorence,Signoria,Carteggi,Resp.,b.18,c.8:AntonioMalegonnelli,31Oct.1499,Rome.65 Shaw, ‘The Roman barons and the Guelf and Ghibelline factions’, 489; ACapitolino,

AOrsini,b.102,c.145:SantidaCurcumellotoVirginioOrsini,23Feb.1489,Florence.66 AchilleSansi,Saggio di documenti storici tratti dall’Archivio del comune di Spoleto(Foligno,

1861),64–71;ASFlorence,XdiBalia,Carteggi,Resp.,b.56,c.30:AlessandroBraccio,27May1497,Rome;c.36:RiccardoBecchi,29May1497,Rome..


and Cardinal Savelli, sent Antonello Savelli and Giulio Colonna to ask Ghi-belline Rieti to help Terni and ‘the Ghibelline party’ against Spoleto andd’Alviano,andRietiagreedtosendallthementhatcouldberaised.67WhileAntonelloandTroianoSavellisawtoputtingTerniintoastateofdefence,theOrsinisawtostrengtheningTodiandSpoleto.68AreportthatAntonelloSavellihadgonetoTodiprovedfalse;instead,heintervenedwith600Colonnahorseinfaction-fightinginViterbo,andtheslaughterofGuelfsthere.69ThisputtheOrsinionthedefensive,asthepresenceofColonnatroopsinViterboposedathreattotheirestatesinthearea.70Another‘Orsini’town,Norcia,warnedbyaletterfromd’Alviano,askedforassurancethathewouldcometothemiftheGhibelline forces made another move;71 he also wrote to Narni and Orte topreparetroops.72ReportsreachedRietithatd’Alvianoplannedtoattackwith3,000footand2–300horse,sayinghewantedtotreatRietiasAntonelloSavellihadViterbo;theSpoletansweretoldthatAntonelloinTerniwasplanninganattackonthem.73ThisstandoffwasbroughttoanendbyatruceinSeptember.

Inreturn forsuchmilitaryassistanceto theirurbanallies,Romanbaronsenjoyedreservesoflargenumbersofloyalmen,probablymostlyinfantry,onwhomtheycoulddrawatshortnotice.SixteenhundredinfantrycametoRometosupporttheColonnafromNorcia,CasciaandL’AquilaafterthedeathofSix-tusIV,inadditiontomenthattheColonnaandSavelliraisedfromTerni,Ame-lia and Rieti.74 Spoleto provided Napoleone Orsini with 2,000 men in 1528,whileSciarraColonnaraisedaroundathousandfromNorciaandotherplaceslaterthatyear.75Ifneedbe,thesemencouldfightforthebaronsagainstthepope, as did the many ‘partisans’ who helped defend the lands of VirginioOrsiniagainstpapaltroopsin1496–7.76

67 Michaeli,Memorie storiche della città di Rieti,IV,24–5.68 ASFlorence,XdiBalia,Carteggi,Resp.,b.56,cc.42,53:AlessandroBraccio,30May,5June

1497,Rome.69 CesarePinzi,Storia della città di Viterbo(Rome,1887–1913),IV,376.70 ASFlorence,XdiBalia,Carteggi,Resp.,b.56,cc.73,76:AlessandroBraccio,14June1497,

Rome.71 ASSpoleto,Letterealcomune,b.1/Norcia:ConsulsofNorcia,14June1497.72 Sansi,Saggio di documenti storici,76. 73 Michaeli,Memorie storiche della città di Rieti,IV,26;ASSpoleto,Letterealcomune,b.1/

Montefranco:PierLorenzoandJacomo,20July1497.74 Pontani,Il diario romano,42;diVascho,Il diario,514–5.75 ASSpoleto, Lettere al Comune, b. 16/1528C: Napoleone Orsini, 28 May 1528, Vicovaro;

G.Molini,Documenti di storia italiana (Florence, 1836–7), II, 113:CamilloPardoOrsini,30Oct.1528,Ascoli.

76 Sanuto,I diarii,I,col.472.

88 Chapter4

TheColonnaandOrsinifactionswereconstitutedofbaronialfamiliesandurbanfactions;ruralcommunitiesseemtohavebeenprincipallyinvolvedei-therassubjectsandtenantsofthebaronsorassubjectsofthetowns,orten-antsoffamiliesinvolvedintheurbanfactions.Byandlarge,thefactionswerebipolar,inthetownsandataregionallevel:therewasaGuelf,OrsininetworkandaGhibelline,Colonnaone.InLiguria,thesituationwasmorecomplicated.Therewereamultiplicityoffactions,inwhichtheinhabitantsofindependent-mindedruralcommunitieswereasimportantasthoseoftowns.Eachofthemajorcastellanfamiliesaimedtoheadtheirownfaction,andGuelfsandGhi-bellineswerenotorganizedintotworecognizednetworks,withinwhichtherewerelastingallianceswithacknowledgedreciprocalobligationsandcommoninterests.Factionalnetworksweremultipolar,andthe factionsof individualcommunitieswoulddecideforthemselveswhichallegianceswouldtakeprior-ityinanygivencircumstances.If,forexample,theSpinolaorDoriaswitchedalliancesfromonedogalcandidatetoanother,ordecidedtosupporttheclaimtolordshipoverGenoaofthedukeofMilanorthekingofFrance,thefamiliesandgroupswhointheirowncommunitieswouldbeidentifiedasmembersofaSpinolaorDoriafactionwouldnotnecessarilyfollowtheirlead.

Factionalallegianceswerebecomingmorecalculatinginanothersensetoo,during the second half of the fifteenth century. As the Campofregoso andAdorno set about building up their own followings in the Riviere, cuttingacrossandcompetingwiththefactionsheadedbythecastellanfamilies,theyusedmoneyandgiftstowinsupport.ThemenoftheRivierebecameaccus-tomedtobeingtreatedwithfoodandbarrelsofwine,aswellasstockings,per-hapsinthecoloursofthefamilycourtingtheirsupport,or,especiallyforthenotables,outrightgiftsofmoney.Bythelate1470s,ProsperoAdornocouldnotraisehisfriendsandpartisansunlesshepaidthem.77Thismercenaryattitudecarriedoverintotheirrelationswiththecastellanfamilies,whoalsobegantofindthattheirpartisansexpectedpaymentiftheyturnedouttofightforthem.

TheinvolvementofthecastellanfamiliesofLiguriawiththetownsontheRivierewasratherdifferentinnaturefromthatoftheRomanbaronialfamilieswiththetownsofUmbriaandaroundRome.Bythemid-fifteenthcentury,Ro-manbaronswerenotappointedtoholdeitherpapalorcommunalofficesinthosetownsastheyhadsometimesbeeninthethirteenthandfourteenthcen-turies.78InLiguria,membersofthecastellanfamiliescompetedtoholdpostsas Genoese officials in the towns of the Riviere, particularly positions that

77 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.968:governorsoftheMilanesearmytoBonaSforza,28Mar.1477,Serravalle.

78 Shaw,The Political Role,p.127.


wouldbringcontrolofa fortressorothermilitaryresources,suchasthatofcaptainoftheeasternorwesternRiviere.Someofthemorepowerfulcastel-lans nursed ambitions to have neighbouring towns under their domination,eitherdirectlyorgoverningthemnominallyforGenoa.AtVentimiglia,forin-stance,LambertoGrimaldiofMonacowasrecognizedastheirlordbythepeo-ple of the town in a solemn ceremony in September 1463.When FrancescoSforzatookoverGenoaandhistroopscametotakepossessionoftheRivierethefollowingyear,Grimaldihadtosurrenderthesignory,butascompensationwasappointedgovernorofVentimighiaforfiveyears.Attheendofthisterm,havingstrengtheneditsdefences,herefusedtosurrenderit,andVentimigliahadtobetakenfromhimbyMilanesetroopsinSeptember1469,withthefor-tressholdingoutuntilNovember;hisbrotherLuigidieddefendingit.79

Theintricacyandmutabilityoffactionalassociations,andhowtheywereaffectedbychangesofregimeinGenoacanbeshownbyconsideringjustonepartofthewesternRiviera,PortoMaurizioanditshinterland,overonedecadefromtheendoftheFrenchdominionoverGenoain1512totheseizureofpow-erbytheAdornoinGenoawiththehelpoftheSpanishin1522.TherewerethreemainfactionsinPortoMaurizio,theBlack,Guelf,andtwoWhite,Ghibel-line, factions. The two Ghibilline factions were the Spinola and the Doria;membersofbothfamiliesattimesgovernedPortoMaurizio,dependingonthealignmentoftheiralberghiwithwhatevermightbethecurrentregimeinGen-oa. By 1512 both had become estranged from the French. Luca Spinola, themost prominent representative of his family in the region, had been disap-pointedbythefailureoftheFrenchtofulfilapromisetogivehimsecuretitletothestrongholdofPievediTeco,afocusfortheSpinolafamilyandfaction.Itwasablowto the factionwhenPievewas taken fromhimby theFrench inMarch1512.

WhenGianoCampofregosowas installedasdoge inGenoa in June,LucaseizedPieveandinPortoMauriziotheSpinolafactiontookoverthetown.ButtheleaderoftheSpinolafactionthere,thelawyerFrancescoRamoino,cametotermswithGiano,andapparentlysentnoaidtoLucawhentheGenoesetookPieveback.Tomaintaintheirdominanceinthetown,theSpinolafactiontherehadtoweakentheirlinkswithotherSpinolapartisansintheRiviera,andbe-comeclosetotheCampofregoso.DuringthebriefAdornoregimeinGenoainMaytoJune1513,theykeptPortoMauriziofaithfultotheCampofregosountiltheyrecoveredpower inGenoa.Thenewdoge,however,wasnotGianobutOttavianoCampofregoso,whowasnotongoodtermswithGiano,andboth

79 Saige,Documents historiques,I,CLXXXIII,CCXVI-XXIV;322–6,330–2,441–4,455–70,479–81.

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RamoinoandBernardoDoria,thelieutenantinPortoMaurizioofthecaptainoftheRiviera,losttheiroffices.AnewDoriaofficial,Gerolamo,wassenttobevicarandpodestàofPortoMaurizio,andtheDoriafactionthere,togetherwiththerevivingGuelffaction,becamedominant.Discomfited,theSpinolafactionreturned to alliance with the Spinola family, although Luca’s resentment attheirfailuretohelphimin1512keptthematadistanceforawhile.

InNovember1513hehadtakenpart,alliedwiththeGuelfGianGiacomodelCarrettodiZuccarello,inanunsuccessfuluprisingagainstOttavianoCampo-fregoso.ThefocusforexilesandopponentsofthedogeinthatareaoftheRiv-ierahadbecometheImperialfiefofLingueglia.Toputastoptotheirdisruptiveraiding,GerolamoDoria’slieutenant,PaoloGerolamoDoria,inNovember1514ledaroundeightymen,includingDoriapartisansandexilesfromLingueglia,to take and sack the stronghold; the lord, Gian Battista della Lingueglia, es-caped.

Then,asrumourscirculatedthattheAdornoortheFieschiweretoreturntoGenoa,therewasanothershiftinthefactionalalignments.SomeGuelffami-lies in Porto Maurizio changed sides, and Guelfs from the town, allied withAdornopartisansfromOneglia,raidedDoriapropertyinValleImpero;menofthe del Carretto and the Lingueglia joined in. Exiles from Oneglia and else-whereontheRivieraweregatherngatMaro,astrongholdoftheLascarisdiTenda,exilesfromAlbengaatthedelCarrettostrongholdofOnzo.StillloyaltoLuca Spinola, the Ghibelline faction of Pieve was troubling the Genoeseauthoritiesthere.WithhissonsPantaleoandNiccolò,Lucawasgatheringpar-tisans at Finale; he had the open support of the French. Ottaviano Campo-fregoso turned the tables by coming to terms with Francis I, and agreed inOctober1515tobecomeFrenchgovernorinGenoaratherthandoge.FrancisIleftallhissupportersintheRivierainthelurch,andtheSpinolaandAdornofactioncameundergreaterpressure.

InPortoMaurizio,theSpinolafactionhadalreadybeenunderthesurveill-anceofPaoloGerolamoDoria.Whenhisreplacement,SebastianoDoria,or-deredallthefactionheadstoappearbeforehim,manyapprehensiveleadingSpinolafled,andSebastianoreplacedthoseofthemwhohadheldcivicofficeswithDoriapartisans.TheSpinolafactionsplit:thosehostiletoOttavianoCam-pofregoso,Ramoinoattheirhead,leftforexile;thosewhowereleftdeclaredtheirloyaltytothenewgovernment,somejoiningtheDoriafaction.AnumberofRamoino’sfollowersbasedthemselvesattheSpinolafiefofCastellaro,andfromtherefoughtSebastianoDoria’smen.InlateAugust1516,exilesfromPortoMaurizio gathered at Prelà, which belonged to the Lascaris diTenda, underRamoinoandNiccolòSpinola.AstheyadvancedonPortoMaurizioinSeptem-ber,theywereopposedbythelieutenant’smen,supportedby50crossbowmen


andhalbardiersfromOneglia,sentbyGerolamoandStefanoDoria.TheexileswereworstedinanencounteroutsidePortoMaurizio;theirleadersfledasthemen were cut down. Nevertheless, the exiles managed to keep control overpartofthetown,andtheskirmishesandraidscontinued.Withinthetown,theremainder of the Spinola faction splintered, and the Doria faction becamedominant.

Bylate1517,GerolamoDoriahadgeneraloversightofthewesternRivieraascommissioner,whileSebastianoDoriawascaptainoftheRiviera.Thisbroughta new lieutenant to Porto Maurizio, Bartolomeo De Magellis, and under hismoreconciliatorygovernance, theSpinolaexiles,Ramoinoamongthem,re-turned.Economicdifficulties(causedinlargepartbyGenoeseeffortstotight-enrestrictionsonthemaritimecommerceoftheRivieraports)causedamutedresponseamongtheirpartisanstocalls fromLucaSpinolaandhissonsandfromtheAdornoin1521;norweretheDoriaofOnegliaandDolceacquaabletoenthusetheirpartisanstosupportOttavianoCampofregoso.AfterAntoniottoAdornotookpowerinGenoawithSpanishsupportin1522,theDoriaopposedthenewregime,andsomeoftheheadsoftheDoriafactioninPortoMauriziotookrefugewiththeirfamiliesinOneglia,whichbecamethecentreforexilesfromthewholeof thewesternRiviera.TheSpinola familyand factionweredividedandambiguousintheirattitudetotheAdornoregime.Thenewpo-destàandvicarofPortoMauriziowasStefanoSpinola;Ramoinoandhisfol-lowers behaved more like adherents of the Adorno than partisans of theSpinola; while Giorgio Spinola led a force of partisans and paid infantry inraidsandattacksonPieveandAlbenga.80

Asthis–simplified–accountofeventsinpartofthewesternRivieraoveraperiodofjusttenyearsexemplifies,itisextraordinarilydifficulttoformaclearpictureofthelabyrinthinefactionalpoliticsofthisRivieraasawhole.OntheeasternRiviera,thesituationwaslesscomplicated,largelybecauseoftheFies-chi’sdominancethere.ThemainchallengetothatdominancecamefromtheCampofregoso, as they sought to build up their own faction. Despite beingoriginallyGhibelline(onlyGhibellinescouldbecomedogesofGenoa,accord-ingtothestatutes),theCampofregosowereaimingtodisplacetheFieschiasleadersoftheGuelffaction.ItwastheSpinolawhoheadedtheGhibellinesoftheeasternRiviera,althoughsomeGhibellineswerepartisansoftheFieschi.81

80 GianniDeMoro,Porto Maurizio in Età rinascimentale (1499–1599),II,Verso l’Età moderna (1499–1542)(Imperia,1989),91–149.

81 RiccardoMusso,‘I“colori”delleRiviere:fazionipoliticheefamiliariaGenovaenelsuodominiotraXVeXVIsecolo’,536,546.

92 Chapter4

WhiletheGuelffactionwasthestronger,theGhibellineshadasolidpresencethere;theywerenotapersecutedminority.

TheFieschi, itwassaid,couldraisefarmoremenfromtheirfactionthanfromamongtheirownsubjects82(thesamecouldwellhavebeentrueoftheRomanbarons).Fromtheirestates intheApennines,theyhadlinkstobothsidesofthemountains,andsometimeswereabletobringassistancefromtheiramiciintheduchyofMilan.Inthesummerof1453,forinstance,menfromthebishopricofTortona,directedbythebishop’ssteward,apriest,cametohelpGianFilippoFieschi,asdidoverahundredmenofconteManfredoLandi.83ButthebulkoftheforcesthattheFieschicouldcalluponwereonthecoast.FortheFieschi,thetestoftheirpowerintherepublicofGenoawastheextenttowhichthegovernmentof theeasternRivierawasdelegatedto them.TheheadsofthefamilywantedtobecaptainsoftheRiviera,tohavetherighttoappointofficialsthere,togovernimportanttownssuchasRecco,RapalloandChiavari,andtoholdtherepublic’sfortressesthere.

Their principal justification for demanding such control over the Rivierawastheobligationtoprotecttheirpartisans,theiramici.ThatwasthereasonGianFilippoFieschigaveforbuildingfortifications,onlandthatbelongednottohimbut to therepublic,atReccoandCamogli in 1452.84Herebuffedthedoge’s insistencethatthefortificationsshouldbetorndown,sayingwithoutthemhis friendswouldnotbesecure.85 Innegotiationsforasettlementbe-tweenhimandthedoge,hedemandedthatallthosewhohadtakenuparmsforhimshouldremainunderhisprotection,toguardagainstreprisalsbythedoge.86FortheFieschitohavetowithdrawfromthecoasttotheirestatesinthemountainswasseenasadefeat,asignofweakness,andtheywouldruntheriskof their amicibeing forced toprovide for theirownsecuritybyseekingotherpatrons.IfheorhisbrotherGianLuigididnotcometothecoasttoheart-en and support their partisans, Matteo Fieschi warned Obietto Fieschi inMarch1483,thenexttimetheywantedtofightontheRivieratheywouldneedtobringagoodnumberofpaidinfantry,becausetheirfriendswouldnolongerhave it in their power to help them. His presence there now – preferably

82 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.1572:GianPietroPanigarolatoBonaandGianGaleazzoSforza,11July1477,Genoa.

83 Ibid.,b.408:LeonardodaPietrasantatoFrancescoSforza,30July1453,Milan.84 Ibid.,b.407:GiovanniFerufinotoFrancescoSforza,26July1452,Genoa.85 Ibid.,GiovanniFerufinoandAntonioGuidobonotoFrancescoSforza,2Aug.1452,Genoa.86 Ibid.,GianFilippoFieschitoFrancescoSforza,23Oct.1453,Morazana.


bringingwithhimsomemoneytoheartentheir friends–wouldbeworthathousandinfantry.87

Thefriendswhomitwasmostcrucialtoreassureandkeeponsidewerethefamiliesofnotableswhoweretherealpower-brokersinthecoastaltownsandvalleycommunities;someofthemcould,liketheFieschi,boastdescentfromtheancientcountsofLavagna.88(Similarly,FieschiinfluenceinthePiacentinointhesixteenthcenturydependedontheirrelationswiththeNicelli family,whowerekingpinsintheValNure.)89Suchmenhadmindsoftheirown,andwouldnotblindlyfollowtheFieschioranyotherfactionleader.AswiththeircounterpartsinthewesternRiviera,theywouldnotnecessarilyjointhecastel-lansintacticalallianceswithrivalfactions.PartisansoftheFieschiwereper-hapsmoreliablethanthoseofanyotherLiguriancastellanfamilytobeaskedtobackthemagainstthecurrentregimeinGenoa,andmightweightheoddsofsuccesscarefullybeforedecidingiftheywould.GianLuigiFieschiwasre-portedtohaveheldameetingwithhispartisansinJune1477,atwhichmanyhadtoldhimthattheydidnotintendtofollowhim,becausetheydidnotthinkhimstrongenoughtotakeontheforcesofMilanandGenoawithouttheaidofanotherItalianstate.Arguinghecouldnotrevealwhatcontactshehadwithother powers to so many, Gian Luigi asked them to appoint representativeswhomhecouldmeetprivately,whowouldhavedelegatedpowerstocommittherest;butthedecisionofthedelegates,itwassaid,stillwentagainsthim.90Whatevertheoutcomeofthismeeting,somesupportwasforthcomingfromhispartisansatthistime,enoughtoencouragehimtoapproachGenoainthehope of provoking an uprising against Prospero Adorno, then governor fortheMilanese.

If the Fieschi managed to win the support of the notables, thousands ofmencouldberaisedquickly,asrecruitingpartiesralliedmenbyringingbellsandblowinggreatseashellswhichwereusedashornsintheregion.91FortheFieschi,whowerenotrichincash,thenumbersofmenpreparedtoanswertheircallcouldsoonbecomeaproblem.Thesepartisansundoubtedlycostlessthanhiringprofessionalinfantry,buttheydidnotcomeentirelyforfree.ThiswasalreadyaproblemforGianFilippoFieschiinthe1450s,andexpectations

87 Ibid.,b.994:MatteoFieschitoObiettoFieschi,27Mar.1483,Rapallo.88 Musso,‘I“colori”delleRiviere’,546–7.89 Riccardo De Rosa, Lo Stato Landi (1257–1682) (Piacenza, 2008), 40; for the Nicelli, see

DanieleAndreozzi,Nascita di un disordine. Una famiglia signorile e una valle piacentina tra XV e XVI secolo(Milan,1993).

90 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.972:GianAngelode’TalentitoBonaandGianGaleazzoSforza,1July1477,Genoa.

91 Musso,‘I“colori”delleRiviere’,549.

94 Chapter4

ofrewardmaywellhavegrown,astheeffortsoftheCampofregosoandAdornotoattractfollowersraisedtheprice.LocalnotablescametolookforsubsidiesfromtheFieschieveninpeacetime,astheirownmenbecamemoredemand-ing.Asyouknow,FrancescodellaTorrecarriesquiteaburdenofexpenseforustosustaintheamici,GianLuigiFieschiremindedObiettoinAugust1482.Youshouldthinkofmaking‘somefittingprovision’forhim,forbothwarandpeace,tosatisfyhisneedsandourdutytosupporthim,andthinkofotherswhomightmeritsimilarpayments.92

PaymentstotheiramiciwasoneofthereasonsGianLuigiandtheAdornobrothersgavein1494fortheirunwillingnesstogiveupthepensionstheyre-ceivedfromLudovicoSforza;iftheydidnotmakethesepayments,theywouldlosetheirfriendsandtheirreputation.93Atthattime,theywerestillabletoraise3,000amicifromaroundGenoa(payingtheirexpenses,ofcourse)tode-fendthecity fromathreatenedattackbyexilesbackedbytheFrench; 1,500menweretobeheldinreadinessontheeasternRivieratocomeifneedbe.94Butinthesixteenthcenturysuchleviesseemnolongertohavebeenpossible.ChangesinthenatureofGenoesepolitics,andinthepositionofGenoawithintheItalianstatesystemastherepublicbecamecaughtupinthecontestbe-tweentheEuropeanpowersbroughtchangestotheroleoftheRivierafactionsinthelifeoftherepublic.WhenGianLuigiFieschi’sgrandsonandnamesakemadehisbidtochangetheregimeinGenoain1547,hedidsobyaconspiracy,tryingtoenthuseafewhundredmenmeetinginhispalaceontheoutskirtstofollowhimthroughthecity,notbyadvancingonGenoaattheheadofthou-sandsofmenashisforebearshaddone.95Somepartisanswereamongthede-fendersofMontoggioashisbrotherGerolamoledtheFieschi’slaststandaftertheconspiracyfailed,buttheywerenumberedintens,nothundreds.96TherewerestillFieschipartisansintheRivieraafter1547,buttheycouldnothelpthefamilyholdontotheirlands.

ForthecastellansofLombardy,potentialmilitarysupportwasamuchlesssignificantfactorintheirrelationswiththeirfactionalallies,atleastthosein

92 ASMi,ASforzesco,b.993:GianLuigiFieschitoObiettoFieschi,12Aug.1482,Montoggio.93 Ibid.,b.1217:CorradoStangatoLudovicoSforza,11Mar.1496,Genoa.94 Ibid.,b.1221:CorradoStangatoLudovicoSforza,20Jan.1497,Genoa.95 Pacini,La Genova di Andrea Doria,606–7.Amongthemostusefulcollectionsofdocu-

ments concerning this famous conspiracy – long viewed as a romantic, heroic failureratherthanafiasco–areEdoardoBernabòBrea(ed.),Sulla congiura del Conte Gio Luigi Fieschi, documenti inediti (Genoa, 1863), and Lorenzo Capelloni, La congiura di Gio Luigi Fiesco,ed.AgostinoOlivieri(Genoa,1858),andSpinolaetal., ‘Documentiispano-genovesi’.

96 Spinolaetal.,‘Documentiispano-genovesi’,157–9.


thecities.Castellanslookingformilitaryassistancewouldappealtoothercas-tellans,orneighbouringprinces towhomtheymightwellbe linkedby longassociationasGuelfsorGhibellines.Butatthislevelofpoliticalsociety,othernetworksofassociationandinterest,someoflongstanding,somearisingoutofcurrentcircumstances,cutacrossthetraditionalfactions.TheRossiofPar-ma,forexample,wereGuelfs,butwererivalsoftheSanvitale,whohadalongattachmenttothed’EsteofFerrara,whowerealsoGuelfs.PietroMariaRossiopposedd’EsteambitionstotakeParma,choosingrathertoadheretotheSfor-za,whowereGhibellines.Thecastellans’connectionswiththeurbanfactionsthatboretheirnameswereessentiallypolitical,ratherthanmilitary.NeithertheSforzadukesnortheVenetianrepublicwerepreparedtotoleratefaction-fightinginthestreetsoftheirtownsandcities,ortocountenanceurbanfac-tionssendingcolumnsofinfantrytosupportthecastellans,orthecastellansleadingorsendingtroopstointerveneinthequarrelsoftheirurbanallies.

Inperiodsofunrest, rebellionorwar,however, themilitaryaspectof thefactions became more apparent. An outbreak of violence in Parma in earlyMarch 1477 that resulted in the sack and destruction of much property ofmembersoftheRossisquadre,wasarepercussionofthepowerstruggletakingplace in the Milanese court following the assassination of Duke GaleazzoMaria Sforza, between his widow, Bona, who was regent for their son GianGaleazzo,andthelateduke’sbrothers.HaditnotbeenfortheeventsinMilan,itisunlikelythattheRossi,Pallavicini,Sanvitaleandothercastellanfamilieswouldhaveriskedsendinglargenumbersofarmedmenfromtheirestatestostrengthentheforcesofthesquadre,menwhowereresponsibleforsomeoftheworstoftheviolence.97

DuringtheItalianWars,thefactionsinLombardybecameamilitaryforcetobe reckonedwith.Garrisonsandoccupationcontingentscouldbekept toaminimumwhereafriendlyfactionheldsway,butthismeantthatifthefactionturnedagainsttheoccupyingpower,acitycouldbelostinaday.98Inthecoun-tryside,too,thefactionswererevitalized.Influxesofexilesfromthetownsandcities,takingrefugeontheestatesofcastellans,hadapartinthis,asbandsofmenbroughtfromthecountrysidebycastellanfactionleaderscoulddecideachangeofallegiance.Aforceof‘friendsandpartisans’ledbytheGhibellinesFedericoDalVermeandMatteoBeccariatookVogherafrom300infantryand150horseholdingitfortheFrenchin1515.‘Everythingshowsthatrebellionsof

97 Pezzana,Storia della Città di Parma,IV,14–22;Gentile,Fazioni al governo,21–69.98 LetiziaArcangeli,‘AppuntisuguelfieghibelliniinLombardianelleguerred’Italia(1494–

1530)’,421–31.

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partisanshavemoreeffectthanthestrengthoftheenemy’,wastheconclusiondrawnbyoneobserverfromthisepisode.99

EventsinPiacenzaandthePiacentinoillustratehowthecastellansandthefactionstheyheadedrespondedtothecrisesandpoliticaluncertaintiescausedbythewars,combiningeffortstodeterminewhichofthecontendingpowersshould have Piacenza, with the settling of old scores and personal quarrels.Foursquadreorclassi,headedbycastellans–theGhibellineLandiandAnguis-sola,theGuelfScottiandFontana–dominatedthepoliticallifeandcivicgov-ernment;theleadersofthecastellanclansweremorepersonallyinvolvedinthegovernmentofthecitythatweretheircounterparts inParma.100Notallcitizenswerecontentwiththeirdominance,butthesquadreweretoofirmlyrootedtobedislodged.AllfoursquadreagreedinsubmittingtotheFrenchaf-tertheirconquestoftheduchyofMilanin1499,butduringLudovicoSforza’sbrief recovery of the duchy in early 1500, the Piacentine Ghibellines led bythe Landi and Anguissola families went over to his side. Some, includingCorradoLandi,fledthecity,havingsuggestedthatPiacenzashouldsubmittoLudovico, while the Guelfs were said to have proposed bringing back theFrenchgarrisonwhichhadleft.WhenVenetiansoldiersarrivedtotakeposses-sionofPiacenzafortheFrenchking,Venice’sally,theGuelfsacceptedthem,whiletheGhibellinesgatheredathousandstrongbythecathedral, togetherwiththeLandiandtheir followers,whoweredrawnupreadytogivebattle.Ratherthanstandandfight,however,theyleftforthecastellans’estates.

AstheFrenchweredrivenoutoftheduchyin1512,theGuelfswithashowofforcewereinstrumentalinPiacenzaacceptingthepope,JuliusII,astheirnewlord.Followinghisdeath,theLandiandAnguissolainvitedMassimilianoSforza,whohadbeeninstalledasdukeofMilanbytheHolyLeague,toclaimPiacenzaforhisown;hecame,backedbythetroopsofhissponsors,andthepapalgovernorfled,togetherwithmanyGuelfs.Thenewpope,LeoX,succeed-ed through political pressure in recovering Piacenza, the self-exiled Guelfsreturned,buttheGhibellinescontinuedtosupporttheSforzaduke.Faction-fightingbrokeoutinandaroundthecity.Inthecountry,PietroMariaScotti–whohadabandonedtheGuelfheritageofhisfathertoalignhimselfwiththeGhibellinerelativesofhismother,aPallavicino–ledtheGhibellineforcesre-sistingthepapalgovernment.Anattemptbythepapalvice-governortocap-ture him ended in an ignominious retreat to the city, pursued by Scotti.

99 ‘LetteredimonsignoreGoroGheri’,119:GoroGheritoCardinalGiuliode’Medici,25Aug.1515,Piacenza.

100 LetiziaArcangeli,‘AggregazionifazionarieeidentitàcittadinanellostatodiMilano(fineXV-inizioXVIsecolo)’,404–5.


Faction-fightinginthecityreachedanewpitchwith,itwassaid,6,000menfromoutsidePiacenzatakingpart.AfteratrucehadbeennegotiatedinPia-cenza(whichdidnotlast),thefocusofthefightingshiftedtothecountryside.In1514,theGhibellineshadhelpfromtheDalVermeandMassimilianoSforzasent500SpanishinfantrywhiletheGuelfshadaFrenchcaptain,hiscompany,and300menfromtheRossi,aswellasmenfromLiguria.PietroMariaScotti’sactivitiesrangedfromassaultingthevice-governorandhisescorttooccupyingthelandsofmarcheseGhiselloMalaspina,againstwhomhemayhavehadapersonalgrudge,aswellassundryhomicides.HecontinuedforawhiletotakelandsandfortressesbelongingtoGuelfs,notwithstandingageneralpeacehadbeenagreedinMarch1515.

AfterLeoXcededPiacenzatoFrancisIinOctober1515(followingthenewking’srapidconquestoftheduchyofMilanandhisvictoryattheepicbattleofMarignano),PiacenzabecamethebaseforasubstantialcontingentofFrenchtroops, and the factions in the city were stilled. Not so in the countryside,wheretheGhibellinesremainedactivelyhostile,andittooktheFrenchafewyearstoestablishfirmcontrol.WhenthewarinLombardywasrekindledin1521,withthearmiesofLeoXandtheyoungemperorCharlesVseekingtoex-peltheFrench,theGhibellinesofPiacenzawerepartisansoftheemperor,theGuelfsoftheFrenchking.TheGuelfsguardedthewallsandgatesofPiacenzawhilePietroMariaScottiwith200horseand300infantryraidedthecountryround.InJune,GiacomoandGiovanniAnguissolaadvancedonthecitywithaforceoftheirsubjectsandpartisans,buttheiraccomplicesinPiacenzawerediscovered,andtheAnguissolahadtoretreat.AnotherattemptinAugust,thistime with Pietro Maria Scotti, was beaten back after they had succeeded inburningoneofthecitygates.TheFrenchtroopsinthecitylaunchedacounter-attack,butPietroMariaescapedthemandtookseveralcentresinthecountry-side,beforehewaskilledinthecourseofanattack,inaquarreloverbooty.InOctober, Giacomo Anguissola made a third attempt on Piacenza, this timewithGiacomoDalVerme,attheheadof2,000men,butretiredwhentherewasnosignofanuprising,pursuedbytheFrench.ItwasnottheeffortsofthelocalGhibellines, but the defeat of the French in the contest for the duchy thatcausedtheFrenchgarrisontoleavePiacenzaandthecitytoberecoveredbythepope.101

InFriulitherewerenohistoricruralorurbanfactionstolooktocastellanfamiliesfor leadership,boundtogetherbyjointactionandloyaltiesfosteredover generations. Historians have tended to concentrate on the violence inUdine in 1511, and trace the factions back from that point, paying most

101 Andreozzi,Piacenza,138–57;Arcangeli,‘Appuntisuiguelfieghibellini’,430,n.126.

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attentiontotheSavorgnan-ledZamberlani. ‘Membershipinthefactionswassotransitory’,accordingtoEdwardMuir,‘thattheircompositioncanusuallybediscernedonlyatmomentsofconfrontationwhenparticipantsrevealedalle-giances byattackingmembersof theother side.Oneknows the factionsbydiscoveringwhokilledwhom.’102Nevertheless,heargues,thefactions‘provid-edshadowinstitutionsthatoftensubstitutedfortheformalinstitutionsofgov-ernment at all levels’, providing ‘more coherence and strength than anyalternativeformoforganization.’103Butlittleisknownabouthowthefactionsoperated,orhowcohesivetheywere,particularlytheStrumieri.

The Zamberlani and Strumieri factions as they developed in the later fif-teenth century were seen as the local equivalent of Guelfs and Ghibellines,with thepro-ImperialStrumieri theGhibellines,andthepro-VenetianZam-berlanitheGuelfs.104Essentially,theFriulanfactionswerepro-oranti-Savorg-nan groupings. Originally, the Strumieri were followers of the Della Torrefamily,whosefeudwiththeSavorgnancanbetracedbackto1339.105Theinflu-enceoftheDellaTorredeclinedaftertheVenetianstookoverFriuli,andtherewasaprolongedlullintheconflictbetweenthefactions.Itrevivedinthe1470sand1480s,asresentmentgrewamongtheothercastellanfamiliesoftheprivi-legedpositiontheVenetiansgrantedtheSavorgnan,especiallyinmakingfirstNicolòandthenAntonioSavorgnanheadofthemilitia.TheZamberlanifac-tionbecametheSavorgnanclan,theirurbanalliesinUdineandthepeasants,includingthesubjectsofothercastellans,wholookedtothemforprotection.Bycontrast,theStrumieriappearedtobeanallianceofcastellanfamilies,withnosignificantlinkstodifferentsocialgroups,otherthantheirownretainers.The blood feud that developed between the factions after the massacre ofStrumieri inUdine in 1511didnotescalate intoaprivatewar. Itwasnot thebusinessofanyonebutthefamiliesandtheirservants,andtheVenetianau-thoritieswhopunishedthemoreegregiousactsofviolencethatwereperpe-tratedwithintheirjurisdiction.106

AftertheItalianWarsandtheopportunitiestheyhadoccasionallyprovidedfortherevivaloffactionsandtheprosecutionoffamilyfeuds,therewaslessscopeforbaronsandcastellanstowagewarontheirownaccount.Privatewarshadnotbeencommonplacebeforethewarsandwerestill rarer inthe latersixteenthcentury.Theywereexpensiveforbaronsandcastellans,whohadto

102 Muir,Mad Blood Rising,xxiv-v.103 Ibid.,xxv.104 Ibid.,89.105 Ibid.,90.106 Seeabove,pp.74–5.


drawheavilyonotherresourcestoo,especiallythegoodwillofalliesandparti-sans,whichwasnot inexhaustible.Therewasa limit tothetoleranceof thedisruptionbaronsandcastellansmightcausebeforetheywouldbeconsideredaseriousnuisanceandathreattopublicorder,whichtheirfamilyandtheirallieswouldhesitatetosupport.Thebondsbindingfactionstogetherandlink-ingthemtothemilitarynobilityseemedtobeweakeningbythemid-sixteenthcentury, and this, with the changes in the structure of armies, above all thedeclineinthesystemofcondotte,meantthatbaronsandcastellanshadfewermilitaryresourcesattheirdisposal,orwithwhichtheycouldgototheaidofrelativesandfriendsorpoliticalallies.

Governments inthenewstatesystemthatwasanoutcomeoftheItalianWarswerelesstolerantofprivatewars,orperhapsitwouldbemoreaccurateto say, were in a better position to repress them. More than ever, they wereviewedasanaffronttotheauthorityofthegovernment,especiallyiffightingwasanescalationofadisputeduringwhichoneormoreparticipantshadap-pealedforajudicialrulingorbeenprepared(orsaidtheywereprepared)toaccept arbitration. Barons and castellans might still be inclined to considertheyhadtherighttouseviolencetodefendorassert theirprivate interests,theirclaimstoaninheritanceortheirhonour.Asbefore,violencewithinthefamiliesofthemilitarynobilitywasperhapsmorecommonthanviolencebe-tween them, but inheritance disputes and honour killings were apparentlymorelikelytobeconsideredtheconcernofthe judicialauthorities.Eveninregulatingtheaffairsoftheirownfamily,orvindicatingtheirpersonalhonour,itwasincreasinglydifficultforbaronsandcastellanstoplaybytherulestheychoseforthemselves.

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CHAPTER5

A Life in Arms

Forbaronsandcastellans,themilitarytraditionsoftheirfamilieswereafunda-mentalaspectoftheircollectiveidentity.Theirestateswereincompletewith-outatleastonefortressorattheveryleastadefensiblehouse;theirpowerwasestimatedintermsofthenumbersofmenfromtheirlands,andoftheir amiciandpartisanswhowouldcometofightforthemandundertheircommand.Themenofthefamilies–even,sometimes,theclerics–wereexpectedtobeabletofight,andtoleadmenintoaction.

That did not mean that they would necessarily be expected to have, orwouldwant,amilitarycareer.ThepeculiarconfigurationofItalianstatesmadeitexceptionalforthemilitarynobilitytobeinthepositionofFrenchorEnglishbarons,whosenaturalmilitarycareerwouldbetoserveintheking’sarmies,fightinghiswars(unlesstheywereinrebellionagainsthim).Manydidmakecareers as condottieri, professional mercenary soldiers and commanders, anhonourableprofessioninRenaissanceItaly.Forothers,theirmilitaryorganiza-tionwouldbelimitedtoprivatewarsandfaction-fighting.Theoptionsavail-able changed during the ItalianWars.The French and Spanish armies wereorganizeddifferentlyfromthoseoftheItalianstates,andtherewerefewerop-portunitiesforcondottieri,transferringfreelywiththeirowncompaniesfromone employer to another. But there were openings for Italian lords in theFrench,SpanishandImperialarmies,andtheycouldreachthehighestposi-tionsofcommand.

OfallthemilitarynobilitiesofItaly,theRomanbaronswerethemostin-clined to become condottieri. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,thepopes,absentorweakenedbyschism,wereinnopositiontoassertpriorrights, let alone exclusive rights, to the military services of the barons, whoowednomilitaryobligationstothepapacyfortheirlands.RomanbaronsweredrawnintothedynasticwarsinNaples,attractedbytheprospectofgrantsofestatesthere,aswellascondotte.TheyalsofoughtinthewarsinnorthernItaly.Paolo Savelli, for example, died commanding theVenetian army engaged intheconquestofPaduain1405;hisequestrianstatueonhistombstillstandsintheVenetianchurchofSantaMariaGloriosadeiFrari.Dolcedell’Anguillara,afterfightingforAlfonsoofAragoninNaples,joinedthecompanyofFrances-coSforza,dyinginLombardyin1449.1Thosebaronswhomadeaprofessionof

1 Sora,‘IcontidiAnguillara’,67.


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soldieringintheearlyfifteenthcenturytendedtobethelesswealthyormem-bersofofthesecondarylineagesoftheirfamilies.2Butasthesystemofcon-dottebecameanestablishedpillarofthemilitaryorganizationoftheItalianstates,offering theprospectof regular, lucrativeemployment inhonourableposts,membersofthemajorbranchesofthefamiliescametothefore.Bythetimethepopeswereseeking tostrengthentheirgovernmentover thePapalStates,Romanbaronshadcometoconsiderthemselvesprofessionalsoldierswiththerighttoserveotherpowers,eveniftheywereattackingthepope.

EvenwhenthepopeshadconsolidatedthepositionofthepapacyamongthefivemajortemporalpowersinItaly,fullyengagedintheirwars,thebaro-nialcondottieristilldidnotcometoseethepopeastheirnaturalemployer,ortheir firstchoiceasemployer.Occasionally, thepopemight try toclaimtherighttoblockthenegotiationofcondotteofRomanbaronswithotherpowers,andmightsucceedindoingso,aswhenJuliusIIpreventedSavelliandOrsinicondottierifromtakingupcondottewithVenicejustashewaslaunchinganat-tackonVenicewithhisalliesintheLeagueofCambraiin1509.3Generally,thepope’saim,asinthisinstance,wastodenyhisenemiestheservicesoftheRo-manbarons,nottoreservethoseservicesforhimself;generally,too,thebaronsandtheirpotentialemployerwoulddisregardtheobjectionsofthepope.

The papal army could never accommodate all the baronial condottieri intimeofwar, letalone inpeacetimewhenthepopeshastened to reduce thenumbersoftheirtroops.Inthelaterfifteenthcentury,itbecamethenormforpopestogivetheirnephews(ortheirsons,iftheyhadsons),howeverinexpe-riencedtheymightbemilitarily,thehighestcommandinthepapalarmy,asGonfalonieredellaChiesa(Standard-beareroftheChurch).Actingaslieuten-anttoapapalnipotewasnotnecessarilyanattractivepropositionforabaronwhohadworkedhardtobuildareputationasasoldierandcommander,andthe best baronial condottieri usually had other options. On the other hand,therewerepoliticaladvantagestocloseassociationwiththepope’sfavouredrelations,andsomebarons–usuallyincludingatleastoneOrsini–weregen-erally to be found serving under them.Virginio Orsini, for example, put upwithsubordinationtoGirolamoRiario,thenephewofSixtusIV,usingRiario’sdependenceonhimtogethispoliticalanddiplomaticbackingforVirginio’seffortstorecovertheNeapolitancountiesofTagliacozzoandAlbi.Satisfaction

2 FrancaAllegrezza,Organizzazione del potere e dinamiche familiari. Gli Orsini dal Duecento agli inizi del Quattrocento(Rome,1998),201.

3 ChristineShaw,‘TheRomanbaronsandthesecurityofthePapalStates’,315–6.

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forVirginiowasamajorproblemduringthelaterstagesoftheWarofFerrarain1484,becauseofRiario’sinsistenceonhisbehalf.4

Careersascondottieriwerenotsomuchamatterof individualchoiceforRomanbarons,asafamilybusiness.Seniorcondottieriwould,aswasnormalpractice for condottieri from any region of Italy, bring their sons and otheryoungerrelativesintotheircompaniestotrainthem,andnegotiateseparatecondotteandcommandsforthemaspartoftheirowncontracts.Ashewasillanddidnotknowhowlonghewouldbeabletocarryon,VirginioOrsiniin-sistedwhenrenegotiatinghiscondottaasNeapolitancaptain-generalin1491,thekingmustagreetosubstantialcondotteforhislegitimateson,Giangiorda-noandhisillegitimatesonCarlo,ashewantedthemtobecomeknownbeforehediedorcouldnolongerserveinperson.Ifthekingesteemedhimasmuchashesaidhedid,heshouldgivethemsomestanding,andnotleavethemtohavetolookforitelsewhere.5Intheevent,Giangiordanowouldnevermakehismarkasasoldier:heowedhiscondottetohispositionasheirto,andthenheadof,theleadingbranchoftheOrsinifamily.Carlomademoreofareputa-tion,butdidnotreachthefirstrankofhisprofession.ThestaramongthoseformedunderVirginio’stutelagewasnotanOrsinibutamemberofaminorbaronialfamilycloselyalliedwiththem,Bartolomeod’Alviano.Lesserbaronshadtosettheirsightsatamoremodestlevelfortheirprotégés,likeGiacomoContitryingtoplacehisnineteen-year-oldsonintheserviceofSienawithtencoraze(cuirassiers),promisingtosendhimingoodorder.6

Cardinals and other prominent baronial clerics could also be involved innegotiatingcondottefortheirlayrelatives.TheprotonotaryGianbattistaSavel-liaskedGaleazzoMariaSforzatotakehisbrotherMarianointohisservicein1474;twentyyearslater,thenacardinal,heaskedLudovicoSforzatotransferacondottahehadgiventooneofMariano’ssons,Paolo,toanother,Troilo,be-causehewasmoreinclinedtothemilitary life.7CardinalGiovanniColonnahandled the negotiations in Rome in early 1494 that resulted in his brotherProsperoacceptingajointcondottafromPopeAlexanderandMilan.8ForGiu-lioOrsini,theclosesupervisionandcontrolthathisbrother,CardinalGianbat-tistaOrsiniexercisedoverhiscareerwasnotalwaystohisadvantage.Itseems

4 Shaw,‘TheRomanbaronsandthepopes’,115–7.5 Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli,VI(Naples,2004),106.6 ASSiena,Balia522,33:GuidantonioBuoninsegni,28Apr.1485,Rome.7 ASMilan, ASforzesco, b. 77: Protonotary Savelli to Galeazzo Maria Sforza, 6 Oct. 1474,

Rome;b.109:AscanioSforzatoLudovicoSforza,19Apr.1494,Rome.8 Ibid.,b.108:AscanioSforzatoLudovicoSforza,28Jan.,14Feb.1494,Rome;StefanoTaverna

toLudovicoSforza,14Feb.1494,Rome;BartolomeoZambeccaritoNestorePallioti,27Feb.1494,Rome.

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tohavebeenGianbattista’sideathatGiulioshouldacceptthecommandofanill-fatedattemptbySieneseexilestoforcetheirreturntoSienainMay1485.WhenVirginioobjected, thecardinaldefendedhisbrother’s involvementbyarguingthatifanOrsinisoldierwasaskedtodosomethingthatcouldbringhimhonourandprofit,itwasnotwrongforhimtoaccept;themenofthefam-ilywouldbeesteemedforundertakingimportantventures.9NapoleoneOrsinigrewtiredoftheinterventionofhisbrother,thepowerfulCardinalLatinoOr-sini.Towardstheendofhiscareerin1472,heandLatinodisagreedovertheexpediencyofNapoleoneleavingtheserviceofthepope–asGonfaloniere,hewascommanderofthepapalarmy–forthatofthedukeofMilan;hewasnottwentyyearsold,andcouldlookafterhimself,hegrumbled.10

If they built up their own companies of men-at-arms, and perhaps someinfantrytoo,whowouldtransferwiththemfromoneemployertoanother,bar-onsfacedtheproblemcommontocondottieriofhowtomaintaintheircom-panybetweencontracts.Billetscouldbefoundontheirestates,butthatwouldstillleavetheproblemoffindingmoneytopaythem.Themoresuccessfulthecondottiere,thebiggerhiscompany,thegreatertheproblem.Refusingtoac-ceptthePrefectofRome,GiovannidellaRovere,thenephewofSixtusIV,ashiscommander in June 1485, Virginio Orsini was holding back from renewinghiscondottawithPopeInnocentVIII,but itwasobservedthathe ‘couldnolongerbearthegreatexpenseofthemen-at-arms’11forwhichhewasnotbeingpaid.Amonthlater,acondottawasagreedforhim,withthequestionofwheth-erhewouldbesubordinatetothePrefectleftopen.12GiacomoConti’swishtohavefoundanotherpositionbeforetheendofhiscondottawithFlorenceinMarch1494,soasnottohavetolookforoneafter,wastypicalofcondottieri,aswashisexpectationthatLudovicoandAscanioSforzashouldnottakeitamissthatiftheydidnotwanthim,hewouldtakeservicewiththekingofNaples,theirenemy.13

EverymajorItalianstateemployedRomanbaronialcondottieri.Sonumer-ouswerethey,soreadytoserveanywhereinItaly,thatitwouldarguablyhavebeenmoresignificantifadeliberatedecisionhadbeenmadebyaprinceora

9 ACapitolino, AOrsini, b. 101, c. 74: Antonello Sinibaldo to Virginio Orsini, 7 May 1485,Rome.

10 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.70:ArchbishopofNovaratoGaleazzoMariaSforza,15Aug.1472,Rome.

11 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.847,cc.291–2:GianPietroArrivabenetoFrancescoGonzaga,24June1485,Rome.

12 ASFlorence,XdiBalia,Carteggi,Resp.,b.34,c.287:GuidantonioVespucci,30July1485,Rome.

13 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.108:AscanioSforzatoLudovicoSforza,2Mar.1494,Rome.

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republicnottoemploythem.Itwasthepopeswhosometimescamenearesttodoingthat,becauseofthepoliticalimplicationsoftheirgivingcondottetomenfromoneorotheroftheleadingclans.Therewasalsothethreatthatthemili-tarystrengthofthebaronsnourishedbypapalcondottecouldbeturnedagainstthepope,asJuliusIIclaimedtheexperienceofhispredecessorshadshown,when‘theyhadbeenoppressedbymeansofthemoneyoftheChurch’,sothathewasinclinednevertohaveeitherOrsiniorColonnainhispay,buttousecaptainsfromoutsidethePapalStates.14Inpractice,heandotherpopeswereunabletoavoidusingthem.PiusIIsetoutinhismemoirstheconflictingcon-siderationsbehindhisdecisiontogivethecommandofthepapalarmytoNa-poleoneOrsiniin1461.NapoleonehadalreadyfoughttoconsiderableacclaimforAlfonsoandtheVenetians,andhadalreadycommandedlargearmies.Theonly obstacle was the envy of other Roman barons who could not beartheOrsini’sglory,anditseemedimprudenttoaugmentthepowerofthatfam-ily, already so strong around Rome. Naturally arrogant, the Orsini could be-come intolerable. But necessity prevailed, and Napoleone was appointedcaptain.15

Politicalconsiderationsoftenenteredintothecalculationsofotherpowersin deciding whether to employ Roman barons. Prospective employers fre-quentlyboreinmindthepotentialthebaronshadforputtingpressureonthepope.Thiswouldnotalwaysbethecase:themilitaryreputationaloneofsomeRomanbaronswouldhavebeenenoughtogainthemthehighestcommandsinItaly.NiccolòOrsini’smostimportantestates–thoseonthebordersofTus-cany,includingPitiglianoandthecountyofNolainthekingdomofNaples–weretoofarfromRometofigurelargeinsuchanequation.Whatwonhimhispositionascaptain-generalforFlorencein1485,thenthepapacyin1489andfinally governor-general for Venice in 1495 was primarily the reputation hebuiltup.Alreadyby1484,intheestimationofAlfonso,dukeofCalabria,hewasonthewaytobecomingthebestcondottiere inItalyafterRobertodaSanse-verino,andtheVenetiansesteemedhimjustashighly,Calabriabelieved.16Onefactor inhis jealousyofVirginioOrsiniwasapparentlyasensethatVirginiohadanunfairadvantageoverhimbecauseofhispositionasheadofthemajorbranch of the Orsini. All he had acquired himself, Niccolò complained toLorenzode’Medici,hadbeenbyhisowntalents–notlikesomeothermembers

14 ASFlorence,XdiBalia,Carteggi,Resp.,b.81,c.217:AlessandroNasi,3Feb.1505(6),Rome.15 Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Pope Pius II, I commentarii, ed Luigi Totaro (Milan, 1984), I,

1014–5.16 Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli(Naples,2005),I,440,471.

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ofhisfamily.17Virginio’smilitaryreputewasrespectableenough,butwhetherhewouldhavebecomegovernor-generalofthearmyoftheleagueofNaples,Milan and Florence in November 1485, or captain-general of Naples in 1489(andGreatConstablein1494)ifhehadnotbeenseenasthekeyfigureintheOrsinifamilyandfactionisopentoquestion.

WhatfactorsthatmightenterintotheequationwhencondotteforRomanbaronswereunderdiscussionwereillustratedinthecorrespondenceofGale-azzoMariaSforzawithhisenvoysinRomein1471–2,whenthedukewasen-gagedinexpandinghisarmyandlookingtohiresomeofthem.OnecondottiereheenquiredaboutwasAndreaConti,whohadspentmostofhiscareerintheserviceofthepope,andhadalsoservedFerrante.Agedforty-six,Andreawasdescribed as being small in stature, physically fit, with a good reputationamongsoldiers.HeandhistwobrothershadsevencastellenearthelandsofthecontediFondi(tothesouthofRome),andotherlandswithoutfortresses;he wanted a condotta for 50 lances. Giovanni Conti had had larger condottethanAndreawiththepapacyandVenice,andsohisreputationstoodhigher,buthewastenyearsolder.18

ItwasGiovannithatthedukedecidedhewasinterestedin.Ifhewasnotasphysicallystrongashehadbeen,helookedwell,andwasknownforhisfidelityandobediencetohisemployers,andwasexperiencedandagentleman.19Thedukeofferedacondottafor80men-at-armsinpeacetime,and120,with100in-fantry,intimeofwar;Giovanniaskedfor200infantry,apparentlytokeeponhisestates,togivehimsomeguaranteethattheywouldnotbeattackedwhenhewasnotthere,buthedidnotgetthem.20Nomentionwasmadeofhises-tatesinthecondotta;Giovanni’slandswereheldjointlywithhisnephewsAn-dreaandGiacomoanditwouldbedifficultforhimtoputthelandsunderanyobligation without them, the duke’s envoy warned.21 Andrea and Giacomomightalsobewillingtoservetheduke,however,andGaleazzoMariawastoldoftheadvantagesofhavingalltheConti:theyhadafollowingandstandinginandaroundRome,andtheirestatesincludedplacesofimportance.22Itseems

17 ACapitolino,AOrsini,b.102,c.777:SantitoVirginioOrsini,25Aug.[1487?],Florence;forNiccolò’sjealousyofVirginio,seeChristineShaw,‘Lorenzode’MediciandNiccolòOrsini’,260–70,278–9.

18 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.68:NicodemotoGaleazzoMariaSforza,2Aug.1471,Rome.19 Ibid.,b.70:NicodemotoG.M.Sforza,18May1472,Rome.20 Ibid., b. 69: G.M.Sforza to Nicodemo, 27 Apr. 1472; b. 70: Archbishop of Novara to

G.M.Sforza,6May1472,Rome.21 Ibid.,b.70:NicodemotoG.M.Sforza,2June1472,Rome.22 Ibid.:NicodemotoG.M.Sforza,2June1472;ArchbishopofNovaratoG.M.Sforza,11July

1472,Rome.

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thedukedidaskGiovannitocommithisestates.Giovannirepliedhewashap-pytodothis,andofferedthoseofhisrelationsandfriendsaswell,promisinghehadthemeanstoprovidegoodbilletsforhiscompanyinlocationsbetweenRomeandtheNeapolitanborder, fromwhichtheycouldcoveranextensiveswatheofterritory,andthathecoulddrawovertothedukemanylocalleaders,most by love, the remainder by fear, and put his party and followers at theduke’sdisposal.23Intheevent,GiovanniwasrequiredtoserveinLombardy,EmiliaandTuscany,andin1474heactuallyrefusedtolodgehiscompanyonhisownestates.Thedukethoughthighlyofhim,nevertheless,andGiovanniCon-tiwastohavebeenportrayedinafrescodepictingthedukestudyingmapsandmuster rolls with his commanders and military advisers, in a decorativeschemeforthefortressofMilanwhichwasneverrealized.24

PoliticalconsiderationsweretotheforeinproposalsfortheduketotakeonsomeOrsinicondottieri.NiccolòOrsini,thenintheearlystagesofhiscareer,offeredhisownservicesandthoseofVirginio(notyethisrival,andstayingonNiccolò’slandsafterquarrellingwithhisfather),askingforthirtymen-at-armseach,tenmoreeachiftheywouldberequiredtogofarfromthePapalStates,for10,000ducatsayearbetweenthem.Hejustifiedrequestingmorethantheusualratebyhisbeingpreparedtocommithisstatoinwarorpeaceasthedukerequired,andneedingtoprovideforitsprotection.Hispropositionwasthatofthe lordofaminor independentstate,andtheduke’senvoynotedthat ‘thestateofthiscountisimpregnable,andsosituatedthatattackscanbemadeonthePapalStates,andthoseoftheFlorentinesandtheSienese.’25

GaleazzoMariawasmoreinterestedinthepossibilityofhiringNapoleoneOrsini,whohadcontinuedascaptainofthepapalarmyunderPiusII’ssucces-sor,PaulII.SoonafterPaul’sdeath,thedukewrotethathewasreadytomakeNapoleonehisowncaptain-general.BeforeNapoleonehadtimetorespond,hisbrotherCardinalLatinowasarguingthathecouldbemoreusetoGaleazzoMariaifhestayedaroundRome,tosupportthenewpope,SixtusIV,againstFerranteofNaplesifneedbe.26ArapprochementbetweenSixtusandFerranteearlythenextyearmadeNapoleonethinkabouttransferringtotheserviceoftheduke,offeringtheuseofhisestatesaswellashismilitarycompany.Ar-guingthatFerrantewouldhavenorespectforthepopeifhelostNapoleone,thesoldierof thebestreputethathehadandonewithagreat followingof

23 Ibid.:ArchbishopofNovaratoG.M.Sforza,20July1472.24 Covini,L’esercito del duca,299–300,322–7.25 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.69:NicodemotoG.M.Sforza,26Feb.1472,Rome.26 Ibid.,b.68:G.M.SforzatoNicodemo,14Sept.1471;NicodemotoG.M.Sforza,26Sept.1471,

Rome.

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partisans,CardinalLatinotriedtodishthenegotiations.27Hisbrotherpersist-ed, however, on the premise that he would be employed around Rome as acheckonFerrante,givingassuranceofhiswillingness toserve forup to tenyearswithhisperson,hismen-at-armsandhisestates.28WarnedthatSixtushadgrumbledthedukewastryingtotakeallhissoldiersfromhim,29GaleazzoMariadecidedagainstconcludingacontractwithNapoleone.Inanycase,Na-poleonewasknowntobenearingtheendofhiscareer.Age,andgout,weretakingtheirtoll.Soonthepopewasfeelingheneededacaptain-generalwhowas physically able to lead his men in person. Napoleone’s political impor-tance,however,inhibitedthepopefromterminatinghiscontract.30Althoughhehadtoacceptareductioninhiscondotta,31in1477hewasappointedcap-tain-generalofthepapaltroopsforlife.32

On Napoleone’s death in 1480,Virginio Orsini inherited his father’s landsand his position as head of the Orsini faction, giving political weight to hiscondotte.Whenhebecamecaptain-generalof the leagueofMilan,FlorenceandNaplesinNovember1485,theutilityofhisestatesandthoseoftheotherOrsinicondottieriwiththeleaguewasemphasizedbyLorenzode’Medici.‘Inthemconsistsinlargepartthesafetyoftheking’,heargued;‘iftheyarewithus,thereisfreepassagefromLombardytoNaples’.33Withoutthem,troopscouldnotbesenttoNaples;withthem,notonlywasvictorycertain–intheimmi-nentwaroftheleagueagainstPopeInnocentwhowasbackingtheNeapolitanrebels–‘butinfutureweshallhavethebitinthepope’smouth’.34

InnocentassertedthatbythetermsofVirginio’scondottawiththepapacy,renewedonlyamonthbefore,hecouldnotacceptonefromanybodyelse.35HedidnotargueonthisoccasionthatVirginio,asaRomanbaron,couldnotacceptacondottawithouthisapproval,buthedidcomplainthattheleaguehadgiventheOrsinicondottewithouttheirbeingreleasedfromtheircondottewith him.The ambassadors of the league replied that the Orsini had made

27 Ibid.,b.69:NicodemotoG.M.Sforza,19Mar.,13Apr.1472,Rome.28 Ibid., b. 70: Nicodemo to G.M.Sforza, 18 May 1472, Rome; Archbishop of Novara to

G.M.Sforza,15Aug.1472,Rome.29 Ibid.:ArchbishopofNovaratoG.M.Sforza,3July1472,Rome.30 Ibid.,b.74:SacromorotoG.M.Sforza,25Feb.1474,Rome;b.75:SacromorotoG.M.Sforza,

5Mar.1474,Rome.31 Ibid.,b.81:SacromorotoG.M.Sforza,4Apr.1476,Rome.32 AVaticano,Reg.Vat.657,ff.125r-126v.33 Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,VIII,305.34 Ibid.,IX,16.35 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.99:AscanioSforzatoGiangaleazzoSforza,12Nov.1485.

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manifestthattheywereatliberty.36Virginioassuredthepopehehadnointen-tion of using his estates against the Church, provided they were not threat-ened.Askingforguarantees,Innocentsuggestedanexchangeofhostages,orthatVirginio’sprincipalfortress,Bracciano,shouldbeputintopapalcustodyorthatofathirdparty.37Virginiowouldnotagreetoeither;heurgedthedukeofCalabriatobringhistroopsnorth,offeringtocontrivehisentryintoRome.38OrsiniestateswouldbeabaseandarefugeforCalabriaandtheleague’stroopsthroughoutthecampaigntheywagedagainstInnocent’sforcesuntilthecon-clusionofpeacebetweenthepopeandkinginAugust1486.

WhenLudovicoandCardinalAscanioSforzawerearrangingcondottewithRomanbaronstoaidCharlesVIII’spreparationsforhisexpeditiontoclaimthekingdomofNaplesin1494,theypaidcloseattentiontothebarons’estatesastheyweighedupwhowouldbemostuseful.39TopoftheirwishlistwerePros-pero and Fabrizio Colonna, above all Prospero, whose estates in Lazio weremoreextensiveandricher.Fabrizio’slandsinLazio,itwasnoted,werenotsuit-abletolodgemen-at-armsandcouldnotsupplyvictuals,andweresurroundedbythelandsofProspero,CardinalSavelliandthepope.40TothedispleasureoftheotherColonnaandtheirpartisans,FabriziochosetoacceptacondottawithAlfonsoofNaplesfor160men-at-arms,forwhichhewouldbepaid22,000duc-atsayear,andhewaspromisedestatesinthekingdomworth2,000ducatsayear.41ProsperoagreedtoajointcondottawithMilanandPopeAlexanderfor150men-at-armsand50mountedcrossbowmen,for24,000ducatsayear.42

Ascaniohadbeenanxiousatthattimetobringthepopeintothiscontract,fearfulthatifhelosttoomanybaronialcondottieritootherpowers,hemightgo over to Alfonso.43 Soon after Alexander did align himself with Alfonso,opening up the question of whether Prospero should serve the pope, alliedwithAlfonso,orMilanalliedwithFrance.TheSforzawereconfidenthewouldsidewiththem,andAscaniorecommendedthatcondotteshouldbenegotiatedwithotherRomanbaronswhoseestatescouldaccommodatemen-at-armsun-

36 ASFlorence,X di Balia, Carteggi, Resp., b. 35, c. 131: GuidantonioVespucci, 9 Nov. 1485,Rome.

37 ASFlorence,XdiBalia,Carteggi,Resp.,b.35,c.148:GuidantonioVespucci,15Nov.1485,Rome.

38 Albini, De gestis Regum Neapolitanum, 324–6: Alfonso, Duke of Calabria to GiovanniAlbino,22Nov1485.

39 ChristineShaw,‘TheRomanbaronsandtheFrenchdescentintoItaly’,251–7.40 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.108:StefanoTavernatoLudovicoSforza,8Mar.1494,Rome.41 Ibid.:BartolomeoZambeccaritoNestorePallioti,27Feb.1494,Rome.42 Ibid.:AscanioSforzatoLudovicoSforza,1Mar.1494,Rome.43 Ibid.:StefanoTavernatoL.Sforza,2Mar.1494,Rome.

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tiltheywereneeded,andwereadjacent,sotheycouldhelponeanother.44TheFrenchagentsinRometookthesamelinewhentheyfoundthattheyhadun-dertakencondotteexceedingthe500men-at-armstheyhadbeenorderedtoraise,anddecidedtoconcludethosewiththebaronswhoseestatesweremostadjacent.45Onlythosewhoseestateswerecapableofwithstandinganattackshouldbegivencondotte,otherwisemoneyspentonthemwouldbewasted,Ludovicoreckoned.46Ascanioassuredhimthatthebarons’estateswouldbestrong enough toholdupAlfonso,preventinghim fromadvancing northorsendingmorethanaweakforcetoconfronttheFrenchexpedition.47Theprob-lemwasthatneitherProsperonorFabrizio(whotheywerestilltryingtowoo),nor Antonello Savelli and the other barons who had agreed condotte withMilan,werewillingtodemonstrateopensupportfortheFrenchuntilCharles’sforceswereclosetoRome.Inanycase,theywantedtheircondottetobewithMilan,notFrance,eveniftheFrenchwouldbepaying.48

NeapolitanbaronsweremuchlessconspicuousthanRomanbaronsamongtheranksofprofessionalcaptainsinItaly,atleastuntilthelaterstagesoftheItalianWars.DuringthereignsofthelastAngevinmonarchs,someNeapolitanbaronshadbecomecondottieri,fightinginthewarsinnorthernItalyaswellasinthedynasticwarsinthekingdomofNaples.PiergiampaoloOrsinidiManu-pello, for example, whose branch of the family had been established in thekingdomsincetheearlyfourteenthcenturylearnedhistradeunderBracciodaMontone,beforeholdingcondottefromFilippoMariaVisconti,dukeofMilan,Pope Eugenius IV and Florence. As commander of 1,000 Florentine men-at-armshehadaconspicuousroleintheFlorentinevictoryatAnghiariovertheMilanesetroopsunderNiccolòPiccininoin1440.49Onebaron,JacopoCaldora,wasacondottierewhosemilitaryreputationandcompanyof troopsrivalledthose of Braccio or Muzio Attendolo Sforza. After his death in 1439, his sonAntonioinheritedhiscompany,butnothismilitaryskills.Alfonso’svictoryinJune1442overAntonioCaldora–whowasfightingforRenéd’Anjou,ashisfa-therhaddone–sealedhistriumphovertheAngevins.Caldorawascaptured,his company disbanded. Other Neapolitan barons were among the soldierstrained by Caldora who transferred to the service of the Aragonese king.50

44 Ibid.,b.109:A.SforzatoL.Sforza,12May1494,Rome.45 Ibid.:A.SforzatoL.Sforza,28May1494,Rome.46 Ibid.:L.SforzatoA.Sforza,22May1494,Vigevano.47 Ibid.:A.SforzatoL.Sforza,28May1494,Rome.48 Ibid.:postscriptA.SforzatoL.Sforza,26(or28)May1494,Rome.49 GustavoBriganteColonna,Gli Orsini(Milan,1955),112.50 Francesco Storti, L’esercito napoletano nella seconda metà del Quattrocento (Salerno,

2007),22–4.ForbothCaldora,seeDBI,XVI,633–41.

