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FICKSBURG TRANSPORT (EDMS) BPK v RAUTENBACH EN 'N AN DER 1988 (1) SA 318(A)

1988 (1) SA p318

Citation 1988 (1) SA 318 (A)

Court Appèlafdeling

Judge Rabie Wn HR, Botha AR, Jacobs AR, Vivier AR en Boshoff Wn AR

Heard August 27, 1987

Judgment September 19, 1987

Annotations Link to Case Annotations

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde

Verkoop - Van grond - Opsie - Uitoefening van - Wanneer betyds uitgeoefen - Brief van uitoefeningop laaste dag vir uitoefening aan voordeur geheg van woning op perseel deur verkoper gekies asdomicilium citandi et executandi - Kies van domicilium citandi et executandi verwys gewoonlik nabetekening van prosesstukke in hofverrigtinge tensy kontrak 'n wyer betekenis aan die woorde heg- Geen sodanige aanduidings in huidige kontrak nie - Bepaling in kontrak dat opsie 'uitgeoefen worddeur lewering van 'n skriftelike kennisgewing aan die eienaar...' - Geen aanduidings

1988 (1) SA p319

dat wyer betekenis aan woorde geheg moes word nie - Woord 'lewering' gebruik in sin van in besitstel - Waar verkoper vier dae vroeër op reis gegaan het en geen aanduiding dat hy uitoefening vanopsie selfs nalatiglik verydel het nie is leerstuk van fiktiewe vervulling nie van toepassing nie.

Headnote : Kopnota

Kragtens 'n notariële prospekteerkontrak, het die eerste respondent aan die appellant 'n opsieverleen om sekere eiendomme in die kontrak genoem te koop. Klousule 4.2 van die kontrakhet, in verband met die uitoefening van die opsie, soos volg bepaal: 'Die opsie sal skriftelikuitgeoefen word deur lewering van 'n skriftelike kennisgewing aan die eienaar tot die effek datdie opsie uitgeoefen word, en wel voor beëindiging van die kontrak....' Klousule 8.2 het bepaaldat die eienaar (eerste respondent) domicilium citandi et executandi by sy plaas gekies het. Opdie laaste dag vir uitoefening van die opsie, het appellant se prokureur, vergesel deur 'n polisieoffisier, na eerste respondent se plaas gegaan en die kennisgewing van uitoefening van dieopsie aan die voordeur van die woning op die plaas geheg. Die eerste respondent het vier daevroeër na sy dogter in Natal gegaan en het eers die dag na die laaste dag vir uitoefening vandie opsie na sy plaas teruggekeer. In 'n Provinsiale Afdeling het die appellant aansoek gedoenom 'n bevel wat verklaar dat die opsie geldiglik uitgeoefen is en dat eerste respondent verpligwas om die eiendom aan appellant oor te dra. Die aansoek is van die hand gewys. In 'n appèl isdit onder andere namens die appellant aangevoer: (a) met 'n beroep op klousule 8.2, dat hygeregtig was om die opsie uit te oefen deur aflewering van die kennisgewing by die domicilium


citandi et executandi, soos gedoen is; (b) dat die woord 'lewering' in klousule 4.2 nie betekenhet dat die eerste respondent in besit gestel moes word van die kennisgewing nie; en (c) dateerste respondent vir appellant verhinder het om die opsie uit te oefen deur nie beskikbaar tewees om die kennisgewing te ontvang nie en dat, met toepassing van die beginsels vanfiktiewe vervulling, die opsie geag moes word vervul te gewees het.

Beslis (per Vivier AR, Botha AR en Jacobs AR samestemmend, Rabie Wn HR en Boshoff WnAR afwykend), dat die keuse van 'n domicilium citandi et executandi sonder meer slegsbetrekking het op die betekening van prosesstukke in die loop van 'n regsgeding en in dieonderhawige kontrak was daar geen aanduidings tot die teendeel nie.

Beslis, verder, dat aan die woorde 'lewering aan die eienaar' in klousule 4.2 die betekenisgeheg moet word dat eerste respondent in besit van die kennisgewing gestel moes word.

Beslis, verder, dat daar geen ruimte vir toepassing van die leerstuk van fiktiewe vervulling in diehuidige saak was nie: appellant het nie sy saak op hierdie basis gevoer nie en daar was ookgeen aanduiding dat eerste respondent die uitoefening van die opsie selfs nalatiglik verydel hetnie.

Beslis, gevolglik, dat die appèl afgewys moes word.

Ficksburg Transport (Edms) Bpk v Rautenbach en 'n Ander 1986 (2) SA 88 (O) bevestig.


Sale - Of land - Option - Exercise of - When timeously exercised - Letter exercising option fixed tothe front door of the residence on the property chosen by the seller as domicilium citandi etexecutandi on the last day for the exercise of the option - Choice of domicilium citandi et executandiusually refers to the service of process in legal proceedings unless the contract confers a widermeaning on the words - No such indications in present contract - Provision in contract that theoptions shall 'be exercised by delivery of a written notice to the owner...' - No indication that widermeaning to be attached to words - Word 'delivery' used in sense of 'being put in possession of' -Where seller had gone on a journey four days earlier and no indication that he even negligentlyfrustrated the exercise of option, doctrine of fictional fulfilment not applicable.

Headnote : Kopnota

In terms of a notarial prospecting contract, the first respondent had conferred an option on theappellant to purchase certain properties mentioned in the contract. Clause 4.2 of the contractprovided, in connection with the exercise of the option, as follows:

1988 (1) SA p320

'The option shall be exercised in writing by delivery of a written notice to the owner to the effectthat the option is exercised, before the termination of the contract....' Clause 8.2 provided thatthe owner (first respondent) had chosen domicilium citandi et executandi at his farm. On thelast day for the exercise of the option, the applicant's attorney, accompanied by a police officer,went to the first respondent's farm and attached the notice of exercise of the option to the frontdoor of the residence on the farm. The first respondent had, four days earlier, gone to visit hisdaughter in Natal and had returned to his farm only on the day after the last day for the exercise


of the option. In an application in a Provincial Division the appellant applied for an orderdeclaring that the option had been validly exercised and that the first respondent was obliged totransfer the property to the appellant. The application was dismissed. In an appeal it wascontended inter alia on behalf of the appellant: (a) with reference to clause 8.2, that theappellant was entitled to exercise the option by delivering the notice to the domicilium citandi etexecutandi as had been done; (b) that the word 'delivery' in clause 4.2 did not mean that thefirst respondent had to be put in possession of the notice; and (c) that first respondent hadhindered the appellant from exercising the option by not being available to receive the noticeand that, applying the doctrine of fictional fulfilment, the option was deemed to have beenfulfilled.

Held (per Vivier JA, Botha JA and Jacobs JA concurring, Rabie ACJ and Boshoff AJAdissenting), that the choice of a domicilium citandi et executandi in itself related solely to theservice of process in legal proceedings and in the present case there were no indications to thecontrary.

Held, further, that the words 'delivery to the owner' in clause 4.2 should be given the meaningthat first respondent had to be put in possession of the notice.

Held, further, that there was no room for the application of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment inthe present case: the appellant had not conducted his case on this basis and there was noindication that the first respondent had even negligently frustrated the fulfilment of the option.

Held, accordingly, that the appeal had to be dismissed.

Ficksburg Transport (Edms) Bpk v Rautenbach en 'n Ander 1986 (2) SA 88 (O) confirmed.

Case Information

Appèl teen 'n beslissing in die Oranje-Vrystaatse Provinsiale Afdeling (Smuts R)gerapporteer te 1986 (2) SA 88. Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van Vivier AR.

C Ploos van Amstel namens die appellant: The first respondent was temporarily absentfrom the farm on 15 May 1985. By that date he had already been away from the farm for fourdays, in Pietermaritzburg. First respondent concedes that he left his Black employee at thefarm, and he does not dispute that the Black employee was a responsible adult person,apparently in charge of the premises during the temporary absence of the first respondent fromsuch farm. The aforegoing amounts to a situation wherein the first respondent had given tacit orimplied authority to such employee to deal with callers at the property. First respondent'sabsence at the crucial time suggests that he probably did leave a responsible servant in charge,with authority to act for and on behalf of the first respondent in the receipt of messages orletters or notices or documents or postal articles. It would also fall within the course and scopeof the servant's employment by the first respondent. Van Loggenberg v Sachs 1940 WLD 253;Voet 46.3.4. It follows that the servant was duly authorised, at least by implication or tacitly, toact for and on behalf of first respondent and to receive on behalf of the first respondent, on 15May 1985, the copy of the notice of exercise of the option. Generally, performance, payment orthe like under contract, may be made to the creditor in person, or to his servant or agent acting


within the scope of his authority. Lee and Honoré

1988 (1) SA p321

The South African Law of Obligations 2nd ed at 54 para 160 (i) and (ii); Wessels Law ofContract in South Africa 2nd ed vol I at 65 - 6 para 239, including n 49, as to making acommunication, or receiving a communication, through an agent; vol II at 611 - 14; Voet 46.3.1,2 and 4 (translation by Gane vol VII at 93 - 7). Notice received by the servant, if authorised todo so, would be notice to the principal, the first respondent. The duty of a servant is to furtherthe affairs and the interests of his master, doing so competently and in good faith. Wille andMillin Mercantile Law of South Africa 18th ed at 346 - 8; Scoble Law of Master and Servant inSouth Africa at 151 - 2. It is significant that the first respondent did not state any defence in hisaffidavits to the effect that the servant had no power or authority to receive the post or letters,notices or documents, et cetera. The authority to receive the notice was not expressly put inissue: the denial of authority must be specifically pleaded. De Villiers and Macintosh The Law ofAgency in South Africa 3rd ed at 86, 91. If delivery of the notice (or payment of money) iseffected by a person duly authorised to receive it, then that constitutes effective notice (orpayment) to the principal, even though the principal does not receive it, or he receives it late.Wille and Millin at 158; Voet 46.3.4 (Gane's translation vol VII at 97); Rhodes Motors (Pvt) Ltd vPringle-Wood NO 1965 (4) SA 40 (RA) ; Loryan (Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Tea and Coffee (Pty) Ltd1984 (3) SA 834 (W) .

Domicilium citandi et executandi. The choice of a domicilium citandi et executandi refers tothe technical matter of the service of legal process and execution. Whether the choice of thedomicilium citandi et executandi is relevant to a contractual notice would depend upon thecontents in which the reference to a choice of domicilium is used. The case law thereon mayconveniently be divided into the following categories: I. Where the wording in the contractexpressly links the choice of a domicilium to the contractual notice. Lovasz and Another vEstate Rosenberg 1940 TPD 342 at 344; Gerber v Stolze and Others 1951 (2) SA 166 (T) at169F (a case solely on execution); Iscor Estates v Van Wyk 1966 (2) SA 386 (T) at 387A; SAWimpy (Pty) Ltd v Tzouras 1977 (4) SA 244 (W) at 245E - F; Loryan (Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Teaand Coffee (Pty) Ltd (supra at 835F - H). II. Where the wording in the contract expressly refersto the choice of domicilium and to the contractual notice, but does not expressly link them.Ettrick Farms & Investments Co (Pty) Ltd v Du Ponte and Others 1967 (1) PH F10. III. Wherethe wording in the contract expressly refers to the choice of domicilium but does not expresslyrefer to the contractual notice. Sfetsios and Others v Theophilopoulos and Another 1967 (4) SA645 (W) at 646C; Muller v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 328 (W) at 331C; Maharajv Tongaat Developments Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 314 (D) at 317D. In category II(supra ) the relevant clause in the Ettrick Farms case supra reads: 'All notices to be given underthis agreement shall be sent by prepaid registered post.... For the purpose of the lease thelessees declare stand... to be their domicilium citandi et executandi.' It was held that theaddress given was for all purposes of the lease, including any notice to be given under thelease. In other words, the Court treated the clause as establishing a linkage between the choiceof domicilium and notice. In that case a broader interpretation was assigned to the clause. Seethe Sfetsios case supra at 649A - B. In category III (supra ) the Sfetsios case


1988 (1) SA p322

was one wherein there was a choice of domicilium citandi et executandi simpliciter. That was acase where there was a lease for a certain period in terms whereof there was an option ofrenewal. That option could be renewed before the expiration of the lease if the lessee gave thelessors notice in writing of the intention to do so. One of the lessors lived at the domiciliumchosen and was employed thereat. The lessee gave notice of renewal at the domiciliumchosen, having given the appropriate six months' notice. The lessors claimed that notice wasineffectual because they did not receive it. The lease having run its course, without the renewal,the lessors claimed the ejectment of the lessee, the latter relying upon a renewal of the leaseby virtue of his notice having been sent timeously to the stated domicilium chosen. Thequestion was whether the choice simpliciter of a domicilium citandi et executandi enabled thenotice to be delivered there, as being sufficient notice, even though the lessors may not havereceived it. It was held that all notices directly or intimately concerned with a lawsuit or thepossibility thereof may be served at the chosen domicilium. That is the place for service ofprocess. But if the one party, the lessee, wishes to prevent the other issuing summons, eg forejectment, he is impliedly entitled to serve the notice of intention to renew at that address, so asto prevent the process for ejectment. Such a notice is intimately connected with the probabilityof a lawsuit. If at the time of drawing up the agreement of lease, the lessee had asked wherenotice of intention to renew had to be served, it was held that the answer would have been atthe chosen domicilium. The Sfetsios decision is in favour of the appellant's case in that thenotice to exercise the option, ie to create a sale, has the corresponding consequence ofpreventing the lessor from issuing summons, eg for ejectment after 15 May 1985. On thequestion where the lessee had to deliver the notice exercising the option, the answer wouldhave been at the chosen domicilium, unless there be indications to the contrary in the contract.The Sfetsios case has been the subject-matter of criticism in the Muller case supra at 333H -334A. Also in respect of category III (supra ) the relevant clause related to the choice of adomicilium citandi et executandi 'for all purposes hereunder' in the Muller case at 331G, and 'forall purposes under this agreement' in the Maharaj case at 317D. In the latter case, the Courtwas concerned with s 4(1)(a) of Act 72 of 1971 providing that the address of the party shallserve as his domicilium citandi et executandi 'for all purposes of the contract'. In the Maharajcase supra it was held that the service of the 30 days' warning notice at the domicilium chosensufficed, but the decision was reversed in the Appellate Division (1976 (4) SA 994 (A) ). So, ofthese decisions, only the Muller case is relevant in this subparagraph. It was held that the words'for all purposes' meant for all purposes under the sale, the parties contemplating a notice bythe seller to the purchaser, calling upon the latter to remedy his default. Hence, the notice sentto the chosen domicilium sufficed. In the Muller case, the addition of the words 'for all purposeshereunder' constituted the linkage of the contractual notice with the chosen domicilium, so thatthe choice of domicilium constituted a 'double provision' being both for the notice and for legalprocess. The choice of a domicilium simpliciter is in any case 'for purposes of the contract', iefor purposes of litigation under the contract. So even without the wording in the contract 'forpurposes under

1988 (1) SA p323

the contract', the choice of a domicilium simpliciter would be for legal process. The wording in


the contract that the choice of domicilium is 'for purposes under the contract', covers not onlythe purpose of litigation, but, as decided in the Muller case, it covers also contractual notices.The reason why contractual notices would be included would be because the contract itselfprovides for the notices, and the contract provides, in addition, for a choice of a domiciliumcitandi ; the two combined may thus be linked, as happened in the Muller case. The properapproach for the interpretation is to examine the contract as a whole, and not seek to excisetherefrom the clause as to the choice of domicilium and seek to read it in isolation from the restof the contract. Cf Swart en 'n Ander v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 (1) SA 195 (A) at 202C. Theinstant contract provides for various notices to be given: clauses 1.2, 2 and 4.2. Did the partiesby way of clause 4.2 intend to insist upon the delivery of the applicant's notice, exercising theoption being made to the first respondent 'personally' or 'into his hands'? As appears from thejudgment in the main application herein, the requirement of delivery to the first respondent washeld to be delivery into his hands. The result would be that the choice of domicilium would beirrelevant to the delivery of such notice, because the notice not coming into his hands could notconstitute good delivery as would have been the case had it been held that the choice ofdomicilium was relevant, to which the Lovasz and Muller decisions would have been relevant.However, there are indicia in the instant contract for the contrary view. The provisions in thecontract relevant herein may be renumbered and referred to as follows: (i) The applicant maycancel the contract on the written notice to the first respondent (clause 1.2). (ii) The applicant isobliged to pay to the first respondent R50 per month (clause 2). (iii) All monies shall be paiddirectly to the first respondent on the farm (clause 2). (iv) The first respondent may cancel thecontract after 14 days' written notice (clause 2). (v) The option may be exercised by the deliveryof written notice to the first respondent (clause 4.2). (vi) A guarantee for payment of thepurchase price shall be delivered to the first respondent (clauses 4.3 and 4.7). The concept ofdelivery is not stated in (i) or (iv), but it is implicit therein. Vengatsamy v Scheepers 1946 NPD84 at 87. The provision for payment as in (ii) and (iii) supra includes delivery of the money, eventhrough the medium of a cheque. In (i) - (vi), save for (iv), there are stipulations as to theperson to whom the delivery of payment is to be given. In (iv) as to the notice to be given by theapplicant, there is no statement as to whom it is to be given. It is implicit that the notice in (iv) isto be given to the opposite party, ie the applicant. Accordingly, in (i) - (vi), the provisions allcontemplate the relevant delivery or payment to be made to someone, ie to the opposite party.That renders all the provisions consistent with one another, as was probably intended by theparties. However, one vital difference arises because of (iii) supra, because clause 2 providesthat all monies shall be paid directly ('direk') to the first respondent on the farm 'De Villiersdrift',district Fouriesburg. The adverb 'directly' means: '1. In a direct manner; in a straight line ofmotion;... 4. Without the intervention of a medium; immediately; by a direct process or mode.'The Shorter Oxford Dictionary 3rd ed (reprinted 1959). '1. In a direct way, line or course;straight not in a winding course;

1988 (1) SA p324

as, aimed directly at the object. 2. Immediately; without a person or thing coming between....'Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary 2nd ed (1979). That would suggest thatmonies are to be paid to the first respondent personally, into his hands, and not through anagent. The addition of the address as being at the farm 'De Villiersdrift' was presumablyintended so that the payment should not go astray, thereby reinforcing the need for the


payments to be made directly to the first respondent. In none of the other provisions (i), (ii) and(iv) - (vi), did the parties provide for the delivery to be made 'directly' or to any stated address.Hence, in these cases, the delivery could be effected either directly or indirectly. In other words,any notice by the appellant as in (i) and (v) could be delivered even to a representative of thefirst respondent or to the chosen domicilium of the first respondent (clause 8.2). In addition,there seem to be no differentiation in (i), (iv) and (v) as to the different notices, as in each casethe notice was required to be delivered to the opposite party. More specifically, in theseprovisions, nothing is stated that the notice must be delivered directly to the opposite party or tohim personally or into his hands, or at any stated address. Hence there seems to be no reasonwhy the notice under (v) given by the appellant to the first respondent, could not have beengiven at the chosen domicilium. That the guarantee under (vi) could be delivered to the firstrespondent via his chosen domicilium does not detract from the above principle. Even if theguarantee be sent to the domicilium chosen by the first respondent, the first respondent wouldbe safeguarded and not lose his property without payment therefor, because no transfer maybe effected except against payment as provided for in clause 4.1. That is also the common lawin the usual sale of land. See AA Farm Sales (Pty) Ltd (t/a AA Farms) v Kirkaldy 1980 (1) SA 13(A) at 16H - 17E. There has been a loose use of language by the parties in the drafting of theircontract, but the aforegoing interpretation results in the harmonisation of the different provisionsalong lines which the parties probably intended. Hence, the first respondent's chosendomicilium, referred to in clause 8.2 of the contract, contains the so-called double provision,available not only for the service of legal process but also for the delivery of contractual notices.This would be in terms of the aforegoing interpretation of the contract; alternatively, in terms ofthe tacit or implied term of the contract as in Sfetsios' case supra to which is to be added thatthe first respondent's residential address was also his chosen domicilium. Accordingly, thedelivery of the notice by the appellant to the first respondent's chosen domicilium constitutedproper delivery of the notice to the respondent in terms of clause 4.2 of the contract. See theSA Wimpy case supra.

