Lothar Hobelt, Thomas Otte - European Diplomacy and the Habsburg Monarchy

Lothar Hobelt Thomas G. Otte

(Eds.)

Qi Sbmg Qinac rom m ? European Diplomacy and the Habsburg Monarchy

Festschrift fiir Francis Roy Bridge zum 70. Geburtstag

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Contents

E D I T H M O C K

Roy Bridge zum 70. Geburtstag 9

LOTHAR H o BELT & T. G . OTTE

Preface 11

J O H N CHARMLEY

'Unravelling Silk': Princess Lieven, Metternich and Castlereagh 15

DAVID BROWN

Palmerston and Austria 29

ALAN SKED

Austria and the "Galician Massacres" of 1846 49

T. G . OTTE

'Knavery or Folly'?: The British "Official Mind" and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1856-1914 119

H E L M U T RUMPLER

Die Dalmatienreise Kaiser Franz Josephs 1875 im Kontext der politischen Richtungsentscheidungen der Habsburgermonarchie am Vorabend der orientalischen Krise 157

LOTHAR H O B E L T

The Bosnian Crisis Revisited: Why did the Austrian Liberals oppose Andrassy ? 177

ISABEL F. PANTENBURG

Der menschliche Faktor in der Politik am Beispiel der Botschafter-tatigkeit Philipp Eulenburgs 199

H O L G E R AFFLERBACH

Das Wilhelminische Kaiserreich zwischen Nationalstaat und Imperium 223

M A R K CORNWALL

The Habsburg Elite and the Southern Slav Question 1914-1918 ... 239

List of Contributors 271

MARK CORNWALL

The Habsburg Elite and the Southern Slav Question 1914-1918

On 24 July 1914, the day on which the Serbian government in Bel-grade was poring over a rigid ultimatum from Austria-Hungary, the

Hungarian capital was struck by a dramatic thunderstorm. Outside the Budapest parliament, a statue of Gyula Andrassy, one of the architects of the Habsburg monarchy's dualist system, was supposedly seen to tot-ter in the face of the elements. In Vienna, Lajos Thalloczy, responsible for Bosnian affairs in the common finance ministry, noted in his diary that medieval chroniclers usually took such events to be portents of an upheaval, himself implying that a calamity was about to beset the king-dom of Serbia.' Indeed, the Habsburg elite over the previous three weeks had resolved to scotch the Serbian 'nest of vipers' as a means of settling once and for all the monarchy's 'southern Slav question'. If the inclem-ent omens were to be believed, this struggle, which the elite saw as vital for Austria-Hungary's existence, was one that might have a particular resonance for the Magyars, challenging the dualist system upon which Magyar hegemony rested in the empire. On 25 July, as Austria-Hungary duly rejected Serbia's response, Count Istvan Burian coincidentally ap-plied the same metaphor as Thalloczy, noting in his diary that 'across the whole of Europe our steps are rumbling like a storm which truly will decide our destiny'.-

It is a truism for historians that in 1914 Austria-Hungary went to war in order to crush Serbia and, in doing so, aimed also to annihilate Russian influence in the Balkans. The Habsburg elite's decisions in the July crisis have been endlessly examined and dissected.^ Similarly for the war itself,

1 Ferdinand H a u p t m a n n and Anton Prasch (eds), Dr Ludwig Thalloczy - Tage-bucher, 23. VI. 1914-31. XII. 1914 (Graz, 1981) ,p .56 ,

2 Bard Buridn Istvdn naploi 1907-1922 [hereafter Buridn naploi], (Budapest, 1 9 9 9 ) , p . l 0 9 : 25 July 1914.

3 Over the past twenty years, see especially John Leslie, 'The Antecedents of Aus-tr ia-Hungary's War Aims. Policies and Policy-Makers in Vienna and Budapest before and during 1914 ' , in Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer (eds), Archiv und

240 A Living Anachronism ?

Roy Bridge and others have illuminated how the elite's initially limited objectives in the Balkans multiplied as the European war snowballed, and how for the monarchy its most fatal entanglement quickly became its alliance with the German Reich/ Amid these studies, due attention has been paid to Austria-Hungary's wartime Balkan mission, particularly with regard to the military conquest and occupation of Serbia/ Andrej Mitrovic for instance, in the spirit of the Habsburg elite's obsession in July 1914, focused on Serbia in his authoritative framework for explain-ing Habsburg (and German) imperialism in the peninsula/ Generally, the external or irredentist dimensions of the monarchy's south Slav problem have been to the fore, largely in keeping with the mindset of the Ballhaus-platz and the Austrian High Command.

Far less frequently have historians probed what the southern Slav ques-tion meant as a whole, in its domestic as well as its foreign or irredentist manifestations, for the Habsburg wartime leadership. In the later years of Yugoslav historiography, some fine works appeared from a Slovene and Bosnian perspective which incorporated the elite viewpoint to a degree; and the Croatian historian Dragovan Sepic produced perhaps the best archive-based synthesis of how the Yugoslav idea evolved in the shifting political and diplomatic frameworks of the war.' Rarely however has the

Forschung. Das Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung fUr Geschichte Osterreichs und Europas (Vienna and Munich, 1993), pp. 307-94; F.R. Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815-1918 (New York and Oxford, 1990), pp. 335-44; Samuel R. WilHamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (Basingstoke, 1991), pp. 190-216; and most recently, Williamson, 'Aggressive and Defensive Aims of Political Elites? Austro-Hungarian Policy in 1914', in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (eds), An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914 (New York and Oxford, 2007), pp. 61-74.

4 Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy, pp. 345-70; Manfried Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers: Osterreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg (Graz, 1993).

5 See most recently, Jonathan Gumz, The Resurrection and Collapse of Empire in Habsburg Serbia, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, 2009), which however appeared too late for me to consult.

6 Andrej Mitrovic, Prodor na Balkan i Srbija 1908-1918 (Belgrade, 1981). See also Mitrovic, 'Die Balkanplane der Ballhausplatz-Biirokratie im Ersten Weltkriege 1914-1918' , in F. Glatz and R. Melville (eds), Gesellschaft, Politik und Verwaltung in der Habsburgermonarchie 1830-1918 (Stuttgart, 1987); and Helmut Rumpler, 'Die Kriegsziele Osterreich-Ungarns auf dem Balkan 1915/16', in Osterreich und Europa. Festgabe fur Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag (Graz, Vienna and Cologne, 1965).

7 Dragovan Sepic, Italija, Saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje 1914-1918 (Zagreb, 1970). For the Slovenes: Janko Pleterski, Prvo opredeljenje Slovenaca za Jugosalviju

T H E HABSBURG ELITE AND THE SOUTHERN SLAV QUESTION 2 4 1

Habsburg elite's stance on how to resolve the question in the monar-chy been explored holistically, illustrating not just the leaders' competing views over the fate of Serbia, but also uncovering their range of schemes for restructuring Austria-Hungary's south Slav territories. In the early years of the war most of these plans gained a hearing because of the em-pire's periodic military successes on the Balkan and eastern fronts, and were largely conceived as ways of completely eliminating any notion of south Slav unification. But in 1917-18, as the Yugoslav idea was able to manifest itself more strongly at home, some of the elite reacted in tandem and viewed domestic south Slav unity as a way forward for the monarchy to master the situation pro-actively at the eleventh hour.

Whereas in July 1914 this was a question exercising a small Habsburg elite in Vienna, by 1918 those contributing to the debate not only includ-ed regional experts in Bosnia or Montenegro, but also a new elite: par-ticularly those Slovene or Croat leaders who from the summer of 1917 were re-establishing influence over their popular constituencies and pro-posing their own agendas for a south Slav solution. In the face of domes-tic and foreign developments, some among the Habsburg leadership saw the need to swim with the tide rather than be stranded on a stony beach. For many, however, the underlying mindset as exposed in July 1914 had not really changed (even if many of the key players had). Just as in July 1914 the elite was unanimous that the south Slav problem must be finally settled, so in October 1918 the consensus was that it remained the 'most burning question' affecting the existence of the monarchy.^ The following discussion aims with fresh evidence to shed new light on the road that the elite travelled over these four years, when different priorities tended to hamper a common engagement with the question. It highlights the potential opportunities for (and obstacles to) a Yugoslav solution within the Habsburg monarchy, and also seeks to explain why in 1918 it was

(Belgrade, 1976). For Bosnia: Hamdija Kapidzic, Bosna i Hercegovina pod austro-ugarskom upravom (Sarajevo, 1962). For Croatia, the focus is narrower (mainly on Croatian Sabor wartime debates) in Bogdan Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svjetskoni ratu. Hrvatsko-srpski politicki odnosi (Zagreb, 1989).

8 See for example, Arthur Baron Arz, Kampf und Sturz der Kaiserreiche (Vienna and Leipzig, 1935), p.108; and the discussions on this subject in the common ministe-rial council in October 1918: minutes reproduced in Mark Cornwall (ed.), The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. A Multi-National Experiment in Early Tiventieth-Ce7itury Europe (Exeter, 2002), pp. 198, 203.


the 'new eUte' who eclipsed the old in taking control of the south Slav agenda.

