Crim Pro Digest 3

8/3/2019 Crim Pro Digest 3

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Criminal Procedure a2010 page 32 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales

US v HEERY 25 Phil 600

TRENT; Oct 22, 1913

FACTS

-Heery was charged with attempted murder, but wasconvicted of the lesser crime of maliciously inflictingserious injury upon Alex Sternberg, and wassentenced to one year and three months of prisioncorreccional by the trial court.-On appeal, the decision was affirmed but case wasremanded because it did not include the evidence of civil damages suffered by the offended party.-Then lower court, in its ruling, restated theconviction (of one yr to 3 months of prisioncorreccional) and then included P50,500 forindemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.-Heery raised the question of double jeopardy, andthe award being excessive.

ISSUES1. WON remanding the case for determination of civil damages and their assessment against thedefendant are to be considered as a modification of the punishment, by increasing the penalty orotherwise, meted out to the defendant for thecommission of the crime. (WON there is double

jeopardy)2. WON award was excessive

HELD1. NO.- Civil damages are no part of the punishment for thecrime.

- What was the effect of the action of this court inaffirming that judgment as to the guilt andpunishment of the accused and of reversing it as tothe question of civil damage, with instructions toexecute the punishment imposed and to try the civilbranch of the case? Bearing in mind the broad line of demarcation between the civil liability of the accusedand his criminal liability, the bare fact that his civilliability was determined and fixed had nothingwhatever to do with the punishment imposed. Thelatter was not thereby affected. This timeintervening between the judgment of guilt and the

judgment of civil damages could in no way give tothe latter the character of the former.- (That) the defendant might serve the term of

imprisonment fixed by the court as the punishmentfor his crime, and after the sentence for civil

damages and in case of his insolvency, he wouldhave to return to prison to serve the subsidiaryimprisonment by reason of his insolvency, beingargued that this would constitute double jeopardy. Itis well settled that execution against the person willissue in civil actions in case of personal injuries, and

that this is not imprisonment for debt or punishmentfor crime. It is in lieu of the payment of the indemnityand is considered as a discharge thereof. If thepayment of the indemnity is not punishment for thecrime, the imprisonment in lieu thereof is notpunishment for the crime.- As the civil liability is no part of the punishment forthe crime, there would have been no question of double jeopardy... In the present case, the civilliability of the defendant was established, and thesole question determined upon the second trial wasthe amount of civil damages. The plea of double

jeopardy can not be allowed.-On civil liability of persons accused of crime:

- Springer vs. Odlin: "By General Orders, No. 58,section 107, the privileges secured by the Spanishlaw to persons claiming to be injured by thecommission of an offense to take part in theprosecution of the offense and to recover damagesfor the injury sustained by reason of the same, arepreserved and remain in force, and it is thereinexpressly provided that the court, upon convictionof the accused, may enter judgment in favor of theinjured person, against the defendant in thecriminal case for the damage occasioned by thewrongful act."- Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.: "Accordingto article 112 (Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure)the penal action once started, the civil remedyshould be sought therewith, unless it had beenwaived by the party injured or been expresslyreserve by him for civil proceedings for the future.If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising outof a crime that could be enforced only on privatecomplaint, the penal action thereunder should beextinguished."- Almeida vs. Abaroa (8 Phil. Rep., 178), was a civilaction for damages brought the plaintiff against aperson who had been previously acquitted on acriminal charge. It was held that his acquittal in thecriminal action was a complete bar to a civil actionfor damages based upon the alleged criminal actof which the defendant had been accused. In thecourse of this decision it was said:

- "Instituting a criminal action only, it will beunderstood, brings the civil action as well, unless thedamaged or prejudiced person waives the same or

expressly reserves the right to institute the civilaction after the termination of the criminal case, if there be any reason therefor. (Art. 112 of the saidLaw of Criminal Procedure.)- "The right to bring the civil action, as reserved bythe person damaged or prejudiced, after the

termination of the criminal case, is only permitted, if there be any reason therefore, and so says the law,in the event that the judgment rendered in thecriminal cause is a finding of guilt against theaccused; but if the accused be acquitted, then thecompliant in the civil action must be based on somefact and or cause distinct and separate from thecriminal act itself."- The court then quotes from article 114 of theSpanish Code of Criminal Procedure provides:

"When a criminal proceeding is instituted for the judicial investigation of a crime or misdemeanor,no civil action arising from the same act can beprosecuted; but the same shall be suspended, if there be one, in whatever stage or state it may befound, until final sentence in the criminalproceeding is pronounced."To prosecute a penal action it shall not benecessary that a civil action arising from the samecrime or misdemeanor be previously instituted."

- Under the Spanish criminal law, an injured personhad the right to intervene in the prosecution of theaccused for the purpose of having his damagesascertained. The trial court was required to includethe amount of these damages in the judgment of conviction. The plain provisions of section 107 of ourcriminal procedure, quoted supra, expresslypreserves this right to the injured person. The refusalof the trial court to allow the injured person tointroduce evidence as to his damages is, therefore,clearly prejudicial error.2. YES.- There can be no objection to allowing thephysicians' fees of P500 and P1,300 for the threemonths' salary, being the time the injured party wasincapacitated from performing the work in which hewas then engaged. The remainder, P48,700, appearsto have been allowed on account of the permanentdiminution of Sternberg's ability to earn money. Theevidence of record does not establish such disabilitywith that degree of certainly which will justify anaward for that purpose. We have reached thisconclusion after a most careful examination of all thetestimony upon this point.Dispositive The award of damages is reduced toP1,800, the defendant to suffer subsidiary


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defendants Yakult and Salvado to appeal the judgment. They also filed a peitition for certiorari inthe CA challenging the RTCs jurisdiction in the civilcase. Their argument was that the civil action fordamages for injuries arising from alleged criminalnegligence, there being no malice, cannot be filed

independently of the criminal action and that underRule 111 Sec.1 of the 1985 Rules of Crim. Pro., sucha separate civil action may not be filed unlessreservation thereof is expressly made.- The CA on Nov. 1989, dismissed the petition andthe subsequent MFR.

ISSUEWON a civil action instituted after a criminal actionwas filed can prosper even if there was noreservation to file a separate civil action

HELD YES- Although the separate civil action filed in this case

was without previous reservation in the criminalcase, it was nevertheless instituted before theprosecution presented evidence in the criminalaction, and the presiding judge handling the criminalaction was duly informed thereof, such that nodamages was awarded in the disposition of thecriminal action.Reasoning- Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civilaction for the recovery of civil liability is impliedlyinstituted with the criminal action unless theoffended party waives the civil action, reserves hisright to institute it separately or institutes the civilaction prior to the criminal action.- Such civil action includes recovery of indemnityunder the Revised Penal Code, and damages underArticles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.It is also provided that the reservation of the right toinstitute the separate civil action shall be madebefore the prosecution starts to present its evidenceand under circumstances affording the offendedparty a reasonable opportunity to make suchreservation.** The SC considered the actual filing of the civilaction far better than a compliance with therequirement of an express reservation that should bemade by the offended party before the prosecutionpresents its evidence. It added that the purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the

offended party from recovering damages twice forthe same act or omission.Dispositive petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.

MANIAGO vCA (BOADO)253 SCRA 674

MENDOZA; February 20, 1996

FACTS- Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttlebuses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, Inc. from Baguio City properto its plant site at the Export Processing Authority inLoakan, Baguio City.- One of his buses figured in a vehicular accident witha passenger jeepney owned by private respondentAlfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As aresult of the accident, a criminal case for recklessimprudence resulting in damage to property andmultiple physical injuries was filed against

petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya, with theRegional Trial Court of Baguio City- A month later, a civil case for damages was filed byprivate respondent Boado against petitioner himself - Petitioner moved for the suspension of theproceedings in the civil case against him, citing thependency of the criminal case against his driver. Butthe trial court denied petitioners motion on theground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the actioncould proceed independently of the criminal action,in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not theaccused in the criminal case.- CA dismissed his petition- There is no dispute that private respondent, asoffended party in the criminal case, did not reserve

the right to bring a separate civil action, based onthe same accident, either against the driver,Herminio Andaya, or against the latters employer,herein petitioner Ruben Maniago.- petitioner argues that the civil action against himwas impliedly instituted in the criminal actionpreviously filed against his employee becauseprivate respondent did not reserve his right to bringthis action separately. (The records show that whilethis case was pending in the Court of Appeals, thecriminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 forfailure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of itsevidence, with the consequence that the prosecutionfailed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems tobe petitioners argument that since the civil action to

recover damages was impliedly instituted with the

criminal action, the dismissal of the criminal casebrought with it the dismissal of the civil action.)- Private respondent admits that he did not reservethe right to institute the present civil action againstAndayas employer. He contends, however, that therights provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil

Code are substantive rights and, as such, theirenforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservationto bring the action to enforce them separately.