Fictional fulfilment. It is assumed herein that delivery of written notice, exercising the option,had to be given to the first respondent personally at the latest on 15 May 1985. The applicant'scase on fictional fulfilment is based on what is common cause, namely the first respondent'stemporary absence from the province, at a distance of several hundred kilometres from hishome address, on the last day for the delivery of the notice exercising the option. Firstrespondent frustrated the appellant in the intended delivery of such notice to the firstrespondent personally on such last day. We are herein concerned with fictional fulfilment inrespect of a

1988 (1) SA p325

term of the contract in question. Although fictional fulfilment is ordinarily applicable in the caseof a suspensive condition, it is also applicable to a term of a contract. Christie The Law ofContract in South Africa at 138 - 40, and authorities therein cited; Van Heerden v Herman 1953(3) SA 180 (T) ; Wessels (supra vol II para 2933). It was the duty of first respondent to assist bybeing available to receive the written notice in order to make the exercise of the option effective.He took no precaution by way of a provision to absolve himself from such duty. It was not in hisdiscretion to bother whether to be available or not, nor does first respondent suggest that he


had such a discretion. Stirling v Maitland 34 LJQB 1; Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd andFederated Foundries Ltd v Shirlaw [1940] 2 ALL ER 445 (HL) at 451 - 2, 454 - 5 and 469 - 70;Fluxman v Britain 1941 AD at 292; Williams v Evans 1978 (1) SA 1170 (C) . Cf Deetleefs vWright 1977 (2) SA 560 (A) at 567E - F. The test for fictional fulfilment is 'dolus ' in the widersense, and not in the narrow sense of fraud or want of good faith. In the widest sense, itincludes the following: If it be a party's duty (contractual or moral and whether expressly orimpliedly laid on him) to assist in the fulfilment of a contractual term or condition, then thefulfilment is considered to have occurred as against him by way of the doctrine of fictionalfulfilment, if it be his fault that the duty to assist was not fulfilled, or he intended to prevent suchfulfilment in terms of his duty, or if he neglected his duty to take steps to assist in suchfulfilment. Koenig v Johnson & Co Ltd 1935 AD 262 at 271 - 2, 281; Scott and Another vPoupard and Another 1971 (2) SA 373 (A) ; Design and Planning Service v Kruger 1974 (1) SA689 (T) at 699 - 700; Landsberger v Vogl & Co 1904 TH 30 at 37; Van Loggenberg v Sachs1940 WLD 252; Hanekom v Amod 1950 (4) SA 412 (C) ; Christie (supra at 46, 135 - 8, 399,400, 413, 428 and 496). The moral duty to assist as in Koenig's case supra and the duty not tobreak off from a required state of affairs as in Scott's case supra are relevant herein. Thedoctrine of fictional fulfilment protects a party's legitimate expectation by the application of theequitable rule that no one should take advantage of his own default to the loss or injury ofanother. Scott's case supra at 378G - H; the Design and Planning case supra at 700G; Christie(supra at 136, top of the page). The first respondent was at fault in not fulfilling his said duty tobe available to receive the said written notice on 15 May 1985, or that he intended to preventsuch fulfilment or he neglected the duty to assist in such fulfilment. If the first respondentgenuinely believed that the option would not be exercised, or if Schuld elected not to exercisethe option or waived the right to do so, there would then be no fictional fulfilment. But there areno facts to support such a hypothetical situation.

Proper communication despite temporary absence. Timeous delivery to the firstrespondent's correct residential address of the written notice exercising the option to purchasesufficed to constitute proper communication to the first respondent, thereby creating a valid andeffectual sale, notwithstanding the temporary absence of the first respondent from suchaddress. Smeiman v Volkersz 1954 (4) SA 170 (C) at 177C - E. Delivery of such notice to theonly address for the first respondent of which the appellant knew was good in law, because theappellant did everything that could reasonably have been required of it to give the requirednotice

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during the first respondent's temporary absence. Naude v Malcolm and Another 19 SC 482;Baker v Marshall & Edwards 1913 WLD 156 at 160; Frank v Knight 1937 OPD 113. As the firstrespondent absented himself or otherwise made it impossible for the applicant to give thewritten notice exercising the option at a time before the expiration of the option, the firstrespondent can hardly complain that he did not receive the written notice timeously or inaccordance with the stipulated prescribed mode for communication of the exercise of theoption. Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa at 66.

G F Wright namens die eerste respondent: Dit is korrek dat eerste respondent nie betwisdat 'n afskrif van die kennisgewing oorhandig is aan die meerderjarige Swartman, Isak Pheleu,


op 15 Mei 1985, en dat eerste respondent nie betwis dat die betrokke werknemer skynbaar inbeheer van die perseel was nie. Insoverre appellant daarop steun dat eerste respondent nooitin sy beantwoordende beëdigde verklaring vermeld dat die werknemer nie magtiging gehad hetom die kennisgewing te aanvaar nie, kan niks daarvan afgelei word nie, want nêrens in dieaansoek word beweer dat die betrokke Swart werknemer magtiging gehad het om diekennisgewing te aanvaar nie. Om op hierdie grond te kan steun, moet appellant by die eerstebeen verbykom om te kan aantoon dat die betrokke werknemer gemagtig was (hetsy uitdruklik,alternatiewelik stilswyend) om uitoefening van die betrokke opsie-kennisgewing te aanvaar, enis dit nooit 'n feit wat ooit vermeld is in die aansoek nie, en derhalwe uitgestryk is in verklaringsnie. Eerstens word derhalwe die submissie gemaak dat appellant in elk geval nie nou daaropkan steun dat die betrokke werknemer, hetsy uitdruklik of stilswyend, die betrokke magtiginggehad het nie. In Dicks v South African Mutual Fire and General Insurance Co Ltd 1963 (4) SA501 (N) op 505 word dit vermeld dat dit 'n feitelike vraag is of 'n bepaalde werknemer magtiginggehad het om 'n bepaalde regshandeling te verrig. Sien ook Bester 'The Scope of an Agent'sPower of Representation' (1972) 89 SALJ 49 op 54, waar hy veral aandag geen aan diefeitelike afleiding van stilswyende magtiging. Sien ook De Villiers en Macintosh The Law ofAgency in South Africa 3de uitg op 148 - 52. Dit moet in gedagte gehou word dat dit hier gaanoor die kennisname van 'n aanvaarding van 'n opsie, welke kennisname noodsaaklik is vir diebereiking van wilsooreenstemming en die totstandkoming van die kontrak. Wat appellantderhalwe besig is om te sê, is dat die betrokke werknemer gemagtig was om namens eersterespondent te kontrakteer. Dit is wel so, en blyk uit die beslissing van Van Loggenberg v Sachs1940 WLD 253, dat 'n werknemer gemagtig kan word stilswyend om 'n bepaalde taak te verrig.Hier wou die respondent wat geregtig is om huurgeld te betaal tot die 8ste dag van elke maandsy tjek oorhandig aan die applikant se eggenote wat gemagtig was om die tjek te aanvaar. 'nBediende het egter vir respondent se boodskapper toegang onmoontlik gemaak tot diebetrokke huis, en kon hy nie die tjek aan applikant se eggenote oorhandig nie. Die Hof hetderhalwe juis besluit dat die betrokke bediende magtiging gehad het om mense toegang tot diedeur te belet of onmoontlik te maak, en hier kan verwys word na die volgende gedeelte in diekopstuk: 'The applicant's wife who was authorised to receive the cheque, was at the residenceat the time, but a domestic servant of the

1988 (1) SA p327

applicant within the scope of whose employment it was to deal with persons at the doorrequiring access to those within, informed the postman that she was not there.' (Mykursivering.) Dit is iets heeltemal anders as om te beweer dat die betrokke bediende gemagtigwas om self die tjek te aanvaar, en daar was nooit naastenby so 'n submissie gemaak nie.Voorts het die Hof in hierdie saak juis gesteun op die beginsel soos uiteengesit in die beslissingvan Koenig v Johnson and Co Ltd 1935 AD 262. Hieruit sal geensins 'n feitelike afleidinggeregverdig word dat die bepaalde werknemer in die onderhawige geval, hetsy uitdruklik ofstilswyend, gemagtig sou wees om die kennisgewing te aanvaar nie, en is daar in elk gevalgeen aanspraak dat hy die aflewering van die kennisgewing op enige wyse probeer verhinderhet nie.

Domicilium citandi et executandi. Die sienswyse van die Hof a quo was korrek metbetrekking tot klousules 4.2 en 8.2 van die betrokke prospekteerkontrak. Die Hof was ook


korrek om te beslis dat die betrokke klousule nie 'n sogenaamde 'double provision' was soos naverwys in Gerber v Stolze and Others 1951 (2) SA 166 (T) en Iscor Estates v Van Wyk 1966 (2)SA 386 (T) nie. 'n Behoorlike uitleg van die betrokke klousule (para 8.2) begin met die basieseuitgangspunt dat indien niks meer gesê is nie, die keuse van 'n domicilium citandi et executandislegs gedoen is met die oog op regsprosesse. Muller v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1)SA 328 (W) , en veral die gesag aangehaal op 332G - 333A; Fourie v Olivier en 'n Ander 1971(3) SA 274 (T) op 284A - B. Aanduidings dat dit inderdaad is wat die partye in hierdie betrokkegeval in gedagte gehad het, word versterk deur die feit dat die volgende klousule in die kontrak(klousule 9) ook handel met regsprosesse, naamlik toestemming tot die jurisdiksie van dielanddroshof, en is hierdie twee klousules (8 en 9) ver verwyder in die kontrak van al die anderklousules wat betrekking het op kennisgewing (veral klousules 1, 2 en 4). Die keuse van 'ndomicilium citandi et executandi vir die ontvangs van 'n kennisgewing van 'n opsie sou 'nafstanddoening van die reg wees om die betrokke stuk te ontvang, en kennis te neem van dieinhoud daarvan. Daar is 'n sterk vermoede teen die afstanddoening van regte. Fourie v Olivieren 'n Ander (supra op 284B). Die keuse van 'n domicilium citandi et executandi vir die ontvangsvan 'n kennisgewing vir die uitoefening van 'n opsie is onversoenbaar met die bepalings vanklousule 4.2 van die betrokke kontrak, wat lewering van 'n skriftelike kennisgewing aan dieeienaar vereis. 'n Versoening tussen die twee klousules is wel moontlik, naamlik dat die keusevan 'n domicilium citandi et executandi beperk word tot geregtelike kennisgewings. Die keusevan 'n domicilium citandi et executandi vir alle doeleindes hoegenaamd, insluitende dieontvangs van kennisgewings en dokumente, is ook onversoenbaar met klousule 4.3 van diekontrak, met betrekking tot die lewering van waarborge. Indien dit die partye se bedoeling wasom die keuse van 'n domicilium citandi et executandi uit te brei tot die ontvangs vankennisgewings, dan sou 'n mens verwag het dat die partye dit sou gestipuleer het. By gebrekaan 'n uitdruklike bepaling tot dien effekte of oortuigende bewys van 'n stilswyende beding totdien effekte, volg dit dat dit nie gesê kan word dat dit die partye se bedoeling was nie. Loryan(Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Tea and Coffee (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 834 (W) op 847D - F. Die aanduidingsin die betrokke kontrak derhalwe is dat die klousule met

1988 (1) SA p328

betrekking tot 'n domicilium citandi et executandi nie bedoel was om die kennisgewing metbetrekking tot die uitoefening van die opsie in te sluit nie. So byvoorbeeld vervat klousule 1.2van die prospekteerkontrak ook 'n drastiese bepaling, en sou 'n mens verwag dat dieaanwysing van 'n domicilium citandi et executandi dit duidelik sou stel indien dit ook vir hierdiedoeleinde aangewys is. Appellant steun baie sterk op klousule 2, wat meld dat gelde direk aandie eienaar betaal sou word, maar hierdie klousule beteken slegs dat gelde byvoorbeeld nie by'n bank inbetaal moet word nie, en dit gaan juis hier om die nakoming van die verpligtings vandie appellant wat moontlik aan 'n verteenwoordiger kon geskied in teenstelling met byvoorbeeldklousules 1.2 en 4.2, asook die laaste gedeelte van para 2 wat nie gaan oor die nakoming vandie kontrak nie, maar met die kansellasie daarvan (wat in teenstelling met betaling seker slegseenmalig sou geskied), en klousule 4.2 wat gaan oor die uitoefening van die opsie wat praktiesgesproke tot gevolg sou hê dat die prospekteerkontrak as sulks ook tot 'n einde sou kom. Al dieindicia in die kontrak dui daarop dat klousule 8 nooit bedoel is vir die dubbele doel waarnaverwys word in die aangehaalde beslissings nie.


Fiktiewe vervulling van die term. Dit gaan hier om die fiktiewe vervulling van 'n term van dieooreenkoms, en nie van 'n voorwaarde nie. Sien Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa(1981) op 138 - 40. 'n Hof sal egter nog meer teësinnig wees om fiktiewe vervulling van 'n termte bevind as van 'n opskortende voorwaarde. By 'n opskortende voorwaarde is daar welwilsooreenstemming tussen die partye, en maak een party dit slegs onmoontlik dat die betrokkeopskortende voorwaarde vervul word, en dat die kontrak derhalwe afgedwing kan word. By 'ngeval soos dié waar die hof fiktiewe vervulling van 'n term toedig aan een van die partye, komdit daarop neer dat die hof aanvaarding van die opsie, dit wil sê behoorlike kennis van dieuitoefening daarvan en die totstandkoming van die koopkontrak deur wilsooreenstemming,bevind. Dit is duidelik uit 'n onlangse Appèlhofbeslissing dat dit die houding van die Appèlhof isdat 'n persoon wat hierop steun, die bewyslas dra, en die hof moet oortuig dat hy of sy geregtigis op die fiktiewe vervulling. Sien Dirk Fourie Trust v Gerber 1986 (1) SA 763 (A) op 774 - 5. Ditis ook duidelik uit hierdie beslissing dat opset vereis word, en nie bloot nalatige optrede nie,asook dat die persoon teen wie die leerstuk opgewerp word, die oogmerk moes gehad het omdie kontrak te verydel. Sien Dirk Fourie Trust v Gerber (supra op 774I). Dit is ook duidelik uit DeWet en Yeats se bespreking dat die vervulling van die voorwaarde (in hierdie geval die term)opsetlik belet of verhinder moet word. Sien De Wet en Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4deuitg op 136. Daar word verwys na Van der Linden 1.14.92, wat die woord 'opzettelijk' gebruik.Sien De Wet en Yeats (op cit op 136 n 107); Gowan v Bowern 1924 AD 550 op 572 en 553;Design and Planning Service v Kruger 1974 (1) SA 689 (T) op 699 - 700. In appellant se hoofdeword deurgaans na die laaste paar dae vir die

uitoefening van die opsie as die 'crucial' tyd verwys, terwyl daar geen rede hiervoor is nie. Daarwas vyf jaar waarin die opsie uitgeoefen kon word. Vermoedelik sou die opsie uitgeoefen wordindien die prospekteerder iets gevind het wat dit vir hom die moeite werd gemaak het, maar isdit glad nie te sê dat dit eers kon geskied in die laaste gedeelte van die prospekteertydperk nie.Selfs volgens appellant se weergawe dat