5;- i'r

In the July crisis of 1914, the decision-makers in Vienna all agreed that the chief way to cure the south Slav cancer was to humiliate Serbia. Most of the discussions were about the tactics for achieving this, militarily and diplomatically, and resulted in the ultimatum of 23 July. It was also agreed early on that the crisis in the aftermath of the Sarajevo murders could not be settled simply by energetic domestic action. For instance, at the common ministerial council of 7 July, the Austrian prime mini-ster, count Karl Stiirgkh, noted that the issue of confronting Serbia had eclipsed any Habsburg measures in Bosnia; he echoed the alarmist view of Bosnia's governor-general, Oskar Potiorek, that the monarchy might not be able to hold Bosnia if it did not attack and crush Serbia.' The ex-ternal threat was viewed as preeminent. However, from this perception, as Helmut Rumpler has emphasized, it is not possible to disentangle the domestic political roots and expected repercussions of Habsburg foreign policy: an underlying Primat der Innenpolitik in the case of the south Slav question.'" Although the elite was focusing on Serbia, there were many underlying assumptions, usually unspoken or implied because of recent experiences, about how a settlement with Serbia would produce a settle-ment within the empire's borders. A few of those present, for instance the war minister Alexander Krobatin, stressed openly that by not attacking Serbia the monarchy would be displaying weakness in its own south Slav provinces; privately he warned the Hungarian prime minister, count Ist-van Tisza, about greater Serbian agitation in Croatia and beyond." One of the major results therefore expected from the local war with Serbia

9 Mikos Komjathy (ed.), Protokolle des gemeinsamen Ministerrates der oster-reichisch-ungarischen Monarchie (1914-1918) [hereafter Protokolle], (Budapest, 1966), p.144. Stiirgkh made a similar argument to the Austrian cabinet on 9 July: Leshe, 'Antecedents', p. 356.

10 Helmut Rumpler, 'Die rechtlich-organisatorischen und sozialen Rahmenbe-dingungen fiir die Aussenpolitik der Habburgermonarchie 1848-1918 ' , in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (eds), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, Band VI/1: Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der internationalen Beziehungen, 1. Teilband (Vienna, 1989), p.120.

11 Carvel de Bussy (ed.), Count Stephen Tisza, Prime Minister of Hungary. Letters 1914-1916 (New York and Bern, 1991), pp .8-9 (Krobatin to Tisza, 14 July 1914); Protokolle, p. 146.

T H E HABSBURG ELITE AND THE SOUTHERN SLAV Q U E S T I O N 2 4 3

was that the south Slav problem at home would not just be stabihzed but would disappear altogether.

In July 1914 the underlying agendas and concerns about the future domestic solution, even if not fully thought through, came to the sur-face particularly as the leadership squabbled over whether Serbia should be annexed after victory. Two main stances were evident, both with a long pedigree from the previous Balkan crises, and both revolving around the thorny issue of the monarchy's dualist system. On the one hand, as represented most forcefully by Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, the army chief of staff, there was the desire to annex Serbia to the monarchy in some form, completely destroying its independence and its ability to act as a 'Yugoslav Piedmont' in the future. When Conrad had mooted this in 1907, it was part of a south Slav solution he had long considered in favour of Croatia (perhaps since 1878 when he had warmed to the Croat bishop Josip Strossmayer's antipathy for Hungary). Namely, the mon-archy ought to be restructured as a trialist empire, its third state based in the south around Croatia, Bosnia and the core of annexed Serbia. In the years after the annexation of Bosnia in 1908, Conrad seems to have abandoned trialism as the region looked so unstable, but in the crises of 1913-14 his obsession with seizing large parts of Serbia had returned.'^ The underlying implication was still that some restructuring in the south would eventually ensue, not only scotching the Serbian snake but weak-ening Magyar hegemony by the abandonment of dualism. As we will see, Conrad would consistently maintain this stance in the war years.

Its main opponents were the 'imperial Magyars' - Tisza and his min-ister in Vienna, Istvan Burian - who viewed the world through both an imperial and Magyar dualist lens. This obsession too would be taken into the war. In 1907, as common finance minister (responsible for Bosnia), Burian had set out for the emperor a scheme for calming the south Slav question while retaining dualism. He proposed that, in tune with Croatian state right and as set out in the Hungarian-Croatian settlement of 1868, Dalmatia should be added to Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina also

12 I would give this more emphasis than either Roy Bridge {The Habsburg Mo-narchy, pp. 337-8) or Samuel Williamson ('Aggressive and Defensive Aims', p. 69).

13 Leslie, 'Antecedents', pp. 311-18 . See also, for Conrad's earlier pro-Croatian views: Lawrence Sondhaus, Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf. Architect of the Apocalyp-se (Boston, Leiden and Cologne, 2000), pp. 19, 24, 62. Conrad, fluent in Serbo-Croat by 1881, had told Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1901 that he urgently favoured resol-ving the south Slav question by trialism 'in favour of the Croatians'.


loosely attached in a sub-dualist structure under Hungary's control; Ser-bia could be given to Bulgaria but not annexed to the monarchy. A few years later, after the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9, Burian continued to urge a form of this solution in order to settle Bosnia's unresolved constitutional status within the dualist system. Certainly, one point where Burian was ready to convince a sceptical Tisza was on the matter of incorporating more Slavs into Hungary. This might occur through the existing sub-dualist framework, but the evidence suggests that Burian envisaged the pieces of the south Slav jigsaw remaining separated, as autonomous satel-lites that would circle round the 'Hungarian empire' (with Serbia apart, isolated or dissected).''*

This conservative programme of the Magyar leaders, with its dualist obsession, was evident in the July crisis even if one often has to read be-tween the lines. Already in early July, Burian felt that the crisis offered an opportunity to resolve Bosnia's status through annexation by Hungary, but he himself also veered in a harsher direction over Serbia, euphemis-tically telling Thalloczy that he favoured tying the Serb hands so tight that they would remain quiet for a long time." Tisza, as is well known, favoured a less belligerent course towards Belgrade. A number of argu-ments would win him over to the majority view of an uncompromising ultimatum. If perhaps he chiefly needed reassurance about the danger to Hungary from Romania, he was also constantly perturbed in July by a war that could result in an annexation of Serbian territory. True, this was partly due to fears that Russia would then remain eternally intransigent, but there was also his consistent view that Hungarian interests could be seriously threatened in the context of some south Slav 'solution'. Thus he exploded on 7 July when he learnt that count Hoyos had suggested in Berlin that the monarchy might annex Serbia. The same day, the common ministerial council was a rancorous affair, and not just because count

14 Leslie, 'Antecedents', pp. 326-37. See also for Burian's Hungarian imperialist approach to the Balkans, Robin Okey, 'A Trio of Hungarian Balkanists: Beni Kallay, Istvan Burian and Lajos Thalloczy in the Age of High Nationalism', Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 80/2 (2002), pp. 249-56 ; and Okey, Taming Balkan Na-tionalism. The Habsburg 'Civilizing Mission' in Bosnia, 1878-1914 (Oxford, 2007), chapters 8-9 .

15 Buridn naploi, 1 and 7 July 1914, pp. 106-7; Thalloczy Tagebticher, p. 37 (7 July 1914).


Berchtold, the foreign minister, gave his guests so little to eat/* A key point of friction was Tisza's insistence that the monarchy must not be planning to annex swathes of Serbian territory. He received this assur-ance from the council, then secured it also from emperor Franz Joseph via Burian, but once again he returned to insist on it vigorously at the council meeting on 19 July."

The underlying premise was that dualist Hungary would be under threat if the monarchy incorporated Serbia. The most Tisza would agree was that some Hungarian-Serbian border rectifications might occur after victory and that Serbia could be temporarily occupied.'® The force of his insistence on this point, though rarely emphasized by historians, is strik-ing evidence of his fears for Hungary in some future south Slav solution; the unspoken paranoia was about a trialist experiment as already floated for years by Conrad and other 'Great Austrians'. Tisza might feel that his dramatic performance in July had permanently undercut that possibility. In fact, the qualifications agreed on 19 July about border changes were a loop-hole that Conrad and others could later exploit. And since Burian, the future foreign minister, was also less fearful than Tisza about some loose south Slav jigsaw, there remained a good chance that in the turmoil of hostilities Tisza's rigid position might be softened.

Indeed, very early in the conflict the potential for some radical restruc-turing of the monarchy arose. It was immediately apparent that, while the elite in the hothouse July atmosphere had focused on Serbia and Bosnia, the fluidity of war would offer many chances to alter the status quo on a grander scale. The labyrinth complexity of this was clear when, in early August, Stiirgkh and Berchtold floated the idea of uniting Russian Poland to western Galicia in a new PoUsh conglomerate that could be attached to Austria (an Austro-PoUsh solution). Burian endorsed this scheme of 'enlarged dualism' only if there was 'complete parity' for Hungary in the southern Slav sphere, namely through his plan of formally attaching Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia to the crown of St Stephen. Tisza was even more insistent on maintaining both dualism and parity for Hungary, but as usual was more cautious than his fellow Magyar in regulating

16 Thalldczy Tagebucher, p .35 (report to Thalloczy by Biliriski); and Buridn nap-loi, p. 106 (7 July) noting that Tisza had poured cold water on Hoyos's suggestion 'and brought it back to reality'.

17 Buridn naploi, 12 July; the emperor's assurance; Protokolle, pp. 143, 146, 1 5 3 ^ .

18 See Mitrovic, Prodor na Balkan, pp. 192-6.


the south Slav problem, warning Burian that including Dalmatia could be unwise; 'I believe that Croatia, Slavonia and Bosnia will give us quite enough to digest'."

If Tisza here, under Burian's influence, was already acknowledging a south Slav domestic settlement largely under Budapest's auspices, others with a voice on the subject were beginning to set out alternative pro-grammes. Most notable was the emerging scheme endorsed by Berchtold, Potiorek and Thalloczy (the latter a 'Magyar imperialist' but one opposed to Hungary swallowing the 'devil's child', Bosnia), that advocated divid-ing Bosnia-Herzegovina equally between Austria and Hungary.^" All these plans remained academic and had died down by September as the mili-tary events took centre stage on the eastern and southern fronts. How-ever, they already highlighted key sticking points caused by dualism and the Hungarian-imperial relationship. These would re-emerge periodically, albeit assumed by new voices with their own perspectives and prejudices on how to settle the southern provinces.