ISSUEWON despite the absence of reservation, Boado maynonetheless bring an action for damages againstpetitioner under the Art.2176, 2180 and 2177 of theCivil Code and Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

HELDNORatio The right to bring an action for damages under

the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. 1 quiteclearly requires that a reservation must be made toinstitute separately all civil actions for the recoveryof civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed tohave been instituted with the criminal case. The rightof the injured party to sue separately for therecovery of the civil liability whether arising fromcrimes or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of theCivil Code must be reserved otherwise they will bedeemed instituted with the criminal action.Reasoning A. There are statements in some cases implying thatRule 111, 1 and 3 are beyond the rulemakingpower of the Supreme Court under the Constitution.A careful examination of the cases, however, willshow that approval of the filing of separate civilaction for damages even though no reservation of the right to institute such civil action had beenreserved rests on considerations other than that noreservation is needed.- In Garcia v. Florido the right of an injured person tobring an action for damages even if he did not makea reservation of his action in the criminal prosecutionfor physical injuries through reckless imprudencewas upheld on the ground that by bringing the civilaction the injured parties had in effect abandonedtheir right to press for recovery of damages in thecriminal case.- In Abellana v. Marave in which the right of personsinjured in a vehicular accident to bring a separateaction for damages was sustained despite the fact


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that the right to bring it separately was not reserved.But the basis of the decision in that case was the factthat the filing of the civil case was equivalent to areservation because it was made after the decision of the City Court convicting the accused had beenappealed.

- In Jarantilla v. CA the ruling is that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case for physical injuriesthrough reckless imprudence on the ground of reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of anaction for damages even though the filing of thelatter action was not reserved. This is because of Art.29 of the Civil Code which provides that when anaccused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt hasnot been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civilaction for damages for the same act or omission maybe instituted. This ruling obviously cannot apply tothis case because the basis of the dismissal of thecriminal case against the driver is the fact that theprosecution failed to prove its case as a result of itsfailure to make a formal offer of its evidence.

- the rulings in these cases are consistent with theproposition herein made that, on the basis of Rule111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civilliability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted withthe criminal action, except only (1) when such actionarising from the same act or omission, which is thesubject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the rightto bring it separately is reserved or (3) such actionhas been instituted prior to the criminal action. Evenif an action has not been reserved or it was broughtbefore the institution of the criminal case, theacquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civilliability unless the acquittal is based on a finding thatthe act from which the civil liability might arise didnot exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.- Through all the shifts or changes in policy as to thecivil action arising from the same act or omission forwhich a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear:

The change has been effected by this Court. The newrules require reservation of the right to recover thecivil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed tohave been instituted with the criminal action.- Contrary to private respondents contention, therequirement that before a separate civil action maybe brought it must be reserved does not impair,diminish or defeat substantive rights, but onlyregulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure.- It is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - notits institution through the filing of a complaint - whichis allowed to proceed independently of the outcomeof the criminal case.

B. There is a practical reason for requiring that theright to bring an independent civil action under theCivil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoidthe filing of more than one action for the same act oromission against the same party. Any award madeagainst the employer, whether based on his

subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the RevisedPenal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from theaccused.- In the present case, the criminal action was filedagainst the employee, bus driver. Had the driverbeen convicted and found insolvent, his employerwould have been held subsidiarily liable for damages.But if the right to bring a separate civil action(whether arising from the crime or from quasi-delict)is reserved, there would be no possibility that theemployer would be held liable because in such acase there would be no pronouncement as to the civilliability of the accused. In such a case the institutionof a separate and independent civil action under the

Civil Code would not result in the employee beingheld liable for the same act or omission. The rulerequiring reservation in the end serves to implementthe prohibition against double recovery for the sameact or omission.- Nor does it matter that the action is against theemployer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art.2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in thecriminal case, the employer is very much a party, aslong as the right to bring or institute a separateaction (whether arising from crime or from quasidelict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decisionconvicting the employee is binding and conclusiveupon the employer not only with regard to its civilliability but also with regard to its amount becausethe liability of an employer cannot be separated butfollows that of his employee is true not only withrespect to the civil liability arising from crime butalso with respect to the civil liability under the CivilCode. Dispositive The decision appealed from isREVERSED and the complaint against petitioner isDISMISSED.

SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC. v CA(PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY

CORPORATION)300 SCRA 484

MARTINEZ; April 24, 1998

NATURE

Petition for review after a motion for reconsiderationof respondent court judgment was denied

FACTS- In the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite AceVan being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a

passenger bus of herein petitioner San IldefonsoLines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) collided with each other atthe intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue andRodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila,totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jaoand her two (2) passengers in the process.- A criminal case was thereafter filed with theRegional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991charging the driver of the bus, herein petitionerEduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting indamage to property with multiple physical injuries.- About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992,herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance andSurety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van andsubrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner

SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seekingto recover the sums it paid the assured under amotor vehicle insurance policy as well as otherdamages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 asactual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 asexemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees;P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 asappearance fees.)- With the issues having been joined upon the filingof the petitioners' answer to the complaint fordamages and after submission by the parties of theirrespective pre-trial briefs, petitioners filed onSeptember 18, 1992 a Manifestation and Motion toSuspend Civil Proceedings grounded on thependency of the criminal case against petitioner

Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of respondent PISC to make a reservation to file aseparate damage suit in said criminal action.This was denied by the Manila Regional TrialCourt in its Order dated July 21, 1993- After their motion for reconsideration of said July21, 1993 Order was denied, petitioners elevated thematter to this Court via petition for certiorari whichwas, however, referred to public respondent Court of Appeals for disposition. On February 24, 1995, adecision adverse to petitioners once again wasrendered by respondent court, upholding theassailed Manila Regional Trial Court Order. Hence,this petit ion for review after a motion forreconsideration of said respondent court judgmentwas denied.


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ISSUES1. WON an independent civil action based on

quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Codecan be filed if no reservation was made in the saidcriminal case

2. WON a subrogee of an offended party canmaintain an independent civil action during thependency of a criminal action when no reservationof the right to file an independent civil action wasmade in the criminal action and despite the factthat the private complainant is activelyparticipating through a private prosecutor in theaforementioned criminal case

HELD1. NO- On the chief issue of "reservation", at the fore isSection 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court whichreads:

"Sec. 3 . When c iv il act ion may proceed

independently. -- In the cases provided for inArticles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines, the independent civil action which hasbeen reserved may be brought by the offendedparty, shall proceed independently of the criminalaction, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

- Even though these so-called "independent civilactions" based on the aforementioned Civil Codearticles are the exceptions to the primacy of thecriminal action over the civil action as set forth inSection 2 of Rule 111, it is easily deducible from thepresent wording of Section 3 as brought about by the1988 amendments to the Rules on CriminalProcedure -- particularly the phrase " which has

been reserved " -- that the "independent" character of these civil actions does not do away with thereservation requirement. In other words, priorreservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted andthereafter have a continuous determination apartfrom or simultaneous with the criminal action.- According to Justice Jose Y. Feria, remedial lawexpert and a member of the committee whichdrafted the 1988 amendments, whose learnedexplanation on the matter was aptly pointed out bypetitioners, the 1988 amendment expands thescope of the civil action which is deemed impliedlyinstituted with the criminal action unless waived,reserved or previously instituted. Under the present

Rule as amended, such a civil action includes notonly recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal

Code and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of theCivil Code of the Philippines, but also damages underArticle 2176 (quasi-delicts) of the said code. - It should be noted that while it was ruled in Abellavs. Marave (57 SCRA 106) that a reservation of theright to file an independent civil action is not

necessary, such a reservation is necessary under theamended rule. Without such reservation, the civilaction is deemed impliedly instituted with thecriminal action, unless previously waived orinstituted.- Far from altering substantive rights, the primarypurpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in " Caos v. Peralta ":" to avoidmultiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression andabuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets,to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, theattainment of justice with the least expense andvexation to the parties-litigants."2. NO- Private respondent PISC, as subrogee, is not

exempt from the reservation requirement withrespect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner

Javier complained of in the criminal case. As privaterespondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then itis bound to observe the procedural requirementswhich Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.Dispositive The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolutiondated April 3,1995 denying the motion forreconsideration thereof are reversed. The"manifestation and motion to suspend civilproceedings" filed by petitioners is granted.