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AlfonsowouldnotpermitanysubjecttoemulateCaldoraandbuildupsuchaprivatearmy.51

Hedidnotforbidthemfromservingotherpowersascondottieri.AnumberofNeapolitanbaronsfoughtinthewarsinLombardyinthelate1440s.TheyincludedCarlodiMonfortedaCampobasso,whohadaconsiderablemilitaryreputation;hefoughtforFrancescoSforzaforayearorsobeforereturningtoNaples.52 Antonio Centelles, marchese di Cotrone, having rebelled againstAlfonsoandconsequentlylosthisestatesin1445,leftthekingdom(ratherthenkickhisheelsinNaples,asAlfonsowishedhimtodo),andwasgivenacon-dottabyVenicebeforetransferringtotheserviceoftheAmbrosianRepublicinMilan.HedidnotgetonwellwithFrancescoSforzaafterhebecamedukeofMilanandreturnedtoNaples.53Fromthe1450s,ifNeapolitanbaronsweretobefoundintheserviceofanotherpowertheyweregenerallyexiles,suchasColadiMonforte(thenephewofCarlo)whochoseto leaveNapleswithhisfamilyafterFerrante’svictoryin1464,andtakeservicewiththeAngevinsforwhomhehadfought.HethenwenttoservethedukeofBurgundy,CharlestheBold,whohadahighopinionofItaliansoldiers.54Alongbuterroneoustradi-tionattributedtohimaplottokill theduke;somehistorianssaidhesetonanotherexiledNeapolitanbaroninCharles’sservice,RuggeroneAccrocciamu-ro,contediCelano,tofinishoffthedukeatthebattleofNancyinJanuary1477.ThissinisterreputationwasfosteredbythefacthedidleavetheBurgundiancampafewdaysbeforethebattle,taking180men-at-armswithhim,andfol-lowedbyhissonsAngeloandGiovanniwith120more:hebelievedthehaughtyandevermorewaywardduke(whohadpubliclystruckhiminthefaceashewaspleadingforthelifeofaprisoner)washeadingfordisaster.55Approachedby theVenetians, he accepted a condotta from them for 500 horse, and theVenetiansalsotookonfourinfantryconstablesandfiveartillerymenhehadwithhim.Onhisdeaththefollowingyear,theVenetiansgavehiscompanytohistwosons.56Angelo,havingmadehispeacewiththekingin1480afterthewarinTuscany,assomeotherNeapolitanexilesalsodid,wenttoNaplesandwasgiventhecountyofCampobassoandotherlandsthathisfatherhadlost.Fromthenon,hefoughtfortheking.57

51 Ryder,Alfonso,248.52 Croce,Vite di avventure,71–2.53 Pontieri,‘LaCalabria’,118–20;andseebelow,p.187.54 R.J.Walsh,Charles the Bold and Italy (1467–1477). Politics and Personnel(Liverpool,2005),

341–405.55 Ibid.,365–79;Croce,Vite di avventure,130–59.56 Croce, Vite di avventure,161–6.57 Ibid.,168–9.

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BothAlfonsoandFerrantemuchpreferrednottogivecondottetoNeapoli-tanbarons,unlesstheyweremilitaryprofessionals.Theydidnotregardcon-dotteasaroutinemeansofbindingthebarons,greatorsmall,tothecrown.Iftheygaveacondottatoabaron,theyexpectedhimandthetroopstheywerepayingfortobereadytoservewherevertheyrequired,notforhimtokeepthemenonhisestatesasamilitaryforcetoboosthislocalstandingandstrengthenhishandinhisprivatedisputes,whichiswhatmanyofthebarons,especiallythemajorones, seemtohavehankeredafter.Sometimes, thekinghad littleoption.GiovanniAntonioOrsini,principediTarantowassufficientlypowerfulinhisownrighttobeabletoobtainacondottafor500lances,andthepositionofGreatConstable fromAlfonso.OnceAlfonsohadsecuredthe throne, theprincedidnot leadhismeninpersonto fight for theking,butsentcontin-gents,suchasthe200lanceshedespatchedforthecampaignsoftheNeapoli-tanarmyinTuscanyin1452–3.58

TheprincewasoneofthesevenNeapolitanbaronswhofiguredinalistofAlfonso’scommandersdrawnupin1444.Amongthem,theycommanded1,600lances,sohiscontingentaccountedfornearlyathirdofthem.Alltheotherswereprofessionalcondottieri,mostofthemtrainedintheschoolofCaldora,includingTroianoCaracciolo,ducadiMelfi,whohad300lancesandPaolodiSangro,reputedamongthebestcondottierioftheday,whohad200.Thesemenweregivencommandsbecauseoftheirmilitaryskills,nottheirsocialpositionorpoliticalstanding.59TheCaldoraveteransremainedinAlfonso’sservice,andbytheearly1450smorebaronshadjoinedthem,someexpertsoldiers,suchasNicolaCantelmo,ducadiSora.OtherbaronsfoughtwiththeNeapolitanarmyintheTuscanwarsnotascondottieributattheirownexpense,includingAnto-nioCaldora,andCarlodaCampobasso,becausetheyreceivedalifepensionfromthekingof3,000ducatsayear(4,000inthecaseofCaldora)forwhichtheywereobligedtoserveintimeofwarwith100horseeach.60

At the beginning of his reign, Ferrante was faced with many requests forcondottefrombarons.Withinayearofhisaccession,aquarterofhiscavalrywasunderbaronialcommanders,butintheautumnof1459lessthanaquarter–only190of880–ofthebarons’ lanceswerefightingfortheking.Therestwereonthebarons’estates,orwiththerebelsandAngevins.61Ferrantehadtocontinuetogivecondotte tobaronsthroughoutthiswar,ortoagree,aswithGiulioAntoniod’Acquavivain1462,thattheycouldretainmen-at-armstobe

58 Storti,L’esercito napoletano,27–8.59 Ibid.,19–28,Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli,II(Salerno,1997),17–19(forthelist).60 Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli,I,101.61 Storti,L’esercito napoletano,64–70.

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paidforfromroyaltaxesduefromtheirestates.62Understandably,afterFer-rantefinallyovercametherebellionandJeand’Anjouhadleftthekingdomin1464,heinitiatedareformoftheorganizationofhismilitaryforcesthatwouldensure,astheMilaneseambassadorputit,‘thatinthekingdomtherewillbenoothertroopsthanthoseofHisMajesty’.NodistinctionwasmadebetweenbaronswhohadbeenloyalandthosewhohadbeendisloyaltoFerrante:allwereorderedtohandtheircompaniesovertotheking.Bytakingtheirmen-at-armsfromthem,thekingwouldfeelmoresecure.63Professionalcaptainswhohad built up their own companies in Ferrante’s service, however well theymighthaveserved,werealsorequiredtogiveuptheirmentotheking.

They,andthebarons,iftheytookuppositionsascaptainsintheroyalarmy,couldbegivenacommandthatwastheequivalentofasubstantialcondotta.OrsoOrsini(fromthePitiglianobranchofthefamily)madeagoodcareerforhimself serving Alfonso (commanding 200 lances in 1439), then Milan andVenice,beforecomingsouthagaintofightfirstagainstandthenforFerrante,thenstayedwithFerrante’sarmyuntilhisdeathin1479.Hewasgivenestates,includingthestrategicallyimportantNolaandcreatedducad’Ascoli,placinghimamongthe front ranksofNeapolitanbarons.Givenchargeof the lanze spezzate,themen-at-armsfromthecrownlands,hewasanadviserandmentortoFerrante’sheir,Alfonso.Hehadwrittenatreatiseonmilitaryorganizationwhichhelaterdedicatedtotheking.64Membersoflong-establishedbaronialfamiliescouldalsoadapttothenewmilitaryorder.GiulioAntoniod’Acquaviva,duca d’Atri, a nephew of Jacopo Caldora and son-in-law of the principe diTaranto,servedthekingfaithfullyoncehewasreconciledtohimfollowingthedeathofhisfather-in-law,eventuallydyingahero’sdeathoutsidethewallsofOtrantoin1481atthehandsoftheTurkswhohadcapturedthecitytheyearbefore.

Somebarons,notablysomeofthemajorbarons,founditgallingnottohavetheirowncompaniesofmen-at-arms,preferablypaidforbytheking.Accord-ingtothepublishedevidencefromtheinterrogationsoftheprincipediBisig-nano and principe d’Altamura following the rebellion against Ferrante in1485–6,65thebaronshadsenttoInnocenttoarguethat,justasthekingusedtheColonnaandOrsinitorestrainthepope,soitwasinthepope’sinterests

62 Viterbo,‘Aragona,OrsinidelBalzoeAcquavivad’Aragona’,p.355.63 Storti,L’esercito napoletano,119:A.daTrezzotoFrancescoSforza,19Sept.1464.64 Ibid.,163–4;andseebelow,p.188.ForhistreatiseseePieroPieri,‘Il“Governoetexercitio

delamilitia”diOrsodegliOrsiniei“Memoriali”diDiomedeCarafa’,126–79;forthedateofthetreatise,seeCovini,L’esercito del duca,52.

65 Seebelow,p.196.

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that the barons could keep men-at-arms.66 Ferrante was determined theyshould not; it was, he argued, contrary to custom and to right that vas-sals shouldhavemen-at-arms; thekingdomcouldneverbe trulypeaceful iftheydid.67Oneofthedemandstheymadeduringtherebellionwasthattheprinciped’Altamura,asGreatConstable,shouldhave70men-at-armspaidbytheking,andtheprincipediSalerno,asGreatAdmiral,sixgalleyspaidbytheking. According to the sixteenth-century historian of the rebellion, CamilloPorzio,thebaronsalsowantedleavetotakecondottefromotherpowers,pro-videdtheywouldnotbeusedtoattackthekingdom.68GiovanniCaracciolo,duca di Melfi, while ostensibly loyal to Ferrante, refused to attack the rebelbaronsunlesshewasgivenacondottafromtheleague.69Anxioustocontenthim–becauseofthepositionandstrengthofhisestatesandbecausehewasreputedtobetheonlybaronatthattimewithanymilitarytalent70–Ferrantesupportedhisdemand.ButhewasnotgivenacondottawiththeleagueandduringthefinalthroesoftherebellioninAugust1486hesignedacondottatobecaptain-generalofthepapalandbaronialtroops.Hedidnothavethere-sourcestoraisemorethanahundredofthe200men-at-armshewassupposedtohave,andwasunabletopayeventhose.71

Ifonlyaminority–andadecreasingminority–ofNeapolitanbaronschoseacareerinarms,‘forayoungandenterprisingEmilianlorditwasthealmostobligatoryprofession’.72SoldiersfromfamiliesholdingImperialfiefswouldbefreetolookforcondottewherevertheychose,andfindsomeonereadytohirethemonacceptableterms.MilanorVeniceweretheobviousfirstchoices:thenearestpowerfulstateswithlargearmies,abletooffereffectivepoliticalpro-tection as well as military contracts. Ideally, a condotta with either of thesestates would provide a lord with money to maintain a band of professionalsoldiersthatcouldbeusedtodefendhislands,anddiplomaticsupport,with-outrequiringhimtoservefaraway,leavinghisterritoryexposedtoattackfromrivals and enemies.The marquis of Mantua or the duke of Ferrara not only

66 Porzio,La Congiura de’ Baroni,ed.d’Aloe,CCXXII-III,CCXL.67 Paladino, ‘Per la storia della Congiura dei Baroni’, 48 (1923), 258: Battista Bendedei to

Ercoled’Este,23Oct.1486,Naples.68 Porzio,La Congiura de’ Baroni,ed.d’Aloe,73–4.69 Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli,II,561:GiovanniLanfredinitoXdi

Balia,24/29May1486,Naples.70 Ibid.,573–4:GiovanniLanfredinitoXdiBalia,4/8June1486,Naples.71 GiulianaVitale,‘LerivoltediGiovanniCaracciolo,ducadiMelfi,ediGiacomoCaracciolo,

contediAvellino,controFerranteId’Aragona’,39–40,51–3.72 Chittolini,‘Ilparticolarismosignorile’,271.

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wouldhavefarfewerandsmallercondottetooffer,butmightthemselveshavedesignsonthelandsoftheindependentlordships.

GaleottoPicodellaMirandola,forinstance,heldVenetiancondotteforsev-eralyears,becomingoneof their leadingsecond-rankcommanders.Hewasdismissedin1486,undersuspicionoftryingtofindoutstatesecrets.73PerhapshehadbeenpassinginformationtoLudovicoSforza,forhewassoongivenacondottawithMilan.In1487,LudovicolenthimtoFlorencewithacompanyof100men-at-arms,and40mountedcrossbowmentofightinthewartheFloren-tineswerewagingagainstGenoaintheLunigiana.74Galeotto’sbrotherAnto-nioMariabeganhiscareerasacondottiereabout1468withVenice,butthebulkofhiscondottewerewiththepapacy.Heservedthreepopes,SixtusIV,Inno-centVIIIandAlexanderVI.75DuringtheWarofFerraraintheearly1480sthebrothersfoughtonopposingsides,AntonioMariaforthepope,GaleottofortheVenetians.Sixtus’sprotectionofAntonioMaria,andtheexpectationthatheshouldbesupportedbythepope’salliesinhisdisputewithGaleottooverthelordshipofMirandola,76wasembodiedinaclauseofthepeacetreatyofDecember 1482 thatbroughtSixtusover to thesideof the leagueofNaples,FlorenceandMilanagainstVenice.77OnceGaleottohadtransferredtotheser-viceofMilanheenjoyedthebackingofLudovicoSforza.PopeInnocentex-pressedconcernattheendofthewarinLunigianathatGaleottowouldtakehistroopstoattackthefortressofConcordia,whichwasheldforhisbrother.Ludovico declared he could not forbid Galeotto to do this; the FlorentinessoughttodefusethesituationbygivingGaleottoleavetogowhileholdinghistroopsback.78

Theproblemwiththepoliticalprotectionthatcameasanadjuncttoacon-dottawasthatitcouldwellendwhenthecontractdid.GibertodaCorreggiomadehaywhilethesunshoneduringthewarsinLombardyafterthedeathofFilippoMariaViscontiandFrancescoSforzabecomingdukeofMilantotakeoverlandshisfamilyclaimed,includingtheimportantstrongholdofBrescellonearParma.HeservedtheVenetiansfrom1447to1449thenswitchedtotheserviceofSforza.InhisnewcapacityofdukeofMilan,however,SforzaorderedGibertotogiveupalltheterritoryhehadoccupiedsinceFilippoMaria’sdeath.

73 MichaelMallettandJohnHale,The Military Organization of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617(Cambridge,1984),184.

74 Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,X,182.75 FeliceCeretti,‘IlconteAntonmariaPicodellaMirandola:memorieedocumenti’,239.76 Seeabove,p.80.77 Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,VII,491.78 Ibid.,X,235,404,450.

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Refusingtodothis,GibertotookacondottawithAlfonsoofNaples,whowasatwarwithSforza,and tookovermore land in theareaofParma.Hesenthisbrother Manfredo to the Emperor Frederick III (who was at that time inVenice)togetarenewaloftheImperialinvestitureforCorreggio.Theinvesti-turetheyobtainedcomprisedmanyplaceslonglosttotheCorreggio,andtheelevationofCorreggioitselftoacounty;henceforthGibertoandhisbrothersandnephewscouldbearthetitleofcount.

Impressiveasthisdocumentmayhavesounded,itwasnodefenceagainstthestipulationofthePeaceofLodi,includedatSforza’sinsistence,thatGibertohadtorelinquishallthelandshehadseizedintheterritoryofParmaandofMantua,andthatSforzacouldforcehimtodosoifneedbe.FacedbythethreatofSforza’stroops,andnolongerabletocallontheprotectionofVeniceorofNaples,Gibertohadtosubmit.SforzagrantedhimtheinvestiturewithBres-celloandsomeotherlands,inreturnforanoathoffidelitythatmadenomen-tion of the Imperial investiture.79 A month before this grant, in September1454,GibertohadagreedacondottawiththerepublicofSienafor1,200horseand300infantry,butSienawasnotastrongenoughstatetoofferpoliticalpro-tection to its condottieri, certainly not against the duke of Milan. AlthoughGibertowassoonpromotedtobeSiena’scaptain-general,heenteredintoin-trigueswithJacopoPiccinino,thepowerfulcondottierewhoseattackonSienahewassupposedtowardoff.Alertedtotheseexchanges,theSienesegovern-mentsummonedhimtoseethem,andhewasassassinatedinthechamberofthe Balia, the committee directing their military effort. A contemporary in-scriptionthatcanstillbeseenscratchedintothewall,apparentlywithadag-ger,recordedthe‘deathofthetraitorinthisplace’.80

Unlike the Imperial fiefholders of Emilia, those in the Lunigiana did notgenerallybecomecondottieri.TheexceptionsinthefifteenthcenturywereafewindividualsfrombranchesofthefamilythatwereaderentiofFlorence.81SpinettaMalaspinadiVerrucola,whohadbeenbroughtupfromtheageoftwounderFlorentineprotectionaftermostofhiscloserelationshadbeenkilledinafamilyfeud,servedasaFlorentineinfantrycaptaininthemid-century.82ThemostprominentoftheMalaspinacondottieriwasGabriele,marchesediFosdi-novo.Heheldcondotte fromFlorencefor24years;in1487hewasappointed

79 DBI,29,446–7.80 Luciano Banchi, ‘Il Piccinino nello Stato di Siena e la Lega italica (1455–1456)’, 226–8;

G.Pardi,‘IlprocessopostumodiGibertodaCorreggio’.81 Seebelow,pp.151–4.82 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,III,488–92.

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captain-generaloftheFlorentineinfantry.83ResentmentabouttheFlorentinetakeover of Spinetta’s estates, which had been bequeathed to Florence butwhichGabrieleconsideredshouldhavegonetohimandhisnephewLeonardo,eventuallycausedabreach,andin1494GabrielewentovertoCharlesVIIIastheFrencharmypassedthroughtheLunigiana.HetookhismentojointheFrench attack on the stronghold of Fivizzano, one of the places taken bytheFlorentinesthatGabrielebelievedtoberightfullyhis.In1498heservedthePisans, who were in rebellion against Florence.84 His nephew Leonardo fol-lowedhisuncleintotheserviceofFlorencein1476,andthenfollowedhimoutofitin1494.85Leonardo’ssonGaleotto,however,havingbegunhiscareerun-derhisfather,wasgivenacondottafromtheFlorentinesforasmallcompanyofmen-at-arms(fifteen,laterincreasedto20),andfoughtforFlorenceinthePisanwar.86Gabriele’sillegitimatebrother,Simone,hadamorevariedcareer,mostlyservingErcoled’Este,DukeofFerrara,butalsoCharlestheBoldofBur-gundy,aswellasholdingaFlorentinecondottaforafewyears.87

NobleswhoselandslaywithintheboundariesoftheduchyofMilandidnothaveasmuchfreedomofchoiceinseekingcondotteastheholdersofImperialfiefshad.Iftheywantedamilitarycareer,theywouldbeexpectedtopursueitintheserviceoftheduke,unlesstheyhadhisapprovaltotakeupacondottawithanotherpower.ExilesfromtheduchytendedtogravitatetotheserviceofVenice,whichwouldbeveryunlikelytomeetwiththeapprovaloftheduke.Those who did serve in the armies of the Sforza would not be fulfilling anyobligationsdue fromfiefholders; theywouldhave condotte,asall theSforzacaptainsdid,andevenindividualmembersofthelanze spezzate.GreatlordsliketheRossiorthePallaviciniwouldnotseeacondottaascompromisingtheirassertionoftheirpoliticalstatusandjuridicalindependence,butratherasakind of contract of aderenza.88 Prompt obedience to orders was difficult toenforce, especially if payments due under the condotte were in arrears, andfromtheperspectiveofthelords,theirtroopsmightbemoreurgentlyrequiredtodefendtheirownlandsorpursuesomeprivatedispute.Thetroopsmain-tained,inwholeorinpart,byacondottacouldeasilytakeonthecharacterofasmallprivatearmy.89

83 Ibid.,567–76.84 Ibid.,576–8.85 Ibid.,684–5.86 Ibid.,687–8.87 Ibid.,551–3;Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,I,173–4.88 Seebelow,pp.165–8.89 Covini,L’esercito del duca,101–22.

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To some extent, the semi-political nature of the condotte that the SforzadukesgavetothemajorfamiliesofthemilitarynobilityoftheduchywasanoutcomeoftheagreementsFrancescoSforzamadewithsomeofthembeforehebecameduke.Apromisetogivecondottefor200horsetosonsofRolandoPallaviciniwasonlypartofatreatymadewiththispowerfullordinFebruary1448,bywhichSforzapromisedtomaintainRolandoandhissonsinalltheirlandsandjurisdictions.Rolando’sundertakingsinreturnincludedapromisetoensurethathewouldseehissonsservedfaithfullyandreadily,asmen-at-arms should.90The condotta for 200 horse that Pietro Maria Rossi acceptedfromSforza in lateOctober 1447had“political”clauses,andfiveweeks laterSforzasignedanundertakingtodefendandfavourhim,allhisestatesandsub-jects,hisprivileges,jurisdictionsanddignities,andtoprotectRossi’sownad-herentsandallies.Inearly1449,aspartofanewpactbetweenRossiandSforza,hiscondottawasincreasedto500horse.91

Pallavicini’ssonslosttheircondottefromthedukewhentheirdisputeovertheirinheritancemeanttherewasnopoliticaladvantageforthedukeincon-tinuingthem.92PietroMariaRossialsohadtoacceptadiminutionofthecon-dottehehadhopedwouldbegiventohissons:afterthePeaceofLodi,Sforzacutthesizeofhisarmyandonlyonecondotta,forhissonGiacomo,wasallot-tedtoPietroMaria’sfamily.Giacomowantedamilitarycareer,butcouldnotacceptmilitarydiscipline.Hefellintodisgraceafterarrangingtheassassina-tionofoneofSforza’smostvaluedveterancaptains,whocommandedasquad-ronoflanze spezzate,withthecomplicityoftheman’swife,whowashisloverandwhomhemarriedsoonafter.His fatherdisinheritedhim,andGiacomowenttoservetheVenetians–briefly,forhequicklydeserted.Thefamilycon-dottawenttoanotherofPietroMaria’ssons,Guido,untilafterGiacomohadmadehispeacewiththefamilyofthemurderedman,andhisfathergavehimbackthecommandofthecompany.93Evidently,theRossicondotta,whichwasonlyfor100–150horse(20–30lances)inthe1460sand1470s,wasoflittlemili-taryconsequencetothedukes,andformedonlyapartofthemilitaryresourc-esoftheRossi.Whenitwasincreasedto300horsebytheregencycouncilin1477afterthedeathofGaleazzoMariaSforza,PietroMariatookitoverhimself

90 Pezzana,Storia della Città di Parma,II,620–2.91 Covini,‘LecondottedeiRossi’,61,66;foralistofRossicondottefrom1446to1481,seeibid.,

97–9.92 Ibid.,77.93 Ibid.,76–82.

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again.94Thelossofhiscondotta,whenLudovicoSforzatookitfromhim,wasoneofthereasonsadducedbyRossiin1481forhisrebellion.95

AmongthehostofFrancescoSforza’srelatives(brothers,sonsandnephews,legitimateandillegitimate)whoweregivenlandsinLombardyandheldcon-dotteintheMilanesearmy,one,RobertodaSanseverino,stoodout.Hebecamethepremiercondottiereofhisgeneration.Closefamilytiestothenewducaldynasty – he was the son of Francesco Sforza’s sister Elisa and Leonetto, amemberoftheSanseverinoclaninthekingdomofNaples–andtheestatesintheduchyheinheritedfromhismotherorwasgrantedinhisownright,madeLombardyratherthanNapleshisbase,buthedidnotlosetouchwiththeking-dom.ThetitleofcontediCaiazzothatheboreandpassedontohisdescen-dantswasaNeapolitanone:FerrantegrantedhimthecountyofCaiazzoforhisservicesfightingfortheking,asaMilanesecondottiere,inthewarsduringtheearlyyearsofhisreign.ThelandsRobertowasgrantedinLombardyalsocametohimnotbecausehewasrelatedtotheduke,butratherasanadjuncttoorpartialpaymentofhiscondotte.Theprincipalone,CastelnuovointheterritoryofTortona,wasmadeintoamarquisatewhenitwasgiventohimin1474.96Hewasprimarilyacondottiere,whosegoalwas‘greatnessinhisprofession’;97likeothersofFrancescoSforza’srelatives,heidentifiedhimselfwith‘akindofin-terregionalelitesharingmilitarytraditions’98ratherthantheducaldynasty.Hehadaspirationstoanindependentstateofhisown,havinganeyeonthecityofImola,orperhaps,moreambitiously,Bologna,whereheandhistroopswerestationedforseveralyearsinthe1470s.99

RobertodidnotgetonwellwithDukeGaleazzoMaria;theirtemperamentswereincompatible,andhewasvexedbyhisexclusionfromimportantconsul-tationsaboutmilitaryaffairs.GaleazzoMariaarrangedacondottaforhimwithFlorencein1467,andayearlaterhewasappointedFlorentinecaptain-general.HewasnothappyintheserviceofFlorence,resentingacutimposedonthenumbersofhistroops(from800to600horse,andofthe300infantryithadbeenagreedheshouldhave),100andwhatheconsideredtobeexcessiveinter-ferencefromFlorentineofficials,buthemaintainedcontactwithLorenzode’

94 Ibid.,92.95 Chittolini,‘Ilparticolarismosignorile’,275.96 Covini,L’esercito del duca,99.97 Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,I,111,note5:G.CerrutotoGaleazzoMariaSforza,25June1470.98 Covini,L’esercito del duca,40.99 Milanese troops were stationed there, really to maintain Milanese influence over the

duke’saderentiintheregion,althoughthepopeandtheFlorentinesweretoldtheyweretheretoprovidepromptsupporttothemifneedbe.

100 Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,I,45,110.

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MediciafterhereturnedtotheserviceofthedukeofMilanin1471.GaleazzoMariawasnofonderofhimthanbeforebutRoberto’sreputationnowstoodsohighthatthedukedidnotliketheideaofhisservinganyoneelse,andsoughttobindhimtoMilanbygivinghimacondottaworth30,000ducatsayearforlife,aswellasgrantinghimmorelands.101Robertostillkeptcontactswithoth-erpotentialemployers–Florence,Venice,thepope,thekingofFrance.

After Galeazzo Maria’s assassination Roberto conspired with the duke’sbrothersagainsttheregencyofhiswidow,Bona,andfledintoexileastheydid;heledthecampaignthatbroughtthembackin1479.ButLudovico,whotookover the regency,didnotgiveRoberto theprominent rolehe felthe shouldhave, and Roberto stayed at Castelnuovo, ignoring Ludovico’s demands heshouldgotoMilan.WhentroopsweresentagainstCastelnuovoinearly1482,he left the duchy forVenice.102 Roberto had already been sounding out theVenetians,andwithoutdelaytheytookhimonastheirlieutenant-general,giv-inghimthefiefofCittadellanearPaduaandapalaceinVenice.103Thepros-pectofhavinghimastheircommanderhaddecidedthemtoattackthedukeofFerrara,withwhomtheyhadanumberofdisputes.AttheendofthewarofFerrarain1484,theykepthimon.HewasgivenpermissiontotakehiscompanytofightonthesideofthepopeandtherebelsintheNeapolitanBarons’Warin1485, but he did not go as a Venetian commander. Returning to the Venetoin1486,hebasedhimselfatCittadella,butwasonlyreinstatedaslieutenant-generalthefollowingyearwhenhewascalledontocommandtheVenetianforceswhowerefaringbadlyinawaragainstAustria.Hemethisdeathonthiscampaign,drownedashewastryingtofordtheAdigetoconfrontanAustrianattack.104

When the rebellion of the Rossi ended in the loss of their lands in 1482,RobertodaSanseverino’sson-in-lawGuidoandGuido’ssonFilippofledtoVen-ice, where potentially useful Milanese exiles generally had good hopes of awelcome,andtheyweregivencondotte.GuidoRossiearnedhimselfareputa-tionasaworthysoldier.HehelpedtopreventtheheavydefeatoftheVenetianarmybytheAustriansatCallianoin1487,inwhichRobertodaSanseverinowaskilled,fromturningintoarout.105Filippowasnotconsideredsoimpressiveorvaluable, and on his father’s death in 1490 the Venetians debated whetheror not to honour their commitment to continue his son’s condotta. Despite

101 Ibid.,II,176.102 ChristineShaw,The Politics of Exile in Renaissance Italy(Cambridge,2000),8–9.103 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,51.104 Ibid.,53.105 Ibid.,53–4.

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beingdescribedasinexpertandworthless,andhavingadmittedhehadtriedtogetacondottaelsewhere,Filippowasgivenanewcontract:considerationsofthe influence he could still wield in and around Parma carried the day. Tohisdisappointment,hewasnotgiventhewholeofhisfather’scondotta,whichwasreducedto400horse,anddividedequallybetweenhimandhisyoungerbrother,Beltramo,whowasconsideredabettersoldier.106

Long-termrelationshipswithcondottieribecameacharacteristicelementofVenetianmilitaryorganization.TheVenetians likedtokeeponsoldierswhohadprovedtheirloyaltyandworth,andtorewardgoodservice.Asaninduce-ment tostayon, theymightgrant lands in fief to favouredcommanders,al-thoughtheywerereadiertodothisinthefirstthaninthesecondhalfofthefifteenthcentury.So longas theystayed loyal, thesoldiers couldkeep thesefiefsforlife;whethertheycouldpassthemontotheirheirsdependedonthesizeandstrategicimportanceoftheplace,andwhetherornottheheirswerecapableofexercisingmilitarycommandsthemselves.TheexceptionallylargegrantscentredonBergamogiventotheVenetiancaptain-generalBartolomeoColleoni,forexample,werenearlyalltakenbackafterhisdeathin1475,andonlytwo,MalpagaandCavernago,ofthetenfiefshehadbeengrantedwerelefttohisheirs.GrantsinperpetuityofplacesoftheimportanceofBergamoand thestrongholdsofMartinengoand Romano,were not likely tobehon-oured,unlessperhapsColleonihadleftsonswhohadinheritedtheirfather’smilitaryskills.Colleoni’sdesignatedheirstohisestateswerethesonsofoneofhis daughters, Orsino and Gerardo Martinengo. They were given small con-dotte,withcommandoversomeofthemen-at-armsofColleoni’scompanyleftleaderlessbyhisdeath.107

Morepermanentwerethegrantsoffiefs,ortheextensionofprivilegesandjurisdictionoverexistingfiefs,grantedtomembersofthemilitarynobilityoftheVenetoinrecompenseformilitaryservicetotherepublic.Insomecases,specific military obligations were attached to such fiefs. Parisio da Lodrone,whoheldlandsintheBresciano,inreturnforcontinuingtoenjoyhisprivilegesoverhislandsundertookin1439toraise600infantryforVenicewhenrequired.108His sonsPietroandGiorgioheld condotte fromVeniceafterhisdeath.109AsVenetianrulebecamefirmlyestablishedovertheTerraferma,membersofthemilitarynobilityweremoreinclinedtoseekacareerinVenice’sarmy–whichmaywellhavebeentheonlyoptionopentothosewhowantedtobesoldiers,

106 Ibid.,94.107 Ibid.,68,187–9,193–4;SergioZamperetti,I piccoli principi(Venice,1991),181–6.108 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,189.109 Zamperetti,I piccoli principi,173,n.61.

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unlesstheywerepreparedtoriskbeingregardedaspoliticallysuspect.FromthestandpointoftheVenetians,providingopportunitiesformembersofthepowerfulandinfluentialmainlandfamiliestopursueamilitarycallingwasoneway of binding the families to them.Troops maintained through these con-dottewouldcertainlyberegardedasVenetiantroops,expectedtoservewheretheywereneededandnotascompaniesintheserviceofthenobility,paidforbytheVenetians.WhenCaterinaCornaro,QueenofCypruscouldbeaccompa-niedonherformalentryintoBresciainSeptember1497byMarcoMartinengo,Luigi Avogadro and Gian Francesco Gambara with their men-at-arms, theywerethereasVenetiancaptainsaswellasprominentmembersoftheBresciannobility.110AllhadseenactionunderVenetianbanners,notleastagainsttheFrenchatthebattleofFornovotwoyearsbefore.111

ThecastellansofFriuliwerenot,ingeneral,inclinedtoseekcondottefromVeniceinthefifteenthcentury.VenicelookedtothemtodefendFriulibuttheywere not much inclined to do that either, even when, as in 1479, the threatcamefromtheTurks.112Suchobligationsastheyhadtoprovidecavalryforceshadfallenintodesuetude,andthehabitualresponseofthecastellanswastowait out invasions behind their fortifications.113 Local peasant militias weremuchmoreactiveindefenceoftheirprovince.AVenetiandecisionin1487togiveaheadoftheSavorgnanclan,Nicolò,permanentresponsibilityfororga-nizing,trainingandcommandingtheFriulanmilitia,annoyedrivalcastellansbuttheirprotestswereinvain.114LeadershipofthemilitiagavetheSavorgnanaholdoverthepeasantsofothercastellans,andtheyseizedtheopportunity.Theymadethemilitiaintoamoreeffectivefightingforce,andleditnotjustindefence of the province but on campaigns outside Friuli during the ItalianWars.

BycontrastwiththemilitarystrengthdevelopedbyVeniceoverthefifteenthcentury,therepublicofGenoahadnopermanentarmy.Theonlymilitaryes-tablishmentoftheGenoesestatewastheguardofthedogeorthegovernorandthegarrisonsofthemajorfortresses.NorwasthereapermanentGenoesestate fleet until the later sixteenth century. Only occasionally would theGenoesecouncilsvotethefundsforagalleyortwotoguardthecoastsofLigu-ria fromattacksbycorsairs.TheGenoeserarelybecame involved inwars inItaly on their own account, and usually contrived to make only limited

110 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,199.111 Ibid.,56.112 Zamperetti,I piccoli principi,217.113 Trebbi,Il Friuli,81.114 Ibid.,81–3;Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,92–3.

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contributionsofamodestfleetorafewthousandinfantrywhencalledupontotakepartinwarsonbehalfofaFrenchorMilaneseoverlord.

Theheightofmilitaryaspirationforthemostambitiousdogewouldbeastandingforceofafewhundredinfantry,paidforbyotherpowers.TheGeno-esethemselveswouldbeloathtopayforsuchaforce,letalonetoagreetohir-ingcondottieriinpeacetime.ForwarsinLiguria,theGenoesereliedonlocalleviessupplementedbyprofessionalsoldiersifthemoneytopaythemcouldberaised.MembersofthemilitarynobilityofLiguriaweremorelikelytobethetargetsthanthecommandersofsuchcampaigns.Ifadogewasattheheadoftherepublic,thecommandwaslikelytogotooneofhisrelatives;ifaMila-neseorFrenchgovernorwasinthecityMilaneseorFrenchtroopsundertheirowncommanderswouldgenerallydoanyfightingtherewastobedone.TheendemicwarsintheGenoesedependencyofCorsicawereunglamorousandunrewarding,andtherewaslittleincentiveforthemilitarynoblesofLiguriatolookforglorythere.

WhentheGenoesewereprojectingtheirpowerbeyondLiguria,theyusuallydid so by a fleet of galleys and ships put together by hiring vessels that be-longedtoindividualsorprivateconsortia.Thecaptainsofthevesselswereaslikelytobepopolariasnobles,menwhowereprimarilytraders,notspecialistsinnavalwarfare.ThepostofadmiralofsuchfleetswassupposedtobesubjecttotherulesofalternationinofficeofBlacksandWhites,noblesandpopolari.IfaFieschiwasprominent in the regime,however, he wouldbe inclined tothinkheshouldbeappointed.

InJanuary1443GianAntonioFieschiwaselectedadmiralforlife,theprice,perhaps,ofhisacceptanceoftheelectiontothedogeshipofRaffaeleAdornothedaybefore,buthenevertookcommandofaGenoesefleet.115WhenGianFilippoFieschiwasappointedadmiralinJanuary1454,followingareconcilia-tionwithDogePietroCampofregoso,therewasataskforhim.116PreparationswerebeingmadetoattackthefleetofAlfonsoofAragon,andthedogewouldhavebeengladtoseeFieschiwellawayfromGenoa.Therewassomedoubtabout whether he would go in person or send his brother Rolando as hislieutenant,117 but he did take command himself. Planning to burn Alfonso’sshipsintheharbourofNaples,Fieschiaskedformoregalleys,118butthefleetwasdispersedbyastormoffCorsicainlateAugustbeforeanythingofnotewas

115 ASGenoa,AS529,ff.17v-18r.116 Hewaselected‘prefectusseucapitaneus’on22January(Ibid.,AS555,f.11r-v).117 Ibid.,AS1794,f.488r:PietroCampofregosotoGianFilippoFieschi,22Jan.1454.118 Ibid.,f.595r:PietroCampofregosotoGianFilippoFieschi,15Aug.1454;AS557,ff.23v-25r.

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accomplished,andtheenterprisewassooncalledoff.Fieschikeptthetitleofadmiral,nevertheless.

GianLuigiFieschiwasalsoadmiral,duringhisuneasyalliancewithGiovan-niandAgostinoAdornoingoverningGenoaunderMilaneselordship.HetookumbragewhenhishopesofbeingappointedadmiralofafleetLudovicoSforzawaspreparingtobesentagainsttheFrenchin1496werethwarted;theAdornobrotherswereprimedwithargumentsthattheadmiralshouldnotembarkonafleettotakepersonalcommandunlessitconsistedofatleasttenlargeves-sels.119ThefollowingyearFieschiwasreluctanttocommandasmallfleettobesentagainstpirates.Hewouldnotgoifthereweretobeonlytwogalleyswhenhehadbeenpromisedsix,andsuspectedtheAdornobrotherswerereluctanttoseehimgainsomepersonalglory.120Pleadingillness,hereturnedtoGenoa,afterputtingthefleetinorder;BernardoFieschibecamehislieutenant.121GianLuigiwassigninglettersasducalandGenoeseadmiralin1499,122buthealsotried,unsuccessfully,togetamilitarycondottafromLudovicothatyear.123

GianLuigideclaredhisreadiness toserveLudovicoanywhere,describinghimselfasbroughtupinthesaddle.124FormostofthemilitarynobilityofItaly,thatwouldscarcelybeworthmentioning,itwouldbesonormal.ButtheLigu-riannobilityinthefifteenthcenturyhadnotraditionofseekingacareerasacommander of military forces on land. Even those who had estates in theduchyofMilanwouldnotgenerallytrytogetmilitarycondottefromtheduke.Iftheyneededtoearntheirliving,asmanyofthemdid,theirnaturalcoursewastobeamerchantorbanker.Ifadventurewaswhattheywereafter,thelifeofamerchanttravellingwithhisgoodsthroughtheMediterranean,runningthe gauntlet of pirates, could provide plenty – or they could take to piracythemselves.

ThecircumstancesandstructuresthatshapedthemilitarycareersopentothelandednobilityofItalyweretransformedinthesixteenthcentury,chieflyasaconsequenceoftheItalianWarsandthepoliticalchangestheybrought.Changes to the composition of armies, to the balance between cavalry

119 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.1219:CorradoStangatoLudovicoSforza,9June1496,Genoa.120 Ibid.,b.1225:CorradoStangatoL.Sforza,2June1497,Genoa.121 Ibid.:GianLuigiFieschitoL.Sforza,29July,4Aug.1497,Genoa;C.StangatoL.Sforza,

5Aug.1497,Genoa.122 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.757,c.436:GianLuigiFieschi toFrancescoGonzaga,28Mar.

1499.123 Léon-G. Pélissier, ‘Documents pour l’histoire de l’établissement de la domination fran-

çaise à Gênes (1498–1500)’, 423: Francesco Fontana to Ludovico Sforza, 12 Aug. 1499,Genoa.

124 Ibid.

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andinfantryalsoaffectedthem.ThestrengthofItalianarmiesinthefifteenthcenturytendedtobemeasuredbythenumbersofmen-at-armsorcorazzetheycomposed.Bythe1520s,thestrengthofarmiesfightinginItalywasmorelikelytobeassessedbyreferencetothenumbersofinfantry,ofpikemenandarque-busiers,whowereseenasthekeytovictoryinbattle.Amongthecavalry,men-at-armswereflankedbyincreasingnumbersoflighthorse.Men-at-arms,theheavycavalry,stillhadanimportantroleandstillhadgreatersocialprestige:serviceinthatarmcontinuedtobethefirstchoiceformanynobles.Thegrow-ingsignificanceofinfantryandlighthorse,however,madetakingcommandofthemcometobeamoreattractivepropositionfornobleswhosawsoldieringasaprofession.Italianinfantrydidnotacquiremuchofareputationaspike-menbuttheyweremorerespectedashandgunners,andItaliansalsobecametosomedegreespecialistsaslighthorsemen.125

ThemostpowerfularmiesthatfoughtthewarswerenotItalian,theywereFrench,SpanishandSwiss.Eachwasorganizeddifferentlyfromtheothers,andfromthearmiesoftheItalianstates.TherewasnoroomforoutsidersintheSwissforces,andfindingapositionandaroleamongtheFrenchandtheSpan-ishcommanderscouldbeproblematicforItaliansoldiers,whatevertheirso-cial status or military experience and reputation. In the early phases of thewars, the French and Spanish kings were ready to give Italian commanderscondotte,butastheybecameestablishedinItaly,theypreferredItalianstofitinwiththeorganizationoftheirarmies.TheywouldtakeoncompaniesofItal-ianinfantryorlighthorse–oftenthefirsttobedismissedattheendofacam-paignorwhencutsneededtobemade–butwouldrathergivecommandsoverexistingcompaniesofmen-at-armstoItaliancaptainsthanhireacaptainwithhisownmen.Italianprincesandrepublicswhomaintainedtheirownarmiescontinuedtohirecondottieri,sothechoicesandcareerpathsopentonobleswho were pursuing a military career were not completely changed. But theadjustment of expectations to the new realities took time, particularly, per-haps,forthosewhohadbeguntheircareersundertheolddispensation.FormanyoftheItalianmilitarynobilitywhofoughtinthewars,moreover,itwouldbeamisconceptiontoregardtheirparticipationastheexerciseofaprofession.Somefoughtonlyincampaignsthataffectedtheirownregion,someasexiles,takingtoasoldier’slifebecausethatwasawaytoearnaliving,orbecausetheirpatronexpected itof theminreturn for thesupporthegave, like theexiles

125 Forthecampaignsof theItalianWars,andthesechanges inmilitaryorganizationandtactics,seeMallettandShaw,The Italian Wars,andthereferencesgiventhere.

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fromNaples,LombardyandFlorenceatthecourtofHenryIIofFrance,whowereallorderedtojoinintheFrenchdefenceofSienain1553.126

Lombardnobleswhowishedtopursueamilitarycareerfacedrepeatedtestsoftheirpoliticaljudgement.Itwasimpossibletotrimtoeverychangeofre-gime, and still be trusted. If they became too closely associated with oneprince,exilemightbetheonlyoptionwhenhelosttheduchyofMilan.ForthenobilityaroundParmaandPiacenza,thesituationwasstillmorecomplicated.Not only did they have to weigh the relative advantages of siding with theFrenchortheSforzadukesortheemperor,butalsotodealwiththepopeswhoclaimedParmaandPiacenzaforthepapacyorplannedtoendowtheirownfamilieswiththem.127

TheFrenchkingswerepreparedtotakeLombardnoblesintotheirarmy,buttherewereonlylimitednumbersofpositionsavailable.TherewasnoshortageofFrenchnobleseagertoserveateverylevelfromman-at-armstoking’slieu-tenant,andtherewereItaliannoblesandprincesfromoutsideLombardywill-ingtoservethekingofFrance.EvenwhenthekingheldtheduchyofMilan,Lombards could not apparently expect to benefit much from preferentialtreatmentinthecompetition.SomeindividualsdidbecomefirmlyestablishedintheFrencharmy.One,GianGiacomoTrivulzio–whosefamilywerefromthecityofMilan,courtiersandofficialsratherthanmilitarynobility–ledthefirstFrenchinvasionofMilanin1499.Aftertherapidconquesthegovernedtheduchyastheking’slieutenantuntilLudovicoSforza’sbriefreturntopowerin1500.Hewasnevergivensomuchpoweragain,buthedidholdseniorcom-mandsonanumberofcampaigns.HehadbeenintheserviceofFrancesince1495,andowedhiscommandoftheinvasionin1499notjusttohisreputeasacondottiere,trainedinthearmyoftheSforzadukes,buttohisstatusasanexile,hostiletoLudovicoSforza,andwithvaluablepoliticalcontactsintheduchy.ButwhentheFrencharmyretreatedoutofLombardyin1512,hehadtogowiththem,losingallhislandsintheduchyuntilFrancisIreconquereditin1515.128

Amongthosewhosoonerorlaterthrewintheir lotwiththeFrenchaftertheirconquestofMilanweresonsofRobertodaSanseverino.Twoof them,GaleazzoandGianFrancesco,hadgoneovertoMilanfromVenicein1483dur-ingtheWarofFerraraandbecameprominentfiguresatthecourtofLudovicoSforza;GaleazzobecameaparticularfavouriteandmarriedanaturaldaughterofLudovico.Bothweregivensubstantialcondotte.AstheFrenchinvasionof

126 LucienRomier,Les origines politiques des Guerres de Religion(Paris,1913–14),I,393.127 Seebelow,pp.214–8.128 LetiziaArcangeli, ‘GianGiacomoTrivulziomarchesediVigevanoe ilgoverno francese

nelloStatodiMilano’;andseebelow,pp.211–2.

126 Chapter5

Milanloomedin1499,Galeazzowasputinchargeoftheduchy’sdefences.HisflightinlateAugustfromAlessandria,whichwastohavebeenthebastionoftheduchy,leavingtheMilanesearmyindisarraytofallcaptivetotheFrench,earnedhimscornandderisionfromtheFrenchasmuchasanyone.WhileGa-leazzowentintoexilewiththeSforza,GianFrancesco–piqued,itwassaid,athisyoungerbrotherhavingbeengiventhecommand129–hadalreadycometotermswiththeFrench,andwasgivenacompanyof100lances.130HewasoneofthecaptainsoftheFrencharmysenttoNaplesin1501,anddiedtherethatyear.

Meanwhile,Galeazzoandtwootherbrothers,AntonioMariaandGaspare,had joinedLudovicoSforza inhis short-livedrecoveryof theduchy inearly1500, and been captured with him at Novara. Having ransomed themselves,GaleazzoandAntonioMariamadetheirwaytojointheMilaneseexilesgivenrefuge by the emperor-elect Maximilian. In 1502, they began attempting tomaketheirpeacewithLouisXII.Withthegroundwell-prepared,AntonioMa-riawasgivenacompanyof50lancesinJuly1503withinweeksofarrivingattheFrenchcourt,andkeptthiscommanduntilhisdeathinJanuary1509.Ittooklonger for Galeazzo to win favour with the king, but at length his gifts as acourtier,andaboveallhisskillsintheartsofcombatintournaments,earnedhimtheofficeofGrandÉcuyerandthecommandof50lances,laterincreasedto100.HelivedmostlyinFrance,atthecourt,buttookpartinseveralFrenchcampaignsinItaly,anddiedfightingamongFrancisI’shouseholdtroopsattheBattleofPaviain1525.Hiscommandof100lancespassedtohisbrotherGiulio,whohadbeenhislieutenant.131Gasparewasalsogivenacommandof50lanc-esbyLouisin1503,butforhim,thekingwasonlyoneofanumberofemploy-ersheservedafter1500.BeforeLouis,therewasCesareBorgia,andafterLouis,MaximilianandthenVenice.Employerswerewillingtotakehimon,despitehisnotoriouslyvolatile temperament(whichearnedhimthenicknameFra-cassa),becauseofhismilitaryexpertise;intheend,hisluckandtheseriesofcontractsranout,andhediedinpovertyin1519.132

GianFrancesco’sson,Robertocarriedonthefamily’smilitarytradition.Ofthe generation that began their military careers during the ItalianWars (hewasbornaround1500),likeGasparehewasfirstandforemostaprofessional

129 Stefano Meschini, La Francia nel ducato di Milano: La politica di Luigi XII (1499–1512)(Milan,2006),I,59–60.

130 Arcangeli,’GianGiacomoTrivulzio’,40.131 Meschini,La Francia nel ducato di Milano,59–61,80–1,103,153–4,207,248,282–4,326,552,

561;LetiziaArcangeli,‘Carrieremilitaridell’aristocraziapadananelleguerred’Italia’,398.132 Meschini,La Francia nel ducato di Milano,149–50.

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soldier.Hewasathomewiththetacticsofskirmishes,raidsandambushesthatcharacterized much of the fighting between the famous series of battles inLombardyinthe1520s.Bytheendofthatdecade,hewasusuallycontractedtocommand at least 1,200 infantry and 150 light horse, although like all com-mandershestruggledtokeepnumbersupwhenpaywasinarrearsorarmieswerebeingreducedinthelullsbetweencampaigns.Knownforthegoodqual-ityofhiscompany–whowerehismen,andmovedwithhimwhenhechangedemployer – he would pay extra out of his own resources to retain men heprized.Hiscareermovesweremotivatedbythesearchforgoodcontracts,notpoliticalconsiderations,orthedesiretopreservehisestatesinLombardyorNaples,wherehehadinheritedthecountyofCaiazzo.Hemadehisnamefight-ingwiththeImperialarmy,beforeacceptingajointcondottawithClementVIIandFlorenceinFebruary1527.Thiswasabadmomenttomakethemove–inMaythepopewouldbeaprisoneroftheImperialarmyinRomeandtheFlo-rentineswouldexpelhisfamilyfromtheircity.InAugust1527Robertotrans-ferredtotheserviceofVenice,stayingwiththeVenetiansuntiltheydismissedhimin1530afterthePeaceofBolognabroughtthewarinLombardytoanend.Hemayhavehadacondottafromthepope,andthenin1531wasreportedtohaveconcludedacontractwithFrancisIfor3,000infantryand200lighthorse,onlytodieearlythenextyear.133

AsthisreportedcontractofRobertodaSanseverinoillustrates,evenafter1530thekingofFrancecouldstillbeinterestedintakingLombardnoblesintohisservice;itwouldbemanyyearsbeforeallhopesofrecoveringMilanfinallydiedattheFrenchcourt.ThelastSforzadukeshadcomparativelylittletooffer.DuringthethreeyearsofMassimiliano’sreign,from1512to1515,whatmoneyhehadforsoldierswentmostlytotheSwiss,whohaddonemuchtomakehimdukeandtookituponthemselvestokeephiminMilan.HewasalsomoreorlesscompelledbytheSpanishtoappointProsperoColonnahiscaptain-gener-al.FrancescoIISforzahadevenlessmoneytospareafterhebecamedukein1521,astheduchywasravagedbyyearafteryearofwarandhewasfacedbydemandstopayhugeindemnitiestotheImperialarmyfortheexpensesofthewar against the French – when he was not having to resist the efforts oftheImperialarmytotakehisduchyfromhim.WhenCharlesVtooktheduchyintohisownhands,afterthedeathofSforzain1535,andfinallydecidedtokeepitandpassitontohissonPhilip,themilitarynobilityofLombardycouldnotexpecttoreceivepreferentialtreatmentinthecompetitionforpositionsandcommandsinthearmiesoftheirnewmasters.Iftheywantedtomakeacareerin theserviceofCharlesorPhilip, theywouldhavetocompetewithnobles

133 Arcangeli,‘Carrieremilitari’,396–404.

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fromotherpartsofEurope,notjustotherregionsofItaly,andtheycouldnotexpecttoserveonlyinLombardy.

Few opportunities for a military career in the service of the pope wereopeneduptothenobilityaroundParmaandPiacenzawhenthosecitiescameunderpapalgovernment,forthepopeswerenotanxioustoenhancethemili-tarystandingofthelocalnobility.AfterPaulIIIinstalledhisownfamily,theFarnese,asdukesofParmaandPiacenzain1545,thenewdynastystruggledtoestablishcontroloverthenobility,andhadfewerresourcesinlandsandmon-eythansomeoftheirownnobles.

ForsomeyearsGuidoRangoniheldanexceptionalpositionamongthemil-itarynobilityoftheareasofsouthernLombardythatcameunderpapalrule.AtatimewhenthepopeswereseekingtoholdontoModena,whichhadbeentakenbyJuliusIIfromthedukeofFerrarain1510, itmadepoliticalsensetomakeuseofhimtogainthesupportofhisfamilyandfactioninModenaanditsterritory.TransferringfromtheserviceofVenicetothatofLeoXin1514,hewasgivencommandof100lances.HewascalledontoreinforcepapalruleoverParma, where he acquired lands, and in 1526 became governor of the papalarmy.OnceModenahadbeendefinitivelylosttothepapacy,Rangoni’srela-tionswiththepopesoured. In1532hewasofferedacontractascolonelloof3,000infantrybythecommanderoftheImperialarmyinItaly,themarchesedelVasto.Intheendherejectedit,believingheshouldbecaptainofalltheItalianinfantry,notjustoneofanumberofcolonelli.134HewenttoserveFran-cisIinstead,recruitingthousandsofmenwhomheledtoPiedmontin1536tofightfortheFrenchintheircampaignofconquestthere.InPiedmontheheldthecommandofalltheItaliantroopswiththeFrenchuntilhetookumbrageattheauthorityanewFrenchlieutenant-general,JeandeHumières,wasgivenoverhim,andleft.

Rangoni’sgreatrival,nottosayenemy,wasPietroMariaRossi,contediSanSecondo,whose father,Troilo,hadbeenable to retrievesomeof theestatesaroundParmalostbytheRossiinthe1480s.Rossispentlittleofhiscareerintheserviceofhispapalprince,andnoneinthatoftheSforzaduke.HestartedoutwiththeFrench,commanding200lighthorsein1522.Forsomeyearshewascloselyassociatedwithhismaternaluncle,Giovannide’Medici,andtrans-ferredwithhimtothepapalarmyintheautumnof1526.UnpaidbythepopeaftertheSackofRome,hemovedtotheImperialarmyascolonelloof2,000Italian infantry. During his decade under the Imperial banner, he fought invarioustheatresofwar,includingthesiegeofFlorence,theconquestofTunis

134 Ibid.,393–4,400,409,411–2;V.L.Bourrilly,Guillaume du Bellay, seigneur de Langey, 1491–1543(Paris,1905),237,240,251.

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byCharlesVin1535andtheemperor’sinvasionofProvencethefollowingyear,and against theTurks. But his independent political connections, especiallywiththesonofGiovannide’Medici,Cosimo,whenhebecamedukeofFlor-ence,madehimlosefavourwiththeemperor’smen,andin1541heendedupbackintheserviceofFrancisI,forwhomhebecamecaptainoftheItalianin-fantry.135

ThechoicesconfrontingNeapolitanbaronspursuingacareerinarmsinthesixteenth century were not so complicated. After Ferdinand of Aragon hadoustedthecadetlineofhisdynastyfromthethroneofNaplesandthearmyofLouisXIIinNapleshadbeendefeated,baronswhowantedtostayintheking-domandholdontotheirestates,andwantedalifeinarms,hadlittleoptionbuttoserveintheforcesoftheirmonarch.Theprincipalobstaclewasfindingaroleinthoseforces.Oncehiscommander,GonzaloFernándezdeCórdobahadeliminatedtheFrenchchallengeforthethrone,Ferdinandgaveinstruc-tionsinlate1504thatnofurthercondotteweretobegiven.Anybaronswhoheldacommand,includingRomanbaronswithestatesinNaples,weretohavecaptaincies,ashisSpanishnoblesdid,notcondotte.136Captaincieswereusu-allyforlessthananhundredmen-at-arms,whichwouldbeamedium-rangecondotta,notthesizeofpersonalcompanyeminentItaliancondottieriwouldbeaccustomedtohaving,anditwasnotintendedthattheyshouldmaketheholder’sfortune.Thekingorderedthatonly1,200men-at-arms,mostlySpan-ish,shouldbekepton,and600lighthorsemen,whoshouldallbeSpanish,asshouldthe3,000infantrytoberetained.137

The military establishment in Naples in peacetime was generally rathersmallerthanthis,withfewercavalry.138In1514,therewere508Spanishheavycavalry,and243Italians(whowerepaid90ducatsayear,whiletheSpanishwerepaid110).139Theproportionmayhavealteredlater–in1530therewereelevenNeapolitancompaniesofheavycavalrytofiveSpanish–butSpanish

135 Arcangeli, ‘Carriere militari’, 405–6; J. Lestocquoy (ed.), Correspondance des Nonces en France Capodiferro, Dandino et Guidiccione 1541–1546(Rome,1963),112,186.

136 L.J.SeranoyPineda,‘CorrespondenciadelosReyesCatólicosconelGranCapitándurantelas campañas de Italia’, 27 (1912), 514–5: Ferdinand to Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba,3Nov.1504.

137 Ibid.,515.138 RaffaeleAjello,Una società anomala: Il programma e la sconfitta della nobiltà napoletana

in due memoriali conquecenteschi(Naples,1996),318–20.139 RobertoMantelli,Il pubblico impiego nell’economia del Regno di Napoli: retribuzioni, reclu-

tamento e ricambio sociale nell’epoca spagnuola (secc. XVI-XVII)(Naples,1986),421.

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commanderswerestillpreferred.140Theinfantryforcescontinuedtobepre-dominantly,ifnotexclusively,Spanish,becomingthetercioofNaples.Thiswasnot so much a Neapolitan army, as a Spanish army based in Naples. TherewouldbesomeroomintheranksofthecavalryforNeapolitanbarons,butfewcommandsofanysubstanceorhonour.PlacesandcommandsinotherSpan-isharmies,particularlytheoneinLombardy,couldbeopentothemtoo,buttheywouldhavetofaceevenmorecompetitionthere.

CaptainciesinthecavalryheldbyNeapolitanbaronswouldbeanalogoustocommandsoverunitsoflancesintheFrencharmyheldbyItalianprincesandnobles.Whilethemonarchexpectedthetroopsmaintainedathisexpensetobe functional units of his army, available for service as and when required,therewasanelementofpoliticalpatronage,ofrecognitionofthespecialsta-tusofsomeindividualsorfamiliesbehindappointmentstocaptainciesofNea-politanbarons.Onthedeathoftheholder,acaptaincycouldbegiventohisheir,whateverhisageandmilitaryexperienceor inexperience.Thus in 1516FerrantediCapua,ducadiTermoli,alongwithconfirmationoftheestatesandtitlesofhisfatherAndreawasgrantedhisfather’scompanyofmen-at-arms,andin1520AscanioColonnawasgiventhecaptaincyofmen-at-armshisfatherFabriziohadheld,togetherwiththeofficeofGreatConstable.141Ingeneralitwasmembersoffamiliesofprovenloyaltytothenewdynastythatweregivensuchgrants,withserviceinthewarsbytheformerholdercitedasthereasonforthecompanytobepassedontohisheir.SomesuchfamilieswererecentadditionstotheNeapolitanbaronage.LuisdeLeyva,principed’Ascoli,in1536wasgrantedthecaptaincyofmen-at-armsvacatedbythedeathofhisfather,theeminentgeneralAntoniodeLeyva,whohadbeengrantedhisestates inNaplesforhisservicesintheItalianWars;Luiswasstillaminorin1539.142Mil-itary prowess elevated the Spanish soldier Fernando de Alarcón to be mar-chesediValleSiciliano;hisotherrewardsincludedtheright,grantedin1526,toleavehiscaptaincyof75men-at-armstohisson-in-lawasaninheritance.143

WhetherornottheyheldanofficialpositionintheSpanisharmy,Neapoli-tanbaronscouldbecalledupontodemonstratetheirloyaltytothemonarchbygoing,partlyorwhollyattheirownexpense,tofightinhiswarsoutsidethekingdom. Those who responded to Charles V’s appeal for help to defend

140 CarlosJoséHernandoSánchez,Castilla y Nápoles en el siglo XVI. El Virrey Pedro de Toledo: linaje, estado y cultura (1532–1553)(Salmanca,1994),390–1.

141 J.ErnestoMartínezFerrando,Privilegios otorgados por el Emperador Carlos V en el Reino de Nápoles(Barcelona,1943),49,80.

142 Ibid.,149.143 Ibid,10.

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ViennaagainsttheTurksin1532includedFerrantedaSanseverino,principediSalerno,andAlfonsod’Avalos,marchesedelVasto(althoughthecampaignwasoverbeforeSalernoforonecouldgetthere).144AmongtheSpanishcommand-ersandofficialsinNaples,however,therewasalevelofsuspicionaboutthereliabilityofItaliansoldiers,includingbaronswhoweresubjectsoftheirking.NotablydistrustfulofthemwasPedrodeToledo,thelong-servingviceroy,andhisarrogancefosteredanti-Spanishsentimentswhich,withpersistingAngevinsympathies,deterredmanybaronsfromcompetingforsettledpositionsintheSpanisharmies.145Nevertheless,baronswereaskedtoperformanimportantroleinthedefenceofthekingdom,especiallyagainstthefrequentattacksbyTurkishandcorsairfleetsonthelongcoastline.Theviceroys‘werethefirsttocallfortheinterventionofthebaronsandtolaudtheiraidandmilitaryforcewhentheTurkish fleetarrived.’146Thebaronswerebeingencouragedtoseemilitaryservice,whenitwasrequestedofthem,asanattributeoftheirstatus,asaduty–notasaprofessionorawayoflife.Exceptforafavouredfew,theywerenotbeingofferedmilitarycommandsinthearmyofthemonarchasarightoraprivilegeoftheirstatus.

Outstanding among those favoured few were the d’Avalos, who held thehighestmilitarycommandsintheSpanishandImperialarmyinItaly.Notonlydid the family have a tradition of loyal service to the Aragonese dynasty ofNaples which they transferred to the senior line when Ferdinand took thethrone,butoneofthem,FerranteFrancesco,marchesediPescara,wasatal-ented military leader.147 In his early twenties he commanded a company oflighthorseagainsttheFrenchandthedukeofFerrarain1511,andhefoughtatthebattleofRavennathefollowingyear,fallingprisonerthere.In1513hewasacaptainofSpanishinfantryinLombardyandtheVeneto,commandingapikesquareof4,000SpanishatthebattleofVicenza. It isameasureof thetrustplacedinhimthathewasgivencommandofSpanishinfantryandameasureof the growing status of infantry commands that this haughty Neapolitannoblecametospecializeinthat.Nevertheless,healsoretainedacaptaincyof60men-at-armsfirstgiventohimbyFerdinand,confirmedbyCharlesin1516,andincreasedby30in1524.148

Hisgreatservicestothecrowninwarandpeacewerecitedasthereasonforhisappointmentascaptain-generalofalltheinfantryintheSpanisharmyin

144 HernandoSánchez,Castilla y Nápoles,385.145 Seebelow,pp.207–9.146 Ajello,Una società anomala,153.147 Foranoutlineofhiscareer,seeDBI,IV,623–7.148 MartínezFerrando,Privilegios,25–6.

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Italyin1516,149andhesharedcommandofthecampaignsinLombardyandProvenceinthefirsthalfofthe1520s.Innovativeandimaginativedeploymentoftheinfantryinthefieldofbattle,especiallyhispositioningofarquebusiers,broughthimanenduringreputationandthedevotionofhismen.Heappre-ciatedtheirachievements, too.WhiletheotherSpanishgeneralspraisedhiscontributiontothevictoryatPaviaoverFrancisIin1525,hewrotetoCharlesVthattheemperorowedasmuchtotheleastofhissoldiersfortheirenergyanddetermination.150InNovember1525hewasappointedcaptain-generaloftheImperialarmyinItaly.151

Before he died, he nominated his cousin Alfonso d’Avalos, marchese delVasto,captain-generaloftheSpanishandItalianinfantryintheImperialarmyin Italy, and Charles V confirmed this appointment.152 As well as his uncle’swishes,Alfonso’sownmilitaryservices,especiallyatthebattleofPavia,werecited.HewasalsogivenPescara’scaptaincyover90men-at-arms,buthadtoresigntheonehealreadyheldover50men-at-arms.153Trainedbyhiscousin,attheageoftwenty-twohehadcommandedtheItalianinfantryonthefutilein-vasionofProvencebytheImperialarmyinItalyin1524.Ambitious,butnotgiftedwithsuchoutstandingmilitaryskillsasPescara,hecouldbeadifficultcolleague,andhebecameknownasmuchforhispersonalextravaganceandalmosteffeminatewaysasforhisabilitiesasasoldier.WhenhefelthumiliatedbyhisfailuretotakethesmalltownofVolterrain1530duringthesiegeofFlor-encebytheImperialarmy,heleftandwithdrewtoNaples.Buthecouldalsobeacommittedandhardworkingsoldier,earningtherespectofhistroopsandwasentrustedwiththecommand(undertheemperor)oftheattackonTunisin1535,andaccompaniedCharlesascommanderoftheinfantryonthe1536invasionofProvence.AfterthedeathofAntoniodeLeyvainProvence,hewasgivenoverallcommandofthearmy,andledthecampaigninPiedmont.In1538hewasappointedgovernorofMilanaswellasImperialcommanderinItaly,andinthosecapacitiesheheadedthewaragainsttheFrenchinPiedmontin1542–4,beingdefeatedatthebattleofCeresolein1544.Bythetimeofhisdeathin1546hehadlostthefavouroftheemperorandwassubjecttoanenquiryinto his government of Milan. His son, Francesco Ferdinando, marchese diPescara, continued the family tradition, holding his first command in thewarofParmain1551,agedabouttwenty-one.Threeyearslaterhewasmade

149 Ibid.,25.150 Sanuto, I diarii,XXXVIII,col.23.151 MartínezFerrando,Privilegios,26.152 Foranoutlineofhiscareer,seeDBI,IV,612–6.153 MartínezFerrando,Privilegios,22.

