Tullahoma Campaign

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THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN: OPERATIONAL INSIGHTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

RICHARD J. BREWER MAJ USAB.A. University of Maine Orono Maine 1978

Fort Leavenworth Kansas1991

Approved for public release; distribution s unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: MAJ Richard J. BrewerTitle of thesis: The Tullahoma Campaign: OperationalInsights

Approved by:

MemberLTC Richard L. Kiper,/~.A.

Member, Consulting FacultyCOL Charles A. Endress, Ph.D.

Accepted this 7th day of June 1991 by:

Director, Graduate DegreePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent theviews of the U S Army Command and General Staff College orany other governmental agency. References to this studyshould include the foregoing statement.)


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ABSTRACTTHE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN: OPERATIONAL INSIGHTS by MAJRichard J. Brewer, USA, 192 pages.This study examines the operational insights offered by theanalysis of the Tullahoma, or Middle Tennessee, Campaign of1863. The thesis uncovers these operational insights byexamining how Major General William S. Rosecrans, commanderof the Army of the Cumberland, and General Braxton Bragg,commander of the Army of Tennessee, planned for andconducted the nine day campaign.

is study of both commanders planning and execution of acampaign characterized by maneuver, rather than large scalebattles, highlights five important insights into operationalwarfighting. These insights include the translation ofstrategic guidance into an operational plan, offensive anddefensive operational planning, the importance of deception,the effects of sustainment on an operation, and theinfluence of leadership on the planning and conduct of acampaign


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGEAPPROVAL PAGE iABSTRACT iiiTABLE OF CONTENTS vLIST OF MAPS iCHAPTER

I INTRODUCTIONI1 PRELUDE TO BATTLE

Strategic SettingUnion Military Strategy 1863Confederate Military Strategy 1863 0Operational Setting 13The Terrain 6The Commanders 25Rosecrans Plan 0ragg s Plan 57I11 THE CAMPAIGN BEGINS 3

The Fight For the Gaps 78The Drive to Manchester 5

IV THE CAMPAIGN ENDS 14Rosecrans Continues to Concentrate 14Bragg Considers the Situation 25Tullahoma Evacuated 27Rosecrans Seizes Tullahoma 33Bragg Escapes and the Campaign Ends 50CONCLUSIONS 159Translation of Guidance into an Operational Plan 59Defensive Operational Planning 63Offensive Operational Planning 66Deception 68Sustainment 70Leadership 72An Overview 75


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APPENDIX 1Order of Battle: Army of the Cumberland.......... l78

APPENDIXOrder of Battle: The Army of Tennessee............lM

BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................lfI4INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST................................192


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LIST OF MAPS

Map 1 Strategic Setting May une 1863Map 2 The Tullahoma Campaign Area of Operations 4Map 3 Terrain in the Tullahoma Area of Operations 7Map Movements on 23 June 1863 4ap 5 Movements on 24 June 1863 77

Map 6 Movements on 25 and 26 June 1863 9Map 7Map 8

Map 9

Map 10

Movements on 27 and 28 June 1863 00Movements on 28 June through Midnight 30June 1863 15Movements on 1 July through 8 A M 2 July1863 34Movements on 2 July through 3 July 1863 41


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CHAPTER

INTRODUCTION

The American Civil War represents a field of studyrich with examples of operational art. As such it providesnumerous insights into operational warfighting. Onecampaign in particular embodies many of the operationalprinciples that promote sound operational planning andexecution, despite it being a little-known campaign ofmaneuver in which the participants suffered fewer than 2 300casualties. It was the Tullahoma or Middle TennesseeCampaign of 1863.

The Tullahoma Campaign immediately preceded theChickamauga campaign and in the larger operational sense waspart of it. It marked the peak of Federal Major GeneralWilliam Starke Rosecrans* career and the continued declineof Confederate General Braxton Braggls. It was a campaignof brilliant operational planning and maneuver by Rosecransand less than effective operational performance by Bragg.

Despite its relative obscurity, the TullahomaCampaign had far reaching effects on the course of the warin Middle Tennessee. Rosecrans victory coincided with thetwo great Union victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg and asa result is often overlooked. Yet, this little known or


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studied campaign resulted in the opening of the path toChattanooga, and ultimately, the capture of Chattanooga andAtlanta.

The very nature of this campaign s a stark contrastto most Civil War campaigns. It was not a campaign thatbegan or ended with a climactic battle. The casualties werea mere drop in the bucket of the carnage which characterizedthe American Civil War. Unlike most campaigns it occurredin terrible weather conditions; it rained the entire ninedays of the campaign. The commanders within each army werefor the most part unknown to those who observed the war inthe East. The armies themselves had a distinctive westerncomposition. Most of the Federals hailed from Illinois,Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky. The preponderance of Bragg sarmy came from Tennessee, Alabama and Kentucky. Both armies


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address both operational commanders in terms of theirsucce ss in accomplishing their missions and the strategicgoals within their theaters. The underlying theme thenwill highlight the process of operational warfare andprovide increased insight into the nature of opera tionalwarf ighting.


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CHAPTER 2

PRELUDE TO BATTLESTRATEGIC SETTING

In the spring of 1863 Union and Confederate armiesprepared for another season of campaigning which wouldhopefully end the war. Following a winter of fruitlessattempts to gain Vicksburg by attacking from the north andwest, Major General Ulysses S. Grant s Army of the Tennesseesat on the west bank of the Mississippi ready to continueits advance against General John C. Pemberton s forcesaround Vicksburg (Map 1 . In the East, Major General JosephHooker, with the Army of the Potomac still smarting fromtheir defeat at Fredericksburg the previous December,prepared again for a battle with General Robert E. Lee sArmy of Northern Virginia. Major General William SRosecrans, at Murfreesboro, after his victory over GeneralBraxton Bragg on 2 Jan 1863, faced Bragg s Army of Tennesseeand threatened Middle Tennessee and ultimately the railhub at Chattanooga, which, if seized would mean the openingof the gates to Georgia.

Hooker and Grant moved on 27 and 29 April,respectively, against the Confederates. On 30 April Grantcrossed the Mississippi River south of Vicksburg and in the


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early days of May maneuvered between Vicksburg and Jackson.,Mississippi. After capturing Jackson, Grant advanced towardVicksburg, defeated Pemberton s army of maneuver at ChampionHill and, by 8 May reached the outskirts of the city. On 4July Pemberton surrendered his army and the city ofVicksburg. The fall of Vicksburg made the other Confederat:efortress, Port Hudson, untenable. With its surrender onJuly the entire length of the Mississippi River was in Unionhands.

Hooker, in the East, moved against Lee s army onthe last day of April but lost the subsequent Battle ofChancellorsville. On the 4 May Hooker vithdrew his entirearmy north of the Rappahannock River. The Army of NorthernVirginia again prevented the Federals from gaining accessto the land south of the Rappahannock. After the battle,the Army of the Potomac rested near Fredericksburg untilLee s movements north forced it to pursue Lee as he movednorth toward the great confrontation at Gettysburq,Pennsylvania. 3

As these events developed in other theaters,Rosecrans continued to prepare his Army of the Cumberlandfor the summer offensive he would commence on 23 Juneagainst Braxton Braggls Army of Tennessee. A few cavalryand infantry skirmishes characterized the action betweenthese armies from the end of the Battle of Stones River inJanuary to the initiation of Rosecrans offensive in June.


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UNION MILITARY STRATEGY 1863In 1861 and 1862 the Union had attempted to strangle

the Confederacy economically the strategy suggested bythe Anaconda Plan. Winfield ~cott's upporting militarystrategy, however, was distorted by a strong desire tocapture the Confederate capital at Richmond and at the sametime protect Washington. Major General Henry W. Halleck, onhis assignment as General-in-Chief of all Union armies inJuly of 1862, brought with him a firm conviction that therewas much more to Scott's Anaconda Plan than simplestrangulation. The path to victory for the North lay in astrategy that capitalized on the Union effort in the West.It was, in a way, a continuation of Scott's policy ofstrangling the South, but it went beyond the current ideamaintained by Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stantonthat constant pressure on the enemy on all fronts was theonly way to win.

Halleck possibly thought that the Union armies inthe West, because of their distance from Washington, mightstand a better chance of success. These western armieswould not have to contend with the continued interferencefrom Washington, given the time and distance that separatedthem from the politicians in the East. Also Halleckcertainly realized that his Western armies had won recentvictories and appeared to be on the verge of winning more.


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Halleck recognized the stalemate in the Easterntheater. The Federal Army of the Potomac and theConfederate Army of Northern Virginia had done little morethan bloody each other without attaining significantterritorial gains. Furthermore, Federal success againstRichmond would be a great psychological victory, but littlewould change in the East if Lee s army survived. TheConfederates would move their capital and continue the war.If, on the other hand, Halleck could implement his Jominianbeliefs and concentrate Union strength against Confederatzeweakness, a resolution to the war might result.

The capture of key western cities would serve to cutthe Confederate rail and water routes and render itdifficult, perhaps impossible, for the Confederates t:osupply their armies. The West represented a bread baske.tfor the Confederacy. Grain crops and livestock wezeplentiful in the regions west of the Appalachians.Preventing these supplies from reaching the Confederatearmies would eventually take its toll.

Halleck also believed that such a policy, in concertwith constant pressure on Confederate armies in the East,would divide the Confederate high command on measures tocounter the Union threat. He believed that maintainingpressure in the East should further Confederate concerns fortheir capital. This strategy, Halleck asserted, would makeit difficult, if not impossible for the Confederates to


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shift forces from the eastern theater to the westerntheater.