MARCIA v CA (PAJE and VICTORY LINER)

120 SCRA 190RELOVA; January 27, 1983

NATUREAppeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filedby the petitioners against private respondents in theconcept of an independent civil action for damagesfor physical injuries resulting from recklessimprudence.

FACTS- On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated byprivate respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven byits employee, private respondent Felardo Paje,

collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia,resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuriesto herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap.

Thereupon, an information for homicide and seriousphysical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filedagainst Felardo Paje in the CFI of Pampanga.- On January 23, 1957, an action for damages wasfiled in the CFI of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato

Yap, together with their respective parents, againstthe Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging thatthe mishap was due to the reckless imprudence andnegligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.- While said Civil Case was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceededin the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The

accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offensecharged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals,he was acquitted with the CA holding that "CRIMINALNEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and thatappellant was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE.Insofar as appellant was concerned, the CA held thatthis was a case of PURE ACCIDENT."- As a consequence, herein private respondents,defendants in Civil Case of the Court of First Instanceof Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaintinvoking the decision of the Court of Appealsacquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section 1 (d), Rule107 of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 (c), Rule111 of the New Rules of Court). On August 10, 1966,the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a

decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against thedefendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje.Petitioners appealed the case to the CA, whichbasically affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, thisrecourse.

ISSUEWON the decision of the Court of Appeals acquittingthe accused in reckless imprudence on the groundthat the incident was accidental, extinguished byimplication the civil action for damages

HELD YESRatio Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction

proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that


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the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.Since, the CA found that this case was of pureaccident, it is as good as saying as if he did not commit the crime charged. There being no crimecommitted, no civil liability arises.Reasoning

- It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2,Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c)thereof, should apply in the case at bar.

"Sec. 2. Independent civil action. - In the casesprovided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independentcivil action entirely separate and distinct from thecriminal action, may be brought by the injuredparty during the pendency of the criminal case,provided the right is reserved as required in thepreceding section. Such civil action shall proceedindependently of the criminal prosecution, andshall require only a preponderance of evidence."

- We do not agree. Section 2 of Rule 111 merelyrefers to the institution of an independent civil action

without waiting for the filing or termination of thecriminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not proof beyondreasonable doubt as required for conviction incriminal cases. However, an acquittal based on thefinding that the facts upon which civil liability did notexist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. As early as 1952, We haveheld in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum OilCompany, 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of theaccused from the criminal charge will not necessarilyextinguish the civil liability unless the court declaresin the judgment that the fact from which the civilliability might arise did not exist. Where the courtstates 'that the evidence throws no light on the

cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accidentfor which the accused cannot be held responsible,'this declaration fits well into the exception of the rulewhich exempts the accused, from civil liability."- Also, the charge against Felardo Paje was not forhomicide and physical injuries but for recklessimprudence or criminal negligence resulting inhomicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physicalinjuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap.

They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentionedin Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civilaction shall proceed independently of the criminalprosecution.

BUNAG JR. v CA (CIRILO)211 SCRA 440

REGALADO; July 10, 1992

NATUREPetition for review from the decision of the CA

FACTS- On Sept. 8, 1973 Conrado Bunag Jr. broughtZenaida Cirilo to a motel or hotel where they hadsexual intercourse and later that evening he broughtZenaida to the house of his grandmothers housewhere they lived together as husband and wife for 21days until Sept. 29, 1973. They filed their applicationfor marriage license with the Local Civil Registral of Bacoor, Cavite. However, after a few days, Conradofiled an affidavit withdrawing his application for amarriage license.Plaintiffs Claim Conrado Bunag Jr. abducted her inthe vicinity of San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay Cityand brought her to a motel where she was raped.Afterwhich he said that he would not let her gounless they get married, as he intended to marryher , so much so that she promised not to make anyscandal and to marry him. They went to hisgradmothers house and lived together as husbandand wife for 21 days until Bunag Jr. left and neverreturned which humiliated Zenaida and compelledher to go back to her parents.Respondents Comment Conrado Bunag Jr.andZenaida Cirilo had earlier made plans to elope andget married (same as first set of facts) . And that thereason why Conrado broke off their plan to getmarried was their bitter disagreements over moneyand Zenaidas threats to his life.- The Cirilos filed a complaint for damages againstConrado Bunag Jr. and his father Conrado Bunag Sr.(Zenaidas uncle claims that Bunag Sr. assured themthat the couple were to be married). The

Trial Court ordered Bunag Jr. to pay damages (80K-moral damages,20K-exemplary damages, 20k-temperate damages and 10k attorneys fees) BunagSr. was absolved from any and all liability.CAaffirmed in toto- Bunag Jr contends that both the trial court awardedthe damages on the basis of a finding that he isguilty of forcible abduction with rape,despite theprior dismissal of the complaint therefore filed byZenaida with the Pasay City Fiscals Office.

ISSUEWON the Fiscals dismissal of the complaint forforcible abduction with rape extinguished the civilliability of Conrado Bunag Jr

HELDNO- The dismissal did not in any way affect the right of Zenaida Cirilo to institute a civil action arising fromthe offense.- Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it

the extinction of civil liability unless the extinctionproceeds from a declaration in a final judgment thatthe fact from which the civil case might arise did notexist.Reasoning-Generally, every person criminally liable is alsocivilly liable. Criminal Liability will give rise to civilliability ex delicto only if the same felonious act oromission results in damage or injury to another andis the direct and proximate cause thereof.-The two proceedings involved are not between thesame parties (the criminal action is between theState and the defendant and the civil case isbetween the offended party and the defendant).Also, there are different rules as to the competency

of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminaland civil proceedings.(criminal action proof beyondreasonable doubt; civil actionpreponderance of evidence)- In this case the dismissal of the complaint forforcible abduction with rape was by mere resolutionof the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage.

There is no declaration in a final judgment that thefact from which the civil case might arise did notexist.

JARANTILLA v CA

JIMENEZ v AVERIA

ROJAS v PEOPLE (ALIKPALA)57 SCRA 243

FERNANDO; May 31, 1974

NATUREPetition for certiorari and prohibition

FACTS- Rojas was charged w/ violation of Art.319 (Removal,sale, pledge of mortgaged property) of RPC forexecuting a new chattel mortgage on personalproperty (Caterpillar Tractor) in favor of anotherparty w/o the consent of the previous mortgagee.After the criminal case was instituted, a civil casewas filed against him by the offended party (CMSEstate) for the termination of a management


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contract, one of the causes of action of whichconsisted of petitioner having executed a chattelmortgage when a prior chattel mortgage was stillvalid and subsisting, thus giving lie to his expressmanifestation that the property was free from allliens and encumbrances.