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captainofthecavalryoftheSpanisharmyinLombardyandPiedmont.Hewasleftin1556bythedukeofAlba(whohadbeenappointedPhilipII’slieutenant-generalinItaly)toundertakethedifficulttaskoftryingtocontaintheFrenchinPiedmontandMonferrato.154

FerrantedaSanseverino,principediSalerno,foughtwiththeSpanish-Impe-rialarmyonseveralcampaignsbeforehewentovertotheFrenchin1551,butlessasaprofessionalsoldier,moreasabaronservinghismonarchinawayap-propriatetohisrank;hespentmuchmoretimeatCharlesV’scourt,onprivateandpublicbusiness,thandidthed’Avalos.LikeothermajorNeapolitanbarons,includingPietroAntoniodaSanseverino,principediBisignano,heequippedagalleyathisownexpenseforCharles’sexpeditionagainstTunisin1535,andhecommandedItalian infantry there. BoththeSanseverinoalsoaccompaniedCharlesonhisforayintoProvencein1536,SalernoagainincommandofItalianinfantry,Bisignanowiththecavalry(hehadbeengrantedacaptaincyofmen-at-arms in 1530),155andSalernowentwithhimonhisdisastrousexpeditionagainstAlgiersin1541.Threeyearslater,hecommandedtheItalianinfantryinPiedmontunderhis frienddelVasto, judging the4,000menunderhiscom-mand good troops, if badly disciplined and ill-equipped for battle, becausetheywereshortofpikes.Hisfailuretodeploythesetroops,lackingpreciseor-dersfromdelVasto,wasblamedforthedefeatatCeresole,andwasredeemedonlyinpartbyhisleadingaroutatSerravallelaterthatyearofreinforcementsPieroStrozziwasbringingtheFrenchfromLombardy.156

AmongthemanynewentrantstotheranksoftheNeapolitanbaronsduringtheItalianWarswasAndreaDoria,CharlesV’scaptain-generalontheMediter-raneanSea,whowascreatedprincipediMelfiin1531.157HisroleintheItalianWarswasbyfarthemostprominentofanyoftheLigurianmilitarynobility.AndreadidnotwanttostayinLiguria,buthispursuitofamilitarycareerout-sideItalyachievedonlymodestsuccess.Notuntilhewasinhislatefortiesdidhebeginhiscareerasagalleycommander, first forGenoa,under thedogesGianoandOttavianoCampofregoso.WhenOttavianoCampofregosowasoust-ed by Imperial troops in 1522, Doria transferred the four galleys he had hadwithhimtoserveFrancisI.BythetimehelefttheserviceofFrance,afterpay-mentstohimdwindledfollowingthecaptureofFrancisatPavia,Doriahadsixgalleys of his own. He was building up his personal fleet like a condottiere

154 Foranoutlineofhiscareer,seeDBI,IV,627–34.155 MartínezFerrando,Privilegios,234.156 Colapietra,I Sanseverino,146–9,163,180–2;CarloDeFrede,‘FerranteSanseverinocontro

laSpagna’,209–11.157 MartínezFerrando,Privilegios,96.

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captainbuildinguphiscompanyforhire.Havingbecomecaptain-generalofthepapalgalleys,afterthepopebecameaprisonerintheSackofRomein1527hereturnedtotheserviceofFrancis,beforesettlingintheserviceofCharlesVfrom1528.Throughoutthe1520s,hisprincipaltasks,apartfromtransportingtroopsandmunitions,hadbeeninterventionsinLiguria.HisgalleysharassedtheAdornoregime,andhelpedtoinstalltheFrenchinGenoaagainin1527.Ayearlater,bythenundercontracttoCharlesV,hisinterventionwasdecisiveinoustingtheFrenchandfacilitatingtheinaugurationofa“newrepublic”un-deraradicallychangedconstitution.

Andrea Doria became the most influential men in Genoa, as well as thetrustedadmiraloftheMediterraneanfleetofCharlesV.158HisdualrolehelpedprotectGenoeseindependence.TherelianceofCharlesVonhisgalleystosup-plementtheImperialfleetandsecurethesearoutesbetweenSpainandItalygaveDoriatheleveragetowardoffthedesignsoftheemperor’smeninItalytoestablishcontroloverGenoa.Inhisothermajortask,combattingthegrowingthreatfromthefleetsoftheTurksandcorsairs,Doriahadmixedsuccessandhisreputationsufferedaccordingly,buthekepttheconfidenceoftheemperor.After Charles’s abdication, he retained his position under Philip II until hisdeath.Hewasstilltakingpersonalcommandofhisgalleysinthe1550s,whenhewasinhiseighties,evenwhenhewastoophysicallyfrailtoleavehiscabin.His fleetbecameafamilybusiness,withseveralotherDoriaamonghiscap-tains.HisnephewFilippinocommandedhisgalleysinthemajornavalbattleofthe ItalianWars, at Capo d’Orso in the bay of Naples in 1528, defeating theSpanish-ImperialgalleysdefendingNaplesagainsttheFrenchsiege.(AmongtheprisonerstakentoGenoawereAlfonsod’AvalosandAscanioColonna,whohelpednegotiateDoria’stransfertotheserviceofCharleswhenhiscontractwithFranceexpired.)Onhisdeathin1560Dorialefthisgalleystothegrandsonofacousin,GiovanniAndreaDoria.HedidnotinheritAndrea’soffice–hewasagedonlytwenty–buthewouldbecomePhilipII’sadmiralintheMediterra-neanin1583.159

SomemembersoftheLiguriannobilitywerebeginningtoforgecareersassoldiersintheserviceofotherpowers,suchasGiulioSpinola,whowasgivenacolonelcyof 1,500 infantrybyPhilip in 1559.160NosoldiersofanyeminencecamefromLiguriaduringtheItalianWars,however,andingeneraltheLiguri-anmilitarynobilitystillconfinedtheirmartialexploitsonlandtotheirhome

158 DBI,XLI,264–74.159 Vilma Borghesi (ed.), Vita del Principe Giovanni Andrea Doria scritta da lui medesimo

incom pleta(Genoa,1997),LI.160 Ibid.,67.

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turf.TherewasstillnostandingarmyoftherepublicofGenoainwhichtheycouldseekpositions;afewhundredinfantryweretheonlypermanenttroops.Otherthanintheirowndefence,theGenoesetooklittlepartinthemainlandcampaignsoftheItalianWars.Genoa’smainmilitaryeffortofthewarswasthedefenceofCorsicafrom1553to1559againsttheattemptedconquestoftheis-landbytheFrench,andinthistheyreliedheavilyontheaidofImperialtroopsandforcessentbyDukeCosimoofFlorence.AndreaDoriawaselectedCap-tain-GeneraloftheGenoeseforces,andthecampaignsinCorsicawerethelasthecommandedinperson,as indomitableaseverdespitehisphysicalweak-ness.The“newrepublic”hadbroughtnoinnovationstoGenoa’smilitaryorga-nization,orlackofit.

The far superior military organization of the republic of Venice also re-mainedsubstantiallythesameduringtheItalianWars.TherewasasignificantchangeinstrategyafterthepeacetheVenetiansnegotiatedwithCharlesVinBolognain late1529broughtanendtotheiractiveengagement inthewars.Lessreliancewouldbeplacedonmaintainingastrong fieldarmytodefendVeniceandtheVeneto,morerelianceonextendingandstrengtheningasystemoffortressesandfortifiedtowns.

Butthisdidnotmeanareductionintheopportunitiesforthemilitaryno-bilityoftheVenetotoserveintheVenetianarmy.Ifanything,theymighthavehadabetterchanceofholdingaVenetiancondotta.In1554sevenofthetwelvecondottieri commanding units of men-at-arms in the Veneto were Venetiansubjects.161Thegreatmajorityofthemen-at-armswerealsoVenetiansubjects:aroundthemiddleofthesixteenthcentury,onlyfourofatotalestablishmentof480men-at-armswerenot.162FamiliessuchasthedaPortoofVicenzaandthePompeiofVeronajoinedotherswithanestablishedtraditionofholdingmilitarycommands,suchastheMartinengoofBrescia.Commandscametobepassedontorelatives.TheVenetianswerecontenttodothisbecausetheyhad‘alreadyacceptedthefactthattheretentionofheavycavalrywasprimarilyanexerciseinmaintaininggoodrelationswithpowerfulTerrafermafamiliesanda diversion of their chivalrous pretensions into a form of public service’.163Commandsoverlighthorseweremuchlesssoughtafter,perhapsbecauseofthetraditionalrelianceofVeniceonstradiotsfromtheBalkansfortheirlightcavalry.

161 LucianoPezzolo,‘NobiltàmilitareepoterenelloStatovenezianofraCinqueeSeicento’,399.

162 Ibid.,413.163 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,369.

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Politicalconsiderationswereoperativeonbothsides.Forthenobles,acom-mandenhancedtheirprestigeandinfluenceintheirlocality,notleastbecausetheycouldprovidepositionsasmen-at-armsto theirownfollowers.For theVenetians,condottewereawaytosecurethepoliticalloyaltyofpowerfulfami-lieswhohadsometimesshownduringtheLombardycampaignsoftheItalianWarsthattheyfeltmoreathomeintheserviceofthekingofFranceortheemperor than in that of theVenetian patricians. Once the ItalianWars hadended,theVenetiansbecamemorecomfortablewiththeideaoftheirsubjectsservingotherpowers–indeed,experienceinthewarsinFlanders,say,couldbeseenasanasset.164ButdedicationtotheserviceofVenicecouldbeusedasameanstostakeaclaimtoprivilegedtreatmentfromthegovernment,ortogetindulgence for behaviour that might otherwise have merited rebuke. ConteAlessandroPompeistipulatedinhiswilldrawnupin1546thatanyofhissonswhoservedanyotherpowerwouldbeexcludedfromtheirshareinthefamilyfief;theiradherencetothisinjunctionapparentlyearnedthemimpunityforoffences,suchasexceedingtheirpowersofjurisdiction,thatwouldnormallynotbetakenlightlybyVenice.165

InFriuli,thecastellansdidnotshareinthisdevelopmentintherelationsbetweentheVenetiansandtheirmilitarynobility.There,theSavorgnancon-tinuedtohaveaprivilegedrelationtoVenice.GirolamoSavorgnanandthemi-litia were instrumental in Bartolomeo d’Alviano’s victory over the GermantroopswhohadoccupiedpartoftheCadoreandFriuliin1508.166ItwasAnto-nioandGirolamoSavorgnanattheheadofthemilitiawholedtheresistancetotheinvasionsofFriulibyImperialtroopsduringthefirstyearsoftheWaroftheLeagueofCambrai,receivinglittlehelpfromVenice.Tosparetheprovincefurtherdestruction,AntoniomadetermswiththeImperialtroopsin1511.Thiscosthimdear:hewasregardedasatraitorbytheVenetians,butwasnotre-wardedbyMaximilian,andwasassassinatedinexilebyhisenemiesfromFri-ulithefollowingyear.167HiscousinGirolamokeptthetrustoftheVenetians,andcontinuedtodefendFriuli.Heconsciouslydirectedhissonsintomilitarycareers,tostrengthenthefamily’sposition.Theybecamebestnotedasmili-taryengineers,particularlyGiulio,whohadaprominentroleinthedesignofVenice’sfortificationsonthemainlandandinheroverseasempire,whileMariowroteanimportanttreatiseonartillery.Anotherbrotherwithatalentformili-taryengineering,Germanico,havingbeenexiledin1547forassassinatingsome

164 Pezzolo,‘Nobiltàmilitare’,408–9.165 Zamperetti,I piccoli principi,268.166 PieroPieri,Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana(Turin,1952),449–51.167 Trebbi,Il Friuli,95–100;Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,216–20.

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personalenemiesenteredtheserviceofthekingofFrance.168Thisgenerationtookgreatcarewiththeeducationofthenext,tocontinuethefamily’sexper-tise.169

Forthetopcommandersoftheirarmy,theVenetianswerestillinclinedtochoosemenwhowerenottheirsubjects,atendencythatcouldbreedameas-ure of resentment. ‘It is true that I was not born in the kingdom of Naplesor the lands of Rome but nevertheless I hope that though simply a humbleFriulan,Icandohonourableservice’,remarkedGirolamoSavorgnan,ashewasleftshortofsuppliesheneededtobesiegeImperialtroopsinMaranoin1514.170HisreferencetoNeapolitans–ofwhomtherewerefewintheserviceofVenice–wasmorethanlikelypromptedbyGianbattistaCaracciolohavingbeencap-tainof theVenetian infantry from1499to 1508.171Romanbarons(andothercondottierifromthePapalStates)172weremuchmoreconspicuousinthehighcommandoftheVenetianarmy,especiallymembersoftheOrsinifamilyandfaction.

TheVenetianshadalreadyhadtheireyesonNiccolòOrsinidaPitiglianofora decade when they finally were able to net him, after he escaped from hisFrenchcaptorsatthebattleofFornovoin1495.Hewasappointedgovernor-generaloftheVenetianarmy,andinthatcapacityledtheVenetianinvasionofMilanin1499thatsupportedtheFrenchconquestoftheduchy.Hegrewimpa-tientatnotholdingthemoreprestigiouspositionofcaptain-general,whichwas vacant, before being appointed to it in 1504. His cautious style of com-mandwasoneoftheattributesforwhichhewasvaluedbytheVenetiansbutitcontributed to the traumatic defeat at Agnadello in 1509, when he failed tocometotheaidoftheVenetianforcesengagedinbattlewiththeFrench.Nev-ertheless,hiscontractwasrenewedbuthediedinJanuary1510.173

This created problems for the Venetians, because their governor-general,Bartolomeo d’Alviano, had been captured at Agnadello and was a prisonerwhomtheFrenchkingdidnotwishtoreleaseoragreetoransom.Hewasval-uedfortheoppositequalitiestoPitigliano,forhisdashanddaringandenergy.HefirstenteredtheserviceofVenicein1498withCarloOrsini,Virginio’snatu-

168 Casella,I Savorgnan,p.115;Conzato,Dai castelli alle corti,pp.36–9.169 Casella,I Savorgnan,167–9.170 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,344.171 Ibid.,81.172 Including, about the time of Savorgnan’s remonstrance, Gianpaolo Baglioni and Lucio

Malvezzi,whoeachservedabrieftermasgovernor-general,andDionigiodiNaldo,aval-uedRomagnolinfantrycaptain.

173 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,61–2,158–9,284–5.

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ralson;bothweregivencondotte for 150men-at-arms.174CarloOrsini left in1501,whiled’Alvianostayeduntillate1503,whenhewenttoRometojointheOrsiniinrecoveringtheirpositionthereafterthedeathofAlexanderVI.TakenbackbytheVenetians in1506afteraspell intheserviceofSpain, twoyearslater he was made their governor-general. His defeat of the German troopswhohadoccupiedtheCadoreregionatPievediCadorein1508wasregardedby theVenetiansas a victory tobeproudof, andhe was rewarded with thegrant of the town of Pordenone in Friuli in fief. Although some blamed hisimpetuosityforthedefeatatAgnadellothefollowingyear,theVenetiangov-ernmentwaskeentobringhimbackfromhiscaptivityinFrancetoleadthearmy.Onhisreleasein1513,whenVeniceenteredintoanalliancewithLouisXII,d’Alvianowasappointedcaptain-general,apositionhehelduntilhisdeathin1515.ThiscameshortlyafterhischaracteristicallycourageousinterventionattheheadofachargeofVenetiancavalryhelpedtoswingthebattleofMari-gnanotovictoryfortheFrenchovertheSwiss.Duringhisyearsincommandofthe Venetian army he had sometimes chafed at the restraint the Venetiansdemandedofhim,buttheytrustedhisloyaltyandrespectedhisskillsasacom-manderandinthedesignoffortifications.Hisdeathwasmarkedbyadayofpublicmourning.175

Oneofthepotentialcandidatestotaked’Alviano’splacewasanotherminorRomanbaronandmemberof theOrsini factionwhohadstartedoutunderOrsinitutelage,LorenzodegliAnguillaradaCeri,usuallyknownasRenzodaCeri.Havingmadehisreputationasaninfantrycommander,inAugust1510hewasappointedcaptainoftheVenetianinfantrywithapersonalcommandof800infantryand100lighthorse.176Resourcefulandresilientwhenhehadsolecommand,heapparentlydislikedbeingsubordinatetomenheconsideredhisequals.Hewasgivenasecretdispensationin1512fromobeyingGianpaoloBa-glioniasgovernor-general,andhisrelationswithd’Alvianobecamefractious.177In1515hemadeitknownthathewantedtoleave,andcontactedFrancisI,butthekingurgedhimtoserveouthiscontractwithVenice,sayingtheVenetians

174 Sanuto,I diarii,II,cols9–10.175 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,63,64,188,191,223,286–8,293,295,381,384–

5. An extensive collection of documents, relating particularly to d’Alviano’s service ofVenice,isprintedasanappendixtoLorenzoLeônij,Vita di Bartolomeo di Alviano(Todi,1858),133–375;ford’Alviano’sreporttoVeniceonthebattleofMarignano,seeSanuto,I diarii,XXI,cols100–2.

176 Sanuto,XI,I diarii,cols43,62,223.177 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,288.

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werenotresponsibleforhisdifferenceswithd’Alviano.178HelefttotakeupacondottafromPopeLeoXfor200men-at-armsand200lighthorse.179

ThesuccessionofOrsinicondottieriinVenetianservicecontinuedintothemid-sixteenth century and beyond. In June 1515 Giancorrado Orsini fromthe minor Mugnano branch of the family was given a condotta for 1,000infantry,180butonlystayedayearbeforeleavingtojoinRenzodaCeri.ThenexttoserveVenicewasCamilloOrsinidiLamentana,whocametobeconsideredthebestOrsinicondottiereofhisgeneration;hewastakenonin1522withacommandof100lances.181HestayedwithVeniceforovertwentyyears,apartfrom a period in 1528–9 when, withVenetian permission, he fought for theFrenchinthekingdomofNaples.Areportedpromiseofacondottafor3,000infantryand200lighthorsefromFrancis182mayhavecometonothing,astheking’s thoughts turned to peace following his army’s defeat in Lombardy.DuringtheVenetians’waragainsttheTurksinthelate1530s,Camillocommand-edtheirforcesonlandinDalmatia,whileanotherOrsini,Valerio,commandedtheirfleet.183(Onhisdeathin1550,ValeriowasdescribedastheVenetians’bestsoldier.)184 Although Camillo’s contract was renewed after the war – for 100men-at-arms,100lightcavalryand10infantrycaptains185–hewaspassedoverforpromotiontogeneralcommandoftheVenetianarmy,andlefttotakeser-vicewiththepope.

RomanbaronsduringtheItalianWarswerestillthemostinclinedofalltheItalianmilitarynobilitiestomakeacareerofsoldiering,andstillhadthemostfreedomofchoiceofprospectiveemployers.Initially,thosewhohadgrownupwiththesystemofcondottehadsomedifficultyadjustingtothenewtypesofcommandavailable.ThefrequentchangesofregimeinthekingdomofNaplesduringthefirstdecadeofthewarsconfrontedthemwithsomeriskydecisions.For some, it was not only military commands but also valuable estates thatwereatstakeiftheyfoundthemselvesonthelosingside.CompoundingtheirproblemswastheattitudeofPopeAlexanderVI,whoexploitedopportunitiespresentedwhenbaronialcondottierionthelosingsideintheNeapolitanwarsweredeprivedofeffectivepoliticalprotection, inordertoseizetheirestates

178 Sanuto,I diarii,XXI,cols62,72.179 Francesco Guicciardini, Carteggi, ed. Roberto Palmarocchi (Bologna, 1938–72), I, 263:

F.GuicciardinitoLuigiGuicciardini,12Sept.1515;FrancescoGuicciardini,Storia d’Italia,BookXII,Chap.14.

180 Sanuto,I diarii,XX,col.330181 Ibid.,XXXIII,col.356.182 Ibid.,L,col.97.183 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,299.184 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1319,120–1:JuanHurtadodeMendoza,9Mar.1550,Venice.185 MallettandHale,The Military Organization,300.

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aroundRome.VirginioOrsiniwasthemostnotablecasualtyofthesedilem-mas.HavingadmittedtheFrenchkingCharlesVIIIandhisarmyintohises-tatesinLazioin1494,VirginiolefttofightforAlfonsoinNaples,butwascaughtupinthecollapseofresistancetotheinvadersfollowingAlfonso’sabdicationandflight.CapturedwithNiccolòOrsinibytheFrenchinFebruary1495,andtakennorthasaprisoner,hewasfinallyreleasedwhenCharlesVIIIreachedAsti. His Neapolitan counties of Tagliacozzo and Albi, confiscated by theFrench,hadbeenlosttotheColonna,anditmayhavebeenhopesofrecover-ingthemthatswayedhischoiceofacceptingacommandfromCharlesVIII,ratherthanacondottafromtheleagueofAlexander,VeniceandMilan.186Asaconsequenceofthisdecision,hefoundhimselfonceagainonthelosingsideinNaplesin1496,andonceagainaprisoner,thistimeofAlfonso’ssonFerrandi-no.Alexanderlaunchedanattackonhisestates,whichhisfamilyandparti-sanswereabletodefeat,butVirginiodiedinprisoninJanuary1497,beforeheknewhislandshadbeensaved.187

Prospero and Fabrizio Colonna were ultimately more successful in theirchoices.BythetimeCharlesVIIIreachedRomein1494,FabriziohadjoinedProsperoinholdingacondottafromtheFrenchking,andthenaccompaniedhimonhisrapidconquestofNaples.AfterCharleslefttoreturntoFrance,theyswitchedsides,toserveAlfonso’ssonFerrandinoasherecoveredhiskingdom,andremainedintheserviceofhissuccessor,Federico.Thismeanttheycouldgetconfirmation of thegrants of landsCharleshad made to them,butalsomeant they were in a vulnerable position when Federico was threatened in1501withajointinvasionofNaplesbyFrenchandSpanisharmies.AlexanderseizedhischancetotaketheirestatesbetweenRomeandtheNeapolitanbor-ders.OnceFedericohadsurrenderedandleftforexileinFrance,ProsperoandFabriziocontrivedtoenterthegoodgracesoftheSpanishcommander,Gon-zaloFernándezdeCórdoba.Forawhile,itlookedasthoughtheymighthavebackedthewrongside,astheFrenchseemedtohavetheadvantagewhencon-flictoverthedivisionofthekingdombecameopenwar.Butthenotablepartthey played as Gonzalo’s captains and advisers in the war and in Gonzalo’seventualvictorygavethemstrongclaimstothefavourofFerdinandofAragon,thenewkingofNaples.188

ProsperoandFabriziobecamecloselyidentifiedwiththeSpanishinItaly,but not so single-mindedly as the d’Avalos. They did not forget they were

186 Sanuto,I diarii.II,cols33–4.187 Shaw,The Political Role,180–3.188 Shaw,‘TheRomanbaronsandtheFrenchdescent’,253–6;AlessandroSerio,Una gloriosa

sconfitta. I Colonna tra papato e impero nella prima età moderna (1431–1530)(Rome,2008),120–33;MallettandShaw,The Italian Wars,23,33,559–60,62,64.

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RomanbaronsandcondottieriaswellasNeapolitanbarons,anddidnotfeelboundtoservethekingofNaplesalone.InAugust1503,Prosperocomplainedthathehadhadenoughofbeingwith‘barbari’.189Herefusedtoacceptsubor-dinatecommands,includingundertheviceroyofNaples,maintaininghehadaclauseinhiscontractwithFerdinandthatheshouldnotbeobligedtogooncampaignunlesshewasthecommander,andthatonlythekingcouldcom-mandhim.190IfhecouldhavehadthetitleofGonfalonieredellaChiesaorofcaptain-general of the papal army, he might have accepted a condotta fromJuliusIIin1512,butthosepositionswerealreadyheldbyothers.Overallcom-mandoftheforcesagainstFrancewouldhavebeenevenbetter,butwhilethepopewasreadytoconsent,theSpanishambassadorsaidhehadnomandatetoagree.191

Thenfrom1513acommandwasfoundforhimthathewouldaccept,ascap-tain-generalofthenewdukeofMilan,MassimilianoSforza.Notonlywasheoverallcommanderof theduke’sarmy(suchas itwas),hecouldrecruithisown men-at-arms.192 This appointment meant that when the Milanese andVenetianarmiesconfrontedoneanotherinLombardyin1514,bothwereunderthecommandofRomanbarons:ProsperoColonna(withSilvioSavelliasoneofhisseniorcaptains)ononeside,RenzodaCeriandBartolomeod’Alvianoonthe other. But when Prospero led his men into Saluzzo to meet the Frencharmy advancing over the Alps to invade the duchy of Milan in 1515, he wastakenunawaresandcaptured,andhisfinecompanyofmen-at-armsstrippedof their weapons and their prized Neapolitan horses and dispersed. By thetimehehadpaidhisransomandreturnedfromcaptivityinFrance,MilanwasunderFrenchruleandProsperowasagainwithoutacommand.193

The renewal of the contest for possession of the duchy of Milan in 1521broughtProsperototheforefrontagain.HewasgivenchargeofthepapalandImperial forces mustered near Parma to fight the French. He threatened toleavethecampimmediatelyiftheviceroycametotakecommand(whichhedid not), or if the marchese di Pescara who was captain of the Spanish-Imperialmen-at-armsrefusedtoaccepthisauthority.194WhenPescaraarrivedinthecamp,theymanagedtoestablishaworkingrelationshipsoProsperore-mainedincommand.HesuccessfullypetitionedCharlesVforappointmentto

189 AntonioGiustinian,Dispacci,ed.PasqualeVillari(Florence,1876),II,162:27Aug.1503.190 Sanuto,I diarii,XII,cols176–7;XIII,cols126–7.191 Ibid.,XIV,col.314.192 Serio,Una gloriosa sconfitta,204–5.193 ForProsperoColonna’sroleintheLombardcampaigna,seeMallettandShaw,The Italian

Wars,122,124–5,127–8.194 Guicciardini,Carteggi,IV,142–4,148,154–7,179–80:F.GuicciardinitoCardinalGiuliode’

Medici,30July,4,9,18Aug.1521,fromthecamp.

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behiscaptain-generalinLombardy,195andkeptthatpositionuntilhisdeathon30December1523inMilan.196

FabrizioColonnawasnotquitesoexigent,andwaspreparedtosettleforsomethingotherthanthesupremecommandofanarmy.He ledthetroopssentfromNaplestosupportJuliusIIinhiswaronthedukeofFerrarain1510,andin1511acceptedacondottafor300men-at-armsunderthecommandoftheviceroyRamondeCardona,andthetitleofgovernorandlieutenant-generalofFerdinand’sarmyinItaly.197ItwasinthiscapacitythathefoughtunderCar-dona’scommandattheBattleofRavennain1512,wherehewascaptured.198Fabriziomayhavegrownrestivebeingsubordinatetothe incompetentCar-dona.AlthoughCardonaandtheSpanisharmywasstillcampaigninginLom-bardy in the summer and autumn of 1513, Fabrizio obtained leave fromFerdinandtotakethepositionofcaptain-generalofanyChristianpower,pro-videdtheywerenotattackingthelandsofFerdinandorthoseofthepope.Hiscaptaincyof100men-at-armswastobepassedtohissonFederico.199Intheevent,Fabriziodidnotholdanothercommandbeforehisdeathin1520,andFedericowaskilledfightinginLombardyin1516.200

NeitherthesurvivingsonofFabrizio,Ascanio,norProspero’ssonVespasia-noachievedthemilitaryimportanceoftheirfathers.OnFabrizio’sdeath,As-caniowasgrantedthecaptaincyofhiscompanyofmen-at-armsandhisofficeofGreatConstableofNaples,201whichseemstohaveinspiredAscaniotoclaimalevelofcommandforwhichhislackofexperiencedidnotqualifyhim.Dis-appointedinhisaspirationstooverallcommandoftheSpanish-Imperialmen-at-armsbeingsentfromNaples,hedisobeyeddirectordersfromCharlesVtogotoLombardyin1521.202HealsoignoredordersfromCharlestoputhimselfunderProspero’scommand,sentinNovember1522withtheadmonitionthat,youngashewas,hehadmuchto learnfromProspero’swisdomandexperi-ence.203AscaniodoesnotseemtohavetakenanypartinthewarsinLombar-dy. Nor does Vespasiano, who was much older than Ascanio but had notapparentlybeentrainedtofollowinhisfather’sfootsteps.Hewasgrantedthecaptaincy of his father’s personal company of men-at-arms on Prospero’s

195 Serio,Una gloriosa sconfitta,268.196 DBI,XXVII,418–26.197 Serio, Una gloriosa sconfitta,181,194.198 FabrizioColonna’saccountoftheBattleofRavennaisinSanuto,I diarii,XIV,cols176–80.199 Serio, Una gloriosa sconfitta,208.200 Ibid.,228.201 MartínezFerrando,Privilegios,80.202 Serio, Una gloriosa sconfitta,242–3.203 Ibid,266–7.

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death,buttheappointmentmentionedhisfather’smilitarymerits,notanyofthebythenmiddle-agedVespasiano.204AscaniodidtakepartinthedefenceofNaplesagainsttheFrenchin1528,andwastakenprisonerinthenavalbattleoffCapod’Orso.Vespasianotooknopart inthiswar;hewasailinganddiedthatyear.AscaniohadmilitaryresponsibilitiesasgovernoroftheAbruzzi,apositionheowedtohisbeingtheheadoftheColonnafamily,withextensiveestatesinthatprovince,nothislimitedcapacitiesasasoldier.

The close association that the major branch of the family developedwiththeSpanishregimeinNaplesmeantthatforColonnacondottieriservingthe king of Spain and the emperor became the norm, serving the king ofFrancetheexception,somethingofananomaly.TwoprominentColonnacon-dottierididtakethestep.OnewasMarcantoniodiPierantonioColonna,Pros-pero’s nephew, who died fighting with the French army besieging Milan inMarch1522,whenProsperowascommandingthedefenceofthecity.Hepur-suedacareerwhichsethimapartfromtheotherheadsofthemainbranchesofthefamily,inpartbecausehewishedtoasserthisindependencefromthem.BeginninghiscareerwithProsperoandFabrizio in theserviceofSpain,hisfirstmajorcondottawaswithFlorencefrom1504to1510,andhethenservedpopesJulius(whoseniece,LucreziaGaradellaRovere,hemarried)andLeo.In1515hewassenttosupporttheImperialdefenceofVeronaandwiththepope’spermissiontransferredtotheserviceofMaximilian.Unabletosecurethees-tablishedsubstantialImperialcommandhehopedfor, in1517heacceptedacontractfromFrancisI.205

AnotherprominentColonnacondottierewhoservedtheFrenchwasStefanoColonnadaPalestrina.HefollowedseveralearliergenerationsofhisPalestrinabranch of the family in adopting a political stance contrary to that of themainbranches.ButhebeganhiscareerfightingwithImperialandMilaneseforcesinLombardyintheearly1520s,commanding1,000infantryintheImpe-rialarmybyDecember1523.206HespentsomeyearsintheserviceofClementVII–leadingtheresistancetotheincursionintoRomebytroopsbroughtbyCardinalPompeoandAscanioColonnainSeptember1526207–beforejoiningtheFrench.Bythattimehehadacquiredagoodreputationasaninfantrycom-mander,andinlate1528wasgivenacondottaof2,000infantryand200lighthorse.HestayedintheserviceofFrancisIforseveralyears,withoneinterval

204 MartínezFerrando,Privilegios,84.205 Serio, Una gloriosa sconfitta,161,174,181,233,238,273;DBI,XXVII,365–8.206 EnruquePachecoydeLeyva(ed.),La politica española en Italia: correspondencia de Don

Fernando Marín, Abad de Nájera, con Carlos I(Madrid,1919) ,487.207 Sanuto,I diarii,XLII,cols700,727.

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when,withtheking’spermission,hewasoneofthecommandersdefendingFlorenceduringthesiegebyImperialtroopsin1529.HefoughtfortheFrenchinLombardy in 1529andPiedmont in 1536,and tookpart in thedefenceofProvenceagainsttheinvasionbyCharlesVthatyear.ButhewasdissatisfiedbyFrancis’sattitude tohis Italian infantryandmovedon inearly 1537 toservePopePaulIII,becomingcaptain-generalofthepapal infantryin1538.Then,afteraspellwithVenice,hewasappointedlieutenant-generalofDukeCosimode’Medici’stroopsin1542.BecauseofhisassociationwithFrance,therewassomeattemptbyCharlesVtodissuadethedukefromtakinghimon,butCosi-mo resented this interference and went ahead with the appointment.208TodemonstratehehadcuthistieswithFrance,Stefanoreturnedtheinsigniaofthe French royal chivalric order of Saint-Michel to Francis. He stayed withCosimountilhisdeathin1548.209

FortheOrsini,ontheotherhand,serviceintheSpanishandImperialarmiesbecametheexception.TheyweremuchmorelikelytoholdcommandsintheFrench,Venetianandpapalarmies,andintheFlorentinearmywhentheMedi-ciwereinpower.Itwasthemembersofthesecond-ranklineagesofthefamilythatcarriedonthemilitarytradition;noneofthemenofthemainbranch,theOrsinidiBracciano,mademuchofamilitaryreputationforthemselvesafterVirginio.HisillegitimatesonCarlowasabettersoldierthanhislegitimatesonandheir,Giangiordano.Carlo’sson,GentilVirginio,conted’Anguillarabecameacommanderofgalleys,firstforPopePaulIII,thenin1542forCharlesVunderAndreaDoria,andthenforFrancisI.210CamillodiLamentanaandValeriodiMonterotondowereprobablythebest-reputedOrsinisoldiersofthelaterde-cadesofthewars.Camillo’ssonsPaoloandLatino,andValerio’sson,Giordanocontinuedthefamilytradition.

RomanbaronsweretobefoundineverytheatreoftheItalianWars,andinsometheatresofwaroutsideItaly,too.Theyheldcommands,notonlyinLom-bardy,NaplesandtheVeneto,andinthePapalStates,butalsoinTuscany,inPiedmontandCorsica.InthewarofSienain1552–5, inwhichtroopsintheserviceofFrancehelpeddefendSiena,undersiegebythearmiesofCharlesVandDukeCosimo,ValerioOrsini’ssonGiordanodistinguishedhimselfinthedefenceoftheSienesehilltownofMontalcinoagainstSpanish-Imperialtroopsin 1553, Carlo Orsini (perhaps the natural son of Gentil Virginio), one of

208 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b. 1912,cc134–5:NinotoCardinalErcoleGonzaga,30Apr. 1542,Rome.

209 DBI,XXVII,443–5.210 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.883,c.242:FabrizioPeregrinotoFedericoGonzaga,17Dec.1534,

Rome;b.1912,c.220:NinotoCardinalErcoleGonzaga,23Aug.1542,Rome.

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Cosimo’scaptainsofhorse,methisdeathdefendingFoianotheyearafter,andFedericoSavelliwaskilledattackingthedefensiveoutworksofSienain1554.FrancescodiOttavioOrsiniandFlaminiodegliAnguillarawereamongthede-fendersofthecityandterritoryofSiena,aswasPaoloOrsini,whowasoneofthe captains taken prisoner in the defeat of the French forces at the battleattheFossodiScannagalloin1554.Thenineteen-year-oldsonofAscanioCol-onna,Marcantonio,commandedtheheavycavalryonthesideofthevictorsinthe battle, while Camillo Colonna was at the head of 3,000 infantry he hadraisedfortheSpanisharoundRome.211ThegrandsonofanillegitimatebrotherofProspero,Camillowasdescribedin1551asbeingtheonlysoldierofnoteinthefamilyatthattime.212

Duringthewar inPiedmont,RenzodaCeri’s sonGianpaolocommandedItalianinfantryfightingfortheFrenchthereduringthefirstphaseofthewar,beforehisdeathin1542.HewasheldinhighregardattheFrenchcourt,butdidnotalwaysfeelthathewastreatedashisservicesmerited.213FedericoSavellifoughtforCharlesVinPiedmontinthethirdphaseofthewars,butcameun-deracloudin1553,accusedofmaltreatingthepeopleofVolpianowhenhewasgovernorthere.214WhenthewarsspreadtoCorsicainthe1550s,astheFrenchtriedtotaketheislandfromtheGenoese,Romanbaronsbecameengagedonthatfront,too.FrancescoandGiordanoOrsiniwereamongthetroopsthattheFrenchmarshalTermestookfromTuscanytoCorsicain1553.GiordanowouldbecomethecommanderoftheFrenchforcesinCorsicaandtheking’slieuten-antthere,battlingonuntilthepeaceofCateau-Cambrésisin1559.215DuringthewarofParmain1551,CamilloOrsinicommandedthepapalarmybesiegingMirandola,andGiulioandCarloOrsini,AntimoSavelliandAlessandroCol-onnadiPalestrinawerepapalcaptainsandsubordinatecommanders.216

211 RobertoCantagalli,La Guerra di Siena (1552–1559)(Siena,1962),48,102–3,199,204,293,295–7,302–6;AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1444,80:‘Avvisidelcampo’,May1554.

212 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.1921,c.531:CardinalErcoleGonzagatoNatale,16Oct.1551.213 J. Lestocquoy (ed.), Correspondance des Nonces en France Carpi et Ferrerio 1535–1540

(Rome,1961), 144, 178, 181, 199,276;ASMantua,AGonzaga,b. 1912,c.291:NinotoErcoleGonzaga,2Nov.1542,Rome.

214 AGSimancas,Estado, leg.879,61:complaintbythecommunityofVolpianotoFedericoSavelli,22May1553;62:copyoftheaccusationsagainstFedericoSavelliandhisreplies.

215 MarcAntonioCeccaldi,Histoire de la Corse 1464–1560(Ajaccio,2006),264ff;MichelVergé-Franceschi, Sampiero Corso 1498–1567: un mercenaire européen au XVIe siècle (Ajaccio,2000),245,279–80,285–6,306–31.

216 Giampiero Brunelli, Soldati del Papa. Politica militare e nobiltà nello Stato della Chiesa (1560–1644)(Rome,2003),54.

146 Chapter5

CamilloOrsinionlytookcommandwhenthepope’snephewGianbattistadelMonte,whohadbeeninchargeofthepapalforces,fellill.Romanbaronswhoservedthepopestillgenerallyhadtoacceptthatthehighestposition,thatofGonfalonieredellaChiesa,wouldgotoarelativeofthepope,howeverinex-perienced,howeverincompetenthemightbe.CamilloOrsinihadbeengover-nor-general of the papal army since 1548. In 1553 Pope Julius III thought ofdismissing him, suggesting Venice might take him on again, but when theVenetiansdeclined,heappointedCamillo ‘custodediRoma’.217Heagreedtodevise the defences of Rome for Paul IV, when the duque de Alba broughtSpanishtroopsfromNaplesintothePapalStatesin1556,butitwasthepope’sCaraffa nephews who were in command. Another Orsini, Giulio, did play aprominentroleinthewar,includingthedefenceofPaliano,whichthepopehadtakenfromMarcantonioColonnaandgiventohisnephewGiovanni.218MarcantonioColonnacamewithAlbatoreclaimhisestatesandharriedthepapalforcesintheCampagna.219

TheabilityofRomanbaronstoraiseinfantrybydrawingonlocalloyaltiescould still be regarded as an asset to employers, but the utility of such in·fantrycouldbelimitediftheyweretobepittedagainstspecialist,professionalinfantry.Thepotentialutilityofthebarons’landscouldalsostillbeaconsider-ation,althoughitwasoflesssignificancethanithadbeen.Asinthefifteenthcentury,itwasofmostinteresttothekingofNaples,nowthekingofSpain.How useful the estates of the Colonna in particular could be in projectingSpanish-ImperialmilitarypowerwithinthePapalStates,andinbringingpres-suretobearonthepope,waspartofthecalculationsoftheviceroysofNaplesandoftheSpanish-ImperialrepresentativesinRome.Buttheydidnotexpectaccesstosuchlands,ifneeded,tobeconditionalontheagreementofasub-stantialcondottaforthebaronconcerned.

On the whole, by the mid-sixteenth century less weight was given to thepotentialpoliticalassetsofRomanbaronswhentheywerebeinggivenmili-tarycontracts,andthequestionofwhotheymightservewasoneoflesscon-cerntothepopes.Thethreattheymightposetothepopeswithoutthebackingofanotherpowerhaddiminished.ThemilitarystrengthoftheGuelfandGhi-bellinefactionshadwaned,andthesortsofcommandavailablegavebaronsless scope for independent action, as they could no longer use condotte tomaintaintheirownindependentcompaniesthatcouldmovewiththemfrom

217 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1321,8:FranciscodeVargastoCharlesV,13Oct.1553,Venice.218 CSPVenetian,VIi,583,671;VIii, 753–6,775,901,1092,1225,1235,1236.219 Seeabove,pp.31,39.

147ALifeinArms

oneemployertoanother,andbedeployedtoenhancetheirpowerinthePapalStates.

With the end of the ItalianWars, the military nobility of Italy in generalbecamelessdistinctivelymilitaryasagroup.Theycouldnolongermakeapro-fessionofsoldieringascondottieri,astheyhadinthefifteenthcentury.InthemorepeacefulItalyofthelatersixteenthcenturythemainoptionsavailablewereserviceinthemilitia(wheretherewasone),orgoingtofightabroad.Thedevelopmentof larger,moreorganizedmilitiaforcesinTuscany,theVeneto,thePapalStatesandtheduchyofSavoybroughtsomenewpositionsandcom-mands suitable for nobles, but did not create such opportunities that theycouldprovideanewtypeofcareerforthemilitarynobility.Aproposalmadein1567 by Marcantonio Colonna, that the pope should give permanent com-mandsofcompaniesofcavalrytoatleasttwentynoblesfromtheleadingfam-iliesofthePapalStates–backedbytheargumentthatasotherprincesmadeuseoftheirvassals,sothepopeshouldtrustinhis–wasnottakenupbyPiusV.220

Thosewhowantedtoseesomemilitaryactioninordertoprovetheirmet-tle,wouldheadforthewarsinnorthernEurope,inFlandersorFrance,orgotofighttheTurksonlandorsea.ItaliansoldiersintheserviceofFrance,SpainortheEmperorearlierinthecenturyhadalreadybeenemployedinthesearenas.MilitarycareerscouldstillbemadebythosepreparedtospendmuchoralloftheirtimeoutsideItaly.LatinoOrsini,forinstance,havingbegunhiscareerattheageofsixteeninthelastdecadeoftheItalianWars,alternatedbetweenserviceofthepopeandofVenice,butthistookhimtoFrance,HungaryandtheEasternMediterranean,aswellassuppressingbanditsinthePapalStates.221Itwastherightofeverynoble,heasserted,toexercise‘thattalentthatGodhasgivenhim,tohonourhimselfandhisfamily,andtodosomethingtoserveoth-ers’.222Tospendalifetimeexercisingthattalent,however,becameanexcep-tionalmatterofindividualchoice,nottheexpectedpathoftheyoungmenofthemilitarynobility.Bythelatersixteenthcentury,evenRomanbaronsweremorelikelytoseekhonourbyspendingsometimeservingabroadasvolun-teers, thanbymakingaprofessionof soldiering.Many Italiannobleswouldhavesomeexperienceofwarfare–ifonlyinvoluntaryserviceinasinglecam-paign–butfarfewerwouldspendalifeinarms.

220 Brunelli,Soldati del Papa,41–2.221 Ibid,38,43,46–8,57;Giampiero Brunelli,‘“Primamaestro,chescolare”.Nobiltàromanae

carrieremilitarinelCinqueeSeicento’,93.222 Brunelli,Soldati del Papa,42,59.

148 Chapter6

CHAPTER6

Allegiance and Rebellion I: The Fifteenth Century

Formanymembersof themilitarynobility,allegiancewasnotastraightfor-wardmatter.BecauseofthecomplexitiesofthepoliticalgeographyofItaly,itwouldveryoftennotbesosimpleasasubject,howeverpowerfulasubject,owingundividedallegianceasaprimarydutytoonesovereignprince.Manybaronsandlordsofcastlesfelttheyhadachoice,atleastintheory,whethertogivetheirallegianceatall,andiftheydid,towhom,andonwhatterms.Apartfrom private loyalties to family and faction (which in some circumstancesmightoverrideallothers), themilitarynobilitycouldoweallegiance toem-ployersascondottieri,ortoprotectors–betheyprince,republic,evenamorepowerful noble – as an aderente or raccomandato, or as vassals or subjects.Theycouldbeaccusedof treachery inallof theserelationships,butonlyasvassalsorsubjectscouldtheybechargedwithrebellion.

Condottierimightbeconsideredtraitorsiftheyconnivedwiththeenemy,enteredunauthorizednegotiationswiththemtoprotecttheirowninterests,orheldbackfromfightingwhennecessityoropportunityurgedthattheyshouldtakeaction.Suchaccusationscould,ofcourse,haveseriousconsequences.Atbest,areputationfordisloyaltywouldhinderacommander’schancesoffind-inganothercontract;atworst,hemightbearrestedandexecuted,orsummar-ilykilled,asGibertodaCorreggiowasinSienain1455.1Forbaronsandlordsofcastles, loyal service to theiremployeras condottieri could, in somecircum-stances,exposethemtoaccusationsoftreacherybytheenemy,ifthatenemyhappenedtobeaprinceorrepublicthatclaimedtheirallegianceasvassalsorsubjects.2Ifasoldierfoundhimselfinthatposition,hemightwellputhismil-itaryhonourbeforehisobligationsasasubject–ifheacknowledgedhehadanysuchobligations.

Recognitionofthethreatofreprisalsagainstmembersofthemilitarynobil-itywhowereenteringintocondottewithemployerswhowerenottheirprinces,andperhapsagainstthewishesoftheirprince,wasonereasonfortheclausespromisingprotectionofthecommandersandtheirlandsinsertedintosomecontracts.Romanbaronspreparingtocommittheirestatestotheserviceofanemployer,potentiallyinhostilitiesagainstthepope,wouldcertainlyexpectapledge of protection if they were in consequence to come under attack, for

1 Seeabove,p.115.2 Forexample,seebelow,pp.178–9.


149AllegianceandRebellionI:TheFifteenthCentury

example.Attheleast,baronsandcastellansholdingcondottewouldexpect(asdidsecond-rankprincessuchasthemarquisofMantuaorthedukeofUrbinowhen they held military condotte from other powers) to be able to use thetroopspaidforbytheiremployertodefendtheirownlands.Somecondotte,fromtheemployers’pointofview,wereprimarilyanexcusetoplacetroopson,orwithin,thebordersofanotherstate,andtointerfereinitsinternalpolitics;thevalueofanymilitaryservicetobeexpectedfromthecondottierewasasec-ondaryconsideration.Therewasnocleardividinglinebetweenmilitarycon-dotte with a clause promising political protection, and political agreementspromisingmilitaryprotection,whetherthecondottierewasaprinceoraminorcastellan,amarquisofMantuaoroneoftheplethoraofMalaspinamarquises.Therewas,rather,aspectrumofarrangementsrangingfromthepurelypoliti-caltothepurelymilitary.

Consequently,itisnotalwayseasytodistinguishcontractsofmilitarycon-dotte from contracts of political aderenza or accomandigia.The agreementsmadebyFrancescoSforzawithPietroMariaRossiandRolandoPallaviciniinthe late 1440s contained elements of both. A condotta for 200 horse, with apromisetodefendRossi’slandsagainstanyaggressorwasagreedattheendofOctober1447.ThiswasfollowedinearlyDecemberbyamoreextensiveformalpromisetodefendandfavourRossi,hislandsandfortresses,hisprivilegesandjurisdictions, his men, his subjects, and his own aderenti and raccomandati,againstanyonemakingwaronthem,attackingthemorusurpingtheirlands.Sforzacommandedhisowntroopstotreatthemwithcareandrespect,‘solongas the said Pietro Maria follows our path, as he has promised’.3 ReaffirmingthesepledgesinFebruary1449,SforzaincreasedRossi’scondottato500horse.4Terms he agreed with Rolando Pallavicini in February 1448 were linked to acondottaof200horseforsomeofRolando’ssons.SforzapromisedtomaintainRolando and his sons in the possession of their estates and jurisdictions, tohelphimrecoverlandstakenfromhimbythecondottiereNiccolòPiccinino,andtogivehimandhissonssecureaccesstoSforza’sownlands.Pallavicinipromisedinreturnthatthoseofhissonswhoheldthecondottewouldservewellandfaithfully;thatSforza’sfriendswouldbehisfriends,andSforza’sene-mieshisenemies;thathewouldmakewar,peaceortruceasSforzaasked;andthathewouldgivetransit,victualsandlodgingstoSforza’smen,includinghistroops.5

3 Covini,‘LecondottedeiRossi’,61–2.4 Ibid.,66.5 Pezzana,Storia della Città di Parma,II,621–2.

150 Chapter6

Whentheseagreementsweremade,FrancescoSforzawasnotyetdukeofMilan,onlyapowerfulcondottiereholdinglargeswathesoftheduchy.Althoughthetermswerethoseofaderenze,Sforza,hiseyesonthedukedom,didnotlistRossiorPallaviciniamonghisaderentiinhistreatywithVeniceinDecember1448.6 Nor did he, or his successors, ever acknowledge them as aderenti, astheyandotherLombardnoblespreferredtoberegarded,ratherthanasthevassals and subjects that the dukes held them to be.7To recognize them asaderentiwouldbetorecognizetheessentialautonomyof theirestates fromthedominionofthedukes.8

Legaldoctrinedrewacleardistinctionbetweenfiefholders,feudatari,whowere under the jurisdiction (‘sub iurisdictione’) of a prince, and aderentiwhowereunderhisprotection(‘subprotectione’).9Governmentssometimestendedtooverlookthedistinction,andclaimauthorityovertheiraderentiandtheirlandsandsubjectsthatthecontractsofaderenzadidnotmention.Baronsandcastellans,however,werewellawareofthedistinction,andkeentomain-tain it.Whenaducalcommissionerwassent to intervene ina legaldisputeinvolvingmarcheseAntonioMalaspinain1487,Antoniowasquicktoobject.Doubtless,therehadbeensomemistake,hesaid,andLudovicoSforzaperhapsbelievedthathewasasubject,buthewasanaderenteandraccomandato, ifstillafaithfulservantoftheSforza.10ItwasamistakethatthedukesofMilanand their officials made repeatedly, but the dukes could be obliged to backdown and their officials be obliged to back off – as in 1474, when GaleazzoMariaSforzaadmonishedtheofficeinchargeofcollectingextraordinaryrev-enuesthat‘ouradherentesandcolligatosarenotoursubjects,butequals’.11

Nobleswhowereaderentiwouldbetheequaloftheprincefromwhomtheyreceivedprotectioninthesensethattheywerepoliticallyautonomous,subjecttonoone,exceptperhapstheemperor.Aderenzeandaccomandigiewerevol-untaryarrangements,atleastintheory.Inpractice,theweakerparty,theader-ente or raccomandato, might have little option about whether or not theyentered into the arrangement, or agreed to its renewal.The combination oflegal independence and political and military vulnerability explains why somanyaderentiwereholdersofsmallImperialfiefs.Typically,formaladerenzeandaccomandigiewerearrangementsbetweenunequals;toputoneselfand

6 Somaini,‘Unastoriaspezzata’,153.7 Chittolini,‘Infeudazioniepoliticafeudale’,61;Chittolini,‘Ilparticolarismosignorile’,269.8 Chittolini,‘Guerre,guerricciole’,246.9 LetiziaArcangeli,‘Piccolisignorilombardiepotenzegrosse’,412.10 Chittolini,‘Infeudazioniepoliticafeudale’,61.11 Ibid.,91,note101.


one’slandsundertheprotectionofanotherwasanacknowledgmentofbeingtheweakerparty.Thepromiseofprotection,politicalandgenerallymilitary,wasmadeinexchangeforthepromiseoffidelityandoftensomeformofmili-taryservice,includingmakinglandsandfortressesavailablefortheuseoftheprotector.

Writtencontractssetoutall theobligationsofeitherparty,sometimes inbroad terms, sometimes in considerable detail. Depending on the circum-stancesinwhichtheywereagreed,contractscouldbeforafewyearsoralon-gerfixedterm(tenyears,fiftyyears),forthelifetimeofoneoftheparties,eveninperpetuity,committingtheheirsandsuccessorsoftheaderentetocontinuethearrangement.Contractsmightbemadeforthedurationofawar,orspecifydifferenttermsandconditionsforwartimeandpeacetime.Allthelandsoftheaderente could be covered by and committed to the arrangement, or onlysome.

ThetermsofFlorentineaccomandigiewereelaboratedwithparticularcare.If they were continued for several generations, the same terms could be re-peatedtimeaftertime.ThoseagreedwithFlorencein1513byGiovanLorenzoMalaspinadiFilattiera,inperpetuity,werethesameagreedbyhisancestorsNiccolòandBernabòin1417.Firstagreedin1404,theaccomandigiawasrepeat-edlyrenewedthroughoutthefifteenthcentury.12Assetout in1417,itwastobefortenyears.ThemarchesiweretoregardFlorence’sfriendsandenemiesastheirfriendsandenemies;theenemiesofFlorencewerenottobegivenvict-uals,helporfavour,orpassagethroughtheirterritory.Intimeofwar,Florencecouldcallonthemforcounselandaid,withtheirmen,ifnecessary.Infantryandarchersfromamongtheirsubjectsweretobesent,asmanyastheycouldraise,forthirtydaysattheirexpensewhenFlorenceneededthem;afterthirtydays,Florencemustpayforthem,atthesamewagesgiventotheirothertroops.In their defence, the marchesi could fly the standard of Florence over theirfortresses,andFlorencehadtosupport,defendandprotectthem.ShouldthemarchesifightalongsidetheFlorentinesinawarintheLunigiana,anylandsorcastlesthatweretakentowhichtheyhadaclaimshouldbeassignedtothem,eveniftheyhadbeencapturedbyFlorentineforces.Inanywarwagedbythemarchesi on their own account, the Florentines were not bound to supportthemunlesstheyhadagreedto itbeforehand.Whenthemarchesiwereen-gagedinawartogetherwithFlorence,theyhadtoobserveanytruceorpeacethe Florentines might make. In recognition of their accomandigia, the mar-chesiwereobligedtoprovidetransit, lodgingsandvictuals(whichwouldbepaidfor)toFlorentinetroops.OnthefeastofStJohntheBaptist,theywereto

12 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,III,40,61–3.

152 Chapter6

sendahorseman,withasilkenbannerworthat least twenty florins, totakepartintheceremoniesheldthatdayinFlorence.13Contractsofaccomandigiabetween Florence and other branches of the Malaspina were on much thesamegenerallines.14SomestipulatedthattheFlorentineswouldgarrisononeormoreoftheMalaspinafortresses.Forinstance,thecontractagreedin1424with marchesi Gabriele and Fioramonte Malaspina di Villafranca specifiedthat the Florentines, if they were at war with Filippo MariaVisconti, wouldguardthefortressofSantaCaterina,handingitbacktothelordsattheend,and,intheevent,thisiswhathappened.15

TermsmadewithGianLuigiFieschi,inthesamecontextin1424,reflectedthemuchgreaterpowerofthemainbranchoftheFieschithanofanyoftheMalaspina.Thiswasframedasaleague,fortheexaltationofthe‘Guelfparty’and its followers and aderenti. Nevertheless, the first clause recounted thatGianLuigiFieschirequested‘laadherentiaetaccomandigiagenerale’ofFlor-enceforallhislands,fortressesandmen;theFlorentineswereboundtode-fend them as though they were their own. In time of war, he was to have acondottaof30lancesand200infantry;aquarteroftheinfantrycouldberaisedfromamonghisownmen.Thiscondottawasforthedefenceofhislands,al-thoughthetroopscouldbeusedinoffensiveoperationsbytheFlorentinesaswell. In peacetime, he was to have a condotta of 15 lances and 100 infantry,whichwastocontinueforatleastfiveyearsaftertheendofthewar.Atthere-questoftheFlorentines,GianLuigiwastomakewaronanyoftheirenemies,excepttheEmpireorGenoa,unlessGenoawasruledbythedukeofMilanoranotherenemyofFlorence.Hewastobeincludedinanypeaceortrucewiththe duke of Milan as the raccomandato and aderente of Florence, and to

13 Ibid.,III,41–2.14 Forexample,theaccomandigiawiththemarchesidiLusuoloofthesameyearstipulated

thattheyshouldtaketwolances,eachofthreemenandthreehorses,with25infantry,including16crossbowmen,todefendFlorentineterritory,andwouldbepaidascondott-ieri at thecustomary rate for thedurationof thewarwithVisconti. If,becauseof thisaccomandigia,theyweretolosetheirlandssothattheycouldnolongersupportthem-selves,theFlorentineswouldbeobligednotonlytotrytoreinstatethem,buttoprovideforthembygivingthemacondottaorinsomeotherway.Thisfive-yearaccomandigiawasrenewed for ten years in 1429, with some variation reflecting changing circumstances.This time, ifFlorencewent towarwith thedukeofMilanorwithGenoa(thenunderMilaneserule),themarchesishouldhaveacondottaofthreelancesand25infantry,toguardtheirownlands. (Ibid.,II,218–20,223–4).

15 Ibid.,II,63–4.


acknowledgehislinktoFlorencebysendingasilkenbannertothecityeveryyearforthefeastofStJohntheBaptist.16

RequirementsthataderentishouldsendahorsemanwithabannertotakepartinthecivicprocessionsandcelebrationsonthefeastdayofFlorence’spa-tronsaint,togetherwithrepresentativesofFlorence’ssubjecttowns,wouldbereadastokensofdependence,ofsubordination,notalliance.TheFieschiweretoopowerful, tooconsciousof theirowngrandeur, toacceptsubordination,andcoulddropthe link ifandwhenitsuitedthemtodoso.Lesser lordsofcastleswhowereFlorentineaderentimightfinditmoredifficult.Ifthecon-tinuation of an accomandigia suited the Florentines, they expected it tocontinue. Accomandigie for some Malaspina branches, repeatedly renewed,looked less and less like voluntary agreements. Underlying Florentine insis-tencetheseaccomandigieshouldbecontinuedwasthedesiretoincorporatedirectly into their dominions the lands of their raccomandati whose estateswereclose toFlorentine territory.Clausesweresometimes inserted into thecontracts, stipulating that in certain circumstances lands should be sold, orevenbequeathed,toFlorence.

When the accomandigia of the Malaspina diTreschietto was renewed in1477,aclausewasaddedthatifthemalelineoftheeightjointlordsenteringinto it should die out, Treschietto should be ceded to Florence. This clausenevercameintoeffect.17InthecaseoftheMalaspinadiBagnone,theFloren-tines forced the issue, beginning by fomenting rebellion amongst their sub-jects in the late 1460s, and stirring up trouble among other branches of thefamilywhowerealsotheirraccomandati.Toberidoftheproblems,marcheseCristianodaBagnoneandhisbrothersofferedinAugust1469toselltheirlandstoFlorence,buttheywentbackonthedealafterthedukeofMilanobjected.OrdersfromtheFlorentinegovernmentsenttoCristiano,addressinghimasavassalandenjoininghimnottomakeanymoveswithoutanexpresscommis-sionfromthem,18maywellhavecontributedtothedecisionofthemarchesinot to go through with it. Pressure from Florence to complete the sale wasfruitless,andin1471theFlorentineshadrecoursetointrigueandforcetotakeBagnoneandcaptureCristianoandtwoofhisbrothers.Aftertwoyears’ im-prisonmentinFlorencetheywerereleased,butfailedtorecoverBagnone.19

16 GiovanniSforza,Memorie e documenti per servire alla storia di Pontremoli(Florence,1904),I,335–8.

17 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,III,187–8.18 Ibid.,155.19 Ibid.,156–60.

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IngettingholdofFivizzano,theFlorentinesplayedalongergame.MarcheseSpinettaMalaspinadiVerrucolahadbeenawardofFlorenceasachildafterhisclosestrelativesweremassacredinafamilyfeud.Aswellasbeingaracco-mandatoof Florence,hewasgivenFlorentinecitizenshipin1447,severalcon-tractsasan infantrycaptain,apensionof 1,200ducatsayear in 1467,andapropertyinEmpoli.Allthewhile,theFlorentineshadtheaimoftakingoverhis lands, and obtained a promise from him to cede his property to themafterhisdeath,ifnotbefore.Onseveraloccasionswhenhewasill,envoysweresenttohisestatestopreparethegroundforthetransfer,andwhenheeventu-allydiedin1478,theFlorentinesimmediatelytookpossession.Hisillegitimatesons(hehadnolegitimatechildren)wereboughtoffwithpensions,andthetwoclosestrelativesfromotherMalaspinabrancheswerecededsomeofhiscastles,asperpetualgovernorsforFlorence,inreturnfortherenunciationoftheirclaimstoinherittheestates.20

ThedukesofMilanhadlessinterestthantheFlorentinesinformingbondsofaderenzawiththelordsofcastlesintheLunigiana.TheGhibellinemarchesiMalaspinadiMulazzoseemtohavebeenexceptionalinhavinganaderenzafromtheViscontiandthentheSforzaoverseveralgenerations.21Otherindi-vidual Malaspina held aderenze with the duke from time to time.22 For thedukesofMilan,aderenzeasanexpedient forextendingtheir influenceoverthe Imperial fiefholders in areas bordering the duchy were perhaps second-besttotherightstheyclaimedtoexerciseoverthosefiefsasImperialvicars,byvirtueof thegrants toGianGaleazzoViscontibytheEmperorWenceslas in1395and1396.23Thequestionofwhatrights thedukeofMilanmightclaimover Imperial fiefholders inEmilia, theLunigianaandLeLanghe, the ill-de-finedareaofthemountainstothenorthofGenoa,wouldgiverisetodisputesandcontroversies forcenturies. In the fifteenthcentury, the Imperialgrantsprovidedthedukesandtheirofficialswithgroundstoexercisethepowersoftheemperortodecidedisputedsuccessions,forexample.Butatthattimetheemperor’spowersoverImperialfiefsinItaly,otherthanthepowertograntin-vestiture,werevague,andinanycasewerepracticallydormant.

Howwide-rangingFilippoMariaViscontiwouldhavelikedhissuperiorityoverImperialfiefstobeisrevealedbyadraftofagrantfromtheEmperorSigis-mundpreparedbytheViscontichancery,apparentlyafterFilippoMariahadreceived confirmation of the Imperial investiture in 1426. All Imperial

20 Ibid.,490–9,507–8.21 Ibid.,I,221–2,225,228.22 E.g.ibid.,II,72–3.23 Chittolini,‘Infeudazioniepoliticafeudale’,50–1;Sisto,I feudi imperiali,87–8.


fiefholders between the River Adda to the east and the River Magra (whichmarked the border withTuscany, as agreed with Florence), the sea and theAlps, in the territories of Genoa, Monferrato and Parma but not those ofthedukeofSavoy,weretobeorderedtoobeyVisconti,whethertheyrecog-nizedonlytheemperorastheirsuperiororwerethevassalsofothers.AmongthoseexplicitlynamedasbeingincludedinthisweretheMalaspina,theFies-chi,Spinola,Doria,GrimaldianddelCarretto.Theemperorwouldannulalladerenzeandotherpactswhichwereincontradictiontothisgrant;allthosewhorebelledagainstitcouldbesubjecttothebanoftheEmpire,makingthemeffectivelyoutlaws.24

ThisdraftdoesnotseemtohavebeenadoptedbySigismund.Haditbeen,itisdoubtfulwhetheritwouldhavehadmucheffect,atleastoutsidethebordersoftheduchyofMilan.Beyondthoseborders,onlysomeoftheweakerImpe-rialfiefholderswerereadytoacknowledgesubmissiontothedukeofMilanastherepresentativeoftheemperor,andtoturntothedukeforinvestiturewiththeirfiefs.MostholdersofImperialfiefs,particularlythemorepowerful,weretooappreciativeoftheadvantagesoftheirpositionofindependence,andofthestatusandthebargainingpoweritgave,tobepreparedtoacknowledgeanexclusiveandirrevocablelinktothedukeofMilan.

Aderenzewereanothermatter.ForFilippoMariaVisconti,aderenzewiththecastellansofLiguriaandLeLanghewhowereImperialfiefholderswereause-ful tool in his efforts to establish, maintain, or, once lost, recover dominionovertherepublicofGenoa,andinhiscontestwiththemarquisofMonferratoforinfluenceovertheselords.IfthedukeofMilanwantedthemilitaryaidofthecastellansofLiguriaandLeLanghe, aderenze,with their implicit, ifnotexplicit, acknowledgement of the castellans’ freedom of choice as to whomtheymightsupport,wouldbefarmoreeffectivethanassertionsofauthorityoverthembyvirtueofanImperialgrant.BeforehebecametheraccomandatoofFlorence,GianLuigiFieschihadbeenanaderenteofFilippoMariaViscontiinApril1421withothermembersofthefamily.Theypromisedaderenzatohimwithalltheirlands,inLombardyaswellasLiguria;hepromisedthemprotec-tionand,ifheweretobecomelordofGenoa,topreservealltheirrightsandprerogatives.25Ofmorelong-termconsequencewasthepactViscontienteredintowiththeSpinola.Hegainedfreetransitforhistroopsthroughtheirfiefs,promised them freedom from all Genoese tolls and taxes, and returned to

24 Sisto,I feudi imperiali,41–2.25 Ibid.,32.

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themtheimportantfiefofBorgodeiFornariintheValleScrivia,soldbyTroiloSpinolatoGenoaafewyearsbefore.26

AdecadeafterhehadlostcontrolofGenoa,Visconti,inmakingatrucewiththe Genoese, still maintained that many Ligurian castellans were under hisprotection as his ‘recommandati, adherentes et feudatarii’, including severalSpinolaandDoria,the‘nobilesdeCarretto’asagroup,GiovanniGrimaldiofMonacoandGianAntonioFieschi.27Whetherallthosehenamedwouldhaveregarded themselves as his aderenti is doubtful. Giovanni Grimaldi, for one,objectedtobeingincludedinthetrucewithGenoa.28InlettersViscontiwroteto him in the mid-1440s, the duke addressed him as a friend, but did notrefertoanyobligationsoneithersidearisingoutofanaderenza.29

RecordsintheMilaneseducalchanceryofaderenzeinLiguriaintheearly1450swereinaccurate,asisevidentfromtheresponseofcastellanstherewhentheywereaskedtoratifytheirnominationasaderentiofFrancescoSforzainhis league with Florence and Genoa in late 1451 and the peace withVenicein 1454. Some allowance should be made for destruction and dispersion ofrecordsduringtheinterregnumbetweenVisconti’sdeathin1447andSforza’saccessionin1450,theperiodoftheAmbrosianRepublicinMilan.Chanceryofficialsferretedoutdocumentswhichyieldednamesofmenwhoweredead,orwhohadneveracceptedtheywereaderentiof thedukeofMilan.OthersacknowledgedtheyhadbeenaderentiofVisconti,butclaimedthepacthadlapsedandtheyhadsubsequentlyentered intoobligationswithother lords.Therepliesofthecastellansthrowlightontheirattitudestotheobligationstheyenteredinto,ontheoptionsavailabletothemandthereasonswhytheymightchooseoneratherthananother.

In1451,anumberofSpinolawerehappytoacceptnominationasaderentiofFrancesco Sforza, but Giovanni Antonio Spinola wrote from his fortressofLermatosaythathecouldnothonourablydoso.Sincethetroublesfollow-ingthedeathofFilippoMariaVisconti,heexplained,hehadfeltitnecessary‘for my safety’ (‘per mia salute’) to enter into ‘certain obligations’ with the

26 Ibid.,32–3;seeabove,p.10.27 ASGenoa,AS536, ff.49v-50r,55r-v:copiesof letters fromFilippoMariaVisconti to the

Doge,AnzianiandOfficio provisionisofGenoa,8,15July1445.SeveralMalaspinamarchesifromtheLunigianawerealsoonthelist.

28 Saige,Documents historiques,I,168–9:FilippoMariaViscontitoGiovanniGrimaldi,8July1445.InordertorecoverpossessionofMonaco,whichhadbeenheldforViscontisince1428,GrimaldihadbeenobligedtoacceptinvestiturewithitasafiefinNovember1436,butthisrecognitionwasannulledbyatreatybetweenVisconti,VeniceandFlorencefiveyearslater.(Ibid.,LXXVII-LXXXII,XCV-VI,CXI,67–77,103–9.