1988 (1) SA p329

hy te kenne gegee het aan eerste respondent dat die opsie uitgeoefen sal word, maak nie dielaaste paar dae enigsins meer krities as enige ander dae in die laaste maand voor dieverstryking van die betrokke kontrak nie. Die feit dat appellant byna die volle vyf jaar van dieopsietydperk niks gedoen het met betrekking tot die opsie nie, en kort voor die einde daarvan,dit wil sê ongeveer een maand voor die opsie-uitoefening moes geskied, na eerste respondentgekom het en 'n eerste verband gevra het, was voldoende vir enige mens om af te lei datSchuld, en derhalwe appellant as sy regsopvolger, nie in staat was om die fondse bymekaar tekry om die opsie uit te oefen nie. Juis die feit dat hy 'n desperate poging om fondse te bekom,aangewend het, en selfs gepoog het om die eiendom teen 'n hoër prys aan ander persone teverkoop, is ook aanduidend hiervan. Dit is insiggewend dat appellant nooit hierdie oogmerk vaneerste respondent, naamlik om die totstandkoming van die kontrak te verydel, in dieaanvanklike aansoek genoem het nie, en word dit vir die eerste keer in die repliserendeverklaring genoem. Eerste respondent meld in sy aanvullende stukke dat, sedert hy die grondeverhuur het, hy nie meer aktief geboer het nie, en afgetree het. Hy was feitlik maandeliks oftweemaandeliks nie op die plaas nie, en het by sy kinders te Bloemfontein, Pretoria enPietermaritzburg gekuier. Daar is geen sprake dat hy vir 'n maand of twee gekuier het nie en is


daar slegs die bewering dat hy 'feitlik maandeliks of tweemaandeliks nie op die plaas (was) nie'bedoelende daarby glad nie dat hy meer as noodwendig 'n paar dae nie op die plaas was nie.Eerste respondent meld self dat dit slegs ongeveer vier ure se reis is na Pietermaritzburg. DieSwart werknemer was op die plaas, en kon enige tyd vermeld het waar eerste respondent wasindien daar navraag by hom gedoen is. Dit geld ook wat betref die bure. Eerste respondent geeook 'n goeie rede waarom hy vanaf 11 Mei 1985 nie op die plaas was nie, naamlik dat sy dogterhom versoek het om te kom help met die trek na Pretoria. Selfs indien appellant se weergaweaanvaar word, kan daar geen sprake wees van die opsetlike oogmerk om die uitoefening vandie opsie te vermy nie (en ook nie van nalatigheid nie). Indien appellant nog 'n maand voor dietyd besig was om finansiering te soek, sou 'n mens een of ander mededeling aan eersterespondent verwag het in die laaste paar dae voordat die opsie uitgeoefen moet word. Die Hofhet korrek tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat eerste respondent nie kontrakbreuk gepleeg hetnie deur na Pietermaritzburg te reis nie, en daardeur nie opsetlik met die bedoeling om dievervulling van die voorwaarde te verydel, opgetree het nie. Daar word nie fout gevind met diestelling van Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 66 wat soos volg lui: 'An offerer whochanges his address or absents himself or otherwise makes it impossible for the offeree to givenotice of acceptance before the expiration of the offer can hardly complain that he has notreceived such notice.' (My kursivering.) Christie verskaf geen beginselgrondslag vir hierdiestelling nie, maar dit is 'n duidelike geval van onmoontlikmaking van prestasie met die normalegevalle wat daaruit voortspruit. Sien De Wet en Yeats (op cit op 158). Alternatiewelik, en inbepaalde gevalle, kan dit juis 'n geval wees waar die leerstuk van fiktiewe vervulling van diebetrokke term van toepassing mag wees, en kan die ontwykende party in bepaalde gevalle seoptrede op afstanddoening van sy regte of selfs tot stilswyende aanvaarding van 'n ander wysevan

1988 (1) SA p330

VIVIER AR

aanvaarding van die aanbod neerkom. Die belangrike punt hier is dat die een party deur syoptrede dit vir die ander party onmoontlik moes gemaak het om betyds die aanbod te aanvaar,en gaan dit nog veel verder as die leerstuk van fiktiewe vervulling waar die betrokke party slegsopsetlik moes poog om die ander party se regte te verydel. In die geval van Baker v Marshall &Edwards 1913 WLD 156 het dit gegaan oor die hernuwing van 'n huurkontrak (wat gewoonlikteen die einde van 'n huurperiode verstryk), en het die verhuurder die land verlaat, en ditonmoontlik gemaak vir die huurder om die kontrak te hernu. Die verhuurder het ook geen adresverskaf aan die huurder waar kennis gegee kon word van die hernuwing nie. Die Hof het blootgesteun op Naude v Malcolm and Another (sien infra ), en tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat diehuurder alle moontlike stappe geneem het om die vereiste kennis te verskaf. In Naude vMalcolm and Another 19 SC 482 was daar 'n huurkontrak met 'n opsie, en het die eenopsiegewer gesterf terwyl die ander een na Engeland gegaan het. In die beslissing is daar ookop geen spesifieke gesag gesteun nie, en is die gevolgtrekking ook gebaseer oponmoontlikmaking van die betrokke term deur die opsiegewer. Die saak van Frank v Knight1937 OPD 113 bied geen steun vir appellant nie, en daar moet ook in gedagte gehou word datdie opmerkings van Ogilvie Thompson R (soos hy toe was) in Smeiman v Volkersz 1954 (4) SA170 (K) op 177C - E, bloot obiter is. Daar kon geen sprake wees dat eerste respondent dit vir


appellant onmoontlik gemaak het om die opsie uit te oefen nie. Daar moet in gedagte gehouword dat die opsie gestrek het oor 'n periode van vyf jaar, en dat eerste respondent slegs virvier dae van die plaas af weg was, en ook nie die land verlaat het nie, maar slegs inPietermaritzburg was waar hy dieselfde dag nog gevind kon word, of veel makliker, indienappellant 'n dag of twee voor die tyd die moeite sou gedoen het om vas te stel waar hy toe was.Vir doeleindes hiervan moet net weer beklemtoon word dat die gewone reël by kontrak is datdie kontrak eers tot stand kom as die persoon wat die aanbod gemaak het, van die aannamedaarvan te wete kom.

Ploos van Amstel in repliek.

Cur adv vult.

Postea (September 29).

Judgment

Vivier AR: Eerste respondent is die eienaar van die plaas De Villiersdrift ('die eiendom') in diedistrik Fouriesburg. Op 26 Oktober 1981 het eerste respondent en ene Schuld 'n notariëleprospekteerkontrak aangegaan ingevolge waarvan Schuld die alleenreg verkry het vir 'ntydperk van vyf jaar, gereken vanaf 16 Mei 1980, om op die eiendom vir edelgesteentes teprospekteer. Prospekteergelde van R50 per maand was maandeliks vooruitbetaalbaar vanaf 1Februarie 1980. Ingevolge klousule 4 van die prospekteerkontrak is 'n opsie aan Schuld verleenom die eiendom, insluitende sekere mineraalregte, te koop. Klousule 4.2 het vereis dat dieopsie

'skriftelik uitgeoefen word deur lewering van 'n skriftelike kennisgewing aan die eienaar tot die effek dat die opsieuitgeoefen word, en wel voor beëindiging van die kontrak'.

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VIVIER AR

Schuld het sy opsie aan die appellant sedeer. Die geskil tussen die partye gaan oor die vraagof die opsie behoorlik uitgeoefen is al dan nie.

In die Hof a quo het die appellant by kennisgewing van mosie 'n verklarende bevel gevradat die opsie behoorlik uitgeoefen is en vir 'n bevel wat eerste respondent gelas om oordragvan die eiendom aan hom te gee teen betaling van die koopprys, sowel as vir sekere verwanteregshulp. Die aansoek is deur eerste respondent bestry. Tweede respondent in die Hof a quosowel as in hierdie Hof, is die huurder van die eiendom ingevolge 'n skriftelike huurkontrak watná die prospekteerkontrak, en onderhewig aan die bepalings daarvan, gesluit is. Tweederespondent berus hom by die uitspraak van die Hof. Die aansoek is met koste afgewys deurSmuts RP (sien 1986 (2) SA 88 (O) ), wat aan die appellant verlof verleen het om na hierdieHof te appelleer.

Op 15 Mei 1985, wat die laaste dag was waarop die opsie uitgeoefen kon word, was dieeerste respondent tydelik afwesig van die eiendom toe die appellant se prokureur teen 4 uur diemiddag daar opdaag met 'n brief van dieselfde datum waarin die eerste respondent in kennis


gestel word dat die opsie uitgeoefen word. Dit moet aanvaar word dat toe die appellant seprokureur verneem dat eerste respondent nie tuis is nie, hy nie verder navrae gedoen het oorwaar eerste respondent was nie, omdat hy van mening was dat lewering van die kennisgewingvan aanname van die opsie by die eerste respondent se adres, wat sy gekose domiciliumcitandi et executandi was, voldoende sou wees. Hy het gevolglik die oorspronklike van die briefaan die voordeur van eerste respondent se woning geheg en 'n afskrif is aan 'n werknemer vaneerste respondent, ene Izak Pheleu, wat skynbaar in beheer van die perseel was, oorhandig.Eerste respondent het eers die volgende dag by sy terugkeer vanaf 'n besoek aanPietermaritzburg, waar hy sedert 11 Mei 1985 was, van die gepoogde uitoefening van die opsieverneem.

Namens appellant is op verskeie gronde betoog dat die opsie regsgeldig uitgeoefen is op15 Mei 1985. Daar is eerstens betoog dat die lewering van die kennisgewing aan Pheleubehoorlike lewering van die kennisgewing aan die eerste respondent was, deurdat hy tydens syafwesigheid vir Pheleu in beheer van die eiendom gelaat en daarmee stilswygend vir Pheleugemagtig het om kennisgewings soos die huidige namens hom te ontvang. Dat 'n werknemerstilswygende magtiging kan hê om 'n bepaalde regshandeling te verrig, is voor die handliggend. Of daar in 'n bepaalde saak magtiging bestaan, hang van die besondere feite enomstandighede van daardie saak af. Om mee te begin, is daar in die huidige saak geenbewering in die beëdigde verklarings dat Pheleu uitdruklike of stilswygende magtiging gehadhet soos nou betoog word nie. Al wat van hom in die appellant se beëdigde verklarings gesêword, is dat hy ''n volwasse, verantwoordelike, Swartman is wat skynbaar in beheer van dieperseel was'. Of hy die plaasbestuurder of huisbediende was, word nie gemeld nie. In dieeerste respondent se beëdigde verklarings word niks meer oor Pheleu gesê nie. Die redewaarom so min oor Pheleu in die beëdigde verklarings gesê is, is omdat dit nie appellant sesaak was dat lewering van die kennisgewing aan Pheleu as eerste respondent segevolmagtigde geskied het nie. Dit het mnr Van Amstel, namens appellant, geredelik toegegee.Na my mening is die afleiding dat Pheleu magtiging gehad het

1988 (1) SA p332

VIVIER AR

om kennisgewings namens eerste respondent te ontvang, nie geregverdig bloot uit die feit datPheleu in beheer was van die eerste respondent se woning tydens laasgenoemde se tydelikeafwesigheid nie (vgl Loryan (Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Tea and Coffee (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 834 (W)op 848 in fine ). Indien nie bewys is dat Pheleu die nodige magtiging gehad het nie, volg dit datdie verdere betoog dat sy kennis aan die eerste respondent toegereken moet word, ook nie kanslaag nie.

Daar is voorts namens appellant betoog dat die woorde in klousule 4.2 van die kontrak'lewering van 'n skriftelike kennisgewing aan die eienaar' nie beteken dat die eerste respondentof sy gevolgmagtigde in besit gestel moes word van die kennisgewing nie, maar dat aan diewoorde 'n wye betekenis geheg moet word sodat niks meer vereis is as dat die kennisgewingop 'n wyse wat redelik is onder die omstandighede, gelewer moes word nie. Daar is betoog datlewering by die eerste respondent se adres, wat ook sy gekose domicilium citandi et executandi


was, onder die omstandighede redelik was.

Die algemene reël van ons reg is dat die uitoefening van 'n opsie aan die opsiegewermeegedeel moet word (Dietrichsen v Dietrichsen 1911 TPD 486 op 495; Smeiman v Volkersz1954 (4) SA 170 (K) op 176E - F). Die opsiegewer kan egter uitdruklik of stilswygend 'nbesondere wyse vir die uitoefening van die opsie voorskryf, in welke geval die kontrak tot standkan kom selfs sonder dat die uitoefening van die opsie aan die opsiegewer meegedeel is(Driftwood Properties (Pty) Ltd v McLean 1971 (3) SA 591 (A) op 597D - E). De Groot De JureBelli ac Pacis 2.11.15 sê dat die aanbieder kan voorskryf dat sy aanbod 'n kontrak tot stand salbring òf deur die geadresseerde se blote aanvaarding daarvan, òf eers wanneer hy verneemvan die aanvaarding, en dat in geval van twyfel, vermoed word dat die kontrak eers tot standkom indien die aanbieder van die aanname verneem. Hierdie passasie is goedgekeur deurhierdie Hof in Driftwood Properties (Pty) Ltd v McLean (supra op 597E - F).

Om terug te keer tot die huidige kontrak. Klousule 4.2 vereis 'lewering aan die eienaar' vandie skriftelike kennisgewing. In R v Rudd 1912 TPD 195 het Smith R, met verwysing na diewoord 'deliver' in art 52 van Ord 32 van 1902, op 199 gesê:

'The ordinary and popular sense of delivering a thing to another is to hand over the thing to him'

en na my mening is dit die betekenis wat aan die woorde 'lewering aan die eienaar' in diehuidige kontrak gegee moet word. (Vgl A to Z Bazaars (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Agriculture 1975(3) SA 468 (A) op 477A - H en S v Solomon 1986 (3) SA 705 (A) op 711E - F.) Indien klousule4.2 lewering sonder meer, of lewering by die eerste respondent se adres vereis het, sou ditseker voldoende gewees het om die kennisgewing by die eerste respondent se adres te laat,soos die geval was in die Loryan -saak supra op 835G - H en 849I. Klousule 4.2 vereis egteruitdruklik dat lewering aan die eerste respondent moet geskied, sonder vermelding van enigeadres, en die betekenis wat aan hierdie woorde geheg moet word, is dat eerste respondent inbesit van die kennisgewing gestel moes word.

Namens appellant is betoog dat klousule 4.2 saamgelees moet word met klousule 8.2waarin, so is betoog, wel voorsiening gemaak word vir 'n adres vir die lewering van diekennisgewing van uitoefening van die opsie.

1988 (1) SA p333

VIVIER AR

Daar is betoog dat met die keuse van die eiendom as domicilium citandi et executandi inklousule 8.2 van die prospekteerkontrak, die partye nie slegs bedoel het om te verwys na diebetekening van prosesstukke in die loop van 'n regsgeding nie, maar ook na alle kennisgewingsingevolge die prospekteerkontrak. Klousule 8 bepaal as volg:

'8.1 Die prospekteerder kies domicilium citandi et executandi te Kloofstraat 16, Ficksburg.

8.2 Die eienaar kies domicilium citandi et executandi te De Villiersdrift, Ficksburg.'

Dit word algemeen aanvaar in ons praktyk dat die keuse van 'n domicilium citandi etexecutandi, sonder meer, slegs betrekking het op die betekening van prosesstukke in die loop


van 'n regsgeding (Voet 5.1.93, Merula Manier van Procederen 4.41.4, Van der Linden Inst3.1.2.14, Van Zyl Judicial Practice op 38, Reël 4(1)(a) (iv) van die Eenvormige Hofreëls, Mullerv Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd 1972 (1) SA 328 (T) op 331 in fine - 332A en Loryan (Pty) Ltd vSolarsh Tea and Coffee (Pty) Ltd (supra op 847D)). Soms word 'n domicilium egter ook deurdie partye tot 'n kontrak gekies vir die betekening van kennisgewings ingevolge die kontrak. Ofin 'n bepaalde geval 'n keuse van 'n domicilium citandi et executandi slegs betrekking het opprosesstukke in 'n regsgeding en of dit ook van toepassing is op kennisgewings ingevolge diekontrak (die sg 'dubbele voorsiening'), hang af van die juiste vertolking van die bepaaldekontrak. So is beslis dat die gekose domicilium ook geld vir kontraktuele kennisgewings inonder andere Muller v Mulbarton Gardens (Pty) Ltd (supra ) en die sake daar aangehaal op332H - 333A en Loryan (Pty) Ltd v Solarsh Tea and Coffee (Pty) Ltd (supra op 848).

In die onderhawige kontrak is dit opvallend dat klousule 8 nie uitdruklik na kontraktuelekennisgewings verwys nie, en ook nie woorde gebruik wat wyd genoeg is om kontraktuelekennisgewings in te sluit nie. Dit ten spyte van die feit dat daar verskeie voorafgaandebepalings is wat voorsiening maak vir een of ander kennisgewing ingevolge die kontrak. Sobepaal klousule 1.2 dat die prospekteerder met skriftelike kennisgewing aan die eienaar diekontrak kan kanselleer indien hy nie verder wil prospekteer nie. Klousule 2 bepaal dat indienprospekteergelde nie betyds betaal word nie, of ingeval van nie-nakoming van die bepalingsvan die kontrak, die eienaar geregtig is om die kontrak te kanselleer na 14 dae skriftelikekennisgewing. Ek het reeds na klousule 4.2 verwys wat ook 'n skriftelike kennisgewing vereis.Klousule 4.3 maak voorsiening vir die lewering aan die eienaar van 'n waarborg vir betaling vandie koopsom. Omdat die keuse van 'n domicilium citandi et executandi gewoonlik alleenbetrekking het op betekening van prosesstukke van die hof in die loop van 'n regsgeding, soumens verwag dat, indien die bedoeling was om in klousule 8 ook voorsiening te maak virkontraktuele kennisgewings, die partye dit uitdruklik sou gesê het of woorde sou gebruik hetwat wyd genoeg was om kennisgewings ingevolge die kontrak in te sluit. Dit is nie gedoen nie.Vir die betoog dat klousule 8 ook verwys na kontraktuele kennisgewings, is sterk gesteun opdie vereiste in klousule 2 dat prospekteergelde direk aan die eienaar betaal moet word, terwylhierdie vereiste nie verskyn in die ander klousules wat voorsiening maak vir kontraktuelekennisgewings nie. Daar is betoog dat hierdie verskil in

1988 (1) SA p334

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bewoording daarop dui dat in die laasgemelde gevalle 'indirekte' betekening in die sin vanbetekening by die gekose domicilium, voldoende is. Ek stem nie saam nie. Al wat na mymening met 'direkte betaling' in klousule 2 bedoel word, is dat prospekteergelde aan dieeienaar, en nie bv in sy bankrekening nie, betaal moet word.