As winter approached and Potiorek's army pushed forward trium-phantly into Serbia, it appeared suddenly that the war was won and that it was time to finaUze the plans already sketched out for a south Slav set-tlement. On 14 November, Thalloczy noted in his diary that Serbia could become not the Piedmont but the (benign) Belgium of the Balkans.^' In the Ballhausplatz, conscious that a victory would deter Romania from at-tacking, but that territorial gains in the Balkans would be grist to the mill of Italy demanding compensation from the monarchy, Berchtold's offi-cials proceeded to draw up both moderate and radical solutions for deal-ing with Serbia. Admittedly, this reflected the elite's conflicting stances in July. Thus, if some memoranda emphasized simple border rectifications to ensure security, others were expansionist, pushing for the empire to annex western Serbia and attach it to Hungary together with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmat ia .Whi le Potiorek's soldiers began to set the

19 Buridn naploi, 7 August 1914, p. 117; Leslie, 'Antecedents', pp. 347, 358-9; De Bussy, Tisza, pp. 18-21.

20 Ferdinand Hauptmann, 'Kombinacije oko drzavnopravnog polozaja Bosne i Hercegovine na pocetku prvog svjetskog rata ' , Godisnjak druhva istorijskog Bosne i Hercegovine, XI (1961), pp. 94ff; Thalloczy Tagebiicher, 6 and 7 August 1914.

21 Ibid., 14 November, p. 294. 22 Mitrovic, Prodor na Balkan, pp. 208-12 . All these memoranda still advocated

leaving a ' rump Serbia' although it would be a completely satellite state (most notably in the radical agenda set out by Leopold von Andrian-Werburg, dated 6 December).


pace for political decisions, Tisza's views were crucial; how far he was biddable was the issue. Particularly, he protested on learning that Poti-orek in setting up a regime in occupied Serbia planned to source officials from Hungary, Austria and Bosnia; in the employment of Bosnian offi-cials he smelt a whiff of'trialism', insisting therefore that only Hungarian or Croatian administrators should be used.^^ This of course would be a check on any military machinations to annex Serbia in the long run. Yet on the latter question there had perhaps been a small if temporary shift in Tisza's thinking. The suspicion of Berchtold and others that the Hungarian premier's stance might soften when faced with realities was justified. For when Thalloczy met him on 9 December in Budapest, Tisza agreed that Hungary might annex not just a few slivers or bridgeheads of Serbian territory, but the city of Belgrade and the economically rich Negotin district to the east, thereby ensuring full control of the Danube and a strategic link to Bulgaria.^'*

In the euphoria of early December, the fate of Bosnia also seemed on the cards, producing ever more imaginative solutions but usually within the dualist framework and conceived separately from Serbia. Above all, Potiorek, supported among others by Berchtold and Thalloczy, pressed for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Austria and Hungary. Not only did brutal experiences convince Potiorek that this was the only means of mastering a province which, he felt, would require firm con-trol for fifty years.^ It was also a way to balance the demands of both Hungary and Austria (seemingly ignoring any benefits to the latter from a future Austro-Polish solution). Thalloczy in the common finance min-istry was ready in December to tear himself away from his historical studies and map out a Bosnian solution for the Ballhausplatz. Yet his talks with interested parties showed once again that, although even Franz

23 Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna [HHStA], P.A. 1/ 973,Tisza to Berchtold, 2 December 1914. Tisza also justified this as a quid pro quo for Austria sourcing the officials in occupied Poland, but Stiirgkh refused to agree. See also Thalloczy Tagebu-cher, 7 December, p. 331.

24 Ibid., 9 December 1914, p.334. Admittedly, these gains had been suggested also in August in a Ballhausplatz memorandum by the Magyar count Markus Wicken-burg (Leslie, 'Antecedents', pp. 344-5) . By October, Tisza was already tending in this direction: see Jozsef Galantai, 'Tisza und die siidslawische Frage wahrend des Ersten Weltkrieges', Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis, section historica, 21 (1981), p. 249. I am most grateful to Martyn Rady for securing this article for me.

25 Thalloczy Tagebucher, 12 December 1914, pp. 338-9.


Joseph had been told of the scheme, Hungarian sensitivities would prob-ably scupper or at least substantially delay its implementation. Burian for one told Thalloczy that he firmly opposed it, wanting all of Bosnia for Hungary, and that if Austria made a fuss it would come to a 'show-down over power' in the monarchy. Alongside this 'Magyar imperialist' stance, Tisza too showed his priorities but a seeming flexibility. He stressed to Thalloczy that he would first demand all of Bosnia but perhaps in the end concede a dualist division, making sure that the Hungarian half was colo-nized with Magyar settlers.^' This frenetic scheming in December came to nought of course because of the successful Serbian counter-offensive (including the re-conquest of Belgrade). Amidst the catastrophic disaster, as Potiorek was dismissed in disgrace, it was clear that any thought of re-structuring in the south was on hold. At most, the Ballhausplatz officials moved to strengthen their future plans for a real obliteration of Serbia with major annexation of territory." As in July 1914 the implication was that this would go a long way to eliminating any south Slav agitation in the monarchy.

Early in 1915, Thalloczy warned Tisza presciently that in solving the south Slav problem the decision-makers in the future would not just be Vienna and Budapest but a third party: the military.^® Developments later in 1915, as the war deepened, would prove this correct. But Thalloczy typically ignored or refused to admit a fourth element: namely, those Croat or Serb political leaders across the region who, after months of ostensibly obeying the patriotic crusade, would begin from mid-1915 to sound a note of discord. For most of the Habsburg elite in the first half of 1915 the south Slav issue was eclipsed by more pressing anxieties over Italy and Romania and fluctuating fortunes on the eastern front. How-ever, a new leadership for Bosnia served to re-focus attention on that province's perpetual danger. As the new military governor to replace Poti-orek, General Stjepan Sarkotic was shocked to learn in January that Tisza preferred to settle any 'domestic difficulties' after the war. He himself believed in a strong but calculated strategy to undermine the Yugoslav

26 Ibid., 6 and 9 December 1914. A madder and broader version of this scheme, one supposedly backed by Berchtold and Krobatin, was that Croatia should be assi-gned to Austria and Slavonia to Hungary (ibid., p. 340).

27 For the more radical Ballhausplatz approach: Mitrovic, Prodor na Balkan, pp. 221-5 .

28 Luka Djakovic, Polozaj Bosne i Hercegovine u austro-ugarskim koncepcija-ma rjesenja jugoslovenskog pitanja (Tuzla, 1980), p. 29.


illusion. This meant not just prohibiting any politics in Bosnia (the Sara-jevo diet was dissolved), but targeting the Serb population as disloyal, and actively curbing any Serb-Croat links whether in Bosnia or between Bosnia and Croatia.-'

To some extent this was a 'Croatian imperial' agenda to set alongside that of Magyar imperialists like Burian, for in April 1915 Sarkotic too suggested that Bosnia might be united with Croatia and attached to Hun-gary.^" At the same time he was expressing a radical military challenge (on the lines of Conrad or Potiorek) to supposed 'laxity' from the politicians, condemning particularly the Hungarian tendency to patronise the coali-tion of Croat-Serb parties in Zagreb and ignore what Sarkotic saw as the ubiquitous Serb menace. Although the new common finance minister, Ernst von Koerber, was ready to agree with Sarkotic that Bosnia required special attention as 'the most neuralgic and sensitive point' in the whole south Slav complex, Tisza on 20 April reacted waspishly to Sarkotic's critique. His own preferred tactic, with an eye on supposedly 'loyal Serbs' like Dusan Popovic in Zagreb, was to cultivate patriotic elements and to dissipate any broader Serb unity by a subtle variety of approaches in the different south Slav regions; a 'real politician', he observed sarcastically, would understand the necessity of this. Concerning Bosnia, he would only concede on 16 May that it required strict (but impartial) govern-ance, and implied that it would then be allotted to Hungary either after the war or 'in the near future'.^' It was a patronising rebuff that Sarkotic would not accept. He proceeded to go his own way in order to correct the mistakes that he felt the monarchy had made in Bosnia; he duly targeted the Serb population, culminating in early 1916 in the Banja Luka trial of 150 Serb suspects.

Tisza's own strategy for settling the south Slav question became sharp-er in the summer of 1915 owing to two developments: first, political noise from Croatia, and second, the resurrection of the Austro-Polish solution. Both together explain his behaviour that autumn. In February 1915, Tisza had spoken with Franz Joseph about disturbing conditions in Croatia, emphasizing that a new patriotic poHtical party was needed

29 Signe Klein, Freiherr Sarkotic von Lovcen. Die Zeit seiner Verwaltung in Bosnien-Herzegovina von 1914 bis 1918 (PhD, Vienna, 1969), pp. 36-9; Djakovic, Polozaj Bosne i Hercegovine, pp. 30-7 .

30 Kapidzic, Bosna i Hercegovina pod austro-ugarskom upravom, pp. 209-10 . Kapidzic incorrectly suggests that Sarkotic thereby favoured triahsm.

31 Djakovic, Folozaj, pp. 40 -2 , 47-54 .


there, one that would eHminate any great Serbian agitation and work loyally with Hungary on the basis of the 1868 Nagodba. These, Burian noted later, were 'golden words' but were not followed up with any con-crete p roposa l s . In June, it is true, Budapest allowed the Croatian Sabor or diet to reassemble in Zagreb to discuss the Croatian budget. The depu-ties however proceeded to proclaim their wish for Croatian lands (Dal-matia and Bosnia) to be united in a separate unit within the monarchy, ef-fectively thereby announcing their own Croatian 'war aim'. Perceptively, Thalloczy warned Tisza that the Croatian political climate was 'akin to ashes covering live coals which even a gentle breeze can inflame'."