- Note: the trigger for the filing of information re:art.319 violation was the filing of 5 estafa casesagainst Rojas.- CFI Judge Alikpala ordered the arraignment, thenthe trial for the criminal case. Rojas filed an actionfor certiorari against the arraignment order, andprohibition against the order setting the trial, basedon the civil action for the revocation of themanagement contract. He contended that aprejudicial question was involved, thus he could nolonger be tried pending the termination of the civilsuit. The respondents, in turn, contended that theresolution of the civil case will not determine theliability of Rojas in the criminal case (not a prejudicialquestion); and even granting that there was a

prejudicial question, the cases could proceedindependently pursuant to Art.33 of CC, whichprovides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physicalinjuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separateand distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shallrequire only a preponderance of evidence .

ISSUEWON the is a prejudicial question, thus requiring theresolution of the civil action for the determination of the criminal case

HELDNORatio : A prejudicial question, which is must bedeterminative of the case before the court, and

jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged inanother court, is not present in this case.Reasoning :- It is indispensable then for this petition to succeedthat the alleged prejudicial question must bedeterminative of the criminal case before respondent

Judge. It is not so in this case.- Pisalbor. v. Tesoro: CFI erred in holding that thecriminal case should be suspended. In the presentproceedings, the civil case does not involve aquestion prejudicial to the criminal case, for towhomsoever the land may be awarded after all the

evidence has been presented in the civil case, maynot affect the alleged crime committed by the notary

public, which is the subject of the criminal case. But,even supposing that both the civil and the criminalcase involve the same question and one mustprecede the other, it should be the civil case whichshould be suspended rather than the criminal, toawait the result of the latter.

- Dela Cruz v City Fiscal: Regardless of the outcomeof the pending civil case for annulment of theaffidavit of adjudication, determination of the chargeof falsification would be based on the truth or falsityof the narration of facts in the affidavit of adjudication, * * *. Therefore, the civil caseaforementioned does not involve a prejudicialquestion.- Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr (more analogous): the factthat the principal issues in both cases are the sameand did arise from the same facts would not showany necessity that the civil case be determined firstbefore taking up the criminal case.- Isip v. Gonzales: there is a prejudicial question onlywhen the matter that has to be priorly decided by

another authority is one the cognizance of whichpertains to that authority and should not, under thecircumstances, be passed upon by the court tryingthe criminal case.- Moreover, Art.33 explicitly provides that in cases of xxx fraud, xxx, a civil action for damages entirelyseparate and distinct from the criminal action, maybe brought by the injured party. Such civil actionSHALL proceed independently of the criminalprosecution xxx.- in this case, fraud is the basis for both the civil andcriminal actions, thus they are to proceedindependently. The invocation of the doctrine of prejudicial question is thus attended with futility.Personal note: ang pangit ng case. theres realy no

discussion, puro citations, thats why this digest isalso full of it.Dispositive Petition DENIED.

RAS v RASUL100 SCRA 125

TEEHANKEE; September 18, 1980

NATUREPetition to review and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated December 12, 1978 of criminal case in CFI Basilan denying petitioner'smotion as accused therein to suspend proceedingsdue to the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil

Case of the same court

FACTS- April 27, 1978 - Luis Pichel filed a COMPLAINTagainst Alejandro Ras and Bienvenido Martin beforeCFI Basilan praying for the nullification of the deed of sale executed by Ras in favor of Martin and for thedeclaration of the prior deed of sale allegedly

executed in his favor by the defendant Alejandro Rasas valid.- RAS ANSWER> they never sold the property to Pichel> the signatures appearing in the deed of sale infavor of plaintiff Pichel were forgeries> therefore the alleged deed of sale in Pichel's favorsought to be declared valid was fictitious andinexistent- September 5, 1978 - while Civil Case was being

TRIED before CFI Basilan, the Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed an INFORMATION for Estafa (criminalcase) in the same court against Ras arising from thesame double sale subject matter of the civilcomplaint filed by Luis Pichel.

- November 6, 1978 - petitioner filed a MOTION FORSUSPENSION OF ACTION in said Criminal Caseclaiming that same facts and issues were involved inboth the civil and criminal case and that theresolution of the issues in the civil case wouldnecessarily be determinative of the guilt orinnocence of the accused.- December 4, 1978 - Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filedhis opposition on- December 12, 1978 - respondent judge saw noprejudicial question and accordingly denied themotion

ISSUEWON civil case would be prejudicial to the criminal

case given that they would discuss same facts andissues

HELD YES- there appears to be a prejudicial question in thecase at bar, considering that Ras' defense in CivilCase of the nullity and forgery of the alleged priordeed of sale in favor of Pichel (plaintiff in the civilcase and complaining witness in the criminal case) isbased on the very same facts which would benecessarily determinative of Ras' guilt or innocenceas accused in the criminal case.Ratio A prejudicial question is defined as that whicharises in a case the resolution of which is a logical

antecedent of the issue involved therein, and thecognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The


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prejudicial question must be determinative of thecase before the court but the jurisdiction to try andresolve the question must be lodged in another courtor tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinctand separate from the crime but so intimatelyconnected with it that it determines the guilt or

innocence of the accused.Reasoning- For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to acriminal action as to cause the suspension of thecriminal action pending the determination of thecivil, it must appear not only that the civil caseinvolves the same facts upon which the criminalprosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would benecessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.- If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void orfictitious, then there would be no double sale andpetitioner would be innocent of the offense charged.A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to

proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and wouldhave to be set aside if it were finally decided in thecivil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of salewas a forgery and spurious.Dispositive Order of respondent judge in CriminalCase dated December 12, 1978 is hereby set aside.

The temporary restraining order issued by this Courton May 16, 1979 is hereby made permanent andrespondent judge is enjoined from proceeding withthe arraignment and trial of the criminal case unlessthe civil case shall have been finally decided andterminated adversely against petitioner.

LIBRODO v COSCOLLUELA, JR.(GUANTERO)116 SCRA 303

MELENCIO-HERRERA; August 30, 1982 NATUREPetition for certiorari to review Negros CFI order

FACTS- Felipe Rivera died leaving certain properties in SanCarlos, Negros Occidental. His estate was settled in aspecial proceeding on November 24, 1976 and wasterminated on the basis of a Project of Partitionamong Rufino Rivera Damandaman, DemocrataGuantero, and Zosimo Guantero.- Rufinos share of the estate comprise of lots

designated as Lots 559-B, 1906-B, 1910-B, and a901-B which were all sugar lands. On January 18, 1977,

Rufino leased the properties to Dr. Librodo, thepetitioner, for a period of ten agricultural crop years.- On August 31, Democrata filed a petition to re-openthe intestate proceeding on the ground that she wasnot present when the subdivision plan was submittedand that the judgment has not become final as the

boundaries on the partition have not been platted.- In the meantime, according to the petitioner,private respondents, Guanteros, harvested the sugarcanes he planted on the land he leased from Rufino.On August 10, 1978, a Criminal Case (the CriminalCase) was filed against the respondents for theftdemanding damages amounting to Pesos 15,120.00.During the pendency of the Criminal Case, anothercase for damages (the Damages Case) against theprivate respondents alleging damages to thepetitioner caused by the private respondents theft of the sugar canes and their occupation of the leasedproperties thus preventing him from cultivating ortaking possession of the same. He alleged that thisresulted in his being deprived of income for two

years amounting to Pesos 78,280.00.- In their answer, respondents asserted that the lotsare still under co-ownership among the heirs andthat this is the subject of another special proceeding(the Intestate Case). That said, Democratacontended that Rufino could not execute the leasecontracts without her conformity without herconformity as co-owner. The Guanteros filed amotion to suspend the proceedings in the CriminalCase on the ground of pendency of the DamagesCase, the Intestate Case, and the ejectment case(the Ejectment Case) which was filed by Rufinoagainst Democrata on January 13, 1977.- The respondents took the position that the variouscases focused on the issues of possession and

ownership of the lots involved as well as of theimprovements thereon, hence, determinative of theirguilt in the criminal action and hence constitutive of a prejudicial question .- Despite the objections made by the petitioner, thelower court issued the order finding that a prejudicialquestion existed and suspending the Criminal caseproceeding. Hence this appeal.