29 E.g.,ibid.,164–5:FilippoMariaViscontitoGiovanniGrimaldi,14Apr.1445.


marquisofMonferrato.HavingbeenafaithfulservantofFilippoMaria,hewasdisposedtocontinuethatbondwithFrancescoSforza,but‘alittlegentlemanlikemeisworthnothingwithoutfidelity’.30SomedelCarrettoalsorepliedthatthey were bound by other obligations. Those of the Zuccarello branch hadbondsof‘fidelity’tothedukeofSavoy,‘becauseofcertaineventswhichhavehappenedinthepast’,aswellashavingtiestothecommunityofGenoainre-spectofsomeoftheirestates.31GiovannidelCarrettodaFinalehadalsobeenobligedtoenterintoobligationstoGenoa(followingtheGenoesewaragainstFinale),32andhebelievedhewouldbeincludedinatreatyasadependentofGenoa.‘Nevertheless,inspiritIamnumberedamongyourmen,andsoIshouldbebyinheritance.’IfhecouldbefreeofhisobligationstoGenoa,‘IwouldbehappytobewhatIoughttobe’.33

In1454,theduke’sofficialsseemtohavecompiledalongerlistofputativeaderenti.Again, somereadilyacceptednomination, includingmanySpinolaand Doria.The wife, brother and cousin of the absent Gian Filippo Fieschi,ratifyinginhisnameaswellastheirs,wereconfidenthewouldhaveaccepted‘asanadherentandally(coligato)’ofthedukeifhehadbeenthere.34GiovannidelCarrettodaFinaleagainrefused,thistimecitingobligationstoGenoaforone-thirdofFinale,andanaderenzawiththemarquisofMonferrato;withouttheirleaveitwouldnotbelicitforhimtoenterintoanyotherobligation.35Thedel Carretto di Zuccarello did ratify this time, though reserving their ties toother lords.Theyhadonlybeen ‘obligato’ toFilippoMariaVisconti forone-thirdofBardinetoandone-thirdofStellanello,andthenonlyforhislifetime,theyexplained.36FrancescodelCarrettorefused,however,sayinghecouldnot,inhonour,ratifywithoutthepermissionofthedukeofSavoy,becauseoffidel-itypledgedtohimforhislands.HehadbeendevotedtotheVisconti,hesaid,andhadofferedhimselftothecityofMilanwhenitwasgovernedasarepublic(butbeforetheMilanesecametobeatwarwithFrancescoSforza).Theyhadrepliedthat,duetothedistanceofhislandsfromthecity,theywouldnotbeabletohelphimifneeded,andheshouldmakearrangementswithwhomhechose.Fearinghewouldnotbeabletowithstandanattackunaided,hehad

30 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.407:GiovanniAntonioSpinolatoFrancescoSforza,20Nov.1451,Lerma.

31 Ibid.:GiorgiodelCarrettotoF.Sforza,20Nov.1451,Zuccarello.32 Seeabove,pp.27–8.33 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.407:GiovannidelCarrettotoF.Sforza,19Nov.1451,Finale.34 Ibid.,b.409:AntoniaMaria,RolandoandJacoponeFieschitoF.Sforza,9June1454,Recco.35 Ibid.:GiovannidelCarrettotoF.Sforza,10June1454,Finale.36 Ibid.,GiorgioandCarlodelCarretto toF.Sforza,23 June1454,Zuccarello; 13 July 1454,

Bardineto.

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madetermswiththedukeofSavoy.37Sforzawouldnottakenoforananswerin this instance, asserting that the del Carretto were his ‘recommandati dejure’andcouldnothaveenteredintoanaderenzawiththedukeofSavoyorothers,38andFrancescodelCarrettoeventuallyratified.

TheSpinolaofTassarolodeclinedtoratifythepeaceasaderentiofthedukeof Milan on the grounds that they were feudatari and raccomandati of thecommuneofGenoa,andhadtoratifywithGenoa.SupportingFilippoMariaaftertheGenoeserebelledagainsthimhadalreadyoncemadethemoutlawsandrebelsofGenoa,andtheyhadonlyreceivedconfirmationoftheirfiefsandbeenrestoredtothegoodgracesoftheGenoesegovernmentthroughhisinter-cession.But,theyassuredSforza, intheirheartsandwiththeir friends,theywereandwouldbe‘morethansubjectsandraccomandati’oftheduke.39Clear-ly,SforzahadnotacceptedtheirexcusesandamonthlatertheSpinolabroth-ersgavearatherdifferentaccountoftheirrelationtoGenoaandMilan.TheyhadneverhadanyaderenzawithFilippoMariaVisconti,forneitherhenoranyotherlordhaddeignedtotrytointerferewiththeirconnectiontoGenoa.Tas-sarolo,impoverishedandsterile,hadbeenboughtfromGenoanearlyacen-turybefore,withakindofaderenzaattached.SinceFilippoMaria’sdeath,theyhadagreednootheraderenzawithanyother lordsorcommunes.TosatisfySforza,however,theysentaformalacceptanceofthepeace.40

TheDogeandAnzianiofGenoaprotestedagainstSforza’s insistencethatGaleottoandEttoreSpinola,GiovannidelCarrettoandStefanoDoriawerehisaderenti, as the successor of Filippo Maria Visconti, asserting that none ofthemhadhadanyspecialobligationtoVisconti.41SforzatriedtogetStefanoDoriatoenterintoanaderenzawithhimforOvada,butDoriarespondedthatheandthatestatewerepartofthecommuneofGenoa,andthathehadbeenadvisedbylawyersthathewouldruntheriskoflosingit,bythetermsofhisagreementwithGenoa.42Sforzaaccepted,withanapology,abluntletterrefus-ing ratification from a branch of the Fieschi, in reply to one addressed to‘Jacomoandhisbrothers’and‘Giorgioandhisbrothers’.TheonlyGiorgiointhefamilywasCardinalFieschi,andtherewereseveralnamedJacomo,theyobjected;inanycase,theyknewofnobondtothedukeofMilan,throughafief

37 Ibid.,FrancescodelCarrettotoF.Sforza,29June1454,Spigno;FrancescodelCarrettotoGiorgiodeAnnono,1July1454,Novello.

38 Ibid.:F.SforzatoGiorgiodeAnnono,7July1454,Milan.39 Ibid.:GaleottoandEttoreSpinolatoF.Sforza,15June1454,Tassarolo.40 Ibid.:GaleottoandEttoreSpinolatoF.Sforza,21July1454,Tassarolo.41 Ibid.:DogeandAnzianiofGenoatoF.Sforza,26July1454,Genoa.42 Ibid.StefanoDoriatoF.Sforza,20June1454,Genoa;GiovannidellaGuardiatoF.Sforza,

17Sept.1454,Genoa.


or an aderenza or anything else, and there were no grounds on which theycouldbecalledupontoratifythepeace.43Acknowledgingthattherehadbeenanerrorintheaddress,forthenameshadbeentakenfromanolddocument,Sforza assured them he wanted nothing from them but their long-standingfriendship.44

BeforehefinallymadeuphismindtotakeoverGenoahimself,requeststoSforza to intervene inGenoesepoliticsweregenerallypolitely turnedaside,andhewasreluctanttocommithimselfwholeheartedlytosupportinganyonefactionorgroup.Hedid,however,acknowledgeadutytodefendhisaderenti.Byvirtueofthe‘raccomandigia’hehadoversomelandsofGianFilippoFies-chi,hewas ‘boundtodefendhimfromanyonewhowishestoattackhiminthoselands’,Sforzawarnedin1456.45Hereactedmorevigorouslywhenanum-berofhisraccomandatiand aderentiwereattackedorthreatenedbytheDukeofSavoyin1458,informingthedukethatifhedidnotwithdraw,troopswouldbesentfromMilantodefendthem.Toone,conteOnoratodiTenda,hesent25handgunners(‘schioppettieri’),paidfortwomonths,withtheassurancethathewasreadytodowhateverwasneededtopreservetheestates.46Newsofthethreathadcome fromGiovannidelCarretto,whohadurgedSforza tohelp,advisinghimthatmanylordsintheregionwerewatchingtoseewhatsupporttheywouldget,andthateffectivesupportatsuchatimeencouragedthemtoputtheir livesandpropertyat theserviceof the lordswhogave it.47Uncer-taintyintheregionasthesubmissionoftherepublicofGenoatotheFrenchcrownwasbeingconcludedin1458,probablystirredSforzatodeclarehiswill-ingnesstostandupforhisraccomandati(andmaywellhavestirredthedukeofSavoy’sattacks).AndwhenhisSpinolaaderentiwerecalledupontoraisetheFrenchroyal standardover theircastles,hischanceryprovidedthemwithacarefully-drafted,elaboratereply,totheeffectthattheirfamilyhadlongbeen

43 Ibid.:JacomoFieschiandhisbrotherstoF.Sforza,24July1454,Genoa.44 Ibid.:F.SforzatoJacomoFieschiandhisbrothers,10Aug.1454,Milan.Anotherembar-

rassingerroroccurredinaletteraddressedtoGiovanniandBoruelGrimaldi,admonish-ing them to send their ratification of the peace. There was no Giovanni in the wholeGrimaldi family,wastheresponseonbehalfof thealbergo (theMilaneseofficialsmayhavehad in mindGiovanniGrimaldiofMonaco,whohaddiedsomemonthsbefore);Boruel was in Caffa, and his procurator, Francesco Grimaldi, had ratified in his name.(Ibid.:‘ServitoresalbergusGrimaldorum’toF.Sforza,5Sept.1454,Genoa.)

45 Ibid.,b.410:F.SforzatoLodovicoCampofregoso,13Jan.1456,Milan.46 Ibid.,b.412:F.SforzatoOnorato,contediTenda,9Apr.1458,Milan.47 Ibid.:GiovannidelCarrettotoF.Sforza,1Apr.1458,Finale.DelCarrettodescribedhimself

as Sforza’s ‘faithful servant’, not his raccomandato. (Ibid., b. 411: Giovanni del Carretto,instructionstoOttodelCarretto,11Feb.1456,Finale.)

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aderentiofthedukesofMilan,thatthisconnectionhadkeptthemandtheirpeoplesecureinthefluctuationsofGenoesepolitics,someowedhimfidelityforfiefs,andtheyintendedtomaintainthesetiesinfuture.Aftermuchdiscus-sion – for there were many Spinola, with various opinions as to what theyshoulddo,andnotallwerehostiletothenewregimeinGenoa–theSpinolaoftheValleScriviaandtheValBorberaagreedtoadopttheMilanesereply.48

OnceFrancescoSforzaandhisheirswerelordsofGenoa,orclaimedtobelordsofGenoa,theywerenotinclinedtoagreeaderenzewithcastellanswhoselandslaywithinGenoeseterritory.TheDoriadiValled’Onegliahadbeenre-gardedasaderentiofthedukeofMilanin1454;49in1482,atatimewhenMilandidnotcontrolGenoa,theyweredescribedas‘ourfeudatariandvassalsandsubjects’.50TheSforzamightstillagreeaderenzewithlordsintheregionwhoselands lay, at least in part, outside Genoese territory. Margherita, contessa diTenda (Onorato’s widow, who was governing the family estates) was recog-nizedasanaderenteofMilanin1475.51ThedelCarrettodiZuccarelloratifiedthepeaceofBagnoloin1484andaleaguein1493asaderentiofthedukeofMilan.52ButwhenthemarchesidiCevaclaimedtobetheduke’saderentiin1485,theMilanesechancerycouldnotfindacopyoftheagreementandaskedifthemarchesicouldproducetheirs.Inanycase,theyweretobewarnedthatthedukecouldnotbackthemintheirconflictwiththeducd’Orléansandhisofficials,becausemarcheseLuca,whowascomplainingofoppressionbythem,wasafeudataryofOrléans.53LambertoGrimaldiofMonacoagreedafive-yearaderenza with the regency government in Milan in July 1477. For him,thisaderenzawasatacticalploy,balancingobligationshehadjustenteredintowiththeregentduchessofSavoyforMenton,whichhehadonlyrecentlyre-coveredfromMilanesetroops,54andconstitutingrecognitionbytheMilanese

48 Ibid.,b.412:copyofletterfromJeand’AnjouandBaliaofGenoatotheSpinolaofValleScriviaandValBorbera,24May1458,withadraftofareply;OrfeotoF.Sforza,4June1458,Buzalla;FrancodaAsseretotoF.Sforza,5June1458,Serravalle.

49 Ibid.,b.409:ScevaDoria‘cumdominiiVallisUnelie’toF.Sforza,12June1454,Genoa.50 Ibid.,b.993:GianGaleazzoSforzatoBattistaCampofregoso,30Jan.1482,Milan.51 Saige,Documents historiques,I,504.52 ASMilan, ASforzesco, b. 994: Giorgio and Carlo del Carretto to Gian Galeazzo Sforza,

16 Oct. 1484, Zuccarello; b. 1211: Giorgio and Antonio del Carretto to Gian GaleazzoSforza,15June1493,Zuccarello.

53 Presumably, he held a fief dependent on the city of Asti, which belonged to the ducd’Orléans. Ibid., b. 994: Instructions to Bernardino Valerio, going to marchese Luca diCeva,14May1485,Milan.

54 InordertohavesupportforhiseffortstorecoverpossessionofMenton,Lambertohadagreed to recognize theportionofMentonheownedasa fief fromthedukeofSavoy(Saige,Documents historiques,I,CCXL-I).


regimeofhisindependence,whichGaleazzoMariaSforzahadbeentryingtoundermine.55

Grimaldiwas toldthatGianLuigiFieschiwas includedamongtherebelsandenemiesofMilanthatheundertooknottoreceiveinhislands.TheSforzawouldhavepreferredtoregardtheFieschiastheirsubjects,ratherthantheiraderenti.In1481(orsohewouldlaterclaim)GianLuigiFieschiofferedtobe-comean aderenteofMilan,butwas refused.56An aderenzawasagreed twoyears later,but in1484GianLuigibaulkedatratifyingthepeaceofBagnolo,arguingpromisesmadetohimtheyearbeforehadnotbeenkept.57Asacen-tralfigureoftheregimegoverningGenoaunderMilaneseoverlordshipin1493,hedidratifytheleaguebetweenMilan,Veniceandthepopeasanaderenteoftheduke.58HoldinglandswithintheboundsoftheduchyofMilanaswellasthoseoftheterritoryofGenoa,theFieschi,intheeyesoftheSforzadukesandtheirofficials,wereinsomerespectsofanequivalentstatustotheRossiorPal-lavicini families.Yet theirpeculiarposition inGenoesepolitical lifemade itdifficulttotreatthemasjustanotherpowerfulclanofLombardlordswhosepretensionstoindependenceweretobechecked.TheFieschimanagedtosur-vivetheperiodofSforzadominanceoverGenoawithoutsuccumbingtorele-gationtotheranksofsubjectsofthedukesofMilan,astheRossiandPallavicinihadtodoiftheywishedtokeeptheirlands.

OtherprincesandtherepublicswerejustasunwillingastheSforzatomakeaderenzewithlordstheyregardedastheirsubjects,andtheydidnotwantoth-erstatesmakingaderenzewiththem,either.Notthatthiswouldholdanyonebackfromformingsuchassociationswiththesubjectsofotherstates,ifasuit-ableopportunityarose.Thepopes’subjectsinparticularwereregardedasfairgamebyotherpowersinthefifteenthcentury.ThedukeofMilan,thekingofNaplesandtherepublicsofFlorenceandVenicewerehappytomakearrange-mentswithsubjectsofthepapacythattheywouldnothavetoleratedif thepopeoranotherpowerhadtriedtomakethemwiththeirs.Aderenticouldbejealouslyguarded, too.Poachingof aderenti couldbemuchresented, to thepointofbeingregardedasahostileact.Majorpowersmightattempttodelimitspheresofinfluencebytreaty.FlorenceandFilippoMariaViscontiagreedin1419 that the river Magra would be the dividing line in the Lunigiana: tothe north, Visconti could make aderenze with the Malaspina, to the south,Florence.TheMalaspinawerenotpartytothisagreement,anddidnotcon-

55 Ibid.,CCXLIV-VII,544–50.56 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.993:GianLuigiFieschitoCostanzoSforza,6Feb.1482,Genoa.57 Ibid.,b.994:GianLuigiFieschito‘SerJo.Jac.o’,15Oct.1484,Montoggio.58 Ibid.,b.1211:GianLuigiFieschitoGianGaleazzoSforza,11June1493,Torriglia.

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siderthemselvesboundbyit.59In1454FrancescoSforzaclaimedthattheVe-netianshadagreedinthepeacetheymadewithhimthatallsubjects,aderenti,andracommandatiofFilippoMariaViscontishouldreverttothestatustheyhadheldduringhisreign.Thesewerethegroundsonwhichheinsistedthatsome Ligurian castellans should accept nomination as his aderenti.60 Againthose concerned would not have considered themselves bound to observesuchaclausewhichignoredthereciprocal,voluntarynatureofaderenze.

Claimstoaputativeexclusiverighttotheaderenzeofthelordsofcastlesofaspecificregioncouldonlybeenforcedincertaincircumstances.Theeffectivepowerthataprinceorrepubliccouldprojectatagiventimeinagivenarea,andtheabsenceofanequallyattractive,ormoreattractive,alternative,wereonly parts of the equation.The wishes of the nobles, where they perceivedtheir best interests to be – which might be alignment with a weaker poweragainsttheoverweeningclaimsofastronger–cameintoplayaswell.Somightpersonalrivalriesandjealousieswithinandbetweennoblefamilies.Ifaper-sonalenemywastheaderenteofonepower,anoblemight feel thathehadbetteroptforanaderenzawithadifferentone,ifanotherwouldbeinterestedinofferinghimprotection.

The two main poles of attraction for castellans in Emilia in the first halfofthefifteenthcenturyweretheViscontiandtheEste.AlongcontestbetweenthedukesofMilanandthelordsofFerraraforthecontrolofEmiliawasonlyjustreachingitsdefinitivesolutionbythemid-fifteenthcentury,asParmaandPiacenzawereboundintotheduchyofMilan,andReggioandModenatotheEsteofFerrara.TherewasstillacontestfortheloyaltiesoftheImperialfief-holdersoftheregion.Intheearly1450s,Borsod’EsteandFrancescoSforzadis-putedwhethertheCorreggio,whomthedukeofMilanregardedashisvassals,couldbeBorso’saderenti.61ItwasthepossessionofthestrongholdofBrescello,heldinfieffromthedukeofMilan,thatgavehimgroundstoviewtheCorreg-gioasvassals,whoseprimaryloyaltyshouldbetohim.Losingthefortressin1468wasablowtoManfredodaCorreggio,butheconsoledhimselfwiththereflectionthathewouldnowbe‘afreeman’.62Demandingreimbursementofthe expenses of taking Brescello, Galeazzo Maria Sforza threatened to send

59 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,I,78.60 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.409:FrancescodelCarrettotoF.Sforza,11Sept.1454,Spigna.Such

termsdonotappearinthetextofthetreatiesbetweenFrancescoSforzaandVenicein1454,orinthelistsofaderentiassociatedwiththem:J.Dumont,Corps universel diploma-tique du droit des gens(Amsterdam,1726–31),III,part1,202–6,208–9,228

61 Arcangeli,‘Piccolisignorilombardi’,414.62 Gentile,Fazioni al governo,162;seeabove,p.13.


troopstotakeCorreggioitselfin1470,butthematterwassettledinaconfer-enceatParmabetweenSforza,Borsod’EsteandLudovicoGonzaga,MarquisofMantua,inwhichBorsodefendedtheCorreggio.63GaleazzoMariainterferedinfamilyquarrelsthatsplitthePiodaCarpiandthePicodellaMirandola,aswellastheCorreggio.64Theirdisputescausedhimmoretroublethanthema-jorpowersdid,hecomplained,andBorsoletthemdoit.Borso,hegrumbled,wasvyingwiththosewhoweregreaterthanhewas,andshouldrecognizehislimitations.65

GaleazzoMaria’sirritationatBorsod’EsteappearingtoconsiderhimselftheequalofthedukeofMilan,andatthefactthatimportantImperialfiefholdersinEmiliagravitatedtowardsFerrararatherthanMilan,seemstohaveledhimtoexaggerate,perhapsunwittingly,thedegreeofcontrolthattheEstehadoversuchlords.RuleoverModenaandReggiodidnotnecessarilybringwithitau-thorityoverthemilitarynobilityholdinglandswithintheterritoriesofthosecities,becausemanynobleshadnotbeensubordinated to thecivicgovern-ments.SomeofthegrantsofprivilegesnegotiatedbyfamiliessuchasthePio,PicoandCorreggio,givingtheirlandsthestatusofImperialfiefs,werequiterecent.ThusthePico,whohadbeengrantedImperialprivilegesforMirandolain1311,obtainedthemfortheirothermajorstronghold,Concordia,in1432,be-coming countsofConcordiaas wellas ofMirandola.The Correggiohad re-ceived Imperial investiture in 1350, and this was confirmed and Correggioelevatedintoacountyin1452.66Suchgrantsgavelegitimacytotheautonomythesefamilieshadalreadyenjoyed.WhenFilippoMariaViscontirecognizedNiccolòd’Este’slordshipoverReggioin1421,hereservedtohimselfdirectdo-minion over castles held by several families, the Pico and Correggio amongthem.67Hewasclaimingsomethinghedidnothaveandcouldnotexercise.MoreeffectivewerethecontractsofaccomandigiaagreedbythecastellansoftheModeneseandReggianowiththeEste.EvenaftertheImperialgrantofthetitleofdukeofModenain1452wasaccompaniedbythegranttotheEsteofauthorityovertheImperialfiefsintheModeneseandReggiano,theycontin-uedtoprefertobasetheirrelationswiththemilitarynobilityofthisregionontiesofaccomandigia.

63 Gentile,Fazioni al governo,163.64 Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,I,203.65 Carteggio degli oratori mantovani alla Corte Sforzesca (1450–1500),VIII,1469–1471(Rome,

2000),254,271:ZaccariaSaggitoLudovicoGonzaga,3,15Aug.1470,Milan.66 Trevor Dean, Land and Power in Late Medieval Ferrara. The Rule of the Este, 1350–1450

(Cambridge,1988),176;Gentile,Fazioni al governo,110.67 Dean,Land and Power,166–7,note79.

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AvarietyofformsofaccomandigiawereusedbytheEsteinthefourteenthandfifteenthcenturies,dependingonthefamilyconcernedandthecircum-stancesinwhichtheyweremade.Someinvolvedthesurrender,temporaryorpermanent,offortressesintothecustodyofEstetroops,somestipulatedthatthelordcouldbuildnewfortressesorrepairexistingones.Sometimesthelordwastobeallowedtoserveotherpowersasacondottiere,providedEstepermis-sion was given. There were also political arrangements, including grants ofpowersofgovernmentonbehalfoftheprinceoverlandswheretheEstehadnothaddirectlegalauthority.68TheEstelikedtheirraccomandatitoresideinFerrararatherthanontheirestates.ForthosecastellanswhowerecontenttogravitatetoFerraraandtheEsteentouragetherewererewardstobehad,intheformofcondotte,offices,pensionsandgrantsoflands.Ontheotherhand,itcouldberiskytobecomecloselyassociatedwiththecourt,becauseitgavetheprincemorepretextstobecomeinvolvedinthefamilyaffairsofthecastellans.

TheEstecovetedthestrongholdsoftheImperialfiefholderssituatedwithintheirdominions,andquarrelsamongthe joint lordsprovidedopportunitiesforintervention,possiblythedespatchoftroops.DisputesamongthePiocous-inswhosharedthelordshipofCarpieventuallyledtoErcoled’Esteobtaininghalfofit,cededtohiminJuly1499byGibertoPioinexchangeforthefiefofSassuolo.69 Giberto had agreed to the exchange two years before, when thedukewaspreparinganexpeditionagainstCarpi.PuttingastoptothedamagecausedtothePiofamilyandthepeopleofCarpicausedbythechronicdisputebetweenthecousins,wasErcole’sofficialjustificationforhistakingoverGib-erto’s share.70 Family disputes also stimulated the quest for other patrons,however. The Gonzaga of Mantua maintained close ties with several of thenoble families in theModeneseandReggiano,andwelcomedthem in theircourt,onoccasionprovidingmilitaryanddiplomaticsupporttothem.GibertoPio’srival,AlbertoPio,turnedtoFrancescoGonzagaforhelp,forexample,andMantuantroopstookpartinthefightingthatbrokeoutinCarpiin1496.TroopswerealsosenttherefromModena,Mirandola(Alberto’smaternalunclewasGaleotto Pico della Mirandola) and Bologna (Giberto was the son-in-lawofGiovanniBentivoglioofBologna).LudovicoSforzaandtheVenetianswere

68 Ibid.,170–6.69 AlbertoSabattini,Alberto III Pio. Politica, diplomazia e guerra del conte di Carpi (Carpi,

1994),15.70 AnnaLauraTrombettiBudriesi,‘SuirapportitraiPioegliEstensi:loscambioCarpi-Sas-

suolo’,396–405.


interestedinCarpi,too.71AfterErcolehadsenthissoldiersandofficialstoCar-pi,AlbertohopedforImperialsupport,butMaximiliandelegatedauthoritytosettletheaffairsofthisImperialfieftoErcole.72OthercastellansintheModen-eseandReggianomanagedtoavoidlosingtheirlandstotheEste,althoughthePicostruggledtoholdontoMirandola,losingcontrolofittotheFrenchformanyyearsduringtheItalianWars.73

CastellanswhoselandslaytothewestaroundParma,whointheearlyfif-teenthcenturyhadenjoyedasimilardegreeofautonomytothatoftheImpe-rial fiefholdersoftheModeneseandReggiano,werenotabletomaintainit.TheycameundergreaterpressurefromFilippoMariaViscontiandhisSforzasuccessorstoacknowledgesubordinationtothedukeofMilanastheirprince.Notonlywerethedukesnotpreparedtotreatthemasaderenti,theywantedcastellanstoholdtheirlandsfromtheminfief.FromwhenGianGaleazzoVis-contireceivedImperialinvestitureasdukeofMilanin1395,thedukeshadusedgrantsoffiefsasameansofconsolidatingcontrolovertheborderregionsoftheduchy,orofextendingtheirauthorityoverthe landsofnobleswhohadbeenexercisingwidepowersofgovernmentovertheirlandsandthepeopleonthem.Mengrantedfiefsinthefrontierareas,ofteninthemountains,weregen-erallynewtothearea,andhadservedascondottieri.Theymightcomefromfamilies of military nobility in other regions, like the Dal Verme, originallyfromVerona,whoweregrantedtheimportantcentreofBobbioandlandsintheterritoriesofPiacenzaandPavia,inandneartheApennines,ortheSanse-verinofromthekingdomofNaples,givenlandsinthefootholdsoftheAlpsintheValLugano.74Fiefholdersplantedinareaswheretheir familyhadfew, ifany,historicties,couldstruggletodisplaceorestablishlinkswithexistinglocalnetworksofpowerandinfluence.Intheeyesofthedukes,theprimaryroleofsuchfeudatariwaskeepingorder,transmittingandsometimesenforcing,thedukes’ordersandwishes.75

Doubtlessthedukeswouldhavelikedtohavethiskindofrelationshipwiththeestablishedindependentcastellans,buttherewasanotherimportantmo-tivebehindthedrivetomakesuchcastellansacceptthattheir landsshould

71 SomeofGiberto’sbrotherswereintheserviceofLudovicoSforza,whileAlberto’sbrotherLeonellowasmarriedtoadaughterofBernardinoMartinengoofBrescia,andthroughhimwassolicitingtheassistanceofVenice.(RiccardoBacchelli,La congiura di Don Giulio d’Este(Milan,1931),I,216.)

72 Ibid.,218.73 Seebelow,pp.243–4.74 PierreSavy,‘LesfeudatairesetlecontrôleterritorialdansleduchédeMilanàl’époquedes

Sforza’,174–7;Covini,L’esercito del duca,104–5.75 FortheValLugano,seeDellaMisericordia,‘La“coda”deigentiluomini’,327–43.

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henceforthberegardedasducalfiefs.Theindependentjurisdictionexercisedby these lords was an affront to the conception of princely authority beingdevelopedbytheduke’slawyers.Itwasnotpracticaltohopetoeliminatealltheseparatejurisdictionsbut,throughthegrantofafiefthatinvolvedjurisdic-tion(a formofdelegatedauthoritythat lawyerscouldrecognize), thedukescouldasserttheirauthorityandarighttointerveneiftheywerenotsatisfiedwith how the delegated powers of justice were being exercised.76 Such fiefscouldlegitimize,intheeyesoftheprinceandhisofficials,powersofgovern-mentthatcastellanshadalreadybeenexercisingandwhichwouldbeleft,toalleffects,thesame.Butthecastellanswouldberecognizingthesuperiorityoftheprince,thatthosepowersofjurisdiction–“merumetmixtumimperium”–thatweretheessenceofcivillordshipweredelegatedbytheprince.

AmongtheprivilegesgrantedtoGianGaleazzoViscontibytheemperorin1395and1396wasonethatobligedImperial fiefholderstosubmittotheau-thorityofdukesofMilanasImperialvicarsandtoswearfidelitytothem.IngeneralthecastellansofLombardywerenotreadytoacceptthatbecausetherulerofMilanwasnowadukeandanImperialvicar,thenatureoftheirrela-tions with him had been fundamentally changed. Attempts to make themrecognizeducalauthorityovertheirlandsandsubjectsortheirfamilyarrange-ments(themarriagesoffamilymembers,theinheritanceordivisionofprop-erty) met with mixed success.The dukes, even the imperious Filippo MariaVisconti,frequentlyhadtobackdownorordertheirofficialstobackoff,inthefaceofprotestandresistancefromcastellans.77

Usually,castellanswouldonlyagreetoreceiveinfieffromthedukelandstheyortheirfamilieshadpreviouslyheldwithoutobligationtohim,ifthees-tateshadbeenlostorwereindangerofbeinglostthroughwarorconfiscationorfamilydisputes.ItwasinsuchcircumstancesthatGianAntonioFieschiwasgrantedthecastlesofCalestanoandMarzolarain1443byFilippoMariaVis-conti,landsthattheFieschihadheldasImperialfiefsinthefourteenthcen-turybutsubsequentlylost.78Familycrisesalsopresentedopportunitiestothedukestocoercecastellans intorecognizingtheir landsasducal fiefs.Appar-entlyitwasthequarrelsamongthesevensonsofRolandoPallaviciniafterhisdeath in 1458 that led to the recognition of the Pallavicini estates as ducalfiefs.79 In normal circumstances, minor castellans might be pressured into

76 Chittolini,‘Infeudazioniepoliticafeudale’,65–6.77 Gentile,‘Aristocraziasignorile’,151–3.78 Chittolini,‘Infeudazioniepoliticafeudale’,52–3,88.79 Ibid., 63; Arcangeli, ‘Un lignaggio padano’, 68–9. A ducal chancery note claiming that

RolandohadrecognizedhislandsinfieffromthedukeafterareconciliationwithFilippo


acceptingas fiefs landsor jurisdictiontheyalreadyheld,butmorepowerfullords would be resistant to the idea of compromising the independence oftheirposition,especiallythosewhocouldresttheircaseonImperialinvesti-tures confirming their immediate dependence on the emperor, without themediationofthedukeofMilanasImperialvicar.80

Suchinvestituresmightconstituteadefence,butcouldnotstopthewarofattritionwagedbythedukes,theirofficialsandtheirlawyers.Evenifatsomepointtherehadbeenanexplicitrecognitionoftheindependenceofacastel-lan’s lands, attempts might still be made to treat them as though they wereducal fiefs. Privileges associated with grants of lands or jurisdiction in fiefwerenotsafefromchallengeorinroadsbeingmadeonthem.GaleazzoMariaSforza’s own ducal council (which included some feudatari) reminded himthatfeudatariwhoseprivilegeswereinfringedhadjustcauseforcomplaint.81Butthedukesandtheirofficialstendedtotreatallcastellansasbeingsubjecttothesamerules,andtothesameoverridingducalauthorityandsuperiority.Those who wished to preserve their privileges or their independence intacthadtobeontheirguard.

AnotherwayinwhichthedukestriedtomakemajorcastellansrecognizetheirsubordinationwasbyinsistingthattheyshouldresideinMilanandat-tendtheducalcourt.GaleazzoMariaSforzainparticularwantedthemtoplayaroleinceremoniescelebratingandmanifestingthesplendourandpoweroftheduke.82SomecastellansdidacquirefinehousesinMilanandliveinthematleastpartofthetime;someweremademembersoftheducalcouncil.Mili-tarycondottemightbeusedtoattractthenobilityintotheserviceoftheduke,although these were of more significance for younger and minor nobles.83Closeassociationwiththecourtandthedukescouldbringsubstantialrewards.Nevertheless, the dukes did not succeed in turning the military nobility ofLombardyintoacourtnobility,orinbuildinguprealloyaltyandatraditionofservicetothedukeamongthem.Therewerenotenoughcondotte,letaloneseatsintheducalcouncil,tosatisfytheambitionsofthemall.Norweretheducalofficesavailableintheprovincessufficientlyprestigiousorinfluentialtoattractanybutminornoblesorthosewhosefamilieswereinfinancialdifficul-ties.ThehiatusinducalrulebetweenthedeathofFilippoMariaViscontiin1447andtheseizureofpowerbyFrancescoSforzain1450wasasetbacktothe

MariaViscontiin1445appearsdubious(Chittolini,‘Infeudazioniepoliticafeudale’,92–3).80 Ibid.,59–62.81 Gentile,‘Aristocraziasignorile’,125.82 Lubkin,A Renaissance Court,66–7.83 Covini,L’esercito del duca,91–3,101–3.

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duke’sauthority.Adecreeof1454chargedfeudatariwithbehavingasthoughtheyweremonarchs,notrecognizinganysuperiorityintheduke.84NumerousLombardlordswouldbeconsciousthattheirfamilieshadbeenpowerfulforseveralgenerations,farlongerthantheSforza.Theymightthinkofthemselvesas being superior in nobility and dignity to the Sforza; they would not seethemselvesastheduke’sinferiors.

ThecastellansofLombardyingeneralsawtheirrelationswiththedukesaspersonalandpolitical,notconstitutionalorinstitutional.Theyhadnoconceptofthenobilityasbeingcollectivelyan“estate”oftheduchy;theduchyofMilanwastoorecentanentity,notsufficientlywell-establishedforsuchaconcepttodevelop.Therewasnoassembly,noparliament,whereasenseofcommonin-terestandpurposecouldbegeneratedandformulated.Ifonefamilycameintoconflictwiththedukesoveramatterthatmightalsobeofmoregeneralcon-cern, such as an encroachment on their privileges, they would receive littlesupportfromothernoblefamiliesnotlinkedtothembyclosetiesoffamilyorfaction. Such conflicts would not turn into a concerted challenge to ducalauthority,oranattempttoforcesomegeneralconcessionfromtheduke.

WhenthedisputesofLombardcastellanswiththegovernmentofthefif-teenth-centurySforzadukesreachedthestageatwhichtheybecameamilitaryconflict,andducaltroopswouldbesentagainstthem,thecastellanswouldbebranded as rebels. Because they did not really think of themselves as beingsubjects, however, they would not have seen themselves as rebels. Fightingagainsttheforcesofthedukewouldnotberegardedbythemasanactofrebel-lion,butasthelegitimatedefenceoftheirinterestsandrights.

DissatisfiedwiththeirtreatmentbyFrancescoSforza,includingunsuccess-ful negotiations for a condotta, the Correggio resorted to military action in1452–3.Theircampaignswereanunwelcomedistraction forSforza fromhiswaragainstVenice,andfromhispointofviewconstitutedrebellion,notleastbecausetheCorreggiohadcontactswiththeVenetians.Buttheyweredirectedagainstthelandsoftheirlocalrivals–theCorreggioaimedtoseizelandstheyclaimed,suchastheirformerpossessionofPoviglio,strategicallyplacedontheroutebetweentheirrecentacquisitionofBrescelloandCorreggio.TheRossi,whoselandswereamongtheirprincipaltargets,andthePallavicinisupportedtheducal troops,with theirmentakingpart in the fighting,garrisoning for-tressesandprovidingintelligence.Borsod’EstesuggestedthatitshouldbelefttotheRossitocombattheCorreggio:ineffect,thattheconflictinEmiliashouldbetreatedasaprivatewaramongthecastellans.85

84 Catalano,Francesco Sforza,52–3.85 Covini,‘LecondottedeiRossi’,70–2.


The pretext for the ducal army being sent against Brescello in 1468 wasthattheCorreggiohadnotobeyedinjunctionstorenewtheiroathoffidelity,andhadrefusedtoacceptaducalcastellanforthefortress.Inthebackground,therewasthequestionofthecontactsofManfredodaCorreggioinparticularwithVeniceandhisaderenzawithBorsod’EsteaswellthedesiretocurbhisdisruptiveinfluenceinParmathroughtheCorreggiosquadrathere.Thedukealsoneededtofindsomecompensatoryactionforhisarmy,whichhadbeengearingupforanattackonPiedmontthathadbeencalledoff,andwasdis-gruntled at being deprived of the opportunity for booty.This was why a farmore powerful force than was needed was sent against Brescello, includingboatstoattackthefortressfromtheriver.Brescellowassurrendered;ManfredodeclaredhimselfgladtoberidofthetietothedukeofMilan,buthisbrotherAntoniomaintainedrelationswiththeduke.GaleazzoMariaintendedtocon-tinuethecampaignagainstotherfractiousfeudatari,buthistroopsweretoonumerous,tooanxiousforloot,tobekeptundercontrolandhiscommander,FedericodaMontefeltro,DukeofUrbino,advisedagainstit.86

AnambitiontobecomelordofPiacenzawassaidtobebehindtheassocia-tionofOnofrioAnguissolawitha peasantuprisingagainst taxation in 1462;othermembersoftheAnguissolaclandidnot joinhim.PietroDalVerme,alocalrivalof theAnguissolaandaducalcondottiere,besiegedhis fortressofMasseratawith2,000men;defendedbyOnofrio’speasants,armedwithhand-guns and crossbows, it fell after several hours of fierce combat.87The mainforceofthepeasantswasroutedinbattle,andOnofriofledandwascaptured;hespenttherestofhisdaysinaducalprison.88

The most significant military action against castellans in Lombardyunder theSforzadukeswas thatdirectedagainst theRossi in 1482–3,whichtookplaceduringtheWarofFerrara.ThediversionofeffortfromthedefenceofFerraraagainsttheVenetiansconcernedMilan’sallies,butLudovicoSforzaaccordedhiswaragainsttheRossihigherpriority.PietroMariaRossimadeanagreementwithVenice,butonlyafterSforzatroopshadbeensenttoattackhim.89Hewasdeclaredarebel,andallwhohelpedhimweretobetreatedasrebelstoo.90

PietroMariamaintainedhisactswerea justified reaction to repeatedof-fences.Thereweremultiplecausesforhisdisaffection,withanintensification

86 Covini,L’esercito del duca,224–6;Gentile,Fazioni al governo,160–2.87 Savy,‘Lesfeudataires’,184–5;Covini,L’esercito del duca,78,n.93.88 Pezzana,Storia della Città di Parma,III,220.89 Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,VII,11–12.90 Pezzana,Storia della Città di Parma,IV,271.

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ofhisrivalrywiththePallaviciniunderlyingmanyofthem.InParma,theRossisquadrawasundergreatpressure;attheducalcourt,thePallaviciniwerehigh-lyinfluential,especiallysinceLudovicoSforzahadestablishedcontrolovertheregencygovernmentin1480.Rossiblamedtheirinfluenceforvexatiousordersfromthecourt,includingcancellationofhisprivilegetokeepthetaxleviedtosupporttheducalcavalry,andacommandtorestorethestrongholdofNocetototherivalSanvitale.91Themostpatientmanintheworldwouldnothaveputupwithsomanyinsultsandoutrages,heprotested,thebestservanttheSforzahadeverhadwasbeingundonetosatisfytheillicitappetitesofothers.92Inat-tackingthePallavicini,hewasonlyrespondingtoprovocation,andheintend-edtokeepfaithwiththegovernment(‘stato’),heclaimed.93Buthebegantodraw a distinction between the duke – who was, he said, the only one whocouldcommandhim,andwhosecommandshewouldobey,whenthedukereachedyearsofdiscretion94–andtheregimeofLudovicoSforza,inwhichthePallavicinihadtoogreataninfluence.

Thecampaignbytheducaltroopsinthespringof1482,concentratingonsackingunfortifiedvillages,didnotbringaboutthemassdesertionofPietroMaria’s men or the quick surrender of his castles that Ludovico Sforza hadhopedfor.Thefortresseshadtobefoughtforandtakenonebyone.Nocetofellafteraweek’ssiegeby400men-at-arms,3,000infantryandfourbombards.95SanSecondoonlycapitulatedafterthedeathofPietroMariaon1September1482,havingresistedasiegelastingamonth,whenGuidoRossidecidedhehadtowithdrawandtakerefugewiththeVenetians.96Guidocontinuedhisfather’sfightwiththesupportoftheVenetians,wasdeclaredarebelandlosthislands.Hisillegitimatehalf-brotherBertrando,whosaidGuidowaspreparingtotakefromhimthelandsthathadbeenlefttohimbytheirfather,promisedtobefaithfultotheregimeinMilanandkepthisestates.97NeitherBertrandonor

91 Ibid.,243–5;Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,VI,300–1.92 Lorenzo de’Medici, Lettere, VI, 304–5: Pietro Maria Rossi to Lorenzo, 4 Apr. 1482, San

Secondo.93 Carteggio degli oratori mantovani alla Corte Sforzesca (1450–1500), XII, 1480–1482, 278:

ZaccariaSaggitoFedericoGonzaga,30Jan.1482,Milan.94 Ibid.,302:ZaccariaSaggitoFedericoGonzaga,22Feb.1482,Milan.95 Arcangeli,‘Principi,hominese“partesani”’,236,note24.96 Ibid.,237.97 AlargepartofthevastestatesofPietroMaria,oncetheyhadfinallybeentaken,were

dividedamongstthosewhohadfoughtagainsthim:NocetowenttotheSanvitale,Roc-cabiancatoGianFrancescoPallavicini.Threeofthemajorstrongholds–Felino,Torrechi-araandSanSecondo–wereassignedinfieftoayoungsonofLudovicoSforza(Ibid.,253).


anyotheroftheRossiremainingintheduchycouldfilltherolePietroMariahadplayedforsomanyyears.

ThedistinctionPietroMariaRossimadebetweentheduketowhomhepro-fessedsomeloyaltyandtheregimethatwasdirectingtheducalgovernment,betweenthe legitimateholdersofpowerandthoseabusing, ifnotusurpingthatpower,wasonethatwasfamiliar,mutatis mutandis,toLiguriancastellansin their relationto thegovernmentof therepublicofGenoa.FewwouldbedescribedassubjectsofGenoa.ManyofthemwerecitizensofGenoa,somewereImperialfiefholders,afewwereboth.Eveniftheyheldafiefofthecom-muneofGenoa,thatdidnotnecessarilymakethemGenoesesubjects.Whenthetermwasusedofcastellans,itwouldnotbeaneutralone.Foreignerscouldsaythattherepublichadnotbeenabletosubdueoneofitsownsubjects,acouncilcalledtodiscusstheprosecutionofawaragainstGaleottodelCarrettowaswarnedinJune1448.98

Forcastellanswhowerecitizens,Genoawastheirpatria,theirhomeland.Anyallegiancetheyfeltwastotheirpatria,ratherthantoanyparticularformofgovernmentorregime,whetherofadogeoraprince.‘Thisdogeisthede-structionofthepatria’,PietroSpinolawrotetoSpinettaCampofregoso,urginghimtojoinLudovicoCampofregosoin ‘framingawaytodeposethepresentregime, and put in place in the city some good and upright government,throughwhichourpatriacanbesetrightagain’.Heappealedtothemtodoit‘foryourdutyandhonour,bothbeingloversoftherepublic,andalsoforyourcomfortandsecurity’.99

Onlytheinvocationofloveoftherepublicwasunusualinthiscompendiumofreasonsforjoininginthedepositionofaregime.Fifteenth-centuryGenoesewerenotgiven,asfifteenth-centuryFlorentinesorVenetianswere,tolaudingthesuperiorityofrepublicangovernmentovertheruleofprinces.Thisdidnotmean they were not attached to the idea of civic self-government, yet theycouldincertaincircumstancesseeanadvantageinhavinganoutsideprince,rather than a native doge, as the head of their state. Approaches to outsidepowers were common moves in the internal politics of Genoa. Like otherGenoesecitizens,castellanswereready to inviteaprince tobecome lordofGenoa,inordertoousttheirenemiesorpreventthemfromtakingpower,andwouldnotregardthisastreacherytoGenoa.

Norwasresistancetotheregimeofarivalfactionoreffortstooverturnitbyforce,even if thatmeant thecastellans leadinga smallarmytoGenoa,per-ceivedasrebellion.Givenhowoftencastellanstookarmsagainsttheregimein

98 ASGenoa,AS537,f.235v(27June1448).99 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.158:PietroSpinolatoSpinettaCampofregoso,6Apr.1454,Acqui.

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power,itisstrikingthattheterm“rebellion”wasrarely,ifever,usedintherec-ordsofGenoesecouncilsandcommitteesabouttheseepisodes–perhapsbe-causeitwasrecognizedthattheywerefightingagainsttheregimeofthedogeorprince,nottherepublic.Resistancetothemwouldbelefttothedogeandhis own men and supporters, or to the garrison troops of the prince.Whencastellansandtheiralliesappearedbeneaththewallsofthecity,itwasnevertoattackthecityitself,ortoattempttotakeitandholditbyforceofarms.Atworsttherewouldbesomefightinginthestreets,attacksonareasdominatedbyarival faction,never indiscriminateslaughterandlooting.Norweretheyattackingthecivicgovernment,theofficialsandinstitutionsofthecommune.Noneof thesittingmembersofgovernmentcommittees–unless theywereprominentmembersofthefactioninpower–needfearassault.Thisisnottosaythattheresorttoviolencebycontendersforthedogeshipandtheircastel-lanbackerswasseenasanunavoidablenuisance,partofthenormalrhythmofGenoesepoliticallife.ItwasamajorreasonwhysomanyGenoesecouldonoccasionreconcilethemselvestothesubmissionoftheirrepublictoaprince.

Oppositiontoadoge,even inarms,wasnotdescribedevenbythedogesthemselvesasrebellion.Havinganelevatedconceptionofhisowndignityasdoge,PietroCampofregosodidonoccasionaccusehiscastellanopponentsoflèse-majesté.ThusinSeptember1453heorderedhisjudicialofficer,thevicar,toenquireabouttheSpinolawho‘hadtakenuparmsagainsthisgovernment[stato]andthepeaceofthecity’,committingtheoffenceoflèse-majesté,onlytochangehismindtwomonthslater,decidingthetimesurgedclemency,andorderhisvicartoabsolvethem.100Oppositiontotheruleofaprincewhowaslord of Genoa, on the other hand, might be called rebellion, at least by theprinceandhisrepresentatives.GianLuigiFieschiwasdescribedasarebelbythe regency government in Milan in 1477.101 His brother Obietto was pro-claimedarebelinGenoainFebruary1493,buthewascalledarebelagainstthedukeofMilan,notagainstGenoa.102

DogesofGenoawerenotprinces,andtheirofficewasnotsuchastoinspiremuchreverencefortheincumbent.AlthoughtheCampofregosoandAdornosawthemselvesashavingvirtuallyanhereditaryclaimtotheofficeofdoge,totheestablishedcastellanclansofLiguriatheywerestillsocialinferiors.Look-ingforsupport,dogeswouldsometimestrytopresentthemselvesasthecham-pionsofthepopoloagainstthenoblesofGenoa.Whenthepopolowasincited

100 ASGenoa,AS3040:orderstovicarfromdoge,20Sept.,23Nov.1453.101 ASMilan, ASforzesco, b. 972: Bona and Gian Galeazzo Sforza to Galeotto del Carretto,

17July1477,Milan.102 Ibid.,b.1211:CorradoStangatoGianGaleazzoSforza,7Feb.1493,Genoa.


against them, the castellans might appeal to a prince as the ‘refuge ofgentlemen’.103Itcouldbeeasierforthemtorespectaprincethanadoge.

Otherthingsbeingequal,wouldthecastellansofLiguriahavenecessarilypreferred the lordship of a prince over Genoa to government headed by adoge?Apparently,theyhadnoexpectationsofenjoyingagreaterroleinthegovernmentofthecityunderaprince.Likeothercitizens,theydidnotantici-pateorhopeforanychangetotheinstitutionsofgovernment,otherthanthedogeship.AidingtheprincetogaincontrolovertheRivierecouldreaprewardsingrantsorconfirmationofcustodyoffortresses.Allthefortressesofthewest-ernRivieraandmanyofthoseontheeastern,wereinthepossessionoftheLigurianmilitarynobilityintheearlyyearsofSforzadomination.104Itwasim-possible,however,forprincestosatisfyeveryoneofthem,resolvingallcon-flictsandclaims,norweretheycontenttoleavethegovernmentorthesecurityoftheRivieretothecastellans.105

In some ways, castellans may have found having a prince as head of theGenoese state more congenial than dealing with a popolare doge. Boththe Doria and the Spinola left Genoa when the French were being oustedfromthecity in 1461,andtherewereDoriaamongtheGenoesenobleswhofoughtfortheFrenchwhentheyunsuccessfullytriedtoreestablishtheirruleinJulyofthatyear.106SpinolaandDoriaexilesadvisedFrancescoSforzahowtotakeoverGenoain1464,andtheSpinolahadaprominentroleinsupportingtheattemptsoftheMilaneseregencygovernmentin1477torecovercontrolofGenoaafterthecityhadbeenlosttothem.TheSpinolaagain,andtheFieschi,helpedtobringabouttherestorationofSforzaoverlordshipin1488.CastellanswouldnotalwayssupportprincelyregimesinGenoa,however.GiovannidelCarrettodaFinale,GianFilippoFieschiandtheSpinolaopposedtheinstalla-tionoftheFrenchinGenoain1458;GianFilippoFieschidiedleadinganas-saultonthecityinJanuary1459.HisbrothersObiettoandGianLuigihadaveryuneasyrelationshipwiththeregimeofGaleazzoMariaSforzaandtheregencygovernmentthatsucceededit.Thepoliticalstanceofthecastellanswasgener-ally determined by practical concerns, rather than by any ideological or in-stinctivesympathyforprincelyruleratherthanrepublicangovernment.

103 Ibid.,b.411:BenedettoDoriatoFrancescoSforza,30May1456,Pieve.104 Riccardo Musso, ‘“El Stato nostro de Zenoa”. Aspetti istituzionali della prima domina-

zionesforzescasuGenova(1464–78)’,228.105 FortheSforzaandViscontilordsofGenoa,seeibid.,228–9,232,234–6;RiccardoMusso,

‘Leistituzioniducalidello“StatodiGenova”durantelasignoriadiFilippoMariaVisconti(1421–1485)’,80–2,104–6,110–1.

106 ChristineShaw,‘TheFrenchsignoriaoverGenoa,1458–1461’,52–3.

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Spinolasupport forthedukesofMilanwasa fairlyconsistentelement inGenoesepolitics.SomeSpinolaheldlandsintheduchyofMilanandindividu-als,sometimeswiththeformalbackingoftheiralbergo,occasionallysoughtofficesintheduchyoraplaceattheMilanesecourt.Theywerelookingfordu-calpatronagetohelpthemmakealiving,notforpositionsfromwhichtheymightexercisepoliticalinfluenceintheduchy.Politically,theSpinola,liketheotherLiguriancastellanfamilies,werefocusedonGenoaandtheRiviere.TheirhostilitytotheCampofregoso,whoweremoresuccessfulthantheAdornoatkeepingagripon thedogeshipduring the fifteenthcentury,meant that theSpinola spent much time in exile (usually self-imposed) from the city.LucaSpinola’sdeclarationin1485ofhisintentiontokeepthebannersofthedukeofMilanflyinginGenoeseterritory–specificallyoverhisfortressofPieve–duringthedogeshipofPaoloCampofregoso,107wasnotmadefromdisinter-estedloyaltytotheduke.Asheexplained, ‘maintainingthisplace[Pieve]indevotiontotheduke,withthegovernmentofGenoainthehandsoftheFrego-si’wouldbeexpensive,hewasinexileforpoliticalreasons,andwasspendinghisownmoneysothatthedukecouldrecoverGenoaandhecould‘gohome’,andhewantedasubsidyfromMilan.108TheDoriafoundthemselvesinthatpositionwhenProsperoAdornowasdogein1478,andprofferedadvicetotheMilanesegovernmentonhowtorecoverGenoa.BackingBattistaCampofrego-soandmakinghimgovernor,wastheirsuggestion,citingamongtheotherad-vantagesthattheythemselveswouldbefreedfromexile.109

RelationsbetweenthemajorbranchesoftheFieschiandthedukesofMilaninthesecondhalfofthefifteenthcenturycoveredthegamutfromextravagantexpressionsofdevotion–GianFilippoFieschiassuredFrancescoSforzathathewas‘mygodinthisworld’110–towarasMilanesetroopsfoughttotakealltheirlands.Inthe1450sGianFilippodevotedmuchefforttopersuadingFran-cescoSforzathathewasthebestguarantorofMilaneseinfluenceinGenoa.WhathewantedfromthedukewasbackingagainstdogePietroCampofregoso(who was arguing much the same case for Sforza helping him defeat GianFilippo). The doge asked Sforza to bring pressure to bear on Gian FilippothroughhislandsinMilan,askinghimtotakecustodyofBorgoValditaroandVareseinordertoforceFieschitoacceptarbitration.111Notwishingtoantago-

107 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.994:LucaSpinolatoGianGaleazzoSforza,24Mar.1485,Lerma.108 Ibid.:LucaSpinolatoBartolomeoCalco,14July1485,Pieve.109 Ibid.,b.984:‘FamiliadeAuria’toPierfrancescoVisconti,12Aug.1478,Sassello.110 Ibid.,b.407:GianFilippoFieschitoFrancescoSforza,17Dec.1451,Montoggio.111 Ibid.,b.408:PietroCottatoFrancescoSforza,12Sept.1453,Genoa.


nize either party, Sforza avoided taking sides, exhorting them to come to apeacefulcompromise.

Once he became lord of Genoa, the terms of the equation changed.TheFieschiwerenolongerapotentiallyusefulmeansofinterventioninGenoesepolitics:theywereapotentialchallengetotheauthorityofthedukeoverGen-oa.GianFilippo’sbrotherObiettowasespeciallydifficulttocontrol,anddur-ing the periods of Sforza rule was generally forced to stay in exile out ofGenoeseterritory,sometimesindetentioninMilan.ItwashisyoungerbrotherGianLuigiwholedtheFieschiforcesthatjoinedintherebellionagainsttheSforzain1477andwhohadtoconfrontthemightoftheMilanesearmythatwassenttosuppressit.In1478ObiettowasreleasedfromprisoninMilan,atthebehestofGenoesenobleswhoarguedhecouldhavethesiegeoftheMila-nesegarrisonholdingoutinthefortressinGenoalifted.Hepromisedhewould,butwhenhereachedGenoaconcentratedonreplacingtheAdornodogewithaCampofregosoone.AlthoughhehadcometoGenoatoactintheinterestsofMilan,hewasreportedtohavesaidpublicly,oncehearrivedhehaddecidedtobea‘goodGenoese’anddoastheothersweredoing.112

HavingfallenoutwithdogeBattistaCampofregosoin1481,ObiettoclaimedhecouldrecoverGenoaforMilanifheweregiven30mountedcrossbowmen,25men-at-arms,300infantryand1,000ducats.113FromtheMilaneseperspec-tive,theFieschihadagainbecomepotentialcounterweightstothedoge.Un-derstandably,Obiettowasstillregardedasuntrustworthy,andbestkeptawayfromGenoa.GianLuigi,however,didcometoinspireenoughconfidenceinhisfidelityforhimtobegivenaprominentroleintheregimeafterGenoaagainsubmitted to Sforza dominion, with Agostino Adorno as governor, in 1488.WhenObiettobecameinvolvedinplotsagainsttheregimeandtookpart inNeapolitan-backed attempts to overthrow it in 1494,114 Gian Luigi remainedloyal.AllObietto’spropertyandthepensionhehadbeengivenwastransferredtohisbrotherbecauseofthefidelityhehadshownincombattingtheNeapoli-tanfleet.115

GianLuigi’sroleattheheartofthegovernmentofGenoa,whilehealsoheldswayovermostoftheeasternRiviera,wasthepinnacleofFieschiinfluenceinGenoaduringthefifteenthcentury.Obiettowouldhavelikedtoholdsucha

112 Ibid.,b.996:GiovanniGiapannotoBonaandGianGaleazzoSforza,29Aug.1478,Ovada.113 Ibid.,b.992:GianGaleazzoSforzatoFilippoSacromoro,4July1481,Milan.114 AlfonsoIIwastryingtopreventGenoabeingusedasaportfortheFrenchfleetpreparing

forCharlesVIII’sinvasionofthekingdomofNaples.115 ASMilan,ASforzesco,Registriducali,50,p.346:letterspatentofLudovicoSforza,5Jan.

1485.

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position,butevenifhehadmanagedtoattainit,wastoovolatiletohavemain-tainedit.TheAdornobrothersresentedanyimplicationthatGianLuigihadanofficialshare intheauthorityof thegovernmentofGenoa,116andtherewasoftenconsiderabletensionbetweenthemandhim.Difficultasitwastokeepthe three men working together amicably, the Milanese commissioner whokeptawatchfuleyeonthemfeltitwasbetterthatGianLuigishouldbeinGen-oathanliveoutsideit,whichmightemboldenenemiesoftheregime.117

ThedogescouldnothavetoleratedtheheadoftheFieschiclanresidinginGenoa,andhavingadirectvoiceinallimportantdiscussionsanddecisions.Yettheyall,CampofregosoorAdorno,hadtodealwiththepretensionsoftheFies-chitoaspecialpositionwithintherepublic.CitizenstheFieschimightbe,andweresometimescalled,buttheleadingFieschimightalsobereferredtoasa“limb”(membro)oftherepublic.NoteventheSpinolaortheDoriawerere-ferredtointhatway.Itwasbecauseoftheirclaimtoaspecialstatusthattheymightbeincludedseparatelyintreaties,as‘aprincipallimb’ofthecommunityofGenoa.118Naturally,thedogesandGenoesehostiletotheFieschiorweariedbytheunresttheycaused,preferredtoseethemascitizens.Youshouldknowwhateverycitizenoweshispatria,RaffaeleAdornoadmonishedGianAntonioFieschi;theFieschiowedmorethanmost,becauseofthehonoursanddigni-tiestheyhadreceivedoverthegenerations.119

TheFieschiconsideredthehonoursanddignitiestheyreceivedastheirdue,theirright;theheadsofthefamilythoughtofthemselvesasthepartnersofthedogeingovernment.Andtotheirchagrin,severalofthedogeshadtocometotermswiththeFieschi,promisingthemashareintheirpatronage,andapen-sion.120Theseagreementsareanindicationofboththestrengthandtheweak-nessoftheFieschi.Thedogeshadtoacceptthem,becausetheFieschicouldmakeitsodifficultforthemtomaintainpower.TheFieschineededthem,be-causetheywereunabletosustaintheroletowhichtheyaspiredinGenoaandparticularlyintheeasternRivierafromtheirownresources:theyneededthepensionasmuchastheyneededashareinthedoge’spatronage.TheycouldnotaffordtostandapartfromthepoliticsoftheGenoeserepublicandassumetheroleoffullyindependentlordsofcastles.Hadtheydoneso,theirinfluenceand prestige would have been much diminished. Yet their involvement in

116 Ibid.,b.1220:CorradoStangatoLudovicoSforza,30Oct.1496,Genoa.117 Ibid.,b.1221:CorradoStangatoLudovicoSforza,16Dec.1496,Genoa.118 Ibid.,b.410:GianFilippoFieschitoFrancescoSforza,3Feb.1455,Recco.119 ASGenoa,AS1788bis,f.177r:RaffaeleAdornotoGianAntonioFieschi,2Sept.1444.120 Forexample,ASMilan,Registriducali, 18,pp.500–504(PietroCampofregosoandGian

FilippoFieschi,21Oct.1452).


Genoesepoliticsbroughtthemmanytroubles,andintheendledtothede-structionofthefamily.

TheRomanbarons,bycontrast,wereabletotakeafarmoredetachedatti-tudetothepopesandtothegovernmentofthePapalStates.TherewaslittletobindtheRomanbaronstothepope,ortoinducethemtoregardhimastheirprince,withanoverridingcallontheirserviceandtheirloyalty.Therewasnoroleforthelaybaronsatthepapalcourt,andtheywerenotexpectedtospendtheirtimethere.NoofficesinthePapalStateswerereservedforthem,orcus-tomarilygiventothem.Popesturnedtomembersoftheirownfamiliesandhouseholdsand to favouredcardinals forcounselandcompanionship.OnlyRomanbaronswhowerecardinalssatinConsistory,andtheydidsoascardi-nals,notasbarons.Whenlaybaronsparticipatedinsomepapalceremonies,suchastheprocessiontotheLateranofanewly-crownedpope, theydidsobecauseoftheirassociationwiththecityofRome,notbecausetheywereinanysenseapapalnobility.

There were no opportunities to form bonds of hereditary loyalty to a dy-nasty,evenduringthisperiod,whenseveralpopeswererelatedtoapredeces-sor on the papal throne. Popes came and went more quickly than secularprincestendedtodo,theirpontificatesgenerallylastingaboutadecade,ifthat.Laypapalnipoti,whothepopestriedtoinsertintotheranksofbaronsorlordsinthePapalStates,weretoleratedatbest,usuallyresentedasintruders.Con-sciousoftheprecariousnessoftheirposition,papalnipotididsometimestrytoestablishlinkswithRomanbaronialfamilies–generallywiththeOrsini–hop-ingfortheirsupportwhenthepopedied.Barons,however,showedlittleornoinclinationtopropuppapalnipotiafterassociationwiththemceasedtooffertheprospectofcondotteandfavours.121Itwascommonknowledgethatpapalfamilies came and went, but baronial families endured: it was precisely be-causetheyenduredthatpapalnipotiwantedtoforgelastingbondswiththem.Thosewhotriedtobreakthispatternbyseekingtoejectthebaronsandre-placethembytheirownfamilies–asSixtusIVdidand,onaspectacularscale,AlexanderVIdid–failed.FerranteofNaplespropheticallywarnedAlexanderwhat would happen if he tried to give the barons’ lands to his children: heshouldbearinmindthatoncehewasdead,hischildrenwouldbealone,out-siders, and unlikely to be supported by his successors; he should try to givethembedsoftheirown,notplacetheminthebedsofothers.122

Ratherthanexpresssubmissiontoanindividualortothepapacyasaninsti-tution,thebaronswouldbemorelikelytoacknowledgeadutyofobedienceto

121 Shaw,The Political Role,171–203.122 Trinchera(ed.),Codice Aragonese,II,ii,424:FerrantetoLuigidePaladinis,17Jan.1494.

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la Chiesa,theChurch,astheirtemporalsovereign.Inperiodsofsede vacante,betweenthedeathofonepopeandtheelectionofhissuccessor,inassuringthe cardinals that they would not try to interfere with the conclave in anyway,thebaronswouldstresstheirloyaltytotheChurch.ThewholeOrsinifam-ilywouldbegoodandfaithfulsubjectsofHolyChurch,VirginioOrsiniassuredtheCollegeofCardinalsafterthedeathofInnocent,andwerereadytodefenditsstateanditslibertywiththeirlivesandtheirestates,beingboundtodothisforthesakeoftheirpatria,andbecausetheOrsinihadreceivedsomanyben-efitsfromtheChurch.123Abaronmightcallhimselfthepope’sservant,orevenhissubject,ifitwasexpedienttodoso,butsuchexpressionswereoftencou-pledwithadeclarationoffidelitytotheChurch,andcouldbeaccompaniedbyacaveat.HewantedtobeagoodandfaithfulservantofSixtusandtheChurch,MarianoSavelliwrotetoSixtusIV,andwoulddowhateverthepopewanted–exceptreturntothepapalprisonfromwhichhehadjustescaped.124

Romanbaronswerefarfromaloneinhavingslightregardforthepopeasatemporalprince:thepopearousedlittlereverenceamonghissubjects.NordidthepopeasaprincearousemuchrespectfromotherItalianpowers.Theyen-couragedthebaronstoputtheircommitmentsascondottieribeforeanydutytothepope,anorderofprioritieswhichcamequitenaturallytothebarons.Areputationasareliablesoldierwasofmorelastingvaluetoabaronthanthegoodwill of any pope, was the calculation. Commending the reply given byGirolamoContitoSixtus’sdemandsthatheshouldensurehisfatherGiovanni,whowasintheserviceofMilan,cametoRome–thatthepopeshouldnotbe-lievethatGiovanniwouldbreachhisfaith–theMilaneseambassadorarguedthatevenifthepopeconfiscatedhislands(ashewasthreateningtodo)this‘could not be anything but temporary, because another pope would restorethemtohimlater’.125

Occasionally,apopewouldasserttherighttoapproveorvetothecondotteofRoman baronswithotherpowers–generallyinreactiontoparticularcir-cumstancesratherthaninaneffortsteadfastlytoupholdalegalprinciple.Howmuchweightwasgiventohisapprovalorvetowouldalsodependonthecir-cumstances.GiacomoContihadtoturndownaFlorentinecondottahewantedtoaccept,becauseInnocentwassokeentokeephimthatwhenGiacomode-liberatelyaskedforconditionshebelievedwouldbeunacceptabletothepope,

123 Johannes Burckhardt, Diarium sive rerum Urbanarum commentarii (1483–1506), ed. L.Thuasne,I,575–6;FilippoValoritoOttodiPratica,1Aug.1492,Rome.

124 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.93:AntonioTrivulzioandBrandadaCastiglionetoGianGaleazzoSforza,30July1483,Rome.

125 Ibid.,b.86:GianAngeloTalentitoBonaandGianGaleazzoSforza,27Apr.1479,Rome.


he agreed to everything, and clearly would not give Giacomo permission toleave.Inthiscase,Giacomowasboundbythetermsofhiscontractthatspeci-fiedanoptionalyearwhichInnocentwasdeterminedtoenforce.Giacomofeltboundbytheobligationsofacondottiere,ratherthanthoseofasubject.126Atthesametime,InnocenttriedtopreventVirginioOrsinihavingacondottawithFerrante, maintaining that ‘being a subject of the Church, Virginio cannotcommithimselfpersonallytothekingwithoutthepermissionandconsentofthepope.’127VirginiodidnotletInnocent’sobjectionsstandinhisway,butdidwhat suited his own interests best; by the end of the year he was governor-general of the men-at-arms of the league of which Ferrante was a member,which was at war with the pope. At the end of the war, Innocent wanted aclauseinsertedinthepeacetermstotheeffectthatneithersidecouldrenewanycondottewiththevassalsoftheother–aclauseclearlyaimedattheOrsinicondottierioftheleagueandonethatMilanandFlorencedidnotwanttoac-cept.128

The pope could also object to other powers nominating Roman baronsamongtheirraccomandatiintreaties.PaulIIwasfuriousthat‘thekingwantedtodefendtheOrsiniasthoughtheywerenothis[thepope’s]subjects’.129WhenarenewalofthegeneralleaguesupposedlyunitingtheItalianpowerswasbe-ingdiscussedin1475,Sixtuswantedaclausethatnoneofthepartiestoitmightnominatethevassalsorsubjectsofanotherasaderentiorraccomandati.130Infact,exceptinsofarasclausesincondottepromisingprotectionwereanalogoustoraccomandazioni,Romanbaronsdidnot,ingeneral,formallybecomerac-comandatioraderentiofotherpowers.131

126 ASFlorence, X di Balia, Carteggi, Resp., b. 30, c.144: Guidantonio Vespucci to X, 13 Jan1484(5),Rome.

127 ACapitolino,AOrsini,b.101,c.10:FrancescodaCastellotoVirginioOrsini,13Jan.1484(5),Rome.

128 Paladino, ‘Per la storia della Congiura de’ Baroni’, 48 (1913), 248: Battista Bendedei toErcoled’Este,8Sept.1486.

129 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.843,c.465:BartolomeoMarascatoBarbaraGonzaga,27Aug.1467,Rome.