Some historians have suggested that Tisza's stance over Croatia was blinkered, based on ignorance and wishful thinking that all was well.''' He perpetually rejected any discussions with the Croat nationalists (the Party of Right), driving them into the arms of 'Great Austrians' in Vienna, and gave too much credence to the Serb-dominated Croat-Serb coalition. There is some truth in this, even if Tisza's prejudices were justified in view of the course of Croatian politics since 1903. Where commentators have erred, however, is in claiming that Tisza had no real 'political concept' for facilitating south Slav unity within Hungary.^^ His moves in the autumn show that he did, even if it was naturally a 'Magyar imperial' agenda rather than one sanctioning 'Croatian imperialism' or the dreaded trial-ism. The major mistake was not to follow the programme through at an opportune time. Thus in mid-1916 in the Sabor, a loyalist like Dusan Popovic could publicly express his frustration that Hungary was not ac-tively moving to shape a solution of the 'Croatian-Yugoslav problem'.'®

In fact, Tisza's calculated response to the Sabor statements of June 1915 had offered a way forward. On 3 September, there took place in Vienna an official celebration of the emperor-king and the dualist sys-tem with Tisza leading the Hungarian deputation. At a luncheon in the Konzerthaus, in the presence of Stiirgkh and the Croatian governor {ban)

32 Count Burian, Austria in Dissolution (London, 1925), p. 257. 33 Djakovic, Polozaj, p. 27 note 62 (letter of 9 November 1915). 34 Gabor Vermes, Istvdn Tisza. The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of

a Magyar Nationalist (New York, 1985), pp. 314-15. Burian himself wrote later that Budapest was 'exceedingly ill-informed on Croatian affairs'; Austria in Dissolution, p. 258.

35 Gusztav Gratz, A dualismus kora. Magyarorszdg tortenete 1867-1918, vol. 2 (Budapest, 1934), p.326.

36 Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svjestkom ratu, p. 99.


count Skerlecz, Tisza used the occasion to heap praise on the Hungar-ian-Croatian relationship, claiming that in the war, standing shoulder to shoulder, Croatia's patriotic elements had risen up against pointless nationalist rhetoric. The only way for Croatia-Slavonia to realize its na-tional development, he said, was on the basis of 'historic right' and in league with fraternal Hungary; the war had demonstrated only too well the sorry outcome of'great south Slav slogans'. Amidst these sentiments, which Skerlecz echoed, there were signs that Tisza was moving to pre-empt the Croat nationalists/trialists with a Hungarian solution grounded in historic-legal arguments." A month later, he confidently explained his plans to the Hungarian cabinet. It seemed an opportune moment. Not only, with Bulgaria entering the war, were the Central Powers about to launch a new common offensive against Serbia; on the eastern front, Rus-sia had been pushed right back, producing fresh calls for the final settle-ment of Poland in an 'Austro-Polish solution'.

The combined impact on Tisza of the Polish and Croatian questions is clear. On 2 October 1915 he set out for the cabinet his programme for incorporating both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia into Hungary. Unusually and perceptively (in view of the final radical outcome of the Yugoslav question), he stressed that it must be carried out during the flux of hostilities rather than fought over acrimoniously in peacetime. On the one hand, the renewed plan to incorporate Poland into Austria enabled Hungary to seek compensation in Bosnia; it thereby settled the limbo-status of that 'Reichsland' which would be attached to the king-dom of St Stephen but ruled firmly for a long period. On the other hand, acknowledging the voices from the Sabor, Tisza pressed for Hungary to make good its historic right to Dalmatia, since any delay could send the wrong message to loyalists in Zagreb. That crownland would gradually be incorporated into Croatia, dulling the latter's national-political ambi-tions while bringing economic and maritime advantages to Hungary. The whole programme, needless to say, would preserve the monarchy's dual-ist system and also deal at a stroke with the south Slav question (even if, as Skerlecz pointed out, Serbia was yet to be conquered). Tisza, who had been mulling it over for months, could be satisfied that his cabinet

37 Djakovic, Polozaj, pp .58-9 note 143.


unanimously supported him in taking the plan forward to discuss with the monarchy's leadership in Vienna.'®

It was at this point, four days later, that the programme hit a sand bun-ker. The common ministerial council of 6 October was convened princi-pally to discuss Poland's future and guide Burian, the foreign minister, in his imminent negotiations with Germany." Interestingly, Burian admit-ted that all must now acknowledge Polish national consciousness and give the Poles some kind of 'national fulfilment' (a view the elite would cautiously echo only in 1918 for the south Slavs). In the face of an Aus-tro-Polish solution, as presented by Burian and Stiirgkh, Tisza abruptly revealed his plans for Hungary annexing both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia. The case for Dalmatia he justified not only in terms of dualist parity, but on historic-legal, economic and national-political grounds; for if the opportunity was allowed to sHp, 'it would produce great unrest [in Croatia] and disagreeably affect the whole south Slav question' both for Austria and Hungary.'*" Tisza's proposal was a shock to Stiirgkh who de-clared himself 'most unpleasantly surprised' by Hungary's sudden claim to Dalmatia. In reply, Tisza stressed that Hungary in this way would be doing Austria a service by 'taking on its shoulders the greatest part of the burden of the south Slav question'."'

This rather spiky exchange highlighted once again the major barriers to restructuring dualism. More surprising perhaps is Tisza's growing con-viction that a bold stroke in the south would eventually be necessary. Yet the conclusions reached at the meeting show that Tisza too was prepared to hold off for the moment. While the issue of Dalmatia clearly required more work by Budapest, the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina was principally being raised because of the Austro-Polish solution.'*^ Since the latter was viewed warily even by Stiirgkh and was also dependent on Germany's agreement (which proved never to be forthcoming), the chances of move-

38 Ibid., pp. 59-74; Vermes, Istvdn Tisza,'pp. 317-18 . Djakovic devotes (pp. 76 ff) much attention to the economic repercussions of this programme in terms of increa-sed Magyar interest in exploiting Bosnia's resources.

39 Protokolle, pp. 290ff. See also for the following discussion: Bridge, The Habs-burg Monarchy, pp.353-5; and Helmut Rumpler, 'Die Kriegsziele Osterreich-Ungarns auf dem Balkan 1915/16', in Osterreich und Europa. Festgabe fiir Hugo Hantscb zum 70. Geburlstag (Graz, Vienna and Colgne, 1965).

40 Protokolle, p. 301. 41 Ibid., p. 308. 42 Burian noted this, although he viewed Tisza's argument as 'sensible': Buridn

naploi, 6 October 1915, p.158.


merit on Bosnia's status were minimal in late 1915. Indeed, Tisza himself was ready to postpone discussion of his south Slav programme to a later council meeting and Burian, preoccupied with Poland, readily agreed.

Such a meeting never took place, at least in the framework suggested."*^ One reason was that, having been put on the common agenda indirectly because of the Austro-Polish question, the matter was then raised directly and in a different form because of the Central Powers' new military of-fensive against Serbia and Montenegro. As a year previously, the real pos-sibility of victory in the Balkans opened up the question of Serbia's fate and therefore the broader issue of a south Slav settlement. The debate over Serbia had been simmering since the spring of 1915 as Berlin and Vienna sought to entice Balkan allies to their side. Regularly, Germany's interests had set the pace on questions such as the territory Serbia might have to concede to Bulgaria; whether Serbia would be allowed access to the sea through north Albania; or even whether the monarchy might need to surrender part of southern Bosnia to its traditional enemy in order to make peace in the region.'^

What remained clear throughout were the opposing stances of Conrad and Tisza. The latter insisted on reducing Serbia to a satellite state, but solving the rest of the south Slav question separately in a Hungarian framework. Conrad in contrast was adamant that Serbia be incorporated into the empire, either completely, or federally like Bavaria's position in the German Reich. It meant subverting the dualist mantra in order to im-pose trialism. As he had noted on 31 May, T have always emphasized that solving the south Slav question is the monarchy's most important prob-lem and stressed that Yugoslav unification is an unavoidable fact that will occur either inside the monarchy or outside it to its detriment'. Although between these two pillars Burian ostensibly inclined towards Tisza, the pressure from the Habsburg military and Germany gradually pushed him in a more radical annexationist direction. Perhaps particularly influential was the German emperor's triumphant visit to Vienna in late November 1915 and his call for Serbia's extermination. As Burian noted drily, 'The

43 In the common ministerial council of 12 December, Tisza briefly alluded to it but Stiirgkh was absent f rom the meeting so there could be no discussion: Protokolle, p. 338.

44 Mitrovic, Prodor na Balkan, pp. 240-3 .


words of Kaiser Wilhelm were just like the fireworks - exploded bril-liantly, but little remains'."'

It was particularly in the wake of this that the Conrad-Tisza clash came to a head as the two powerful characters tried to assert their views in Vienna. All the elite were agreed that Serbia, as the key 'nest' of south Slav agitation, should be made harmless for ever; the disagreement, just as in July 1914, was how best to achieve this in order to settle the broader south Slav idea. Tisza fully realized the enormity of the problem, writing urgently to Franz Joseph on 3 December that 'the task is very heavy and must fill all statesmen responsible for the fate of their fatherland with serious anxieties'. His modest solution now was that Hungary should an-nex only a corner of north-west Serbia (including Belgrade), colonizing it with Magyars and Germans as a wedge between Hungary's Serb popula-tion and what would remain of Serbia to the south."® While he also drew on the argument (now dear to Burian) that the monarchy must not preju-dice the chances of European peace by publicly announcing Serbia's com-plete destruction, Tisza was still primarily motivated by Hungary's 'vital interests'. He argued that incorporating the remains of Serbia into the monarchy (therefore into greater Hungary) would not staunch the poi-sonous Serb agitation but simply bring it closer to home."' It could also destabilize Hungary's relationship with sub-dualist Croatia, for implicitly there was likely to be a swamping of Croatia with a mass of new and hos-tile Serbs (not to mention the complication of eventually incorporating Serbs and Croats from Bosnia as well). Here, Tisza naturally had his re-cent programme for Bosnia and Croatia in mind when he concluded that while Serbia and Montenegro would be kept detached, Hungary would work to influence the monarchy's Serbs in a patriotic direction. Tisza thus felt that maintaining the region in splinters was crucial to prevent any chance of south Slav unity in the future. His concern about the pos-sible impact on Croatia was especially significant, highlighted once again

45 Buridn napldi, 29 November, p. 162. See also Mitrovic, Prodor, pp. 299, 303—4. In his memoirs Burian blandly suggests full agreement with Tisza over the annexation issue: Austria in Dissolution, p. 260.