ISSUEWON the issues raised in the three cases mentionedinvolve a prejudicial question that warrants asuspension of the Criminal Case

HELDNO

The issues raised in the three cases do not involvethe pivotal question of who planted the sugar canand, therefore, are not determinative juris et jure of guilt or innocence in the Criminal Case.Reasoning- A prejudicial question is one based on a fact

distinct and separate from the crime but sointimately connected with it that it determinesthe guilt or innocence of the accused., and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves factsintimately related to those upon which thecriminal prosecution would be based but alsothat in the resolution of the issue or issuesraised in the civil case, the guilt or innocenceof the accused would necessarily bedetermined.- In the case at bar, the issues raised would notconstitute a prejudicial question to the Criminal Case.

The Intestate Case involves only the co-heirs and thefacts involved are totally unrelated to the Criminal

Case. Even if the Intestate Court should annul thedivision and uphold the co-ownership, that would notbe determinative of the criminal responsibility of private respondents for theft of the sugar cane,which petitioner claims he planted in good faith byvirtue of the valid lease agreement. The EjectmentCase also does not constitute a prejudicial questionto the Criminal Case. It involves the issue of possession between co-owners. A decision therein infavor of Democrata would not affect the rights of Librodo, which spring from the lease contract. Withregard the Damages case, it is actually the civilaspect of the Criminal Case as the two cases are of the same facts, and the entitlement to damagesbeing predicated on the unlawful taking treated of in

the Criminal Case, no necessity arises for that civilCase to be determined ahead of the Criminal Case. Dispositive In the absence of a prejudicial question,the order of the judge is set aside and he isinstructed to proceed without delay with the trial of the criminal case.

BALGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN176 SCRA 287

GANCAYCO; August 10, 1989

NATUREPetition to review the decision of Sandiganbayan

FACTS


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- Balgos et al were charged with violation of Section3(c) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practice Act, as amended, in aninformation that was filed with the Sandiganbayan bythe Special Prosecutor which was approved by theDeputy Tanodbayan, a fte r a p re liminary

investigation.- Lim, the plaintiff and prevailing party in Civil CaseNo. 4047 filed a complaint for rescission of the saleof the car by Juanito Ang to private respondentLeticia Acosta-Ang for being allegedly in fraud of creditors. The said complaint was filed with the RTCof Nueva Vizcaya. On the same day, petitioners fileda motion for reinvestigation in the Tanodbayan. Thesame was granted.- The Tanodbayan ordered to dismiss the case forlack of merit and to withdraw the Information filed inCriminal Case No. 11414 as soon as possible in theinterest of justice.- Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a motionto withdraw the information against petitioners. This

was denied.- BAlgos et al filed a motion to suspend proceedingsin the criminal case against them on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil CaseNo. 5307. This was l ikewise denied by theSandiganbayan.

ISSUEWON the denial by the Sandiganbayan of the motionto withdraw the information and of another motion tosuspend proceedings on the ground of a prejudicialquestion in a pending civil action constitute a graveabuse of discretion.

HELDNO.- While the public prosecutor has the sole directionand control in the prosecution of offenses, once thecomplaint or information is filed in court, the courtthereby acquires jurisdiction over the case and allsubsequent actions that may be taken by the publicprosecutor in relation to the disposition of the casemust be subject to the approval of the said court.Before a re-investigation of the case may beconducted by the public prosecutor, the permissionor consent of the court must be secured. And if aftersuch reinvestigation the prosecution finds a cogentbasis to withdraw the information or otherwise causethe dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action must be addressed to the sound discretion of

the court.

- The only instance when the appellate court shouldstay the hand of the trial court in such cases is whenit is shown that the trial court acted without

jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or otherwisecommitted a grave abuse of discretion amounting tosuch lack or excess of jurisdiction.

- Petitioners are public officers charged with havingviolated Section 3(c) of RA 3019, for evident badfaith and manifest partiality in enforcing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 4047 against a Mustangcar registered in the name of Leticia Acosta-Ang(complainant) who is not the judgment debtorthereby causing undue injury to said complainantand giving unwarranted benefits to the judgmentcreditor in said case.- Upon reinvestigation of the criminal case by the

Tanodbayan, he found evidence tending to show thatthe sale of said car to the complainant by JuanitoAng, the judgment debtor, was a sham intended todefraud his creditors; that the deed of absolute salewhich ostensibly was executed before a notary public

appeared to be fictitious inasmuch as the entry of the document in the notarial register of said notarypublic on said date referred to a catering contract of other parties; that the certificate of registration of the car was issued to complainant only on June 13,1984 which showed that the document of sale wasactually executed only on or about the same date,that is, seven days after Juanito Ang received copy of the adverse decision in Civil Case No. 4047; and thatupon the execution of the judgment, the car wasfound in the possession of Alvin, the son of JuanitoAng, who admitted that the car belonged to hisfather by showing the receipt of its repair in thename of Juanito Ang. This is the basis of the motionfor withdrawal of the information of the Tanodbayan.

- The respondents are aware that the complainant isnot a party to the civil case filed by the creditoragainst spouses Juanito and Lydia Ang and that a writof execution cannot be implemented validly againstone who is not a party to the action. All these,coupled with the under haste in which the levy onthe Mustang car was made without first ascertainingthe true owner thereof demonstrate quiteconvincingly the evident bad faith and manifestpartiality of the respondents, thereby givingunwarranted benefits to the judgment creditor to thedamage and prejudice of the complainant.- Although at the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayanwas persuaded that in fact the sale of the car toLeticia Ang was fraudulent, this did not necessarily

clear petitioners of the aforesaid Anti-Graft chargeagainst them. Still the burden is on the petitioners to

establish that they acted in good faith in proceedingwith the execution on the car even they werepresented evidence tending to show it did not belongto Juanito Ang anymore.- The denial of the motion to suspend the criminalproceedings on the ground of the pendency of a

prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 5307 is welltaken. The doctrine of prejudicial question comesinto play usually in a situation where a civil actionand a criminal action are both pending and thereexists in the former an issue which must bepreemptively resolved before the criminal action mayproceed, because whatsoever the issue raised in thecivil action is resolved would be determinative juriset jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in thecriminal case.- The pending civil case for the annulment of the saleof the car to Leticia Ang is not determinative of theguilt or innocence of the petitioners for the actsallegedly committed by them in seizing the car. Evenif in the civil action it is ultimately resolved that the

sale was null and void, it does not necessarily followthat the seizure of the car was rightfully undertaken. The car was registered in the name of Leticia Ang sixmonths before the seizure. Until the nullity of thesale is declared by the courts, the same ispresumptively valid. Thus, petitioners mustdemonstrate that the seizure was not attended bymanifest bad faith in order to clear themselves of thecharge in the criminal action.Dispositive The petition is DENIED for lack of meritand the restraining order dated June 6, 1989 ishereby lifted. No costs.

UMALI v IAC (EDANO)219 SCRA 339

PADILLA; June 21, 1990

NATUREReview on certiorari

FACTS- Petitioners (Umali, Calleja, Ledesma) are officers of the Orosea Devt Corporation. Sometime on Sept. 4,1979, Umali purchased from spoused Homorio andSolina Edano a lot in Mulanay, Province of Queazonfor P1, 036,500 payable on 4 installments (P225,000,P271,500, P270,000, P 270,000) They issued for thispurpose 4 checks drawn against the Chartered Bank,Manila Branch. The first check for P225,000.00 was

honored upon its presentment. By arrangement thepetitioners made with the Edano spouses, a deed of


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absolute sale in the name of Orosea Devt Corp. wasexecuted even of the full purchase price has not yetbeen fully paid. Thereafter, OROSEA secured a loanof P1,000,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bankusing this property as security. When the check forthe second installment fell due, petitioners twice

asked for deferment. The checks they have issuedwere dishonored. As a consequence of the dishonorof these checks, the Edano spouses filed a complaintfor estafa against petitioners.- The information was filed by the Provincial Fiscalagainst petitioners on May 21, 1981, and it wasdocketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-I. Arraignmentwas set on September 4, 1981 but petitioners failedto appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981 but thiswas postponed upon motion of petitioners.- On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint inthe Court of First Instance of Quezon against theEdano spouses for the annulment/rescission of theContract of Sale for which the petitioners issued thechecks, subject of the criminal case.