Lincoln, admittedly concerned about the riskinvolved, and ever conscious of public demand for thecapture of Richmond, accepted Halleck s idea. Thisrelatively new departure, or so called wLincoln-Halleckstrategy, would set the prevalent direction for the Northover the next two and a half years of the war. It meantthat in early 1863 the Union would make its major effort inthe West. While the Army of the Potomac would still conductEastern campaigns, their actions would be a manifestation ofLincoln and Halleck s desire to keep constant pressure onall points of the Confederacy.1

Halleck, having given priority to the West duringthe winter of 1862-1863, identified Grant s Army of theTennessee for the major effort. Halleck then directedRosecrans to support Grant s movements by fixing Bragg sarmy. By May, Hooker s failure at Chancellorsville, andGrant s successful crossing of the Mississippi which causedGeneral Joseph Johnston to shift Confederate forces torelieve Vicksburg, led Halleck to give further guidance.He directed Rosecrans and Major General Ambrose Burnside,commanding the Department of the Ohio and operating withforces under Brigadier General George Hartsuff northeast ofRosecrans in Kentucky, to maintain pressure on theConfederate forces and drive them from East Tennessee. As


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importance to the Confederacy and which were not. Davis,with Seddon s concurrence, refused to specify any areas asmore important than others. Davis argued the North wasincapable of conducting more than one major westernoperation at a time and further believed that Johnston wouldhave adequate time to know where and when the Federals wouldattack. Davis believed Johnston could shuttle his troopswhere needed most. 2

Johnston countered this argument by trying toconvince Davis that Tennessee, by its physical location, wasvital to the protection of the Confederate depots inChattanooga, Atlanta, and other storehouses in the south.He further added that it was not as simple as it appeared toshuttle forces from one place to another in his theater.Railroads seldom ran directly toward the point an army hadto reach. Even in the best of cases, time consuming trainchanges because of differing railroad gauges wererequired. 3

There were others who tended to agree withJohnston s appraisal. General P.G.T. Beauregard wroteJohnston in early May of 863 that he believed inestablishing priority for an offensive in Tennessee andKentucky. He felt such a move necessary to relieve thepressure on Vicksburg and the Mississippi River. He toldJohnston that the offensive would draw Union forces fromGrant s army to contend with the new threat. Whatever merit


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Beauregard s idea held, Johnston did not aggressively seekan opportunity to propose a bold offensive to Davis.Instead, Johnston concerned himself with the problems ofcoordinating Pemberton s and Bragg s armies. Additionally,he continued to assert that if priority were placed inMiddle Tennessee, it should be for defensive purposesinitially. Only after the wearing down of Rosecranst armyshould the Army of Tennessee take to the offense. 4

Also in May, Lieutenant General James Longstreetproposed to Davis and Seddon that his own corps fromVirginia, and elements of Johnston s western forcesreinforce Braggts army in Tennessee. He suggested an attac:kby the Army of Tennessee into Ohio to draw Grant from hissiege, and force the Union armies well back into thenorthern states. Davis tabled Longstreet s idea, perhapsbecause he was at the time intrigued by an alternativeproposed by General Lee. 15

Lee, not desiring to commit any part of the Army ofNorthern Virginia for western excursions, had his own ideasfor breaking the deadlock. He proposed an attack deep int:othe enemy s territory in the East. Lee felt a successfulattack into Pennsylvania, and the subsequent defeat of theArmy of the Potomac might cause an already tired Unionpublic to pressure their leaders to sue for peace. In lateMay, Davis accepted Lee s plan for the invasion ofPennsylvania. 6


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Davis thus closed the door on a western offensivestrategy or a diversion of troops to the west. It fell toJohnston to develop a strategy for the armies in the Westusing the forces at hand. By May, left to fend for himself,and directed to defend everything, Johnston absorbed himselfin the problem of Vicksburg and generally neglected the restof his theater.

OPERATIONAL SETTINGFor the first six months of 863 the Army of

Tennessee and the Army of the Cumberland sat no more thanthirty miles apart astride the main line of the Nashvilleand Chattanooga Railroad (Map 2 and each used it for theirresupply. Rosecrans drew his sustenance from Nashville andLouisville to the north. Bragg received the bulk of hisforage from the local countryside and Alabama to the south.He relied on his base at Chattanooga, and whatever he couldprocure from Atlanta, for his dry goods and ordnance.Bragg s army was all that stood between Rosecrans and themajor rail hub in Chattanooga.

The spring was a fairly quiet time for both armies.Both engaged periodically in cavalry raids on each otherslines of supply, but there was little other combat activity.Both seemed content to ready their armies for the eventualconfrontation. Units were restructured, supplies stockpiledand reinforcements sought.


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General Bragg, after withdrawing from theMurfreesboro battlefield on 3 January 1863, had establisheda defensive line along the Duck River. By June of 1863 hisarmy of 45,000 was spread from Spring Hill in the west toMcMinnville in the east. Brigadier General Nathan BedfordForrest s cavalry division covered the Confederate leftflank and screened a tenuous line from Spring Hill to theouter reaches of Shelbyville. Lieutenant General LeonidasPolk s corps of two divisions occupied defensive works inShelbyville. Lieutenant General William Hardee s twodivision corps occupied Wartrace, with elements garrisoningTullahoma, and others picketing the southern egress pointsof Liberty and Hoover s Gaps. Major General JosephWheeler s cavalry corps, positioned forward of Polk s andHardee s corps, occupied a line from Guy s Gap in the westto McMinnville in the east. 7

Major General Rosecrans encamped around Murfreesborowith four infantry and one cavalry corps (XIV Corps underMajor General George Thomas, XX Corps under Major GeneralAlexander McCook, XXI Corps under Major General ThomasCrittenden, the reserve corps commanded by Major GeneralGordon Granger and the Cavalry corps under Major GeneralDavid Stanley) totaling over 70,000 effectives. 8Rosecrans infantry corps were stronger than Bragg s, eachcontaining at least three divisions. The reserve corps,however, had two divisions assigned to picket duty along


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the line of communication from Louisville to Nashville,leaving it with only one division for the campaign.Rosecrans, too, established a series of entrenchments toprotect against any possible offensive attempt by Bragg.

Rosecrans, during the intervening months was moresuccessful than Bragg in bolstering his manpower. Throughgreat diligence and perseverance, Rosecrans managed to buildhis cavalry arm up to 10,000 effectives. With the additionof 3,000 mounted infantry Rosecrans, in effect, had 13,000horsemen. This put Rosecrans at least at par with Braggl scavalry. l9 Rosecrans actually had several advantages incavalry. His mounts were in better shape than Bragg's andhis mounted infantry brigade, under Colonel John T. Wilder,was armed with the new Spencer repeating rifle.

THE TERRAINThe terrain in Middle Tennessee presented challenges

to the attacker and the defender alike. Poor weather wouldintensify the challenges. The terrain itself is varied (Map3). Numerous creeks laced the entire area and proved to bea hindrance to movement in wet weather. The relief ofterrain features in the area greatly affected the course ofthe roads, streams and railroads. As one moved south fromMurfreesboro to the Cumberland Mountains the terraincontinued to increase in elevation. While the elevationchanges were generally gradual, there were some exceptions.


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Map 3 Terrain in the Tullahoma Area of Operations 20

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Map 3. Terrain in the Area of Operations continued).

8


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Bragg s defensive line along the Duck River receivedprotection from one such exception. Approximately ten milesnorth of Shelbyville an east-west line of high rocky hillrose steeply. At places, this line of hills was three tofour miles in depth, from north to south. They extendedfrom Bradeyville in the east to about three miles west ofFosterville. The hills themselves rose as much as 5 feetabove the table land and presented a barrier to movement.

Through these hills four gaps provided accessbetween Murfreesboro and Tullahoma. Hoover s Gap was along, narrow defile that narrowed to the width of two wagonsat places. Further to the west lay Liberty Gap, thenBellbuckle Gap, through which the Nashville and ChattanoogaRailroad ran. Each of the three gaps was suitable fordefense by a determined and well emplaced infantry force.Lastly, the Shelbyville Pike ran through the low ground atGuy s Gap. Guy s G a p w a s a c t u a l l y a low, wide saddle,barely noticeable as a gap. It served little purpose to adefender as the ground west of it was traversible.

The next exception to the gradual elevation changewas the escarpment running from Wartrace northeast toWoodbury. South of this line the terrain rose steeply toform a wide plateau that extended to the Duck River. Exceptfor the hills breaking the plateau on the eastern side, thisplateau was uniform.


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West of Wartrace and north of Shelbyville, extendingto Murfreesboro and west to Columbia Franklin, the landremained basically flat. Except for a few creeks, theterrain in this area was easily trafficable.

Moving further south another exception to thegradual elevation changes occurred. Another escarpment roseup from the south bank of the Duck River and formed thePlateau of the Barrens. The elevation rose 500 to 600feet above the previously mentioned escarpment. It was onthis plateau that Bra gg ts advanced depot at Tullahomarested. The Barrens ran in an easterly direction fromUpper Elkton (50 miles west of Tullahoma) to Tullahoma, thenran northeasterly to McMinnville and beyond.

The last sharp elevation increase in the area ofoperations occurred just to the south of the Elk River inthe vicinity of the Cowan University Place Pelham line.It was here that the ground rose sharply up as it reachedthe Cumberland Mountains. At an elevation 1200 feet abovethe lfBarrens,*t he Cumberland Mountains were visible from agreat distance and appeared as a solid wall to southerlymovement.

The two major rivers in the area of operations alsohindered movement. The Duck River never exceeded more thanfifty yards in width during good weather and was fordable atmany places. Still, there were a number of points,particularly to the west of the Chattanooga and Nashville


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Railroad where crossings were possible only on bridges or inthe ford sites.