46 Grof Tisza Istvdn osszes munkdi [hereafter Tisza munkdi], vol. 4 (Budapest, 1927), pp. 296-301. (A shortened and bad English translation is in De Bussy, Tisza, pp. 168-75).

47 For the following, see Tisza to Burian, 30 December 1915, in Tisza munkdi, IV, pp. 336-45; and in HHStA, P. A. 1/499.

T H E HABSBURG ELITE AND THE SOUTHERN SLAV Q U E S T I O N 255

at New Year when he stressed pubUcly the supposed harmony between Budapest and Zagreb.

Conrad meanwhile, in the wake of the Kaiser's visit, had been bom-barding Burian with a series of memoranda wholly at variance with Tis-za's arguments. On 1 December he had told Franz Joseph and the foreign minister that western Serbia and Montenegro must be fully incorporated into the monarchy and the southern border reorganized as a new 'mili-tary frontier'.'*^ There was no alternative to wiping Serbia off the map. In his fatalistic scenario, which more than matched anything envisaged by Tisza, Conrad repeatedly wrote to Burian that the only way to end the south Slav question was to destroy the real source; if Serbia remained in any form, its 'great Serb agitation' would continue, enticing the monar-chy's south Slavs and making the sacrifice of the war completely point-less. Understated, but quite clear in Conrad's argument, was his underly-ing opposition to the duahst system and his overall view of the Yugoslav idea. On 31 December he prophesied to Burian that southern Slav unity was only a matter of time and therefore the monarchy must take con-trol: 'I can only repeat myself. If we don't carry out this unification now, radically and without delay, it will take place inevitably against us with the loss of all our south Slav territory and notwithstanding Magyar he-gemony'. This sentiment was of course toned down in a letter to Tisza on 4 January where he tried to counter some of the latter's claims that annexing Serbia would endanger Croatia or block the chances of peace with the Entente.'*'

Burian, noting that the two sides were 'diametrically opposed', called a meeting of the common ministerial council to settle the matter. He him-self had sensed a possible compromise, favouring the full destruction of Serbia but naturally committed to a settlement on Hungary's terms within the dualist structure.^" Above all, however, the decision (or lack of decision) taken on 7 January 1916 set the subject in aspic for a consider-able time.^' Although at the start of the meeting Burian said that the time had come to solve the south Slav question while all was now in flux and

48 Mitrovic, Prodor na Balkan, p.299. See also Conrad's letters to Burian (5, 26 and 29 November) in HHStA, P. A. 1/499. And for a recent summary in English of the clash: Andrej Mitrovic, Serbia's Great War 1914-1918 (London, 2007), pp. 193-8.

49 HHStA, P. A. 1/499, Conrad to Burian, 7, 21 and 31 December 1915; Conrad to Tisza, 4 January 1916 (the latter also reproduced in Protokolle, pp. 374-81 .

50 Buridn naploi, 3 and 31 December 1915, pp.163-4. 51 Protokolle, pp. 354-73.


Serbia conquered, he proceeded, after outHning the options for Serbia's fate, to stress that the 'moment for decisive decisions has still not arrived' [!]. Particularly in view of any prospective peace terms from Russia, the monarchy must keep its hands free to respond flexibly. While Tisza and Conrad forcefully set out their positions (and Tisza threatened to resign if the decision went against him), Burian's flabby compromise was what prevailed. According to this, although it was agreed that the north-west-ern corner of Serbia would probably fall to Hungary, any more substan-tial annexation of Serbian territory was left for a future decision. The fact that part of Serbia was now under an Austrian regime of occupation also offered flexibility in that regard, since it might be prepared for eventual annexation by the monarchy (as all except Tisza preferred) or it might be conditioned to be a future satellite state. Burian summed up the result in his diary; 'The Serb question is difficult, but it is not possible to decide it today, the future will force out the correct solution."

This was partly true, but it had the fatal effect of leaving any broader south Slav settlement within the monarchy on hold. Most notably, Tisza's programme for Bosnia and Croatia had not been raised at the meeting by Burian or anyone else. Not surprisingly, Conrad was completely dissatis-fied with the outcome, steadily complaining to Burian that if Serbia was not annexed the monarchy would lose its great Power position." Tisza in turn was to be vigilant in trying to forestall any military efforts to make the occupation of Serbia a prelude to annexation. Already in late 1915 he had openly told the Budapest parhament that occupied Serbia was to be in Hungary's sphere of interest.^'* In May 1916, after touring Belgrade and northern Serbia and then visiting Conrad at army high command, he was alarmed to find that the military authorities were pursuing their own political agenda in Serbia and dismissing the decisions of 7 January as of 'academic significance'. Especially, Tisza asserted, Hungary at that meet-ing had been accorded the primary responsibility for the southern settle-ment, something now being ignored as the occupation regime established

52 Buridn naploi, 1 January, p. 167. See also the revealing entry on 13 March (p.170), after a talk with Tisza, Stiirgkh and Krobatin about war aims: 'Concerning Serbia still dense uncertainty in our opinions' .

53 HHStA, P.A.1/499, Conrad to Burian, 24 January 1916. 54 Galantai, 'Tisza und die siidslawische Frage wahrend des Ersten Weltkrieges',

p. 245.


firm roots rather than just keeping order amongst an unruly population." The upshot was that Burian took this complaint straight to the emperor, who decided to dismiss and replace the military governor in Belgrade. For Tisza it was a small victory. And since the civilian commissioner in the oc-cupation regime was Lajos Thalloczy, a Magyar-imperialist, Tisza could rest more easily about maintaining Hungarian influence.^''

Nevertheless, however significant the fate of Serbia, it remained some-thing of a distraction in that it postponed any wider settlement of the south Slav issue. As one of those at the council meeting on 7 January had noted, the Serbian state might be extinguished, but the south Slav idea could not be eliminated so easily; it required the monarchy's leaders to assert their control of the agenda." Since this was not done in any posi-tive way at this crucial juncture, the 'idea' could re-emerge in mid-1917 in a new guise.

X-

On 1 December 1916, Burian learnt that Thalloczy, who was returning to Belgrade from Vienna after attending the funeral of Franz Joseph, had been killed in a train crash. In his diary, the foreign minister noted how only the day before they had lunched together, and on that occasion spo-ken once again about the undecided fate of Serbia. A week later, when Burian saw the new emperor Karl, he mentioned the radical idea of final-ly uniting Serbia with Montenegro and then annexing both to the mo-narchy.^^

The circular debate had therefore found no resolution. Unforeseen circumstances were also intervening to change its parameters. Some ad-justment in perspective seemed inevitable as certain Habsburg decision-makers left the scene (either through violent death in late 1916: Stiirgkh, Thalloczy; or through summary dismissal in the early months of the new emperor's reign: Burian, Conrad, Tisza). More significantly, the domestic and foreign contexts for settling the south Slav question were shifting. On the one hand, domestically, the new emperor's regime witnessed both a determination to reconvene the Austrian parliament in Vienna, and a campaign by the new Austrian government to push through some 'Ger-

55 See the documents in HHStA, P.A. 1/973, especially Tisza to Burian, 3 June; and Tisza to Archduke Friedrich, 26 May 1916 (also in Tisza munkdi, V, pp. 8-19).

56 HHStA, P.A. 1/973, Szechenyi to Burian, 22 July 1916. 57 Protokolle, p.369: Ernst von Koerber, common finance minister. 58 Buridn naploi, 1 and 8 December 1916, p. 185.


man course' in the western half of the monarchy.^' Both moves would provoke a vocal response from Slovene politicians in particular. On the other hand, the monarchy's foreign and mihtary landscape had been tri-umphantly transformed in late 1916. The Central Powers had conquered most of Romania, and had publicly announced the creation of an inde-pendent kingdom of Poland. How precisely these developments would affect a future European settlement was a crucial consideration when the monarchy's elite, ever mindful of peace, gathered to discuss war aims and peace terms in the winter of 1916/17.

When on 12 January 1917 the common ministerial council met in Baden (the new army headquarters), the divergent approaches to a settle-ment in the south were ever present, with forceful voices on both sides. The emperor presided and suggested, as Austria-Hungary's maximum goals, correcting the border with Serbia, replacing Serbia's Karadjordjevic dynasty, and annexing occupied Montenegro. (Stiirgkh a year earHer had suggested turning Montenegro into an American-style national park).'" Tisza however took issue, prioritising the monarchy's major need for se-curity in the Balkans, something only possible through a fundamental weakening of Serbia by reducing her to an economic satellite. For Hein-rich Clam-Martinic, the new Austrian prime minister, this opened up the whole south Slav question. Sounding a new voice (though Conrad was there too to repeat his usual stance on annexation), he suggested that south Slav unity was unstoppable; it was far better, surely, to incorporate all south Slav lands into the monarchy and take control of the movement? Naturally this was something that Tisza immediately stamped on - 'un-realisable, dangerous dreams' - and since the new foreign minister, count Ottokar Czernin, concurred, Conrad's own last chance to put his case for a radical solution fell on deaf ears. As Karl summed up, the 'consensus' was that a diminished Serbia should become an economic satellite.'"'