- The estafa case was again set for arraignment. Thiswas postponed. With the entry of a new counsel,petitioners filed a motion to quash the estafa case,on ground of improper venue, but this motion waswithdrawn by petitioners before it could be resolved.- The arraignment was again postponed thrice.Petitioners then filed a 'Motion to SuspendArraignment and Further Proceedings, with aSupplemental Motion To Suspend Proceedings. Thiswas opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon.Resolving the motion to suspend, respondent Judgeissued his orders, now under question, denying themotion. CFI of Zambales also denied the samemotion. A petition for certiorari is filed with CA andCA affirmed.

ISSUEWON proceedings should be suspended until the civilcase is disposed of, since CV No. 8769 involves aprejudicial question.

HELDNO.- CV No. 8769 seeks the annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Orosea on the gound that there wasfraud in misrepresenting that the land is free from allliens and encumbrances, and that it is not tenanted,when in truth and fact, the land is covered by theland reform program and that vast portions thereof are timber land, hence, allegedly indisposable public

land. Therefore, according to petitioners, CV No.8769 involves issues, the resolution of which will

determine whether or not petitioners are criminallyliable in CR No. 1423-I. They further argue that, if and when the court hearing CV No. 7869 annuls thesubject deed of sale, then, their obligation to payprivate respondents under the said deed would beextinguished, resulting in the dismissal of CR No.

1423-I. The contracts are thus voidable with theexistence of fraud vitiating their consent.- However, it cannot be denied that at the time theacts complained of in the estafa case werecommitted, the deed of sale they seek to beannulled, was still binding to the parties.- The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicialquestion to exist are: (a) the civil action involves anissue similar or intimately related to the issue raisedin the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of suchissue in the civil action determines whether or notthe criminal action may proceed.- Given the nature of a prejudicial question, andconsidering the issues raised in CV No. 8769 and CRNo. 1423-I, we agree with the ruling of the

respondent Court of Appeals that the resolution of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of theguilt or innocence of the petitioners-accused in CRNo. 1423-I, hence, no prejudicial question is involvedbetween the said two (2) cases.Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

The decision dated 23 September 1982 of the Courtof Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 14504 is herebyAFFIRMED.

VALDEPENAS V PEOPLE16 SCRA 871

CONCEPTION; April 30, 1966

NATUREAppeal by Maximino Valdepenas from a decision of the CA, affirming that of the CFI of Cagayan,convicting him of the crime of abduction withconsent.

FACTS- Jan 25, 56 Ester Ulsano filed with the justice of peace a criminal complaint charging Valdepenas withforcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After thepreliminary investigation, the second stage of whichwas waived by Valdepenas, the justice of peacefound that there was probable cause and forwardedthe complaint to the CFI.- CFI found him guilty as charged and sentenced him

accordingly.

- On appeal, CA modified the decision, convicting himof abduction with consent.- Valdepenas filed MFR and new trial contesting thefindings of CA, to the effect that complainant wasbelow 18 y/o at the time of the occurrence. Motionwas granted. The decision was set aside and the

case was remanded to the CFI- CFI rendered decision reiterating findings of CA.Petitioner again appealed to CA which affirmed theCFI decision.- MFR was filed on the ground that lower court hadno jurisdiction over the person and the subjectmatter of the action wrt the offense of abduction withconsent. MFR was deniedPetitioners claims there was no complaint forabduction with consent filed and that the lower courtacquired no jurisdiction over his person or over thecrime of abduction with consent.

ISSUEWON CA erred in not reversing he decision of the TC

for lack of jurisdiction over the accused and thesubject matter of the action for the offense abductionwith consent

HELDNO.- Jurisdiction over the person of an accused isacquired upon either his apprehension, with orwithout warrant, or his submission to the jurisdictionof the court. It is not claimed that petitioner had notbeen apprehended or had not submitted himself tothe jurisdiction of the court. His actions show that henever questioned the judicial authority of the CFI, the

justice of peace and the CA. He is deemed to havewaived whatever objection he might have had to the

jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to havesubmitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. Hisbehavior - particularly the motions therein filed byhim implied, not merely a submission to the

jurisdiction thereof, but also, that he urged the courtsto exercise the authority thereof over his person.- On the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdictionover the subject matter of an action is and may beconferred only by law. That jurisdiction over a givencrime, not vested by law upon a particular court, maynot be conferred thereto by the parties involved inthe offense; and that, under an information forforcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent. Art 344 (3) RPC states that:". . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or

acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted exceptupon a complaint filed by the offended party or her


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parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case,if the offended has been expressly pardoned by theabove- named persons, as the case may be".- Art 344 RPC does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the offense therein enumerated. Itcould not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is

governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by RPC,which deals primarily with the definition of crimesand the factors pertinent to the punishment of theculprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 ismerely a condition precedent to the exercise by theproper authorities of the power to prosecute theguilty parties. And such condition has been imposed"out of consideration for the offended woman andher family who might prefer to suffer the outrage insilence rather than go through with the scandal of apublic trial."- The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there aresome elements of the latter which are not included inthe former, and, not alleged, according to him, in thecomplaint filed herein, namely: 1) that the offended

party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and under18 years of age. The second element is clearly setforth in said complaint, which states that EsterUlsano is "a minor . . . 17 years of age . . .", and,hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age.- As regards the first element, it is settled that thevirginity mentioned in Art 343 RPC, as an essentialingredient of the crime of abduction with consent,should not be understood in its material sense anddoes not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuouswoman of good reputation because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, butthe outrage to the family and the alarm produced init by the disappearance of one of its members."- The complaint in the case at bar alleges not only

that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age, but alsothat petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously"took her by force and violence . . . against her willand taking advantage of the absence of her mother"from their dwelling and carried "her to a secludedspot to gain carnal intercourse with the offendedparty against her will, using force, intimidation andviolence, with lewd designs." This allegation impliesthat Ester is a minor living under patria protestas,thus leading to the presumption that she is a virginapart from being virtuous and having a goodreputation. The presumption of innocence includesthat of morality and decency, and of chastity.

Dispositive Wherefore, the decision appealed fromis hereby affirmed, with costs against the

petitioner Maximino Valdepenas. It is soordered.

PEOPLE v PLATEROS83 SCRA 401

AQUINO; May 30 1978

FACTS- One night, Pedro Candel together with otherpedicab drivers and Tomas Metucua, a second yearcollege student drank beer in the kitchenette.Seated at another table were Warlito Plateros andMurillo Lahoy who were also drinking beer.- Metucua and Plateros were rivals for the affectionof Estrella Silamro, the cashier in the kitchenette.When Metucua was talking with Estrella, his allegedsweetheart, Plateros went near them and refused toleave them, thereby annoying Metucua.

- At about midnight. Piquero, Candel and Aora,accompanied by Metucua, left the kitchenette andwent to their pedicab. Candel was seated in thesidecar of the tricycle. Metucua sat on the driver'sseat. Lahoy and Plateros came out of thekitchenette. Lahoy appeared to be angry, hostile andmenacing. Without any warning, he stabbed Candel(maybe thinking that it was Metucua who was insidethe pedicab because Candel is the driver abberatio

personae) two times. Plateros also stabbed Candel.Moved by the instinct of selfpreservation, Candel

jumped out of the sidecar. He fell on the ground facedown. Lahoy allegedly stabbed Metucua. Then,Plateros and Lahoy fled from the scene of theassault,

- Candel was brought to the hospital but he died onthat same morning.Procedure- Two informations were filed in the Court of FirstInstance of Bohol accusing Plateros and Lahoy of (1)Murder of Candel and (2) Attempted Murder of Metucua.- The trial court tried the two cases jointly andrendered only one decision. Plateros and Lahoy werefound guilty of murder, sentencing each of them of reclusion perpetua. In that same decision, the trialcourt convicted Lahoy of attempted murder(Plateros, his co-accused, was acquitted) of Metucua.- Lahoy appealed to the Court of Appeals and the CAacquitted him.