The Elk River presented a somewhat more difficultproblem. In places it was more than fifty yards wide ingood weather. One generally had to cross exclusively onbridges or the limited number of ford sites. Worse, therewere only four good bridges between Pelham and Allisoniavicinity Estell Springs). Two of the bridges, one a

railroad and the other a highway bridge, crossed the riverat Allisonia. One bridge crossed at Bethpage and theremaining bridge crossed at Pelham.

In 1863 the area had a number of good, macadamizedroads, the best of which ran between the larger towns andcities. Only one major railroad ran through the area but itdid have short spurs. One spur ran from Tullahoma toMcMinnville via Manchester, another ran from Decherd toWinchester and the last ran from Cowan to Tracy City viaUniversityroads went.such as thefor north-s

ace. The terrain determined largely where theThough many of these roads joined at points

gaps or bridges there were a number of avenuesuth movement. To the attacker these avenues

represented a number of opportunites.Should Rosecrans opt for a direct approach to

Shelbyville, Wartrace or Tullahoma, there were three goodroutes to use. Each of the three would entail movementsthrough one of the three westernmost gaps in the line of low


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Lastly, the numerous roads to the vest allowed easyaccess to Shelbyville. The terrain on this flank was moreopen and level. The Shelbyville Pike was the most directroute from Murfreesboro to Shelbyville. To the west theMiddleton road also ran to Shelbyville from Murfreesboro.Further to the west there were a number of less direct roadssuch as those running from Triune, Spring Hill and Columbia.

During their planning for the campaign bothcommanders carefully considered the terrain. Neither,however, indicated undue concern for what effect the weathermight have on their plans. Prior to the execution ofRosecrans advance there were no discussions concerning whatthe army would do in the event of heavy rain. It wasunfortunate, for this was one campaign that the weatherdramatically affected trafficability.

While the main pikes running from Murfreesboro toShelbyville, Wartrace and Manchester were macadamized, thelesser roads connecting the smaller towns were in most casesnothing more than worn dirt tracks. During periods ofsustained rain, these roads became virtual quagmires.Crittenden s corps would travel on one such route during hisadvance and it would take him four days to travel 7 miles.

Similarly, the creeks and rivers became significantobstacles to movement during periods of heavy rain. TheDuck and Elk Rivers swelled normally above their banks inrainy weather. The widths and depths of both rivers could


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increase as much as twice their normal measurements. Whenthis happened one could only cross the Duck River at theford and bridge sites. In the case of the Elk River thefords could also become completely unusable leaving only thebridges as a means to cross.

Rain also greatly increased the velocity of th.erivers. This made it difficult in some cases impossible toput pontoon bridges across the river. In those places wherefording was possible it meant the crossing force had toplace heavy ropes across the river to prevent having the menand horses swept downstream.

The road systems and potential weather effectscombined with the nature of the terrain made defense anightmare anywhere forward of the Elk River. The attackerpossessed a great advantage with so many avenues to choosefrom. The opportunities for envelopments either single ordouble abounded in this region. The multitude of avenuesavailable to an attacker made it practically impossible todefend effectively against each one. This meant that thedefender could defend only the most likely attack routes inforce. Additionally if the weather turned wet a defendingforce with its back to either of the major rivers riskedlosing its withdrawal routes.

However if the defender could avoid defendingforward of the Duck River there were other options. Exceptfor the McMinnville via Jasper approach 20 miles southeast


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of the University , all other roads in the region traversedthe Cumberlands at either Cowan or University. This was theone piece of decisive terrain that Bragg had at hisdisposal. A determined resistance in this location wouldforce an enemy to take a wide detour. A wide detour would,in turn, expose the attacker to flank attacks on his line ofcommunication. Most importantly, a wide detour wouldpreclude use of the railroad for sustainment. 2

Importantly, even though forces could traversesoutheast to Chattanooga via Cowan, this movement had topass through the railroad tunnel at Cowan. The 22 footlong tunnel completely controlled access to the railroad,and without it forces could not move through, or over themountains at this point. In the event the Confederatesdestroyed or blocked the tunnel it would cause a lengthydelay to the Federals. Faced with such a proposition therewould only be the road south from University on which theFederals could proceed southeast to Chattanooga.2

THE COMMANDERSTHE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND

By the spring of 863 the senior commanders in theArmy of the Cumberland and the Army of Tennessee wereveterans of extensive Civil War service. Most were educatedat the Military Academy at West Point. Some had served oncontinuous active duty for over 2 years. Many fought inthe Indian Wars and in the Mexican War. One experience they


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all shared, however, was prior to the Civil War, they hadnever maneuvered organizations the size and complexity ofthose they now commanded.

William Starke Rosecrans, commander of the Army ofthe Cumberland, was born September 1819 in DelawareCounty, Ohio. Despite a limited formal education, Rosecransbecame an extremely proficient reader and demonstrated aninventive streak. In 1838, Rosecrans, received anappointment to the United States Military Academy. Heexcelled in West Point's formal academic regimen andgraduated in 1842 fifth in his class of fifty-one. As areward for his academic excellence, Rosecrans wascommissioned a lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers.2

On his departure from West Point, Rosecrans spent ayear working on fortifications at Hampton Roads, Virginia.He then spent four years at West Point teaching engineering,an assignment which prevented Lieutenant Rosecrans fromseeing action in the Mexican War. The years that followedwere uneventfully spent on various engineering projects. 1:n1854 Rosecrans resigned his commission to return to civilianlife where he eventually applied his inventive talents t:othe refining industry. 7

When the war began Rosecrans volunteered as an aideto Major General George B. McClellan, commander of theDepartment of the Ohio. Colonel Rosecrans served in thiscapacity from 19 April to 10 June 1861 when he became the


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commander of the 23rd Ohio Infantry. Shortly following thisappointment Rosecrans became a brigadier general in theRegular Army and took command of a brigade. He participatedin McClellanls operations in western Virginia and won hisfirst significant engagement at the Battle of Rich Mountainon 11 July 1861. When McClellan left to take command of theArmy of the Potomac Rosecrans served as the commander ofthe Department of the Ohio until September 21 1861 and thenas the commander of the Department of Western Virginia until7 April 1862.

Rosecrans left Virginia to take command of adivision in the Army of the Mississippi and became thecommander of that army on 11 June 1862. This positionplaced Rosecrans directly under Major General Ulysses S.Grant. Rosecrans fought his first battle as commander ofthe Army of the Mississippi at Iuka Mississippi on 19September 1862. Despite winning the battle he failed topursue the withdrawing Confederates as Grant had ordered.Thus began the ill feelings that developed between the twomen. The day after Iuka Rosecrans learned of hispreviously confirmed promotion to major general. 29

The Battle of Corinth Mississippi followed on 3 4October 1862. In this battle Rosecrans skillfully repulsedGenerals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price and exacted aheavy toll on the attacking Confederates. As at Iuka


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however, Rosecrans failed to pursue the retreatingConfederates, increasing Grant s annoyance with him.30

Grant even considered relieving Rosecrans, however,orders directing Rosecrans to succeed Major General DonCarlos Buell in command of the Army of the Cumberland, savedGrant the trouble. Grant indicated in his memoirs that hefelt a separate command would be good for Rosecrans andwould show the qualities of sound generalship Grant knewRosecrans to possess.3

The assignment to the Army of the Cumberland wouldpit Rosecrans against Braxton Bragg, his adversarythroughout his command of this army. After building hissupply base at Nashville, Rosecrans moved south and foughtthe Battle of Stones River at Murfreesboro, Tennessee on 31December 1 8 6 2 2 January 1 8 6 3 The casualties suffered byboth armies rivaled Shiloh; all told more than 24,000 men.Rosecrans, despite facing near disaster on the first day ofthe battle, saw Bragg withdraw and was thus able to claimvictory for the North. Rosecrans then settled in aroundMurfreesboro for the remainder of the winter and on intospring. He spent the ensuing six months preparing his armyfor its inevitable advance on Bragg. 3

Following the Battle of Stones River, Rosecransenjoyed a mixed reputation as a military commander. He wasknown throughout the United States Army as a methodicalplanner and an excellent organizer. 3 He had a keen eye for


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operational maneuver and grand strategy. Strategy, in fact,was one of his more noted strengths. It is likely that hismembership in Dennis Hart Mahan's Napoleon Clubft at WestPoint had fired Rosecrans' interest and proficiency instrategy. 4

It is perhaps significant that even Rosecrans'principal enemy, Braxton Bragg, said good things about him.Following the Battle of Stones River, Bragg, in his officialreport of the battle, issued forth a complimentary word forRosecrans and his enemy which fought .with a skill andjudgment which has ever characterized his able commanderIRosecransl 1 1 3 5 On another occasion, Bragg remarked to thevisiting Colonel James Arthur Lyon Fremantle, of HerMajesty's Coldstream Guards, that Rosecrans was a firmleader, and the only man he was aware of in the Union armywho did not suffer grave defeats. 6

The opinions of the soldiers of Rosecrans' army areyet another indicator of the high reputation Rosecransenjoyed. Rosecrans' soldiers liked him and respected hiscourage. A member of Rosecrans' army would write yearslater that Old Roseyl' enjoyed a great reputation with themen. He went on to say that . .no commander was evermore liked by his soldiers than Rosecrans. 7 Many under hiscommand observed that Rosecrans held a warm glace in thehearts of the soldiers, that he was respected for hisbravery under fire, and that he was a compassionate leader


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as demonstrated by his care and concern for the health andcomfort of the troops. 8

Rosecrans* reputation with others, however, was leesfavorable. Grant, as a result of Rosecrans* actions atCorinth and Iuka, accused him of lacking aggressiveness.Because Rosecrans expressed little love for politicians, anddid not appreciate political interference with his campaignplans, he often drew criticism for his actions from Stantonand Halleck. Still others, notably, Brigadier General JamesA Garfield, Rosecrans* chief of staff, would accuseRosecrans of possessing great genius for strategy, butlacking patience in combat to give the tactical maneuveringstime to develop. 9

Another important aspect of Rosecrans reputatianwas his character and personality. Rosecrans was amethodical planner who did not believe in accepting battlewithout making all necessary preparations. Rather, h.epreferred to take the time and meticulously prepare for anupcoming operation. Rosecrans would also spend a greatamount of time in reflection prior to a campaign. 0 Hisalmost six months of preparation for his move againstTullahoma proved to be an extreme example of this tendency.