While this meeting of the elite had focused on Serbia, the following council on 22 March encouraged a broader discussion for it touched

59 The 'German course' was intended to soHdify German-Austrian control of Austria: under an anticipated Austro-Polish solution the Polish lands would be exclu-ded from representation in the Austrian parliament, thereby giving Germans a majo-rity over Slavs (Slovenes and Czechs). In addition, German would be made the 'state language', and Bohemia would be administratively divided on ethnic lines so that Czechs could not continue to outvote German Bohemians in provincial business.

60 Protokolle, p. 367. 61 Ibid., pp. 446-51 .


upon Bosnia's fate and thereby provoked challenges to the dualist sys-tem.® Significantly, the emperor had just dismissed Conrad, and his com-pliant successor, Arthur Arz von Straussenburg, made no intervention in the lively debate. Yet the south Slav question was again still only being addressed indirectly. Since it surfaced primarily as a result of other foreign and strategic concerns, most of the discussion was inherently speculative and particularly dependent on what Germany might agree to. Czernin at the start signalled that since the Germans were now determined to take full control of the Polish kingdom as their spoils of war, the monarchy had to insist on territorial gains in the Balkans and specifically to an-nex most of Romania. For Tisza, this was only feasible if it became a 'Magyar solution', with Romania incorporated fully into the Hungarian kingdom. Tisza here, to the surprise of many in the room, showed a cer-tain flexibility but also his set of priorities as a Transylvanian landowner. In an 'about-turn' from his plans of late 1915, he proposed that Hun-gary, while annexing Romania, would be prepared to renounce claims on Bosnia-Herzegovina and allow its incorporation into Austria as a definite solution for that troubled 'Reichsland'.

Although this showed Tisza's concern to settle Bosnia, it proved also his detachment as well as his underlying preference for south Slav dis-unity. It was Clam-Martinic again who took up this baton, expressing his alarm that by the end of the war both the monarchy's Polish and south Slav questions would remain unsolved. In terms of the latter, he countered that Austria would have to annex not only Bosnia but also northern Serbia, the region being 'reserved' for Hungarian control. Clam was framing his argument partly in terms of territorial compensation for Austria (pre-empting the possible demise of any Austro-Polish solution as well as offsetting Hungary's gain of Romania). But as on 12 January he had a broader perspective, one in tune with his own programme for re-structuring the western half of the monarchy. Thus, his main justification for annexing north Serbia was that it would 'round off Austria's posses-sion of Bosnia and ensure a 'healthy and secure' policy in the southern Slav lands." This was completely anathema to Tisza because it would mean the encirclement of Hungary with a band of Serb-inhabited terri-tory outside Budapest's control. Since he continued to insist on his own plan, Karl rather weakly asked the two prime ministers to consider that

62 Ibid., pp. 484-91 . 63 Ibid., p.489.


solution further. In fact it was the death of the scheme, not least because as in October 1916 it was so dependent on Germany's indirect approval and especially agreement over Poland; later in the year the Austro-Polish solution would resurface with all the implications this had for domesti-cally restructuring the monarchy.

Burian, since December 1916 relegated to being common finance min-ister, had been present at the meeting of 22 March but had left the talking to Tisza and Clam. He had been genuinely surprised at Tisza's ideas, not-ing that 'perhaps he feels the hand of fate is in control'. His own interpre-tation was that Tisza saw in Romania a chance for Hungary to have a re-ally free hand, while any Hungarian management of the south Slav lands would involve a labyrinth of historic claims and constructions. It is clear from Burian's diary that he himself saw the south Slav question as post-poned and unresolved.*^" Wary of the monarchy annexing too much extra territory (including Romania) since this could lead to a federal state, his preference in the south remained the sub-dualist solution for both Bosnia and Croatia under the Hungarian crown.

On this point there was agreement with General Sarkotic. As the key individuals now responsible for Bosnia, both Burian and Sarkotic were initially very wary of each other. While Sarkotic saw Burian as surly and reserved ('a man who makes the worst conceivable impression on me'), Burian would write of the 'delusions of grandeur and hypersensitivity in this otherwise honest man'.®' The two were therefore astonished on meeting in Sarajevo in February 1917 to find that they shared the same basic views over the governance and fate of Bosnia. For Sarkotic in 1917, the priority in Bosnia was to manage the escalating food crisis, maintain order, and keep abreast of rising political activity as local Moslem, Serb and Croat politicians called for the reconvening of the Bosnian Sabor. Occasionally there was time to consider the broader south Slav question. In June for example, at an audience with the emperor, Sarkotic proposed a 'Croatian' but still dualist solution: uniting Dalmatia with Croatia but keeping Bosnia as a separate administrative unit under Hungary.^'' It was a settlement that sat well with the wily new Hungarian prime minister.

64 Buridn naploi, 20 and 22 March 1917, pp. 194-5. 65 Ibid., p. 207; Klein, Sarkotic von Lovcen, p.120 (Sarkotic diary, 26 December

1916). 66 Klein, Sarkotic von Lovcen, p. 163: Sarkotic on this occasion also suggested

that the western crownlands of Istria and Carniola be united.


Sandor Wekerle, who in talks with both Sarkotic and Burian in the sum-mer readily confirmed Budapest's old line that Bosnia should be made a corpus separatum under Hungary. Sarkotic nevertheless was wary about how the Magyars might proceed. In his diary he warned that the southern Slav might be 'cooked in advance in Budapest', producing in the end a 'south Slav monstrosity'; the comment partly explains his move there-after in a more radical direction. By the autumn he was also frustrated that while Budapest at least seemed to have a clear stance, the Austrian government was dragging its heels and thereby prolonging uncertainty amongst the Bosnian public.®^

Indeed, since May 1917, developments in Austria had cast the whole subject of south Slav unity in a new light from an unexpected angle. In all of the elite's deliberations over the previous three years, the Slovenes had barely been mentioned. In the last eighteen months of hostilities they as-sumed the mantle of Yugoslav agitation which in the early years, at least from the Habsburg elite's perspective, had been worn chiefly by Serbia and Serb accomplices in the monarchy. In early 1917 there were signs, as shown in the ministerial council, that Clam-Martinic saw south Slav unity as a challenge, something the monarchy must control and direct. Yet at the same time, he was manoeuvring with German and Polish poli-ticians in Vienna to push through by imperial decree (oktroi) a 'German solution' for Cisleithania with little regard for either Slovene or Czech viewpoints.^^

This proposed coup, backed by Czernin, was fully indicative of Clam's own (Bohemian) German outlook and his emphasis on German centrali-sation. It sets his comments in the ministerial council in some perspective. In January 1917, when the Entente had called for Slav liberation and the destruction of the monarchy, the Slovene leader Anton Korosec had dutifully repudiated the demand, probably reassuring Clam. In fact, the evidence that then leaked out about the Austrian government's 'German course' could only accelerate Slovene clerical moves towards cooperation with Croat politicians, both within Austria in a newly formed 'Yugoslav parliamentary club' and across the dualist border to Uke-minded Yugo-slavs in Zagreb. Clam on 22 May also made his views abundantly clear

67 Ibid., p. 164; Buridn naploi, 6 September 1917, p.209; Kapidzic, Bosna i Hercegovina pod austro-ugarskom upravom, p. 230.

68 Felix Hoglinger, Ministerprdsident Heinrich Graf Clam-Martinic (Graz and Cologne, 1964), pp. 132ff , 145-6.


to the veteran Slovene clerical Janez Krek: he reaffirmed dualism, and rejected not only south Slav unity outside dualism but even any Slov-ene unity within Austria.'"' Clam's government, like its successors, was in thrall to the German-Austrian political parties and would consistently ignore Slovene sensitivities, with dire results.

It was against this background, and stimulated by Czech and Polish examples, that on 30 May 1917 at the opening of the Austrian Reichsrat, the Yugoslav club of 33 south Slav politicians made a ground-breaking declaration. Following soundings since late 1916 with religious and po-litical leaders in Croatia, they demanded unification of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in a special democratic entity under the Habsburg dynasty, bas-ing their claim on the 'national principle' and also that of 'Croatian state right'. This major challenge to dualism was ignored by Clam and, after his resignation in June, was resisted even more tactlessly by his successor, the bureaucrat Ernst von Seidler. In September 1917, himself committed to a German radical course, Seidler told the Yugoslav club that any con-stitutional reform could only be within the dualist framework and only involve some national autonomy in the Austrian crownlands.™ These were crumbs to Korosec and his colleagues. Moving into opposition, and joined by illustrious figure-heads such as bishop Jeghc of Ljubljana, they proceeded over the next six months to launch a movement on behalf of the May declaration in the Slovene communities. What began as a cam-paign of mass-petitions became, from March 1918, a series of mass-ral-lies at a grassroots level. It spread southwards into the starving villages of Istria and Dalmatia, and resonated in Croatia too amongst liberal clergy and the small Starcevic party in the Sabor. Since Korosec had made an early tour of Sarajevo to publicize the declaration, it even began to infect the political life in Bosnia, much to the alarm of Sarkotic and Burian."

