Mt Consti LAGCAO

8/10/2019 Mt Consti LAGCAO

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BANC

OSDADO LAGCAO, G.R. No. 155746

OROTEO LAGCAO and

RSULA LAGCAO,

Petitioners, Present:

DAVIDE, C.J.,

PUNO,

PANGANIBAN,


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QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,*

CALLEJO, SR.,

AZCUNA,*

TINGA and

HICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.

DGE GENEROSA G. LABRA,


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anch 23, Regional Trial Court,

bu, and the CITY OF CEBU,

Respondent. Promulgated:

October 13, 2004

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E C I S I O N

ORONA, J.:

fore us is a petition for review of the decision dated July 1, 2002 of the Region

al Court, Branch 23, Cebu City[1] upholding the validity of the City of Cebus


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rdinance No. 1843, as well as the lower courts order dated August 26, 2002

nying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of

ese lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048

uare meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. Bu

en, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of

bu.[2] Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the C

Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specif

rformance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.

n July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the

ovince of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. On June, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant t

e ruling of the appellate court, the Province of Cebu executed on June 17, 1994

ed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer

rtificate of Title (TCT) No. 129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and

spina Lagcao.[3]

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to

scover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997,

titioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal

al Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1,


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160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate

dinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its c

ecutive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent

main for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the

ndless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the

nstitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).

Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners lot w

acted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless an

w-income residents of the City.

owever, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social probl

the country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exer

eir power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem.


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ere are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no pers

all be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shal

rson be denied the equal protection of the laws;[12] and (2) private property s

t be taken for public use without just compensation.[13] Thus, the exercise b

cal government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact,

ction 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with

ovisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowne

ht to private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected rightcessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimate

nnected with the rights to life and liberty.[14] Whether directly exercised by t

ate or by its authorized agents, the exercise of eminent domain is necessarily i

rogation of private rights.[15] For this reason, the need for a painstaking scru

nnot be overemphasized.

The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance

ders the expropriation of a private individuals property. The courts cannot

en adopt a hands-off policy simply because public use or public purpose is

voked by an ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed and determined. e Knecht vs. Bautista,[16] we said:


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It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protecti

e process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is t

tithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates s

wer to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the

mbodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a guara

justice. That is the standard that must be met by any governmental agency in

ercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stresthe present Chief Justice, Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive

n deny due process only under pain of nullity. xxx.

The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessit

d that necessity must be of public character.[17] Government may not capricio

arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case

ere was no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for

propriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choi

selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners

operty as the site of a socialized housing project.

ndemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random

propriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatcertainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution

is is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without

rceptible benefit to the public.[18]


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RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for

rposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide:

SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housi

all be acquired in the following order:

) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumental

agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their

bsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;


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) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal

provement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program

es which have not yet been acquired;

) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have

t been acquired; and

(f) Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous

e beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The loca

vernment units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of governm

nds. (Emphasis supplied).

SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands fo

rposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land

wapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the

overnment, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:

ovided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other mode

quisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is


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sorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted f

rposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).

the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et al.

y of Manila,[19] we ruled that the above-quoted provisions are strict limitation

e exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units, especial

th respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing an

) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lan

nk last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same v

propriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes ofquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory becaus

ese are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property

ainst what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is

rcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.

e have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied

ictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to exprop

titioners property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to

Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other mo

acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to tssage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite off

buy petitioners property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160.[20] We there

d Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the

titioners right to due process.


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should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a

vorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. Th

dgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ

ecution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court

spend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a

ocation site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site

ring the suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1

r the expropriation of petitioners lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and

mple. The unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was pass

early indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and

79.

r an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of t

y or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure

escribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic

nciples of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1)

ust not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or

pressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but ma

gulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) mus

t be unreasonable.[21]

dinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirement

ear case of constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is

nstrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:


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st, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent

ovisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;

cond, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression

asquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;

rd, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for expropriation fo

e purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest

rtiality against petitioners, and

urth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation betwee

e end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu

provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit

ch objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the

cumstances.


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deed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic liberties and the use of

ort-sighted methods in expropriation proceedings have not achieved the desire

sults. Over the years, the government has tried to remedy the worsening squa

oblem. Far from solving it, however, governments kid-glove approach has only

sulted in the multiplication and proliferation of squatter colonies and blighted

eas. A pro-poor program that is well-studied, adequately funded, genuinely sin

d truly respectful of everyones basic rights is what this problem calls for, not tprovident enactment of politics-based ordinances targeting small private lots in

tional fashion.

HEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1, 2002 decision of Bran

of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

O ORDERED.

NATO C. CORONA

sociate Justice

E C O N C U R:


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LARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

ief Justice

YNATO S. PUNO

sociate Justice

RTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

sociate Justice

ONARDO A. QUISUMBING

sociate Justice


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ONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

sociate Justice

NGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

sociate Justice

NTONIO T. CARPIO

sociate Justice

A. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

sociate Justice


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n leave)

ONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

sociate Justice

OMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

sociate Justice

n leave)

DOLFO S. AZCUNA

sociate Justice

ANTE O. TINGA

sociate Justice

n leave)

NITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

sociate Justice


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E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

at the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before th

se was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

LARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

ief Justice

on leave

] Presided by Judge Generosa G. Labra.


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] The records of the case do not state why and how the lots reverted

e Province of Cebu.

] Now deceased.

] Dated February 22, 1999 and May 20, 1999.

] The Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (Lina Law).

] Entitled, AN ORDINANCE FURTHER AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 1AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 1684 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE 1966

VISED ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF CEBU, BY INCORPORATING

HEREIN A NEW DISTRICT CALLED SOCIALIZED HOUSING SITES.

] Entitled AN ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING THE CITY MAYOR OF CEB

TY TO INSTITUTE EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MRS. CRISPINADA. DE LAGCAO, OWNER OF LOT NO. 1029 LOCATED AT GREEN VALLEY, CAPI

TE, CEBU CITY, TO ACQUIRE THE SAME FOR PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE.


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] Article IV, Section 9Private property shall not be taken for public

e without just compensation.

] Section 48. Local Legislative PowerLocal legislative power shall b

ercised by the sangguniang panlalawigan for the province; the sangguniang

nlungsod for the city; the sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and thengguniang barangay for the barangay.

0] The law was approved on October 10, 1991 and it became effective

nuary 1, 1992.

1] City of Cincinnati vs. Vester, 281 US 439, 74 L. ed 950, 50 S Ct. 360

2] Article 3, Section 1, 1987 Constitution.

3] Article 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution.

4] Joaquin G. Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the

ilippines: A Commentary, vol. 1. p. 43, 1987.

5] City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349, 1919

6] G.R. No. L-51078, 30 October 1980, 100 SCRA 660.

7] City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, supra.


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8] Urban Estates, Inc. vs. Montesa, 88 Phil. 348 (1951).

9] G.R. Nos. 132431 and 137146, February 13, 2004.

0] Sec 19. Eminent Domainxxx. Provided however, that the power

minent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been

eviously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: xxx.

1] Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207

RA 157.

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