Rosecrans was also tireless. He seemed capable ofgreat amounts of work with little sleep. He was a devoutRoman Catholic, but possessed an extensive vocabulary ofprofanities that he was not averse to using. He was often


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given to excitement, not from fear or nervousness, butbecause of anger or impatience. 1

Whatever the opinion held by those associated withRosecrans, it is likely that his continued bickering withthe higher authorities contributed to his relief followingthe Battle of Chickamauga. Other generals lost and remainedin command because of political support, but Rosecrans hadmanaged to erode whatever support he might have had by thetime the call for his relief came.4

If Rosecrans had a mixed reputation as a commander,so too did most of his corps commanders. His XIV Corpscommander was the notable exception. Major General GeorgeHenry Pap Thomas, a Virginian, attended West Point,graduated 12th in his class in 1840 and joined the 3rd U.S.Artillery. Prior to the Civil War he fought bravely againstthe Seminoles. Following the Seminole Wars Thomas fought inthe Mexican War, served on the faculty at West Point as atactics instructor and fought Indians in the westernfrontier.

With the outbreak of the Civil War Thomas, a majorin the, 2nd Cavalry, remained with the Union, despite hisVirginia roots. He quickly achieved a reputation as adependable and proficient field commander. Thomas foughthis first battle of the war as a brigade commander at theFirst Manassass. This was his first and only Easterntheater fight. Following Manassass and an assignment to the


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Western theater he fought at Mill Springs, Shiloh,Perryville and Stones River.4

Thomas apparently enjoyed a most trusted statuswith the army commander. Thomas and Rosecrans knew eachother since West Point and were fast friends. Rosecransalso deeply respected Thomas. He believed that Thomas had akeen eye for strategy, had the character of GeorgeWashington, and was absolutely trustworthy. 46

After assuming command of the Army of theCumberland, Rosecrans initiated the practice of conductingfrequent evening discussions with his corps commanders.Rosecrans acquired the habit of calling on Thomas prior t:omaking any critical decisions that would come out in theevening discussions. Even if time was not available for aconsultation with all corps commanders, Rosecrans almostalways consulted Thomas. 7

Major General Alexander McDowell McCook, commanderof XX Corps, was born in Ohio in 1831. He spent fiveyears, instead of the normal four, at West Point andgraduated in 1852 as a lieutenant of infantry. He served anuneventful career of fighting in the Indian wars in NewMexico, and by 1858 returned to the Military Academy toteach tactics. 8

When the Civil War began, McCook left his instructorduties and returned to Ohio to serve as a colonel in the 1stOhio Infantry Regiment. Prior to the Tullahoma campaign he


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fought at First Manassass as a brigade commander at Shilohas a division commander and at Perryville and Stones Riveras a corps commander. At Stones River his corps comprisedthe right wing of the army and suffered the brunt of theConfederate attack but fought bravely and managed to avoiddisaster. 49

Rosecrans did not hold McCook in particularly highesteem. Rosecrans believed McCook to be a political pushyand boyish individual. McCook impressed Rosecrans as onewho was not serious about his profession and prone to jokingwhen there was a need for attentiveness. FurthermoreRosecrans did not believe that McCook was capable of deepreasoning and sound decisionmaking. 50 This may explain whyMcCook inevitably was kept in close proximity to Thomas andRosecrans during the advance on Tullahoma.

Major General Thomas L. Crittenden XXI Corpscommander was born in Kentucky in May of 1819 Crittendenunlike his fellow corps commanders in the Army of theCumberland did not attend West Point. He became a lawyerin 1840 and practiced law until the outbreak of the MexicanWar when he enlisted in the army. Crittenden attained therank of colonel during war and eventually took command of aregiment.

With the declaration of war Crittenden sided withthe Union and took command of all Kentucky militia stillloyal to the United States. 2 In September 1861 Crittenden


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received a commission as a brigadier general of volunteers.He later fought at Shiloh and Corinth as a brigade anddivision commander. By the fall of 1862 Major GeneralCrittenden assumed command of one of the three army corps inBuell s army.53 His force became the XXI Army Corps whenRosecrans assumed command from Buell and redesignated theArmy of the Ohio as the Army of the Cumberland.

Crittenden enjoyed the reputation of being a warriorand his men harbored great respect for him. Rosecransbelieved Crittenden s intentions were good and that hedischarged his duty to his fullest ability. Rosecrans,however, was somewhat concerned about Crittenden s lack offormal military education.54 In spite of any reservations,Rosecrans would give Crittenden an important role in theTullahoma Campaign.

The Reserve Corps commander was Major General GordonGranger. Born in New York state in November of 1822, hegraduated from West Point as an artillery officer in 1845.Granger served initially in the western frontier then, withthe opening of the war with Mexico, went south with WinfieldScott s army. Following the Mexican War, Granger returnedto serve in the western frontier in a mounted infantryregiment. 55

Granger s first Civil War action was as a regimentalcommander at Wilson s Creek, Missouri in August of 1861.Following this he led a brigade at New Madrid, Island No. 10


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THE ARMY OF TENNESSEEBraxton Bragg, the commander of the Army of

Tennessee, was born in North Carolina in 1817. Raised in alarge family, with no money for college, Bragg sought anappointment to the United States Military Academy. Weentered the Academy in 1833 and was considered an excellent:,though somewhat moody, student. Bragg graduated alieutenant of artillery in 1837, the fifth of 50 cadets inhis class.

After graduation Bragg was assigned to the 3rdUnited States Artillery. At various times between 1830 and1843 Bragg participated in campaigns against the SeminoleIndians in Florida. It was during this time period thatBragg developed the first of many illnesses, dysentery.6

Bragg fought in all the major battles of the MexicanWar as an artillery commander and finished the war as aBrevet Lieutenant Colonel. He was an extremely braveleader. His most notable action occurred during the Battleof Buena Vista in 1847. It was here that Bragg earnedJefferson Davis respect and lasting gratitude. During adesperate moment in the battle, when all that stood betweenthe Mexican Army and the American army s rear was Davisregiment, Bragg wheeled his artillery battery into positicnjust in time to save Davis command. Throughout the battleBragg held his ground against heavy odds and prevented aMexican breakthrough. Davis later remarked that had it not


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been for Bragg s gallantry under fire that the American armywould have surely suffered defeat.

~ f t e k the Mexican War Bragg served on the frontierperforming various routine duties. By 1856 Bragg, then alieutenant colonel and frustrated with chasing Indians andnot getting choice assignments, resigned from the army. Hebecame a planter in Louisiana where he remained until theopening of the Civil War.

With the coming of the Civil War Bragg joined theConfederacy as a brigadier general in the Provisional Armyof the Confederate States. During the first months of thewar he served as coastal commander for all land forces fromPensacola to Mobile. It was in this capacity that Braggonce again bolstered his reputation with Jefferson Davis.Davis commented favorably on Bragg s performance andremarked that Bragg was the only general in the Confederatearmy who accomplished what he set out to do. 63

By September, 1861 Bragg received a promotion toMajor General and assumed command of General Albert SidneyJohnston s Second Army Corps in the Army of Mississippi.Bragg fought his first major battle as a corps commander atShiloh in April 1862 During the battle Johnston fellfatally wounded and Bragg controlled the battle for a timeuntil General P.G.T. Beauregard could take command. For hisbravery at Shiloh, Bragg was promoted to full General withan effective date of 6 April 1862 64


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In June 1862, Bragg replaced P.G.T. Beauregard asthe commander of the Army of Mississippi. Bragg thendevised an invasion plan for Kentucky. In October of 1862Br aggf s army, now called the Army of Tennessee gathered atPerryville, Kentucky and engaged Union forces under MajorGeneral Don Carlos Buell. Although Perryville was largely atactical draw, Bragg ordered a retreat from the field an.dwithdrew from the state allowing the North to claim avictory.65

As a result of his failed Kentucky campaign, Braq gwas left with little choice but to reestablish a defensiveline in Tennessee. His presence near Murfreesboro an.dRosecransf advance south precipitated the Battle of StonesRiver from 31 December 1862 January 1863. Once again,despite the lack of clear tactical defeat, Bragg withdrewfrom the field. He had not thought out plans in the eventthe battle lasted longer than a day. As a result heimprovised movements poorly, which allowed Rosecrans to holdthe field. He then moved his army south of the lowfoothills of middle Tennessee, and deployed his army alongthe Duck River line, with headquarters at Tullahoma.