How the Habsburg leaders approached this very sudden manifestation of the Yugoslav question reveals their reticence about thinking outside old parameters at a time when they were facing a powerful new challenge to their own legitimacy. Many realised the need to act, just as in the past

69 Pleterski, Prvo opredeljenje Slovenaca, p. 149. 70 Ibid., p. 206. 71 For a recent assessment of this phenomenon, see Mark Cornwall, 'The Great

War and the Yugoslav Grassroots: Popular Mobihsation in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918 ' , in Dejan Djokic and James Kerr-Lindsey (eds), New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies (Basingstoke, 2009). For Korosec's visit to Sarajevo in September 1917: Kapidzic, Bosna i Hercegovina, pp. 221-31 .


the subject had regularly been raised at the Ballhausplatz and elsewhere; now a major obstacle to any solution was having to engage with emerg-ing and vocal national elites. Among those who sounded the alarm was Clam-Martinic who since July 1917 had been governor-general of Mon-tenegro. In November, he gave a memorandum to Czernin, urging that the monarchy must take command of the inevitable process of south Slav unity in view of the rising agitation at home and increasing echoes abroad of Entente support.'^ Clam's solution followed familiar lines. He favoured full south Slav unity under Hungary while in the north there would be an Austro-Polish solution; it was therefore as usual a dualist settlement, but involved annexing Serbia-Montenegro and excluding the Slovenes. To his credit. Clam did suggest taking the Serb-Croat slogans of self-determination seriously and using them as a way to convince the Magyar regime. Unfortunately the memorandum, written from the tranquillity of Cetinje, was directed at a foreign minister immersed in peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and largely unsympathetic. Czernin not only rejected any radical solution during the war, but expressed his scepticism as to wheth-er the south Slavs actually wanted to unite. A few weeks later he would pin his colours to the mast at Brest, publicly rejecting the notion of any national self-determination for peoples. It deepened the gulf between the Habsburg elite and the Yugoslav club."

Clam's feeling that southern Slav unity (minus the Slovenes) was inevi-table inclined him increasingly towards triahsm, but it came up against the forceful views of Sarkotic when he visited Sarajevo in mid-May 1918. For Sarkotic, as for the Magyar government, there was no question that the monarchy needed territorial restructuring, but any solution had to be sub-dualist under Hungary. It should not pander to the 'passing phe-nomenon of Yugoslavism' (Sarkotic's words) by allowing broader unity with Serbia and Montenegro.''' Between Sarkotic and Budapest by 1918, however, there was also developing a clear difference of emphasis. Sarko-tic was shifting his stance by wanting Hungary to pursue an openly pro-

72 Hoglinger, Clam-Martinic, pp. 210-13; Sepic, Italija, Saveznici, p.244. Enemy support for the Yugoslav cause was increasingly noticed by the Habsburg elite in the last year of the war, both in terms of Allied official statements and in a vigorous propaganda campaign launched on the Italian front: see Mark Cornwall, The Under-mining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle for Hearts and Minds (Basingstoke, 2000).

73 Leo Valiani, The End of Austria-Hungary (London, 1973), pp. 209-11. 74 Bogdan Krizman, Raspad Austro-Ugarske i stvaranje jugoslavenske drzave

(Zagreb, 1977), p. 23.


Croat agenda of unification in the south. Wekerle remained ever wary of anything smacking of triahsm and therefore anxious to preserve south Slav disunity in the spirit of Tisza. When Sarkotic visited Budapest in early March, alarmed by new evidence of Yugoslav machinations in Zagreb," he set out for the Wekerle government his 'Croatian course'. Dalmatia should be incorporated into Croatia immediately, and Bosnia-Herzegovina gradually annexed later to the sub-dualist unit after being carefully administered by Croat officials. Only through such a unit could Croats be satisfied and Serbs be kept in their place. Wekerle seemed to be in agreement, but it was deceptive.™

Most revealing is the audience that Sarkotic had with the emperor at Baden on 6 March. When questioned about the urgency of a south Slav solution, Sarkotic duly explained his dualist-based proposal, add-ing that Austria would have to deal with the Slovenes and that in the east Croats and Serbs should be kept apart as far as possible. When Karl opined (in the spirit of his Austrian prime ministers) that the south Slavs would all have to come together, Sarkotic was blunt. Occident and orient could not be united: 'a correct solution of the south Slav question is only theoreticallv possible, but practicallv not'. It had to be a dualist solution that was imposed on Dalmatia and Bosnia, with a firm hand especially in Bosnia since 'the Bosnian is never satisfied'. Karl's concluding words were not very inspiring: 'It is so terribly difficult to find the right solution but it must happen'."

Nevertheless, in late May, the emperor made a fresh effort to confront the problem with his advisers. Earlier in the month, with evidence that the 'Korosec agitation' was beginning to infect military units in the hin-terland, the authorities had officially banned the declaration movement. Both Seidler and the emperor also prescribed a bitter pill, announcing again to Slovene leaders that there could be neither Slovene nor Yugoslav

75 On 2 - 3 March a meeting organized in Zagreb by the Yugoslav club and the (Croatian) StarCevic party gathered together delegates f rom across the region, inclu-ding politicians from Bosnia and Dalmatia. It was one further step towards a concen-tration of Yugoslav forces and the later founding of a 'national council' for the south Slav region: see Sepic, Italija, Saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje, pp. 280-3 .

76 Hrvatski drzavni arhiv [HDA: Croatian state archives], Sarkotic MSS, Sarko-tic diary, 4 March 1918.

77 Ibid., 6 March 1918. Burian too was alarmed to find at this time that the emperor 'plays a little freely with the idea of "Yugoslavia". I warned him': Buridn naploi, 16 March (p. 222).


national unity. When on 30 May, at Sarkotic's suggestion, Karl convened a crown council, he knew it was to discuss a question of the 'greatest importance'. Burian (once again foreign minister) proceeded to introduce the subject at length. In the face of mounting nationalist agitation, he said, the monarchy had to offer a positive alternative; only in that way would - what he termed - the 'artificial' agitation be subdued and the danger appear as 'passing clouds'. All at the meeting could agree on pre-serving dualism, all could agree that the Slovenes would have to be han-dled separately by Austria. The real sticking point as usual was over how Hungary would manage the rest of the south Slav region. While Sarkotic set out his 'Croatian course', Wekerle would still only agree to Bosnia as a corpus separatum, something that Sarkotic felt would provoke Croat irredentism.'"'

Neither Karl nor Burian seemed able to push the meeting towards a final decision. Instead, fatally, it was agreed that both Vienna and Bu-dapest would discuss the matter further.™ As Sarkotic noted angrily, the whole problem had been handed over to a triumvirate of Seidler, Wekerle and Burian, and therefore postponed ad calendas graecas. Like Conrad in earlier meetings, he wanted action: 'The south Slav question is a Gord-ian knot which can only be cut by someone with intense determination backed by force (the army). Now we have all the south Slavs in our hands - so, fairly divide them up, separate Croats from Serbs, the former to Aus-tria, the latter to Hungary in a sub-dualist arrangement. He who knows a better solution, come out with it'.®"

Notwithstanding the myriad responsibilities facing the Habsburg lead-ers in the final months of the war, their inability to advance after this

78 Proto^o/Ze, pp. 661-8. 79 Burian's diary captures well the bland conclusion of the meeting: 'Agreement

in principle that the two governments are authorized to discuss with one another procedures for a solution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia' (Buridn naploi , 30 May 1918, p. 224).

80 HDA, Sarkotic diary, 30 May 1918 (pp. 41-2) . As this indicates, Sarkotic wanted if possible to divide up the Croat and Serb territories between Austria and Hungary respectively, although the difficulty of achieving this was immense, not least the need to persuade Hungary to break its historic bond with Croatia. It also implied that the ehte had agreed over annexing Serbia and Montenegro, yet Burian for one on 30 May had brought up his old reservation that such an annexation might obstruct peace with the Entente. See also HDA, Sarkotic MSS, Sarkotic to Burian, 16 June 1918 (where Sarkotic emphasizes the need for a clear programme in order to fight Yugoslav agitation).


meeting is striking testament to the cumbersome decision-making proc-ess when any common questions were at stake. All seemed aware of the urgency. By July even General Arz, usually averse to political questions, was insisting to Burian that the Yugoslav problem must soon be radically solved.^' Yet when Sarkotic had an audience with the emperor at the end of the month, both regretted that the triumvirate had made no progress; Karl despaired that 'as a constitutional monarch' he could do little more. Why discussions were delayed is unclear. Burian with some justification would later point the finger at Seidler, although he himself (still common finance minister) seems to have done little in view of his own workload at the Ballhausplatz. In fact it was Wekerle, not usually known for his initiatives, who on 20 July cranked the machinery into motion, finally sending Seidler his proposals for linking Bosnia to Hungary as a corpus separatum. The move, he suggested, would solve the south Slav question once and for all and eliminate all other dreams of Yugoslav unity.

This 'Hungarian course' continued to be challenged by Sarkotic but also by Seidler's successor, Max von Hussarek. The latter however did not deviate in the summer from Vienna's own 'German course' - he meant to put it into practice. Thereby the Slovene leaders, whose Habsburg loyalty even at this late stage was biddable, were alienated even further from Austria and proceeded in mid-August to launch their Slovene national council in Ljubljana. Where Hussarek showed more imagination (and naturally more detachment), was in supporting Sarkotic's Croatian solu-tion in the Balkans. On first delving into the question he sensed that the monarchy was 'on the edge of an abyss'. His own strong Catholicism possibly inclined him towards Sarkotic's Croat programme as a way of defusing the Yugoslav agitation, but he was also pragmatic for giving Dalmatia to Hungary would facilitate German dominance in Austria; the fullest south Slav unity under Hungary also matched the continued advice of Clam-Martinic and other imperial advisers. It is questionable therefore whether one can term Hussarek's programme in August 1918

81 Andrej Mitrovic, 'Die Kriegsziele der Mittelmachte und die Jugoslawienfra-ge 1914-1918' , in Adam Wandruszka, Richard Plaschka, Anna Drabek (eds), Die Donaumonarchie und die siidslawische Frage von 1848 bis 1918 (Vienna, 1978), p. 150.