130 Ibid.,b.845,c.347:CardinalFrancescoGonzagatoLudovicoGonzaga,24Feb.1475,Rome.131 The Orsini di Pitigliano were an exception to this rule, as they had some contracts of

accomandigiawiththerepublicofSiena.ThecontidiPitiglianohadlongbeenterritorialrivalsoftheirSieneseneighbours,andoccasionallywenttowaragainstthem.Theacco-mandigie Aldobrandino Orsini agreed with the Sienese in 1442 and 1455 were part ofpeacesettlementsaftersuchawar;thefirstincludedamodestcondotta.(GiugurtaTom-masi,Dell’Historie di Siena(Siena,2002–6),I,400–402;II,76–8,82–90;LucianoBanchi,‘Laguerrade’SenesicolcontediPitigliano(1454–1455)’)FortheSienese,theseaccomandigiemayhaveappearedtoberecognitionbyAldobrandinoofsubordinationtotherepublic,

180 Chapter6

Ofall therelationships formedbythebaronswithotherpowers, theonethatpopeswatchedmostjealously,andmostwantedtocontrol,wasthatwiththekingofNaples.ItwasnotonlythattheyhadtocompetefortheloyaltiesofthosebaronswhoheldlandsinboththePapalStatesandthekingdomofNa-ples,butthatthekingsofNapleswerefullyawareofhowusefulaninstrumentRomanbaronscouldbeinputtingpressureonthepope.GivecondottetotheOrsiniandColonna, take themandtheirestatesunderprotection, for therecanbenomoresecureorhonourablewaytoforcethisoranyotherpopetoliveasauniversalpastorshould,FerranteurgedhisalliesinSeptember1485.132Ifthebaronswoulduniteandstayonthesideofthekingandtheleague,itwouldbetotheiradvantagetoo,heargued,becauseeverypopewasbentonundoingthebarons.133Thepopesmightwishthat,asSixtuswrotetoFerrante,theking‘would leavehisbaronsaloneas thepope leaveshisvassals in thekingdomalone’.134SometimestheyhadtoacknowledgethatforsomeRomanbaronsthekingwastheirsovereigntoo,buttheywantedtheobligationtothemtobegiv-enpriority,oratleastthatthekingshouldnottreattheresourcesofthebaronsinthePapalStatesasthoughtheywereathisdisposal. Innocent’sproposedsolutiontoVirginioOrsini’sdualloyaltieswasthatVirginioshouldholdapapalcondotta, with his lands in the Papal States freed of any obligation to otherpowers,andoneofhissonscouldserveFerrante,forhisestatesintheking-dom.135

Acknowledging,howeverreluctantly,thatthebaronsmighthavecommit-mentstootherrulersthataffectedtheircommitmentstotheRomanChurchasatemporalpower,wasonething;acceptingthebarons’reservationsabouthav-ingadutyofobediencetothecommandsofthepopeastheirprincewasan-other.Clericsingeneral,notonlythepopes,hadreadyrecoursetotheweaponsof excommunication and interdict against anyone who crossed them evenovertrivialmattersthathadnothingtodowiththespiritualfunctionsoftheChurch.Similarly,thepopeswerereadytolabelas“rebellion”anychallengetotheirsecularauthoritybytheirsubjects.Intheireffortstoenforcetheirauthor-

buttherewasnoindicationthathethoughtoftheminthatway.NiccolòOrsini’sagree-mentwiththeSienesein1470wasasmuchacondottaasanaccomandigia;theypaidhim,nominallyforacavalrycommand,forseveralyears(AngeloBiondi,‘Illungofeudalesimodiunterritoriodiconfine’,125–6),buthewasactuallyintheserviceofFerranteduringatleastpartofthisperiod.

132 Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli,II,324–5:G.LanfredinitoXdiBalia,30Sept.1485,Foggia.

133 Ibid.,558:G.LanfredinitoXdiBalia,17May1486,Naples.134 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.76:SacromorotoGaleazzoMariaSforza,1May1474.135 ACapitolino,AOrsini,b.102,c.20:ObiettoFieschitoVirginioOrsini,15Jan.1485.


ityinthePapalStateswhereithadbeenweakforsolong,thepopesmightde-scribe as “rebellion” behaviour that the barons regarded as customary orlegitimate–givingrefuge tooutlawsandexileson theirestates,conductingprivatewars, fightingascondottieriagainstthepope.ThusInnocentandtheCollege of Cardinals warned the Colonna and the Orsini who were fightingoverlandstheColonnaclaimedthatwereheldbyabrother-in-lawofVirginioOrsini,tolaydowntheirarmsorbedeclaredrebels.136Butthebaronswouldnotcallthemselvesrebels:iftheywereatopenwarwiththepope,theycouldstillfallbackonthepositionthattheywereloyaltotheChurch.

Inthe1430s, theColonnaandotherbaronshadopenlydefiedtheruleofEugeniusIVoverRomeandthePapalStates,takingandholdinglands,eventowns, to which they had no claim, helping create a situation in which thepopefeltcompelledtofleefromRomeforhisownsafety,andittookamajormilitaryefforttorecovercontrol.137Twodecadeslater,JacopoSavelliandEver-sodegliAguillarawereassociatedwiththecondottiereJacopoPiccinino,whobroughthistroopstothePapalStatesasthecivilwarinNaplesspilledoverintopapal territory. Jacopo Savelli also received rebellious Romans at his strong-holdofPalombara,althoughherefusedtosendtroopswiththemwhentheymadeafoolhardyattempttorousetheRomansagainstthepope.Eversowasaccused of plotting against the pope’s life.138 Pius wanted the punishmentmetedouttoSavelli,aspapaltroopsweresenttodevastatehislandsandtakePalombara,tobeexemplary,‘tocowalltheotherRomanbarons’.139Savellisub-mittedtothepope,andkepthisestates.Eversoalsomanagedtopassonhislandstohisheirs,hissonsDeifeboandFrancesco,buttheywereexcommuni-catedbyPaulIIafterrefusingthetermsheofferedwhentheytriedtorecoveran estate, Caprarola, over which they claimed rights, and Paul did not givethembackafterhistroopshadtakenthem.140

Bythelastdecadesofthefifteenthcentury,althoughthebaronswerestillconsideredcapableofposingathreattothepope,particularlyifbackedbythetroopsofanotherpower,therewereindicationsofaperceptionthatthepopeswereinapositiontobeathreattothebarons,that‘thesepriestsarecontinu-

136 ASMantua, AGonzaga, b. 847, c. 318–9: Gian Pietro Arrivabene to Francesco Gonzaga,18July1485,Rome.Forthisdispute,seeShaw,The Political Role,175–6.

137 PioPaschini,Roma nel Rinascimento(Bologna,1940),124–48.138 Piccolomini,I commentarii,I,277–83,771,813,825–7,843,871,951–67;II,2225–31.139 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.841,c.64:BartolomeoBonattotoLudovicoGonzaga,6May1461,

Rome.140 Sora,‘IcontidiAnguillara’,87–92.

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allytryingtobringyoualldown’.141SympatheticastheyweretothedesireoftheRomanstohaveagreaterroleinthegovernmentoftheircity,thebaronswerenotchallengingthelegitimacyofthepapalgovernmentinRomeorinthewiderPapalStates.Butiftheybecamemorecircumspectinopposingthepope,weremoreinclinedtofeeltheyhadtooffersomejustificationiftheydidop-posehim,theirsenseofallegiancetothepopeastheirprincedoesnotseemtohaveincreased.

Thebest-knownandleastequivocalinstancesofrebellionbythemilitarynobilityinItalyinthesecondhalfofthefifteenthcenturywerethoseinthekingdomofNaples.

Inasense,therebellionandcivilwarintheearlyyearsofFerrante’sreignfrom1459to1464wasjustbusinessasusualforthebaronsofthekingdom,aresumption of the turmoil that characterized the reigns of the last Angevinmonarchs of Naples. Support from Neapolitan barons had been crucial inAlfonsoofAragon’sconquest,andhemadeconcessionstotheminordertokeepit.PerhapshewashopingtoreplicatethesettlementthathadfosteredpeaceinthekingdomofSicilyduringhisreign.AfterthereaffirmationofAra-goneseruleintheislandfollowingthecivilwarsofthefourteenthcentury,thecompositionoftheSicilianmilitarynobilityhadbeentransformed.Newfami-lies, some from the Spanish kingdoms, replaced the mighty clans that hadfoughttodominatetheisland.ThekeytosurvivalandprosperityforSicilianbaronsbecamecooperationwiththecrown.142InNaples,althoughthereweresufficientgrantsofbaronialestatestomenfromAlfonso’sSpanishandSicilianrealmstoarouseasenseofgrievanceamongNeapolitanbarons,therewasnotthe wholesale transformation of the baronage that there had been in Sicily.Alfonso’sconfirmationofbaronialrightsandprivilegesbroughtoveradecadeofcomparativepeacebuthadnotwontheallegianceofthebaronstohisdy-nasty.TheformalrecognitionofFerranteasheirtothekingdombythebaronsassembledataParlamentoin1443couldnotguaranteetheirfealtytohimonhissuccession.

Ostensibly,atleastsomeofthebaronswhorebelledagainstFerrantesoonafterhecametothethronewerefightingtoreplacehimwithanAngevinking.LoyaltytotheAngevindynastywasnevercited,however,eitherbythebaronsorbyothersastheprimemotiveforrebellion.TheAngevinshadnotevenbeenthe first choice of the disaffected barons as an alternative to Ferrante: their

141 ACapitolino,AOrsini,b. 102,c. 172:SantidaCurcumellotoVirginioOrsini, 13Oct. 1487,Florence.

142 PietroCorrao,Governare un regno. Potere, società e istituzioni in Sicilia fra Trecento e Quat-trocento(Naples,1991),203–60.


initialapproachhadbeentoanother,legitimateAragoneseprince,CarlosdeViana.143IncreasedtaxationunderAlfonsohadgeneratedsomepopularnos-talgiaforAngevinrule,andaneedtolightentheburdenoftaxesandcorrecttheinjusticesofAlfonso’sreignwerecitedbyoneofthefirstbaronstorebel,GiosiaAcquaviva,whenexplaininghisowndiscontentintheearlystagesofFerrante’sreign.144Nevertheless,neitherhenortheotherbaronswererebel-lingtodefendthepeopleof thekingdomagainstabuseof thepowerof thecrown. Neapolitan barons, by and large, accepted they were subjects, andnone,noteventheprincipediTaranto,aspiredtotakethecrownhimself.Yetthecrownhadnomystiqueforthem,andtheyhadlittlesenseofthesacralityeven of a consecrated king. Neapolitan barons were habituated to a weakcrownanddynasticconflicts.Theydidnotseemtofeelthatrebellionrequiredideologicalorethicalorlegaljustification.

AlthoughitcouldhardlybeexpectedofNeapolitanbaronsthattheyshouldbenaturallyloyaltothemonarch,thereseemstohavebeennocuriosityaboutwhatmotivatedthosewhoconsistentlystoodbyFerrantethroughoutthewar.Enquiriesweremadeofhismostprominentopponents,byvariousinterme-diaries, about their motives. Mainly diplomatic envoys, the intermediarieswereconcernedwithfindingoutonwhattermstheindividualstheyspoketomightbebroughtovertotheking.Personalandfamilygrievancesandfeudsandambitionsfiguredlarge,andnodiscussionorstatementsofgeneralprin-cipleabouttherelationofthebaronstothecrownemergefromthereportsofthese negotiations.145 It has always been assumed that they had no generalprinciples,andwereentirelyconcernedwiththeirpersonalaffairs,andthatmightwellbethecase.NordoesitseemthattheSicilianandSpanishnobleswhohadjoinedtheranksofNeapolitanbaronshadbroughtanewperspectiveontherelationsbetweenthebaronsandthecrown.IftheSicilianbaronsinthisperiodwerequiescent, thoseof theSpanishkingdomsrivalledtheNea-politans for recourse to rebellion and civil war and exploitation of dynasticconflicts.

Thekingpinoftherebellion,thebaronthekingfearedthemost,wastheprincipediTaranto,GiovanniAntonioOrsini.Thiswasnotbecauseofhisqual-itiesasamilitaryleaderorpoliticalstrategist,whichwereuninspiring.Ratherthan looking to him for leadership, other barons turned to him for supportbecauseofhiswealthandpower.Hehadtheresourcesnotonlytoraisehisownarmyandhirecondottieri,buttopayforthetroopsofothers.Jeand’Anjou

143 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,17(1892),571–7,732–3.144 Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli,II,54:OrfeoCennitoFrancescoSforza,28July1458,Capua.145 Forexample,ibid.,53–9;ibid.,97–102;GiovanniCaimitoF.Sforza,29Aug.1458,Teano.

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washeavilyreliantonhimforfinancialaswellasmilitarysupport.NoonewasmoreawarethanOrsinihimselfoftheinfluencehecouldhaveonthecourseofthewar:heclaimeditwasinhispowertosendtheAngevinspacking.146HehadthearrogancetoproposethatthekingshouldrejectthehelpFrancescoSforzawassendinghim,andinsteadjoinhiminpayingthecondottiereJacopoPiccinino,theAngevincaptain-general,andthatthekingshouldhavenomoretroopsthanhedidhimself.147Iftheprince’sdeedshadbeenasboldashisde-mands,hadhebeenabettersoldier,amoreopen-handedally,theoutcomeofthewarmighthavebeenverydifferent.

Asitwas,althoughhisattitudetoFerrantewashostilefromthestart,andalthoughhewasinstrumentalinbringingJeand’Anjoutothekingdom,hede-layed rebelling openlyuntild’Anjouarrived.Sogrudgingwashis attitude toprovidingtheresourcestheAngevinsrequiredfromhim,thatFerrantefelthecould rely on that for his own ultimate victory.148 After the heavy defeat ofd’AnjouatthebattleofTroiainAugust1461,theprincewasamongthebaronswho opened negotiations with the king.The terms he agreed in Septembersecuredhisowninterests,anddidnotincludeeitherd’AnjouorPiccinino.Thewarcontinued,asd’Anjoustayedinthekingdomandsomebaronspersistedintheir rebellion. In the spring and summer of 1463, Orsini was stirring againinPuglia,butnewsinAugustthatPiccininohadcometotermsdiscouragedhimandtheotherremainingrebels.PapalandMilaneseenvoysreinforcedtheeffortsofFerrantetomakeafreshagreementwithhim.Complainingthatthekinghadnotobservedthetermsagreedtheyearbefore,herejectedtheofferofasonofFerranteasahostageandpledgethatthekingwouldfulfilhisprom-iseswhenhecould,andaskedforsomelandsasaguarantee instead.149Hisviolentdeath(atthehandsofconspirators)inNovember1463wasconsideredthesalvationofFerrante.150Soonallhisvastestatesandtreasurewereintheking’shands,andnearlyallhiscavalry–21squadrons–wentovertotheserviceoftheking.151

Changesofsidebybaronsduringthewar,evenrepeatedchangesofside,occasionedlittlesurprise.‘Theycannotbereliedonfromonedaytothenext’,

146 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,21(1896),274.147 Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli,IV(Salerno,1998),50:AntoniodaTrezzotoF.Sforza,27Jan.

1461,Somma.148 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,20(1895),481–2.149 Ibid.,23(1898),173.150 Ibid., 176. For the obscurity surrounding the exact circumstances of his death, see

GiovanniPapuli,‘DocumentieditiedineditisuirapportitraleuniversitàdiPugliaeFer-dinandoIallamortediGiovanniAntoniodelBalzoOrsini’,375–6.

151 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,23(1898),178.


wroteaMilaneseambassador,AntoniodaTrezzo,althoughhebelieved‘theydid not do this out of malice’; ‘with that ease with which they rebel, sotheyreturneverytimetheyseethekingstronginthefield’.152

ThesecommentsweremadewithparticularreferencetotheSanseverinoafterFerrante’sdefeatatthebattleofSarnoon7July1460,whichlosthimthesupportofaconsiderablenumberofbarons,amongthemRoberto,contediSanseverino.HesentamessagetoFerrante,sayinghewasonlygoingovertotheAngevinsidetosavehimself,andwouldchangeallegianceagainassoonascircumstancesallowed.153Withinafewmonths,hejudgedthetimewasripe,andcamebacktotheking.Delightedbythisreconciliation,consideringitagreatboosttohiscausebecauseofthecount’sestatesandhisfollowingamongtheSanseverinoandotherbarons,thekingdisplayedhistrustbysharingabedwithhimwhenthecountcametoseehiminJanuary1461.154BecomingoneofFerrante’smosttrustedcommanders,thecontediSanseverinoplayedamajorroleintherecoveryofCalabriaandotherterritoryfortheking.LucadaSanse-verino,ducadiSanMarco,haddefectedtotheAngevinsideshortlyafterthebattleofSarno,returningtoFerranteatthesametimeasRobertodid.Puttingahigherpriceonhisallegiancethanthecountdid,hewantedapromise inwritingoflandsinCalabria,amongotherthings.Ferrantewaspreparedtogivethispromise;thecounthimselfadvisedhimtomakeitbutnotkeepit,becausehethoughtitunscrupulousoftheduketomakesuchdemands.155Servicestothekingbroughtimportantterritorialgainstoboth.In1463,Robertowasper-mittedtobuytheprincipalityofSalerno for50,000ducats,andLucatobuyBisignanofor10,000ducats,beinggrantedthetitleofprincetwoyearslater.156

ThecityofSalernohadbeenheldagainstthekingaftertherebellionoftheformerprincipediSalerno,FeliceOrsini.Theyoungprince(hewasagedaboutseventeen)andhisbrothersDaniele,contediSarnoandGiordano,contediAtripalda,hadvacillatedformonthsbeforetheycameoutinopenrebellion.AfterDanieleandGiordanohaddonesoinMay1460,FelicesenttoFerrantetosaythatunlesshewashelpedtodefendhislands,hewouldbeforcedtomaketermswiththeenemy.157Althoughhedidrebel in June,heswiftlyretractedwhenpapaltroopsarrivedtosupportFerrante,onlytoswitchagainafterthe

152 Ibid.,20(1895),479:AntoniodaTrezzotoFrancescoSforza,16,23July1460.153 Ibid.,479.154 Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli,IV,14:A.daTrezzotoF.Sforza,12Jan.1461;18,Ferranteto

F.Sforza,12Jan.1461.155 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,20(1895),21:A.daTrezzotoF.Sforza,12Jan.1461,Naples.156 Colapietra,I Sanseverino,35.157 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,20(1895),251–2.

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battleofSarno.158Felice’slands,andapparentlyFelicehimself,cameunderthecontroloftheprincipediTaranto,hisuncle;hewasthoughtafoolforhavingputhimselfintheprince’shands.159Hemayhavehadnochoicebuttoremainarebel,losingallhislandsandlivingouthislifeinexile.160Danielewasforcedto agree terms in March 1462 after Sarno was besieged; he kept Sarno buthadtocedeotherestates.Theestatesofthethirdbrother,Giordano,werecon-fiscated.161

FerrantehadnotexpectedFeliceOrsiniandhisbrotherstorebel.Hehadallowedthemtosucceedtothefiefsoftheirfather,RaimondoOrsini,despitetheir illegitimacy, and Felice was betrothed to Ferrante’s natural daughter,Maria.AnevenmorepersonalblowtoFerrantewastherebellionofMarinoMarzano,principediRossano,whowasmarriedtohissisterEleonora.162Ros-sanowassuspectedofcolludingwiththeprincipediTaranto,beforeheopenlyrebelledonthearrivalofJeand’Anjou,whodisembarkedonRossano’sestatesintheTerradiLavoroinNovember1459.163Inanagreementwithd’Anjou,hewaspromisedtheconfirmationofallhislandsandprivilegesandimportantestateshecovetedinthatregion,includingthecountiesofFondiandTraetto,and in Calabria.164 In May 1460, when the king was attacking his lands, heaskedforterms,proposingameetingwithFerrante.AsRossanotookhisleaveafterthemeeting,themenwhowerewithhimtriedtoassassinatetheking,whowassavedbyhisarmour.Ferrantepretendedtobelievethathisbrother-in-lawwasnotcomplicitintheassault,butfewgavecredencetothat.165Oneofthelastbaronstofighton,RossanoeventuallycametotermswithFerranteinAugust1463.EventhenhecontinuedtogiveJeand’Anjourefugeonhisestates.Onlyafterd’AnjoufinallyleftthekingdominApril1464didhegotoseeFer-rante,whoreceivedhimwithfeignedcordiality.Rossanodidnottrusttheking,orwant toprovide theguarantee thekingsought,andwhenhereturnedto

158 Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli,IV,62,note3.159 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,20(1895),592.160 From1470hebecameacondottiereofthedukeofMilan(Covini,L’esercito del duca,309–

10).161 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,22(1897),206;Colapietra,I Sanseverino,32.162 Marzano’sfather,GiovanniAntonio,ducadiSessa,hadfoughtforAlfonsoinhiswarsto

conquer the kingdom, although towards the end Alfonso had suspected him of beingamongthebaronshefeltwereholdingbackandnotpressingontosecureanAragonesevictory,becausetheywereprofitingtoomuchbythewar(Ryder,Alfonso,232).

163 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,19(1894),330.164 Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli,II,404.165 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,20(1895),245–51.


Ferrante’scampinJune,hewasarrested.Hewouldbeaprisonerfortherestofhisdays.166

AnotherrebelliousbarontodieasaprisonerofthekingwasAntonioCen-telles,marchesediCotrone.OfCatalanorigin,AntonioandhistwobrothershadcomefromSicilytoNapleswithAlfonso.HeplayedamajorroleinwinningCalabria for Alfonso, but when he married Enrichetta Ruffo, a rich heiressthere, instead of persuading her to marry Iñigo d’Avalos as the king had or-deredhimtodo,helostAlfonso’sconfidence.WarnedthatAlfonsowasplan-ningtodetainhim,herebelled.167AlfonsopardonedhiminFebruary1445,butconfiscatedallhisfiefs,andinsistedheshouldstayinNaples.168AfterAlfonso’sdeathCentellesposedasavictimofinjustice.InSeptember1458,hewenttojointheprincipediTaranto,whochampionedhiscauseandaddedrestorationofCentelles’estates tohis listofdemandsofFerrante, justifyingthisby thebetrothalofhisdaughtertoCentelles’eldestson.169Centelles,fomentingre-bellioninCalabria,protestedthathedidnotwanttorecoverhislandsthroughthegoodgracesoftheking,buttotakethemhimself.170ByagreeingthattheprincipediTarantoshouldhavecustodyoftheestates,Ferrantefostereddis-sensionbetweenhimandCentelles.WhenFerrantewenttoCalabriainSep-tember1459,Centellescametohiscamptoseekhispardon;Ferrantepromisedclemency,thenarrestedhim.ContrivingtoescapefromprisoninApril1460,CentellesreturnedtoCalabriawithafewmen,butdidnotgetthewelcomehehadhopedfor.Havingagainsuedforpardon,heandhiswifehadalltheirlandsrestoredinJune1462.Fortheremainderofthewar,Centellesfoughtfortheking in Calabria, being rewarded with the title of principe di Squillace. InOctober1465,hisdaughterwasmarriedtoanaturalsonoftheking,Enrico,butafewmonthslater,Centelleswasarrestedbyhisson-in-law,imprisoned,andallhisestatesconfiscated.Whethertherewasaspecificmotiveforhisdeten-

166 Ibid.,23(1898),193–5;Volpicella(ed.),Regis Ferdinandi Primi Instructionum liber,363.167 Pontieri,‘LaCalabria’,112.168 Growing restless, Centelles went to northern Italy, where he served Venice and the

Ambrosian Republic of Milan, before falling foul of Francesco Sforza who imprisonedhim.Escapingfromincarceration,hereturnedtoNapleswherehewasgivenapensionandapositionatcourt(Ibid.,118–20).

169 Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli,II,163:PietroBeccariaandAntoniodaTrezzotoFrancescoSforza,18Nov.1458,Andria.

170 Arm.-Ad.Messer(ed.),Le Codice Aragonese(Paris,1912),120:FerrantetoJuanIIofAragon,4Oct.1458,Andria.

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tion(otherthanFerrante’sdesireforrevenge),andwhenandhowhedied,areallunknown.171

Ferrantestruggledthroughoutthewartopayforhisowntroops.Someofthecondottieriwhofoughtforhimhadtobepaid,atleastinpart,withestatesor thepromisesofestates.A largepartof the landsofFeliceOrsiniandhisbrotherswasgiventoanotherOrsini,Orso,asthepriceofhisgoingovertoFer-rante.Orso’soriginsareobscure;hewasprobablynotfromoneoftheNeapoli-tanbranchesofthefamily.172HehadbeenbroughtintothewarasacondottierebytheprincipediTarantoinlate1458,andhadspentmuchtimecampaigningintheTerradiLavoro,usingNola,oneofGiordanoOrsini’sestatesasabase.OneofthemosttroublesomecommandersfightingagainstFerrante–theAn-gevinvictoryatthebattleofSarnoowedmuchtohim–thekingwasgladtohavehimwhenhechangedsidesinDecember1461.Fortheremainderofthewar,hewasamainstayofFerrante’smilitaryeffortsandhisserviceswerere-wardedbythegrantoftheduchyofAscoliin1464.HavingbecomeaNeapoli-tanbaron,hewouldbeoneoftheselectfewtrustedbyFerrante.173FrancescoSforza’s nephew, Roberto da Sanseverino (not to be confused with Roberto,contediSanseverino)hadcometothekingdombeforethewartoclaimthelandsthathis fatherLeonettohadheld;hehadrecoveredmostofthembutnotthecountyofCaiazzo.Sentagaininlate1460byFrancescoSforzatosup-porttheking,hewasusedbyFerrantebothasamilitarycommanderandinnegotiations, particularly with his Sanseverino relations. He was rewardedwiththecountyofCaiazzoinApril1461.RobertoOrsini,brotherofNapoleone,wasbroughtintoFerrante’sservicewiththepromiseofthecountiesofTaglia-cozzoandAlbi.174NapoleonestayedinthePapalStatesandonthefrontiersof

171 Pontieri,‘LaCalabria’,100–53;Volpicella(ed.),Regis Ferdinandi Primi Instructionum liber,315–7.

172 He has sometimes been confused with other individuals bearing the same name. It ismost likelythathewasthesonofGentileOrsinidaPitigliano. Ifhewasofthe lineofthecontidiPitigliano, itmightexplainwhyhewasknownas theconteOrso;NiccolòOrsini,contediPitigliano,wouldclaimtobehisheir.

173 Volpicella (ed.), Regis Ferdinandi Primi Instructionum liber, 384–5; Francesco Storti, ‘Ilprincipe condottiero. Le campagne militare di Alfonso duca di Calabria’, 338; and seeabove,p.112.

174 ThesecountieshadrevertedtothecrownonthedeathofGianAntonioOrsini,contediTagliacozzo,in1458.FortheexplicitassociationofthegrantofthecountyofTagliacozzowith military service to be rendered by the brothers, see Messer (ed.), Le Codice Ara-gonese,419–26: instructionsofFerrante toAntonioCazo,31 Jan. 1460,Naples.FerranteheldbackonthegrantofAlbi,hopingtouseittoappeasetheColonna,whoalsoclaimedthecounties,buttheOrsiniwouldnotbecontentuntilhegrantedthemthataswell.


the kingdom, while Roberto Orsini became one of Ferrante’s most reliablecommandersthroughoutthewar.PopePiusII’ssupporthadtobepaidforbythe marriage in May 1461 of his nephew AntonioTodeschini Piccolomini toMaria,thenaturaldaughterofFerranteandthecouple’sendowmentwithsub-stantialestates.PiushopedfortheduchyofSessa,buthadtobecontentforhisnephewtobemadeducad’Amalfi,andlaterbegiventhecountyofCelanoaswell.Antoniodidnotproveungrateful, fightingwell forFerrante inthewar,andremainingfaithfultohimthereafter.

FortunatelyforFerrante,somebaronswhowerealreadyestablishedinthekingdomwereloyaltohimthroughoutthewar.ProminentamongthemwasOnoratoCaetani,contediFondi.HeguardedthenorthernfrontieroftheTerradiLavoro,wherehisestateswereconcentrated,andwasmadegovernorofthecityofNaples–aclearindicationoftheking’sconfidenceinhim–whenFer-rantetookthefieldagainafterhisdefeatatSarnoin1460.Hisfidelityearnedgiftsofmorelands,includingthecountyofAlife,andpermissiontobuyothers,includingTraetto.175AlsosteadilyloyaltothekingwereFrancescodelBalzo,ducad’Andria,brother-in-lawofFerrante’squeen,Isabella,andhissonPirro.AndriawasneartheestatesoftheprincipediTaranto,anddelBalzo’slandswereattackedbytheprince.ForcedtosurrenderafterAndriawasbesiegedforfortydays,FrancescowasheldprisoneruntiltheprincemadetermswithFer-ranteafterthebattleofTroia.176PirrowasmarriedtothedaughterandheiressoftheprincipediTaranto’sbrother,Gabriele,whichmadehimanenemyoftheprinceratherthanafriend,becauseofaninheritancedispute.177BothFran-cescoandPirrodelBalzowerekeyfiguresinthemilitaryeffortstocontaintheprince;theirinterestsandtheking’swereclearlyconnected.

The brothers Iñigo and Alfonso d’Avalos and their half-brothers IñigoandFernandodeGuevarahadbeenAlfonso’strustedcompanionsinarmsandcourtiers,andFerrantehadconfidenceinthemtoo.Allfoughtforhiminthewar.AfterFerrante’sdefeatatSarno,atwhichFernandodeGuevarawascap-tured,IñigodeGuevaraandthed’Avaloshelpedthekingtorallybyprovidinghimwithsixsquadronsofcavalryandhundredsofinfantry,around2,000meninall.178 IñigodeGuevaradidmostofhis fighting intheAbruzziwherethebulkofhisestateslay,andcampaigningwiththeking(hediedfromnaturalcausesinSeptember1462).Alfonsod’AvalosfoughttherebellioninCalabriain

175 Volpicella(ed.),Regis Ferdinandi Primi Instructionum liber,334–5.176 Ibid.,274–5;Carteggio degli oratori mantovani,IV,243,note2.177 Dispacci sforzeschi da Napoli,II,349:declarationofenvoysoftheprincipediTarantoto

Ferranteandtheking’sresponse,20Aug.1459.178 Ibid.,IV,48,note7.

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1458and1459,defeatingAntonioCentelles,andshowinggreatruthlessnessinthemassacreofpeasantswhohadjoinedtherebellion,andthencampaignedmainlyinhishomeprovinceoftheAbruzziandintheTerradiLavoro.179

Faithfulservantsofthecrownastheywere,theGuevaraandd’AvaloswerealsopartoftheproblemthatFerrantehadfromthestartinfindingamodus vivendiwithhisItalianbarons.Althoughmanyofthe“Catalans”(astheAra-gonese,CastiliansandSiciliansaswellasCatalanswhohadcometoNaplesinAlfonso’stimetoservethekingortrytheirfortunetendedtobeindiscrimi-natelylabelled)hadleftafterAlfonso’sdeath,Ferrante’srelianceonthosewhostayed on caused much resentment. Some barons had more personal griev-ances,whenestatestowhichtheyfelttheyhadarighthadcomeintothehandsof “Catalans”. Having waited sixteen years for Ferrante to become king andright the wrongs they had suffered, Antonio Caldora and his son Restainowarned,theywouldbeverydisappointedifFerrantechosetoupholdtheirri-vals.TheycouldbearpatientlywhatmightbedoneattheinstanceofnativeNeapolitans,butcouldnottoleratewhatmightbedoneattheinstanceof‘anunknown barbarian’, the enemy of the king (meaning Iñigo de Guevara).180Ferrantedidnotdenyhefavouredthe“Catalans”.Ifhemadeuseofthem,itwasbecausetheywereexperiencedandservedwillinglyandfaithfully,hesaid.181NoneoftheItalianlordswereofanyusetohim,heargued,becauseAlfonsohadnotemployedany.182

Hedidclaimthathewantedto‘liveasanItalian’,withthecounsel,aidandsupportofItalians,butinsayingthatheseemedtohaveItalianstates,ratherthanNeapolitanbarons,inmind.183BaronswhoflockedtothecityofNaplesatthebeginningofthereign,dreamingofplacesofhonouraroundthekingandmilitarycommands, leftdisillusioned.Unquestionably, theiraspirationshadbeenexaggerated;tenkingdomswouldnothavesufficedtosatisfythemall,itwassaid. Ifnoneof the Italiansweregivencause toenvyoneanother, theycould all share in envy of the “Catalans” Ferrante favoured, especially Iñigod’Avalos.184

179 Ibid.,IV,9,note8.180 Ibid.,II,57:reportofOrfeoCennitoFrancescoSforza,[28July]1458.Guevarahadappar-

entlybeengivensomeCaldoralandsintheAbruzzi.181 Ibid.,126:A.daTrezzotoF.Sforza,22Sept.1458,Venafro.182 Ibid.,102:GiovanniCaimitoF.Sforza,29Aug.1458,Teano.183 Ibid.,149–50:A.daTrezzotoF.Sforza,17Oct.1458,Sulmona.Hemadetheseremarksin

thecontextofadiscussionofhisrelationswiththeFlorentines,andanassurancethathedidnotintendtobedependentonthekingofAragon.

184 Ibid.,109–10:B.AnticidaRecanatitoF.Sforza,30Aug.1458.


Ferrantemaintainedthatthebaronswantedtostayathomeontheirestatesandexpectedhimtosendtothemforadvice,whichhewasnotpreparedtodo.If they would come to stay at court with him, then he would consult themmorethanothers.185Butoncetheirinitialhopesforhonoursandofficesandpositionsofinfluencehadbeendashed,therewaslittletoattractthebaronstothecourt,andFerrantewouldnot tryveryhardtobringthemthere,excepttoconstrainthosehedidnottrusttoresideinNaples,wherehecouldkeepaneyeonthem.Fewbaronsbecamehiscounsellorsorcoadjutorsingoverningtheaffairsofthekingdom,orcompanionsinhisleisure.Ferrante’smilitaryre-forms after the war, his intent to prevent the barons from having their owncompaniesofmen-at-arms,manifestedhislackofconfidenceinthem.186ThechivalricorderoftheErmine,foundedbyFerrantein1465,couldbeviewedasameansofforgingbondsofloyaltywithatleastaselectgroupofbarons,buttohavehisownchivalricorderwasperhapsprimarilyamatterofinternationalprestige.187

The war left a legacy of mutual distrust and suspicion. It was thoughtthatthearrestofAntonioCentellesin1466mightmarkthestartofFerrantetakingrevenge,onebyone,onthebaronswhohadfoughtagainsthim.188Thebaronshehadimprisonedwerenotpardonedorreleased;indeedthesonoftheprincipediRossano,GiovanBattistaMarzanowas incarceratedwithhisfatherwhenhewasstillachild.ButFerrantedidnottakepiecemealrevengeonthosewhohadmanagedtokeeptheirlibertyandstayedinthekingdom,andwaspreparedtopardonexiledbaronsandrestoretheirlands.Hewouldcitehiswelcomingback to thekingdomin 1480AngelodiMonforte, sonofCola,contediCampobasso,andtherestorationtohimofhisfather’scounty,asproofofhiswillingnesstorewardthosewhowouldservehim.189Moretothepoint,perhaps,washisadmonitiontohissonAlfonsotokeepacurbonhistongue:Alfonsoshouldtakeexamplefromhim,forhehadneverthreatenedtopunishthebaronswhohadrebelledagainsthim;muchhastobefeigned.190

185 Ibid.,148:TommasoMoroni,PietroBeccariaandA.daTrezzotoF.Sforza,16Oct.1458,Sulmona.

186 Seeabove,p.112.187 GiulianaVitale,Araldica e politica. Statuti di Ordini cavallereschi “curiali” nella Napoli ara-

gonese(Salerno,1999),55–64.188 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.805:GianFrancescoGonzagatoLudovicoGonzaga,1Feb.1466,

Naples.189 Volpicella(ed.),Regis Ferdinandi Primi Instructionum liber,164:FerrantetoAntonioPhi-

odo,20Sept.1487.190 Albini,De Gestis Regum Neapo. ab Aragonia,281–2:FerrantetoGiovanniAlbini,22Dec.

1483,Naples.

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Harsh,arrogant,assuspiciousashisfather,Alfonsowasnotsuitedtoprovidinganalternativefocusofloyaltytohisdynastyortothecrown.Hisfather’sadvicedidnotrestrainhimfromutteringthreatsagainstthebarons.HespokeopenlyofhiswishthatallthelandforthirtymilesaroundthecityofNaplesshouldbebrought into the royal demesne.191 Reports also reached the barons that hisdeclaredintentionwastoreducetheincomeandauthorityoftheNeapolitanbaronstothatoftheLombardcastellans–withtheexampleofthedestructionofthepoweroftheRossiinmind.192

ThisremarkwasparticularlyalarmingforthebaronswhoheldlandsintheTerradiLavoro,notleastAntonellodaSanseverino,principediSalerno,whobecameacentralfigureinthesecondmajorrebellionagainstFerranteintheBarons’Warof1485–6.OtherepisodesreinforcedconcernthatFerranteandAlfonsowereseekingtoweakenthebarons.Onewastheimprisonmentin1485of the two young sons and heirs of Orso Orsini, duca d’Ascoli (who on hisdeathbed had commended them to Alfonso, whose military mentor he hadbeen),andtheconfiscationoftheirestates,onthegroundsthattheboyswerespurious,notreallyOrso’ssons.193AnotherwasthearrestofthecontediMon-torio,whohadgreatinfluenceoverthecityofL’Aquila;FerranteaccusedhimofbehavingasthoughL’Aquilawerehiscityratherthantheking’s,interferingintheadministrationofjusticeandhinderingthecollectionofroyalrevenues.194Ill-feelingwasalsobeinggeneratedbyadisputeovertheprospectiveinheri-tanceofthetwodaughtersofPirrodelBalzo,principed’Altamura,whohadnosonssurviving.195OneofthedaughterswasmarriedtoPedrodeGuevara(sonofIñigo),theotherbetrothedtoFerrante’sson,Francesco.Ferrantewantedhisdaughter-in-lawtoinheritallherfather’sestates.InAugustGuevarasenttothekingsignifyinghisagreementtotherenunciationofhiswife’sinheritance,inreturnforcompensationingrantsofotherlandsandrevenues,whichthekingagreed. But by then rumours had already reached the king of a conspiracy

191 Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli, II, 208: Giovanni Lanfredini toLorenzo de’Medici,23 July 1485,Naples.The remarks weremadewhilehewas still inLombardyaftertheWarofFerrara,butbecameknowninthekingdom.

192 Gentile,‘Aristocraziasignorile’,154.193 Paladino, ‘PerlastoriadellaCongiuradeiBaroni’,44(1919),352–3:BattistaBendedeito

Ercoled’Este,24May1485,Naples.194 Ibid.,355:BattistaBendedeitoErcoled’Este,2July1485,Naples.Hewouldbereleasedin

lateOctoberonhispromisetousehisinfluencethereonbehalfoftheking(Corrispon-denza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli,II,378–9:GiovanniLanfredinitoXdiBalia,28Oct.1485,Naples).

195 Paladino, ‘PerlastoriadellaCongiuradeiBaroni’,44(1919),362–3:BattistaBendedeitoErcoled’Este,4Aug.1485,Naples.


among the barons, involving Guevara, the princes of Altamura, Salerno andBisignano,AndreaMatteoAcquaviva,marchesediBitonto,andGiovanniCar-acciolo,ducadiMelfi,andthattheyhadappealedtothepopeasoverlordofthekingdomforhelp.196

ThisrebellionwasmuchlessgeneralinitsextentthanthepreviousoneFer-rante had faced, and far fewer barons joined in it. Nevertheless, the leadingfigures in itwereamongthegreatestbaronsofthekingdom.Clearpersonalmotives,fears,disappointments,grievances,canbefoundthatcouldexplaintheirrevolt.Butthistimetherebelsalsoinvokedsomemoregeneralprinciplesthantheirowninterests,andtheydidmakesomeattempttoacttogether,notjustfightandnegotiateeachonhisownindividualaccount.Atthebeginning,it was reported that they were to rise up invoking “Liberty and the Church”(‘Libertàechiesa’).197Towardstheend,inSeptember1486,theprincipalbar-onstookanoathonaconsecratedhost,committingthemselvesandtheirheirsto remain united. They had been acting throughout, they declared, ‘for thepublicgoodandthecommonbenefitofourselvesandofthekingdom’,withtheauthorityofthepope.Theircommonpurposewasjustandhonest,usefulandfruitfulnotjustforthemselvesandtheiradherents,followersandsubjects,butto‘thewholecommonwealthofthiskingdom’.198

Nevertheless,thetermstheyaskedofthekingsoonafterrelatedtotheusualrange of personal interests: restitution of all lands and offices they had lostduringthewar;thatthedaughterofPedrodeGuevara(hehaddiedinSeptem-ber1486)shouldinheritherfather’slandsashehadleftthemtoherinhiswill;thatthemarriageofFrancescod’AragonatoAltamura’sdaughterbeannulled,orthatthedowryshouldbeincashnotlands;andthatthebaronsshouldnev-erhavetocometoNaples.199Ferranteexpressedconcernthatifheagreedtosuch terms, they would only make it easier for the barons to rise up againwhenevertherewasacrisisinItalianaffairs,oratthedeathoftheking.Hehadtodefeatthem,oratleastbringdownsomeofthem,asanexampletotheoth-ersandawarningtostayobedientinfuture.200

196 Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli,II,263:GiovanniLanfredinitoXdiBalia,28Aug.1485,Naples.

197 Ibid.198 Porzio,La congiura de’ Baroni del Regno di Napoli,ed.d’Aloe,CXLIV-CXLV:textoftheoath,

11Sept.1486.199 Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli, II, 713–4: Giovanni Lanfredini to

Lorenzode’Medici,8Oct.1486,Naples;Paladino,‘PerlastoriadellaCongiuradeiBaroni’,46(1921),241:BattistaBendedeitoErcoled’Este,30Nov.1485.

200 Corrispondenza degli ambasciatori fiorentini a Napoli, II, 465: Giovanni Lanfredini toLorenzode’Medici,11Jan.1486,Naples.

194 Chapter6

Ifthebaronsactedtogetherinnegotiatingandformulatingtheirdemands,theydidnotcoordinatetheirmilitaryefforts.Eachfoughtintheirownprov-incestodefendtheirownestatesortograbotherplacestheyclaimedorcov-etediftheysawanopportunity,ortoraidnearbyplacesintheroyaldemesne–Altamura,BitontoandGuevaraintheAbruzziandPuglia,BisignanoandhisbrotherCarlo,contediMiletoinCalabria,theprincipediSalernointheTerradiLavoro.Thistimenoclaimanttothethronecametogivesomesemblanceofbroader strategic aims.The heir to the Angevin claims, René d’Anjou, DukeofLorrainewascalledontocometoNaplesinthespringandsummerof1486,butthiswasaninitiativeofthepope,orratherofCardinalGiulianodellaRov-ere, who was the driving force behind Innocent’s support for the rebelliousbarons.Atanearlierstage,asnegotiationsbetweenthekingandthebaronsweregivingwaytofighting,theydetainedFerrante’ssecondsonFedericoandtried to suborn him, offering to accept him as king in place of Ferrante orAlfonso,butheturnedthemdown.201

Itwasreckonedthattherebelsheld800ofanestimated2,000orso‘terremurate’,walledtowns,townshipsandvillagesinthekingdom.202Buttheydidnothavemanytroops,andcouldnotevenbyacombinedefforthaveputto-getherafieldarmytomatchthatraisedbytheprincipediTarantotwenty-fiveyearsbefore.Ferrantehadanticipatedthatthewarwouldhavetobefoughtonmultiplefronts,andhadtosendmuchofhisarmytothePapalStates,sohecouldnotmusteroverwhelmingforcetoputdowntherebels.Norcouldheaf-fordtosendtroopsormoneytodefendhisdemesnelandsorassistloyalbar-ons,andhadtoallowthemtouseroyalrevenuescollectedlocallytoprovidefortheirowndefences.203Atleastinthiswartherewerenomajordefectionsofbaronswhowerenotrebelsfromthestart,althoughtheFlorentineambas-sador for one suspected their loyalty and that of the demesne lands wouldvacillate if the rebels receivedreinforcements fromoutside thekingdom.204GiovanniCaracciolo,ducadiMelfi,whilesendinghisbrotherGiacomoofftoseize the county of Avellino (that Giacomo had lost as a rebel in the early1460s), did not declare for either side until August 1486 when he finally ac-ceptedacondottafromthepope.205HadFerrantebeenpreparedtoofferhimacondottaofthesizeCaracciolobelievedhemerited,hewouldhavesidedwith

201 Ibid.,412:G.LanfredinitoXdiBalia,22Nov.1485,Naples.202 Ibid.,409–10:G.LanfredinitoXdiBalia,20Nov.1485,Naples.203 Ibid.,424:G.LanfredinitoXdiBalia,26Nov.1485,Naples.204 Ibid.,441–2:G.LanfredinitoXdiBalia,14Dec.1485,Naples.205 Vitale,‘LerivoltediGiovanniCaracciolo’,29–41.


theking.206Ferrantedidnothirecondottierithistimetocommandthecam-paignsagainsttherebels;heusedhissonsFrancesco,FedericoandCesare,andhisgrandsonFerrandinoascommandersinstead.

MostoftheforcesengagedintheBarons’WarwerenotinNaples,butinthePapalStates.ItwastherethatthearmiesofFerranteandhisallies,FlorenceandMilan,confrontedthepapaltroopsledbyRobertodaSanseverino.Accord-ingtohim,therewasaschemetodivideNaplesamongthepope,whowouldbelordofthewholekingdom,withdirectruleoverCapuaandsomesurround-ingterritories,Robertohimself,whowouldhaveestateswherehechoseworth50,000ducatsayearandtheportofManfredoniaontheAdriaticcoast,andthebarons,whowouldsharetherestofthekingdom,accordingtotheirrespectiverightsofinheritance.207Althoughtheplanwasforhimtoleadthepapaltroopstothekingdomhedidnotgetthatfar,astheleague’sarmieskepthimengagedinthedefenceofRomeuntilthepopebegantorunoutofmoneyandresolu-tion.SomepapaltroopsunderGiovannidellaRovere–CardinalGiulianodellaRovere’sbrotherandhimselfaNeapolitanbaronasheheldtheduchyofSora208– did enter the kingdom, but there were not enough to compensate for theweaknessofthebarons’forces.

The“higherallegiance”thebaronscouldsaytheyowedtothepopeasover-lord of the kingdom, was a matter of concern for Ferrante, as it sanctionedtheirrebellion;thebaronswereprimarilysubjectsofthepope,CardinaldellaRovereargued.209WhenFerrantecameto the throne,PopeCalixtus IIIhadbeenhostileandwouldnotrecognizehimasthelegitimateruler.FortunatelyforFerrante,Calixtushadsoondiedandthesucceedingpope,PiusII,hadac-ceptedhim.AppealsfromthebaronstoPiustosupporttheAngevinswerere-jected.210Innocent’ssupportforthebaronsarguablydidthemmoreharmthangood,foritencouragedthemtorebelbutdidnotresultinthemilitaryaidtheyhadexpected,anditheightenedFerrante’ssuspicions,makinghimmoredeter-mined to show himself master in his own realm. Innocent continued to as-sume the role of protector of the barons after he had made peace with theleagueinAugust1486,andFerrante’svengefultreatmentofthembedevilledhisrelationswiththekingfortherestofhispontificate.Otherthanprotectand

206 Seeabove,p.113.207 Paladino,‘PerlastoriadellaCongiuradeiBaroni’,45(1920),343–4:Ercoled’EstetoBattista

Bendedei,10Oct.1485,Ferrara.208 Grantedtohimin1475,duringthepapacyofhisuncle,SixtusIV.209 ASMilan,ASforzesco,b.995:frateBernardodaMilanotoLudovicoSforza,24Apr.1486,

Genoa.210 Nunziante,‘Iprimianni’,20(1895),481.

196 Chapter6

giverefugetothosewhosoughtexile,notablytheprincipediSalerno,therewaslittlehecoulddoforthem.

FerrantejustifiedhisrevengeontherebelsbytheiroathtoacttogetherinSeptember1486which,heargued,wascontrarytotheiroathofhomagetohim;theycouldnotbefaithfulorobedientvassals,ifwhenhegaveacommandtooneofthem,theresponsewasthatthebaronwouldonlyobeyiftheothersagreed.211 His reprisals began immediately after the signature of the peace,withthearrestoftwoofhisministers,AntonioPetrucciandFrancescoCop-pola,whohadconspiredwiththerebels,butnotbeeninopenrebellionthem-selves.FearingfortheirsafetyiftheyallcametorenewtheiroathofhomagetoFerrante,ashewished themtodo, the rebels sentoneof theirnumber, thecontediMileto,totaketheoathontheirbehalf.212TheywereunabletoresistFerrante’sinsistencethattheyshouldsurrendertheirmajorfortressesintothecustodyofhismen:fortheirpeaceandsecurity,aswellashis,hemaintained.213

But they did not feel safe. In January 1487 the principe di Salerno fled toRome,toexile;hisyoungsonRobertoandthecontediMiletoweredetainedinJunetopreventtheirfollowinghim.On4July,whenthebaronshadgatheredfor a tournament in the Castelnuovo of Naples, other former rebels wereroundedup–AltamuraandhisbrotherAngilberto,conted’Ugento,Bisignano,another Sanseverino, Barnabé, conte di Lauria (and his mother Giovanna, aSanseverinomatriarchwhohadconsiderableinfluencewithintheclan),andtheducadiMelfi.Ferranteclaimedtheywereplottingagain,withSalerno,Car-dinal della Rovere and the duke of Lorraine.214Transcripts of the interroga-tions of the prisoners and other witnesses were printed and published, tojustifytheirdetention.215Noneoftheprisonerswereeverreleased,exceptfortheboyRobertodaSanseverino,whowasfinallygivenhisfreedomduringtheFrenchinvasionofNaplesin1495.Bythenalltheothersweredead,thecircum-stancesoftheirdeathsasmysteriousasthoseoftheirpredecessorsimprisonedafterthefirstrebellion.Theirdeathsdidnotbringruintotheirfamilies,how-ever.Ferranteemphasizedthathedidnotintendtotakealltheirlands;hewasnot acting for revenge, he said, or to confiscate the barons’ property, but to

211 Paladino, ‘Per la storia della Congiura dei Baroni’, 48 (1923), 259: Battista Bendedei toErcoled’Este,23Oct.1486.

212 Ibid.,253–4:BattistaBendedeitoErcoled’Este,3Oct.1486.213 Seeabove,p.29.214 Lorenzode’Medici,Lettere,X,411.215 Porzio,La Congiura de’ Baroni,ed.d’Aloe,I-CCLXXIII.


makesurethatthebaronscouldnotdothesameagain.216Althoughsomees-tatesweregrantedaway,thebulkofthemwererecoveredbytheirheirs.

ItalianbaronsandcastellanswerenotuniqueamongthemilitarynobilitiesofEuropeinbeingreluctanttocallthemselves,orthinkofthemselves,asreb-els.Intheircase,thiswasnotbecauseofanycontumelyattachedtorebellioninitself,totheimpliedbreachoffaithtoasovereignlord,butbecausemanywouldnotrecognizethattheyhadadutyofloyaltyandobediencetoasover-eignprinceorrepublic, letaloneadutyofunconditional loyaltyandobedi-ence.Manycould,withjustification,denytheyhadanysovereignotherthanthe emperor –who in the fifteenthcenturywasa sourceof legalvalidationratherthanapoliticalpowerinItaly.Aspartoftheeffortsthatprincesandre-publicsweremakinginthesecondhalfofthecenturytoconsolidatetheircon-trolovertheirterritories,therewasmorepressureonbaronsandcastellanstoacknowledgethattheyweresubjectsorvassals.Evenif theywouldacknowl-edgethisincertaincircumstances,theystillresistedtheconcomitantideaofsubordination,ofadutyofobedience,especiallyifobediencetothesovereignconflictedwithotherobligations,orwithwhattheyperceivedtobethehonourorinterestsofthemselvesandtheirfamilies.Aderenzeoraccomandigie,orthecontractbetweenacondottiereandhisemployer,couldconstituteasstrongabond,whoseobligationsmightbegivenasmuchweightasthatofasubjecttoasovereign.Whenanaderenzaincludedacondotta,oracondottaapromiseofprotection,itcouldbedifficulttodistinguishonefromtheother.Baronsandcastellans preferred such voluntary associations, and were inclined to givethem precedence, if they could, over commands posited on the power of asovereignoverasubject.ItwaswiththeseattitudesandideasthatbaronsandcastellansconfrontedthechallengesandopportunitiesoftheItalianWars.

216 Paladino,‘PerlastoriadellaCongiuradeiBaroni’,48(1923),288–9;Volpicella(ed.),Regis Ferdinandi Primi Instructionum Liber, 131–2: Ferrante’s instructions to his envoy to theKingofHungary,7Aug.1487.

198 Chapter7

CHAPTER7

Allegiance and Rebellion II: The Italian Wars

TheItalianWars,withtheirruptionofthekingsofFranceandSpainandtheemperorintothestatesystemofthepeninsula,complicatedquestionsofal-legianceforthemilitarynobilitythroughoutItaly.Manywerefacedwithun-avoidable choices, on which could hang grave consequences for themselvesandtheirfamilies.ThesechoicesweighedmostheavilyonthebaronsofthekingdomofNaplesandthecastellansofLombardy,themainareasofconten-tionamongtheultramontanepowers.ThebulkofthemilitarynobilityintheseregionsharbourednogreataffectionorloyaltytowardstheSforzadukesofMi-lan, Aragonese kings of Naples or Venetian patricians whose rule was chal-lenged.Acceptinganultramontaneprinceastheirlordinsteadneednothaveoccasionedthemmuchmoralanguish,providedtheywereleftinpossessionoftheirlands.Theymight,indeed,hopethatanon-residentprincewouldallowthemagreaterdegreeofautonomy.Buttherecouldbenoguaranteethatthosewhopledgedtheirloyaltytoanultramontaneprincewouldreceivethebene-fitsandtherecognitiontheymighthavehopedfor.Althoughtheideas,expec-tationsandwayoflifeoftheItalianruralnobilityhadmuchincommonwiththeirGerman,FrenchandSpanishcounterpartswhocametoItalyassoldiersandofficials, theultramontanesgenerallyassumedtheairofconquerors,ofsuperioritytoItaliansofwhateversocialrank.Membersofdifferentnationswereoftenmoreconsciousoftheirdifferencesinlanguageandcustomsthanofanysimilaritiesintheirvalues,andrelationsbetweenthenobilitiesofthevarious nations were frequently imbued with mutual disparagement, ratherthanmutualrespect.

OneofthecharacteristicsassociatedwithItaliansingeneralbyotherna-tions was mutability, seen as infidelity.When the Spanish and French kingswere at war, for a subject of one king to switch allegiance to the other wasviewedastreachery.Italiannobleswerenotaccustomedtoseeingchangesofallegianceinthislight.Choicesofallegiancewereusuallymadeonthebasisoflocalpolitics,factions,familyfeudsandloyalties,aswellaspersonalinter-ests,inthelightofcurrentpoliticalcircumstancesandthefortunesofwar,notonthebasisofwhichprincehadthebestright.Theseweretheforcesinplaywhenfamilieshaddividedallegiances,withsomemembersservingoneprinceandsomeanother;suchdivisionswererarelytheoutcomeofcalculatedfamilystrategies,ahedgingofbets.Thosewhohadpledgedallegianceorservicetooneprince,butthenchangedtheirmindswhencircumstanceschangedcould


199AllegianceandRebellionII:TheItalianWars

considertheyweremakingarationalchoice,whichmightrequiresomejusti-ficationbutcouldbeunderstoodandaccepted.Notthatitalwayswouldbe,particularlybytheprincewhoseservicetheywereleaving–butultramontanesweremore likelytocondemnsuchbehaviour,andtotreat itas treacheryorrebellion.

WhatwouldprovetobetheopeningcampaignoftheItalianWarswastheexpeditionledbyCharlesVIIIofFrancein1494–5toconquerthekingdomofNaples,whichheclaimedastheheiroftheAngevins.ExiledNeapolitanbar-ons, including Antonello da Sanseverino, were prominent among the smallgroupencouragingthekingtolaunchthisexpedition.LettersAntonellowrotetobaronsinNaples,urgingthemtoserveCharles,providedAlfonsoIIwithapretexttoarrestseveralbarons,includingGuglielmodaSanseverino,contediCapaccioandhisson,andLuigiGesualdo,contediConza,andhissonsandbrother.1FewNeapolitanbaronsfoughtforFerrandino(whohadsucceededtothethroneabandonedtohimbyhisfatherAlfonso);oneofthosewhodidwasAlfonsod’Avalos,marchesediPescara.2HisfortressofMonteSanGiovannire-fusedtosurrendertotheinvadingFrencharmyanditsdefendersweremassa-cred;PescarahimselfdefendedthefortressofCastelnuovointhecityofNaplesforFerrandino.CharleswasonlyinthekingdomforafewmonthsandFerran-dinosoonrecovered it; theFrencharmy leftbehindsurrendered justoverayearlater.ThesecondFrenchconquestofNaplesin1501–orratherofthathalfofthekingdomassignedtoLouisXIIintheagreementhehadmadewithFer-dinandofAragontodivide itbetweenthem– lasteda littleover twoyears,beforethearmywasdecisivelydefeatedbytheSpanisharmycommandedbyGonzalodaCórdoba.

TheNeapolitanexileswhohadaccompaniedCharleshadbeeneagertore-cover their estates, and the French barons with him avidly sought grants oflandsfromtheking.ButtherewasnoinfluxofFrenchbarons,underCharlesorduringthelaterconquestunderLouisXII,thatpermanentlyalteredthecom-positionoftheNeapolitanbaronage.Ingeneral,theFrenchwhoweregrantedbaronialestateshadnointentionofsettlinginthekingdom,andweremorethanwillingtoconverttheirlandsintocash,whentheycouldfindabuyer.TheAngevinbarons,asthosewhofoughtonthesideoftheFrenchwereknown,wereanothermatter:theproblemtheyposedpersistedfordecades.

AntonellodaSanseverinofoughtfortheFrenchholdingoutinthekingdomagainstFerrandino’sreconquest,onlymakinghisownpeacewiththeking,in

1 CarloDeFrede,L’impresa di Napoli di Carlo VIII. Commento ai primi due libri della Storiad’Italia del Guicciardini(Naples,1982),262–4.

2 ThesonofIñigod’Avalos.

200 Chapter7

August1496,shortlyafterthesurrenderoftheFrenchcommanderMontpen-sierandhisarmy.Hecametotermsreluctantly,atonestagesayinghewoulddo so only if he received assurance that Charles VIII had no intention oflaunchinganewexpedition, thathisestatesandcastleswereall restoredtohimfreely,thathewouldnotbeobligedtopayduesasavassaloftheking,orbeobligedtogotohim.3BernardinodaSanseverino,nowprincipediBisigna-no in place of his father Girolamo, who had never emerged from Ferrante’sprison,hadbeenreconciledtothekingafewmonthsbefore.

Ferrandino’s death in early October 1496 meant that the sincerity of An-tonello’ssubmissiontohimwasscarcelytested.Bothhe,asprincipediSalerno,andBernardinoacknowledgedthenewking,Federico,butsoondoubtsandsuspicionsgrewbetweenthemandtheking.NeitherattendedhiscoronationinAugust1497.AntonellokeptupcontactswiththeFrenchandFedericoknewit.HavingdeterminedhemustmoveagainsttheprincipediSalerno,thekingwenttogreatlengthstojustifyhisactionsbeforehand,summoningtwoassem-bliesoftheParlamentoandpublishingalengthymanifestoexplaininghowtheprincehadshownhimselftobea‘Frenchpartisan’,‘ourenemyandrebel’,andhowitwashisdutynottoallowadisobedientsubjecttobringwartotheking-dom.4Ifthekingwantedhisestates,theprincereplied,hewouldhavetocometotakethemswordinhand.ThisFederigodid,leadingacampaignthattookmostofSalerno’sestateswithinafewweeks.HoldingoutinhisfortressofDi-ano,wheretheinhabitantsputupafierceresistancetothesiege,theprincefinallysurrenderedon17December,negotiatingasafeconductforallthoseinthefortresswithhim,andsafepassageforhimself,hissonRoberto,andhisfol-lowing to Senigallia.5The principe di Bisignano was not with them; he hadstayed loyal to theking,andwas inhiscampduring thecampaign.6Buthewouldbearrestedsometimelaterwithothers,includinghisbrotherGiacomo,contediMileto,accusedofcorrespondingwithLouisXII.7

RobertodaSanseverino,aprisoneroftheCrownsincehisdetentionin1487attheageoftwo,hadfinallybeenreleasedin1495byFerrandino.Afterhisfa-ther’s death in exile in Senigallia in January 1499, Roberto made his way toFrance, returning to Naples in 1501 with the invading French forces. In May1502,LouisXIIgrantedhimalltheestateshisfatherhadheldandthetitleof

3 Sanuto,I diarii,I,cols275,277.4 Porzio,La congiura de’ Baroni,ed.d’Aloe,207–14.5 Ibid.,216–7.Hisbrother-in-lawGiovannidellaRoverewaslordofSenigallia.6 Colapietra,I Sanseverino,99.7 GiuseppeGalasso,Il Regno di Napoli: Il Mezzogiorno spagnolo (1494–1622)(Turin,2005),

146.


principediSalerno.8BothheandBisignanofoughtfortheFrenchastheybat-tledwiththeSpanish,whentheiraccordoverthedivisionofthekingdomcol-lapsed.RobertowaspresentatthedecisiveFrenchdefeatontheGariglianoinDecember1503,andwaswiththesurvivorswhosurrenderedtotheSpanishgeneral,GonzalodaCórdoba,afewdayslater.

IntheirnegotiationsforthesurrendertheFrenchshowedscantconcernfortheItalianswhohadfoughtforthem.TheirindifferencealienatedtheAngevinNeapolitanbaronswhohadmadetheirwayintoexile,whofeltfreetomaketermswithGonzaloiftheycould.SomeofthosewhofoundtheirwaytoFrancewere reported to be asking the king for absolution from their oath of alle-giance.9AttemptingtokeeptheprincipediSalernoloyal,LouisXIIwrotetoassurehimthatpreparationswereunderwaytorecoverthekingdomandre-storehimtohislandsandlordships.IfhemadepeacewithFerdinandandIsa-bella,Louispromised,hewouldhaveacareforRobertoandtheserviceshehadrendered.10Roberto,however,wrotetoaskLouis forpermissiontosettlehisownaffairswithGonzalo.11BothheandBisignanomadetheirpeacewiththenewregimeinNaples,acceptingFerdinandofAragonastheirking.RobertotravelledtoSpaintomarryanieceofFerdinand.AfterhisdeathinNovember1508,theirson,Ferrante,wasbroughtupinNaplesbyaSpanishguardian,Ber-natVilamarì,whomarriedhiswardtooneofhisowndaughters.

LouisdidhavesomecarefortheAngevinNeapolitanbaronsinatreatyheconcluded with Ferdinand in October 1505, which contained provisions fortheirrepatriationandtheliberationofthosewhowerestillprisonersinNa-ples.12ThesecaptiveswereonlyfreedbyGonzaloinSeptember1506,ashereal-izedthatalong-heraldedvisittoNaplesbyFerdinandwouldfinallyhappen.Gonzalohadmadenumerousgrantsofthepropertyof“rebels”whohadfoughtfortheFrench,exiledbaronsamongthem,addingfurthercomplicationstothealready difficult problem of the restitution of lands claimed by returningAngevin barons. It would be impossible to satisfy everyone whose interestswereinvolved,andtheprocessdiminishedtheloyaltyofsomeofthosewhohad taken part in the conquest of the kingdom.13 On Ferdinand’s arrival inNaples in late October 1506 he was accompanied by a number of Angevin

8 Colapietra,I Sanseverino,109.9 Sanuto,I diarii,IV,cols817–8.10 Ibid.,col.845:copyletterLouisXIItoRobertodaSanseverino,27Jan.1504,Lyon.11 Giustinian,Dispacci,III,133–4:4June1504.12 Galasso,Il Regno di Napoli: Il Mezzogiorno spagnolo,171.13 CarlosJoséHernandoSánchez,El reino de Nápoles en el Imperio de Carlos V. La consoli-

dación de la conquista(Madrid,2001),62.

202 Chapter7

baronswhohadgonefromFrancetoSpain,andinhisformalentryintothecity,Angevinand“Aragonese”baronswereplacedtogetherinsymbolicrecon-ciliation.14ThekinghadalreadybeenpromotingmarriagestobringAngevinand Aragonese families together.Whatever Ferdinand’s desire to reintegratetheAngevinbarons,theprocessofrestitution,involvingasitdidjudicialpro-ceedingstoexamineandprovetitletodisputedlands,waslongandslowandstillnotcompleteadecadelateratFerdinand’sdeath.

Hisgrandsonandsuccessor,Charles,undertheinfluenceofhisFlemishad-visers,madeatreatyinAugust1516withLouisXII’ssuccessor,FrancisI,whocalledhimselfKingofNaples.Inconnectionwiththistreaty,CharlesissuedadecreeorderingallbaronswhohadbeengrantedlandsofAngevinswhowerestillinexiletogivethemback.15Agroupofbarons,includingFerranteFran-cescod’Avalos,marchesediPescaraandFabrizioColonna,asducadiTaglia-cozzo, declaring they ‘would rather die’ than return disputed lands to ‘rebelAngevin barons’, sent Pescara to protest to Charles. In reply, Charles spokeguardedly of his appreciation of the services rendered by the barons to hisgrandfather,andhisdeterminationnottodoanythingtotheirprejudiceasaconsequenceofhistreatywiththeFrenchking,butpostponedanydetailedresponseuntilheshouldcometoNapleshimself(whichhewouldnotdountil1535).16

Pescara’suncle,Iñigod’Avalos,marchesedelVasto,hadbeenoneofthelastbaronstoholdoutforFedericoasthekingdomwasoverrunbytheFrenchandSpanishforcesin1501.Hehadbeengivencustodyofthestrategicallyimpor-tantislandofIschiainthebayofNaples,whichfellwithintheFrenchshareofthekingdom.DisobeyingordersfromFederico,whohadsailedfromIschiaforexileinFrance,tohandovertheislandtotheFrench,Vastodefendeditagainstthem.HetransferredhisallegiancetotheSpanishinstead,makingtermswithGonzalodeCórdobaandparticipatingintheexpulsionoftheFrenchuntilhisdeathinSeptember1503.Noadultmaled’Avaloswasleftandtheguardianshipof his children and of his brother Alfonso’s son was assumed by their sisterCostanza.Shebroughtuptheirsonstobesoldiers,andtobefaithfultothenewSpanishdynastyofkingsofNaples.17FerranteFrancesco,marchesediPescaraandAlfonso,marchesedelVasto,wouldbeamongthemostloyalItaliancom-mandersofCharlesV.