~ragg s eputation during the first half of 1863 wasmuch less favorable than that of his Federal counterpart.While Bragg s reputation, like Rosecrans, was somewhatmixed, the differences of opinion held by those associatedwith Bragg were more pronounced. Interestingly, Bragg s


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superiors [Davis, Seddon and General Samuel Cooper1tolerated him, and with some reservation, judged Braggcapable of continued high command. This toleration of Braggwas for two reasons. Bragg had demonstrated exceptionalabilities in previous campaigns, notably Shiloh, and at themoment, other than Joseph Johnston, there was no one betterin Davis' mind to replace Bragg. Most of Brag gtssubordinates, however, questioned his competence. His corpsand division commanders disliked Bragg personally and lackedconfidence in his ability to lead the Army of Tennessee tovictory. 66

This lack of confidence stemmed partly from Bragg'spropensity to retreat in the face of victory. An attitudeof disgust permeated Br ag gt s subordinates after thedefeats at Perryville and Stones River. After Stones

River, Bragg asked his commanders for a vote of confidence.While some of his subordinates were more tactful thanothers, all agreed a change of commander would be good forthe army. As a result of this and Bragg's failure toexploit success, Bragg's subordinates lobbied their contactsfor a new commander for the Army of Tennessee. 7

Bragg remained in command in spite of the clamoringsfor his relief and the low state of morale among hisofficers. This is not to say that Richmond was totallyambivalent about the situation. Davis personally visitedBragg at Murfreesboro in December of 862 after hearing of


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discontent in Bragg s army. After Bragg s withdrawal fromMurfreesboro Davis ordered General Joseph Johnston t:oTullahoma to visit Bragg and, if necessary, take command.Davis and Seddon apparently believed by this point in thewar that Bragg might need relief and Johnston, by virtue ofhis position, could take command and later advise Davis.Still, Johnston found conditions satisfactory and Bragg wasnot relieved. The air of dissatisfaction and low mora1.econtinued to pervade his army.68

Although Johnston told Davis that Bragg would remainin command and left for Mobile, he had not been gone amonth, when on 9 March Davis ordered Johnston to proceed t:oTullahoma and assume command of Bragg s army. When Johnstonarrived he found Bragg in troubled spirits. Bragg s wifewas ailing and Bragg felt he should go to her. Johnston,not telling Bragg that he was in Tullahoma to assumecommand, agreed and took over for Bragg. A month laterBragg returned to find Johnston too ill to command. Braggtherefore resumed his role as commander of the Army ofTennessee. Bragg would remain in command through theBattle for Chattanooga in November 1863

Johnston s refusal to take command of the army fromBragg was a result of his respect for Bragg. Based onBragg s Mexican War reputation and his demonstratedabilities early in the Civil War, Johnston considered Braqga capable commander. He was also aware that Bragg


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reciprocated this respect. Johnston knew that it was Braggwho had lobbied the hardest for him to become the commanderof all Confederate armies in the west. The mutual respectshared by Johnston and Bragg was a major factor inJohnston s reluctance to relieve Bragg.

Part of the reason for defeats, and subsequentretreats, lay with Bragg s indecisive nature. Inpractically every case, Bragg was capable of puttingtogether a viable plan of action prior to a campaign orbattle. However, Bragg inevitably wavered at the first hintof a problem in executing the plan. He was indecisive,rather than flexible.71

This indecisiveness likely stemmed from Bragg s fearof making mistakes. The situation Bragg found himself in sthe commander of the Army of Tennessee was unenviable to saythe least. His army did not enjoy a high priority forreinforcements or supplies, yet by the fall of 1862 carriedthe burden of action in Kentucky and Tennessee. Davisinsistence that the Federals must not gain access intoTennessee placed great pressure on Bragg to perform. As aresult, Bragg searched hungrily for the options that wouldpreserve his army and, at the same time, deny the Federalsaccess to the land they doggedly sought. This, in turn,created a fear in Bragg that what he might do would fail.As events unfolded during battle Bragg often changed hismind because of the fear he might have made a mistake.


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Bragg's subordinates disliked and distrusted him.Many of Bragg's officers considered him harsh at times,quarrelsome, without compassion and unable to appreciate thehuman side of life. Bragg's character even made its effect:sfelt all the way down to the men. 7 A private in Bra gglsarmy best described how the men felt about Bragg:

None of General Bragg's soldiers ever loved him.They had no faith in his ability as a general. Hewas looked upon as a merciless tyrant. He[Braggl loved to crush the spirits of his men.The more of a hangdog look they had about them thebetter was General Bragg pleased. Not a singlesold 5r in the whole army ever loved or respectedhim.

Bragg was a strict disciplinarian and believed inadherence to the regulations. At one point a regiment ofTennessee volunteers insisted that they had the right toleave when their term of enlistment expired. Bragg statedsimply that there would not be mutiny or desertion. The dayof reckoning came and Bragg ordered up a battery ofartillery to force the men to remain in the service. 4

Bragg's reputation as the most argumentative man inthe whole Confederate army haunted him long before the CivilWar. A popular story, recounted in Grant's memoirs,referred to a time when Bragg was both the quartermaster anda company commander at a post in the army. One day ascompany commander Bragg requisitioned something from thequartermaster. As the quartermaster he refused it to thecompany commander (himself). When Bragg took the matter to


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the post commander for resolution, the commander, wellaware of Bragg s nature, exclaimed that not only had Braggargued vith everyone in the army, but now he was arguingwith himself.

To his credit Bragg was a good organizer, understoodthe value of discipline, and appreciated the need for drill.He did much to improve the Army of Tennessee in this regard.Unfortunately for Bragg, it was his harsh methods, lack oftact and unflinching adherence to the regulations that lostwhat he so hungrily sought; the respect and love of hissoldiers.

Bragg simply could not deal with individuals on aninterpersonal level. He had an irritable and impatientnature. This abrasive nature could infuriate friend andenemy alike. Bragg publicly humiliated his subordinates.Perhaps even more importantly, he seemed to cultivateenemies. They provided Bragg with ready scapegoats forfailures.7

Lastly, Bragg suffered from a diversity of ailmentsthat likely contributed to his foul personality. Hesuffered from frequent bouts of dysentery, dyspepsia andterrible migraine headaches. He ate very sparingly andslept little, although he was still capable of functioningat a much higher degree than many of those around him.

It is little wonder that Bragg had such difficultydealing with subordinates. It is perhaps amazing that in


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spite of the terrible dissension within his army, heremained in command for as long as he did. The answer t:ohis continued command goes beyond his reputation with Davisand Johnston. Bragg might be the lesser of the possib1.eevils confronting the Confederacy. For Bragg, like hissuperiors, had crosses to bear. Some of his subordinateswould try the most patient of men.

One such man was corps commander, Lieutenant GeneralLeonidas L. Polk. Polk was born in Raleigh, North Carolinain April 1806. He attended West Point and graduated n1827. While there he met Jefferson Davis and the two mendeveloped a deep friendship that would have importantconsequences during the Civil War.78

After six months of active duty, Polk resigned hi scommission and entered the Episcopal ministry. By the startof the Civil War Polk was the Southwest Missionary Bishopin Louisiana. Answering the call to arms, Polk reenteredthe army as a Confederate major general. 79

Polk intitially commanded Military Department Number2 in the expansive area which stretched from Kentucky to theMississippi River and organized the Army of Mississippi(later to become the Army of Tennessee). By late 1861, whenGeneral Albert S Johnston succeeded Polk in command of theArmy of Mississippi, Polk became a corps commander. efought in every major campaign of the Army of Tennesseeuntil killed at Pine Mountain, Georgia in 1864. 0


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As a leader Polk lacked tactical skill andaggressiveness. He was lavish in his appetites and dress.He had the irksome quality of obeying only those orders thatsuited him. Bragg thought at times Polk s slowness andselective compliance was insubordinate. Polk did, however,have one very special thing in his favor. He was not only agood friend of Davis but possessed a sizable following inRichmond. 81

Because of this special relationship with Davis andothers in Richmond, Polk enjoyed great power in and out ofthe army. Additionally, he was extremely kind toward hissoldiers, which strengthened his power base from below.Polk believed himself to be the overseer of the Army ofTennessee and as such he felt it his duty to protect it fromruin by the incompetent command of Bragg. ,When it appearedto Polk that Bragg would destroy the army he went overBragg s head and issued his complaints directly to PresidentDavis in Richmond.8

Polk first began to take matters directly toRichmond after the failed Kentucky invasion. After thefailure at Stones River, Polk wrote directly to Davis andrecommended Joseph Johnston take command of the army. Polkwrote Davis yet again in March of 1863 expressing his viewthat Bragg might be of better service elsewhere. 8

Bragg was not blind to Polk s maneuverings andPolk s behavior widened the rift between the two men. Bragg


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suspected Polk was instigating ill feeling toward him. ByMay of 1863, Bragg charged Polk with disobedience atPerryville and Polk, fearful of arrest, renewed his effortsto consolidate support for his defense. Bragg and Polk sanimosity damaged the Army of Tennessee as it prepared t:omeet Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee.84

Bragg s second corps commander was LieutenantGeneral William J. Hardee. Born in Camden County, Georgiain October of 1815, he graduated West Point in 1838. Hefought in the Indian Wars as an infantry company commanderand later served in Mexico where he received two promotionsfor bravery. After the Mexican War Hardee served as thecommandant of cadets at West Point where he wrote hisrenowned textbook entitled Rifle and Liaht Infantry Tacticq.This highly regarded manual was used by both sides duringthe Civil War.86

When Georgia seceded from the Union, Hardee resignedhis commission in the U.S. Army to become a colonel in theConfederate army. By October of 1861 he was a majorgeneral. He fought as a division commander under A.S.Johnston at Shiloh. Following Shiloh, Hardee became a wingcommander in the army and fought in the battles atPerryville and Stones River.8

Most army officers believed Hardee to be a soundtactician and resolute fighter and his sub0rdinat.ecommanders and men respected and admired him. Indeed,


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Hardeels influence within the army stemmed more from hisproficiency than from political connections. In everybattle he exhibited great personal courage. He alsounderstood the value of terrain and consistently apprisedBragg of such facts.