82 Helmut Rumpler, Max Hussarek. Nationalitdten und Nationalitdtenpolitik in Osterreich im Sommer des Jahres 1918 (Graz and Cologne, 1965), p. 93. Also, HDA, Sarkotic diary, 26 July 1918; Burian, Austria in Dissolution, p. 364. Burian's basic agreement with the Hungarian course is clear: Sarkotic diary, 4 August.


a 'masterstroke of compromise' (as does Helmut Rumpler), for it is clear that the new prime minister was producing little new. ^ The only novelty, perhaps, was in proposing a sub-dualist solution which in fact concealed and envisaged the slow introduction of trialism. Unfortunately it was exactly the kind of manoeuvre that Budapest's antennae were alert to detecting and blocking.

On 31 August, Wekerle's own underhand methods were on display in Budapest when he finally met Sarkotic and Hussarek together. At the morning talks there was no agreement, the visitors holding firm to their Croatian solution. In the face of this, Wekerle's tactic was to ply Sarkotic with quality wine over lunch so that he would have a long siesta and be entirely absent from the afternoon discussions. Although there was no overall agreement (since Hussarek still held his ground), the 'political fox' Wekerle seemed quite content with the result: Budapest would sim-ply continue negotiating with the Croat-Serb coalition in Zagreb, even though those politicians were singularly averse to making promises at this stage of the war. Sarkotic returned to Sarajevo feeling that the En-tente could only rejoice at the monarchy's indecisiveness. He wrote to Burian, complaining that Wekerle's plan for Bosnia was a dangerous pro-Serb course that would outrage the monarchy's Croats who wanted unity. On the basis of Wekerle's behaviour, he concluded that Hungary was moving far too slowly, ignoring Croatia, and misjudging the character of the 'Yugoslav infection'.®''

The Hungarian and German 'courses' that Wekerle and Hussarek were pursuing respectively in the two halves of the monarchy continued well into October 1918. Wekerle's guarded response to the Yugoslav idea and his famous dilatoriness (he never even brought the subject to cabinet) was wholly inadequate to meet the national concerns of educated Croats in Croatia or Bosnia. Yet equally, we should stress that Hussarek's policy in Austria was bhnd to Slovene insecurities; he shared a common elite perception that any Slovene support for south Slav unity was 'skin deep' or 'artificial'. As for Bosnia, the supposed route to a south Slav solution

83 Rumpler, Max Hussarek, pp. 93-5 . Clam continued to give the emperor his views on the subject (for example on 4 August).

84 HDA, Sarkotic diary, 31 August 1918, and letter to Burian, 5 September (pp. 64-72); Sepic, Italija, Saveznici i jugoslavensko pitanje, p.346. More research is needed on the nature of Budapest's failed wartime relationship with Croatia, but see Krizman {Hrvatska u prvom svjetskom ratu, pp. 249-50 , 294-5) for some notes on the talks of the final months.


in Wekerle's eyes, there was to be a shock for the Hungarians in late September. When count Tisza visited Sarajevo on 21 September, specifi-cally at the emperor's request, he was insulted to his face by local politi-cians of all creeds who demanded self-determination/^ It was clear that Budapest's favourite plan of a corpus separatum, one supposedly backed by Bosnia's Moslem and Serb leaders, was dead in the water and would have to be imposed by force. There is evidence that this affront caused Wekerle to doubt the viability of a 'Hungarian solution', but if so, it did not incline him towards a Croatian alternative. As Bulgaria collapsed and the military threat from the Allies loomed ever larger, Sarkotic acted as Cassandra, pleading in vain that the Habsburg elite at this eleventh hour could launch a 'political counter-offensive' by adopting his Croat solu-tion for the Balkans.

Indeed, as the southern front drew closer to the south Slav region, there were some new voices in the elite council who suggested that only a form of trialism would satisfy the agitators in the south. One was the new common finance minister, Alexander Spitzmiiller who had been won over through talks with Sarkotic." Wekerle however, backed by Burian, held fast to the dualist structure, while Hussarek, primarily obsessed with implementing the 'German course' for Bohemia, would only hint at the need for a Yugoslav unit subject to Hungary. The domestic south Slav problem in any case was once again being overshadowed by the foreign policy dimension, as Serbian troops began to retake southern Serbia and as the Habsburg elite focused on how best to impress the western Allies. At most, the crown council could vaguely agree that the regime should make a public pronouncement about south Slav unity, partly to quieten the native populations but especially to influence the Allies with an eye on the forthcoming peace talks.**®

In fact, the statements were never made or at least were wholly insuf-ficient to dominate the public discourse. Hussarek might speak in par-liament about limited national autonomy in Austria; but on the crucial Hungarian side there was silence, perhaps not least because on 6 October

85 Vermes, Istvdn Tisza, pp.434-9; Klein, Sarkotic von Lovc'en, pp. 237-47; Krizman, Hrvatska, pp. 251-61.

86 Rumpler, Max Hussarek, p.100; Klein, Sarkotic, p. 258. 87 Klein, Sarkotic, p. 255; and Alexander Spitzmiiller, Memoirs (New York,

1987), pp. 1 9 0 - 3 , 1 9 6 - 7 . 88 Cornwall (ed.), The Last Years of Austria-Hungary, pp. 198-203. A thorough

treatment of Wekerle, a key individual for these months, is sorely needed.


the poUticians in Zagreb finally threw off their masks and coalesced in a Yugoslav national council. In the final weeks therefore, any last Habsburg pronouncements were swamped by radical voices from Ljubljana and Zagreb. This was a new elite that was preaching south Slav unity and offering a national and economic security that the Habsburg monarchy seemed incapable of providing.®'

If in 1914 the south Slav question was largely an imperial problem with Serbia as the target, by 1918 most of the Habsburg elite acknowledged it as a Hungarian problem and one that would require major adjustments to the monarchy's structure in the south. Here there was a consistency in the Magyar regime's perspective, namely that any solution had to re-affirm south Slav disunity or at least never acknowledge the viability of trialism or lend any credence to 'Yugoslavism'. As Burian observed, 'we need to fight against the south Slav state as long as our powers permit'.'" In retrospect, the ideal time to implement the Hungarian solution was in the winter of 1915-16 when most of the Croat-Serb lands were un-der Habsburg control; it seemed opportune, even to Tisza, to impose a wartime settlement before the start of any awkward peacetime debates. But as we have seen, this moment was not seized due to a number of obstacles, including the prickly question of Austro-Hungarian dualist pa-rity and, particularly, a continued elite obsession with the fate of Serbia. Tisza's and Conrad's viewpoints in that regard were fatally irreconcilable. The elite's discussions in early 1916 did pave the way for a primacy of Hungarian interest in the question that lasted until the end of the mo-narchy. Yet implementing a settlement became ever more complex. While the Austrian elite (post-Stiirgkh) might be prepared to permit a domestic sub-dualist solution that included Dalmatia, by 1917-18 a rising tide of opinion in the south Slav region itself was multiplying the number of

89 The emperor's desperate 'manifesto' of 16 October was primarily focused on the Czech problem and, in applying only to the Austrian half of the monarchy, ignored the south Slav question as being chiefly the responsibility of Budapest. This despite the fact that since early October the Ballhausplatz and Hussarek's prime mi-nisterial office had been planning their own imperial declaration supporting a south Slav sub-dualist (Hungarian) solution. See Helmut Rumpler's stimulating study; Das Vdlkermanifest Kaiser Karls vom 16. Oktober 1918. Letzter Versuch zur Rettung des Habsburgerreiches (Munich, 1966), especially pp. 55-9.

90 Buridn naploi, 1 January 1918, p. 218.


people who would need to consent to such a settlement under Hungary's leadership. In this environment, Sarkotic's Croat solution offered one vi-able way forward for the monarchy, but it always smacked too much of trialism for Budapest's taste.

The historian who views this subject from the perspective of 2009 in-evitably conceives it differently to the Yugoslav historians of forty years ago. Now, after the bloody spHntering of Yugoslavia, we may appreciate as rather realistic those voices among the Habsburg elite who warned about south Slav disunity or, like Sarkotic, stressed an incompatibility be-tween the various national elements. Even so, the monarchy in the last ten years of its existence was faced with a major and concrete dilemma: how best to pre-empt the Yugoslav agenda by setting out a clear Habsburg alternative that could entice a majority of interested parties. This was very difficult to achieve because the Yugoslav idea was rarely static and it assumed a different character when viewed from Ljubljana, Zagreb or Belgrade. The Austro-Hungarian elite also had their fatal German-Magyar blind spots, grounded in the dualist system, which prevented a flexible response to the question. In particular, Slovene anxieties were consistently neglected, while the problem of Serbia was, arguably, given too much weight to the detriment of pushing through a radical settlement for Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Nevertheless, if the elite usually found it impossible to achieve a com-mon position on the south Slav question, it is easy to over-emphasize their blind spots and obstinacy as constituting the whole picture. To achieve any radical domestic change in the middle of a war on three fronts was ambitious (many urged delay until the end of hostilities). By 1918, the Habsburg elite - even the Hungarian leadership - was recognizing the need to accelerate a south Slav settlement. Some, like the emperor himself even inclined to a Yugoslav unit within the monarchy. The Magyar re-gime however had the final say in 1918 as in 1914. Budapest had its own agenda, but it moved too slowly to pre-empt the shifts in allegiance that were fast taking place in the south as the empire's military defeat became clearer. Political legitimacy was ebbing away from Habsburg Vienna and Budapest in the direction of Yugoslav Zagreb and Belgrade. With the col-lapse of the monarchy, power passed into the hands of a new elite, one that would find a solution of the south Slav riddle just as intractable as their Habsburg predecessors.

Documents

Lothar Hobelt, Thomas Otte - European Diplomacy and the Habsburg Monarchy