Mnr Van Amstel het voorts betoog dat die kennisgewing van uitoefening van die opsie in elkgeval by implikasie deel vorm van die prosesstukke van 'n regsgeding, aangesien dit 'n geldigekoopkontrak van die eiendom tot stand gebring en aldus 'n uitsettingsbevel na 15 Mei 1985verhoed het. Vir hierdie betoog het hy gesteun op die beslissing in Sfetsios and Others vTheophilopoulos and Another 1967 (4) SA 645 (W) op 648D - F. Na my mening kan op geenbasis gesê word dat die kennisgewing waardeur die opsie uitgeoefen is, direk of indirek deel


vorm van die prosesstukke in 'n regsgeding nie en die uitspraak waarop gesteun is, kan inhierdie opsig nie ondersteun word nie (vgl wat in die Muller -saak supra op 333H - 334A gesê isomtrent die Sfetsios -saak).

Ek is gevolglik van mening dat die prospekteerkontrak geen adres bepaal, uitdruklik of byimplikasie, met betrekking tot die lewering aan die eerste respondent van die kennisgewingwaardeur die opsie uitgeoefen is nie. Volgens die duidelike bepalings van klousule 4.2 meen ekdat vereis is dat die kennisgewing persoonlik aan die eerste respondent of sy gevolmagtigdeoorhandig moes word. In soverre daar twyfel hieroor mag bestaan, moet, volgens die gesagwaarna ek reeds verwys het, die konstruksie ten gunste van so 'n vereiste wees.

Mnr Van Amstel het gesteun op 'n obiter dictum in Smeiman v Volkersz (supra ) waar diebehoorlike uitoefening van 'n mondelinge opsie om 'n sekere belang in 'n maatskappy te koop,ter sprake was. Telefoniese navraag by die opsiegewer se adres in Wynberg, Kaapstad, op dielaaste dag waarop die opsie uitegoefen kon word, het getoon dat die opsiegewer tydelik opKroonstad was. Gevolglik is briewe van aanname daardie dag na beide adresse gepos, wategter hul bestemmings eers ná daardie datum bereik het. In die loop van sy uitspraak hetOgilvie Thompson R in 'n obiter dictum op 177C - D gesê dat hy geneig is om te dink dat tydigeaflewering van die brief van aanname by die aanbieder se juiste Wynbergse adres voldoendesou gewees het om 'n kontrak tot stand te bring ten spyte van die aanbieder se tydelikeafwesigheid. As gesag vir hierdie stelling is verwys na die Restatement of the Law: Contractspara 69; Williston on Contracts 3de uitg band 1 para 89 en na die beslissings in Naude vMalcolm and Another 19 SC 482 en Baker v Marshall and Edwards 1913 WLD 156. Diebetrokke paragraaf in die Restatement lees as volg:

'A written revocation, rejection or acceptance is received when the writing comes into the possession of theperson addressed, or of some person authorised by him to receive it for him, or when it is deposited in someplace which he has authorised as the place for this or similar communications to be deposited for him.'

In die tersaaklike passasie uit Williston on Contracts word dieselfde gesê:

'Accordingly, if a letter comes into the possession of the person addressed or of one authorised to receive it forhim, or in a place which he has designated as the place for this or similar communications to be deposited forhim, the letter has reached its destination and is as effectual though unread as if it were read.'

1988 (1) SA p335

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Die passasies in die Restatement en Williston, wat in ooreenstemming met ons reg is, neem dieappellant se saak nie verder nie omdat, soos ek reeds daarop gewys het, Pheleu nie gemagtigwas om die betrokke dokument namens die eerste respondent te aanvaar nie enlaasgenoemde nie sy adres aangewys het as die plek waar die betrokke kennisgewingafgelewer kon word nie.

Die Naude - en Baker -sake is voorbeelde van gevalle waar die totstandkoming ofverlenging van 'n kontrak deur die skuld van die aanbieder verydel is deur adresverandering,afwesigheid of andersins, sodat die vereiste kennisgewing sy bestemming laat, of glad nie,bereik het nie, terwyl die aannemer, aan die ander kant, alles gedoen het wat redelikerwys van


hom verwag kon word om die kennisgewing aan die aanbieder te besorg. Onder daardieomstandighede is kennis aan die aanbieder toegeskryf asof hy wel die vereiste kennisgewingbetyds gekry het (De Wet en Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4de uitg op 36). In Naude vMalcolm and Another was die vraag of 'n opsie om te koop behoorlik uitgeoefen is. Een van dieopsiegewers is oorlede en geen eksekuteur is vir hom aangestel nie, terwyl die anderopsiegewer oorsee is en van sy adres daar vertrek het sonder om sy nuwe adres te verstrek.Gevolglik het die brief waarin die opsie uitgeoefen is, hom nooit bereik nie. Daar is beslis datdie opsienemer alles gedoen het wat redelikerwys van hom verwag kon word, en dat hygeregtig was op oordrag van die eiendom. In Baker v Marshall and Edwards was die vraag of 'nhuurkontrak behoorlik deur die vereiste skriftelike kennisgewing hernu is. Die verhuurder hetdie land verlaat sonder om aan die huurders te sê hoedat kennis van hernuwing aan homgegee kon word. Onder daardie omstandighede is beslis dat 'n brief oor die pos aan sy korrekteadres voldoende kennisgewing van hernuwing was, al het dit hom nooit bereik nie, omdat ditnie die huurders se skuld was dat die brief nie sy bestemming bereik het nie. Die beginselwaarop die Baker - en Naude -sake beslis is, skyn ook die basis te gewees het vir die obiterdictum in die Smeiman -saak waarna ek verwys het.

Na my mening is daar geen ruimte vir die toepassing van 'n soortgelyke beginsel op diefeite van die huidige saak nie. Die appellant se saak, soos ek reeds gesê het, was dat leweringby die domicilium citandi et executandi voldoende lewering aan eerste respondent was. Sy saakwas nie dat hy alles gedoen het wat redelikerwys van hom verwag kon word om diekennisgewing aan die eerste respondent te lewer en dat lewering verydel is deur eersterespondent se afwesigheid nie. Indien dit sy saak was, sou mens verwag het dat hy navraagsou gedoen het oor waar eerste respondent hom bevind en 'n ontmoeting probeer reël het virlater dié betrokke dag. Dit het hy nie gedoen nie. Ons weet uit die beëdigde verklarings dateerste respondent op die betrokke dag vier uur se ry per motor van die eiendom af was en datappellant by navraag kon vasgestel het waar eerste respondent hom bevind. Daar wasgevolglik oorgenoeg tyd vir lewering aan eerste respondent indien appellant dit wou doen. Ekmeen dat dit nie van eerste respondent verwag kon word om, waar hy niks van appellantgehoor het, op die laaste dag voortdurend op die eiendom aanwesig te gewees het nie. Ditmoet aanvaar word wat eerste respondent in sy beëdigde verklaring sê, nl dat sy besoek aanPietermaritzburg heel

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onskuldig was en dat Pheleu aan enigeen wat navraag gedoen het, sou gesê het waar hy tevinde was. Daar is geen aanduiding dat hy nie betyds sou teruggekeer het indien dit vereis wasnie.

Daar is origens geen basis waarop gesê kan word dat die eerste respondent die uitoefeningvan die opsie met indirekte oogmerk, soos deur mnr Van Amstel betoog, of selfs op nalatigewyse verydel het nie. Hieruit volg dat die leerstuk van fiktiewe vervulling, waarop namensappellant gesteun is, ook geen toepassing het in die huidige saak nie.

Laastens is daar namens die appellant betoog dat deur sy afwesigheid van die eiendom op


15 Mei 1985, eerste respondent afstand gedoen het van sy reg dat die betrokke kennisgewingaan hom gelewer word. 'n Beweerde afstanddoening van regte verg duidelike bewys, veralwaar op stilswygende afstanddoening gesteun word. Die gedrag waarop gesteun word, moetteenstrydig wees met die voortbestaan van sodanige regte of met 'n bedoeling om dit af tedwing. (Laws v Rutherfurd 1924 AD 261 op 263; Hepner v Roodepoort-Maraisburg TownCouncil 1962 (4) SA 772 (A) op 778 en Borstlap v Spangenberg en Andere 1974 (3) SA 695 (A)op 704G - H.) In die huidige saak is daar geen getuienis om die beweerde afstanddoening testaaf nie en die blote afwesigheid van die eerste respondent regverdig nie so 'n afleiding nie.

Ek is gevolglik van mening dat die Hof a quo tereg die aansoek afgewys het. Die appèlword met koste afgewys.

Botha AR en Jacobs AR het saamgestem in die uitspraak van Vivier AR.

Judgment

Rabie Wn HR: Die eerste respondent (na wie ek hierna as die respondent sal verwys) het op 26Oktober 1981 'n notariële prospekteerkontrak met ene Herman August Schuld aangegaan. Dieooreenkoms het 'n opsie, waarvan die besonderhede hieronder sal blyk, bevat. Schuld het syregte onder die ooreenkoms aan die appellant-maatskappy, waarvan hy die besturendedirekteur is, gesedeer, en die vraag in die appèl is of die appellant die opsie wat die respondentin die gemelde ooreenkoms aan Schuld verleen het, behoorlik uitgeoefen het. Die Verhoorhof,wie se uitspraak gerapporteer is (kyk 1986 (2) SA 88 (O) ), het bevind dat die opsie niebehoorlik uitgeoefen is nie. Ek het die uitspraak van my Kollega Vivier, waarin hy bevind dat dieVerhoorhof se beslissing juis is, gelees, maar ek kan my, met eerbied gesê, nie met dié meningvereenselwig nie.

Die ooreenkoms tussen die partye het betrekking op drie plase in die distrik Fouriesburgwaarvan die respondent die geregistreerde eienaar is. Die plase word in die ooreenkomsbeskryf as Verblyden nr 279, Pilaar nr 285 en die resterende gedeelte van die plaas DeVilliersdrift nr 338. Ek haal 'n gedeelte van die ooreenkoms aan:

'1.1 Die eienaar verleen hiermee die alleenreg aan die prospekteerder om in, of onder die eiendomme teprospekteer en te soek na edelgesteentes en opnames daarvan te maak vir 'n tydperk van vyf jaar vanaf 16 Mei1980 (hierna "die prospekteertydperk" genoem) onderworpe aan die voorwaardes hierinlater uiteengesit.

1.2 Indien die prospekteerder sou verkies om nie verder te prospekteer nie, kan hy met skriftelike kennisgewingaan die eienaar hierdie kontrak kanselleer.

2. Die prospekteerder sal aan die eienaar prospekteergelde betaal soos volg:

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(i) geen prospekteergelde is betaalbaar vir die tydperk tot en met 31 Januarie 1980nie;

(ii) daarna sal prospekteergelde R50 per maand wees, maandeliks vooruitbetaalbaar opdie 1ste dag van elke maand vanaf 1 Februarie 1980.


Alle gelde sal direk aan die eienaar betaal word op die plaas De Villiersdrift, distrik Fouriesburg. Indien gelde niestiptelik op datum betaal word nie, of indien die terme en voorwaardes hierin nie nagekom word nie, sal dieeienaar geregtig wees om hierdie kontrak te kanselleer na 14 dae skriftelike kennisgewing en indien dieprospekteerder nie voor die verstryking van die 14 dae die gebrek aangesuiwer het nie.

...

4. Die prospekteerder sal die uitsluitlike en onherroeplike opsie hê vir die termyn van hierdie ooreenkoms om dieeiendomme met die mineraalregte op edelgesteentes, ingesluit alle ander minerale regte, dit wil sê al die regtevan welke aard ook al wat die eienaar volgens enige Wet wat van toepassing is op 'n ontdekking of dieontginning van edelgesteentes mag besit of verkry, op die volgende terme en voorwaardes te koop:

4.1 Die prys sal wees R300 per hektaar, betaalbaar teen registrasie van dieeiendomme in die prospekteerder se naam.

4.2 Die opsie sal skriftelik uitgeoefen word deur lewering van 'n skriftelikekennisgewing aan die eienaar tot die effek dat die opsie uitgeoefen word, en welvoor beëindiging van die kontrak. By versuim, verval die opsie by beëindiging vandie kontrak.

4.3 'n Waarborg aanneemlik vir die eienaar vir betaling van die koopsom sal binne 60dae na uitoefening van die opsie aan die eienaar gelewer word.

...

6. Dit is 'n term van hierdie kontrak dat die eiendomsreg van alle edelgesteentes wat ontdek word gedurende dieprospekteertydperk op die prospekteerder sal oorgaan wie dit sal bemark op voorwaarde dat waar die opbrengsvan die edelgesteentes die bedrag van R20 000 per maand oorskry, die prospekteerder aan die eienaar 10 %betaal van die bedrag waarmee die R20 000 per maand oorskry word.

7. Die prospekteerder het die reg om hierdie kontrak of enige regte hierkragtens te sedeer, assigneer of oor temaak aan enige maatskappy, sindikaat, vennootskap of persoon.

8.1 Die prospekteerder kies domicilium citandi et executandi te Kloofstraat 16,Ficksburg.

8.2 Die eienaar kies domicilium citandi et executandi te De Villiersdrift, Fouriesburg.

9. Beide partye stem toe tot die jurisdiksie van die landdroshof ten opsigte van enige geskil wat uit hoofde vanhierdie kontrak mag ontstaan, maar kan enigeen van die partye 'n aksie in die Hooggeregshof van Suid-Afrikainstel indien hy so sou verkies.'

Soos blyk uit klousule 4.2 van die ooreenkoms, moes die opsie uitgeoefen word

'deur lewering van 'n skriftelike kennisgewing aan die eienaar tot die effek dat die opsie uitgeoefen word, en welvoor beëindiging van die kontrak'.

Die ooreenkoms, en dus ook die reg om die opsie uit te oefen, sou om middernag op 15 Mei1985 verstryk. (Dit word tereg so deur die respondent in sy beantwoordende beëdigdeverklaring aanvaar, en die Hof a quo het dit ook so ingesien: kyk 1986 (2) SA 80 op 95D - E.)

Wat die gebeure op 15 Mei 1985 betref, blyk dit dat die appellant se prokureur, ene mnrHibbert, en adjudant-offisier O A van Tonder, 'n lid


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van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie, op dié dag na die respondent op Fouriesburg gesoek het maarhom nie kon vind nie. In die uitspraak van die Hof a quo word gesê dat dit in daardie Hofgemene saak tussen die partye was dat die respondent 'nie op die betrokke dag opFouriesburg was nie en dat hy nie daar gevind kon word nie'. (Kyk 1986 (2) SA op 92B - C.)Hibbert en Van Tonder het daarna na De Villiersdrift, die plaas waarop die respondent sewoonhuis staan, gegaan. Die respondent was nie op die plaas nie. Hibbert sê die volgende in 'nbeëdigde verklaring oor wat hy en Van Tonder toe gedoen het:

'Ek en adjudant-offisier Van Tonder kon eerste respondent nie vind nie en was in sy afwesigheid genoodsaak omdie oorspronklike dokument aan die voordeur van sy woonhuis op die plaas De Villiersdrift, Fouriesburg aan teheg. Adjudant-offisier Van Tonder het in my teenwoordigheid 'n afskrif daarvan oorhandig aan 'n volwasseverantwoordelike Swartman wat skynbaar in beheer van die perseel was in die afwesigheid van eersterespondent, naamlik ene Izak Pheleu. Die aanhegting van die dokument asook oorhandiging van 'n afskrifdaarvan aan gemelde Pheleu geskied om 16h00 op 15 Mei 1985.'

Die 'oorspronklike dokument' waarna daar in die aanhaling verwys word, was 'n brief waarin dieappellant die respondent meedeel dat hy die opsie uitoefen. Die respondent het in sybeantwoordende beëdigde verklaring gesê dat hy die bewerings in die aangehaalde paragraaf,wat deur Van Tonder beaam is, nie betwis nie.

Die respondent sê in sy so pas gemelde verklaring dat die kennisgewing van die uitoefeningvan die opsie by sy 'tuiskoms' op 16 Mei 1985 'tot (sy) kennis' gekom het. Hy sê verder in diéverklaring dat die kennisgewing nie aan hom gelewer is soos bedoel in klousule 4.2 van dieooreenkoms nie. Hy sê ook dat die domicilium citandi et executandi wat hy in klousule 8.2 vandie ooreenkoms bepaal het 'n adres is 'wat betrekking het op die betekening van prosesstukke'en dat daar geen bepaling in die ooreenkoms is 'wat aandui dat dit ook my adres is wat gekiesis vir die doeleindes van kennisgewings aan my nie'. In 'n dupliserende eedsverklaring, opgestelin antwoord op bewerings wat die appellant in sy repliserende verklaring gemaak het, gee dierespondent besonderhede in verband met sy afwesigheid van die plaas op 15 Mei. (Dievolledige bewerings word in 1986 (2) SA op 97B - G aangehaal.) Hy sê in dié verklaring dat hyen sy vrou op 11 Mei 1985 na Pietermaritzburg toe afgereis het om hulle dogter, wie se man naPretoria toe verplaas was, te help om te pak; dat Pietermaritzburg 'slegs vier ure se reis vanafdie plaas' is en dat hulle op 16 Mei 1985 teruggekeer het na die plaas. Hy sê verder ook:

'Ek wens te vermeld dat my Swart werknemer, Isak Pheleu, bewus daarvan was dat ek na my dogter toe afgereishet en indien applikant sou navrae doen op die plaas hy onmiddellik die feit kon bekom het. Indien hy by enigevan ons bure navrae gedoen het, sou daar ook sonder moeite vasgestel kon word dat ek na my dogter toe was.Mev Beaurain is een van ons buurvroue en is dit alombekend aan ons bure dat, indien ons iewers heen sou reis,mev Beaurain presies sou weet waarheen ons is.'