Though very different from Polk, he showed the samedislike of Bragg. Hardee also incurred Bragg s wrath anddistrust after the failure of the Kentucky campaign and theretreat from Murfreesboro. Hardee, like many othersdisgusted with Bragg s command style, eventually fell intothe anti-Bragg faction with Polk. 9 After Perryville heopenly criticized Bragg s performance in front of the otherofficers. After Stones River, Hardee candidly wrote Braggthat in his opinion Bragg no longer enjoyed the confidenceof the army and that a change was necessary.9

Faced with such honesty on the part of asubordinate, Bragg remained at odds with Hardee until he wastransferred later in the year. In Br agg ls eyes, Hardee wasnothing more than a troublemaker, who enjoyed criticizinghis superiors, but accepted little, if any, responsibilityhimself. Bragg s vocal opinions of Hardee, however, didlittle more than drive more fence-sitters into the anti-Bragg camp. 1

Bragg s relationship with his cavalrymen was hardlybetter. Continued infighting among the cavalry leadershipand their penchant for failing to provide Bragg with


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of 1863, Forrest swore he would never take orders fromWheeler again. Morgan for his part tried and was eventuallysuccessful in escaping Wheeler s command.

Nathan Bedford Forrest was perhaps the best generalin Brag gls army, yet he was self-taught in the art ofwarfare. Born in Bedford County, Tennessee on 13 July 1821,Forrest received little formal education. Despite thishumble beginning he became a successful planter and slavedealer prior to the Civil War. After enlisting in theConfederate army in early 1861 as a private, Forrestequipped a battalion of cavalry at his own expense andbecame its commander. During the siege at Fort Donelson in1862 Forrest received permission to escape with his menrather than surrender. Prior to Shiloh, the 3rd Tennesseeelected Forrest colonel of the regiment. By July of 1862Forrest received promotion to brigadier general and tookcommand of a cavalry division. Throughout the later monthsof 1862, Forrest s cavalry harassed Grant s communicationsin West Tennessee.9

Despite Forrest s successes, Bragg never consideredhim anything more than a partisan raider, devoid of thecapability for higher command. The close relationship Braggenjoyed with Wheeler probably did not help since Forrestdetested Wheeler and openly showed it. This behaviorprobably contributed to the ill feelings between Bragg andForrest.9


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ROSECRANS' PLANIn late October 1862, shortly after taking command

of the Army of the Cumberland from Bue11, R0secran.sreceived his orders from Halleck. Halleck directedRosecrans to apply pressure on Bragg to force the Army ofTennessee out of Kentucky. Halleck also directed Rosecransto cover Nashville and repair and secure the railroad t;opermit the movement of supplies between Nashville andLouisville. Additionally, Halleck informed Rosecrans thatit was necessary to remain actively employed and keep thepressure on Bragg to prevent the Army of '~ en nes se e frommoving west to affect Grant's operations. In these ordersHalleck also provided Rosecrans with two great objectivesfor the operations in Tennessee. Specifically, Rosecra:nswas to first move his army to drive the rebels out ofKentucky and Middle Tennessee. Second, he was I . .to takeand hold East Tennessee, cutting the line of railroad atChattanooga, Cleveland, or Athens, so as to destroy theconnection of the valley of Virginia with Georgia and theother Southern states. 98

By the end of January Rosecrans, already developinga reputation for slowness, achieved only the first portionof Halleck's directions. Rosecrana had moved into Tennesseeand pushed Bragg south. Bragg, however, still had a graspon Middle Tennessee and it remained for Rosecrans to expelhim.


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Rosecrans delayed the better part of six monthsbefore attempting to remove Bragg from Tennessee for fourbasic reasons. First, Rosecrans army was greatly depletedin supplies, wagon transport and cavalry, a situation thatrequired rectification before moving on. Rosecrans goalwas to have enough supplies on hand to fight two greatbattles. Second, Rosecrans stated that he must secure hislines of communication before advancing, which requiredadditional troops to guard the 185 miles between Louisvilleand Murfreesboro. Third, the extremely wet winter and thespring weather made roads impassible until May. Lastly,Rosecrans suggested he might actually be accomplishing partof his mission support of Grant by remaining inposition. Rosecrans feared that the Confederates might bewilling to sacrifice Middle Tennessee, and go to Pemberton said if threatened by an advance. Alternatively, Rosecranssuggested that an advance might have the ill effect offorcing Bragg s already depleted forces back to a betterdefensive line at Chattanooga. From Chattanooga fewer mencould defend and Bragg could slip reinforcements west.

Whatever Rosecrans reasons for delay it is clearthat it was not for the lack of planning. Indications arethat Rosecrans knew well before June what he intended to doand how he wanted to do it. It is unlikely, however, thatanyone in his command with the possible exception of Thomasknew the details of the plans prior to 22 or 3 June 1863


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Rosecrans stated years later that in May he divulged theplans to Brigadier General Hartsuff (Burnside's deputyoperating with forces north and east of Rosecrans).However, Rosecrans was quick to point out that he gave thedetails of his plan to no one else.100

Much of Rosecrans' hesitancy to inform hissubordinates about the campaign design stemmed from a fearthat a loose tongue might allow the enemy to gain knowledgeof the plan. Rosecrans was well aware that nonmilitaryenemiesM (spies and southern sympathizers) occupied his areaof operations and from time to time passed information 'the enemy. He was also aware that there might be a numberof uniformed soldiers and officers in his command who werespies. An incident in early May confirmed this suspicion.At that time Brigadier General John Turchin's cavalrybrigade captured two Confederate officers posing asinspectors. The two men possessed false orders fromWashington, D C and Rosecrans' headquarters authorizingthem to inspect all Federal positions. The inherent dangerin situations such as this did much to curtail Rosecrans'issuance of orders well before an event.101

Based on Halleck's guidance Rosecrans deemed itnecessary to drive the Rebels not only out of MiddleTennessee, but out of Chattanooga and beyond. Chattanoogawas a key railhub for traffic northeast to Virginia,southeast to Atlanta, and west to Memphis. Loss of the


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Chattanooga area would make it virtually impossible for theConfederates to move men swiftly vest to Vicksburg or eastto Virginia. Rosecrans estab1ishe.d a phased plan to wrestthe rail line from the Confederates. His plan for theoverall operation follows:

First: We must follow the line of the Nashvilleand Chattanooga Railroad [For the purposes oflogisticsSecond: We must surprise and manoeuvre Bragg outof his intrenched camps by moving over routes eastof him to seize the line of the Nashville andChattanooga Railroad in his rear; beat him if hefights, and follow and damage him as best we can,until we see him across the Tennessee.Third: We must deceive him as to the point of ourcrossing of the Tennessee and securely establishourselves on the south side.Fourth: We must then manoeuvre him out ofChattanooga, get between him and that point, andfight him, if possible, on ground of our. ownchoosing, and if not, upon such ground as we can.Fifth: Burnside must follow and guard the leftflank of our movement, especially when we get intothe mountains. His entrance into East Tennesseewill lead Bragg s attention to Chattanooga andnorthward, while we cross below that point.Sixth: Since our forces in the rear of Vicksburgwould be endangered by General Joseph E. Johnston,if he should have enough troops, we must notdrive Bragg out of Middle Tennessee until it shallbe too lTtj5 for his command to reenforceJohnston s.

This operational scheme extends beyond the scope ofthis study, however, it demonstrates Rosecrans was lookingmuch further ahead than the mere removal of Bragg fromTennessee. This scheme points out some key considerations.First, Rosecrans oriented on the Nashville and Chattanooga


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Railroad to protect and sustain his replenishment and at th,esame time looked to cut Bragg s line of communications.Second, this scheme further explains Rosecrans desire notto move too early. Rosecrans deduced that by forcing Braggto keep the Army of the Cumberland in check, this actua1l.yhelped preclude reinforcing Vicksburg. 3

A third and significant point s that Rosecrans wasunder orders from Halleck to cooperate with Burnside.Burnside too was not ready to move until June. Rosecransdid not dare move until assured that his left flank wasprotected, though Halleck almost undid the plan. In thefirst week of June he ordered Burnside to provide forces toGrant at the very time Burnside was preparing to advance,which caused Rosecrans and Burnside to delay further to

1 4assess the impact.Understanding what Rosecrans intended to do in the

long term, one can now appreciate the following explanationof Rosecrans plan. Rosecrans planned to conduct the firsttwo phases of his grander scheme as part of the MiddleTennessee or Tullahoma campaign. After months ofreconnaissance and study of Bragg s defenses, Rosecransdetermined a frontal assault would be too hazardous. Anassault against Shelbyville would also allow Bragg a safeline of retreat through the narrow roads that moved up overthe Barrens and south to Chattanooga. Ever mindful ofBragg s supposed superiority in cavalry Rosecrans al.so


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assumed that Bragg could keep his railroad open during aretreat. 05

Rosecrans, therefore, envisioned a two part plan torid Middle Tennessee of Bragg. The first part of his planwould entail the deployment of forces to deceive Bragg aboutthe location of the main attack, thereby forcing Bragg outof his entrenchments along the Duck River line. The secondpart of Rosecrans plan, never realized during the campaign,entailed cutting Bragg s line of communication by moving onthe railroad bridge over the Elk River which would causeBragg to retreat on a disadvantageous line. While thesecond part of the plan risked battle with Bragg, if hefought, this was not Halleck s primary charter to Rosecrans.Rosecrans instructions from Halleck established clearlythat driving Bragg out of Middle Tennessee was the mainobjective and Rosecrans plan reflected this as the primarymission. This did not mean, however, Rosecrans planignored Bragg s army. Rosecrans clearly envisioned thepossibility of fighting Bragg in Tennessee to destroyBragg s army if Bragg fought. Rosecrans plan of maneuver,however, oriented primarily on a geographical objective andaddressed the enemy only from a contingency perspective. 106