- The murder case was elevated to SC for review. Together with it, the Solicitor General elevated the

attempted murder case be he believed that thedecision of CA is void because Lahoys appeal oughtto have been certified to the Supreme Court by theCA because the attempted murder imputed to Lahoywas committed on the same occasion and arose outof the same occurrence as the murder imputed to

him and Plateros in this case, as contemplated insection 17(1), formerly section 17(4) of the JudiciaryLaw, which reads:

"SEC. 17, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. -x x x "x x xx x x x x x "The Supreme Court shall haveexclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts herein provided, in "(1) All criminalcases involving offenses for which the penaltyimposed is death or life imprisonment; and thoseinvolving other offenses which, although not sopunished, arose out of the same occurrence orwhich may have been committed by the accusedon the same occasion, as that giving rice to the

more serious offense, regardless of whether theaccused are charged as principals, accomplices oraccessories, or whether have been tried jointly orseparately; x x x."

- In other words, the attempted murder case like theinstant murder case, comes within the exclusiveappellate jurisdiction of the SCt and should havebeen decided together with the instant murder case.

ISSUESOn Attempted Murder Case1. WON the decision of the Court of Appealsacquitting Lahoy of attempted murder should be setaside for lack of appellate jurisdiction or as a lawlessthing

On Murder case2. WON the guilt of Lahoy and Plateros was provenbeyond reasonable doubt3. WON there was conspiracy between Lahoy andPlateros4. WON the crime should be categorized as simplehomicide only and not murder

HELD1. NO.Ratio: The rule in section 17(1) is designed to avoidconflicts between the decisions of this Court and theCourt of Appeals in cases involving offenses whicharose from the same occurrence or which werecommitted on the same occasion usually by the

same accused.


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However, that general rule has an exception. Where,by allowing the Court of Appeals to decide a caninvolving an offense, which is not punishable bydeath or reclusion perpetua but which arose out of the same occurrence or was committed on the sameoccasion, as the case involving an offense punishable

by death or reclusion perpetua pending in this Court,there will be no conflict between the decisions of thisCourt and the Court of Appeals, the former case neednot be elevated to this Court (People vs. Cario, 101Phil. 1206). The rationale of that exception to thegeneral rule is found in the maxim: Cessanie rationelegis, cessat et ipsa lex. (The reason for the lawceasing, the law itself also ceases.)Reasoning:- The doctrine of the Cario case may be applied inthis case because here there can be no conflictbetween the decision of the Court of Appeals and thisCourt's decision in the instant murder case inasmuchas the victims in the two cases are different. Theattempted murder case decided by the Court of

Appeals involved the wounding of a certain TomasMetucua whereas, in the instant murder case thevictim was Pedro Candel. The acquittal of Lahoy inconnection with the wounding of Metucua would notaffect the determination of his guilt or innocence inconnection with the death of Pedro Candel.- This holding does not in anyway emasculate therule in section 17(1) that criminal cases appealed tothe Court of Appeals, involving offenses which aroseout of the same occurrence, or which werecommitted on the same occasion as the offensepunished by death or reclusion perpetua should becertified to this Court by the Court of Appeals. It isthis Court that would determine whether or not thecases appealed to the Court of Appeals should be

decided together with the case appealed to thisCourt.2. YES

The feeble denials of Plateros and Lahoy (whoadmittedly were near the owns of the crime, when itwas perpetrated) cannot prevail over the positiveand unequivocal declarations of the eyewitnesses,Aora and Piquero, that the appellants were theauthors of the stab wounds which caused Candal'sdeath. Their guilt was proven beyond reasonabledoubt.3. YES.

There was a conspiracy between Plateros and Lahoyas shown in their concerted efforts to injure Candel.Plateros and Lahoy, as boon companions, had been

together since four o'clock in the afternoon. They hadgone to different places and repaired twice to the

kitchenette. They were together when they left thescene of the stabbing.4. NOLahoy and Plateros, who could have stabbed Candelor Metucua inside the kitchenette, did not do so.

They waited for Metucua and the pedicab drivers to

leave the kitchenette. Their intention was to make asurprise attack without any risk to themselves. Theassault was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. Thatis the characteristics manifestation of treachery(alevosia). Hence, the kil ling was properlycategorized as murder by the trial court (Art. 14(16),Revised Penal Code).Dispositive WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgmentis affirmed with costs against the appellants. Theyare entit led to credit for their preventiveimprisonment under the conditions laid down inarticle 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE v LAGON185 SCRA 442

FELICIANO.: May 18, 1990

FACTS-On July 7 1976 a criminal action was filed with theCity Court of Roxas charging Lagon with estafa forallegedly issuing a P4,232 check as payment forgoods knowing she had insufficient funds. Howeveron Dec. 2, as the trial commenced, the City Courtdismissed the information on the ground that thepenalty prescribed by law for estafa was beyond thecourts authority to impose. Hence this petition forreview.

ISSUE

WON the City Court had jurisdiction over the caseHELDNO- It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court incriminal law matters is determined by the law ineffect at the time of the commencement of thecriminal action and not the law in effect at the timeof the commission of the offense charged.-Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,municipal judges in the capitals of provinces andsub-provinces and judges of city courts shall havelike jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged withan offense within their respective jurisdictions, inwhich penalties provided do not exceed prision

correccional or fines no exceeding P6,000 or both.

-At the time of the commission of the crime, theimposable penalty under Art 315 of the RPC wasarresto mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional it is minimum period, falling well withinthe jurisdiction of the City Court. But when theinformation was filed, PD 818 had increased the

imposable penalty to prision mayor in its mediumperiod.-The real question raised by petitioner is whether thesaid doctrine disregards the rule against retroactivityof penal laws. It has been repeatedly held that incriminal prosecutions, jurisdiction is not determinedby what may be meted out to the offender in aftertrial but by the extent of the penalty which the lawimposes. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the Court inwhich the information is filed, it is retainedregardless of whether the evidence proves a lesseroffense which carries a penalty that would otherwisefall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court.-In the instant case, should the information be refiledwith the RTC, the court may not impose a more

onerous penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTCretains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decidethe refiled case under PD 818, given the date of thecommission of the crime (before effectivity of PD818), the lower penalty provided in Art 315(otherwise within the jurisdiction of the City Court)should be imposed.Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Court resolved toDENY the petition

ZALDIVIA V REYES, JR.211 SCRA 277

CRUZ; July 3, 1992

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari

FACTS- The petitioner Lus Zaldivia is charged withquarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor'spermit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in theProvince of Rizal, allegedly committed on May 11,1990. The referral-complaint of the police wasreceived by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor(OPP) of Rizal on May 30, 1990 and the informationwas filed with the MTC of Rodriguez, presided by

Judge Andres Reyes, Jr., on October 2, 1990.- The petitioner moved to quash the information on

the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the


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motion was denied. On appeal, the RTC of Rizalaffirmed the denial of the motion.Petitioners claims In this petition, the petitionerargues that the charge against her is governed bythe following provisions of the Rule on SummaryProcedure (RSP):

Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the procedure in the MetTC, the MTC, and the MCTC inthe following cases:B. Criminal Cases:3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; .

- Petitioner also invokes Act No. 3326, "An Act toEstablish Periods of Prescription for ViolationsPenalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinancesand to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin toRun," reading as follows:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special actsshall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,

prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . .. Violations penalized by municipal ordinancesshall prescribe after two months.

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from theday of the commission of the violation of the law,and if the same be not known at the time, from thediscovery thereof and the institution of judicial

proceedings for its investigation and punishment.The prescription shall be interrupted when

proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

- Petitioner concludes that as the information wasfiled way beyond the two-month statutory periodfrom the date of the alleged commission of theoffense, the charge against her should have beendismissed on the ground prescription.

Prosecutions position The prosecution contendsthat the prescriptive period was suspended upon thefiling of the complaint against her with the OPP. TheSolGen invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Ruleson Criminal Procedure (RCP), providing as follows:

Section 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure inspecial cases, the institution of criminal actionshall be as follows:b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with thefiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.