14 Ibid.,115–6.15 Galasso,Il Regno di Napoli: Il Mezzogiorno spagnolo,287.16 HernandoSánchez,El reino,229–33.17 Papagna,‘Travitarealeemodelloteorico’,557–63.


Justbeforehisdeathin1525,Pescara’sfidelitywastestedwhenhewasof-fered the crown of Naples by Gerolamo Morone, chancellor of Francesco IISforza,DukeofMilan.Moronewas involved in trying toorganizean ItalianleagueagainstCharlesV.Pescara’spretenceofconsideringjoiningtheconspir-acy,hisrevelationofittotheemperorandhisarrestofMoronewouldbeseenastreacherousbyItalianpatriotsforcenturiestocome.Inhisconfession,Mo-ronesaidthattheideaofofferingPescarathethronehadcomefromthepope;Pescara’sresponse,hesaid,hadbeenthathishonourmatteredtohimmorethananythingelseand,althoughhecouldthinkofnothingmoregloriousthanto be king of his homeland, he doubted whether, as the vassal, subject andcaptainofCharles,hecouldinhonourdoasthepopewished.18

FarfromhavingaNeapolitanking,thebaronshadtoadjusttoanon-resi-dent king, who sent viceroys from outside Italy, let alone outside Naples, togovernthekingdom.If theywanteddirectaccesstothesovereign, theyhadto travel toSpainor,underCharlesV,FlandersorGermany,wherever inhiswidedominionstheemperormightbeatthetime.Onceatcourt,theywouldbejustanotherprovincialnoble,whowouldhavetojoinaqueueofthosewait-ingforanaudience.OfficialsinNaples,theSpanishandsometimestheItalianstoo,wereinclinedtodistrustthebarons,particularlytheAngevins.Therewasaschoolofthought,especiallyinCastile,thatNaplesshouldbetreatedlikeaconqueredkingdom.19Viceroys,themselvesofthemilitarynobility,couldbemoresympathetictothebarons.RamondeCardonawascriticizedforbeingtooclosetothem,inamemorandumbyaSpanishofficialinNaplesaddressedtoCharlesVin1521,ofallowingthemtoomuchinfluence,aboveallinthead-ministrationofjustice.20

The question of how reliable the Neapolitan barons might be came to ahead with the invasion of the kingdom in 1528 by a French army under thecommandofOdetdeFoix,vicomtedeLautrec.21Accordingtolateraccountsofthewar,thelieutenant-generalofthekingdom,22theSicilianUgodeMoncada,struckabargainwiththebarons.Iftheyagreedtopayalevyfortheupkeepofthearmy,theycouldhaveleavetoraisetheFrenchstandardovertheirstrong-holdsifthatwasnecessarytopreventtheirdestruction,butnottofightforthe

18 TullioDandolo,Ricordi inediti di Gerolamo Morone(Milan,1859),161–2.19 HernandoSánchez,El reino,279–80.20 Ibid.,262–3.21 MallettandShaw,The Italian Wars,166–9.22 CharleshadnotyetappointedareplacementfortheviceroyCharlesdeLannoy,whodied

in1527.

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French.23Achroniclerwholivedthroughthewar,LeonardoSantoro,anoblefromCaserta,madenomentionofsuchabargaininhishistory.ThemotivesheattributedtothemanybaronswhowentovertotheFrenchweremoregeneric:seeinganopportunitytoputintoeffectlong-standingdiscontentwithCharlesV,thathadbeenrepressedbyfearofthestrengthofImperialarms,volatility,hopeforbetterthings,greed,wearinesswithandhatredofSpanishdominion.AndreaMatteoAcquaviva,ducad’Atri,whowasagedaboutsixty,feltithard,beingaccustomedtominorkingswhocouldbeeasilyshakenbybaronialre-volt, to be constrained to inactivity under so powerful an emperor. SantoroclaimedtohavebeenpresentwhenAcquavivaspokeofhisplanstosendhisgrandsonGiulioAntonio to theFrenchcamp, so that if theFrenchwon,hehopedhecouldberewardedwithlandsthathadbelongedtothefamilyinthepast,butiftheSpanishwon,theirlandswouldnotbeconfiscatedbecauseAn-dreaMatteowouldstayintheserviceoftheemperor.24Infact,bothheandGiulioAntoniowentovertotheFrench.Whatevertheirmotives,substantialnumbersofbarons(andothers)didhelptheFrench,althoughmostwereasquicktoturnbacktotheSpanishasitbecamecleartheFrenchwouldbede-feated.25

Totheemperor’sofficialsinNaples,thisseemedagoldenopportunitytocutthe barons down to size, using their confiscated estates to provide a much-neededboosttotherevenuesofthecrown,ortosatisfythosewhohadfoughtforCharlesandwereclamouringforreward.Thesheernumbersofbaronsin-volvedmadethequestionofthetreatmentoftherebelsandtheirpropertyadifficultonetoresolve,aswasreflectedintheplansthenewviceroy,thePrinceofOrange,submittedinlateJanuary1529forCharles’sapproval.Greatnum-bersofbaronsofallrankshadfledtoevadetherigoursofthelaw,hewrote,butitwouldnotservetheemperorwelltomultiplythenumberofexiles,andthusmultiplythesupportersoftheenemy.Theyshouldbeinvitedtoreturn,assuredthat they would be allowed to stay on their estates or in Naples while theircaseswerebeingdecided.Meanwhile,Orangehadbeenforcedtodisposeofsomeoftherebels’propertytopaythetroopswhowereowedmuchmoney,andtorewardthosewhohadremainedfaithfultotheemperorandservedhimwell. He suggested that Charles should revoke some or all of these grants,

23 Galasso,Il Regno di Napoli: Il Mezzogiorno spagnolo,344–5.24 LeonardoSantoro,La spedizione di Lautrec nel Regno di Napoli,ed.TommasoPedìo(Gala-

tina,1972),80–2.25 Galasso,Il Regno di Napoli: Il Mezzogiorno spagnolo,367.


whichOrangehadbeencarefultostipulateweresubjecttotheemperor’sap-proval.26

CharlesVrespondedinAprilbyauthorizingageneralpardon,leavingOr-ange discretion to decide whether it should extend to those who had beenmostcloselyassociatedwiththeFrench.Orangedecideditshouldnot,andhealsoexcludedallfeudatari.27ThisdidnotmeanheintendedtodispossesseverybaronthathadgoneovertotheFrench,butthattheirfateshouldbedecidedindividually,casebycase,andthosewhowerepardonedshouldhavetopay.AfewbaronswhohadbeenunfortunateenoughtobecapturedwereexecutedpubliclyinNaples,themostprominentbeingEnricoPandone,ducadiBoiano,whohadbeenamongthefirsttogoovertotheFrenchandhadbeenwiththematthesiegeofNaples.28Theirfatewouldnothavebeenanencouragementtootherstoappearinpersontosueforpardon.

Exileseemedasaferoption.ManywenttoFrance,wheretheyweredepen-dentonthecharityoftheking.29ThemostprominentofthosewhotookthisoptionwereAlfonsodaSanseverino,ducadiSomma,andGiovanniCaracciolo,principediMelfi(whohadtakenpart inthedefenceoftheAbruzziagainstLautrec,buthaving fallenprisoner, indignant that theviceroyhadmadenoefforttoransomhim,wentovertotheFrench).OthersstayedinItaly,somegoingtoseeCharleswhenhepassedthroughItalyin1529–30.Heissuedasec-ondgeneralpardoninlateApril1530,givingthosewhohadbeencondemnedintheirabsencethreemonthstoappearbeforefivecommissionersappointedtodealwithproceedingsconcerningtherebels.30Buttheexileswereafraidtoreturn, fearing they would be detained and that no lawyers would defendthem.31

ForthosewhodidengagewiththeauthoritiesinNaples,itcouldbealong,tortuous and expensive process before they could secure the possession ofsomeoralloftheirlands,especiallywhenpropertyhadalreadybeensoldorgranted to others. There was some reluctance among the officials to makeagreementswiththerebelsatall.Ontheotherhand,thebaronswouldknowofthedifficultiestheofficialscouldhaveinfindingbuyersatthepricetheyset,andwereawareoftheadministrators’desperationtofindmoneytopaythe

26 Ibid.,368–9.27 Ibid.,370.28 Pedìo,Napoli e Spagna,286–7.29 Molini, Documenti di storia italiana, II, 323–4: principe di Melfi to the Grand Maître

[Montmorency], 27 July 1530, Angoulême; 336: principe di Melfi and duca di SommatoMontmorency,18Oct.1530,Anvers.

30 Galasso,Il Regno di Napoli: Il Mezzogiorno spagnolo,373–4.31 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.849,41:GianantonioMusetula,6June1530,Rome.

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restlesstroops.32Iftheyweredissatifiedwiththeirtreatmentbythecommis-sioners,thebaronscouldmakeadirectappealtoCharles,whoregardedmat-tersconcerningfiefs,certainlythemostimportantones,ashisbusiness,andcouldtakeapersonalinterest.

The struggles of Ferdinando Orsini, duca di Gravina, to recover his landsexemplify the obstacles that might have to be overcome. He had aided theFrenchcausewithmenandmoney,continuingtodosoafterLautrec’sdeathand the defeat of what was left of the French army at Naples, as Renzo daCeriandGiovanniCaraccioloheldoutinBarlettauntilAugust1529.HoldingestatesinthePapalStatesaswellasinthekingdom,hecouldbecountedasaRomanbaronaswellasaNeapolitanone,andthefactthattheOrsiniofthePapalStateswerefightingfortheFrenchortheirVenetianalliesmighthaveinfluencedhim(althoughin1523anOrsinipartisanhadnumberedhimamongthe‘ImperialOrsini’).33Hewouldclaimthathisactionshadbeenjustifiable,thatcircumstanceshadforcedhishandandthathehadalwayswantedtobeadevoted,faithfulvassalofCharles.AshepreparedtoleaveRometopleadhiscauseinNaples,hewasconsciousthattheauthorityoftheviceroy,thePrinceofOrange, thecurrentholderof theduchyofGravina,wouldweighagainsthim.34 Orange was killed shortly after, and Orsini immediately wrote to askCharlesnottogranthisestatestoanyoneelsebeforehehadachancetoputhiscaseinNaples.35

TheonlyexiledbarontopresenthimselfinNapleswithinthetimesetintheemperor’s second general pardon, he was swiftly arrested on the orders ofthecommissionersdealingwiththepropertyofrebels,because,theysaid,hehad been condemned to death in his absence.36 He was kept in prison forabouteighteenmonthsbeforesentencewaspronouncedagainsthim;hewasreleased, but his estates remained sequestered. His hope was that Charleswouldallowhimatleasttobuybackhisestates,beingpreparedtooffer50,000scudi,asumthatitwassaidnootherbaroninthekingdomcoulddisburse.37Despiteadvice fromNaples that theduchyshouldbekept in thecrownde-mesne,theemperoragreedinApril1533torestorehisestates.38Thisprivilegehadtobepaidfor:Orsini’ssubjectscollectedover50,000ducatstohelphim

32 Ibid.,leg.1006,28:BishopofBurgostoCommendadormayor,26July1530,Naples.33 ASSpoleto,Letterealcomune,b.11,filza1523B:FabioVigil,29Sept.1523,Rome.34 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.850,142:DucadiGravinatoCharlesV,27July1530,Rome.35 Ibid.,leg.849,10:DucadiGravinatoCharlesV,6Aug.1530,Rome.36 Ibid.,leg.1006,35:CommissariostoCharlesV,27Aug.1530,Naples.37 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.881,cc.480–1:FabrizioPeregrinotoFedericoGonzaga,6Apr.

1532,Rome.38 MartínezFerrando,Privilegios,185.


buyhislandsback,inwhatwasseenasanimpressivedisplayofdevotion.39Apparently,thepaymentwasmadeintheirname,asOrsinistillmaintainedhisinnocence.40

Notallhisestateswererestoredtohim.CharleshadalreadydetachedsomelandstobegiventoOnoratoGrimaldiofMonaco,andcreatedhimmarchesediCampagna.OrsiniofferedGrimaldianexchangeoflands,totrytorecovertheseestates.41Grimaldikeptthemarquisate,asAndreaDoriakeptthecityofMelfiwiththetitleofprincipe(whichhadalsooriginallygonetothePrinceof Orange), granted to him in late 1531. Charles V and his successors on thethroneofSpainwouldcontinuetograntlandsandtitlesinNaplestonoblesfrom outside the kingdom who would not come to settle there. Even whensuchgrantsmightbemadetorewardloyalserviceelsewhere,thiswasnotadeliberatepolicyofdiminishingtheinfluenceoftheNeapolitanbarons,oroftryingto insert trustedmen intotheir ranks.The fiefswerebeingtreatedasproperties,assourcesofrevenue,asanavailableresourcethatcouldbedis-pensedaspatronage,ratherthanelementsofmilitaryandpoliticalpower.

For all the upheavals they caused, the executions, exiles, dispossessions,temporaryorpermanent,werenotonsuchascalethattheytransformedthebaronage.Onthewhole,thecitiesthathadrebelledduringLautrec’sinvasion,notablyL’Aquila,wereperhapstreatedmoreharshlythanthebarons.Yettheaftermathoftheinvasion,asitaffectedthebaronsandtheirlands,cametobeseenasaturning-pointinthepoliticalhistoryofthekingdom.42Henceforth,thosebaronswhostayedinthekingdom,evenwhentheywouldhavemuchpreferredtohaveakingoftheirown,acceptedwithwhateverdegreeofresig-nationthatthekingofSpainwastheirmonarch.Angevintraditions,memoriesofAngevinloyalties,persistedamongthebaronsandtheurbannobilities,butwere not manifest in active conspiracies against the Spanish or the mainte-nanceofcontactswiththekingofFrance.Theybecamemoreofabasis forlocalfactions,anelementinlocalratherthannationalpolitics.Suspicionslin-geredonamongtheSpanishthatfamiliesofAngevinorigin,establishedinthekingdomundertheAngevinmonarch,couldnotbeasfaithful,aswhollycom-mitted to the Spanish king, as were those of Spanish origin. Some families,such as the Acquaviva, were divided between “Angevin” and “Spanish”

39 ASSpoleto,Letterealcomune,b.24,filza1533B:SempronioAmaranto,26Apr.1533,Rome.40 DomenicoNardone,Notizie storiche sulla città di Gravina(Gravina,1990),216–7.Accord-

ingtoNardone,thepaymentmadewas40,000scudi.41 Saige,Documents historiques,II,658–9:FranciscoValenzuelatoCharlesV,27Nov.1533,

Monaco.42 HernandoSánchez,El reino,383.

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identities.Insuchcases,moreoftenthannotitwasthecadetlinesofthefam-ilywhochosetoidentifymostfirmlywiththeSpanish,outofpoliticalcalcula-tionorrivalrywiththemainbranches.43

Howeverovert,howeversinceretheirdevotiontotheSpanishkingmightbe,manybaronswerenotreconciledtobeingtreatedassubordinatesbyhisviceroy,especiallyonewhocouldbeasarrogantandoverbearingasPedrodeToledo,whogovernedNaplesfrom1532untilhisdeathin1553.SomebaronsdidmanagetobeonamicabletermswithToledo,amongthemPietroAntoniodaSanseverino,principediBisignano(whose fatherBernardinohadnot re-belledduringtheFrenchinvasion).Othersheirritatedandoffended,notleastAlfonso d’Avalos, marchese delVasto (since Pescara’s death the head of thefamily).AscommanderoftheSpanishinfantryinItaly,VastoresentedToledo’sinsistenceonexercisingsoleauthorityoverthedefenceofthekingdomandpublicorder.EventuallyCharlesVhadtointervenetoquiettheirconflictoverwhocontrolledtheinfantry,decidinginfavouroftheviceroy,whomd’Avaloswas commanded to obey.44 Measures to intervene in the administration offiefsandintherelationsofbaronstotheirvassals,andcallingbaronstoac-countbeforethecourtsfortheirbehaviour,causedmuchresentment.Opposi-tiontotheviceroyandhispolicieswasexpressedinParlamentianddelegationssenttotheemperor,notbaronialrebellions.

AnuprisingagainstToledo’sgovernmentdidbreakoutin1547,initiallyinresponsetohisproposaltointroduceaSpanishstyleofInquisition.TheNea-politanschose twodelegates togo to theemperor,oneof themFerrantedaSanseverino,principediSalerno.UntilthenhehadnotbeenonbadtermswithToledo,buthisagreeingtoactastheNeapolitans’representativeintheirap-pealtoCharlescausedabreachbetweenthemwhichwasneverhealed.JustafterSalernoandhiscolleaguePlacidodiSangroleftontheirmission,theun-restinNaplesescalatedintoviolentrejectionofToledo’sgovernment.Toledo’sownenvoygottotheemperorfirst,andCharlesrefusedtogiveSalernoanau-dience.WhilediSangrowassentbacktoNaples,hewasobligedtoremainwiththecourtuntilthespringof1549.

OnhisreturntoNapleshewasfêtedbythepeople,butestrangedbeyondremedyfromtheviceroy.Salernohopedhecouldrecoverthegoodgracesoftheemperorbuttherewasnosignofthat.Inthespringof1551,someofhisservants were arrested, and in June an assassination attempt that left himwounded was traced back to the instigation of the viceroy’s son, García. Asproceedingswereinpreparationagainsthim,withaccusationsofheresyand

43 Visceglia,Identità sociali,122–9.44 HernandoSánchez,Castilla y Nápoles,278–9.


sodomyaswellasrebellion,SalernoleftthekingdominNovemberandwenttotheVeneto. Having ordered him to come to court in February 1552, Charlesscornfullyrejectedhisrequestforasafeconduct,expressingdisdainthatSaler-noshouldpresumetotrytomaketerms.SalernobegannegotiatingwiththeFrenchinstead,andleftforFranceinMay.Beforehisdeparture,hepublishedamanifestosettingouthisservicestoCharlesandthemistreatmenthefelthehadreceivedinreturn.HetoldtheVenetiangovernmentthathedidnotwantto substitute French power for Spanish power in Italy; he wanted Naples tohaveakingofitsownandMilanitsownduke,‘IamnotFrenchorSpanishorGerman,butagoodItalian’.BackinNaples,ToledogottheConsiglioCollater-ale(whosemembersincludedtheprincipediBisignano)todeclarehimareb-el;hewassentencedtodeathandtheconfiscationofhisestates.45Hehadnoheirtopetitiontobeallowedtokeepthelands,andthisbranchoftheSanse-verinofamilyendedwiththedeathofFerranteinimpoverishedexilein1568.

Salerno’srebellionandhisattemptstoprovokeuprisings inthekingdom,appearingoffthecoastwithFrenchandTurkishfleetsin1552and1553,46didnotarousethesupporthehopedfor,butreinforcedSpanishprejudicesabouttheuntrustworthinessofNeapolitanbarons.CardinalPacheco,Toledo’ssuc-cessorasviceroy,alarmedbynewsthathewasinItaly,recommendedthattheestatesofbarons in theAbruzzi, thecustomarygatewayto thekingdomforinvasionsbyland,shouldbeappropriated(givingthebaronssomecompensa-tion)andalltheirfortressesdismantled.47(WhenaFrencharmyunderFran-çois,ducdeGuise,didattempttoinvadeviatheAbruzziin1557,therewasinfactnouprisingintheirfavour.)Pacheco’ssuccessor,theduquedeAlba,toldPhilipIIthat‘thereisnothingsoprejudicialtotheserviceofYourMajestyinthatkingdomastogivegreatauthoritytoanyofthenatives’.48

ThecastellansofLombardydidnotexperiencesuchgreatupheavalsastheNeapolitan barons did, despite the fact that for thirty years Lombardy wasthemainbattlegroundintheItalianWarsandtheyhadtodealwithdecadesofinstabilityandseveralchangesofregime.

TherewasnowholesaleseizureandredistributionoflandsaftertheFrenchconquestoftheduchy,asLouisXIIpresentedhimselfastherightfulheirtoMilanincontrasttothe“tyrant”LudovicoSforza.Onlythepropertyof“rebels”whohadsupportedLudovicototheendwasliabletoconfiscation,andthere

45 DeFrede,‘FerranteSanseverinocontrolaSpagna’,209–54;quotation,250–1.46 Ibid.,260–2,264–70;MallettandShaw,The Italian Wars,265–6.47 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1046,39:CardinalPachecotoPhilip,7Mar.1554,Naples.48 DuquedeAlba (ed.), Epistolario del III Duque de Alba Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo

(Madrid,1952),I,280–1:AlbatoPhilip,4Aug.1555,Livorno.

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werenotmanycastellansamongthem.Mostofthepropertythatwasconfis-catedwasgrantedtoFrenchnobleswhohadfoughtinthecampaignsandof-ficialswhocametoadminister theduchy,who ingeneralwanted toselloffwhattheyweregivenassoonastheycould,andhadnodesiretosettleinItaly.TherewasnolastingrecruitmentofFrenchmenintothemilitarynobilityofLombardy.49AccustomedinFrancetothemilitarynobilityhavinganimpor-tantroleinthegovernmentoftheprovinces,Louislookedforthecooperationofthecastellansinthegovernmentoftheduchy,nottocurbandrestricttheirlocalinfluence.

WhentheFrenchweredrivenout in 1512, therewaswidespreadgoodwilltowardsMassimilianoSforza,whowasinstalledasduke.Thiswassoondissi-patedbyhisobviousincapacityandlackofinterestinthebusinessofgovern-ment.HewasforcedtorelyontheSwisswhohadhadalargepartinmakinghimduke;theywantedmoney,tradingprivilegesandterritorialcessionsintheAlps,notgrantsofestatestoindividuals,sonoSwissjoinedtheranksofLom-bardcastellans.TheSwiss,notthepeopleoftheduchy,wereMassimiliano’schiefdefendersagainsttheconquestoftheduchybyFrancisIin1515.Inthe1520s, thequestionofwhoshouldbe thedukeofMilanbecamean issue inthecontestbetweenFrancisandCharlesV,whoclaimedtherightasemperortodeterminethis.Charlesandhisadvisershadtoreckonwiththestrongpref-erenceoftheItalianpowersforanindependentduchy,andwhentheFrenchwereexpelledfromMilanin1521,FrancescoSforzawasmadeduke.AttheendofadecadeofwarfareandmiseryforLombardy,hewasconfirmedasdukebyCharlesV,butbythenwasinsuchill-health,hewasobviouslyunlikelytolivelongorfatheranheirbeforehedied.Athisdeathin1535,theemperor’smentookchargeoftheduchy,whichforyearswasadiplomaticbargainingcounter.WhenCharlesinvestedhisownson,Philip,withtheduchyin1540hedidnotallowhimtoassumeevennominalrulethere;notuntil1555couldPhiliptakecontrol.

Decades of uncertainty about who was the rightful ruler of the duchy ofMilanhadweakenedbondsofallegianceofcastellanstotheprincethathadnotbeenstrongtobeginwith.ThequestionwouldbesettledbythearmiesanddiplomacyofthepowersengagedintheItalianWars,notbythecastellans.Yettheconflictsofthepowerscreatedconditionsandopportunitiesforcastellanstohavemorefreedomofactionthantheyhadenjoyedsincethemid-fifteenthcentury,whetheritwasthechoiceofwhotheymightserveinarms,50orwhosecause,ifany,theywouldsupportintheirownlocality.

49 Meschini,La Francia nel Ducato di Milano,I,173–5,249,n.90.50 Seeabove,pp.116–20.


EventheinitialchoicebetweentheSforzaandtheFrenchwasnotentirelystraightforward, not least because of the swift, if short-lived, restoration ofLudovicoSforzafromFebruarytoearlyApril1500.ThenephewsofPietroDalVerme,whohadbeenpreventedbyLudovicoSforzafrominheritinghislandsafterPietro’sdeathin1485,51hopedtheFrenchconquestof1499wouldhelpthemtorecovertheseestates,butLouisgavethemtothecomtedeLigny.OnthereturnofLudovicotheysupportedhim,andoccupiedalltheformerfamilyfiefs,butwhentheFrenchreturned,lostthemagain.PietroAntonioDalVerme(whoheldoutinthefortressofBobbiountilSeptember1500),hisbrotherandcousins were exiled. Federico DalVerme and his brother Marcantonio, whoremainedinexilethroughouttheperiodofFrenchrulefrom1500,returnedtotheduchywiththeSwissin1512.Theyrecoveredtheirlands,includingBobbioandVoghera,andwerefavouredbyMassimilianoSforza.52DuringthesecondperiodofFrenchrulefrom1515to1521,theycampaignedagainsttheFrenchintheterritoryofPiacenza.53HavingobtainedconfirmationoftheImperialsta-tusoftheirlandsinthelate1530s,fortheDalVermetheItalianWarsultimate-ly resulted in the consolidation of their position among the castellans ofLombardywhichhadbeenlosttothembeforethewarsbegan.

Opposition to the French ultimately worked to the advantage of the DalVerme.ForGianGiacomoTrivulzio,allegiancetotheFrenchbroughtgreatre-wards,whichdidnotendure.TheTrivulziowereaprominentMilanesefamily,someofwhomtooktosoldiering.GianGiacomomadehisreputationintheservice of the dukes of Milan before accepting the offer of a command intheNeapolitanarmy,andthenin1495transferringtotheFrench.Beforeleav-ingLombardyhehadbuiltupasubstantialgroupofestates,includingfamilylandsbetweenParmaandReggio,butmainlynorthoftheduchy’sborder,intheterritoryoftheGrisons.54FortheselandshewasanaderenteofthedukeofMilan,andatthesametimeamemberoftheLeagueoftheGrisons;healsohadfiefsintheduchyofMilan,titletolandsinthekingdomofNaples,andwasgivenlandsinFrance,becomingavassaloftheFrenchking.WhenCharlesVIIIreturned to France in 1495, Trivulzio was left as governor of Asti for Louisd’Orléans(soontobecomeLouisXII),andlieutenantoftheFrenchtroopsin

51 DanielBuenodeMesquita,‘LudovicoSforzaandhisvassals’,202.52 Meschini,La Francia nel Ducato di Milano,I,81,99,199,329,522,II,1045,1073,1074.53 Andreozzi,Piacenza,155,157.54 BeginningwiththepurchaseofthefortressofMesoccoin1480(forwhichheprocuredan

Imperialinvestiturein1487),hethenacquiredtheTheinwaldandSafienthal,whichheheldinfieffromthebishopofCoira,givinghimcontrolofaccesstotheSanBernardinoandSplugapassesovertheAlps.

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thearea.55Givenhismilitaryreputation,hisconnectionswiththeduchyandcityofMilanandhispossessionofstrategicallysignificantlandstothenorthoftheduchy,hisqualificationstoleadtheFrenchinvasionofMilanin1499wereobvious.

Whentheconquestwasaccomplished,hewasappointedtheking’slieuten-ant,holdingsupremepoliticalaswellasmilitaryauthoritythere.HisuseofhisGuelfassociationstoreinforcehisauthorityalienatedGhibellines,whowouldexcusetheirsupportforLudovicoSforza’sreturnin1500byarguingtheirop-positionwastoTrivulzio,notLouis.56Afterthere-establishmentoftheFrench,Trivulziowasnolongerlieutenant,andalthoughheheldtheprestigiousrankofmarshalofFrance,nolongerhadcommandofthemilitaryforcesinMilan.Hedidretainestateshehadbeengivenin1499,Vigevano,grantedtohimasamarquisate,andChiavenna,akeynodeontheroutenetworkfortheGrisons,andhecontinuedtoacquirelands.AlthoughhestillhadindependentstatusasamemberoftheGrisonleague,hisfortunesandhispositionwerenowboundtothoseoftheFrenchinMilan.WhentheSwissdrovetheFrenchfromMilan,they and the Grisons occupied his strongholds on the frontier, Chiavenna,MussoandMesocco.HehandedoverVigevanotothegovernmentofMilan,tryingtopersuadetheMilanesetoformarepublicalliedtotheSwissratherthanacceptaSforzaduke.57StillamemberoftheGrisonleague,henegotiatedwiththemandtheSwissforLouisXIIintheyearswhentheyheldthewhiphandinMilan.HewouldrecoverMussoandMesocco,butlostChiavenna.VigevanoherecoveredwhenFrancisIreconqueredMilanin1515.TrivulziodidnotenjoysuchfavourwithFrancisIashehadwithLouis.HediedinFrancein1518,leav-ingashisheirhisgrandsonGianFrancesco,designatingastheboy’sguardians,not just a Trivulzio cousin, but also the king of France, the Swiss and theGrisons.58

AnotherfamilyofMilanesecitizensturnedcastellans,theBorromeo,kepttheirestatesandtheirposition,helpedbyvariousfamilymemberschoosingdifferentallegiances.VitalianoBorromeo,whoservedFilippoMariaViscontiashistreasurer,establishedwhatbecameknownasthe“statoBorromeo”ontheLagoMaggiore,builtupbypurchaseandgrants.AmongthegrantswasthetownofArona,fromwhichthefamilytookthetitleofcontid’Arona.Strategi-callyimportantasadefenceoftheduchyagainstincursionsbytheSwiss,theBorromeoestatesenjoyedextensiveprivilegesandexemptionswhichfostered

55 Arcangeli,‘GianGiacomoTrivulzio’,35–8.56 Ibid.,48.57 Ibid.,56–7.CardinalSchinnertookVigevanoforhimself.58 Ibid.,61.


inthefamilyanattitudetowardstheirlandsanalogoustothatofImperialfief-holders.RelationsbetweentheBorromeocountsandtheSforzadukesbecameuneasy.In1495whenLouisd’Orléans,whowassupposedtobeguardingtherouteforCharlesVIIItoreturntoFrance,turnedhisattentioninsteadtoas-sertinghisownclaimtothedukedomofMilan,theBorromeoofferedhimtheuseofArona.59LudovicoSforzaconfiscatedArona,Angera,anotherimportantstronghold,andotherplacesfromthem,restoringthemonlyashewasabouttofleetoGermanyin1499.ConteGibertoBorromeowasmadeamemberoftheSenatetheFrenchestablishedinMilan,butwentovertotheSforzaassoonastheyreturned.60WithhisbrotherFilippo,hewasfined3,000scudiforlèse-majestéagainstLouiswhentheFrenchrecoveredMilan,andthefortressesofAronaandAngerahadtobesurrenderedtotheFrenchforsomemonths.61YetGibertoretainedhisseatintheSenate,untilhisbrotherLudovico,awarmersupporterofLouis,tookhisplacein1505.62

TheBorromeowereprominentGhibellines,andwhenMaximilian,KingoftheRomans,wasplanninganinvasionoftheduchyin1507,twootherbrothersofGiberto,Lancilotto(afinancialofficial)andFilippowereamongthosesus-pectedofcollusionwithMaximilianandorderedtogotoexile inFranceorAsti.Neitherseemstohavegone,andinSeptember1507theywerearrested,aswas Giberto, and their fortresses sequestered; Ludovico was not detained,andwaspermittedtokeepAngera.Injustificationofthearrests,thelieutenantChaumontaccusedthebrothersofofferingtheirfortressestoMaximilian,andoftellinghimthatthelake,withasubstantialfleetofboatstheywouldgathertogether,andthevalleyarounditwouldbeathiscommand.ButChaumont’smotivemayhavebeenthebrothers’refusalofrepeatedrequeststoputtheirfortressesinthecustodyoftheFrench,atatimewhenhewasconcernedtosecuretheduchy’snorthernfrontier.Gibertowassoonadjudgedinnocentandreleased,FilippoandLancilottofreedthefollowingyear.InearlyJuly1508thesequestered lands and fortresses were restored to the Borromeo, placed inthecustodyofLudovico.63

FrenchconfidenceinLudovico’sreliabilityhadhelpedpreservethefamily’sestatesonthisoccasion,andheremainedfaithfultothemuntiltheirexpulsionfromMilanin1512.Hisonlysurvivingbrother,Lancillotto,64assistedtheSwiss

59 LetiziaArcangeli,‘Ludovicotiranno?’,131.60 Meschini,La Francia nel Ducato di Milano,I,64,96.61 Ibid.,152;Sanuto,I Diarii,III,cols306,425.62 Meschini,La Francia nel Ducato di Milano,I,64.63 Ibid.,446–50.64 GibertoandFilippobothdiedin1508.

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invasion, being instrumental in the surrender of the important fortress ofDomodossolatothem.65DuringthesecondperiodofFrenchrule,LudovicowaslessinclinedtotheFrench,andwasprotectedbytheSwiss.66In1519,hebegantoreconstructfortifications,thecastlesofCànneroonrockyislandsinthe Lago Maggiore; he was again aided by the Swiss when he was besiegedtherein1527bythetroopsofFrancescoIISforza,whowereforcedtoabandontheirattack.67HebecameacitizenofsomeSwisscantonsbeforehisdeathin1527.68Again,thechoiceofotherallegiancesbyotherBorromeihelpedprotectthe family’s interests. Conte Giberto was loyal to Francesco Sforza;69 conteCamilloandotherswerequicktooffertheirservicestothenewregimewhenCharlesVtookdirectcontroloftheduchyin1535.70

For castellans with estates around Parma and Piacenza the situation wascomplicatedbythepopes’assertionoflordshipoverthem,raisingthequestionwhetherthecitiesweretobepartoftheduchyofMilanorofthePapalStates,orformaseparatestatealtogether.JuliusIIfirsttookpossessionofthemin1512whentheFrenchwereexpelledfromMilan,andLeoXkeptthemasthepriceofhissupportforMassimilianoSforza.LeohadtogivethemuptoFrancisIin1515, but they were recovered for the papacy in 1521. Charles V, Francesco IISforza and the Milanese still felt that they were part of the duchy, and thatwhoeverruledMilanshouldruletheretoo.In1545PopePaulIIIgrantedthecitiesandtheirterritoriestohisson,PierLuigiFarnese,asdukedoms.Charles’sgovernorofMilan,FerranteGonzagaencouraged, ifnot instigated, thecon-spiracy by a group of Piacentine nobles to assassinate Pier Luigi Farnese inSeptember1547,andseizedPiacenzaandmuchoftheterritoryofParma.WithFrenchassistance,PierLuigi’ssonOttaviomanagedtoholdontoParma,defy-ingtheforcesoftheemperorandPopeJuliusIIIin1551–2.Piacenza(exceptforitsfortress)wasrestoredtoOttaviobyPhilipIIin1556.

WhileParmaandPiacenzawereundertheirgovernment,thepopesfailedto attract the allegiance of the castellans.The two Medici popes, Leo X andClementVII,andtheirFlorentineofficialswerenotsympathetictothecastel-lansasagroup,andtheterritoriesweretreatedasareserveofestatesfortheirrelativesandclients.PaulIIIwashimselfamemberofabaronialfamily,but

65 Ibid.,II,1046.66 Arcangeli,‘GianGiacomoTrivulzio’,66.67 Conti,Castelli e Rocche,55.68 Meschini,La Francia nel Ducato di Milano,I,171.69 FlavioRurale,‘L’ascesadeifratelliMedicitraprotagonismomilitareepraticacortigiana’,

286–8.70 FedericoChabod,‘LoStatodiMilanoel’imperodiCarloV’,42,note3.


thatdidnotmakethegracelessPierLuigianymoreattractiveasafocusofloy-alty.Paulhadintendedtosetuphissonasapapalvicar,notanindependentprince,andwasconsciousoftheperilsofalienatingthemilitarynobility.PierLuigihaddifferentideas,andsetabouttryingtodominatethem.71Fewcastel-lansmournedPierLuigi’sdeath,butfewwelcomedtheideaofParmaandPia-cenza being fully incorporated into the duchy of Milan again, as FerranteGonzagaandCharlesVdesired.Ottavio’sstruggletoholdontoParmaintheteethoftheoppositionofJuliusIIIandtheemperorgavethefeudatariscopetojustifytheirrefusaltoobeyhim,reinforcedbyclausesinthetruceheagreedwiththeemperorthattheyshould‘enjoytheirown’unmolested.Facedbycas-tellanswhohadmoreprivateresourcesthanhehad(forthedukehadnoes-tates),andwhohadlong-establishednetworksofpartisansandclients,Ottaviolabouredtoasserthisauthorityoverthem.Somewerelinkedbymarriagetootherprincelyfamilies,theMediciortheGonzaga,somelookedtoPhilipIIforpatronageandprotection.Hecouldnotconstrainthemtoliveinthecity,ortobecome his courtiers; only minor nobles wished for a career in the Farnesecourt.72

ThePallavicinikepttheirpositionasoneofthemajorfamiliesoftheregionby,itmightbesaid,spreadingtheirbets,althoughwhethertheirdividedloyal-tiesweretheoutcomeofaconcertedfamilypolicyisopentodoubt.HavingbeeninstrumentalinthesubmissionofParmatoLouisXII,GaleazzoPallavi-cinidiBussetoplayedanimportantroleinthecontrolofParmafortheFrench.Grantedimportantestates,includingBorgoSanDonninoandtheformerRossistrongholdsofTorrechiaraandFelino,withprivilegesthatgavetheseplacesameasureofindependenceofducalgovernment,hewasoneofthefewLom-bardcastellanstobegivencommandofaFrenchcompanyofmen-at-arms.Hisyoungerbrother,AntonioMaria, livedmostly inMilan andwasclose toChaumont.73DuringthereignofMassimilianoSforzaGaleazzostayedonhisestates,uncommittedtoanypower,includingthenewlordofParma,thepope.In1513,thePallaviciniobtainedrecognitionfromMassimilianoofthestatusoftheir lands as Imperial fiefs, which previous Sforza dukes had denied.74 AsFrancisIwaspreparingtoreconquertheduchyin1515,thePallavicini,payingno attention to the commands of the pope’s officials, welcomed Teodoro

71 GianLucaPodestà,Dal delitto politico alla politica del delitto. Finanza pubblica e congiure contro i Farnese nel Ducato di Parma e Piacenza dal 1545 al 1622(Milan,1995),132,135.

72 Ibid.,186,193;LetiziaArcangeli,‘Feudatarieducaneglistatifarnesiani(1545–1587)’,82–8.73 Arcangeli,‘Carrieremilitari’,375,379–80.74 Arcangeli,‘Feudatarieduca’,81,note14.

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Trivulzio,whowasintheserviceoftheFrenchking,totheirlandsandbeganraisingtroopsthemselves.75

FrancisIwasnot,however,astolerantoftheindependentattitudeofLom-bard castellans as Louis had been. Although Antonio Maria Pallavicini wasemployedasaFrenchenvoytothepope,GaleazzowasnotgivenaroleinPar-macomparabletotheonehehadhadunderthefirstFrenchregime.BythetimethatFrancis’sruleovertheduchycameunderthreatin1521,Galeazzowasdead,buthisbrotherCristoforo,whohadbeenconsistentlyanti-Frenchandpro-Sforza,gaverefugeinBussetotoMilaneseexileswhowereplottingagainsttheFrench,andresistedatroopofsoldierssenttodetainthem.Thelieutenant-general,thevicomtedeLautrecsentalargerforcetoarrestCristoforo.Interro-gated,evenundertorture,hedeniedconspiringwiththeemperor.Nevertheless,hewassentencedtoperpetualexileinFrance;Lautrecchosetointerpretthisas life imprisonment,andthen,astheFrenchwerebeingpushedoutoftheduchyinNovember,hadhimexecuted.76AnotherPallavicini,Manfredofromthe Cortemaggiore branch, was also executed, publicly quartered in Milan,havingbeencapturedtakingpartwithGermaninfantryinanunsuccessfulas-saultonComo.Hewasanexile,apartisanofMassimilianoSforzawhoseprop-ertyhadbeenconfiscatedbyFrancisI.77

In the next generation, when the Pallavicini, like several other powerfulLombard families,wereshortofadultmales,78 they foundprotectionundertheFarnesepapacyandthenFarnesedukesthroughtheirrelationshiptotheSforzadiSantaFiora.ThisminorbranchoftheextensiveSforzaclanwasset-tledonmodestestatesonthesouthernbordersofTuscanyneartotheFarnesefamily lands.BosioSforzahadmarriedCostanza,daughterofCardinalAles-sandro Farnese, before her father became pope. Consequently, when in theearly1540sBosio’ssonSforzamarriedLuisaPallavicini,theheiressoftheBus-setobranchandhisdaughterGiuliamarriedSforzaPallavicinidiCortemag-giore(Manfredo’sson,hisChristiannameasignofhisfather’sallegiance),thePallaviciniweremarryinggrandchildrenofthepope,andtheirunclebymar-riage was shortly to become duke of Parma and Piacenza. Sforza Pallavicini

75 Cesare Guasti (ed.), ‘I Manoscritti Torrigiani donati al R. Archivio centrale di Stato diFirenze’,19(1874),244:PietroArdinghellitoGiulianode’Medici,29July1515.

76 Benassi,Storia di Parma,III,181–9.77 Guicciardini,Storia d’Italia,BookXIV,Chapters2,3.78 Arcangeli,‘Un’aristocraziaterritoriale’,600,602.


wasoneofthefewfeudatariwhostayedfaithfultoPierLuigiandwasnotsym-pathetictotheconspiracyagainsthim.79

AssociationwiththeFrenchwasthekeytotherevivalofthefortunesinandaroundParmaoftheRossi.WhilethefavouredsonsofPietroMariaRossi,Gui-doandGiacomo,hadgoneintoexile inVeniceafterthelossoftheir inheri-tance toLudovicoSforza, hisdisinheritedeldest sonGiovanni stayed in theduchy,livinginpoverty.In1494,asCharlesVIIIpassedthroughtheterritoryofParma,Giovanniandhishalf-brotherBertrandomadecontactwiththeking.InthetreatyhemadewithLudovicoSforzainOctober1495,CharlesinsertedaclausethatwhatGiovanniandhissonshad‘beforetheywentwith’thekingshould be restored to them by Ludovico Sforza and he should do justice bythem.80Bertrando,however,whohadgivensuppliestotheFrencharmy,wasimprisoned for two years by Ludovico, and one of his estates, Segalara,wasconfiscated.HerecovereditaftertheFrenchconquestoftheduchy.OntheordersofGianGiacomoTrivulzio,Giovanni’sson,TroilowasgiventheformerRossi strongholdofSanSecondo. InFebruary 1500,FilippoRossi, sonof theexiledGuidoandhimselfaVenetiancondottiere,declaredfortheSforzaandtookotherformerRossiplaces,includingTorrechiara,butsoonhadtoreturntoexile.Troilo,whostayedloyaltoLouis,wasrewardedbytheconfirmationofhispossessionofSanSecondo,whichthekingerectedintoamarquisate.HewasalsomadetheheirofhisuncleBertrando,althoughhehadtopaytheking8,000scudiforthefiefs;heagreedtothispayment,onconditionthatneitherLouisnorhissuccessorswouldeverpardonFilippoforhisrebellion.81

Withtheselandsandfurtheracquisitionshemade,TroilobuiltuponeofthelargestgroupsofestatesintheterritoryofParma.82MoreorlessobedientduringthepapalgovernmentofParmafrom1512to1515,nevertheless,Troilowas one of the castellans in the area who made contact with the French inadvance of Francis I’s conquest.83 He died in 1521, about the time that theFrenchwereexpelled.OncetheFrenchhadleft,FilippowasabletoseizeandkeepCorneglio,butcouldnevertakeotherRossilandsfromtheSanSecondobranch.They enjoyed the protection of their maternal uncle, the renowned

79 Arcangeli,‘Feudatarieduca’,82–3,note21.AfterPaulIII’sdeathhewenttoserveFerdi-nand, King of the Romans, Charles V’s brother, while his brother-in-law, Sforza Sforza,servedCharlesV.

80 Arcangeli,‘Principi,hominese“partesani”’,261,note145.81 Ibid.,275,note215.82 Ibid.,276–77.83 Benassi,Storia di Parma,II,138.

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captainGiovannide’Medici.84Theeldestson,PietroMaria,madeacareerasacondottiere.85From1537,theMediciconnectionbecameevenmoresignificant,whenGiovanni’sson,Cosimo,becamedukeofFlorence.Thisconnection,to-getherwiththetroublecausedbyPietroMaria’shot-headedyoungerbrotherGiulio,bothinthecityofParmaanditsterritory,ashelookedforopportunitiestoextendhisestates,souredrelationsbetweentheRossiandtheFarnesepope.AssistancelentbyPietroMariatoGiulio’soccupationofColornobroughtmil-itaryreprisalsagainst theRossibypapal troops.PietroMaria’swife,CamillaGonzagasuccessfullydefendedherhusband’slands,butGiuliolosthisin1539andwasexiled.86

WhencalledupontoswearfealtytoPierLuigiFarnese,PietroMaria,thenintheserviceofFrancisI,madeaformalprotest,althoughafewmonthslaterhesentassurancesofhissubmissiontothenewduke.87Notsurprisingly,theRos-sifavouredImperialisteffortstotakeParmaaftertheassassinationofPierLu-igi.WhentheWarofParmawasendedin1552byatruce,TroiloRossi(thesonofPietroMaria)askedforacondotta fromCharlesVoflighthorseandinfantrytoguardSanSecondo.88TheRossikepttheirestates,butalthoughTroilo,hav-ingresignedhimselftosubmittingtotheFarnese,livedatSanSecondoinsomestyle,otherRossifeltsaferattheMedicicourt.89Onthebasisofpapalinvesti-turesandconfirmationofprivilegesobtainedfromthepopesinthe1520sand1530s,andImperialinvestituresobtainedfromCharlesV,theRossiwouldlaterclaimtheywerenotsubjectsofthedukeofParma.90

The Italian Wars broadened the horizons of the military nobility of theVeneto,manyofwhomwereattractedbytheideaofservingagreatprinceonaninternationalstage,attractedbythelifeofthecourtaswellasbythepros-pectofwinningmilitaryhonourandgloryandachievingahighcommand.91The wars also forced theVenetians to think hard about their relations withtheirsubjectsontheTerraferma.Theworstshockcamein1509,whennearlyall

84 Troilo had married Bianca Riario, daughter of Girolamo Riario and Caterina Sforza;Giovannide’MediciwasCaterina’ssonbyhersecondmarriage.

85 Seeabove,pp.128–9.86 Arcangeli,‘Un’aristocraziaterritoriale’,639.87 Arcangeli,‘Carrieremilitari’,405–15;Arcangeli,‘Feudatarieduca’,81–2;Podestà,Dal del-

itto politico,144–5.88 Podestà,Dal delitto politico,194.89 Arcangeli,‘Feudatarieduca’,86.90 LetiziaArcangeli,‘GiurisdizionifeudalieorganizzazioneterritorialenelducatodiParma

(1545–1587)’,161,note42.91 Pezzolo,‘Nobiltàmilitareepotere’,401–2;theVenetianspreferredtogivethehighercom-

mandsinthearmytomenfromoutsidetheirsubjectlands(seeabove,p.137).


oftheTerrafermawasoverruninamatterofweeksasVenicewasattackedbythearmiesof theLeagueofCambrai,and theVenetians realisedhowdisaf-fectedmanyoftheirsubjectswere,howreadytoaccept,eventowelcome,thelordshipofthekingofFranceortheemperor.Fortheruralmilitarynobility,Venetianrulewasprobablylessirksomethanforthecivicnobilitieswhore-sentedtheconstraintsandlimitationsimposedbytheVenetiansonthecon-troloftheircitiesandtheterritoriestheythoughtshouldbedirectlysubjecttothem.CastellanswhocausednotroubletoVenicewouldbeleftundisturbedinthepossessionoftheirlandsandjurisdictions,andarguablyhadlesscausetofeeldisempowered.

SomenobleswhohadinitiallyacceptedtheFrenchorImperialforcessoonhad a change of heart, or of mind; often the trigger would be disappointedpersonalambitionsorjealousyatthefavourshowntoarivalfamilyorfaction.TherewouldbenonostalgiafortheperiodofFrenchrule,butsomecontinuedtofeelthattheEmpirewouldbeamorecongenialpoliticalframeworkthantheVenetianstate.SomethingamountingtoacultofCharlesVwascherishedamongnoblefamilies,particularlyofVeronaandVicenza,longafterhisdeath.92

Castellans had great influence in the surrender to the French in 1509of Brescia, one of the major cities on the Venetian Terraferma.93 Not wish-ing their city to be put in a state of defence and risk a siege, the BresciansclosedtheirgatestoVenetiantroopsretreatingaftertheirdefeatatthebattleofAgnadello.Amongthosewhoprocuredthecapitulationofthecitywerepromi-nent castellans, including conte Luigi Avogadro and conte Gian FrancescoGambara, both of whom were Venetian captains (Gambara had fought atAgnadello).BeforetheFrenchtroopsarrivedtotakepossession,theGambaraandAvogadrohadalreadysecuredthefortressandimprisonedtheVenetianofficials.94

Louisandhisrepresentativesfavouredthenobilityinthereformofthecivicgovernmentandinthedistributionoffavours.PrivilegesweregrantedtoLuigiAvogadro,recognizedaslordofLumezzaneandtheValTrompia,andtosomeMartinengo. But it was the Gambara who were given the most generous re-wards,notjusttheextensionoftheirprivilegesovertheirestatesbutforGianFrancesco a command of 50 lances in the ordonnance, and for his brotherNicolò, membership of the French royal chivalric order of Saint-Michel and

92 Uta Barbara Ullrich, Der Kaiser im “giardino dell’Impero”. Zur Rezeption Karls V. in ita-lienischen Bildprogrammen des 16. Jahrhunderts(Berlin,2006),191–268.

93 ForthehistoryofBresciaintheseyearsandtheroleofthecastellans,seeStoria di Brescia,II,La dominazione veneta (1426–1575)(Brescia,1963),233ff.

94 Meschini,La Francia nel Ducato di Milano,II,590–2.

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appointmenttotheofficeofchamberlaintotheking.95GianFrancescoGam-bara,asacaptainofFrenchmen-at-arms,tookpartinthecampaignsinLom-bardyuntilhisdeath inNovember 1511. Jealousiesamongthenobles fuelleddiscontentinthose,LuigiAvogadroamongthem,whofelttheyhadnothadtheirjustrewards.ThebehaviouroftheFrenchtroops,alltooreadytoactlikean army of occupation, aroused great resentment. Gian Galeazzo GambarawasimprisonedforhisinvolvementinafightwithsomeGasconsoldiers,andsenttoFrance.ConteGiovanniMariaMartinengo,anenthusiasticsupporteroftheFrenchin1509,ayearlaterwasgatheringfollowerstorestorethecitytotheVenetianswhenhisplanscametolight.HewasexecutedinSeptember1510,arousingadesireforrevengeamongtheMartinengoandtheirrelatives.

There were three conspiracies against the French in 1511, one headed byLuigi Avogadro, who also led another unsuccessful conspiracy to admit theVenetiansinJanuary1512.HeandotherswhohadleftBresciaurgedtheVene-tiansto tryagain, raising10,000menfromtheirownsubjectsandpartisans.Co-ordinating their efforts with aVenetian force, the conspirators and theirmenenteredthecityduringthenightof2to3February,securingitbeforetheVenetiansentered.TheFrenchforcesandtheBresciansmostcloselyassociat-edwiththemtookrefugeinthefortress.Withstartlingspeed,theking’slieu-tenant,GastondeFoix,broughttroopstoretakethecity,whichthensufferedone of the worst sacks of the ItalianWars. Luigi Avogadro was executed, aswerehissonsPietroandFrancescoafewmonthslater.TheGambaraandthoseMartinengo who had remained loyal to the French were rewarded; NicolòGambarawasgivenhisbrother’scommandof50lances.96CastellansdidnothavesuchaninfluentialroleinsubsequenteventsbeforetheVenetiansfinallyrecoveredthecity inMay1516.WhentheFrenchsurrenderedBresciatotheLeagueinOctober1512,theychosetocapitulatetotheSpanishtroopsratherthantotheVenetians.MaximilianclaimedthecityasImperialterritory,andtheGambara,amongothers,weresympathetictothis.GianGaleazzoGamba-ra was nominated Maximilian’s representative there, but it was the Spanishmilitarygovernorwhowasreallyincontrol.97

Atthisstageofthewars,whenVenice’sholdontheTerrafermaprovinceswasunderthegreatestchallengetheVenetianrepubliceverfaced,theambiva-lentallegianceofmanyFriulancastellansbecamealltooapparent.Beforetheytook over Friuli in 1420, the Venetians had had aderenti and raccomandatiamong the castellans; when the castellans became subjects of Venice, the

95 Ibid.,646–7.96 Storia di Brescia,II,248–59,272–7.97 FortheGambara,seeibid.,II,279,285.


Venetianshadlargelyacceptedthepowersandjurisdictiontheyexercised,anddidnotgivethecastellansreasontorebel.TiesoffamilyandfriendshipthatlinkedmanyFriulancastellanstotheGermanaristocracydidnotnecessarilyresultinasenseofallegiancetotheemperor,butwhenMaximilian’stroopsinvadedFriuli,manycastellansfeltnoobligationtoopposethem.AntonioSa-vorgnaninJune1509gavetheVenetianlieutenantalonglistofindividualsandentirefamilies(admittedly,allbelongingtohis factionalopponents)thatheallegedhadcontactswiththeImperialistsandarguedshouldbesenttoVeniceforthesecurityofFriuli.98Thegreaterpartofthecastellans,accordingtoSa-vorgnan,were‘openrebels’againsttheVenetianstate.99Infact,onlyahandful,includingAlbericoColloredoandhissonOdorico,andEnricodiSpilimbergo,areknowntohaveservedwiththeImperialtroops.100

Concentratingtheireffortsontheirwealthier territoriesnearer toVenice,theVenetiansleftmuchoftheburdenofdefendingFriulitoAntonioSavorg-nanandthemilitiahecommanded,whichdidnotencouragehisrivalcastellanstochangetheirstance.In1511,withtheregiontormentedbyfaction-fighting,peasantrebellionagainstthecastellans,andnaturaldisasters(anearthquakeandanepidemic)andtheVenetiansstillnotdevotingenoughtroopstoitsde-fence,somecastellansbegantoswitchtheirallegiancetotheemperor.InSep-tember1511AntonioSavorgnanbecameoneofthem.HispartisansamongthepeopleofUdinesenttoVenicetosayhehadactedforagoodmotive,topreventUdineandtherestofFriulibeingtorched.101TotheVenetians,hewasarebel.Apricewasputonhisheadandhisproperty,withthatofhisbrotherGiovanniandhisnephews,Giovanni’ssons(alsotreatedasrebels,becausetheywereinImperialterritory)wasconfiscated.102

Withinafewweeks,however,theImperialtroopswereforcedtowithdrawfromFriulibecause–aswassooftenthereasonforthefailureofMaximilian’smilitaryefforts–hecouldnotpayhistroops.Theireffortstotakewhattheyneeded fromthe impoverishedFriulans lostMaximiliansupportamong thecastellansaswellastherestofthepopulation.AntonioSavorgnantriedtore-pairhislinkswiththeVenetians,buttheyrejectedallhispleasandoffersofhelp.AftertheymadeatrucewithMaximilianinApril1512,AntoniowasforcedtogointoexileinAustria.Amonthlater,hewasassassinatedinthetownof

98 Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,133–4.99 Casella,I Savorgnan,100–1.100 AntonioConzato,Dai castelli alle corti. Castellani friulani tra gli Asburgo e Venezia 1545–

1620(Verona,2005),19–20.101 Trebbi,Il Friuli,105.102 Muir,Mad Blood Stirring,217.

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Villachbyagroupofhiscastellanenemies,whowereaidedbyMaximilian’srepresentativethere,anexiledcastellanfromFriuli,FedericoStrassoldo.103

TheSavorgnandidnotlosetheirpositionasthemajorsupportoftheVene-tianstateamongthecastellans;Antonio’scousinGirolamotookhisplace.Gi-rolamohadalreadyrenderedvaluablemilitaryservicestoVenice,commandingthemilitiathatsupportedBartolomeod’Alviano’stroopsinrepulsinganincur-sionintoVenetianterritoryin1508.Inthesummerof1511,hewasinOsoppo,theSavorgnanfortresswhichwasoneofonlytwocastlestoholdoutfortheVenetians,althoughhehadmadecontactwithMaximilian.104Girolamodis-tanced himself from Antonio, denouncing his treachery, emphasizing thelong-standingrivalrybetweenthem,andthefidelityoftherestofthefamilytoVenice.TheSavorgnan,hewrotetothedogein1513,hadbeenprimarilyfriendsofVenice,andnoblesratherthansubjects.105HisloyaltytoVenice,heclaimed,hadearnedhimthehatredofmanyFriulansaswellasGermans,andcastellanswereplottingagainsthislife.106Girolamo’sservicesduringthewarswerere-wardedby,amongotherthings,thestrongholdofBelgrado,theestatesconfis-catedfromhiscousinAntonio,thetitleofcount,andtheexceptionalextensionofjurisdictionofhisthreemajorfiefs,Belgrado,CastelnuovoandOsoppo,sothatthelieutenantofFriulinolongerhadanyauthorityoverthem.107

ButthedefectionofAntoniohadcausedtheVenetianstoreconsidertheirpoliticalstrategyinFriuli,andtheydecidedtheyshouldnolongerbesoreliantontheSavorgnan.Treatallthecastellansequally,theCouncilofTenorderedthecommissionerchargedwithre-establishingVenetianruleintheprovinceinNovember1511;givingtoomuchauthorityandfavourtoAntonioSavorgnanhadproducedathousandtroublesandproblems.108YettheSavorgnancontin-uedtogetmorethantheirshareofwhatincentivestheVenetianshadtooffer,andmanycastellansstillfeltmoreaffinitytotheGermanlordsandfeltmoreathome in the service and the courts of the Habsburgs than inVenice.Therewererecurrentconcernsaboutthesecurityofthefrontiers,aboutthepossibil-ityofexiledandoutlawedcastellans(therewasnoshortageofthemasper-sonalandfactionalvendetteflourished)comingtoseizeafortressandholditfor the Habsburgs. Clearly the Austrians would like to have Friuli, Giulio

103 Ibid.,218–9.104 Ibid.,217.105 Casella,I Savorgnan,103–8,quotationp.107:‘lamiafamiglia…primafuamicachenobile,

primanobilechesuddita’.106 Ibid.,110.107 Ibid.,131–3.108 Ventura,Nobiltà e popolo,148–9.


Savorgnanwarnedinareportonthefortificationsthere,andthereisnoshort-ageofpeopleheretoencouragethem,tosuggesthowtheymightattractfur-thersupport.109

InLiguria,theItalianWarsdirectlyandindirectlybroughtaboutfundamen-talchangetotheroleofcastellansinthepoliticallifeofGenoa.Directly,be-cause theassertionof theclaimsof theFrenchking toGenoaandthentheeffortsoftheenemiesofFrancetocompetewithhimforcontrolofLiguria,resultedinadiminutionofthesignificanceofsupportfromtheSpinola,DoriaorFieschiindeterminingwhowouldbeattheheadofthegovernmentthere.Indirectly,becausethewaytheCampofregosoandAdornocourtedtheaidofthepowers involvedinthewarsreinforcedtheconvictionofmanyGenoesethatfactionshadaperniciousinfluenceontherepublicandthatitwouldbebetteriftheywereeliminated.Foraspiringdoges,externalsupportinmoneyandtroopsbecamecrucial;factionalsupport,whilecertainlydesirable,wasnolongerthekeytosuccess.TraditionalassociationsoftheDoriawiththeCam-pofregoso,andtheSpinolawiththeAdornopersisted.ThustheDoriabackedtheCampofregosodoges,GianoandOttaviano,from1512to1522,andSpinolabackedAntoniottoAdornoduringhisfewweeksinpowerin1513,andhistimeasdogefrom1522to1527.FortheFieschi,theirtraditional,iftroubled,associa-tionwiththeCampofregosowasdefinitivelybreachedbytheassassinationofGerolamoFieschionthestepsofthedogalpalaceattheirhandsinMay1513.His brothers Sinibaldo and Ottobono, who escaped, had a taste of revengewhentheyhelpedAntoniottoAdornodeposeGianoCampofregosoafewdayslater.110 The Fieschi also supported Adorno’s return to Genoa in 1522 (withthousandsof Imperial troopswhosackedthecity).111Theseassociationsbe-cameenmeshedwithalignmentsfororagainsttheFrenchor,fromthe1520s,theemperor.

DuringtheperiodofdirectFrenchruleoverGenoafrom1499to1512,theydidnotdiscriminatebetweenthefactionsofthemilitarynobility;thekingwaspreparedtogivefavourtoall.TheDoriawerewonovermorecompletelythantheSpinola,whohadbeenfavouredunderthepreviousregimeandnowlostgroundinthewesternRiviera.112TheFieschibenefitedmost,withGianLuigi

109 Conzato,Dai castelli alle corti,34–48;quotationfromGiulioSavorgnan,45.110 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.758,c.43:OttobonoFieschitoFrancescoGonzaga,3June1513,

Genoa.111 ArturoPacini, I presupposti politici del “secolo dei genovesi”. La riforma del 1528 (Genoa,

1990),78–9,90–1,100;Pacini,La Genova di Andrea Doria,196.112 Seeabove,pp.88–9,173–4.

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FieschibeingappointedgovernoroftheeasternRivierafrom1499.113Fieschiseemstohavetakentheprivilegeshereceivedmoreorlessashisdue,andnotfeltthattheyputhimunderanyspecialobligationtotheking.Inthecodiciltohiswill,drawnupinJune1508,hecommendedhissonsto‘theMostChristianKingoftheFranks’,describinghimselfastheking’s‘stipendiato’(thatis,asbe-ing inhispay),andamemberof the royalorderofSaint-Michel,notashissubjectorvassal.114

InJune1512,asGianoCampofregosowasheadingforGenoaaccompaniedbytheforcesoftheLeaguethatwasdrivingtheFrenchfromItaly,theDoriadeclaredforhim.115TheFieschididnotopenlyopposehim,butmaintainedcontacts with the French, acting as intermediaries for Giano with them.116Gerolamo Fieschi was assassinated as a French army invaded Milan, and aFrenchfleetsupportedthedepositionofGianoCampofregosobyAntoniottoAdornoandtheFieschi.BoththeFieschiandtheSpinolaopposedOttavianoCampofregosoafterhebecamedoge.WhenFrancisIcametotermswithOt-tavianotogainatleastsomecontroloverGenoa,SinibaldoFieschigotaprom-iseofpoliticalandmilitaryprotectionfromtheFrenchking for the family’sfiefs,andconfirmationoftheirprivilegesandexemptionsintheduchyofMi-lan.117Buthedidnotenjoytheprominentpositionthathisfatherhadhadun-derLouisXII.Sinibaldo’ssupportforthereturnoftheAdornoin1522markedaswitchinthealignmentoftheFieschifromtheFrenchtotheemperor.Ini-tially,SinibaldowassuspectedbytheImperialambassadorinGenoaofkeep-ingcontactwiththeFrench,118butwhenGenoawastakenbytheFrenchin1527heleftthecity,wherehenolongerfeltsecure.NordidAgostinoSpinola,asoldierbycalling,whohadbeencaptainoftheguard(“capitanodellapiazza”);hewentintoexile.119

WhiletheSpinolasupportedtheAdornoregime,theDoriawereactiveop-ponentsincontactwiththeFrench.InthewesternRivieratheyhadbeendriv-en from their main estates of Oneglia and Dolceacqua. When the Frenchoccupied the Riviera in 1524, Bartolomeo Doria was appointed captain andking’scommissionerthereandOnegliawasrecoveredforStefanoDoria.Whenthe French left following their disastrous defeat at the battle of Pavia in

113 Pacini,I presupposti politici,55.114 FiorenzoDebattisti,‘IFieschiaVarzi’,AppendixII,480.115 DeMoro,Porto Maurizio,92.116 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.758,c.43:OttobonoFieschitoFrancescoGonzaga,3June1513,

Genoa.117 DeRosa,I Fieschi,64.118 Pacini,La Genova di Andrea Doria,196.119 Pacini,I presupposti politici,263,267–8.


February1525,StefanoSpinolabecamevicaroftheRivieraforAdorno,andinAugust Spanish troops at Adorno’s request took and sacked Oneglia.120ThealternationbetweenSpinolaandDoriapredominancecontinuedin1527,whenSebastianoDoriawasgivenwidepowersascaptainandvicaroftheRivieraforthe French regime in Genoa.121 The reaction of the Doria family to AndreaDoria’sswitchtotheserviceofCharlesVin1528wastodissociatethemselvesfromhisaction,protestingtheirfidelitytoFrancisI(whomtheyaddressedas‘OurSovereignLord’),urgingthatthekingshouldnotsuspectthem,or‘permitthattheerrorsofoneshouldharmallofus,andourrelativesandfriends’.122But they did not oppose the change of regime brought about by Andrea amonthlater,andonlyonememberofthefamily,Niccolò,wasrecordedasleav-ingwiththeFrench.123

AndreaDoriahadhelpedtheFrenchtotakeGenoain1527asahiredcom-manderofgalleys,notasapartisan.UnderGianoandOttavianoCampofrego-sohehadbeenadmiralofGenoa.124LikemanyotherGenoese,however,hehadbecomeconvincedthatGenoawouldbebetteroffwithouttheCampo-fregosoandAdornofactions.125Thefactionswerelosingtheirpotency,astheGenoeseweariedofAdornoandCampofregosoforcingtheirwaytotheheadofthegovernmentwiththeaidofotherpowersandexpectingthemtopickupthebillandpaythesubsidiesthathadbeenpromisedinreturnforthemilitarysupportthathadbeengiven.AntoniottoAdornohadbeenunabletoblockthepressureforreform,ortopreventtheelaborationofdetailedprogrammesfor“union”,foranewformofgovernmentdesignedtoexcludethefactions.TheFieschiandmanySpinolahadrefusedtoswearanoathtosupportsuch“union”thatallcitizenswereaskedto take inMay 1527.LopedeSoria, the Imperialambassador,whoopposedreformbecausehethoughtitwouldmakeGenoamoreindependent–asindeeditwould–recommendedthatCharlesVshouldrewardthemforthis.IftheemperorcametoanunderstandingwithSinibaldoFieschi,hesuggested,hewouldbeabletodominatethecity.126

InthisSoriawasalmostcertainlymistaken,asthedesireforanewformofgovernmentinGenoawastoowidespreadandprofound.AndreaDoria’ssup-portforreformafterheexpelledtheFrenchin1528wasofcriticalimportance,

120 DeMoro,Porto Maurizio,160–1,166,168.121 Ibid.,179–80.122 Molini,Documenti di storia italiana,II,54–5:‘lafamiliaDoria’toFrancisI,18Aug.1528,

Genoa.123 Pacini, La Genova di Andrea Doria,37.124 Seeabove,p.133.125 Pacini,I presupposti politici,260.126 Pacini,La Genova di Andrea Doria,196–7;Pacini,I presupposti,256.