To accomplish his plan Rosecrans felt it necessaryto convey that the Union main effort would advance on theShelbyville route. he main effort, however, wouldactually go on the Manchester Pike through Hoover s Gap


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south to Manchester. From Manchester, the army couldthreaten Bragg s flank and his line of retreat. Thismaneuver, by enveloping Bragg s right flank, would hopefullyforce Bragg to leave his entrenchments and retreat. I 3accordance with this scheme, Rosecrans intended to moveGranger s command to Triune and on tovard Christiana tothreaten Shelbyville. A small infantry and cavalry forcewould advance simultaneously with this feint and head easttoward Woodbury. Rosecrans believed the force advancing on

Woodbury would appear to Bragg as a feint, designed to coverthe perceived main attack on Shelbyville. In the meantimetwo of Rosecrans army corps would force the gaps and pass tothe east of the main entrenchments.1 7

Once Rosecrans enveloped Bragg s right flank, th.eenvelopment would become a turning movement that wou1.dforce Bragg out of his defensive works. If Bragg chose toflee, as Rosecrans hoped he would, Rosecrans would denyBragg the best withdrawal routes. Rosecrans could then usethe better routes to pursue Bragg s army thereby driving himout of Tennessee. If Bragg attempted to fight Rosecranswould draw Bragg into a one-sided battle. Rosecransreasoned that whether Bragg fled or fought, the result wouldbe the same, however, his emphasis was on gaining MiddleTennessee through maneuver not decisive combat. 8


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BRAGG S PLANBragg, unlike his counterpart to the north, did not

receive much in the way of long range guidance from hissuperiors. In the early months of 1863 Bragg s immediatesuperior, General Joseph Johnston, was himself unsure ofRichmond s expectations for Middle Tennessee. Johnston andBragg seemed to have agreed on a form o fdefensive/offensive strategy. In other words, Bragg s armywould remain initially on the defense and attack only if aclear opportunity presented itself. This strategy, however,was not articulated well and it served as a source ofconfusion for Bragq s subordinates. By May, it seemed thatthe situation had not improved. Johnston, now inMississippi, was more absorbed with Vicksburg and itssituation than with developing a strategy with Bragq.Furthermore, during the month of May Johnston incorrectlybelieved he did not command Bragg s department. 109

Without specific direction from Richmond orJohnston, Bragg had to deduce what he was expected to do inMiddle Tennessee; which he believed was simply to defend andprevent the capture of Chattanooga. To do this Braggfelt it would be far better to remain in prepared works.From the defensive works Bragg could fend off Rosecrans,deny him the railroad and avoid decisive defeat on an openfield of battle. Bragg s rationale for defense, however,went beyond Davis unwillingness to lose ground. His


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Bragg s troop strength represented another obstacleto offensive planning. While at Tullahoma, Bragg andJohnston managed to gather replacements for Bragg s armyfrom other areas in the West. Additionally, Bragg receivedover 5000 soldiers as a result of General Gideon Pillow sconscription of men in Tennessee and Alabama. With theseacquisitions Bragg received over 10 000 men between Januaryand May of 1863. However, transfers of men from Bragg scommand to the West, particularly in April and May, keptBragg at basically the same strength he finished with atStones River. 13

Perhaps the most interesting reason for Bragg scontinued defense was a parallel to Rosecrans philosophyfor not attacking Bragg. In a letter to his wife in earlyJune, Bragg stated that his demonstrations and raidingsbehind Rosecrans lines had the effect of checkingRosecrans. Bragg maintained that by remaining in MiddleTennessee, and thereby fixing Rosecrans army, he preventedRosecrans from shifting troops to aid Grant. Bragg alsomaintained that by defending and the occasional raiding, heconcealed his own transfer of troops to the West.Traditional defense thus became Bragg s choice. 14

Brag gls defensive line stretched over seventy milesacross its front. Bragg was forced to spread out to forageand cover the approaches to Chattanooga. Bragg, however,knew that the better roads lay in front of Shelbyville and


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traversed Guy s and Bellbuckle Gaps. The railroad that:Rosecrans would use passed through Bellbuckle Gap. It madesense to Bragg that Rosecrans would need to follow thecourse of the railroad to secure it. Additionally, Bragqbelieved that the terrain to the east of Hoover s Gap, whilepassable, was too difficult and too far from Rosecransintended line to be a serious threat. 115

Hardee, tasked with defending the right flank, too:kexception with Bragg s analysis. Hardee pointed out thatTullahoma and the defensive positions around it offered fewadvantages for a defense against Rosecrans. Hardee feltTullahoma could be enveloped via the right flank. Theenemy, he maintained, could come shallow on the ManchesterDecherd approach or come deep via the McMinnville PelhamCowan approach. Of the two approaches, Hardee believed thefirst to be the most likely. He stated that Hoover s Gapand the road from Lumley s Stand provided a more directroute to Chattanooga than did the approach via Shelbyville.Hardee further stated that Tullahoma was too far west toprevent the Federals from continuing south once they gainedManchester. Hardee maintained Rosecrans would simply bypassTullahoma in this case. 16

Bragg disagreed and argued that Rosecrans would optto take a more direct approach to reach Chattanooga.Bragg s belief stemmed from a continued pattern of Federalactivity on the Confederate left flank during the spring.


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On no less than three occasions, twice in March and once inApril, the Federals conducted strong reconnaissances nearSpring Hill and Guy s Gap respectively. Additionally,Bragg s intelligence confirmed that an attack on the rightflank of the army was highly unlikely, as no Federalactivity in the east had as yet been noted. Furthermore,Bragg reasoned, it made no sense for Rosecrans to move eastaway from his line of communications. 117

In March Bragg developed a plan which offered anopportunity to maneuver. Bragg intended to use Tullahomaonly as a position to fix Rosecrans. When Rosecransattempted to continue south from Bellbuckle and to the eastof Shelbyville he would be stopped by Hardee s forces inTullahoma, then be susceptible to attack on his flank byPolk s corps from Shelbyville. 118

Unfortunately for Bragg he could not make his twocorps commanders understand the concept. Other than brieflyoutlining the concept of potential flank attacks, Bragg didnot convey these ideas as orders. As a result, Hardee wasconfused as to his role, and even where he should positionhis forces. Polk, for his part, maintained he did not knowanything of his role in maneuver plan until it was orderedon the 26th of June. 19

Hardee apparently thought he was not supposed tocontest heavily attacks made by Union forces advancing eastof Liberty Gap. Rather, he believed he should fall back to


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Tullahoma if threatened and defend from the works therein.This is a likely explanation for Hardee s failure to defendwell forward in strength at Hoover s and Liberty Gaps. 120

Apparently, Bragg also considered anotheralternative in his defense. In the unlikely event Rosecranstried to flank to the west of Shelbyville, cross the ElkRiver, and proceed directly south of Shelbyville, Hardeecould conduct a flank attack from his Wartrace position.Once again, however, it appears that neither Polk nor Hardeeunderstood the details of this plan. 121

This confused situation did not improve in themonths between March and June. In fact, the discord withinthe leadership of the Army of Tennessee did anything buthelp foster an attitude of understanding or cooperation forthe defensive plan. By June, Bragg s army was still sittingon the Duck River line with the preponderance of Bragg sforces in Shelbyville and Wartrace. The cavalry stillcovered the gaps. One difference did, however, exist thiltwas not the case prior to June. Hardee received permissionfrom Bragg to position infantry forces further north andcloser to the gaps. After convincing Bragg of the necessityto cover the gaps with more force, Hardee positionedBrigadier General William Bate s brigade of Major GeneralAlexander P. Stewart s division forward at Beech Grove.Hardee then moved the remainder of his corps (minus LuciusPolk s brigade of Cleburne s division) to Wartrace. 122


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Such was the situation of the armies in MiddleTennessee as the summer campaign season opened. WhileBragg s leaders feuded, Rosecrans planned his operation.While Bragg lost soldiers, Rosecrans gained strength andimproved his cavalry capability. While Bragg pleaded forsupplies to feed his army, Rosecrans stockpiled enoughsupplies for two great battles. The months of June and Julywould be momentous for the Union and would further frustratethe ailing fortunes of the Confederate armies in the West.


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Johnston in the West. Secretary Seddon prevailed onJohnston to take the soldiers he needed to aid Pembertonfrom Bragg's army and from the scattered garrisons in theWest.1~c~urry, wo Great Rebel Armies, 54; Grant'smaneuverings during his 1864-65 campaign in Virginia were amanifestation of this policy. He would conduct his campaignprimarily to keep Lee from sending troops to other areas,allow Sherman to advance without threat, and to satisfy thepublic opinion of the north which still desired a visibleattempt to capture Richmond.''united States, The War Department, The War of the&bellion: A Comoilation of the Official Records of the

o n and Confederate Armies, 128 Vols. (Washington, D.C.:U S Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, Vol23/2; Message from Halleck to Rosecrans, 30 Jan, 1863, 23;Message from Halleck to Burnside, 23 Mar, 1863, 162; Messagefrom Halleck to Rosecrans, 25 Mar, 1863, 171; Message fromHalleck to Burnside, 18 May, 1863, 337; Message from Halleckto Rosecrans, 3 Jun, 1863, 383. (Hereafter referred to asOR. Volume and part cited in Series I unless otherwiseoted); Victor Hicken, Illinois in the Civil War (Urbana,Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 19661, 187; McPherson,Battle Crv of Freedom 669.

l2~hornas . Connelly, Autumn of Glorv (Baton RougeLousiana State University Press, 19711, 93; McMurry, woGreat Rebel Armies, 57.13@3 23/2: Johnston to Polk, 3 Mar. 1863, 659-60.14stanley F. Horn, The Armv of Tennessee: A MilitarvHistorv (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 19411, 232.~ames Longstreet, From Manassas to A D D O ~ ~ ~ ~ O X(Secaucus, N.J.: The Blue and Grey Press, ND. , 327; GlennTucker, in Chickamauaa: Bloodv Battle of the West, mentionsthat Longstreet may have had designs on Bragg's command.This may have entered Longstreet's mind as a motivation forrecommending the movement of his corps to Tennessee.