Die Hof a quo het, onder andere met verwysing na wat in A to Z Bazaars (Pty) Ltd v Ministerof Agriculture 1975 (3) SA 468 (A) op 477 oor die betekenis van die woord 'deliver' gesê is,bevind dat met 'lewering van 'n skriftelike kennisgewing' in klousule 4.2 van die ooreenkomsbedoel word


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dat die kennisgewing 'in die ontvanger se besit gestel moet word', en dat lewering van 'nkennisgewing 'by 'n plek waar die eienaar nie self was nie' nie lewering is soos deur klousule4.2 vereis word nie. (Kyk 1986 (2) SA op 94A - H.) Die Hof het ook gesê dat indien dieappellant by Pheleu navraag gedoen en vasgestel het dat die respondent per motor binne vieruur bereik kon word, hy die respondent in Pietermaritzburg 'kon opgespoor het'. My KollegaVivier huldig dieselfde mening as die Hof a quo en sê in sy uitspraak onder meer dat klousule4.2 vereis dat die kennisgewing persoonlik aan die respondent, of aan sy gevolmagtigde,oorhandig moet word. Met betrekking tot die feit dat die respondent die middag van 15 Mei1985 nie op sy plaas was nie, is dit my Ampsbroeder se mening dat die appellant by navraagkon vasgestel het waar die respondent hom bevind het en dat aangesien Pietermaritzburg vieruur se ry per motor van die plaas af is, daar oorgenoeg tyd was om die kennisgewing daar aandie respondent te gaan aflewer indien die appellant dit wou gedoen het.

Ek kan met die gevolgtrekking waartoe die Hof a quo en my Kollega gekom het, niesaamstem nie. Ek aanvaar dat daar in die geval van 'n opsie gewoonlik vereis word dat dieuitoefening daarvan tot die kennis van die opsiegewer gebring moet word. (Kyk Laws vRutherfurd 1924 AD 261 op 262; Smeiman v Volkersz 1954 (4) SA 170 (K) op 176D - F.) Ekaanvaar ook dat die woord 'lewer' gewoonlik die betekenis van oorhandig dra, dws afgee aandie persoon wat die betrokke saak of mededeling moet ontvang. (Kyk bv A to Z Bazaars (Pty)Ltd v Minister of Agriculture (supra op 477).) Daar kan egter nie gesê word dat die woord altyd,of in alle omstandighede, dié betekenis het nie. Die ware betekenis daarvan moet in die lig vandie bepalings van die Wet of ooreenkoms waarin dit voorkom, vasgestel word. Waar daarkontraktueel bepaal word dat 'n bindende ooreenkoms tot stand sal kom wanneer dieaanvaarding van 'n aanbod aan die aanbieder meegedeel word, word ook nie altyd en in alleomstandighede vereis dat die aanvaarding tot die werklike kennis van die aanbieder gebringmoet word nie. (Kyk bv Naudé v Malcolm and Another 19 SC 482 en Baker v Marshall andEdwards 1913 WLD 156, waarna ek hieronder vollediger sal verwys.) In die onderhawige gevalmeen ek nie dat bevind kan word dat dit die bedoeling van die partye by die ooreenkoms wasdat, wat die omstandighede ook al mag wees, Schuld (of die persoon aan wie hy sy regtesedeer) nooit die opsie sou kon uitoefen tensy hy sy skriftelike uitoefening daarvan aan dierespondent (of aan sy gevolmagtigde) persoonlik oorhandig nie. (Schuld het sy regte onder dieooreenkoms aan die appellant gesedeer, maar ek sal na die appellant verwys net asof hy selfdie ooreenkoms met die respondent aangegaan het.) 'n Paar voorbeelde is voldoende om tetoon dat die partye nie kon bedoel het dat klousule 4.2 so letterlik opgevat moet word as watnou namens die respondent betoog word nie. Gestel bv dat die respondent vanaf 11 Mei 1985 -of selfs net op 15 Mei 1985 - in 'n koma verkeer het, of hom ná 'n toeval in die waakeenheidvan 'n hospitaal, waar geen buitestander toegang tot hom kon verkry nie, bevind het.Persoonlike lewering van die uitoefening van die opsie sou in sulke omstandighede nie kongeskied het nie, en dus ook nie die uitoefening van die opsie nie, indien aan klousule 4.2 vandie ooreenkoms die betekenis gegee word wat die respondent voorstaan. Ek

1988 (1) SA p340


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vind dit onmoontlik om so 'n vertolking van die klousule te aanvaar. Gestel ook bv dat dierespondent 'n paar dae voor 15 Mei 1985 gesterf het en dat daar nog nie 'n eksekuteur in syboedel aangestel was toe die appellant se prokureur op 15 Mei 1985 op die plaas aangekomhet nie. Volgens die respondent se vertolking van klousule 4.2 sou die opsie nie uitgeoefen konword nie. So 'n gevolgtrekking kan na my mening nie aanvaar word nie. Neem 'n andervoorbeeld. Gestel die respondent was aan die rondreis in Europa - of selfs nader aan die huis -toe die appellant aan hom die skriftelike kennisgewing van sy uitoefening van die opsie wougee. Ek kan nie aanvaar dat die partye bedoel het dat die appellant in sulke omstandighedeverplig sou wees om die respondent op te spoor en sy kennisgewing van die uitoefening vandie opsie aan hom persoonlik te oorhandig om die opsie te kan uitoefen nie. Na my mening hetdie partye beoog dat redelike optrede met betrekking tot die betekening van die kennisgewingvan die uitoefening van die opsie voldoende sou wees wanneer persoonlike betekeningdaarvan weens omstandighede onmoontlik sou wees, of stappe van die kant van die appellantsou verg wat die perke van redelikheid oorskry.

Dit neem my na die gebeure van 15 Mei. Daar is op daardie dag, soos hierbo gesê, eers nadie respondent op Fouriesburg gesoek. Dit spreek duidelik van 'n bedoeling om die appellant sekennisgewing van die uitoefening van die opsie in die hande van die respondent te plaas. Toedie respondent nie daar gevind is nie, het die appellant se prokureur, vergesel vanadjudant-offisier Van Tonder, na die respondent se woonhuis op die plaas De Villiersdriftgegaan. Toe dit geblyk het dat die respondent nie daar was nie, is die skriftelike kennisgewingvan die uitoefening van die opsie aan die voordeur van die woning geheg en 'n afskrif daarvanaan 'n werknemer, Izak Pheleu, oorhandig. Dit word nie deur die respondent betwis dat Pheleu(na wie die respondent as Phelei verwys) 'n verantwoordelike persoon is en in beheer van dieperseel was nie. Die respondent se standpunt is, soos reeds gesê, dat die appellant diegemelde kennisgewing aan hom (die respondent) persoonlik moes gelewer het en dat dieappellant dit kon gedoen het as hy vir Pheleu, of vir sy bure, gevra het waar hy was en dan, metdie inligting wat hy aldus verkry het, 'n motor geneem het en die vier uur se reis naPietermaritzburg onderneem het. Al sou 'n mens aanvaar dat Pheleu aan die appellant seprokureur die adres kon verstrek het waar die respondent hom in Pietermaritzburg bevind het,en ook dat die appellant by die respondent se bure kon uitgevind het presies waar dierespondent hom bevind het, dan meen ek nogtans dat dit nie redelikerwys van die appellantverwag kon gewees het om na Pietermaritzburg te ry en die respondent daar te soek nie. Namy mening het die appellant gedoen wat in die omstandighede redelik was en was die stappewat hy gedoen het voldoende om aan die respondent kennis van die uitoefening van die opsiete gee.

Ek moet daarop wys dat daar namens die respondent betoog is dat dit die appellant se eieskuld was dat sy prokureur op 15 Mei by 'n leë huis aangekom het. Die appellant moes, aldusdie betoog, vroeër besluit het of hy die opsie gaan uitoefen en vroeër uitgevind het waar dierespondent hom sou bevind wanneer hy die nodige kennisgewing aan hom wou oorhandig.Daar was geen plig op die respondent, lui die betoog verder,

1988 (1) SA p341


RABIE WN HR

om gedurig op die plaas aanwesig te wees vir die geval dat die appellant dalk sou besluit omdie kennisgewing na hom toe te bring nie. Ek aanvaar dat daar geen plig op die respondentgerus het om gedurig op die plaas aanwesig te wees nie. Dit sou onredelik wees om so iets teverwag. Die ooreenkoms verg myns insiens nie dat stappe gedoen moet word wat die grensevan redelikheid oorskry nie. Wat betref die betoog dat die appellant vroeër moes besluit het ofhy die opsie gaan uitoefen en dus ook vroeër moes vasgestel het waar die respondent souwees wanneer hy die kennisgewing van sy uitoefening van die opsie wou gaan aflewer, moet ingedagte gehou word dat die appellant die opsie op enige tydstip gedurende die duur van dieooreenkoms tussen die partye kon uitoefen. Hy sou dus ook eers op die laaste dag kon besluitom dit te doen.

Ek het hierbo gesê dat ek later in die uitspraak na die sake Naudé v Malcolm and Another19 SC 482 en Baker v Marshall and Edwards 1913 WLD 156 sou terugkeer. In albei hierdiesake is daar, meen ek, steun te vind vir my mening dat die appellant se kennisgewing van dieuitoefening van die opsie as 'n tydige uitoefening van die opsie beskou moet word, al het dit nieinderdaad op 15 Mei 1985 tot die respondent se kennis gekom nie.

In Naudé v Malcolm and Another was die vraag of Naudé, wie se uitsetting uit sekere plasedeur die eienaars (verhuurders) daarvan geëis is, 'n opsie om die plase te koop, uitgeoefen het.Die opsie moes voor of op 1 November 1901 uitgeoefen word, maar die betrokke ooreenkomshet nie bepaal hoe die mededeling van die uitoefening daarvan deur Naudé aan die eienaarsmoes geskied nie. Een van die eienaars (George Malcolm) is gedurende die loop van diehuurooreenkoms oorlede en daar is nie 'n eksekuteur in sy boedel aangestel nie. Die andereienaar (Harry Malcolm) het in Engeland gaan woon, en toe Naudé die opsie wou uitoefen, hethy, volgens die uitspraak van De Villiers HR (op 485 - 8), alle redelik moontlike stappe gedoenom uit te vind of Harry Malcolm nog lewe en wat sy adres is. Naudé het van 'n adres verneemen het toe, binne die opsietermyn, 'n brief waarin hy die opsie uitoefen aan Harry Malcolm bydaardie adres gestuur. Die brief het nie sy bestemming bereik nie, en 'n paar weke ná dieverstryking van die opsietydperk het Harry Malcolm aan Naudé geskryf dat hy die opsie niehernu het nie en dat dit verval het. De Villiers HR, wat blykbaar aanvaar het dat Naudé dieeienaars van sy uitoefening van die opsie in kennis moes gestel het, het bevind (op 487) datNaudé 'did everything that could reasonably be required of him to give the required notice' endat hy derhalwe geregtig was om te eis dat die plase, teen betaling van die ooreengekomekoopsom, aan hom oorgedra moet word - dws net asof die mededeling van Naudé seuitoefening van die opsie inderdaad tot Harry Malcolm se kennis gekom het.

In Baker v Marshall and Edwards (supra ) was die vraag of 'n huurkontrak met betrekkingtot kleims behoorlik hernu is. Die ooreenkoms tussen die partye het vereis dat 'notice in writing'binne 'n sekere tyd aan die verhuurder gegee moet word, en die Hof (Ward R) het bevind (op158) dat 'the onus is on the defendants to show they gave notice of renewal and that it wasaccepted'. Die verhuurder het Johannesburg verlaat sonder om te laat weet waar 'nhernuwingskennisgewing aan hom gegee kon word. Die huurders het allerlei stappe gedoenom uit te vind


1988 (1) SA p342

RABIE WN HR

waar die verhuurder was en het toe 'n hernuwingskennisgewing gestuur aan die adres wat hullebekom het. Die verhuurder het beweer dat die kennisgewing hom nie bereik het nie. Ward Rhet, met verwysing na Naudé v Malcolm and Another (supra ), bevind dat Edwards 'dideverything that could reasonably be expected of him', dat die huurders geregtig was om diekennisgewing te stuur na die adres waarnatoe hulle dit gestuur het en dat die huur dusbehoorlik hernu is al het die kennisgewing nie inderdaad tot die kennis van die verhuurdergekom nie.

Wat die bogemelde twee sake betref, wys ek kortliks daarop dat nie een van die tweegevalle beslis is op die grondslag dat daar 'n sg fiktiewe vervulling van die vereiste vanpersoonlike kennisgewing was nie. Hulle is beslis op die basis dat die stappe wat daar gedoenis om 'n afwesige party binne die voorgeskrewe tydperk 'n kennisgewing te laat toekom in al dieomstandighede wat daar geheers het redelik was, en dat dit derhalwe nie nodig was om tebewys dat die kennisgewing inderdaad tot die kennis van die betrokke party gekom het nie.

In Smeiman v Volkersz (supra ) het die Hof (Ogilvie Thompson R) na die bogemelde tweebeslissings verwys. Een van die vrae in die saak was of 'n opsie wat die respondent aan dieapplikant gegee het om sy belange in 'n sekere maatskappy te koop, betyds uitgeoefen is. Dieopsie moes voor of op 15 Februarie 1954 uitgeoefen word. Die applikant, wat sedert die middelvan Januarie 1954 uit Kaapstad afwesig was, het op 15 Februarie 1954 (dws die laaste dagwaarop hy die opsie kon uitoefen) 'n prokureur, ene Gelb, in Kaapstad gebel en hom gevra omdie opsie namens hom uit te oefen. Die prokureur het na die respondent se kantoor in YoungsField, Wynberg, gebel en is meegedeel dat die respondent by 'n hotel in Kroonstad tuis was endat hy die volgende week na Kaapstad sou terugkeer. Die prokureur het op dieselfde dag 'nbrief aan die respondent by die maatskappy se posbusnommer in Wynberg gestuur waarin hydie opsie namens die applikant uitgeoefen het. Hy het ook op dieselfde dag 'n afskrif van diébrief aan die respondent by die hotel in Kroonstad gestuur. Albei briewe het hul bestemmingeers ná 15 Februarie 1954 bereik en die Hof het bevind dat hulle nie 'n tydige uitoefening vandie opsie bewerkstellig het nie. Die geleerde Regter, wat aanvaar het (kyk op 176E - F) dat dieuitoefening van die opsie aan die respondent meegedeel moes gewees het, het in die loop vansy uitspraak onder meer gesê (op 177C):

'... and, though I incline to the view that timeous delivery of a letter of acceptance to respondent's correctWynberg address would have sufficed to create a contract notwithstanding respondent's temporary absence fromthe address (see Restatement of the Law: Contracts s 69; Williston on Contracts vol 1 s 89; Naudé v Malcolmand Another 19SC 482; Baker v Marshall and Edwards 1913 WLD 156), it is common cause that Gelb's letter of15 February only reached respondent's Wynberg address subsequent to 15 February.'

Hierdie mening, hoewel obiter uitgespreek, is in ooreenstemming met die benadering wat inNaudé v Malcolm and Another (supra ) en Baker v Marshall and Edwards (supra ) gevolg is engetuig van 'n siening dat die lewering van 'n kennisgewing aan 'n party se korrekte adres tydenssy

1988 (1) SA p343


RABIE WN HR

tydelike afwesigheid in gegewe omstandighede as 'n persoonlike kennisgewing aan diebetrokke persoon kan geld, al het dit nie inderdaad binne die bepaalde tyd tot sy kennis gekomnie.

Uit hoofde van alles wat ek hierbo gesê het, is ek van mening dat die Hof a quo moesbevind het dat die appellant die opsie betyds uitgeoefen het.

Ek is van mening dat daar ook 'n ander grond is as dié wat ek hierbo bespreek het waaropbevind moet word dat die betekening van die appellant se kennisgewing van die uitoefening vandie opsie op 15 Mei 1985 'n behoorlike uitoefening van die opsie was. Dit is naamlik dat diebetekening geskied het by die domicilium citandi et executandi wat die respondent in klousule8.2 van die ooreenkoms bepaal het en dat dié adres ook geld vir 'n kennisgewing soos bedoelin klousule 4.2 van die ooreenkoms. Ek aanvaar dat, soos in die uitspraak van die Hof a quogesê word, 'n domicilium citandi et executandi gewoonlik bepaal word as die plek waarprosesstukke beteken kan word. Daar moet egter in die geval van elke ooreenkoms waar so 'ndomicilium aangewys word, bepaal word of die partye bedoel het dat dit so 'n beperktebetekenis moet hê, en of hulle nie bedoel het dat dit ook op die betekening van anderkennisgewings waarvoor daar in die ooreenkoms voorsiening gemaak word van toepassingmoet wees nie.