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becausehewasabletobargainwithCharles,givinghispledgetoserveastheemperor’s admiral in exchange for an assurance from the emperor that hewouldrespecttheindependenceoftheGenoeserepublic.Theemperor’sreli-anceontheservicesofAndreaDoriaandhisgalleysfortherestofhisreigncontinuedtoprovideprotection,enablingDoriatofendoffsuggestionsfromCharlesandhisofficialsthatGenoashouldbecomedirectlysubjecttotheem-peror.

TheprominenceofAndreaDoriainthenewregimedidnotequatetothedominanceoftheDoriafamilyandfaction,nordiditleadtosanctionsagainsttheSpinola.AgostinoSpinolawasmadecaptain-generaloftheGenoeseforcesraisedtoaidtheImperialarmyinLombardyin1529,buthedidnotgetbackthepositionofcaptainoftheguardthathewanted;thatwenttoFilippinoDoria.127HefoundAndrea’spreeminencehardtobear,couldnotsubmit,ashesawit,tothosewhohadalwaysbeenhisenemiesandhisequals.TheSpinola,hetoldtheemperor,hadlongbeendevotedtohim,whileGenoawasnowgovernedbythosewhohadalwaysbeen‘enemiesoftheImperialCrown’,whoservedhimnotforlove,butbecauseitsuitedtheirpersonalinterests.128From1530,Agos-tinochosetostayoutofGenoa,makingacareerasaninfantrycaptainintheserviceofCharlesV.HowtoreconcilerecognitionofthesuperiorityofAndreaDoriawiththeneedforthesupportoftheSpinolaremainedaproblemfortheImperialambassador.129

SinibaldoFieschiwasgivenspecialhonourinthenewregime,secondonlytothatgiventoAndreaDoria,andheservedasGenoeseambassadortoCharlesV.ButhewasnotentirelyeasywithAndreaDoria’srole,andhisdeathin1532,leaving four small boys as his heirs, helped to defuse the opposition to thatrole.TherewererumoursthatSinibaldo’swidow,MariaGrossodellaRovere,had contacts with the French. When asked to provide supplies and transitthroughthefamilylandsfortroopsintheserviceofFrancisI,andassuredthatthekingwasreadytorenewtheassociationwiththeFieschi,shewassaidtohaverepliedthatitwasherdutytoraisehersonstobefaithfultoCharles.ButFrenchtroopswholaunchedanunsuccessfulattackonGenoain1536didgetsomelogisticalsupportfromtheFieschiestates,nonetheless.130

Astheeldestson,GianLuigi,grewtomanhoodthereweresuspicionsthathe was sympathetic to France, suspicions that were heightened by his plot

127 Pacini,La Genova di Andrea Doria,257,264.128 Ibid.,259–60.129 Ibid.,628.130 Ibid.,599–600.


againstAndreaDoriain1547.131Fightingtoholdontothefamily’sestatesafterhisdeath,hisbrotherswerereportedtohaveaskedforhelpfromtheFrenchforcesbasedatMirandola.132ItwasinFrancethatthesurvivingbrother,Scipi-one,would find refugewhenall the landsand fortresseshadbeen lost,andwherehewouldestablishanewthefortunesofhisbranchofthefamily.TheFieschi brothers were condemned as rebels against the republic, and sen-tencedtoperpetualexileaswellastheconfiscationoftheirestatesandthedestructionofthefinepalaceatViaLatainGenoa.133

CharlesVconsideredtheFieschitoberebelsagainsthim,too,andhewasconcernedthatthestrongholdofMontoggioshouldnotbecome‘anothernest’fortheFrench,likeMirandola.134TheFieschiconspiracyfurnishedawelcomeexcusetoCharlesandhisministers,foremostamongthemFerranteGonzaga,toinsistthatGenoawouldbemoresecurewithaSpanishgarrisonandafor-tressmannedbythem(andpaid forbytheGenoese).AgostinoSpinolawastheirpreferredcandidatetobecaptain.ImmediatelyaftertheconspiracyhehadapproachedGenoawith3,000infantry,buttheGenoesegovernmentor-deredhimtodismissthetroopsbeforeheenteredthecity.Hewasgivencom-mand of the expedition that besieged and took Montoggio, the last Fieschistrongholdtofall.ApretextforAndreaDoriatorefusetohavehimascaptainofanygarrisoninGenoawasprovidedbyanaccusationfromaFieschiassoci-ate,thatStefanoSpinolahadmootedtheideaofinstitutinganAdornoregime,sayingAgostinowouldsupport it.135Figueroa,theImperialambassador,dis-missedthesereports,yethadtoacceptthattherivalrybetweentheSpinolaandtheDoriamadethecandidacyofAgostinoforcaptainuntenable.136TherewouldbenoSpanishgarrison,andnoSpanishfortressinGenoa.CharlesVandPhilipIIhadtorelyonlesstangibleguaranteesthatGenoawouldcontinuetobeareliableally,foremostamongthemthemassivefinancialinterestsGenoesebankershadintheSpanishmonarchy.

FortheRomanbarons,infundamentalways,patternsofallegianceandtheprinciplesonwhichconflictsofallegiancewereresolvedwerenotchangedbytheItalianWars.Theywerestillinclinedtoputtheirobligationstothepopebelowthosetheymighthaveasprofessionalsoldiers;theystillfelttheyhada

131 Seeabove.pp.41,94.132 Spinolaetal., ‘Documenti ispano-genovesi’,73–4:MontesatoFerranteGonzaga,21Jan.

1547,Venice.133 Ibid.,78:FigueroatoCharlesV,25Jan.1547,Genoa.134 Ibid.,123:CharlesVtoFerranteGonzaga,11Feb.1547.135 Pacini,La Genova di Andrea Doria,629–30.136 Ibid.,630.

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righttoputtheirlandsandfortressesinthePapalStatesattheserviceoftheiremployers.IntegratedastheywereintotheItalianstatesystem,however,theycouldnotavoidbeingaffectedbyupheavalsinthatsystembroughtaboutbythewars,orhavingtoadjusttothem.Notonlydidtheyhavetofindtheirplaceinthetransformedmilitaryorder,137butalsointhenewpoliticalorder,shapedanddominatedbytheultramontanepowers.

AdjustmentwasmadeeasierbytheFrenchandSpanishinItalyadoptingthe policies of the Italian powers in dealing with the papacy as a temporalpower,andcultivatingtheallegianceoftheRomanbarons,mainlytheOrsiniandColonna,withaviewtousingthemasacurbonthepope.Asbefore,thepopes’responsewastoassertthepriorityofthebarons’dutyofallegiancetothepapacy,with,asbefore,limitedsuccess.Ontheotherhand,withItalyonlyoneofthebattlegroundsbetweenthemajorEuropeanpowers,andwiththefateofthelargeststatesinItalyatstakeinthecampaigns,ifthepopechosetoconfiscatetheestatesofanimportantRomanbaron,thiswouldnotseemsomomentoustootherprincesasitwouldhavedonetotheItalianpowersofthefifteenthcentury,everattentivetosubtleshiftsinthebalanceofforcesamongthem.Thetemporalambitionsofthepopes,forthepapacyandfortheirownfamilies, were given new scope by the wars – beginning with Alexander VI,whoseplansvirtuallytoeradicatethebaronsfromaroundRometothebenefitofhisownfamily(nottomentionhislavishendowmentofCesareBorgiawithpapalterritory)wereunthinkablewithouttheabsorptionoftheotherpowersinthedeterminationofthefateofNaplesandMilan.

TheloyaltyofRomanbaronstothekingsofFranceorSpainortheemperor,and their readiness to identify with their interests, were apparently greaterthantheyhadbeentowardsItaliansecularprincesinthefifteenthcentury.ItwouldbedifficulttofindanyRomanbaronsreferringwithsuchrespecttoanItalianprinceasGiangiordanoOrsiniwasobserveddoingtothekingofFranceat the English court in 1499, never speaking of him without calling him hislord,138orproferringthekindofadvicethatProsperoColonnagavetoCharlesV,onhowhecouldbecomelordofallItaly,139letaloneaffirmingthathehadgivenhimselfbodyandsoultotheserviceoftheprince,thesoleaimofallhisthoughtsandactions,onwhichhisverylifeandbeingdepended,asCardinal

137 Seeabove,pp.139–47.138 CSPSpanish, I, 207: Pedro de Ayala to Ferdinand and Isabella, 26 Mar. 1499, London

(assuming‘master’,thetermgiventhere,tobeatranslationofseñorintheSpanishdes-patch).

139 Ibid., II, 488–9: Prospero Colonna’s instructions to Gian Vincenzo Cosso, his envoy toCharlesV,2Oct.1522.


PompeoColonnadidofCharlesV.140Nobaron,cardinalorlayman,wouldeverrefertoapopeinsuchtermsofdevotion.

While the Colonna di Marino and Paliano became linked to the Spanish,andhencetoCharlesV,inItaly,theColonnadiPalestrinadidnot,preferringtheserviceofthekingofFrance.Thiswasaninstanceofdividedallegiancesinafamilynotreflectingadeliberatefamilystrategy,ahedgingofbets,butratherthecontinuationofa long-standingbreachbetweendifferentbranches.Norwas it the wish of his uncle Prospero that Marcantonio Colonna di PalianoenteredtheserviceofFrancisI.141TheFrenchkingsenthimtoRometohelptheFrenchambassadorthere.142ConfidentthatFranciswouldbeelectedem-perorin1519,andhavingplannedpubliccelebrationsingreatstyle,Marcanto-nioleftRomewhenitseemedcertainthattheelectionwouldgotoCharles;itwas said he could not bear to see the celebrations of the Spanish king’s tri-umphstagedbyotherColonna.143Fabrizio’snephew,anotherProspero,alsohadhisdifferenceswithhisrelatives,andwasnotcommittedtotheSpanisheither:thiswasattributedtohisnothavingestatesinNaples.144

TheassociationoftheColonnawiththeSpanishwasforgedinNaplesatatimewhentheywerecondemnedasrebelsbythepope.InCharlesVIII’scam-paigninthekingdomin1495,ProsperoandFabriziohadfoughtfortheFrench,andthenswitchedtoserveFerrandinoandhissuccessorFederico.145AstheirrelationswithAlexanderVIdeteriorated,Federicotriedtoprotectthembyme-diating.CesareBorgia’srelianceoncondottierioftheOrsinipartyputtheCol-onna and their Ghibelline allies at a disadvantage. The Colonna protestedaboutattacksontheGhibellines,threateningreprisalsagainsttheOrsinirath-erthanAlexander.146AlexandersaidhewouldleavetheColonnaaloneiftheydidnotinterferewithwhathewantedtodointhePapalStates,butthathecouldnotguaranteethemagainsttheFrench,solongastheywerewithFederi-co.147TheSpanishambassadorinRomebecameinvolvedinnegotiationsfora

140 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1006,136:CardinalColonnatoFranciscodelosCobos,30June1530,Naples.

141 Seeabove,p.143.142 Sanuto,I diarii,XXIV,col.613.143 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.864,c.160:AlessandrodeGabbionetatoIsabellad’Este,17June

1519,Rome.144 ASFlorence, Otto di Pratica, Carteggio, Responsive, b. 41, c. 201: Galeotto de’ Medici,

30June1526,Rome;Shaw,The Political Role,94–5.145 Seeabove,p.140.146 ASFlorence,Signoria,Carteggio,Resp.,b.19,c.71:FrancescoCappelli,22Sept.1500,Rome.147 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.854:GianLucidoCattaneotoFrancescoGonzaga,14Sept.1500,

Rome.

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trucebetweentheColonnaandthepope,actingwithFedericoratherthanfortheColonna.Hewasaguarantorofthefour-monthtrucethatwasagreedinlateSeptember1500:theColonnawerenottoattackthelandsoftheChurchortheOrsini;thepopeandtheOrsiniwerenottomolesttheColonnaandtheirallies.148Atitsexpiry,thetrucewasnotrenewed,andastheFrencharmymadeitswaysouthtoinvadeNaplesinJune1501,andtheagreementbetweentheFrenchandSpanishmonarchstodividethekingdomofNapleswasrevealed,AlexanderdemandedthesurrenderoftheColonna’sestates.Fabriziodeclaredthat,ifFedericowasreadytodefendhisrealm,hewasreadytodiefightinginhisownestates,butsoontheColonnadecideditwouldbebettertosurrendertheirlandstothepope,ratherthanhavethemravagedandtakenbytheFrench,reckoning theycouldberecovered in time fromthepopeorhis son.149TheColonna(andtheSavelli)weredeclaredrebelsbyAlexanderandalltheirprop-ertyconfiscate.

FollowingFederico’sdefeat,ProsperoandFabrizioperhapshadlittleoptionbuttoturntotheSpanish,fortheFrenchwereAlexander’sallies.Fortunatelyforthem,theirmilitaryskillswonGonzalodeCórdoba’sesteem.Intheautumnof1502,whenthefortunesoftheSpanishintheirwaragainsttheFrenchforcontrol of the kingdom were at a low ebb, Gonzalo agreed very favourabletermswiththem,pledgingtheyshouldhaveall theestatestheyhadheld inFederico’sreign.IfFerdinandandIsabellahadtoagreetoadefinitivedivisionof the kingdom with Louis, the Colonna were to receive equivalent recom-pense for any estates still lost to them, until their eventual recovery. If theSpanish were driven from the kingdom entirely, Gonzalo gave his word hewouldstillhelpthemgettheirlandsback.Therewasnomentionofanyobliga-tionsoftheColonnatowardsFerdinandandIsabella,assubjectsorvassals.150TheColonnawerethinkingofthemselvesascondottieriintheserviceofSpain,notsubjectsfightingfortheirking.Atthistime,Ferdinandwasalsothinkingofthemascondottieri, rather thanasNeapolitanbarons.Oncehisholdonthekingdomwasestablished,hebegantothinkofthemashisbarons,aswellasRoman barons. ‘As a vassal of the Church and mine’, Prospero should go toRometosortouttheproblemsBishopPompeoColonnawascausingJuliusII,FerdinandorderedinApril1512.151

148 ASFlorence,Signoria,Carteggio,Resp.,b.19,c.98:FrancescoCappelli,26Sept.1500,Rome.149 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.854:GianLucidoCattaneotoFrancescoGonzaga, 17,23 June

1501,Rome.150 Serio,Una gloriosa sconfitta,128–9.151 BaróndeTerrateig,Politica en Italia del Rey Católico 1507–1516. Correspondencia inédita con

el embajador Vich(Madrid,1963),II,204–5.


RelationsbetweentheColonnaandJulius’ssuccessor,LeoX,wereuneasyfromthestart,becauseofthelongassociationofLeo’sfamily,theMedici,withthe Orsini.152 But Leo did not accuse them of complicity with the cardinalsprosecutedforplottingagainstthepope’slifein1517,despitetheirfriendshipwith two of the main alleged conspirators, Cardinals Petrucci and Soderini.PompeoColonnawasincludedinthesubsequentmasspromotionofcardinalsintended to make the College more obedient to Leo.The pope appeared towanttowinoverProsperoColonnainparticular,proposingtogiveintohiscareanaturalsonofhisbrother,Giulianode’Medici(whohaddiedin1516),whowastobemarriedtoProspero’sgranddaughterandgivenlandsinNaples.Pros-peroevadedthesuggestionbyreplyingthathewasaservantofthepopebutasubjectoftheSpanishking,andcoulddonothingwithouthisleave.153Inthesummerof 1521,whenLeohadswitchedalliances fromFrancis I to theEm-peror,therewerereportshewouldappointProsperoorMarcantonioColonnatocommandhisarmy.154Prosperowasputinoverallcommandofthepapal,FlorentineandImperialtroopsfortheimpendingwarinLombardy.UnwillingtoacceptanyappointmentthatwouldplacehiminoppositiontotheFrenchking,MarcantoniowaswiththeFrencharmythatbesiegedProspero’stroopsinMilan.Afterhewaskilledthere inMarch1522,Prosperocommissionedaeulogyofhim.155

DuringthepontificateofthesecondMedicipope,ClementVII,theColonnabecamemorethaneveridentifiedwiththeSpanishandtheemperor,inlargepartbecauseoftheenmitybetweenCardinalPompeoColonnaandthepope.Thiscametoaheadin1526.CharlesVwouldratherthatCardinalColonnahadstayedinRome,representinghisintereststhere,butthecardinalwasnotongoodtermswith the Imperialambassador,and thepopebridledat the ideathatheshouldbeinvolvedinnegotiations.HedidnotfeelsafeinRome,thecardinal said, but would go there if it was necessary to serve Charles.156 Anedictthatnosubjectofthepope–evenifhewereacardinal–shouldtakeservicewithanyprince,beheemperor,kingorduke,onpainofexcommunica-tion,rebellionandlèse-majesté,wasobviouslyaimedattheColonnaasmuchasanyone.157Beforeitspublication,CardinalColonnahadalreadysenttotell

152 Seebelow,p.237.153 Sanuto,I diarii,XXVI,col.368.154 Ibid.,XXX,cols467–8;XXXI,cols19,21.155 Serio,Una gloriosa sconfitta,274,290.156 CSPSpanish,III,part1,567–8:CharlesVtoducadiSessa,8Feb.1526,Toledo;602–4:Miguel

deHerreratoCharlesV,16Mar.1526,Rome;609:ducadiSessatoCharlesV,16Mar.1526,Rome.

157 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.871,464:printededictofClementVII,11June1526.

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CharleshewaspreparedtodrivethepopefromRomeandtoraiserebellioninsome parts of the Papal States, as well as cause Florence and Siena to riseagainsthisdomination;Charlesorderedheshouldbeencouragedtodothis,ifnegotiationswiththepopefailed.158Lessbelligerentthanhiscousinthecardi-nal,theleadinglaymanofthefamily,Prospero’ssonVespasiano,didnotwanttofightthepope,andwenttoRometomakeanagreementwithhim.OnbehalfofalltheColonna,hepromisedtheywouldbefaithfulvassalsofthepopeforthelandstheyheldinthePapalStates,andwouldnotaidanyImperialattackonhimfromRomanterritory,butalsostipulatedthat,asvassalsofCharles,theywereobligedtodefendthekingdomofNaples.159

Nevertheless, Vespasiano and Fabrizio’s son, Ascanio were with CardinalColonnaandtheImperialenvoyUgodeMoncada,whentheyenteredRomewithseveralthousandinfantryandhorse,andsackedtheVaticanon20Sep-tember,whilethepoperetreatedtotheCastelSant’Angelo.MoncadasignedatrucewithClement,withafullpardonforalltheColonnaandtheirmen.160According to the pope, Cardinal Colonna had said he had come to free hishomeland(patria)fromatyrant,buttheColonna,whoquicklywithdrewtheirmenfromRome,deniedtheyhadorderedthesack,blamingthetroopswhocouldnotbeheldbackwhenthepalacewasundefended.Mortifiedbyhowweakandill-preparedhehadbeenshowntobeintimeofwar,ClementwasparticularlybitteraboutVespasiano’spartinit.161Hetookhisrevengebysend-ingpapaltroopsbroughtfromLombardytooccupytheirestatesaftertheCol-onnahadleftforNaples,inaccordancewiththetermsofthetruce–arguingthatthelandswerebeinglaidwasteaspunishmentofhisrebelliousvassals162–andenlistedthehelpoftheOrsinitocounterthetroopssentfromNaplestosupporttheColonna.

ThescandaloftheirincursionintoRomefadedinthefaceofthefargreateroutrageofthesackofRomebyImperialtroopsinMay1527,inwhichtheydidnotparticipate.Theyhadbeenwaitingwith theirmento joinBourbon, theImperialcommanderbutwhentheybroughtthemtoRomeafewdayslaterandthemenfelltolooting,CardinalColonnacalledthemoff,andhedidwhat

158 KarlLanz(ed.),Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V(Leipzig,1846),I,216:CharlesVtoUgodeMoncada,11June1526.

159 ASMantua, AGonzaga, b. 871, c. 619: Francesco Gonzaga to Federico Gonzaga, 25 Aug.1526,Rome.

160 CSPSpanish,III,part1,927–8.161 ASMantua, AGonzaga, b. 871, cc. 696–7, 698–9, 704–6: extracts Francesco Gonzaga

toGianGiacomoCalandra(?),21,22,13Sept.1526,Rome;cc.700–1:FrancescoGonzagatoFedericoGonzaga,23Sept.1526,Rome.

162 CSPSpanish,III,part1,1007:PereztoCharlesV,16Nov.1526,Rome.


littlehecouldtorestraintheImperialtroops.FullrestorationofalltheColon-naestates,andofthecardinal’sdignitiesandbeneficeswereamongthetermsagreedbetweenthepopeandtheImperialrepresentativeson5June.ClementdidconsiderappointingCardinalColonnalegateinRome,thinkinghecouldusetheauthorityoftheColonnatorestorepeaceinthecityanditsenvirons,but the pope and the cardinal were never really reconciled.163The cardinalendedhiscareernotinRome,butasCharles’slieutenantinNaples.

TherewaspotentialforanothermajorconfrontationbetweenClementandtheColonnain1528,whenVespasianodied,leavinghisonlydaughter,IsabellaashisheiressandstipulatingIppolitode’Mediciashischoiceofhusbandforher,buttheColonnaassertedthelandsshouldrightfullygotoAscanio,asthenearestmaleheir.ClementtookIsabellaandthe landsunderhisprotectionbuttheColonnafoughttotakepossession.Thedisputedidnotturnintoafullscalerebellion,partlybecausetheColonnadeflectedtheirangerontotheOr-siniwhobecameinvolved,andpartlybecauseClement’spersonalinterestwasdiminished,asIsabellawasmarriedofftoherstepmother’sbrotherandthenIppolitomadeacardinalinJanuary1529.164AscaniomanagedtosecureVespa-siano’sinheritanceinthePapalStates,buttheNeapolitanestateswenttoIsa-bella,whowaseventuallymarriedtothesonofaformerviceroy,PhilippedeLannoy.Ascaniowasneverreconciledtothelossoftheselands,andthistem-peredhis loyalty toCharlesV.Thesupporthisestrangedwife received fromCharlesandtheviceroyPedrodeToledofannedAscanio’sdiscontent.

Nevertheless,hewasonbettertermswiththeemperorthanhewaswiththepope.WhenhewenttowarwithPaulIIIin1541overtheimpositionofasalttaxonhislands,heappealedtotheviceroyforhelpin‘myjustandnecessarydefence’,against‘theunjustandtyrannousactionofthepope’,astheemperor’sprotectionandtheserviceoftheColonnarequired.‘IwillalwaysbepreparedtoobeyHisImperialMajestyasmyonlylordandmasterandtruesuperior’.165PaultookprecautionsinRometoavoidarepeatofClement’shumiliationin1526,increasingthepalaceguardandblockingupsomeoftheentrancestotheVatican.166ButAscaniohadalienatedhisownmen,whowouldnothavefol-lowedhimintoRomeifhehadmusteredtheresolutionto leadthemthere,andhewasnotsentanysupportbytheviceroy.Paultoldthecardinalsthatthe

163 ASMantua, AGonzaga, b. 877, c. 530: extracts Francesco Gonzaga to ?Gian GiacomoCalandra,10Sept.1528,Rome.

164 Seeabove,pp.17–18,73.165 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1033,16:copyAscanioColonnatoviceroy,28Feb.1541,Marino;

17:‘lasubstanciascrittaaloratorCesareoetalviceRe’.166 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.1911,c.83:NinotoCardinalErcoleGonzaga,5Mar.1541,Rome.

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warwasonlyagainstAscanio,nottheColonnafamily;hewantedtheworldtoknowthatthepopehadarighttopunishhisvassals.Forhispart,Ascaniowashoping that Charles would command him to make an agreement with thepope,ashefelthishonourwouldtherebybesavedbecausehecouldsayhewasobeyingtheemperor,notthepope.167YetwhentheImperialambassadorcon-cludedtermsforhim,ashehadwished,Ascaniorejectedthemasdishonour-able.168AllhislandsinthePapalStateswerequicklytakenbythepapaltroops,andhedidnotrecoverthemuntilafterPaul’sdeath.

The eccentricities and unreliability of Ascanio exhausted the patienceoftheemperorandtheviceroy.ReportsthathehadbeenincontactwiththeFrenchwerethelaststraw,andin1554hewasarrestedandimprisonedinNa-ples,wherehewouldbeheld,protestinghisloyaltytoCharlesandtoPhilip,untilhisdeath.Hisonlysurvivingson,Marcantonio,wastreatedsympatheti-callybytheemperorandhisofficialsandbyPopeJuliusIII,andnoobjectionwas raised when Marcantonio took over his father’s estates before Ascaniodied.JuliusIII’ssuccessor,PaulIV,however,confiscatedthelandsinthePapalStates in September 1555. Not anticipating this, Marcantonio had made nopreparationstodefendthemandputupnoresistance.Hisdispossessionofhisfatherwasoneoftheaccusationsagainsthim,buthisrealcrimeintheeyesofPaulIVwashisallegiancetoCharlesandPhilip.Thepope(whowasgiventopassionateragesifanyonecrossedhim)denouncedtheentireColonnafamilyas‘alwaysbeingenemiesofthepopes’,‘alwaystraitorsandrebelsagainsttheHolySee’,recallingtheirpartinattacksonPopeBonifaceVIIItwoandahalfcenturiesbefore.169InMay1556,PaulgrantedtheColonnaestatestohisownnephews.MarcantoniohadaprominentroleinthecampaignswagedagainstthepopefromthekingdomofNaplesbythedukeofAlbain1556and1557;thesupporthereceivedfromthemenoftheColonnaestatescontributedmuchtotheirsuccess.170

InnegotiationsbetweenAlbaandCardinalCaraffainNovember1556,thequestionofMarcantonio’sestateswasoneofthetrickiestpoints,notleastbe-cause of the determination of the pope not to restore the Colonna lands.171AlbaarguedthatPhilip(nowkingofNaples)couldnotagreetoanythingless

167 Ibid.,cc.85–6:NinotoCardinalErcoleGonzaga,9Mar.1541,Rome.168 Ibid.,c.115:NinotoCardinalErcoleGonzaga,16Apr.1541,Rome.169 BernardoNavagero,‘DispaccialSenato’,ed.DanieleSantarelli,43,114:11Jan.,25July1556.170 Camillo Colonna, his wife and his brother Ascanio were imprisoned in Rome, among

othersaccusedoffavouringtheinvadingforces.171 CSPVenetian,VIii;816–7,823,825–6,828,832–4;Shaw,‘TheRomanbaronsandthesecu-

rityofthePapalStates’,322.


thanfullrestitutiontoMarcantonio,becausethelandshadbeenconfiscatedfromhimasPhilip’sservant,andotherwisetherecouldbenolastingpeace.172ButwhenitcametonegotiatingpeacewithPaulin1557,Albahadtoconcedethat rebels against the pope, including Marcantonio, should be excluded,173andmakeasecretdealaboutPaliano.AsusualwhenaRomanbaron’sestateshadbeenconfiscatedbyapope,Marcantonioonlyhadtowaitforthepopetodie,in1559,totakethemback–exceptforPaliano,whichwasinPhilip’scus-tody,andnotrestoredtohimuntil1562.174

Ingeneral,theOrsini–oncetheyhadcomethroughthetravailsoftheBor-giapontificate–wereonbettertermswiththepopesthanweretheColonnaduringtheItalianWars.Theymighthaveanticipatedproblemsduringthepon-tificateofJuliusII,forasacardinalhehadbeenanallyoftheColonna,butaspopehewasfairlyeven-handedinhisrelationswiththeRomanbarons,notreallyfavouringeitherfaction.UndertheMediciandFarnesepopes,fromfam-ilieswithlongGuelftraditions,theOrsinihadmorereasonthantheColonnatogivetheirprimaryallegiancetothepapacy.Severaldidholdpapalcondotte,buttherewasstillgreaterattractioninservingotherpowers,especiallyVeniceor France.175 Orsini condottieri, like other Roman baronial condottieri, mademoreofamarkinthewarsintheserviceofothersthanthepope;iftheydidservethepopeitwasstilljustacondotta,likeanyother,withnogreatersenseofallegianceattachedtoit.

NoOrsiniwasabletotakeonthepoliticalaswellasmilitaryrolethatVir-ginioOrsinihadbeforethewars,whenhehadnotonlybeenoneofthetopcondottieriinItaly,andtheauthoritativeheadoftheGuelffactioninthePapalStates,butalsoakeyintermediarybetweenthepope,thekingofNaplesandLorenzode’MediciinFlorence.176HisconnectionswiththeMediciandFer-rante caused trouble in the first months of Alexander VI’s pontificate whenPiero de’ Medici helped Virginio buy Cerveteri and Anguillara from Piero’sbrother-in-lawFranceschettoCibo,whohadbeengrantedtheseestatesbyhisfatherInnocentVIII.AlexanderinsistedthatFerrantewasbehindthetransac-tion, that Virginio’s ownership of these lands would increase the potentialthreattoRomefromtheOrsiniestatesintimeofwar,andthatFerranteand

172 DonataChiomentiVassalli,Giovanna d’Aragona tra baroni, principi e sovrani del Rinasci-mento(Milan,1987),141.

173 PietroNores,‘StoriadellaguerradegliSpagnuolicontroPapaPaoloIV’,215–7;theColonnaheldinRomewere,however,released.

174 Seeabove,p.31.175 Seeabove,pp.137–9,144–5.176 ChristineShaw,‘Lorenzode’MediciandVirginioOrsini’;Shaw,The Political Role,158–9.

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Pierowereplotting‘tomakethesebaronsaroundRomegreatandputpressureontheHolySeeandustobendustotheirwill’.177HeorderedVirginionottobuy the lands, on pain of rebellion,178 and the affair was only settled aftermonths of diplomatic effort by Ferrante lendingVirginio the money, 35,000ducats,topaythepopeforpardonandconfirmationofhispossessionofthelands.179

ThesecondmajorquarrelbetweenAlexanderandtheOrsinifollowedthevanquishingoftheFrenchforcesinNaplesin1496,becauseVirginio,hissonGiangiordanoandcousinPaolohadbeenfightingfortheFrenchwhileAlexan-derwasamemberoftheLeagueopposedtothem.ThethreeOrsini,prisonersofFedericoinNaples,hadbeendeclaredrebelsbythepopeandtheirpropertyconfiscate.HavingrefusedtocedeCerveteriandAnguillaratothepope,theOrsini family and party successfully defendedVirginio’s lands, and defeatedthe papal army in open battle in January 1497, capturing the papal com-mander,thedukeofUrbino.Theywereabletonegotiatetermswithoutrelin-quishing any lands, with Urbino’s ransom covering much of the indemnitytheyagreedtopaythepope.180

Virginiohaddiedinprisonbeforehisfamily’svictory,andtheotherOrsinicondottiereofcomparablestatus,NiccolòdaPitigliano,wasbythenintheser-viceofVenice.SowhenAlexanderswitchedtoanalliancewithFrance,andchangedhisattitudetotheOrsini,itwasmenfromthenext,lesscapable,gen-erationofOrsinicondottieri,Paolo,Giulio,Carlo,andFrancesco,ducadiGravi-na,whoweregivencondotteinthearmyAlexanderrecuitedforhissonCesare.ItbecameanuncomfortableassociationwhenprominentGuelfalliessuchasthe Bentivoglio of Bologna came into the sights of the Borgia as targets forCesare’scampaignsofconquest.Bythesummerof1502Alexanderwascon-templating an attack on Giangiordano Orsini, and made enquiries of theFrenchastohowLouisXIIwouldreact,becauseGiangiordano(liketheBen-tivoglio)wasundertheking’sprotection.Hearingofthis,theOrsiniandtheirallies laidplans todefendthemselves,butPaoloOrsini innegotiationswithCesareagreedtermsthatdidnotreallyguaranteethesecurityofthoseGuelfswhomCesarestillplannedtoattack.ThegroundwaspreparedforCesare’sfa-moustrapatSenigalliaon31December1502,whenPaoloandFrancescoOrsiniwere arrested, together with two of their allied condottieri,VitellozzoVitelli

177 PaoloNegri,‘Studisullacrisiitaliana’,51(1924),122:StefanoTavernatoLudovicoSforza,16Feb.1493,Rome.

178 ACapitolino,AOrsini,b.102,c.573:SanteVittorinotoVirginioOrsini,14Nov.1492,Rome.179 Shaw,The Political Role,53–4,179–80.180 Ibid.,182–3.


andOliverottodaFermo,whowerekilledwithinhours.PaoloandFrancescowerekeptalivefornearlythreeweeks,forCesareapparentlystillhadhopesofkeepingthesupportoftheOrsinifamily,believingthatheneededthesupportofoneof thepartiesaroundRome.Alexanderwanted to root themouten-tirely,ashehaddonewiththeColonna.HedidnotlikeCesare’sreluctancetoattack Giangiordano’s fortresses and willingness to accept the French king’sattempt to negotiate a settlement. Breathtakingly ambitious and greedy asbothCesareandAlexanderwere,CesareshowedagreatergraspofpoliticalrealitiesbyatleastperceivingthatitwasimpossibleentirelytosweepawayallthebaronialfamiliesfromaroundRome,substitutetheBorgiaforthemandexpectsucharrangementstoendureafterthedeathofthepope.Withinweeksofthepope’sdeathinAugust1503,thebaronshadallrecoveredtheirlands.181

TheOrsiniwerelinkedtotheMedicifamilybytwomarriages,ofLorenzode’MedicitoClariceOrsinifromtheMonterotondobranch,andofhissonPierotoVirginio’scousinAlfonsina.ThesemarriageshadnotturnedoutentirelytotheadvantageoftheMedici–oneofthereasonsPierohadfailedtowintherespect of the Medici party in Florence was that he behaved ‘more like anOrsini’.182TheOrsinihadstoodbytheMediciaftertheirexilefromFlorencein1494,althoughsomeofthefamilydisapprovedofbackingPiero’sattemptstoreturn by force, as Virginio did in 1495. Some favoured not abandoning theMedici,buttryingtomaintainrelationswiththeFlorentines.TheMedicicon-nectionsmadetheFlorentineswaryofemployingOrsinicondottieri;onlyone,LudovicodaPitigliano–whosefamilyestatesborderedonFlorentineterritory–heldacondottafromFlorenceforseveralyears.183UnderLeoX–thesonofanOrsinimother–severalOrsiniheldcondotteundertheMedicicommandersofthepapalarmy,Paolo’ssonCamillounderLeo’sbrother,Giuliano,andthenunderPierode’Medici’ssonLorenzo,togetherwithMariodiMonterotondo,OrsinodiMugnanoandGentilVirginio,conted’Anguillara.184RenzodaCerialsoheldacondottafromLeofrom1515.

UnderClement,whohadnoOrsiniblood,theconnectionbetweenthefam-ilieswasnotsoclose.OnlyGentilVirginioheldapapalcommand.WhenRen-zodaCericametodefendRomein1527,hewassentbyFrancisI,nothiredbyClement.WhentheMediciwereagainexpelledfromFlorencein1527,theOr-sinididnotsupportthem.Renzo’sson,Gianpaolo,andMarioandNapoleoneOrsiniwereamongthecondottieriwhodefendedFlorenceagainsttheImperial

181 ChristineShaw,‘AlexanderVI,CesareBorgiaandtheOrsini’,13–19.182 FrancescoGuicciardini,Storie fiorentine,Chap.XVII.183 Shaw,The Political Role,163.184 Ibid.,191,andAppendix3.

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armywhichbesiegedthecityin1529–30andrestoredtheMedici.185UndertheMedicidukesofFlorence,AlessandroandthenCosimo,Orsinicondottieriwereagainabletoreconcilethefamily’straditionofholdingcommandsintheFlo-rentinearmyandtheirconnectionwiththeMedici.

BeforehetookservicewiththeFlorentinerepublicans,NapoleoneOrsinihadalreadyfallenfoulofClement.186InFebruary1527,hehadbeendetainedintheCastelSant’Angeloforinterrogationaboutallegationshewasconspir-ingwiththeColonnaandtheviceroytomakeanotherincursionintoRome.Napoleone was to bring his men, crying ‘Orso’ and ‘Colonna’, pretending tocometothedefenceofthepopeagainsttroopsledbyAscanioColonna,whowouldenterbyanothercitygate,crying‘Colonna’and‘Impero’.OncehismenhadcontroloftheVatican,Napoleonewastokillthepopeandeightcardinals.187Napoleonewassufficientlyheadstrongtohavethoughtupsuchascheme,butClementapparentlyconcludedhewasnotmuchofathreat,andreleasedhimaftertwomonths.Stringentconditionswereattached,withhugesecuritiesre-quired thathewouldstay outof thePapal States,agree toadivision of thefamilylandswithhishalf-brothersandnotuseforceagainstthem.188Hedidnotabidebytheseconditions,continuedtoannoyClementbyusingtheOrsinifortressesheheldasbasesforraidsontravellers,andgavethepopeexcusetobackhisstepmotherandhalf-brothersinthedisputeovertheirlands,sendingpapaltroopstobesiegeandoccupymajorfamilystrongholdssuchasBraccia-noandVicovaro.InJune1530,asClement’stroopsweretakinghisstrongholds,Napoleone was declared a public enemy and a rebel against the Church, aplotteragainstthepersonofthepope,butaFrenchcardinal,Gramont,helpedtoarrangeapardonforhim.189InNovember1533,whenClementwasatMar-seilleswithFrancisI,theking’sintercessionobtainedapardonforhimandhisfollowers for all the highway robberies, murders, kidnaps and other crimestheyhadcommitted.190ClementwasreportedtohavetoldNapoleonethathe

185 Ibid.,164.186 See Shaw, ‘The exemplary career of a rogue elephant’, 348–60, for his relations with

Clement.187 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.873,cc.97–9:FrancescoGonzagatoFedericoGonzaga,6Feb.

1527, Rome; cc. 116–7: extract from Francesco Gonzaga to Gian Giacomo Calandra?,10Feb.1527,Rome.

188 Ibid.,cc.231–2:FrancescoGonzagatoFedericoGonzaga,23Mar.1527,Rome;seeabove,pp.38,68.

189 C.DeCupis,‘RegestodegliOrsiniedeiContiAnguillara’,Ser.4,4(1934),344;AGSimancas,Estado,leg.850,99:transcriptioncodedpassage,MaitoCharlesV,15Sept.1530,Rome.

190 DeCupis,‘RegestodegliOrsini’,Ser.4,4(1934),358–9.


wouldbegivenhislandsifhelivedpeacefullyandwasagoodandfaithfulsub-jectoftheChurch,withtheking’sguaranteethathewouldbe.191

NapoleonehadnoparticularclaimonthesupportoftheFrenchking,otherthanthathewasanOrsini.TheOrsinihadbecomeassociatedwiththeFrenchinItaly,astheColonnawerewiththeSpanish.AsGuelfs,itcouldbeseenasonlyfittingthattheyshouldbedrawntowardstheheirsoftheAngevins.SuchsentimentdidnotstopsomeOrsiniservingtheenemiesofFrance,onocca-sion. In the first campaign of the wars, they were opposed to Charles VIII’sconquestofNaples.VirginioandNiccolòOrsiniwerecapturedandthekingtookthemwithhimonhisreturn journeythroughItaly in 1495.Niccolòes-capedatthebattleofFornovo(andspenttherestofhislifeservingVenice),VirginiowasreleasedwhenCharlesreachedAsti.Afewmonthslater,inJanu-ary1496,heacceptedthecommandoftheItalianforcesrecruitedtofightfortheFrenchinNaples,onlytofallcaptiveagain,thistimeofFerrandino.192HissonGiangiordano,whohadalsobeenimprisonedinNaples,becamedevotedtotheFrenchkingafterhewenttoFrancewithCesareBorgiain1498.WhenotherOrsiniwereagreeingpapalcondotte inApril1500,hechosenottopar-ticipate,andwassaidtobepreparing100men-at-armsfromhisownresourcestoservetheFrench.193

LouisXII’sprotectionofGiangiordanowasanobstacletoAlexander’swishtodestroytheOrsini;thepopehadtoagreetoGiangiordanogoingtoFrancetodiscuss theexchangeofhis lands inthePapalStatesagainstCesareBorgia’sestates inNaples.Giangiordano,whowasconfident thekingwouldtakehisside,undertooktoabidebywhateverLouisshoulddecide,‘aseverygoodser-vantandvassalshoulddotowardshissupremelord,notonlyofhisestatesandproperty, but of his life, his wife and his children.’194 But Louis wanted thepope’ssupportinNaples,wherethewarwasnotgoingwellfortheFrench,andAlexanderwasreadytoswitchhissupporttoSpain;thecessionofGiangior-dano’sestatestothepopewasapricethekingwaspreparedtopay.InJulyhisenvoysdetainedGiangiordanoontheshiponwhichhehadembarkedtogotoFrance,andheremainedintheirdetentionuntilthepope’sdeath.195Inspiteofthis, and in spite of all the Orsini had suffered at the hands of the Borgia,

191 ASMantua,AGonzaga,b.882,c.153:FabrizioPeregrinotoFedericoGonzaga,9Nov.1533,Rome.

192 Seeabove,p.140.193 ASFlorence, Signoria, Carteggi, Resp., b. 14, c. 203: Antonio Malegonnelle, 11 Apr. 1500,

Rome.194 DeCupis,‘RegestodegliOrsini’,Ser.III,17(1926),189–92.195 Giustinian,Dispacci,II,63–4,84–5,93,98–9,106:8,9,27July,2,7,13Aug.1503.

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GiangiordanowasstillwillingtoobeyFrenchorderstoescortCesareBorgiafromRome,wherehewasnolongersafe,toBracciano.Amazedandappalled,his familymanaged to talkhimoutof this,and toabandonCesare,butnottheFrench.196FortheotherOrsini,theprotectionextendedtoCesarebytheFrenchatthisjunctureimpelledthemtorejectoffersfromthemandacceptcondotteofferedby theSpanish. FiveOrsini,197withseveral condottieri fromtheirfaction,Bartolomeod’AlvianoandRenzodaCeriamongthem,foughtfortheSpanishinthefinalcampaignthatdecidedthefateofNaplesin1503.198

NottheleastofthereasonsfortheOrsininotsettlingintheserviceofSpain,wasthattheColonnahadgottherefirst.CutsintroopnumbersandchangestotheconditionsofemploymentoftheItaliancaptainsorderedbyFerdinandin1504199affectedtheColonnaaswellastheOrsini,buttheyhadprecededtheOrsiniintoSpanishserviceandtheyhadsecuredpossessionofthedisputedcounties of Tagliacozzo and Albi and other estates there. Orsini ties to thekingdomofNapleswerefurtherweakenedin1528bytheconfiscationofes-tatesheldtherebythePitiglianobranchofthefamily,becauseEnricoOrsini,contediNola,hadtakenacondottaforatroopoflighthorsefromLautrec.200ThatlefttheducadiGravinaastheonlyprominentOrsinibaronintheking-dom–andhehadhadtostruggletoredeemhisestatesaftertheyhadbeenconfiscated.

HadtheFrenchsucceededinholdingontopartorallofthekingdomatthebeginningofthecenturyorinconqueringitin1528,thentheOrsinimighthavebecomeascloselyidentifiedwiththemastheColonnawerewiththeSpanish.NootherOrsinidisplayedsuchdevotiontotheFrenchkingasdidGiangior-dano.OrsinicondottieriservedtheFrench,andtheFrenchcourtbecamemorefamiliartosomeofthemthanthepapalcourt,butthekingshadlesstoofferinthewayofestatesinItalythantheSpanishkings.OrsinicondottieriwerenotsubjectsandvassalsofthekingofFrance.TheirassociationwiththeFrenchhadlessimpactandwasofmuchlessdirectconsequenceforthepope,thantheassociationoftheColonnawiththeSpanish.

TheFrenchwouldprobablyhavelikedtheOrsiniconnectionwiththemtohavebeenmoreevidentinRome.AproposalthatGianpaolodaCerishouldaccompany Cardinal Ippolito de’ Medici to Hungary left the French

196 Ibid.,243–4:15Oct.1503.197 Giulio,Fabio,Franciotto,LudovicoandRoberto.198 N.F.Faraglia,‘GliOrsinialsoldodiSpagna(1503)’,557–62;MallettandShaw,The Italian

Wars,68–9.199 Seeabove,p.129.200 Guicciardini,Storia d’Italia,BookXIX,Chap.4.


ambassadorinRome‘desperate’becausehewastheonlymemberoftheOrsinifactionthattheambassadorcouldmakeuseofthere.201Persuadedbytheam-bassadorthathecouldnotinhonourdothatwhilehewaswaitingforalong-delayedreplyfromFranceaboutacondottahehadbeennegotiating,Gianpaoloatlastgotgeneroustermsfromtheking.202AstheheirofthemainbranchoftheOrsini,PaoloGiordano(hehadbeenborntwomonthsafterhisfatherGi-rolamodied)grewtomanhoodinthe1550s,HenryII triedtowinhimover,givinghimapensionandmakinghimamemberoftheorderofSaint-Michel.PopePaulIV,keentocementthelinksofhisownfamilytotheFrenchking,encouragedtheconnection,threateningthatifPaoloGiordanodidnotaccom-panyCardinalCaraffatoFrance,hewouldbeimprisonedandhisestateswouldbetreatedlikethoseofMarcantonioColonna,andforcinghimtorenouncehisengagementtothedaughterofDukeCosimode’Medici,ofwhichHenrydidnotapprove.203PaoloGiordanoobeyed,butpreferredtheFlorentineconnec-tiontotheFrench,sendingbackthecollaroftheOrderin1558,204andmarry-ingCosimo’sdaughterIsabella.

It was not a foregone conclusion that the French would lose the ItalianWars,andbeleftwiththemarquisateofSaluzzoandtemporarycustodyofahandfulof fortresses inPiedmontasall theyhadtoshowforsixdecadesofmilitaryanddiplomaticeffort.Inthe1550s,theSpanishinItalyhadcomeun-derrealpressurefromtheFrench,andCharlesVhimselffelthispositioninIt-aly was insecure. The terms to which Henry II agreed in the Treaty ofCateau-CambrésiscameasanagreeablesurprisetotheSpanish.205FrancisIhad never relinquished the idea that Milan and Naples were rightfully his.TheseclaimsmeantlesstoHenryII,yethestillofferedrefuge,protectionandmilitarycommandstoMilaneseandNeapolitanexiles,ashispredecessorshaddone.NoblesfromotherItalianstateswhomightbeusefulcouldalsofindaplaceintheserviceoftheFrenchkings.InItaly,theFrenchwerealwaysonthelookoutforallies,greatandsmall,fromthepopeorVenicetoholdersoflittleImperial fiefs. Imperial fiefholders who chose to associate with the French

201 ASMantua, AGonzaga, b. 881: Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga to Gian Giacomo Calandra,20June1532,Rome.

202 Ibid., 157, 187:CardinalErcoleGonzagatoGianGiacomoCalandra, 10July,8Aug.1532,Rome.Thekinggavehimacondotta for3,000infantryand150horse,andapensionof1,500scudiayear.

203 Ibid.,b.1928:transcriptionofcodeddespatchesfromRome,5,17May1556;AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1323,155:transcribedcodeFranciscodeVargastoPhilipII,7June1556,Venice.

204 MichelFrançois(ed.),Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon(Paris,1946),368:TournontoHenriII,19Aug.1558,Conegliano.

205 MallettandShaw,The Italian Wars,250–85.

242 Chapter7

couldbetakingariskyoption,inthosephasesofthewarwhenitlaidthemopentochargesoftreacherytotheemperor.

ThatwashowCarpiwaslosttothePio,andAlfonso,DukeofFerrarawasabletorealisehislong-standingambitiontoannexit.TheprocessbeganunderAlfonso’sfatherErcole,whohadexploitedafamilyquarrelbetweenthecous-insGibertoandAlbertoPiotoinduceGibertotoexchangehisshareofCarpiwithhim.In1496GibertohadprocuredinvestiturewithCarpifromMaximil-ian,whogaveErcoleacommissiontosettlethedisputebetweenthePio.WhenAlbertoprotestedthatErcolewasjusttryingtogetCarpiforhimself,Maximil-iansenttwoenvoystoaskErcoleforCarpi,tonoavail.AlbertohungontohisshareofCarpiwhilemakingacareerasadiplomat.AmissiontoFrancein1506on behalf of Francesco Gonzaga resulted in his acceptance of an invitationfromLouisXIIthenextyeartoenterhisservice.WhenFrenchtroopsoccupiedAlfonsod’Este’shalfofCarpiin1511,AlbertodecidedtoturntoMaximilianforprotection.HewasImperialambassadortoRomeduringLeo’spontificate,un-til, followingthedeathofMaximilian,hisappointmentwasnotrenewedbyCharlesV.AtLeo’sinsistence,Albertoputhimself,informally,attheserviceofFrancisinlate1519;herefusedthegrantofamilitarycommandandapension.BeforehisroleinnegotiatingatreatybetweenLeoandFranciswasknown,hehadhadarenewaloftheImperialinvestitureofCarpiin1521,butonceitcameto light,hebecamesuspecttotheemperor,althoughhehadsidedwithLeowhenthepopeturnedagainsthisFrenchally.

Leo’sdeathlefthiminaquandary.HewasindisgracewiththeFrenchking,whomhehadservedfaithfully,refusingallreward,Albertocomplained,andhewashatedbytheemperorandhiscouncil,becausehehadnegotiatedfortheFrench.206CharlesorderedCarpitobetakenfromAlbertoasatraitor;Prospe-roColonnasentadetachmentofSpanishtroopstooccupyitinJanuary1523.ColonnahadaskedCharlestograntCarpitohimasarewardforhisservices;hewastoldthatnodecisioncouldbemadeuntiltherehadbeenaproperjudicialhearingtodecidewhetherthefiefhaddevolvedtotheImperialChamber.207AlbertolostanychanceofadecisioninhisfavourbybecomingFrenchambas-sadorinRome.TakingadvantageofthereductionoftheSpanishgarrisonasafreshFrencharmyarrivedinItaly,herecoveredCarpiinSeptember1523,ex-pectinghismen,ledbyhisbrotherLeonello,tobereinforcedbyFrenchtroops.OnlyafewcameunderRenzodaCeri,whosoonmovedon.Diplomaticsup-portfromthenewpope,ClementVII,helpedAlbertokeeppossessionofCarpi

206 Delle lettere di principi, le quali o si scrivono da principi o a principi o ragionano di principi(Venice,1581),98–100:AlbertoPiotoGianMatteoGiberti,25Apr.1522,Carpi.

207 Serio,Una gloriosa sconfitta,168–9.


whentheFrenchwerepushedoutofMilan.Charleswasadvisedthathehadtochoose whether to buy Alberto’s favour or decide to destroy him.208 WhenFrancisI’sattempttorecoverMilanendedindefeatatPavia,Carpiwasswiftlyoccupied by Spanish troops sent by Pescara in March 1525. Like ProsperoColonna,PescarahopedtobegivenCarpibyagratefulemperorforservicesrendered,butlikeColonna,hewastobedisappointed.CarpiwasheldfortheemperoruntilAlfonsod’Este inMarch1527negotiated itscessiontohimbytheImperialgeneral,CharlesdeBourbon.ThePionevergotitback,andAl-fonso d’Este obtained its investiture from Charles in 1530. The dispossessedAlbertoPiowenttoFranceintheautumnof1527,dyingtherein1531.209

Mirandola came under French control following the assassination byGaleottoPicoofhisuncleGianFrancescoin1533.IthadcomeunderFrenchinfluenceearlier,whenGaleotto’s fatherLodovico,ayoungerson,refusedtoacceptthevalidityoftheImperialprivilegethat institutedprimogenitureinthe succession to Mirandola.210 Lodovico’s marriage to Francesca Trivulziobroughthimthehelpofhisfather-in-lawGianGiacomo’stroopsinbesiegingandtakingMirandolaforhimfromhiselderbrotherGianFrancescoin1502.Lodovico paid homage to Louis and was protected by him; Gian FrancescowenttoGermanyandgotthesupportofMaximilian,whorenewedtheinves-titureofMirandolatohim,excludingLodovicoandtheiryoungerbrotherFed-erico.211

After Galeotto seized Mirandola, this Imperial fief became an importantbaseforFrenchforcesinthecentreofItaly,acentreforrecruitmentandmus-teringoftroops,arealthornintheflankoftheImperialandSpanishgovernorsofMilan.In1536therewerereportsthattheFrenchwantedtotakeoverMiran-dola,givingGaleottosomecompensation;then,inMarch1537,itwasreportedthatGaleottowantedtocompletetheexchangebutthekingwasunwillingtoalienateanyCrownlands.212Hecontinuedtoholdmilitarycommandsoftheking,andin1548histwodaughtersandyoungsonarrivedattheFrenchcourtasguarantorsofhiscontinuedallegianceandthatMirandolawouldcontinuetobeatthedisposaloftheFrench.213Galeotto’sson,Lodovicodidindeedfol-lowhisfatherinfightingfortheFrench.In1551–2Mirandolawassuccessfully

208 Ibid.,288.209 Sabattini,Alberto III Pio,10–82.210 Seeabove,p.69.211 Ceretti, ‘LodovicoIPico’, 108–10,121.Fortheperiodbetween1509and1533,seeCeretti,

‘FrancescaTrivulzio’,103–76.212 Lestocquoy(ed.),Correspondance des Nonces en France … 1535–40,221,246,251.213 J.Lestocquoy(ed.),Correspondance des Nonces en France Dandino, Della Torre et Trivultio

1546–1551(Rome,1966),326.

244 Chapter7

defendedbytheFrenchagainstasiegebypapalandImperialtroops,andtheFrenchstayedthereuntilaftertheTreatyofCateau-Cambrésis.LodovicoPicoremainedloyaltoHenryII,whenotherItalianprinceswhohadbeenhisalliesmadetheirpeacewithPhilipIIasthefinalpeacetalksbegan,buthewasabletoholdontoMirandola.

ThequestionoftheallegianceoftheOrsinidaPitigliano–theonlybranchof the family to hold an Imperial fief – became a matter of concern to theFrenchandSpanishinItalyinthe1540sastheagentsofCharlesVweretryingtotightentheirgripontherepublicofSiena,andtheallegiancetotheFrenchkingofconteGianFrancescoheightenedawarenessofthestrategicpositionofPitigliano.GianFrancescohadheldminorcondotte fromVeniceandthepa-pacy inthe1520s.HissisterGirolamahadmarriedPierLuigiFarnesebeforeFarnese’sfatherbecamepope,butthefamilyconnectiontothepopedidnotgiveGianFrancescoapositionofinfluenceinRomeoraboosttohismilitarycareer.HebecamemorecloselyidentifiedwiththeFrenchinItalythanwiththeFarnese,andwasassociatedwithPieroStrozzi,themostvigorousandca-pableofFlorentineexilesfightingfortheFrench;hecommandedinfantrydur-ingStrozzi’sraidfromMirandolaintotheMilaneseandPiedmontin1546.214In1543hewasmadeamemberof theorderofSaint-Michel.ThatyearheandotherOrsini,GentilVirginioandCamillo,weresaidtobeplottingtobringSie-naovertoFrance.215TheonlyperceptiblethreattoImperialinterestsinSienacamefromPitigliano,CharlesV’sagenttherewroteinSeptember1546,becauseof the count’s connection with France and his consequent association withStrozziandotherFrenchadherents.216

Threemonthslater,therebellionofthemenofPitiglianoagainstGianFran-cesco217 tempted the Sienese government into arguing the advantages forCharlesifSienatookPitigliano,‘aplaceofasmuchandperhapsmoreimpor-tancefortheaffairsofTuscanyasMirandolaisforLombardy’,fromthehandsofsomeonesuspecttotheemperor.218GianFrancesco’sson,Niccolò,whohadbeeninGermanyfightingfortheemperoragainsttheProtestants,cametotake

214 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1464,65–6:FrancescoCrassotoCharlesV,20Dec.1546,Siena.215 Ibid.,leg.1461,56–7:RecordofinterrogationofGiulioSalvi,26Sept.1543.216 Ibid.,leg.1464,73:FrancescoCrassotoCharlesV,13Sept.1546,Siena.217 Hehadmadehimselfhatedbyhisdespoticways.218 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1464,63–4:FrancescoCrassotoCharlesV,22Dec.1546,Siena.

TheSienesehadattackedPitiglianoin1527,aftertheSackofRomehadremovedMediciprotectionfromLudovicoOrsini.AnImperialenvoypersuadedthemtomakepeacewithLudovico,whoagreedafifty-yearaccomandigiawithSiena,whichprobablyneverbecameoperative. (Giovanni Antonio Pecci, Memorie storico-critiche della città di Siena fino agl’anni MDLII(Siena,1755–60;1997),I,part2,204,255–9;II,part3,22.)


possessionofPitigliano.ThearroganceofCharlesV’srepresentativeinSienadrovetheSienesetoriseagainsttheSpanishandtowelcomeFrenchtroopsintothecity inJuly 1552,andNiccolòOrsini, too,wentovertotheFrench. Ihaveonlyhadwordsfromtheemperor,heexplained,andIhavealwaysconsid-eredmyselffreetodoasIchoose,soIhavedecidedtoaccepttheoffersthatthekingofFrancehasmadeand‘theworldwillknowthatIammyownmaster’.219Earlierthatmonth,CharleshadgivenordersthatNiccolòbeacceptedintohisservicebutitwastoolate.220ThroughoutthesubsequentwarofSiena,hesup-portedtheFrench.AfterSienahadsurrendered,hewasgivenacavalrycom-mand by Paul IV, but soon fell foul of the pope and was imprisoned in theCastelSant’Angelo,accusedof‘excesses’andofheresy.221OnthegroundsthathewasintheserviceofFranceandnotasubjectofthepope,Niccolòmain-tainedthatheshouldbesenttoFrancetobejudgedbytheking,andHenrybackedthisrequest.222HisstatusasaFrenchprotégédidprobablyfacilitatehiseventualpardon,afterfourteenmonthsofimprisonment.

Newsofhisson’schangeofallegiancecausedhisfather,whohadhithertohopedforhelpfromtheFrench,toofferhisservicestotheemperor.ThekingofFrancehaddesertedhim,hesaid;hewouldratherperishwithCharlesthangotoParadisewiththeFrench.223IfCharleswouldtakehimintohisprotectionandgivehimjusticeagainstNiccolò,hewouldputbothhisfortressesofPiti-glianoandSoranointotheemperor’shands,hepromised.224Allhiseffortstowinthesupportof theemperorwerefruitless.Cosimode’Mediciwasmoresympathetic–butonlybecauseheplannedtouseGianFrancescotohelphimachievehisambitiontogetPitiglianoforhimself–engineeringNiccolò’sex-pulsionfromPitiglianoin1562,andinstallingGianFrancescothere.

Pitiglianobecameoneofthepoliticalconundrumsthat,oncethekingofSpainwasnolongeralsotheemperor,becameproving-groundsoftherelativestrengthofthelegalclaimsoftheemperortojurisdictionoverImperialfiefsinItaly,andthepoliticalinfluenceofthekingofSpaininareasofItalythatwere

219 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1319,380:copyNiccolòOrsinitoDiegodeMendoza,26July1552,Pitigliano.

220 Ibid.,leg.1042,26:PedrodeToledotoCharlesV,5July1552,Naples.221 IreneFosi,‘NiccolòOrsiniribellealPapaeaCosimoI(1561–1568)’,278.222 CSPVenetian,VIii,850,878.223 AGSimancas,Estado,leg.1320,44:copyGianFrancescoOrsinitoAntoniodaSiena,17Aug

1552,Carpineto.224 Ibid., 63: Gian Francesco Orsini to ?, 6 Sept. 1552,Venice; leg. 1321, 85: Gian Francesco

OrsinitoFranciscodeVargas[?Nov.1552].

246 Chapter7

notunderhisdirectdominion.225CharlesVandhisofficialsandagentsinItalyhadconflatedImperialrightsandSpanishpoliticalandmilitarypower,usingclaimstoImperialjurisdictiontobringItalianstatesunderSpanishdominion.ForImperialfiefholders,whathadbeenastatusaffordingprotectionagainstabsorptionintothedominionsofmorepowerfulneighboursbecameonethatmadethemvulnerabletointerferencethatcurbedtheirindependence,fromperemptoryinstructionsastowhotheyortheirchildrenshouldmarry,tore-quirementsthattheyshouldprovidebilletsandsuppliesforImperialtroops.ForthosewhosefiefsborderedtheduchyofMilan,therewasafurthercompli-cation, as Milanese lawyers and officials carried on the Sforza tradition ofclaimingthesefiefsweresubjecttotheduchybecauseoftheImperialinvesti-tureoftheViscontidukes.226TheSenateofMilanbecameazealousguardianofthesepretensions,morezealousthanwassometimespoliticallyexpedientfortheSpanish.Layeruponlayerofconflictinginvestitures,ofdukesofMilan(includingPhilipasdukeofMilan)withpowersovertheImperialfiefs,andofthe Imperial fiefholders with privileges confirming they were dependentontheemperoralone,furnishedaninexhaustiblestoreoflegalargumentsthatcouldbebroughtbeforetheSenateortheImperialcourts.

FortunatelyfortheImperialfiefholders,theemperorstooktheirroleaslordofthesefiefsseriously,andwerenotpreparedtoletthembesubsumedintoPhilipII’sdominions.In1574,forexample,MaximilianIItookintohisprotec-tionalltheMalaspinamarchesi,theirwivesandchildrenandsuccessors,de-claringthat theywereall subject to Imperial jurisdictionalone.227AsimilarprivilegewasattachedtoMaximilian’sinvestiturein1575ofGiovanniAndreaDoriawiththefiefsthathisbrotherPaganohadinheritedfromAndreaDoria.SinceAndrea’sdeathin1560thesefiefs–grantedtohimbyCharlesVafterbe-ingconfiscatedfromtheFieschi–hadbeenanimportanttestcaseforthesta-tus of Imperial fiefs between Liguria and Lombardy. The Milanese lawyersdeclaredthemalldevolvedtotheducalchamber(becausePaganowasthead-optedheir,notthedirectheirofAndrea), irrespectiveofwhethertheywerewithinthebordersoftheduchyornot,andirrespectiveoftheImperialinves-tituresAndreahadreceivedfromCharlesVandfromFerdinandI.PhilipIIand

225 TheSpanishwantedtotakeoverPitiglianotoconnectittotheTuscanports,thePresidi,held by Philip (Angelo Biondi, ‘Tentativi di unire ai Presidi Spagnoli la Contea di Piti-gliano’).ButtheMediciplayeda longgame,until intheearlyseventeenthcenturytheMedici’sexploitationofthecontinuingfamilyfeudsdividingthePitiglianoOrsini,andtheirmisgovernmentoftheirsubjects,resultedintheGrandDukebeinggrantedImperialinvestiturewithPitigliano.

226 Seeabove,p.154.227 Branchi,Storia della Lunigiana feudale,III,309.


hisadvisersinMadridweremorecautiousandquestionedtheconfidentasser-tionssentfromMilan,fortherewereotherconsiderationstobetakenintoac-count–includingthefactthatGiovanniAndreahadinheritedAndrea’sgalleysand this Doria fleet still had a significant role in the naval war against cor-sairsandtheOttomansintheMediterranean.Intheend,theDoriagotposses-sion of all the fiefs, and the Imperial jurisdiction prevailed against theMilanese.228Similarly,Philip’sneedforGenoesefinance,aswellasthesupportoftheemperor,wasbehindthesuccessoftheSpinolainrebuffingMilaneseattemptstosubjecttheirImperialfiefstotaxes,andtobillettroopsonthem.229

Yet there were pressing military reasons why the Spanish should want tohavecontroloversomeoftheImperialfiefs,especiallyinLeLanghe,situatedastheywereonthe“Spanishroad”,formingacorridorbetweenLombardyandthecoast,withtheFrench-heldmarquisateofSaluzzocloseby.Theseconsid-erationswerebehindaconcertedattemptbytheSenatetohavethefeudatariof Le Langhe renew aderenze that their predecessors had held with thedukesofMilan.230Finale,withitsharbour,wasaplaceofspecialinteresttoGenoaaswellastoSpain.Therebellionin1558oftheFinalesiagainstAlfonsodel Carretto (oppressed by his attempts to exact from them the income re-quiredtomaintainhiminthestylehehadlearnedattheImperialcourt)gavetheGenoese theexcuse to interveneand take itover, rejecting the Imperialclaimtojurisdictionwhenthedecisionwentagainstthem.Theyfinallyhand-edFinalebacktoAlfonsoin1564.WhentheFinalesirebelledagainsthimagainin1567theGenoeseheldback,andMaximiliansentcommissionerstogovernFinaleinhisname.AlfonsoturnedtotheFrench,offeringtogivethemcustodyofthefortressofFinaleiftheywouldhelphimrecoverhislands.Thisprompt-ed the governor of Milan to send troops to occupy Finale for Philip in 1571.Maximilianwasoutraged,andtheepisodebecameamajordiplomaticdisputebetweentheemperorandtheking.Atlength,acompromisewasreached,withFinalebeingheldfortheemperorbutwithcustodysharedwithSpain.231Theemperor’sinterestswerenotconfinedtoFinale;in1572,Maximilianhadtakenotherfeudatarioftheregionunderhisprotection,stipulatingtheyshouldbe

228 Sisto,I feudi imperiali,89–92.229 Ibid.,85–7,93–5.230 Riccardo Musso, ‘I feudi imperiali delle Langhe tra Impero e Stato di Milano (XV-XVII

secolo)’,102.231 RiccardoMusso,‘FinaleeloStatodiMilano(XV-XVIIsecolo)’,133–40;Marengo,‘Alfonso

IIodelCarretto’,18–58;FriedrichEdelmayer,Maximilian II., Philipp II. und Reichsitalien: Die Auseinandersetzungen um das Reichslehen Finale in Ligurien(Stuttgart,1988).

248 Chapter7

subjectonlytoImperialjurisdiction,andtheImperialgovernorofFinaleup-heldImperialrightsthroughoutLeLanghe.232

TheItalianWarsaccustomedthemilitarynobilityofItaly–especiallythosewhowantedamilitarycareer–tolooktotherulersofSpain,FranceandtheEmpire.Theattractionoftheultramontanepowersasfociofallegianceandloyaltyremainedafterthewarsended,andwasnolongerconfinedtoexilesandmalcontents.ThebaronsofNaplesandcastellansoftheduchyofMilanhadlittlechoiceinreality:theywerecompelledtolooktotheSpanishking.Forothers,beingunderthe“protection”ofthekingsofSpainorFranceoroftheemperorwasanalagoustohavinganaderenzafromanItalianpowerinthefifteenthcentury,anassertionofadegreeofautonomy,andofresistancetothe idea of being subsumed under the dominion of a single state. That re-mainedtheaspirationofmanyofthemilitarynobilityofItaly.Therulesofthegamehadchanged,butthestakesweremuchthesame.

232 Musso,‘IfeudiimperialidelleLanghe’,104–8.

249Conclusion

chapter8

Conclusion

ItalyattheendoftheItalianWarswasverydifferentfromtheItalyofthe1450s.Howdidthemilitarynobilityofthevariousregionsinthemid-sixteenthcen-turycomparewiththeirancestorsandpredecessorsofacenturyearlier?All,tosomedegree,hadbeenaffectedbyfundamentalchangestothestatesystemofItaly,andtheconcomitantdevelopmentsinpoliticalsocietyandmilitaryorga-nization,yetthebaronsandcastellansofeachregionhadretainedmuchoftheirdistinctivecharacter.