- Respondent maintains that the filing of thecomplaint with the OPP comes under the phrase"such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases"applies to all cases, without distinction, includingthose falling under the RSP.

ISSUEWON the offense has prescribed

HELD YES- The filing of the complaint in the MTC, even if it bemerely for purposes of preliminary examination orinvestigation, should, and does, interrupt the periodof prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filedcan not try the case on its merits. Even if the courtwhere the complaint or information is filed may onlyproceed to investigate the case, its actuationsalready represent the initial step of the proceedingsagainst the offender.

- It is important to note that this decision waspromulgated on May 30, 1983, two months beforethe promulgation of the RSP on August 1, 1983. Onthe other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, havingbeen incorporated therein with the revision of theRCP on January 1, 1985, except for the lastparagraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.- Sec. 1 of the RCP begins with the phrase, "foroffenses not subject to the rule on summaryprocedure in special cases," which plainly signifiesthat the section does not apply to offenses which aresubject to summary procedure. The phrase "in allcases" appearing in the last paragraph obviouslyrefers to the cases covered by the Section, that is,those offenses not governed by the RSP.

- The charge against the petitioner, which is forviolation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, isgoverned by the RSP and not the RCP.- Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTCand MCTC," the obvious reference is to Section 32 (2)of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses

punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more thanfour thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposableaccessory or other penalties, including the civilliability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or

amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offensesinvolving damage to property through criminal

negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.- These offenses are not covered by the RSP. UnderSection 9 of the RSP, "the complaint or informationshall be filed directly in court without need of a prior

pre liminary examinat ion or p rel iminaryinvestigation." Both parties agree that this provisiondoes not prevent the prosecutor from conducting apreliminary investigation if he wants to. However, thecase shall be deemed commenced only when it isfiled in court, whether or not the prosecution decidesto conduct a preliminary investigation. This meansthat the running of the prescriptive period shall behalted on the date the case is actual filed in courtand not on any date before that.- This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedingsare instituted against the guilty party." Theproceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are

"judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the SolGen that they include administrativeproceedings.- At any rate, the Court feels that if there be aconflict between the RSP and the RCP, the formershould prevail as the special law. And if there be aconflict between Act No. 3326 and the RCP, the lattermust again yield because this Court, in the exerciseof its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish,increase or modify substantive rights" under ArticleVIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription incriminal cases is a substantive right.- The prescriptive period for the crime imputed tothe petitioner commenced from its allegedcommission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months

thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance withSection 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted bythe filing of the complaint with the OPP on May 30,1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The

judicial proceeding that could have interrupted theperiod was the filing of the information with the MTCof Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2,1990, after the crime had already prescribed.Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. Case is DISMISSEDon the ground of prescription.

LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE18 SCRA 616

DIZON, October 29, 1966

NATURE


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Petition for review on Certiorari and Prohibition

FACTS-Petitioners (Roy Villasor, Angelina Meijia Lopez andAurora Mejia Villasor) and other heirs of spousesManuel Meijia and Gloria Lazatin entered into a

contract with respondent Trinidad Lazatin for thedevelopment and subdivision of 3 parcels of landbelonging to the intestate estate. Lazatin transferredhis rights to Terra Devt Co (TDC).-Petitioners and co-heirs filed an action in CFI QC forrescission of said contract with Lazatin for allegedgross and willful violation of its terms.-Respondents (Lazatin and TDC) filed with FiscalsOffice of City of Angeles a complaint againstpetitioners for violation of A172 in relation to A171,par4, RPC. Preliminary investigation conducted.Fiscal filed with Court in Angeles City informationcharging petitioners with crime of falsification of private document. Allegedly, Aurora and Angelinamade it appear that they were the guardians of

minors George and Alexander Meijia (sons of thespouses?) when they werent the guardians at thedate of the execution of the document, a certainCarolina M. de Castro was the judicial guardian of thesaid minors).-Petitioners asked for a reinvestigation. Angeles CityFiscal reinvestigated to give them opportunity topresent exculpatory evidence. After reinvestigation,parties charged moved for the dismissal of the casemainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offensebecause the private document that containedthe alleged false statement of fact was signedby them outside the territorial limits of saidcity (One in Makati, the other one in QC).-However, the resolution of their motion to dismisswas delayed and the City Court already set theircriminal case for arraignment. Petitioners securedseveral postponements of the arraignment. But sinceCity Fiscal continually failed to act on their motion todismiss, petitioners filed a motion to quash instead,on the ground that court had no jurisdiction.Respondents (with conformity of City Fiscal) filed anopposition to the motion to quash. Respondent judgedenied motion to quash, set arraignment. Sopetitioners filed present action.

ISSUE1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction totry and decide the criminal case for alleged

falsification of a private document allegedly done bythe parties named in the info even if the acts of

falsification was allegedly done in Makati and QC,and thus outside the jurisdiction of said courtOther procedural issues2. WON the motion to quash was improper, andshould not be allowed since by filing the said motion,the petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of the

allegation of the information to the effect that theoffense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City3. WON the prayer for writs of certiorari andprohibition is proper

HELD1. NO.Ratio. The place where the criminal offensewas committed not only determines the venueof the action but is an essential element of

jurisdiction [US vs. Pagdayuman].Reasoning. Petitioners are charged with havingfalsified a private document, not using a falsifieddocument, so it is essential to determine when and

where the offense of falsification of a privatedocument is deemed consummated or committed. The crime of falsification of a private document isconsummated when such document is actuallyfalsified with the intent to prejudice a 3 rd person,whether such falsified document is or is not put touse illegally. The improper and illegal use of thedocument is not material or essential element of thecrime of falsification of a private document [US vs.Infante, US vs. Barreto]2. NORatio. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule117 of the Rules of Court is manifestly broader inscope than the demurrer, as it is not limited todefects apparent upon the face of the complaint or

information but extends to issues arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that,among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal,extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve questionsof fact in the determination of which a preliminarytrial is required.Reasoning. The argument of the respondents referto the now obsolete demurrer to an information.3. YESRatio. The general rule is that a court of equity willnot issue a writ of certiorari to annul an order of alower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue awrit of prohibition to prevent said court from

proceeding with the case after such denial, it beingthe rule that upon such denial the defendant should

enter his plea of not guilty and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal questionscovered by his motion to quash. In this as well as inother jurisdictions, however, this is no longer thehard and fast rule.-The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as

extraordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimateanalysis, intended to annul void proceedings; toprevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legalauthority and to provide for a fair and orderlyadministration of justice.Reasoning. In several cases, the court already tookcognizance of said writs, overlooking the flaw in theprocedure followed in the interest of a moreenlightened and substantial justice. The lack of

jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles is patent andit would be highly unfair to compel the petitioners toundergo trial in said court and suffer all theembarrassment and mental anguish that go with it.Dispositive WHEREFORE, judgment is herebyrendered declaring that the offense charged in the

information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of theCity Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, saidcourt is hereby restrained and prohibited fromfurther proceedings therein. Costs against the privaterespondents.

PEOPLE v YABUT76 SCRA 624

MARTIN; April 29, 1977

NATUREPetition for review on certiorari of Orders of CFIBulacan

FACTS- Cecilia YABUT was accused of ESTAFA by means of false pretenses before the CFI Bulacan. She, astreasurer of the Yabut Transit Lines, made out 3checks in the total sum of P6, 568.94 drawn againstthe Merchants Banking Corp (located in CaloocanCity), payable to Freeway Tires Supply. The checkswere dishonored because of insufficient funds. Yabutfailed to deposit the necessary funds to cover thechecks.- Instead of entering a plea, YABUT filed a MOTION

TO QUASH contending that: (1) the acts charged donot constitute the offense as there is no allegationthat the postdated checks were issued and delivered

to the complainant prior to or simultaneously withthe delivery of the merchandise; (2) estafa is not


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indictable when checks are postdated or issued inpayment of pre-existing obligations; (3) venue wasimproperly laid because checks were issued andreceived by complainant in Caloocan, Yabuts office.- The

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Crim Pro Digest 3