16~orn, he Armv of Tennessee 232.1 7 0 ~ 3/1: Army of Tennessee strength return for June20, 18637 585 .OR 23/1: Army of the cumberland strength return formonth o f J u n e 1863, 411; Rosecrans' extensive Department ofthe Cumberland actually contained over 97,000 officers andmen, however, the leaves, absences, and garrison details


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left his fighting forces at Murfreesboro at just over65,000.190R 23/1: Army of Tennessee strength return for June20, 18637585; Army of the Cumberland strength return forthe month of June 1863, 411.20~hief f Engineers, United States Army, Military Ma.?of the Tullahoma. Chickamauaa and Chattanooaa Ca m~ ai an s.21 ~h ie f f Engineers, Militarv Mao.2 2 ~3/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 404.2 3 ~ ~3/1: Rosecrans to Stanton, 24 July 1863, 404.24~onnelly, utumn of Glorv, 112.25~onnelly, Autumn of Glory, 134.2 6 ~ z r a . Warner, Generals in Blue (Baton Rouge:Louisiana State University Press, 19641, 410; David L.Wilson, William S. Rosecrans, in American MilitarvLeaders, eds. Roger J. Spiller and Joseph G. Davson 111,(New York: Praeger Publishers, 19691, 263.27 ~ill ia m . Lamers, The Edae of Glory. A Bioa ra ~h vGeneral William S. Rosecrans, U.S.A. (New York: Harcourt,Brace and World Inc., 19611, 16; Wilson, Rosecrans inAmerican Military Leaders, eds. Spiller and Davson, 263;Warner, Generals in Blue, 410.28 ~a me rs , dae of Glorv, 34; Wilson, Rosecrans inAmerican Militarv Leaders, eds. Spiller and Dawson, 263;Warner, Generals in Blue, 411.29~amers, dae of Glory, 103-121; Wilson, ''Rosecransin American Militarv Leaders, eds. Spiller and Davson, 264.30 ~a me rs , dae of Glorv, 103-121; Wilson, ffRosecransin American Militarv Leaders, eds. Spiller and Dawson, 264.31~lysses . Grant, Ulvsses S. Grant. Personal Memoirsof U.S. Grant Selected Letters 1839-1865 (Memoirsorignially published New York: Charles Webster Co., 1885-6;Letters originally published by Southern University Press,1967-85; this book represents the incorporation of both; NewYork: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1990),282.32~ilson , fRosecrans n American Militarv Leaders,eds. Spiller and Dawson, 264; Warner, Generals in Blue, 411.


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3 3 ~ r u c e atton, At the Edge of Glory, AmericanHeritaqe Maoazine, February 1962, 109.34 ~a me rs , dae of Glory, 15.3 5 ~ ~0/1: Bragg to Cooper; Bra ggl s report ofTullahoma Campaign, 665.36~amers, dqe of Glory, 245.37~ra nk . Carpenter, Personal Letters, (FortLeavenworth, KS: Carpenter Files in Staff Ride Office),38~rank . Carpenter, With Old Rosey, The NationalTribune 7 January 1892.39~rant, emoirs, 282; Lamers, Edqe of Glorv, 4;Lamers, Edae of Glorv, 4.40 ~am ers , dae of Glorx, 5.41 ~i ck en , llinois in the Civil War, 187.4 2 ~ l e n n ucker, Chickamauqa: Bloody Battle in theWest, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.,1961;repr., Dayton, OH: Press of Morningside Bookshop, 19841, 37.4 3 ~ o h n itch, Annals of the Armv of the Cumberland,(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1863), 56.4 4 ~ c ~ u r r y ,wo Great Rebel Armies, 34.45 ~a rn er , enerals in Blue, 501.46~homas . Van Horne, Historv of the Armv of theCumberland (Cincinnati: Ogden, Campbell and Co., 1875;reprinted, Wilmington, North Carolina: Broadfoot PublishingCo., 19881, 245.47~ ar ner , enerals in Blue, 500; Van Horne, Historv,xiv, 245.48 ~a rn er , enerals in Blue, 294-5.49 ~i tc h, nnals, 73-5.50 ~i ll iam .G. Shanks, Personal Recollections ofDistinquished Generals, (New York: Harper Brothers, 18661,248-9.51~arner, enerals in Blue, 100.

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52 ~a rn er , enerals in Blue, 100.5 3 ~ a n orne, Historv, 184.54 ~h an ks , ecollections, 249.55~arner,. enerals in Blue, 181.56~arner, enerals in Blue, 181.5701iver L. Spaulding, Jr., "William S. Rosecrans," inDumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Bioqra~hv NewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19431, Vol. XVI, 164.58~arner, enerals in Blue, 470.59~arner, enerals in Blue, 470.6 0 ~ z r a . Warner, Generals in Grav (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press, 19591, 30; Henry SteeleCommager and John S. Bowman, The Civil War Almanac (NewYork: Gallery Books, 1983), 313.' l ~ r a d ~ cWhiney, Braxton Braqq and Confederate DefeakVol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 19691, 27.62~arner, enerals in Gray, 30; Don C. Seitz, BraxtorBrass General of the Confederacy (Columbia, S.C.: the StateCompany, 1924), 9.6 3 ~ c ~ h i n e y ,raxton Braaq, 202.64~arner, enerals in Grav, 30; Seitz, Braqq, 104;McWhiney, Braxton Braqq, 202, 230-1.65~a rn er , enerals in Grav 30; Commager and Bowman,Almanac 316; Thomas L. Connelly, Armv of the Heartland: The-Armv of Tennessee (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State UniversityPress, 19671, 183.6 6 ~ n ebruary of 1863, Davis dispatched General JosephJohnston on an inspection visit to determine the state ofBragg's army. He also desired Johnston to determine ifBragg was still fit for command. In his reports to Davis

Johnston, satisfied that Bragg's army was in good spirits,stressed to Davis that Bragg was fit for command. 23/2:Johnston to Davis, 3 Feb. 1863, 624; Johnston to Davis, 12Feb. 1863, 632; Others within the Army of Tennessee such asGeneral Polk wrote to Davis and implored the president torelieve Bragg for the good of the army. Q 23/2: Polk toDavis, 30 Mar. 1863, 729.


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6 7 ~reat deal of the problem was that the Army ofTennessee did achieve tactical successes. Bragg's tendencyto overestimate the enemy inevitably led him to theconclusion to retreat from the field. This meant that apotentially beaten Union Army, who stayed on the field ofbattle, claimed the victory. Of additional importance arethe attempts by Bragg's subordinates to seek his relief.After Perryville and Murfreesboro many of Bragg'ssubordinates wrote letters to Davis. OR 23/2: Polk to Davis,30 Mar. 1863, 729. Others within Br ag gl s army such asCheatham, Hardee, Withers, and Cleburne either openly toldor wrote Bragg that his presence was no longer desirable andthat he no longer had the confidence of the army. 20/2:Cleburne to Bragg, 3 Jan. 1863, 699; 20/1: Cheatham toBragg, 13 Jan. 1863, 698; Horn, Tennessee 223; Connelly,Autumn of Glorv 75-77.680 52/2: Davis to Johnston, 22 Jan. 1863, 410;

Connelly, Autumn of Glory 40, 77.69~ ill iam . Polk, Leonidas Polk, B i s h o ~ nd GeneralVol 2., (New York: Longmans Publishing Co., 18931, 298-9; R23/2: Johnston to Bragg, 10 Apr. 1863, 745-6.70~ ilb ert Govan and James W. Livingood, A DifferentValor: The Story of General J o s e ~ h Johnston. C.S.A. (NewYork: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 19561, 162.71~onnelly, Autumn of Glorv 71.72~onnelly, utumn of Glory 70; Horn, Tennessee 156.7 3 ~ a m . Watkins, IfCo. Avtch. Maurv Gravs. FirstTennessee Reuiment (Nashville: Cumberland PresbyterianPublishing House, 1882; repr. edition, Wilmington, NorthCarolina: Morningside, 19901, 98.74 ~i ll ia m atson, Life in the Confederate Army (NewYork: Charles Scribner's Sons, 18881, 368.75 ~r ant , emoirs 449-50.76~onnelly, Autumn of Glorv 69; Horn, Tennessee 157.77~ucker, hickamausa 76, 79.78~arner, enerals in Gray 242; OR 20/2: General OrderNo. 143, 388.79 ~a rn er , enerals in Grav 242-3.''Warner, Generals in Grav 74.

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~ c ~ u r r y ,Two G r e a t R e b e l A r mi e s 1 1 4 ; L e t t e r f r o mB ra gg t o h i s w i f e , 2 5 S e p. 1 86 3, B r ag g P a p e r s .

8 2 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r v 2 0-1 .8 3 ~ o n n e l l y , Autumn o f G l o r y 2 0- 1, OR 2 0/ 1: P o

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Tullahoma Campaign