Least affected by the sea changes in political and military society werethecastellansofLunigiana.Seeminglyagainsttheodds,mostbranchesoftheMalaspinahadmanagedtoholdontotheirminiaturemarquisates,someofwhichwereeventinierthanacenturybefore.AfewhadsurrenderedtothepressurefromtheFlorentinerepublicandthentheMediciduke,buttheirsta-tusasImperialfiefholdershadhelpedprotectthemfrombeingabsorbedintothe duchy of Milan.Their lands were too small, too poor, too remote, to besubjecttothecovetousnessofsoldiersandofficialsintheserviceofCharlesVlookingfortherewardstheymightsuggestshouldcometheirwayforservicesrenderedduringtheWars.Onebranchofthefamilyhadincreasedtheirhold-ingsandwouldenhancetheirstatus–theMalaspina-CiboofMassaandCarr-arawouldjointheranksofpettyItalianprinces.

NotmuchhadchangedforthemilitarynobilityoftheVeneto,either,oncethewarsinLombardywereoverandtheyhadsettledbackundertheruleofVenice. If anything, they were paid more regard by the Venetians, who hadbeenchastenedbythereadinessofthenobilityoftheTerrafermatoservetheemperororthekingofFrance,anditwaseasierthanbeforeforthemtofindacongenial role in theVenetian forces among the men-at-arms. In Friuli, theVenetianswerepayingmoreattentiontothedefenceoftheprovince,begin-ningtorelyonnewfortificationsratherthantheassistanceoftheSavorgnan.Nolongersuchprivilegedinterlocutorsandauxiliaries,theSavorgnanwerees-tablishingaroleforthemselvesasskilledandinnovativemilitaryengineers(ifnotalwaysintheserviceofVenice).TheVenetianscontinuedtobeconcernedaboutthecontactsofmanyFriulancastellanswiththeImperiallandsovertheAlps.Therewasconcern,too,aboutthebloodfeudthathadflaredupagainduringthecastellans,andthedisregardshownfortheeffortsoftheVenetianauthoritiestorepressit,butatleastitwaspursuedthroughambushesanddu-elsratherthanprivatewarfare.


250 Chapter8

ThepositionandroleofthemilitarynobilityofLiguria,bycontrast,weregreatlydifferentinthe1550stowhattheyhadbeeninthe1450s.ThesechangescouldonlybeattributedindirectlytotheItalianWars.Genoa’sinvolvementinthewars–primarilythroughtheFrenchclaimstodominionovertherepublicand the opposition among the Genoese, and other powers, to that – hadbroughttoaheadexasperationwiththepoliticalfactionsandtheirdisruptiveroleinGenoa,andpavedthewayfortheradicalrevisionoftheconstitution.The“newrepublic”successfullyeliminatedtheroleoftheCampofregosoandAdornofactions,andhencethecrucialrolethatthemajorclansofthemilitarynobilityhadhadindeterminingwhichregimeshouldprevail.Thoseclanshadnotbeencowed,ordefeated,except forthoseFieschiwhohadbeenunableto adjust to the new order. But the military strength of families such as theSpinola,orthedelCarretto–eventheDoria,despitetheprominenceofAn-dreaDoriainthenewrepublic–becameirrelevantinGenoesepolitics,andcould not be used to impose their will. Andrea Doria held on to his specialpositiontohisdeath,butcouldnothanditontohisheirswiththefleetofgal-leysonwhichhisinfluencerested.

ThepoliticalandmilitaryweightofthecastellansofEmiliawasalsodimin-ished.Attimes,theItalianWarshadcreatedopportunitiesforthemtoactin-dependently,usingtheirownmilitaryresources. Inthe1550s,however, theirroleindeterminingthefateofParmaandPiacenzawasunquestionablysubor-dinatetothatoftheFrenchandSpanishandthepopes.OnceOttavioFarnesemanagedtoconsolidatehispositionasdukeofParmaandPiacenza,thecastel-lanshadtodecidehowtodealwiththeirnewprince;themostpowerfulamongthemweredisinclinedtotreathimastheirsovereignlord,andhecouldnotforcethemtodoso.Furtherwest,thecastellansintheterritoriesofModenaandReggiowerenolongerabletovyewiththeEsteforregionalinfluence;re-sistingEstedesignsontheirestateswasasmuchastheycouldhopetoachieve.TheEstehadalreadyswallowedCarpi.ThePicohadlostcontroloverMiran-dolatotheFrenchforthelasttwodecadesoftheItalianWars,yetintheendtheysucceededinholdingontoit.Nevertheless,retainingtheirstatusasImpe-rialfiefholderswasnotenoughtogivethemscopewithinthenewstatesysteminnorthernItalytoplayanindependentpoliticalrole.

ThepositionoftheRomanbaronshadbeenaffectedbythepoliticalchang-esthroughoutItaly,withtheconsequenteclipseofthesystemofmilitarycon-dotte.Theirmilitarypower,derivedfromtheirownforcesandfromtheirroleasfactionleaders,andhencetheirabilitytoposeathreattothepope,wasap-preciablyreduced.ManyRomanbaronsstillchoseamilitarycareer,andstillfeltat liberty– indeed,preferred– toservewith the forcesofpowersotherthanthepapacy.Theyhadnotyetbeensuckedintotheluxurious,ruinously

251Conclusion

expensiveostentationoflifeinRome,wherethepacewouldbesetbypapalnipotiwith theresourcesof thepapacytodrawon,aswouldhappen in thelatersixteenthcentury.Thenthedebtsofonebaronafteranotherwouldgetoutofhand,andtheywouldbeforcedtosellestatesthattheir familieshadstrivenforcenturiestoacquireandpreserve.Inthemid-sixteenthcentury,thetwomajorfamilies,theOrsiniandColonna,lackedmature,powerfulheadsofthe family to reinforce their position in the new order. The Orsini had lostground because of the internecine quarrels of the Bracciano and Pitiglianobranches.Whilethefamilyasawholekeptupitstraditionofproducinggoodsoldiers,theycamefromtheminorbranches.Theyalsokepttheirlong-stand-ingassociationwithVenice,andwithFlorence,andhaddevelopedanewone,withthekingofFrance,wholookedtotheOrsiniasalliesinthediplomacyandintriguesatthepapalcourt.TheColonnawereenduringdifficulttimesinthe1550s.Twobranchesofthefamilyhaddiedoutinthepreviousgeneration,andthenaturalleaderofthefamily,theguardianofitsfortunes,Ascanio,wasaneccentricwhohaddonehisbesttoruinhisownchildrenoutofspite.Fortu-natelyfortheColonna,inthefirstthreedecadesofthesixteenthcentury,thecondottieriProsperoandFabrizio,andCardinalPompeohadestablishedtheirfamilyasprincipalalliesoftheSpanishinRome.ItwasinSpanishintereststosupportAscanio’sheir,Marcantonio,whorecoveredthefamilyestates,andbe-cameoneoftheselectbandofItaliansappointedviceroysoftheSpanishking,servingasviceroyinSicilyfrom1577to1584.Neitherofthemajorfamilies,northeotherRomanbarons,feltconstrainedtofocusonthepopeasthesourceofhonour,oremployment.

NeapolitanbaronsattheendoftheItalianWarshadmuchlesspoliticalandmilitarypowerthantheirpredecessorsofacenturybefore.Forthepoliticallyambitious,andforthosewhowantedamilitarycareer,serviceoftheSpanishmonarchywastheonlyviableoption.Buttheymightwellfindbetteropportu-nitiesoutsidethekingdomofNaples.IndividualNeapolitanbaronscouldat-tain high office under the monarchy, and be the governor of Milan or theviceroy of Sicily (Francesco Ferdinando d’Avalos, marchese di Pescara, heldboththosepositions,governingMilanfrom1560to1563andSicilyfrom1568tohisdeathin1571).WithinthekingdomofNaples,thedistrustofSpanishoffi-cialsforthe“native”baronswasahindrancetotheirachievingapositionfromwhichtheycouldexertrealinfluenceonthegovernment.Therewasnopros-pectofanybaronbecominganofficialcoadjutoroftheviceroyinthecentraladministration. In theprovinces, thebaronskept theireconomicandsocialpower and prestige, if little independent military strength. They might becalled upon to help defend the kingdom against attacks by corsairs or theTurks,buttheywerenotgivenaroleinthepermanentmilitaryestablishment

252 Chapter8

ofthekingdom.Theylackedthemeanstoposeamilitarythreattothemonar-chy,tostagethekindsofrebellionwhichhadchallengedFerranteinthefif-teenthcentury.AlthoughtheywerenottrustedwhentheFrencharmyundertheducdeGuisethreatenedin1557,theydidnotrebelortrytoexploitthesitu-ation.FerrantedaSanseverino’shopesforsupportwhenheappearedoffthecoastswiththeFrenchandtheTurks in 1552and1553–assumingthat theyweregenuine,andnotjustthedesperateillusionsofaruinedman–provedillusory.

BythetimetheItalianWarswereended,‘asawholetheSiciliannobilityhadceasedtobeamilitaryclass’.1AlthoughindividualSicilianbaronsfoughtinthearmiesofthekingofSpain,theywerenolongercalledontoperformmilitaryservicefortheirfiefs.ApetitiontoCharlesVin1535thattheviceroyshouldbeobligedtoconsulttheprincipalbaronsonmilitarymattershadnoresult.2Sic-ilywasdefendedbySpanishtroops,achainofcoastalfortressesandamilitiainstitutedbytheviceroyJuanDeVega.Hehadapolicyofbearingdownonthebarons,andtheydidnotlikethemilitia;in1562theSicilianParlamentoasked,unsuccessfully, that it be abolished.3The barons also lost what remained oftheirroleinthecentralgovernmentoftheisland.JudicialandadministrativereformsunderPhilipIIexcludedthemcompletelyfromthecentraladminis-tration;anyinfluencetheymighthaveontheviceroyscouldonlybethroughadvicegiveninprivate.Theyhadbeengivensomecompensationingrantsofjudicialpowersoverthepeopleontheirestates.UnderFerdinandofAragon,the judicial system had been used to reduce their power and keep them inline.4DiscontentwithFerdinand’swayofruling,whichwasnotconfinedtothebarons, was expressed in violent protests bordering on rebellion after hisdeath,butveryfewbaronstookpart.UnderCharlesVthepolicywaschanged.Viceroysgranted,orsold,powersofhighjustice(mero et misto imperio)tothebarons,restoringtheirauthorityoverthepeoplelivingontheirfiefswhichhadbeencompromisedduringFerdinand’sreign.Policingoftheinterioroftheis-landwaslargelylefttothebarons.PhilipIIrefusedfurtherconcessionsofmero et misto imperio,butcouldnotrevokethemwholesale.Thebaronswere leftwithgreatauthorityover theirestatesandtheareasaroundthem,andtheythemselveswerebroughtbeforetheroyalcourtsonlyinthemostseriouscases.

1 HelmutKoenigsberger,The Government of Sicily under Philip II of Spain. A Study in the Practice of Empire(London,1951),88;Trasselli,Da Ferdinando il Cattolico a Carlo V,II,507.

2 Koenigsberger,The Government of Sicily,85.3 OrazioCancila,‘FilippoIIelaSicilia’,133–4,143.4 Giurato,La Sicilia di Ferdinando il Cattolico.

253Conclusion

ThecircumstancesinwhichSicilianbaronsfoundthemselvesinthemid-sixteenthcenturywereanextremeversionofchangesexperiencedbybaronsandcastellanselsewhereinItaly.Ingeneral,themilitarynobilitywerehavingtoadjusttotheeliminationoftheirscopeandtheircapacityforindependentpoliticalandmilitaryaction.Asagroup,theirwaysofthinking,theirvalues,theirinstinctswerestillmartial;theywouldfeelpeculiarlyjustified(morethananyothersocialgroup) inhavingrecourse toviolencetosettle theirprivateaffairs.Somewerestillabletoraisesmallarmiestofightforthem,enoughtotakeatownshiporlaysiegetoafortress.Iftheywerenolongerabletomain-taintheirownpermanentmilitarycompanies,paidforbycondotte,therewerecontractsasfreelancecommanderstobehad,intheserviceofItalianandul-tramontanepowers(withthenobilityofsomeregionshavinggreaterfreedomthanothersindecidingwhomtheymightserve).PositionswerealsotobehadascommandersofthemilitiasthatinthesecondhalfofthesixteenthcenturywerebecomingaprominentelementinthemilitaryforcesinItaly–butfewwouldbepermanent,andtheywerenotthewaytomakemuchofaliving,or,byandlarge,muchofareputation.Amilitarycareerin“professional”armies,fighting in wars between states, remained a primary way for a noble to en-hancehisrankandstanding.Forthefortunate,estatesandtitlescouldbetheirreward,althoughaftertheendoftheItalianWars,thesewereprobablyhardertocomebyinItaly.

Baronsandcastellanswhowantedmilitarycommandsorapolitical role,wouldbewelladvisedtolearnhowtonavigatethesociety,bureaucracyandfactions of princely courts, either in person or instructing agents to act forthem.Thishadnotbeenaskillthatthemilitarynobilityofthemid-fifteenthcenturyhadfeltitessentialtomaster.Italianbaronsandcastellanswerebe-comingfixedfeaturesoftheSpanish,FrenchandImperialcourts.Individualscameandwent,buttherewouldgenerallybesomethere.Theseultramontanecourtsweremuchmoreattractive,especiallyformajornobles,thanthecourtsofItalianprinces;therewasmuchmoretobegainedthere.Somewereseducedbythesocietyandentertainmentstobeenjoyedatcourt,expensivethoughitwastoparticipateinthemforanylengthoftimeintheproperstyle.Otherswouldgotocourtonlyifitwerenecessarytosettlepressing,importantbusi-ness,chafingathavingtodanceattendanceonpowerfulofficials,andjointhequeueofpetitionersseekinganaudiencewiththeprince.

ItalianprincesaswellasthekingofSpainandtheemperorexpectedtohavemoresayinwhathadbeenregardedbybaronsandcastellansastheirprivateconcerns–inwhoacquiredorinheritedtheirestates,andintheirmarriages,particularlyofheiressesorminorheirs.Familiesaccustomedtomakingtheirownarrangementsmighthavetostruggletokeepestateswithintheirlineage.

254 Chapter8

Princes were ready to sanction primogeniture where equal division amongmaleheirswasthehistoricnorm.AmoregeneralacceptanceofprimogeniturewouldhaveledtoaverydifferentprofileoftheItalianmilitarynobility,withestatesconcentratedinthehandsoffewerindividualsandmanymoreland-lessnobles.Butinthemid-sixteenthcentury,primogeniturewasarguablyofmoresignificanceinprovokingfamilyquarrelsthaninsafeguardingthewealthandpowerofbaronsandcastellans.

Whateverthechallengetheyfacedinthewiderworld,intheprovincesofthestatesofItalythemilitarynobilityremained,andwouldcontinuetobeforcenturiestocome,powerstobereckonedwith.Theyhadtheirlands,theirfor-tresses,theirpowersofjurisdiction,andthesocialstatusthatwentwiththem.Their social status was, if anything, increasing rather than diminishing, asmore members of the civic nobilities that were increasingly affirming theirownstatusinthesixteenthcenturyadoptedsomeofthevaluesofthemilitarynobilityandsoughttoemulatetheirwayoflife.Themilitaryandcivicnobili-tiesofItalywouldnotmerge,buttherewouldbeagreateroverlap.Thepower-fullandednobleofanancientfamily,servingwithhisownretinueinthewarsofnorthernEurope,whocouldaspiretobemadeagrandeeofSpainoramem-beroftheorderoftheGoldenFleece,wouldnotrecognizeasamemberofthesame species a lawyer who was a member of the civic nobility of his smalltown,evenifthelawyerownedlandthatwastechnicallyafief,withafortifiedhouseonit.Butifthesonofthelawyer,havingperhapsbeeneducatedinoneoftheacademiesteachingtheartsofhorsemanshipandthehandlingofweap-ons that were to be founded throughout Italy, was drawn to soldiering andmadeareputationforhimselfonthebattlefieldsofEurope,thanascionofthemilitarynobilitymightbepreparedtorecognizehimassharingintheEuro-peancultureofthe“gentlemansoldier”.Itwasaboveallaspartofthatculturethat thebaronsandcastellansof Italywouldcontinue toagreateror lesserdegreetobeamilitarynobility.

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270 IndexIndex

Index

Acclozamura,Lionello 26accomandigia–seemilitarynobility:

aderenza, aderentiAccrocciamuro,Ruggerone,contedi

Celano 110Acquaviva,AndreaMatteo,marchesedi

Bitonto,ducad’Atri 193,194,204Acquaviva,Giosia(d’)33,183Acquaviva,GiulioAntonio(d’),duca

d’Atri 111-112,204aderenza, aderenti- seemilitarynobility:

aderenza, aderentiAdorno,familyandfaction 60,61,82,88,

89,90,91,94,172,174,223,225,227,250Adorno,Agostino 28,62,123,175,176Adorno,Antoniotto,DogeofGenoa 61,

91,134,223,224,225Adorno,Giovanni 28,62,123,176Adorno,Girolamo 61Adorno,Prospero,DogeofGenoa 88,93,

174Adorno,Raffaele,DogeofGenoa 122,176Alarcón,Fernando(de),marchesediValle

Siciliano 130Alba,duquede–see alsoToledo,Ferrando

Álvarez(de)Albenga 90,91Albi 78,101,140,188,240Albornoz,Gil,cardinal 31AlexanderVI,Pope(RodrigoBorgia)30,32,

38,102,108-109,114,138,139-140,161,177,228,229-230,235-237,239

AlfonsoII,KingofNaples 12,103,104,108-109,112,140,175n114,191-192,194,199

AlfonsoV,KingofAragonandSicily,AlfonsoIofNaples 1,7,19,20n41,100,104,109-111,112,115,122,182,186n162,187,189,190

Alife 189Alviano 25Alviano,Bartolomeo(d’), 25,86-87,102,

136,137-139,141,222,240Amalfi 33Amaseo,Gregorio 47

AmbrosianRepublic,Milan 57,76,110,156,157,187n168

Amelia 86,87Anagni 85Andria 189Angera 213AngevinsinItaly 7,77,83n56,109,110,111,

131,182-186,188,194,195,199-205,207-208,239-see alsoAnjou,Jean(d’);Anjou,René(d’),DukeofLorraine;Anjou,René(d’),King

Anguillara 77,235,236Anguillara(degli),family 6,63,69,202Anguillara,Deifebo(degli) 77n35,181Anguillara,Dolce(degli) 100Anguillara,Everso(degli) 77,181Anguillara,Flaminio(degli) 145Anguillara,Francesco(degli) 181Anguillara,Gianpaolo(degli)(da

Ceri) 73-74,145,237,240-241,241n203

Anguillara,Girolama(degli)–see Farnese,Girolama

Anguillara,Giuliano(degli) 69Anguillara,Lorenzo(degli)(Renzoda

Ceri) 138-139,141,145,206,237,240,242

Anguillara,Maria(degli)–seeOrsini,MariaAnguissola,family, 96,169Anguissola,Giacomo(d’) 97Anguissola,Giovanni 97Anguissola,Onofrio 169Anjou,Jean(d’) 7,112,183-184,186Anjou,René(d’),DukeofLorraine 194,

196Anjou,René(d’),King 7,109AntoniazzoRomano 25Appiani,family 5Aquino,Lançalao(d’),marchesediQuarata

23Aragona,Carlo(d’),marchesedi

Gerace 70Aragona,Cesare(d’) 195Aragona,Eleonora(d’) 186Aragona,Enrico(d’) 70,187


271

Balzo,Pirro(del),principed’Altamura 12,27,112,113,189,192,193,194,196

Bardineto 157Bari 34Beccaria,Matteo 95Belgrado,222Benedictis,Pietro(de) 72n18Bentivoglio,family 236Bentivoglio,Giovanni 164Bergamo 120Bisignano 185Bobbio 165,211Bologna 118,164,236Bologna,Antonio 70Bomarzo 74BonifaceVIII,Pope(BenedictCaetani)

234Borgia,Cesare 126,228,229,236-237,

239-240Borgia,Lucrezia 32BorgoFornari 10,13,156BorgoSanDonnino 215BorgoValditaro 32,41,174Borromeo,family 212-214Borromeo,Camillo 214Borromeo,Filippo 213,213n64Borromeo,Giberto(d.1508) 213,213n64Borromeo,Giberto(fl.1520s) 214Borromeo,Lancilotto 213-214Borromeo,Ludovico 213-214Borromeo,Vitaliano 212Bourbon,Charles,duc(de) 232,243Bourbon,Gilbert(de),comtedeMontpensier

200Bracciano 11,25,37,38n124,108,238,240Brescello 13,114,115,162-163,168,169Brescia 121,135,165n71,219-20Busseto 216

Caetani,family 32,38,39,76n32Caetani,Benedict–seeBonifaceVIII,PopeCaetani,Bonifacio 38-9Caetani,GiacomoMaria,contediMorcone

22Caetani,Guglielmo 38Caetani,Onorato,contediFondi 6,26,

189Caiazzo 118,127,188

Aragona,Francesco(d’) 12,192,193,195Aragona,Giovanna(d’), 233Aragona,Giovanna(d’),duchessadiAmalfi

69-70Aragona,Luigi(d’),cardinal 70Aragona,Maria 186,189Arcano,Troiano(d’) 74Ariano 48Arienzo 23Arona 212,213Arquata 86,87Atella 21Atri 64AttendoloSforza,Muzio 57,75n31,109Avalos(d’),family 7,140Avalos,Alfonso(d’) 7,189-190Avalos,Alfonso(d’),marchesediPes-

cara 17,199Avalos,Alfonso(d’)marchesedelVas-

to 128,131,132,133,134,202,208Avalos,Costanza(d’) 17,202Avalos,FerranteFrancesco(d’),marchesedi

Pescara 131-132,141,202-203,243Avalos,FrancescoFerdinando(d’),marchese

diPescara 33,132-133,251Avalos,Iñigo(d’) 7,187,189,190,199n2Avalos,Iñigo(d’),marchesedelVasto 17,

202Avellino 194Avezzano 26Avogadrofamily 219Avogadro,Francesco 220Avogadro,Luigi,conte 121,219,220Avogadro,Pietro 220

Baglioni,family 56-57Baglioni,Gianpaolo 57,137n172,138Baglioni,Malatesta 57BaglionidaSipicciano,Pirro 73-74Bagnone 153Balzo,Angilberto(del),conte

d’Ugento 196Balzo,Federico(del) 17Balzo,Francesco(del),ducad’Andria 189Balzo,GisottaGinevra(del) 192Balzo,Isabella(del) 192,193Balzo,MariaDonata(del)–seeOrsini,Maria

Donata

272 Index

Caraffa,Carlo,cardinal 234,241Caraffa,Diomede,marchesediCave 31,

39,146,234Caraffa,Gianpietro–seePaulIV,PopeCaraffa,GianVincenzo 27Caraffa,Giovanni,ducadiPaliano 31,39,

70,146,234Caraffa,Violante 70Cardona,Pietro,contediGolisano 72n18Cardona,Ramon(de),viceroyofNaples

142,203Carpi 4,164-165,242-243,250Carrara 44,79,249Carretto(del),family 3,42,90,155,156,

157-158,169,250Carretto,Alfonso(del) 27Carretto,AlfonsoII(del) 42,247Carretto,Antonio(del) 160Carretto,Carlo(del) 157,160Carretto,Francesco(del) 157-158Carretto,Galeotto(del) 27,171Carretto,GianGiacomo(del) 90Carretto,Giorgio(del) 157,160Carretto,Giovanni(del) 28,157,158,159,

173Carrosio,29Cascia 87Castellaro 90Castelnuovo(duchyofMilan) 118,119Castelnuovo(Friuli) 222Castel’Ottieri,conti(di) 5Cave 30Cavernago 120Celano 26,189Cellammare 22Centelles,Antonio,marchesediCotrone

110,187-188,190,191Centelles,Enrichetta–seeRuffo,EnrichettaCentelles,Polissena,187Ceri,Renzo(da)–seeAnguillara,Lorenzo

(degli)Cerveteri 235,236Ceva 20Ceva,Luca,marchese(di)Ceva,marchesi(di) 160Charles,DukeofBurgundy 110,116CharlesV,HolyRomanEmperor 14,16,

19,20,30,33,37,42,58,97,127,129-135,

Calabria,Alfonso,duca(di)– seeAlfonsoII,KingofNaples

Caldora,Antonio 29,109,111,190Caldora,Jacopo 109-110,112Caldora,Restaino 190Calestano 166CalixtusIII,Pope(AlonsoBorja) 195Camogli 92Campagnano 25,31Campo 44Campobasso 110Campofregoso,familyandfaction 60,61,

78,88,89,91,94,172,174,223,225,250Campofregoso,Agostino 72Campofregoso,Battista,DogeofGe-

noa 174,175Campofregoso,Galeotto 77-8Campofregoso,Giano,DogeofGenoa

(1447-1448) 10Campofregoso,Giano,DogeofGenoa

(1512-1513) 89,133,223,224,225Campofregoso,Ludovico,DogeofGe-

noa 46,171Campofregoso,Ottaviano,DogeofGe-

noa 89-91,133,223,224,225Campofregoso,Pandolfo 82Campofregoso,Paolo,DogeofGenoa,

ArchbishopofGenoa,cardinal 174Campofregoso,Pietro,DogeofGe-

noa 3-4,43,60,81-82,122,171,172,174-175

Campofregoso,Pomellina 41Campofregoso,Spinetta 171Camponesco,PietroLalle,contediMontorio

63-4,192Cànnero 214Cantelmo,Nicola,ducadiSora 111Capace,Marcello 70Caprarola 181Capua 195Capua,Andrea(di) 130Capua,Ferrante(di),ducadiTermoli 130Caracciolo,Giacomo 194Caracciolo,Gianbattista 137Caracciolo,Giovanni,ducadiMelfi 113,

193,194,196Caracciolo,Giovanni,principedi

Melfi 22,205,206Caracciolo,Troiano,ducadiMelfi 111

273

Colonna,MarcantoniodiPierantonio 26,30,143,229,231

Colonna,Marcello 38Colonna,Muzio 86Colonna,Oddone–seeMartinV,PopeColonna,Pirro–seeBaglionidaSipicciano,

PirroColonna,Pompeo,cardinal 37,143,

228-229,230,231-233,251Colonna,Prospero 38,86-87,102,108-109,

127,140-142,143,228,229-231,242,243,251

Colonna,Prospero(daCave) 73,229Colonna,Sciarra 70,87Colonna,Stefano 143-144Colonna,Vespasiano 17,33,73,142-3,232,

233Colorno 218Concordia 80,114,163Conti,family 6,37,77,78,106Conti,Andrea 105Conti,Giacomo 102,103,105,178-179Conti,Gianbattista,73Conti,Giovanni 105-106,178Conti,Girolamo 178Coppola,Francesco 196Córdoba,Gonzalo(de)–seeFernándezde

Córdoba,GonzaloCornaro,Caterina,QueenofCyprus 121Corneglio 217Correggio 115,163,168Correggio(da),family 34,76,115,162-163,

168,169Correggio,Antonio(da) 169Correggio,Giberto(da) 114-115,148Correggio,Manfredo(da) 13,115,162-163,

169Cremona 57

DalVerme,family 97,165,211DalVerme,Federico 95,211DalVerme,Giacomo 97DalVerme,Marcantonio 211DalVerme,Pietro 169,211DalVerme,PietroAntonio 211DeFrede,Carlo 71DellaTorre,family 74,75,98DellaTorre,Alvise 75DellaTorre,Girolamo 75

141-142,144,145,202-210,214-219,223-229,231-234,241-246,249,252

CharlesVII,KingofFrance 3CharlesVIII,KingofFrance 78,108,116,

140,175n114,199,200,211,213,217,229,239

Chaumontd’Amboise,Charles(de) 213,215

Chiavari 61,92Chiavenna 212Cibo,Franceschetto 235CiboMalaspina,Alberico,principedi

Massa 44CiboMalaspina,Giulio 44-45,79CiboMalaspina,Ricciarda–seeMalaspina,

RicciardaCittadella 119ClementVII,Pope(Giuliode’Medici)

11n4,37,66,127,134,143,203,214,231,232-233,235,236-239,242

Colleoni,Bartolomeo 120Colloredo,family 24,47,74-75Colloredo,Gianbattista 75Colloredo,Marzio 74-75Colloredo,Odorico 221Colonna,family 1,6,17-18,30,32,37,38,

63,66,68,70,76,77,78-79,82,83,85-88,104,112,140,180,181,188n74,228-235,237,238,239,240,251

Colonna,Alessandro 145Colonna,AscaniodiFabrizio 17-18,30-31,

37,39,85,130,134,142-143,232,233-234,238,251

Colonna,AscaniodiMarcello 234n170Colonna,Camillo 73,145,234n170Colonna,Fabrizio 38,73,78,86-87,

108-109,130,140-142,143,202,229-230,251

Colonna,Federico 142Colonna,Giovanna–seeAragona,Giovanna

(d’)Colonna,Giovanni 78Colonna,Giovanni,cardinal 86,102Colonna,Giulia–seeGonzaga,GiuliaColonna,Giulio 87Colonna,Isabella 70Colonna,IsabelladiVespasiano 17-18,233Colonna,MarcantoniodiAscanio 31,39,

145,146,147,234-235,241,251

274 Index

Farnese,family 5,128Farnese,Alessandro–seePaulIII,PopeFarnese,Costanza, 216Farnese,Girolama 69Farnese,Girolama–seeOrsini,GirolamaFarnese,Ottavio,DukeofParmaand

Piacenza 214,215,250Farnese,PierLuigi,DukeofParmaand

Piacenza 214,215,216,217,218,244Favale 70Federico,KingofNaples 49,140,194,195,

200,202,229-230Felino 170n97,215FerdinandI,HolyRomanEmperor 32,

217n79,246Ferdinand,KingofAragon,Sicilyand

Naples 19,72n18,129,131,140,141,142,199,201-202,230,231,240,252

Fermo,Oliverotto(da) 237FernándezdeCórdoba,Gonzalo 129,140,

199,201,202,230Ferrandino,KingofNaples 140,195,

199-200,229,239Ferrante,KingofNaples 7,11,12,29-38,

48,63-64,70,77,78,102,105,106-107,110-113,118,177,179,180,182-197,235-6,252

Ferrara 163,164Ferrara,Marquis,thenDukeof 4,113-4

–see alsoEste,AlfonsoI(d’);Este,Borso(d’);Este,ErcoleI(d’);Este,NiccolòIII(d’)

Fiano, 38Fieschi,family 1,2-3,15,23,35,40,42,45,

60-62,64-65,81-82,83,85,90,91-94,122,153,155,158,161,166,173,174,176-177,223-224,246,250

Fieschi,AntoniaMaria 40,82,157Fieschi,Bernardo 123Fieschi,GerolamodiGianLuigi 16,223,

224Fieschi,GerolamodiSinibaldo 94,227Fieschi,GianAntonio 122,156,166,176Fieschi,GianFilippo 3-4,40,81-2,85,92,

93,122-123,157,159,173,174-175Fieschi,GianLuigi(d.1451) 81,152-153,

155

DeMagellis,Bartolomeo 91DeVega,Juan 252Diano 200Dolceacqua 224Doria,family 2,3,28,42-43,58-59,60-61,

64,65,76,83,88-91,155,156,157,173,174,176,223-227,250

Doria,Andrea,principediMelfi 41,45,57-58,61,69,79,133-134,135,144,207,225-227,246,247,250

Doria,Bartolomeo 42,69,224Doria,Bernardo 90Doria,Ceva 58Doria,Domenico 28,58Doria,Filippino 134,226Doria,Gerolamo 90-91Doria,GiovanniAndrea 134,246,247Doria,Niccolò 225Doria,Pagano 246Doria,PaoloGerolamo 90Doria,Sebastiano 90,225Doria,Stefano(fl.1454) 158Doria,Stefano(fl.1515) 91,224

Emilia 1,4-5,21,26,34,35,39,48,69,76,77,80-81,82,84,94-97,113-115,128,149-150,154,162-165,168-171,211,214-218,250

Emperor,HolyRoman 2,5,9,13-14,44,83,167,197,210,219,221,226,228,242,245-248,249,253–see alsoCharlesV,FerdinandI,FrederickII,FrederickIII,HenryVII,MaximilianI,MaximilianII,Sigismund,Wenceslas

Empire,HolyRoman 2,20,152,154,155,219,245-8

Este(d’),family, 4,95,113-114,162-165,250Este,AlfonsoI(d’),DukeofFerrara 128,

131,142,242,243Este,BiancaMaria(d’) 81Este,Borso(d’),Marquis,thenDukeof

Ferrara 162-163,168,169Este,ErcoleI(d’),DukeofFerrara 81,116,

119,164-165,242Este,NiccolòIII(d’),MarquisofFerrara

55,163EugeniusIV,Pope(GabrieleCondulmer)

30,78,109,181

275

108,121-145,159-160,165,173,175n114,196,198-207,209-217,219-220,223-231,234-245,247-248,250,252

Friuli 1,5,23-25,35,46-48,49,59-60,74-75,97-98,121,136,220-223,249

Gambara,family 219,220Gambara,GianFrancesco 121,219-20Gambara,GianGaleazzo 220Gambara,Nicolò 219,220Gambaro 45Genoa,cityof 3,60-62,64-65,94,172-176,

223-227Genoa,Dogeof 3,40,57-58,60-61,65,91,

121-122,171-173,176–see alsoAdorno,Antoniotto;Adorno,Prospero;Adorno,Raffaele;Campofregoso,Battista;Campofregoso,Giano(1447-1448);Campofregoso,Giano(1512-1513);Campofregoso,Ludovico;Campofrego-so,Ottaviano;Campofregoso,Paolo;Campofregoso,Pietro

Genoa,Republicof 2,3-4,10,13,14,27-28,32,41,42,43,44,54,57-58,60-62,88-94,114,121-123,133,134,135,152,155-161,171-177,223-227,247,250

Gesualdo,Luigi,contediConza 199GhibellinesandGuelfs 3,55,83-84,85-98,

146,152,154,212,213,229,235,236,239–see alsomilitarynobility:factions

Gonzaga,family 76,215Gonzaga,Camilla 218Gonzaga,Ferrante 33,214,215,227Gonzaga,Francesco,MarquisofMantua

80,81,164,242Gonzaga,Giulia 73,233Gonzaga,Luigi 73,233Gonzaga,Ludovico,MarquisofMantua,

163Gramont,Gabriel,cardinal 238Gravina 206Grimaldi,family 3,13,41-42,60,69,83,

155,159n44Grimaldi,Agostino 13-14Grimaldi,Boruel 159n44Grimaldi,Catalano 41Grimaldi,Claudine 41Grimaldi,Francesco 159n44

Fieschi,GianLuigi(d.1510), 16,40-41,62,82n53,93,94,123,161,172,173,175-176,223-224

Fieschi,GianLuigi(d.1547) 41,94,226-7Fieschi,Giorgio,cardinal 158Fieschi,Jacomo 158-159Fieschi,Jacopone 82,157Fieschi,Maria–seeGrossodellaRovere,

MariaFieschi,Matteo 92-93Fieschi,Nicolosino 81-82Fieschi,Obietto, 32,82,92-93,94,172,173,

175Fieschi,Ottobono 223Fieschi,Rolando 82,122,157Fieschi,Scipione 227Fieschi,Sinibaldo 223,224,225,226Figueroa,GómezSuárez(de) 227Finale 3,20,23,27-28,34,42,90,157,

247-248Fivizzano 116,154Florence,Republicof 4,44,62,80,103,

104,105,106,107,109,114,115-116,118,119,125,127,143,144,151-156,161,171,178,179,195,231,232,237-8,249,253

Fondi 26,186Fontana,family 96Fontanellato 26Foix,Gaston(de) 220Foix,Odet(de),vicomtedeLautrec 203,

205,206,216,240Forenza 21Fortebracci,Braccio 56,109Fortebracci,Carlo 56France,Kingsof 83n56,88,124,125,143,

147,198,219,223,228,229,239,240,241,248,249–see alsoCharlesVII;CharlesVIII;FrancisI;HenryII;LouisXI;LouisXII;andFrenchinItaly

FrancisI,KingofFrance 30,90,97,125,126,127,128,132,133,134,138-139,143-144,202,210,212,214-218,224,225,226,229,231,237,238,241,242,243,244,251

FrederickII,HolyRomanEmperor 21FrederickIII,HolyRomanEmperor 5,115FrenchinItaly 3-4,13-14,19,21,24,39,61,

62,78,81,83n56,89-90,94,95-97,100,

276 Index

Landi,family 96Landi,Corrado 96Landi,Manfredo 40,92Lannoy,Charles(de),viceroyofNaples

203Lannoy,Philippe(de) 233LaPietra 24L’Aquila 63,87,192,207LascarisdiTenda,family 90Lautrec,vicomtede–seeFoix,Odet(de)LeoX,Pope(Giovannide’Medici) 57,96,

97,128,139,143,214,215,230,235,237,242

Lerma 156Lettere 22-23Leyva,Antonio(de),principed’Ascoli

130,132Leyva,Luis(de),principed’Ascoli 130Ligny,LouisdeLuxembourg,comte(de)

211Liguria 1,2-4,13-14,15-16,20,23,27-29,32,

34,35,40-44,58-59,60-62,68,69,74,76,81,82,83,88-94,121-123,133-134,154,155-162,171-177,223-227,246-248,250

Lingueglia 90Lingueglia,family 90Lingueglia,GianBattista(della) 90Lodrone,Giorgio(da) 120Lodrone,Parisio(da) 120Lodrone,Pietro(da) 120LouisXI,KingofFrance 119LouisXII,KingofFrance 13,14,62,126,

129,137,138,160,199-202,209-213,215-217,223-224,230,236,237,239,242,243

Lucca,Republicof 5,62Ludovico,DukeofSavoy 18,157,158,159Lumezzane 219Lunigiana 4,15,16,20,23,44-46,68,

77-83,114-116,150-156,161-162,249

Machiavelli,Niccoló 51,66Malaspina,family 4,16,20,32,44-46,68,

77-80,83,149,152-155,156n27,161-162,246,249(note-alllegitimateMalaspinamaleshadtherighttothetitleofmarchese;branchesofthe

Grimaldi,Giovanni(d.1454) 156,159n44Grimaldi,Giovanni(d.1505) 42,69Grimaldi,Lamberto 28,41-42,89,160-161Grimaldi,Luciano 13,28,42,69Grimaldi,Luigi 89Grimaldi,Onorato 42,207Grimaldi,Pomellina–seeCampofregoso,

PomellinaGrimaldi,Stefano 42Grisons 211,212GrossodellaRovere,Maria 226Guazzo,Stefano 14-15Guelfs–seeGhibellinesandGuelfsGuevara,Fernando(de) 189,190Guevara,GisottaGinevra–seeBalzo,Gisotta

Ginevra(del)Guevara,Iñigo(de),189,190,190n180,192Guevara,Pedro(de),marchesedelVasto

12,48,192-3,194Guise,François,duc(de) 209,252

HenryII,KingofFrance 125,241,244,245HenryVII,HolyRomanEmperor 10Humières,Jean(de) 128

Imola 118Imperialfiefs–seemilitarynobility:Imperial

fiefsImperialforcesinItaly 20,24,32,100,127-

138,141-146,198,202-204,213,219,221-223,231-233,237-238,243,244–see alsoCharlesV;Emperor,HolyRoman;MaximilianI

InnocentVIII,Pope(GianbattistaCibo) 28,31,72-73n23,103,107-108,112,114,119,178-179,181,193,194,195-196,235

Isabella,QueenofCastile 230Isabella,QueenofNaples 189Ischia(Naples) 202Ischia(PapalStates) 36

JuliusII,Pope(GiulianodellaRovere) 32,57,63,96,101,104,128,141,142,143,194,196,214,230,235

JuliusIII,Pope(GiovannaMariadelMonte) 146,214,215,234

Lagopesole 22

277

Marsciano,Ranuccio,conte(di) 15MartinV,Pope(OddoneColonna) 11,78Martinengo 120Martinengo,family 135,219,220,231Martinengo,Bernardino 165n71Martinengo,Gerardo 120Martinengo,GiovanniMaria 220Martinengo,Marco 121Martinengo,Orsino 120Martini,FrancescodiGiorgio 25Marzano,GiovanBattista 191Marzano,GiovanniAntonio,ducadiSessa

186n162Marzano,Marino,principediRossano

186-187,191Marzolara 166Massa 44,79,249Masserata 169Matera 48MaximilianI,HolyRomanEmperor 5,16,

81,126,136,143,165,213,220,221,222,242,243

MaximilianII,HolyRomanEmperor 246,247-248

Medici(de’),family 144,215,237-8Medici,Alessandro(de’),DukeofFlor-

ence 238Medici,Alfonsina(de’)–seeOrsini,AlfonsinaMedici,Clarice(de’)–seeOrsini,ClariceMedici,CosimoI(de’),DukeofFlor-

ence 71,79,129,135,144,145,218,238,241,245,249

Medici,Ferdinando(de’),GrandDukeofTuscany 71

Medici,Francesco(de’),cardinal 71Medici,Giovanni(de’)(militarycommander)

128,218,218n84Medici,Giovanni(de’)–seeLeoX,PopeMedici,Giuliano(de’) 231,237Medici,Giulio(de’)–seeClementVII,PopeMedici,Ippolito(de’),cardinal 233,240Medici,Isabella(de’) 71,241Medici,Lorenzo(de’)(d.1492) 104,107,

118-119,235,237Medici,Lorenzo(de’)(d.1519) 237Medici,Piero(de’) 235-6,237Melfi 21,207Menton 41,42,160

familyaregivenhereonlytodistin-guishindividualswiththesamename)

Malaspina,Alberico–seeCiboMalaspina,Alberico

Malaspina,Alessandro 68Malaspina,Antonio 150Malaspina,Antonio(Lusuolo?) 46Malaspina,Antonio(Mulazzo) 68Malaspina,AntonioAlberico 44Malaspina,Azzone 15,68Malaspina,Bernabò 151Malaspina,Cristiano 77-78,153Malaspina,Fioramonte 152Malaspina,Floramonte 44Malaspina,Gabriele(Fosdinovo?) 79-80,

115-116Malaspina,Gabriele(Villafranca) 152Malaspina,Galeotto(Fosdinovo) 116Malaspina,Galeotto(Olivola) 79Malaspina,GaspareVincenzo,45Malaspina,Ghisello 45,97Malaspina,GiovanLorenzo 151Malaspina,Giulio–seeCiboMalaspina,

GiulioMalaspina,JacomoAmbrogio 46Malaspina,Jacopo 44Malaspina,Jeronimo 68Malaspina,Leonardo(Fosdinovo) 116Malaspina,Leonardo(Podenzana) 44Malaspina,Leonardo(SantoStefano) 45Malaspina,Ludovico 79-80Malaspina,Malgrato 79-80Malaspina,Morello 44Malaspina,Niccolò 151Malaspina,Ricciarda 45,79Malaspina,Simone 116Malaspina,Spinetta 115,116,154Malaspina,Tommaso 79-80Malgrate 79-80Malpaga 120Malvezzi,Lucio 137n172Manfredonia 195Mantua 115Mantua,Marquisof 33,113-114,149,164

–see alsoGonzaga,Francesco;Gonzaga,Ludovico

Maro 90Marsciano,Antonio,conte(di) 15

278 Index

160,162-167,171,197,211,211n54,213,215,218,241-250

inheritancecustomsandpractices 2,4,8,9-18,38,41,45,50,65,68-69,76n32,77-82,99,120,166,186,192,195,211,233,238,243,246,253-4

militarycontractsandcommands 4,5,6,7,15,18-19,25,28,33,37,40,55-58,66,72-73,76,80,86,100-149,151,152,154,164,165,167-169,177-191,194-195,197,199,202,203,206,208,211,212,215,217-222,224,226-231,235-245,249-253

navalcommands 122-3,133-4,139,144,209,225,226,247

tenants,subjectsandvassals 2,6-9,14,15,20-24,27,32,34-50,56,65,67,76,79,80,86,88,92,95,97,98,100,117,121,149,151-153,164,166,168-70,193,200,206-208,220,234,244,246n226,247,252

andtownsandcities 2-6,21,23,34,37-39,47,48,51-66,72,74,75,84-98,119,164,167,169-172,174-177,181,182,189,191,193-195,207,208,211,212,214,215-221,223-227,229,231-233,236,238,240-241,250,254

Milito 22Mirandola 4,69,80-81,114,145,163,164,

165,227,243-244,250Miroballo,Carlo 23Modena 128,162,163,164Monaco 3,13,23,28,34,41-42,69,156,160Moncada,Antonio 19Moncada,Ugo(de) 37,203-204,232Monferrato,Marquisof 2,27,155,156-157Monferrato,Marquisateof 2,14-15,155Monforte,Angelo(di),contediCampobasso

110,191Monforte,Cola(di),contediCampobasso

110,191Monforte,Carlo(di) 110,111Monforte,Giovanni(di),110Monopoli 34Montana 56Monte,Gianbattista(del) 146Montefeltro,Federico(da),DukeofUrbino

169,236Montercule 27

Mesocco 211,212Milan,cityof 57,76,110,119,125,156,157,

167,211,212,214–see alsoAmbrosianRepublic,Milan

Milan,duchyof(territoryandstate) 1-4,10,12-14,18,19,29,32,44,55-57,76,92-97,102,105,107-109,112-114,116-120,122,123,125-128,137,140,141,143,149-150,161,166-171,174,179,195,198,209-217,224,228,241,243,246-247,248,249,251

Milan,dukeof 2,4,12-13,16,19,28,31,34,40,80,88,95,115-117,150,152,154,155,161,162,166-168,170-172,174,186,198,210,213,215,246,247–see alsoSforza,Francesco;Sforza,FrancescoII;Sforza,GaleazzoMaria;Sforza,GianGaleazzoMaria;Sforza,Ludovico;Sforza,Massimiliano;Visconti,FrancescoMaria;Visconti,GianGaleazzo;Visconti,GiovanniMaria

militarynobility: aderenza, aderenti 5,78,115,116,117,

118n99,148,149-165,179,193,197,211,220,244n219,247,248

estates 2-50,53,55,61,68-69,75-82,84,86,87,90,92,95,96,100,103,105-120,139-140,143,146,148-174,177,180-254passim

andfactions 2-4,6,7,28,37-40,42-3,47,54-56,58-63,65-67,74-75,79,81-99,100,106,107,137,138,140,148,152,168-70,172,174,198,200,206,207,215,219-225,229,230,235-237,240-241,250

fiefsandfeudatari 7,9-13,16,18-19,36,50,120,138,150,156,158,160,162-171,182-197,205-208,211-213,215,217,222,224,236,247-8,252,254

fortresses 2-6,8,9-11,13-15,20-32,35-37,40-42,45,47,48-50,53,56,64,67,70,79-82,86,89,90,94,100,105,108,114-116,120,121,146,149,151,152,154-156,159,162-164,168-170,173,181,196,200,203,209,211,211n54,212-215,217,222,228,235,237,238,241-245,253,254

Imperialfiefs 2-5,8,9,12,13,19-20,27,35,44-45,80-81,90,113-116,150,154-155,

279

Orsini,Alfonsina 237Orsini,Camillo 139,144-146,237,244Orsini,Carlo(fl.1550s) 144,145Orsini,CarlodiGiovanni 11Orsini,CarlodiVirginio 102,137-138,144,

236Orsini,Clarice 237Orsini,Daniele,contediSarno 185,186,

188Orsini,Enrico,contediNola 240Orsini,Fabio 240n198Orsini,Felice–seeRovere(della),FeliceOrsini,Felice,principediSalerno 185-

186,188Orsini,Ferdinando,ducadiGravina 206-

207,240Orsini,Francesco,ducadiGravina 236-

237Orsini,FrancescodiGiangiordano 11,38,

38n124,238Orsini,FrancescodiGiovanni 11Orsini,FrancescodiOttavio 145Orsini,Franciotto 140n198Orsini,Gabriele,ducadiVenosa 189Orsini,Gentile 188n172Orsini,GentilVirginio,conte

d’Anguillara 144,237,244Orsini,GianAntonio,contediTagliacoz-

zo 77,188n174Orsini,Gianbattista,cardinal 102-103Orsini,Giancorrado 17,139Orsini,GianFrancesco,contediPitigliano

25,244,245Orsini,Giangiordano 38,68,102,144,228,

236,239-240Orsini,GiordanodiValerio 144,145Orsini,Giordano,contediAtripalda 185,

186,188Orsini,GiovanniAntonio,principedi

Taranto 6,21,33,34,64,111,112,183-184,186-189,194

Orsini,Girolama 244Orsini,Girolamo 10,68-9,238,241Orsini,Giulio(fl.1550s) 145,146Orsini,GiuliodiLorenzo102-103,236,240n198Orsini,Isabella–Medici(de’),IsabellaOrsini,Latino,cardinal 73,103,106-107Orsini,LatinodiCamillo 144,145

MonteSanGiovanni 199Montesarchio 27MonteTanàno 41Montoggio 23,41,227Morcone 22Morone,Gerolamo 203Morra,Isabella(de) 70Muir,Edward 23,98Mulazzo 68Musso

Naldi,Dionigio(di) 137n172Naples,cityof 6,12,22-23,63,65,110,122,

187n168,189-191,193,199,204,206,208Naples,kingof 1,21,63-64,146,161,180,

198,230-232,252–see alsoAlfonsoII;AlfonsoVofAragon(IofNaples);CharlesV,HolyRomanEmperor;Federico;Ferrandino;Ferrante;PhilipII,KingofSpain

Naples,kingdomof,territoryandstate 1,6-7,8,11-12,16-17,19,21-23,26,29-35,48-49,51,63-64,69-71,77,78,100,101,104,105,107-115,118,125,126,129-133,139-140,143,165,175n114,180-209,211,228-33,235,239-241,248,251-252

Narni 86,87Nicelli,family 93NicholasV,Pope(TommasoParentucelli)

30,32Noceto 77,170,170n97Nola 104,112,188Norcia 87

Oddi(degli),family 56Oneglia 28,90,91,224,225Onzo 90Orange,PhilibertdeChâlons,Princeof

204-207Orléans,Louis,duc(d’)–seeLouisXII,King

ofFranceOrsini,family 1,5,6,10,11,17,25,37,38,

63,64,66-69,76,78-79,82-88,101,104-105,107-108,112,137-140,144,177-181,188n172,188n174,228-233,235-241,244-245,246n226,251

Orsini,Aldobrandino,contediPitigliano 69,179-180n131

280 Index

Pallavicini,Cristoforo 216Pallavicini,Galeazzo 215,216Pallavicini,GianFrancesco 80,170Pallavicini,GianLudovico 80Pallavicini,Giulia–seeSforzadiSantaFiora,

GiuliaPallavicini,Luisa 216Pallavicini,Manfredo 216Pallavicini,Rolando(fl.1450) 34,39,117,

149-50,166Pallavicini,Rolando(fl.1515) 80Pallavicini,Sforza 216-217,217n79Pallavicini,sonsofRolando(fl.1450) 39-

40,117,149,166Palombara 181Pandone,Enrico,ducadiBoiano 205papacy,popes 1,6,11,30-31,37,61-63,66,

83,87,100-105,114,128,139,141,145-147,161,177-182,195,214,218,227-241,244,250-251–see alsoAlexanderVI;BonifaceVIII;CalixtusIII;ClementVII;EugeniusIV;InnocentVIII;JuliusII;JuliusIII;LeoX;MartinV;NicholasV;PaulII;PaulIII;PaulIV;PiusII;PiusIV;PiusV;SixtusIV

PapalStates 1,6,11,17-18,21,30-33,35-39,51,56-57,62-63,68-71,76-79,82-88,101,105-109,146-147,177-182,193,195,206,214,227-241,250-251

Parma 26,39,55,56,58,76,95,96,114-115,120,128,155,162,165,170,214-218,250

Parmigianino 26Parolisi 22PaulII,Pope(PietroBarbo) 106,179,181PaulIII,Pope(AlessandroFarnese) 30-31,

57,128,144,214-216,218,233-235,244PaulIV,Pope(GianpietroCaraffa), 30,31,

70,146,234-235,241,245Pavia 165Perugia 56-57,85Petrucci,Alfonso,cardinal 231Petrucci,Antonio 196PhilipII,KingofSpain 31,127,133,134,

209,210,214,215,227,234-235,244,246-247,252

Piacenza 55,65,68,96-97,128,162,165,169,211,214-215,250

Piccinino,Jacopo 115,181,184

Orsini,LudovicodiAldobrandino 69Orsini,LudovicodiNiccolò,contedi

Pitigliano 237,240n198,244n219Orsini,Maria 77n35Orsini,MariaDonata 189Orsini,Mario 237Orsini,NapoleonediCarlo 25,77,103,

104,106-107,188-189Orsini,NapoleonediGiangiordano 10,

38,38n124,68-69,78,87,237-239Orsini,NiccolòdiAldobrandino,contedi

Pitigliano 25,38,69,104-106,137,140,180n131,188n172,236,239

Orsini,NiccolòdiGianFrancesco,contediPitigliano244-245

Orsini,Orsino 237Orsini,Orso,ducad’Ascoli 38,112,188,

188n172,192Orsini,OrsodiGiovanni 11Orsini,PaolodiCamillo 144,145Orsini,PaolodiLatino 73,236-237Orsini,PaoloGiordano 71,241Orsini,Piergiampaolo 109Orsini,Raimondo,principediSalerno

186Orsini,RaimondodiOrso 38,192Orsini,RobertodiCarlo 188-189Orsini,RobertodiOrso 38,192,240n198Orsini,Troilo 71Orsini,Ulisse 86Orsini,Valerio 139,144Orsini,Virginio 25,26,31,36-37,72-73,78,

85,87,101-108,140,144,178-181,235-237,239

Orte 86,87Ortucchio 26Orvieto 85Osoppo 5,24-25,35,225Ovada 158

Pacheco,Pedro,cardinal 209Padua 75Palestrina 30,32Paliano 30-31,235Pallavicini,family 4-5,26,34,76,80,95,

96,116,161,168,170,215-216Pallavicini,AntonioMaria 215,216Pallavicini,Bernardino 80

281

Porzio,Camillo 113Poviglio 168Prelà 90

Quarata 23

raccomandigia, raccomandati–seemilitarynobility:aderenza, aderenti

Ramoino,Francesco 89-91Rangone,Guido 128Rapallo 92Recco 61,92Reggio 55,162,163Riario,Bianca 218n84Riario,Caterina-seeSforza,CaterinaRiario,Girolamo 78,101-102,218n84Rieti 85-6,87RippaCandida 21-22Roccabianca 170n97RoccadiPapa 30RoccaSanvitale 26RoccaSinibalda 86Roccatagliata 32,41Romano(Veneto) 120Rome 1,6,30,37,38,54-55,57,62-64,66,

70,72,73,79,85,87,106-108,138,143,177,178,181,182,229,231-233,237,238,240-241,251

Roquebrune 41,42Rossi,family 1,4-5,58,76,84,95,97,116,

119,161,169-71,192,215-218Rossi,Beltramo 120Rossi,Bertrando 170-171,217Rossi,Bianca–seeRiario,BiancaRossi,Camilla–seeGonzaga,CamillaRossi,Filippo 119-120,217Rossi,Giacomo 117,217Rossi,Giovanni 217Rossi,Giulio 218Rossi,Guido 117,119,170,217Rossi,Pietro 55Rossi,PietroMariadiPietro 21,26,75-77,

84,95,117-118,149-150,169-171,217Rossi,PietroMariadiTroilo 128-129,218Rossi,Rolando 77Rossi,TroilodiGiovanni 128,217Rossi,TroilodiPietroMaria 218Rota 36

Piccinino,Niccolò 109Piccolomini,Alfonso,ducad’Amalfi 33Piccolomini,Antonio,ducad’Amalfi 26,

33,189PicodellaMirandola,family 4,69,80,

163,165,243-244,250PicodellaMirandola,AntonioMaria 80,

114PicodellaMirandola,BiancaMaria–seeEste,

BiancaMaria(d’)PicodellaMirandola,Federico 81,243PicodellaMirandola,Francesca–see

Trivulzio,FrancescaPicodellaMirandola,Galeotto, 80-81,114,

164PicodellaMirandola,GaleottodiLodovico

69,80-81,243PicodellaMirandola,GianFrancesco 69,

243PicodellaMirandola,Giovanni 80PicodellaMirandola,Lodovico(d.

1509) 69,81,243PicodellaMirandola,Lodovico(fl.1550)

243-244Piediluco 86PievediTeco 89,91,174PiodaCarpi,family 4,34,163,164,

242-243PiodaCarpi,Alberto 164-165,242-243PiodaCarpi,Giberto 164,242PiodaCarpi,Leonello 165n71,242Piombino 5Pisa 116Pitigliano 5,25,104,244-245,246n226PiusII,Pope(EneaSilvioPiccolomini)

77,181,189,195PiusIV,Pope(GiovanAngelode’Medici)

31PiusV,Pope(AntonioMicheleGhislieri)

147Poiani,family 86Pompei,family 135Pompei,Alessandro 136Ponzano 46Pordenone 138Porto(da),family 135Portofino 61PortoMaurizio 89-91

282 Index

Sanseverino,Giovanna(da) 196Sanseverino,Girolamo(da),principedi

Bisignano 112,193,194,196,200Sanseverino,Giulio(da) 126Sanseverino,Guglielmo(da),contedi

Capaccio 199Sanseverino,Leonello(da) 118,188Sanseverino,Luca(da),ducadiSanMarco

185Sanseverino,PietroAntonio(da),principedi

Bisignano 133,208,209Sanseverino,Roberto(da),contediCaiazzo

72-73,104,118-119,188,195Sanseverino,Roberto(da),contediSanse-

verino 185,188Sanseverino,Roberto(da),principediSalerno

196,200-201Sanseverino,RobertodiGianFrancesco(da),

contediCaiazzo 126-127SantaCaterina 152Santacroce,Giorgio 36-37SantaFiora 5Santoro,Leonardo 204SantoStefano 41Sanvitale,family 58,77,95,170,170n97Sanvitale,Giberto 26Sanvitale,Stefano 29Sarno 186Sassuolo 164Savelli,family 6,63,77,78,87,101,230Savelli,Antimo 145Savelli,Antonello 86-87,109Savelli,Federico 145Savelli,Gianbattista,cardinal 87,102,108Savelli,Giovanni 78Savelli,Jacopo 181Savelli,Mariano 102,178Savelli,Paolo(d.1405) 100Savelli,PaolodiMariano 102Savelli,Silvio 141Savelli,Troiano 78,87Savelli,Troilo 78,102Savignone 15,40Savona 3,59Savorgnan 5Savorgnan,family 1,5,24,35,46-47,59,

74-75,98,121,136,221-222,249Savorgnan,Antonio 74,98,221,222Savorgnan,Federico 74

Rovere(della),Felice 38n124,238Rovere(della),Francesco–seeSixtusIVRovere(della),Giovanni 103,195Rovere(della)Giuliano,cardinal–seeJulius

II,PopeRuffo,Enrichetta 187Rusca,family 83-84

Safienthal 211n54SalaBraganza 29Salerno 29,185Saluzzo,Marquisof 18Saluzzo,Marquisateof 18,241,247SaluzzodiCastellar,GiovanniAndrea 18Sanbarbato 22Sanbarbato,Gianbattista(di) 22SandovaldeCastro,Diego 70Sanfele 21SanFelicealCirceo 32Sangallo,Antonio(da) 25SangiorgiodellaMolinara 22Sangro,Paolo(di) 111Sangro,Placido(di) 208SanMarcodeliCavoti 22SanPietro,ducadi 33SanSecondo 170,170n97,217,218Sanseverino(da),family 7,49,65,83-84,

165,185,209Sanseverino,Alfonso(da),ducadiSomma

205Sanseverino,Antonello(da),principedi

Salerno 12,29,49,113,136,192-194,196,199-200

Sanseverino,AntonioMaria(da) 73,126Sanseverino,Barnabé(da),contediLauria

196Sanseverino,Bernardino(da),principedi

Bisignano 200,201,208Sanseverino,Carlo(da),contediMileto

29-30,194,196Sanseverino,Ferrante(da),principedi

Salerno 49,131,133,201,208-209,252

Sanseverino,Galeazzo(da) 125-126Sanseverino,Gaspare(da) 126Sanseverino,Giacomo(da),contediMileto

200Sanseverino,GianFrancesco(da),contedi

Caiazzo 125-126

283

Sicily,kingof 8,18-19Sicily,kingdomof 1,7,8,12,18-19,20n41,

34,50,72n18,182,183,187,251-253Siena,Republicof 5,62,102,103,106,115,

144-145,148,179-180n131,232,244-245Sigismund,HolyRomanEmperor 154-5SixtusIV,Pope(FrancescodellaRovere)

30,66,78,87,101,103,106-107,114,119,177-180,195n208

Soderini,Francesco,cardinal 231Sora 195Sorano 245Soria,Lope(de) 225Spain,kingsof 14,61,124,127,131,143,146,

147,198,202,207,208,228,240,245,248,251,252,253–see alsoCharlesV,HolyRomanEmperor;FerdinandofAragon;PhilipII

SpanishinItaly 14,20,30-31,37,39,42,61,89,91,97,100,124,127,129-134,138,140-146,198-199,201-210,224-235,239-240,242-248,250,251

Spilimbergo,Enrico(di) 221Spinola,family 2,3,10,13,15-16,24,43-44,

60-61,64n32,65,68,76,83,88-91,155-160,172-174,176,223-227,247,250

Spinola,Agostino 224,226,227Spinola,Antonio 68Spinola,Caroccio 10,13Spinola,Eliano 43Spinola,Ettore 32,158Spinola,Filippo 24Spinola,Francesco 43-44Spinola,Galeotto 32,158Spinola,Gilberto 68Spinola,Giorgio 91Spinola,Giovanni 29Spinola,Giulio 68Spinola,Giulio(infantrycaptain) 134Spinola,Jacopo 13,64n32Spinola,Luca 89-90,174Spinola,Niccolò 90Spinola,Opizzino 10Spinola,Pantaleo 90Spinola,Pietro 171Spinola,Stefano 91,225,227Spinola,Troilo 10,156Spoleto 85-87Stellanello,157

Savorgnan,Francesco 74Savorgnan,Germanico 136-137Savorgnan,Giovanni(d.1509) 221Savorgnan,Giovanni(fl.1549) 75Savorgnan,Girolamo 24,59,136,222Savorgnan,Giulio 136,222-223Savorgnan,Mario 136Savorgnan,Niccolò 74Savorgnan,Nicolò 98,121Savorgnan,Tristano(fl.1420) 5Savorgnan,Tristano(fl.1564) 74,75Savorgnan,Urbano 74Savoy,dukeof 2–see alsoLudovico,

DukeofSavoy;Yolande,Duchess-regentofSavoy

Savoy,duchyof 2,147,155Schinner,Matthias,cardinal 61,212n57Scotti,family 96Scotti,PietroMaria 96-7Segalara 217Sessa 189Sforza,Ascanio,cardinal 103,108-109Sforza,Bona,Duchess-regentofMilan

95,118,170Sforza,Caterina 218n84Sforza,Elisa 118Sforza,Francesco,condottiere,thenDukeof

Milan 1,4-5,13,57,76,89,100,110,114,115,117,118,149-50,156-160,162-163,167,168,173-175,184,187n168

Sforza,FrancescoII,DukeofMilan 127,128,203,210,214

Sforza,GaleazzoMaria,DukeofMilan 13,78,95,102,103,105-107,117-119,150,153,161-163,167,169,173

Sforza,Ludovico,regent,thenDukeofMilan 28-29,62,73,94-96,103,102,108-109,114,118,119,123,125,126,150,164-165,169-170,209,211-213,217

Sforza,Massimiliano,DukeofMilan 96,97,127,141,210,211,214-216

SforzadiSantaFiora,family 5,216SforzadiSantaFiora,Bosio 216SforzadiSantaFiora,Costanza–seeFarnese,

CostanzaSforzadiSantaFiora,Giulia 216SforzadiSantaFiora,Luisa–seePallavicini,

LuisaSforzadiSantaFiora,Sforza 216,217n79

284 Index

Vallisnera,family 45,45n162ValLugano 83-84,165ValNure 97ValTrompia 219Varano 26Varese 35,40-41,82,174Venice,cityof 5,75,100,119,147,222Venice,Republicof,territoryandstate 5,

6,19,25,46-47,56,59,62,69,74-76,80,95,96,98,100,101,104,105,110,112-117,119-121,126-128,135-141,144,146,147,149,156,161,162,164-165,168-171,187n168,198,206,218n91,218-223,235,236,239,241,244,249,251

Venosa 27Ventimiglia 89Ventimiglia,Alfonso 72n18Ventimiglia,Enrico,marchesediGerace

72n18Verona 5,135,165,219Viana,Carlos(de) 183Viano 36Vicenza 5,135,219Vico(di),family 6,77Vicovaro 38,238Vigevano 212Vilamari,Bernat(fl.1450) 82Vilamari,Bernat(fl.1508) 201Virgoletta 77-78Visconti,BiancaMaria 57Visconti,FilippoMaria,DukeofMilan

10,13,55,57,76,83,109,114,152,154-158,161-163,165-167,166-167n79,212

Visconti,GianGaleazzo,DukeofMilan 55,154,165,166

Visconti,GiovanniMaria,DukeofMilan 55,56

Vitelli,Vitellozzo 236-237Viterbo 85,86Voghera 95,211

Wenceslas,HolyRomanEmperor 154,166

Yolande,Duchess-regentofSavoy 160

Zamberlanifaction 98Zibello 80

Stendardo,Pietro 23Sterpo 24,47Stigliano 74Strassoldo,Federico 222Strassoldo,Francesco 47Strozzi,Piero 133,244Strumieri,faction 98SwissinItaly 61,124,127,138,210-214

Tagliacozzo 77,78,101,140,188,240Tassarollo 32,158Tenda,Margherita(di), 160Tenda,Onorato,conte(di) 159Teramo 64Termes,Paul(de) 145Terni 85,86-87Terzi,Ottobuono 55,56,75Theinwald 211n54Tivoli 85Todi 86-87Toledo,FerrandoÁlvarez(de),duquedeAlba,

31,39,133,146,209,234-235Toledo,GarcíaÁlvarez(de) 208Toledo,PedroÁlvarez(de),viceroyofNaples

30,131,208-209,233Torelli,Paolo,contediMontechiarugolo

39Torre,Francesco(della),94Torrechiara 21,26,170n97,215,217Torriglia 32,41Traetto 186,189Tramontano,GianCarlo 48Treschietto, 153Trezzo,Antonio(da) 184-185Trivulzio,Francesca 69,81,243Trivulzio,GianFrancesco 212Trivulzio,GianGiacomo 81,125,211-212,

217,243Trivulzio,Teodoro 215-216

Udine 5,47,59-60,74,75,97-98,221Urbino,dukeof 33,149–see also

Montefeltro,Federico(da)

ValBorbera 10,43,160Valled’Oneglia 43,58ValleImpero 90ValleScrivia 10,23,24,156,160