In die onderhawige geval vermeld die ooreenkoms, indien klousule 8.2 buite rekening gelaatword, nie die adres van enige van die partye nie, hoewel waarskynlik uit 'n sin wat in klousule 2voorkom afgelei kan word dat die respondent op die plaas De Villiersdrift (wat ook diedomicilium citandi et executandi is) woon. Die betrokke sin lui: 'Alle gelde (dwsprospekteergelde) sal direk aan die eienaar betaal word op die plaas De Villiersdrift, distrikFouriesburg.' Klousule 1.2 bepaal dat die prospekteerder by wyse van 'skriftelike kennisgewingaan die eienaar' die ooreenkoms kan kanselleer. Daar word nie gesê waar die kennis gegeemoet word nie, en dit is myns insiens 'n geregverdigde afleiding dat die partye bedoel het dat ditaan die eienaar by die adres wat in klousule 8.2 genoem word, gegee kon word. Dié afleiding isveral geregverdig, meen ek, in die lig van die bepaling in klousule 2 dat prospekteergelde 'direkaan die eienaar op die plaas De Villiersdrift' betaal moet word. In nie een van die anderbepalings word van 'direk' aan die eienaar en 'op die plaas' gepraat nie. Verder, wat klousule 2betref: dit bepaal dat indien die prospekteerder die prospekteergelde nie stiptelik betaal nie, dieeienaar geregtig sal wees om die ooreenkoms te kanselleer ná 14 dae 'skriftelike kennisgewing'en indien die prospekteerder die gebrek nie binne daardie 14 dae aangesuiwer het nie.Klousule 2 bepaal nie waar sodanige kennisgewing aan die prospekteerder gegee moet wordnie. Hieruit moet waarskynlik afgelei word, meen ek, dat die partye bedoel het dat dieprospekteerder die kennisgewing aan die prospekteerder by sy domicilium citandi etexecutandi, soos in klousule 8.2 bepaal, kon gee. Dit is, soos reeds hierbo aangedui, dieenigste adres van die prospekteerder wat in die ooreenkoms vermeld word. Dit is moeilik om teaanvaar dat die partye bedoel het dat die eienaar die kennisgewing van kansellasie persoonlikmoes afgee. Die onwaarskynlikheid van so 'n bedoeling blyk veral ook wanneer in gedagtegehou word dat die prospekteerder sy regte onder die ooreenkoms kon sedeer en dat 'nkennisgewing soos in klousule 2 bedoel


1988 (1) SA p344

RABIE WN HR

dan aan die persoon aan wie die prospekteerder sy regte gesedeer het, gegee sou moes word.Klousule 4.2 gee nie die plek aan waar kennis van die aanvaarding van die opsie aan dieeienaar gegee kan word nie, en ek meen dat, net soos in die geval van klousule 1.2 en 2, ditdie bedoeling van die partye was dat die betrokke kennisgewing by die domicilium citandi etexecutandi wat in klousule 8.2 genoem word - en wat die eienaar se woonplaas was - betekenkon word.

Ek is dus van mening dat die appèl moet slaag.

Boshoff Wn AR het saamgestem in die uitspraak van Rabie Wn HR.

Appellant se Prokureurs: Siebert & Honey, Bloemfontein. Respondente se Prokureurs:Naudes, Bloemfontein.

HIRSCHOWITZ v MOOLMAN AND OTHERS 1985 (3) SA 739 (A)

1985 (3) SA p739

Citation 1985 (3) SA 739 (A)

Court Appellate Division

Judge Corbett JA, Miller JA, Cillié JA, Van Heerden JA and Smalberger AJA

Heard March 5, 1985

Judgment May 24, 1985

Annotations Link to Case Annotations


Sale - Of land - Pre-emption - Validity of - In order for holder of right of pre-emption to be able toclaim specific performance against grantor, the right of pre-emption itself should comply with theFormalities in respect of Contracts of Sale of Land Act 71 of 1969, s 1 (1).

Headnote : Kopnota

In order that the holder of a right of pre-emption over land should be entitled, on his rightmaturing and on the grantor failing to recognise or honour his right, to claim specificperformance against the grantor (assuming that he has such a right), the right of pre-emptionitself should comply with the provisions of the Formalities in respect of Contracts of Sale ofLand Act 71 of 1969 (in particular s 1 (1) thereof). Were this not so, the anomalous situation


would arise that on the strength of a verbal contract the grantee of the right of pre-emptioncould, on the happening of the relevant contingencies, become the purchaser of land. Thiswould be contrary to the intention and objects of the Act in question.

The decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division in Hirschowitz v Moolman and Others 1983 (4)SA 1 (T) confirmed, but for different reasons.

Case Information

Appeal from a decision of the Transvaal Provincial Division (COETZEE J, ESSELEN J andPHILIPS AJ). The facts appear from the judgment of CORBETT JA.

M D Kuper SC (with him M Tselentis ) for the appellant: The Court a quo erred in its findings.The pre-emptive right is enforceable against the second respondent on each of the followinggrounds: (1) on the facts and in particular the evidence relating to his conduct, the secondrespondent elected to be bound by all the terms of the lease, including the lessors'

1985 (3) SA p740

obligation relating to the appellant's right of pre-emption; (2) the second respondent was awareof the right of pre-emption at the latest by the time that he received registration of transfer ofthe undivided half-share and is therefore obliged to respect that right on the basis of thedoctrine of notice; (3) a gratuitous successor in title is in law bound to obligations in personamincurred by his predecessor in title in respect of property in question; (4) the doctrine of huurgaat voor koop is not limited in the manner found by the Judge. As to election (point (1) supra ):Where it is contended that a contract has been concluded tacitly, the test is simply whether it ismore probable than not that a tacit agreement has been reached. The test is not whether theconduct relied upon is consistent with no other reasonable interpretation than that a contractwas intended. Mühlmann v Mühlmann 1984 (3) SA at 124B - C. The significance of the cessionand transfer by Mrs C M Moolman of all her interests in and to the farm to the secondrespondent had been to bind the second respondent to the terms of the lease and to theobligations undertaken by the first respondent and Mrs Moolman thereunder in regard to clause8. The second respondent had conducted himself as though he had assumed all the obligationsof Mrs Moolman in respect of the lease. The second respondent's statement in his answeringaffidavit that from the inception of the lease he received a half-share of the rent after thededuction of certain payments was held by COETZEE J in the Court a quo to be no more "thana sufferance of the appellant's occupation of the land under the lease which is a far cry fromdelegation, express or implied". This conclusion is incorrect. "Sufferance of occupation underthe lease", postulates a knowledge and an acceptance of all the terms of such lease, or at leastan acceptance of the lease whatever its terms may be. As the rentals under the lease were paidas a compound consideration for all the rights conferred thereunder (Lazarus & Jackson vWessels and Others 1903 TS at 507), what the second respondent elected to suffer and toreceive payment for was not only the appellant's occupation but the exercise by him of all hisrights under the lease. It is implicit in the aforegoing that the second respondent had fullknowledge of the terms of the lease of 15 May 1978 at an early stage and certainly by the timethat he commenced receiving rentals in September 1978. This is indicated not only by thesecond respondent's failure to allege the contrary in the face of the appellant's allegations, but


also by the close family relationship of those involved and by the timing of the matter. It isinconceivable that Mrs C M Moolman would not have disclosed to her own son by the time ofthe signing of the redistribution agreement of 26 June 1978 that some six weeks before shehad been party to the granting of the lease containing the pre-emptive right; and it is equallyimprobable that this would not have been disclosed to the second respondent by his uncle, thefirst respondent, who was also a party to the lease of 15 May 1978. The prospecting contractgranted by the first and second respondents to the third respondent in February 1980 makesthe option subject to the appellant's lease, which indicates that the second respondent acceptedthat he was bound by the lessors' obligations under such lease. To summarise: the secondrespondent must have been aware of the appellant's pre-emptive right at a very early stage andcertainly by the

1985 (3) SA p741

time that the redistribution agreement was concluded; from the very outset he conductedhimself on the basis that he had taken over his mother's rights and obligations under the lease;in particular, he received the rentals from the outset and these were a compound considerationfor all the rights granted to the appellant under the lease; the appellant's contention that thesecond respondent by his conduct became a party to the lease and accepted all the obligationsthereunder is in effect admitted by the second respondent in correspondence and in theaffidavits filed; the second respondent's conduct in the crucial period after August 1980 isconsistent only with an acceptance by him of the binding force of the pre-emptive right. On thetotality of the evidence, therefore, the second respondent tacitly accepted the full terms of thelease as binding on him and elected to be bound by the obligations contained therein.

As to notice (point (2) supra ): Alternatively, if the above facts do not go so far as to ground aninference that the second respondent tacitly agreed to be bound by the full terms of the leaseincluding the right of pre-emption, the facts at least indicate that the second respondent wasaware of the provisions of the lease by the time of conclusion of the redistribution agreementand at the latest by the time that registration of transfer was effected in his favour of theundivided half-share on 11 May 1979. A right of pre-emption has the same priority as a priorpurchase and, since the decision in Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx andVereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd en Andere 1982 (3) SA 893, is in effect a jus in personam adrem acquirendam. See Le Roux v Odendaal and Others 1954 (4) SA at 442D - F; Campbell vFirst Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA at 929 in fine- 930D. The relevant time fordetermining the second respondent's knowledge of the pre-emptive right is the date of transferof the half-share to him. Milne NO v Singh NO 1960 (3) SA at 452E; Strydom v De Lange 1970(2) SA at 14F. Accordingly, on the basis of the doctrine of notice, the second respondent isbound to respect the appellant's right of pre-emption. Associated South African Bakeries casesupra at 907G, 910B - H; De Jager v Sisana 1930 AD at 74, 80.

As to the legal position of a gratuitous successor (point (3) supra ): It is common causebetween the parties that the second respondent was Mrs C M Moolman's gratuitous successorin title to the undivided half-share. It is now established law in South Africa that a gratuitoussuccessor is bound by obligations of his predecessor in title in respect of the property to whichhe has succeeded. This rule is entrenched where the obligation in question is a lease. CollinsNO v Hugo and the Standard Bank (1893) Hertzog 176; Canavan & Rivas v New Transvaal


Gold Farms 1904 TS 136; Heynes Mathews Ltd v Gibson NO 1950 (1) SA at 14; Bodasingh'sEstate v Suleman 1960 (1) SA at 290H - 291A; Kessoopersadh v Essop 1970 (1) SA at 273G -274B, 285E - H, but cf at 289A; Smith v Farrelly's Trustee 1904 TS at 958; Municipality ofIndwe v The Indwe Railway Collieries and Land Co (1906) 23 SC at 226 - 7; Hitzeroth v Brooks1964 (4) SA at 447F - H; Shell Rhodesia (Pvt) Ltd v Eliasov NO 1979 (3) SA at 918D - 919C;Wille Landlord and Tenant in South Africa 4th ed at 87; Wille Principles of South African Law6th ed at 409; Van der Merwe Sakereg at 430; Kerr The Law of Lease 2nd ed at 35 at footnote6 where the learned author joins

1985 (3) SA p742

issue with the view of Prof De Wet and Dr Cooper that the onerous/gratuitous successordistinction in this context should be replaced by the older universal/particular successordistinction; Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law through the Cases at 587. The rule is alsoapplied to options to purchase (Van der Pol v Symington 1971 (4) SA at 474), grants ofunregistered servitudes (Jansen v Fincham (1892) 9 SC at 292 and 293; Oliver v Matzner 1942TPD at 330), personal obligations incurred in respect of property which is made the subject of alegacy (Kriel v Kriel 1 SC at 52) and indeed to contractual obligations generally (Varkevisser vEstate Varkevisser 1959 (4) SA at 197H - 198B). The suggestion in Cooper The South AfricanLaw of Landlord and Tenant at 254 that this development is founded on an erroneous premiseis incorrect. The premise referred to is that in the Collins and Canavan cases supra the Courtincorrectly took Voet 19.2.1 as authority that an unregistered long lease would be binding onlucrative successors. In the judgment q quo it is suggested that KOTZÉ CJ merely erred in hisreading of Voet. The key to the meaning of this difficult passage is the reference to prejudice tothird parties who are particular successors or creditors and who may be defrauded by theconclusion of a long lease. This can refer only to third parties who give value and accordinglythe "collocation" (Gane's trans vol 3 at 406 at footnote (g)) of creditors with particularsuccessors is significant because it reinforces the view that the particular successors inquestion must be onerous, otherwise there can be no question of fraud, let alone prejudice. Onthe other hand the reference to "heirs" who are bound to the lease is pre-eminently a referenceto universal successors and other gratuitous successors who require no protection against thetype of fraud which is the object of the rule. In Antje Komen v Hendrik de Heer 29 NLR at 243this passage appears to have been read in this way. Furthermore the judgment of CURLEWISJ in Canavan's case is far from a blind following of KOTZÉ CJ's interpretation of Voet 19.2.1 butrather reflects a view that Voet as thus interpreted is the most reasonable reconciliation of thedivergent views of the Roman-Dutch writers (see at 156). KOTZÉ CJ's interpretation receivessupport also from the dictum of INNES CJ at 42 of the judgment as corrected in the mannersuggested in the Antje Komen case at 244. Oliver's case is not distinguishable from the presenton the basis that the distinction between gratuitous and onerous successors and the reasonssuggested therefor in that judgment are peculiar to the transfer of land which is subject to anunregistered servitude. There is no distinction in principle between that case and this: if a doneeof land is obliged to respect a jus in personam ad rem acquirendam in the form of anunregistered servitude, there can be no reason of principle or policy why he should not beobliged to respect a similar jus in personam in the form of a pre-emptive right. The Judge a quoheld that there is no principial basis for equating universal successors with particular gratuitoussuccessors and cited with approval Prof De Wet's and Dr Cooper's criticism that to treat


particular onerous and gratuitous successors differently is logically unsound. There are severalanswers to this: The logic of the distinction arises from the absence of value in the case ofgratuitous successors. This not only affects the equities in the manner suggested below, butalso results in a situation

1985 (3) SA p743

where the gratuitous successor has no legitimate interest worthy of legal protection in receivingthe property unencumbered by the obligation. On the other hand a bona fide onerous successorbases his bargain on the assumption that the property is not encumbered and thereby acquiresa legitimate interest in receiving the property without the encumbrance of the obligation.Secondly, a bona fide onerous successor will not intend to assume the obligation and hispredecessor in title will not intend to transfer it to him: both these facts are to be inferred fromthe onerous successor's bona fides and his predecessor's awareness of such bona fides.However, where the succession is gratuitous, the predecessor's intention will usually be todonate his net economic interest, namely the property subject to the obligation whichdiminishes its value and the donee's expectation as to what he will receive will be not different.Perhaps more important than the logic of the distinction, is the policy of the distinction. Firstly,there is the question of fraud which, as Voet 19.2.1 indicates, is the rationale of the rule thatbona fide onerous successors are not burdened by personal obligations relating to the property;this is not a factor where the succession is gratuitous because the successor does not alter hisposition to his detriment in consequence of a bona fide belief that the property is not burdenedby an obligation in personam (Oliver v Matzner (supra at 330)). Secondly, the rules which theCourts have evolved in this area are based on conceptions of where the equities lie betweencompeting claimants: see for instance Hofgaard v Registrar of Mining Rights 1908 TS at 654;Le Roux v Odendaal (supra at 442G - 443E); Antje Komen v Hendrik de Heer (supra at 224).The rule that the gratuitous successor is bound by the personal obligation of the predecessor intitle is the result of the consistent judicial recognition that the giving of value by the successor intitle is the most important determinant of where the equities will generally lie. Professor Kerr (opcit at 34 - 5 footnote (g)) suggests three further policy considerations in favour of the rule thatthe gratuitous successor is bound by the lease: (a) the rule has been recognised and adoptedby the Legislature in enacting s 1 (2) of the Formalities in respect of Leases of Land Act 18 of1969; (b) as heirs are now in the position of residuary legatees, the only universal successorsleft are Black South Africans if an estate devolves upon them according to Bantu law. As veryfew such estates contain land let by the deceased, there are so few relevant instances ofuniversal succession left that it would not be desirable to return to the older categorisation; (c)there is no ground in equity for distinguishing between legatees and heirs. Finally, as the rulethat gratuitous successors of the lessor are bound by the lease has been endorsed by theCourts consistently since 1893, the practical result of those decisions has been to regulaterights of property for many years and to cause persons to arrange their affairs and acquirevested rights on the basis thereof. Consequently those decisions should not be lightly disturbed.See Webster v Ellson 1911 AD at 82; De Villiers v McIntyre NO 1921 AD at 432; Coronel'sExecutor v Estate Coronel 1941 AD at 341 - 2; Estate Phillips v CIR 1942 AD at 50; MineWorkers' Union v Prinsloo 1948 (3) SA at 852.

As to the doctrine of huur gaat voor koop (point (4) supra ): The principle of huur gaat voor


koop is applicable to gratuitous as well as

1985 (3) SA p744

onerous successors. Van Leeuwen Roman-Dutch Law 4.21.7 (Kotzé's trans vol 2 at 174). TheJudge a quo held that the doctrine obliges particular successors in title to respect the continuedright of occupation of the lessee, but does not impose any obligation upon the successors toabide by other personal or collateral obligations undertaken by the original lessor, such asoptions or rights of pre-emption. This was based in part on the statement in De Wet v UnionGovernment 1934 AD at 63 to the effect that a purchaser is bound by all the material andintegral terms of the lease but not by collateral terms. However, as the facts of that case show,the test of materiality does not relate to what terms are usually found in a lease but to the termswhich the parties have elected to treat as material. Parties may insert a term into a lease whichis not incident to the relation of lessor and lessee but is incident to the contract itself. Archibaldand Co Ltd v Strachan and Co Ltd 1944 NPD at 43. Accordingly, no a priori rule can be laiddown on whether options or rights or pre-emption are material or collateral terms. The test iscorrectly set out in Cooper The South African Law of Landlord and Tenant at 274. At 275 theauthor expresses the view that these principles apply to a pre-emptive right as well. Theseprinciples are also supported by the following authorities: Kerr (op cit at 145); Lazarus vJackson and Wessels 1903 TS at 507; Banket Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Levy 1955 (4) SA at 76A -77B; Uys v Sam Friedman 1935 AD at 166; Kessooperasadh's case supra at 289B - C. Shalalav Gelb 1950 (1) SA 851 was wrongly decided to the extent that it was held (obiter ) that anoption to purchase falls outside the maxim huur gaat voor koop and the criticism of this case byCooper (op cit at 274) is well founded. In the present case the pre-emptive right is an integraland indivisible part of the lease. No separate consideration is stipulated in respect of the right ofpre-emption and accordingly the inference is that the agreed rental of R6 000 per annum ispayable in respect of both the occupation and the pre-emptive right. There is no basis forsevering the option from the other terms of the lease and the lease in its entirety is subject tothe doctrine of huur gaat voor koop.

The Judge a quo correctly held that specific performance could be granted on the strength of apre-emptive right such as the one in issue in this case. Associated South African Bakeries casesupra at 908B - D; Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1967 (3) SA at 320G.The only limitation on the appellant's right to specific performance is the Court's inherentdiscretion to confine the appellant to damages. No attempt has been made in the rresent caseto persuade the Court not to exercise any discretion in favour of the appellant and there are noreasons to refuse an order for specific performance. Associated South African Bakeries casesupra at 921 - 2. What is sought by appellant in this case is identical to what was sought byrespondent in Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1967 (3) SA at 315F, 320 infine- 321A. Furthermore, the Court a quo correctly held that s 1 (1) of the Formalities in respectof Contracts of Sale of Land Act 71 of 1969 did not preclude the granting of the relief sought.This type of right falls outside the ambit of the formalities legislation. Van der Hoven v Cutting1903 TS 299. It is not necessary that the price be fixed in the documents which grants thepre-emptive right. The pre-emptive right in casu is substantially identical

1985 (3) SA p745


with that considered in Sher v Allan 1929 OPD at 138 - 139. It is one in which there is no"option" price nor any express reference to the price which a stranger might offer (Sher's casesupra at 141), but it is nonetheless to be regarded in its effect as an undertaking to offer thesubject-matter thereof first to the appellant at the same price as the owner is prepared toaccept from a third party. Bellairs v Hodnett and Another 1978 (1) SA 1109. That undertakingis not a sale nor yet an offer to sell - it only compels the grantor to give the grantee thepreference in case he sells at all. Van Pletsen v Henning 1913 AD at 95. It is the offer which therespondents are obliged to make to the appellant consequent upon the grant of the pre-emptiveright and the acceptance by the appellant of that offer which constitutes the contract of sale.That offer and that acceptance must comply with the formalities relating to the sale of land andsuch compliance is precisely what is envisaged by appellant's prayers. The "skriftelikekennisgewing" contemplated by clause 8 of the lease agreement is the written offer whichappellant can accept "binne genoemde maand". See in this regard Hartsrivier Boerderye(Edms) Bpk v Van Niekerk 1964 (3) SA at 706 - 7; Wissekerke en 'n Ander v Wissekerke 1970(2) SA 550; B A Hepple "Oral Options" 1960 SALJ at 414 - 5; Homfray v Fothergill LR 1 Eq at575; Brandt v Spies 1960 (4) SA 14; Sher's case supra at 142 - 3; Owsianick's case supra at318H. The Court will not strain to bring the pre-emptive right within the ambit of the FormalitiesAct. That Act constitutes an alteration of the common law in that it is an impediment to thefreedom to contract and falls to be narrowly construed. Pretoria Townships Ltd v PretoriaMunicipality 1913 TPD at 368; Du Plessis v Nel 1952 (1) SA at 527E. It must suffice for thepurpose of the Act if a written sale contract eventuates. The proper approach is that taken inthe analogous case of Campbell v First Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 924. Seealso Rainforth v Brown (SR 12 December 1937, reported in 1938 (55) SALJ at 212). In the ASABakeries' case supra it proved unnecessary for the Court to decide whether the holder of apre-emptive right must wait until the sale contract was concluded with another before he couldcreate a sale contract between himself and the grantor of the right by unilateral declaration tothat effect or whether he could do so prior to the conclusion of such agreement (see at 908F).As indicated in that case, the answer lies in the wording of the pre-emptive right and where, ashere, the manifestation of the desire to sell is all that is necessary to trigger the pre-emptiveprovisions, then that right must be capable of enforcement on the grant of the option. SeeOwsianick's case supra; Le Roux v Odendaal and Others 1954 (4) SA 432. The ASA Bakeries'case also left open the question of whether a unilateral declaration would suffice in contractsinvolving the sale of immovable property. Clearly such unilateral declaration would have, in theappropriate case, to be written and to be signed by the grantee. That, however, would ariseonly where there was a concluded contract of sale between the grantor of the right and another.That is not the case here. It is therefore appropriate that the relief envisaged by OGILVIETHOMPSON JA in Owsianick's case be applied so as to bring into existence the relevant salecontract directly between the first and second respondents and the appellant.

1985 (3) SA p746

R S Welsh QC (with him F J Bashall ) for the respondents: The Court of first instance held thatthe provisions of s 1 (1) of the Formalities in respect of Contracts of Sale of Land Act 71 of1969 precluded it from granting the relief claimed by the appellant against the secondrespondent because "the latter has signed no written document at all which obliges him to sellthe farm to the (appellant) or to offer to sell it to him". The Court below disagreed ("rather


briefly") with this finding of the Court of first instance. The appellant supports this reasoning andcontends, on the strengh of Van der Hoven v Cutting 1903 TS 299 that "this type of right fallsoutside the ambit of the formalities legislation". For the reasons which follow, the decision inVan der Hoven v Cutting (to which the attention of the Court of first instance was, in fact, drawnby counsel for the present appellant) has no bearing on the issue which arises in the presentappeal. The issue in Van der Hoven v Cutting 1903 TS 299, affirming 1903 TH 110, was notwhether a right of pre-emption was binding upon a successor in title of the grantor of that right,but whether a right of pre-emption, which had been validly granted in writing by A in favour of Bor B's cessionaries, had been validly exercised by B's cessionary, C, within the time stipulatedby a written agreement between B and C, as extended by an oral agreement between B and C.A and C were ad idem that C had validly exercised the right of pre-emption: the issue arose asbetween A and D, who was the mortgagee of A's land and who had agreed to accept less thanthe face value of his mortgage bond if B "or his successors or assigns" duly exercised the rightof pre-emption. D contended that the oral variation of the cession of the right of pre-emption byB to C was invalid because it did not comply with the provisions of s 30 of the TransvaalTransfer Duty Proclamation 8 of 1902, which required the sale of "fixed property" (including"land... or any... limited interest therein...") to be in writing and signed by the parties thereto orby their agents duly authorised in writing. That contention was rejected by both Courts becausethe cession of the right of pre-emption by B to C "clearly did not amount to a contract for thesale of land; nor did it constitute a sale of a 'limited interest therein' in the sense in which thosewords are used in s 2 of the Transfer Duty Proclamation" (per INNES CJ at 306). In otherwords, if A executes and signs a written document whereby he grants a right of pre-emption infavour of B "or his assigns (cessionaries)", a cession by B of that right of pre-emption to C neednot be in writing. That is all that was decided in Van der Hoven v Cutting. And that is not theissue which arises in the present appeal. It is true that if A grants B a right of pre-emption inrespect of A's land, A does not thereby enter into a contract for the sale of that land to B oreven offer to sell that land to B. But A does enter into a legally and specifically enforceablecontract with B to make to B a legally binding offer to sell that land to B upon the happening ofcertain events. Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres (Pty) Ltd 1967 (3) SA at 320G;Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3)SA at 904 - 908. In other words, the grant by A of a right of pre-emption to B in respect of A'sland is a contract whereby A undertakes and is obliged to sell the land to B if (1) thecontingency bringing the right of pre-emption into operation has super-

1985 (3) SA p747

vened, and (2) B has exercised the right of pre-emption in writing. It is a promise by A to sell theland to B upon the happening of certain events. It is a pactum de contrahendo. If A and B enterinto a pactum de contrahendo in terms whereof A undertakes to enter into another contract withB upon the happening of a specified event, the pactum de contrahendo itself must comply withany formalities which are requisite to the validity of the proposed second contract. GoudsmitPandecten-Systeem (tweede deel, Leiden 1880) para 27 at 97 - 100; Montrose Diamond MiningCo v Dyer 1912 TPD at 5 - 6; Fuls v Leslie Chrome (Pty) Ltd 1962 (4) SA at 787; Sturt v Roos1907 ORC 4; South African Reserve Bank v Photocraft (Pty) Ltd 1969 (1) SA at 613C - D. It isfor this reason that a right of pre-emption in respect of land, like an option to buy land, must beembodied in a written document signed by the grantor. It is well established that an option to


buy land is not valid unless it is embodied in a written document signed by the grantor. Brandt vSpies 1960 (4) SA at 16 - 17 and the authorities there cited; Venter v Birchholtz 1972 (1) SA at283 - 284. It is true that the grant of an option differs from the grant of a right of pre-emption inthat the former entitles the grantee to conclude a contract of sale with the grantor whenever hechooses during the currency of the option (subject, of course, to the terms thereof), whereasthe latter entitles the grantee to conclude a contract of sale with the grantor only if the grantorwishes or intends or desires (whatever the wording of the contract may be) to sell the property.But the grant of a right of pre-emption, like the grant of an option, is a contract. Neither type ofcontract is, in itself, a contract of sale of land or of any interest in land; but each type of contractwill result in the conclusion of a contract of sale of land if the grantee exercises his rights. Theonly difference between the two types of contract is that the right of pre-emption may only beexercised upon the happening of a contingency (namely the wish, desire, etc of the grantor tosell), whereas the grantee of an option is normally free to exercise his option without any suchrestriction. But in either event, the exercise of the right (whether of option or of pre-emption)takes place by theunilateral act of the grantee: the only difference is that the grantee of a rightof pre-emption cannot exercise his right until the occurrence of the event which brings it intooperation. Once either an option or a right of pre-emption has been exercised, the result will bethe conclusion of a contract of sale of land. That is the reason why the grant of a right ofpre-emption, just like the grant of an option, must be reduced to writing and signed by thegrantor. If the appellant's contentions were correct, it would follow that an oral promise by A toB to execute and sign and deliver a written offer to sell land to B upon the happening of a futureevent, or at a future date, would be valid and specifically enforceable. That proposition is notsupported by any of the decided cases to which reference is made by the appellant. It is not inaccordance with principle or with the provisions of s 1 (1) of the Formalities Act. The appellantsubmits that the "written notice" contemplated by clause 8 of the lease would have had tocomply with the provisions of the Formalities Act. This is incorrect and all that wascontemplated was that the appellant should be notified in writing of the intentions of the originallessors to sell the farm. The period of one month for the exercise of the right of pre-emption

1985 (3) SA p748

was only to run from the date of such notice; but the lessors could not have frustrated theappellant's right of pre-emption by failing to give the notice. The appellant's difficulty on this partof the case is illustrated by the nature of the relief which he seeks, namely an order directingthe first and second respondents to execute and sign and deliver to the appellant a writtenoffer, complying with the Formalities Act, to sell the farm to him, and authorizing the Sheriff toexecute and sign and deliver such offer to the appellant "for and on behalf of the first andsecond respondents" if they fail to do so. For the reasons which have already been given, it isnot competent for the Court to direct the second respondent to execute and sign a written offerin favour of the appellant in view of the fact that he has never executed or signed any documentconferring a right of pre-emption upon the appellant. Nor has the Court any power to authorisethe Sheriff to act as the agent of the first and second respondents in executing, signing anddelivering a written offer to sell the farm in compliance with the Formalities Act. If an offer to sellland is made by an agent of the offeror, s 1 (1) of the Act requires that the agent must have thewritten authority of the offeror himself to make the offer. The appellant submits that theFormalities Act "constitutes an alteration of the common law in that it is an impediment on the


freedom to contract and falls to be narrowly construed" and that "it must suffice for the purposeof the Act if a written sale contract eventuates". The second contention begs the question. As tothe first contention, an illustration of the principles of "strict interpretation" is to be found in thecase to which the appellant refers, Pretoria Townships Ltd v Pretoria Municipality 1913 TPD362, where it was held that "sale" in s 30 of the Transvaal Transfer Duty Proclamation did notinclude exchange. That, however, does not detract from the principle that, if a statute requiresthat a contract of sale of land must be reduced to writing and signed by the parties thereto, apreliminary contract whereby A undertakes to B that upon the happening of a future event hewill sell or offer to sell land to B must likewise be reduced to writing and signed by A. The casesof Campbell v First Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 924 and Rainforth v Brown1937 SR 269, to which the appellant refers, in no way detract from that principle. For thesereasons, the Court of first instance was correct in holding that "the provisions of s 1 (1) of theFormalities Act remain an insuperable obstacle in the way of the Court granting the reliefsought by the (appellant) against the second respondent" and that the Court below erred inthinking that the decision in Van der Hoven v Cutting was authority to the contrary. If thesesubmissions are correct, the contentions of the appellant in regard to election notice, gratuitoussuccession and huur gaat voor koop are irrelevant. This appeal should be dismissed on thisground alone.

The appellant contends that the second respondent "tacitly accepted the full terms of the leaseas binding on him and elected to be bound by the obligations contained therein" or,alternatively, was aware of the provisions of the lease by the time of the conclusion of theredistribution agreement (or at the latest by the time when registration of transfer was effectedin his favour of the undivided one-half share on 11 May 1979), and that "on the basis of thedoctrine of notice the second respondent is

1985 (3) SA p749

bound to respect the appellant's right of pre-emption". The facts, however, do not support thesecontentions. Those facts do not show that the second respondent was aware of the appellant'sright of pre-emption at any material time or that he "elected" to be bound thereby. Still less dothey show that the appellant "accepted" the second respondent as having succeeded to thepersonal obligations which Mrs Moolman undertook, jointly with the first respondent, by grantingthe right of pre-emption to the appellant. On the contrary, the appellant cited Mrs Moolman asthe third respondent in these proceedings in the Court of first instance and sought relief againsther as well as against the second respondent. Even after the appellant had amended his noticeof motion, he continued to cite Mrs Moolman as the third respondent in his appeal to the Courtbelow. The appellant's contentions in regard to "election" and "notice" are an attempt to "have itboth ways" and there is no substance in them.

The appellant contends that the second respondent was Mrs Moolman's gratuitous successor intitle to the undivided one-half share of the farm of which he took transfer from his late father'sestate and was therefore bound by the contractual right of pre-emption which Mrs Moolman,jointly with the first respondent, had granted to the appellant. The appellant further contendsthat, by reason of the doctrine of huur gaat voor koop, the second respondent is bound by thatright of pre-emption. These contentions may conveniently be dealt with together. The firstquestion is whether the second respondent was Mrs Moolman's successor in title at all. The


second respondent took transfer of his one-half undivided share in the farm from the executorof the estate of his late father, Theodorus, and not from Mrs Moolman. On a proper analysis ofthe facts on this issue, second respondent was not the "successor in title" of Mrs Moolman andall the elaborate contentions of the appellant in regard to the "legal position of a gratuitoussuccessor" are misconceived. On the merits of these contentions, the starting point is theRoman law doctrine that obligations were binding on successors of the obligor ex titulouniversali but not ex titulo singulari. Thus, where A had let property to B, there was a purelycontractual relationship between A and B and, if A sold, gave or otherwise disposed of theproperty to C, C was not obliged to respect B's continued right to occupation under his leasewith A. It was otherwise if A died, for his heirs (as distinct from legatees) were universal and notparticular successors. The Dutch doctrine of huur gaat voor koop was a departure from theRoman law doctrine; and it applied in favour of the lessee B against all particular successors,such as purchasers, donees and legatees. No distinction was drawn, for this purpose, betweensuccessors ex titulo lucrativo and successors ex titulo oneroso. Van Leeuwen Roman-DutchLaw 4.21.7 (Kotz's trans vol II at 174); Voet 19.2.17 (Gane's trans vol 3 at 424); De Wet "HuurGaat Voor Koop" 1944 THRHR at 74, 166 and 226; De Wet "Huur Gaat Voor Koop and theProviso to Section 2 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956" 87 SALJ (1970) at 137;De Wet and Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4th ed (1978) at 330 - 335. The Court belowalso held that although the doctrine of huur gaat voor koop protects the continued right ofoccupation of the lessee (including rights of renewal),

1985 (3) SA p750

it does not impose any obligation on particular successors in title (whether onerous orgratuitous) of the original lessor to abide by other personal or collateral obligations undertakenby the original lessor, such as options or rights of pre-emption. Shalala and Another v Gelb1950 (1) SA at 855 - 866, and especially at 864 - 865; De Wet and Yeats Kontraktereg enHandelsreg 4th ed at 335; De Wet "Huur Gaat Voor Koop" 1944 THRHR at 250. The appellantattacks the reasoning of the Court below and that of OGILVIE THOMPSON J in Shalala v Gelb(supra ) on the ground that, although "no a priori rule can be laid down on whether options orrights of pre-emption are material or collateral terms", the pre-emptive right in the present case"is an integral and indivisible part of the lease", since "no separate consideration is stipulated inrespect of the right of pre-emption". The appellant relies mainly on Lazarus & Jackson vWessels 1903 TS at 507. The Court was there concerned with a prospecting contractcontaining an option to purchase the land and held that "where the yearly rental is not definitelyappropriated partly in respect of prospecting and partly in respect of option rights, the inferenceis that the rental is payable in respect of both privileges". In such a contract, the right toprospect is usually granted for a limited period only and for the purpose of enabling the granteewhether or not he will exercise his option to purchase. The present case is concerned with anagricultural lease which contains a right of pre-emption in favour of the lessee. Such a right ofpre-emption is quite different from an option to purchase which is contained in a prospectingcontract. It does not impose any special extra burden upon the lessor, since its only effect isthat, if during the currency of the lease, the lessor wishes to sell the farm to an outsider, hemust give the lessee the first opportunity of buying on the same terms as the outsider hasoffered. There is no room for any a priori inference in such a case that the rent is partly payablein respect of the grant of the right of pre-emption. The appellant relies upon Banket Holdings


(Pvt) Ltd v Levy 1954 (4) SA 74 and Uys v Sam Friedman 1935 AD 165. Both those cases,however, dealt with options to renew and not with options to purchase or rights of pre-emption.They are entirely consistent with what OGILVIE THOMPSON J said in Shalala and Another vGelb 1950 (1) SA at 864 - 865. The general statement by the same Judge in Kessoopersadh vEssop 1970 (1) SA at 289C that a purchaser must "observe the tenant's rights of occupationand other rights under the lease" has to be read in the light of what he had said in Shalala andAnother v Gelb (supra at 857). The question whether the doctrine of huur gaat voor koopapplies to a right of pre-emption did not arise in the Kessoopersadh case. The appellant seeksto rely upon a wider principle than the doctrine of huur gaat voor koop, namely that "it is nowestablished law in South Africa that a gratuitous successor is bound by obligations of hispredecessor in title in respect of the property to which he has succeeded"; and the appellantcontends that "this rule is entrenched where the obligation in question is a lease". The Courtbelow rightly rejected this contention. The appellant has cited no Roman-Dutch authority, andthe respondents have found none, which supports this general proposition. The onlyRoman-Dutch authority to which reference is made is a passage in Voet 19.2.1 (Gane's transvol 3 at 406). The passage is confined to unregistered long leases and does not deal with

1985 (3) SA p751

contractual obligations generally; nor does it draw any distinction between lucrative andonerous successors. It refers to "a third party who is a particular successor"; and, in 19.2.17(Gane's trans at 425), Voet used precisely the same expression so as to include"usufructuaries, legatees and donees", whose position (in relation to the doctrine of huur gaatvoor koop ) he said "is in no way distinguished from that of purchasers". There are dicta insome of the cases to which the appellant has referred which suggest that the reference to"particular successors" in 19.2.1 must be interpreted as a reference to onerous successorsbecause of its "collocation" with creditors. The analysis and criticism of such dicta andinterpretations in Cooper The South African Law of Landlord and Tenant at 254 - 255, and inthe judgment of the Court below, are convincing and correct. The appellant seeks to defendthat "collocation" on the ground that "otherwise there can be no question of fraud let aloneprejudice". This appears to be based on the suggestion of MILLIN J in Oliver v Matzner &Matzner 1942 TPD at 330 that the reason why an unregistered servitutal right is enforceableagainst any gratuitous successor of the grantor in the ownership of the land is that such asuccessor "cannot rely on an estoppel against the owner of the dominant tenement", because,"while he may take the property in the belief that there is no servitude, (he) does not alter hisposition to his detriment". Nevertheless, a gratuitous successor, who takes transfer of propertyin the belief that it is not subject to any servitude or lease which has not been registered againstthe title, may well be said to have been "defrauded" in the broad sense in which Voet uses thatexpression in 19.2.1. As far as leases are concerned, Voet 19.2.1 has to be reconciled withVoet 19.2.17; the governing principle is the doctrine of huur gaat voor koop; and that doctrine,while protecting the lessee against onerous and gratuitous successors of the lessor alike in hiscontinued rights of occupation, does not render binding upon a gratuitous successor withoutnotice such personal rights as a contractual right of pre-emption granted by the lessor to thelessee. As far as other contracts generally are concerned, there is no basis in our common lawfor the supposed doctrine that any contractual obligation assumed by the owner of land inrespect of that land (whether or not it relates to the use of that land) becomes binding, by


operation of law, upon any gratuitous particular successor in title of the owner without notice.On the contrary, that supposed doctrine is contrary to the basic principles of our common law inrelation to the transmission and delegation of contractual obligations. The appellant's generalproposition does find support in some of the textbooks to which the appellant refers, especiallythose of Wille. It also finds some support in some of the dicta and decisions to which theappellant refers, though by no means in all of them. In none of the cases to which the appellantrefers did the precise problem arise which has arisen in the present case. The case most nearlyin point is the decision of HIEMSTRA J in Van der Pol v Symington en 'n Ander 1971 (4) SA472, but the Court below correctly held that this decision was wrong. Furthermore, in none ofthe previous cases on which the appellant relies, was the matter now in issue adequatelyconsidered. And as long ago as 1907, the Full Bench of the Natal Court was careful to reservethe question "whether the particular successors who can claim not to be bound without

1985 (3) SA p752

notice by an unregistered long lease are limited to those holding ex oneroso titulo...". ExecutorEstate Komen v De Heer and Others (1907) 28 NLR at 585. The line of decisions on which theappellant relies is not "consistent" and cannot have given rise to such a state of certainty as itwould now be inexpedient for this Court to disturb on the basis of the stare decisis rule referredto by the appellant. It has been well known for many years that these questions are highlycontroversial. Differing views have been expressed over the years, not only by the Courts, butalso by the writers of articles and textbooks such as Wille, De Wet and Cooper. As far as thepublic are concerned, the most that can be said is that some gratuitous successors may haveaccepted that they were bound by the contracts of their predecessors in title (in preference,perhaps, to embarking upon long and uncertain litigation). And this Court has never made anydefinitive pronouncement on this question. These circumstances do not oblige this Court toperpetuate an erroneous doctrine of recent origin and insecure foundations or preclude thisCourt from settling this question in accordance with the principles of our common law. UnionGovernment v Rosenberg (Pty) Ltd 1946 AD at 130; R v Sibiya 1955 (4) SA at 261 in fine-262C; Bourne v Keane 1919 AC at 859 - 860.

In conclusion, the appellant relies upon certain arguments which are said to be based on"logic", "policy" and "equity". The appellant contends that a gratuitous successor "has nolegitimate interest worthy of legal protection in receiving the property unencumbered by theobligation" (that is to say, the contractual obligation undertaken by his predecessor in title to anoutsider). That is not the point. The question is whether a contractual obligation entered into bya predecessor in title in respect of property is binding, by operation of law, upon a gratuitoussuccessor in title. A gratuitous successor, like an onerous successor, may well assume thatthere are no such contractual obligations. The question is one of legal principle and not of"legitimate interest". The next argument which is said to be based upon "logic" is that, "wherethe succession is gratuitous, the predecessor's intention will usually be to donate his neteconomic interest, namely the property subject to the obligation which diminishes its value, andthe donee's expectation as to what he will receive will be no different". That argument begsseveral questions. It makes assumptions as to what "the predecessor's intention will usually be"and as to what "the donee's expectation as to what he will receive will be". It also assumes thatthe assumption by the predecessor of a contractual obligation to an outsider has the effect of


diminishing the value of the property. All those assumptions have to be tested in the light, not of"logic", but of the facts of the case. The relevant facts in this case are contained in theredistribution agreement. That redistribution agreement makes no reference at all to the lease;nor does it support the assumptions which the appellant has made. (And, of course, it showsonce again that the second respondent was not in truth the "successor in title" to his mother,Mrs Moolman.) On the question of "policy", the appellant relies on two matters. First, he repeatsthe submission that a gratuitous successor cannot be said to have been "defrauded". Thissubmission has already been dealt with. Second, he relies upon "the equities". As to this, therespondents refer to what INNES CJ said in

1985 (3) SA p753

CORBETT JA

Lazarus & Jackson v Wessels 1903 TS at 509. The appellant also contends that "the rule thatthe gratuitous successor is bound by the personal obligation of the predecessor in title is theresult of consistent judicial recognition that the giving of value by the successor in title is themost important determinant of where the equities will generally lie". There has been no such"consistent judicial recognition". The appellant bases some final submissions upon "policyconsiderations" suggested by Kerr. Section 1 (2) of the Formalities in Respect of Leases ofLand Act 18 of 1969 cannot be regarded as a recognition and adoption by the Legislature of thealleged "rule that the gratuitous successor is bound by the lease". It applies only to long leasesentered into after 1 January 1970. The lease in the present case was not a long lease and wasnot affected by the provisions of s 1 (2). Those provisions simply substituted new provisionsrelating to long leases for those which had formerly been contained in the proviso to s 2 of theGeneral Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956. This statute has no bearing on the issues which arisein this case. It may well be that there are now few if any survivals of "universal succession" leftin South African law. But it is not for that reason now the law of this country that the old rulesrelating to the liability of "universal successors" for the debts of their predecessors are to beimposed, as a matter of "policy", upon particular successors merely because they succeededgratuitously and not onerously. Such a change of "policy" requires the intervention of theLegislature and not of this Court.

Kuper SC in reply.

Cur adv vult.

Postea (May 24).

Judgment

CORBETT JA: The appellant, Mr H N Hirschowitz, made application on notice of motion to theWitwatersrand Local Division ("WLD") claiming an order for the enforcement of a right ofpre-emption held by him in respect of a farm known as "Welstand No 55" and situated in thedistrict of Bethal, Transvaal ("the farm"). The application failed, as did an appeal to theTransvaal Provincial Division ("TPD"). The judgment on appeal has been reported (seeHirschowitz v Moolman and Others 1983 (4) SA 1 (T) ). Leave having been granted by the TPD,appellant now appeals to this Court against the dismissal of his application. The essential facts


of the matter are as follows.

In 1955 first respondent, Mr P B Moolman, and his brother, the late Mr T D du P Moolman,became the registered owners of the farm in equal, undivided shares. On 11 July 1977 therewas registered a notarial prospecting contract, granted by the brothers Moolman in favour ofSun Prospecting and Mining Co (Pty) Ltd ("Sun Prospecting"), entitling the latter to prospect forcoal on the farm and giving the latter the option to purchase the coal rights pertaining to thefarm. On 7 December 1977 Sun Prospecting ceded its rights, obligations and interests underand in the prospecting contract to Zenith Enterprises (Pty) Ltd, which later changed its name toDorstfontein Coal Mines (Pty) Ltd ("Dorstfontein") and which figured as fourth respondent in theCourts a quo and third

1985 (3) SA p754

CORBETT JA

respondent in this Court. On 19 December 1977 the cessionary exercised the option topurchase the coal rights in respect of the farm. Later these rights were formally ceded toDorstfontein.

Some time between 19 December 1977 and 3 March 1978 - the precise date does not appearfrom the papers - T D du P Moolman died, leaving a surviving spouse, Mrs C M Moolman, towhom he had been married in community of property and a son, Mr S J D Moolman, the secondrespondent. Mrs Moolman was cited as third respondent in the Court a quo, but the appeal tothis Court is not pursued against her. The late T D du P Moolman and Mrs Moolman had in1959 executed a mutual will, nominating the survivor as the sole and universal heir or heiress oftheir whole joint estate, subject to the following condition, inter alia:

"Indien ek Theodorus Daniel du Plessis Moolman die testateur eerste te sterwe kom en indien ek ChristinaMagdalena Moolman (gebore Botes) die testatrise hertrou wil en bepaal ons dat ons onverdeelde een-helfte indie plaas 'Welstand' nr 34, distrik Bethal (geregistreer in die naam van die testateur) aan ons seun StephanusJacobus Daniel Moolman sal vererf en in sy naam getransporteer moet word."

On 15 May 1978 a written lease of the farm was granted to appellant by first respondent andMrs C M Moolman for a period of five years, reckoned from 1 September 1978. The leasecontains the following clause (which, it is common cause, created a right of pre-emption):

"8. Ingeval die huurders die eiendom wens te verkoop gedurende die huurtermyn, sal hulle aan die huurder dieeerste reg en opsie gee om dit te koop vir 'n tydperk van een maand vanaf datum van skriftelike kennisgewingaan die huurder van hulle voornemens om te verkoop. Indien die huurder nie binne genoemde maand dieeiendom van hulle koop nie sal die eerste reg om te koop outomaties verval."

Mrs Moolman signed this lease presumably in the anticipation that she, as heiress under thewill, would in due course become a registered co-owner of the farm, together with herbrother-in-law, the first respondent. In fact this never came to pass. For on 26 June 1978 sheand her son entered into a redistribution agreement ("herverdelingsooreenkoms"). Thisagreement records in its preamble that Mrs Moolman accepted the benefits of the joint will on23 May 1978 and it provides basically (a) that the one-half share in the farm, together with allmineral rights (other than rights to coal), be awarded to second respondent; and (b) that theentire net residue of the joint estate (including the proceeds of the sale of the coal rights) be


awarded to Mrs Moolman. Subsequently Mrs Moolman remarried and is now Mrs Duvenhage.On 11 May 1979 and in pursuance of the redistribution agreement, an undivided half-share inthe farm was transferred to second respondent.

On 28 February 1980 first and second respondents, as owners of the farm, entered into anunderhand prospecting contract with third respondent (Dorstfontein) in terms whereof the latterwas given the sole and exclusive right to prospect for all minerals, excluding coal, on the farm.(I shall refer to this contract as "the prospecting contract".) Clause 4 (a) of the prospectingcontract provides as follows:

"Te enige tyd gedurende die prospekteertydperk sal die prospekteerder die enigste en uitsluitlike reg en opsie hêom die gesegde plaas tesame met alle regte tot enige minerale uitgesonder steenkool, van die eienaar te koopteen 'n koopprys bereken teen 'n koers van R755 per hektaar oor die hele omvang van die gesegde plaas,betaalbaar in kontant teen registrasie van oordrag daarvan in

1985 (3) SA p755

CORBETT JA

die naam van die prospekteerder, as sekuriteit vir welke betaling die prospekteerder die gebruiklikebankwaarborg sal verskaf op aanvraag sodra die dokumente wat nodig is om sodanige registrasie tebewerkstellig gereed is om by die aktekantoor ingedien te word."

It is appellant's case that the grant in the prospecting contract of the option contained in clause4 (a) "triggered off" the right of pre-emption contained in clause 8 of the lease, quoted above.On 8 August 1980 appellant's attorneys addressed a letter to first respondent and Mrs Moolmanreferring to clause 8 of the lease and stating that their client had been informed of the grant ofan option over the farm. The letter concludes:

"Indien u wel begerig is om die eiendom te verkoop, word u versoek om die voorwaardes te stel sodat ons kliëntsy opsie kan oorweeg ingevolge bogemelde klousule van die huurkontrak."

An exchange of correspondence ensued, culminating in the attorneys acting for first andsecond respondents on 2 December 1980 giving written notice, in terms of clause 8 of thelease, that their clients were considering selling the farm at a price of R270 643,86 and thatappellant, therefore, had the prior right ("eerste reg") to purchase the farm at the offered pricewithin a period of one month as from the receipt of the notice. According to appellant,discussions then took place between the attorneys acting for the parties and a deed of sale wasdrafted. This was signed by appellant on 10 December 1980, ie within the period of one month.Immediately thereafter Dorstfontein intervened; first and second respondents gave a writtenundertaking to Dorstfontein not to sell the farm; and they notified appellant that the notice of 2December 1980 had not been authorized by them and was of no force or effect. Appellant'sattorneys responded by demanding from first and second respondents a formal written offer interms of clause 8 of the lease, to sell the farm to appellant for the price stated in theprospecting contract, namely R755 per hectare. In reply thereto, they were asked to hold thematter in abeyance until 30 June 1981. This they refused to do. In May 1981 appellant institutedproceedings.

In his notice of motion (as amended) appellant claimed orders:


1.A Declaring that first and second respondents are obliged to offer the farm to appellant(applicant) for sale on the same terms and conditions, mutatis mutandis, as those setout in clause 4 (a) of the prospecting contract.

1.B Directing the respondents to deliver the offer to appellant within 30 days of the date ofthe Court's order in compliance with their obligations set forth in para 1.A, which offershall comply with the provisions of the Formalities in respect of Contracts of Sale ofLand Act 71 of 1969.

1.C Alternatively, declaring that first and second respondents are obliged to accept an offerin the terms mentioned in 1.A.

2. Authorising the Sheriff of the Transvaal or any of his lawful deputies to sign,execute and deliver such offer to the appellant for and on behalf of the first andsecond respondents, if the respondents fail to do so.

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3. Directing first and second respondents to pay the costs of the application jointlyand severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.

When the application came before the WLD the presiding Judge, GOLDSTONE J, referred atsome length to the various judgments in the case of Owsianick v African Consolidated Theatres(Pty) Ltd 1967 (3) SA 310 (A) and continued:

"The majority Judges thus decided that the usual right of pre-emption, such as the provision they wereconsidering, does not, when it comes into operation, give rise to a binding contract of sale: ie the holder of theright, when he exercises it, may not demand either transfer of the land or a sale to himself. If that is the properconstruction of the pre-emptive right conferred by clause 7 of the lease in the Owsianick case, then I can findnothing in the provisions of clause 8 of the lease now before me which would justify a broader construction.Certainly, there are no words which would entitle me to hold that the provision confers upon the applicant a rightto demand to become the purchaser of the subject-matter of the pre-emptive right, ie the farm.

As the majority of the Court held in the Owsianick case, such a pre-emptive right gives rise only to a claim for aninterdict in a suitable case or for damages in the event of a breach thereof. No such claims are made in this case.On this ground the application cannot succeed."

The learned Judge then went on to consider a further argument by counsel for the respondentsthat, in any event, even if a right of pre-emption did entitle the grantee thereof to claim transferof the land or to demand to become the purchaser thereof, then such right had to comply withthe provisions of s 1 (1) of the Formalities in respect of Contracts of Sale of Land Act 71 of1969 ("the Formalities Act"). He concluded that s 1 (1) of the Formalities Act was an"insuperable obstacle" in the way of the Court granting the relief sought against the secondrespondent in that the latter had signed no written document obliging him to sell the farm to theappellant or to offer to sell it to him. Moreover, the claims against first and second respondentscould only be made jointly, not jointly and severally. The application was accordingly dismissedwith costs.

On appeal to the Full Bench of the TPD it was held (per COETZEEE J, ESSELEN J and


PHILIPS AJ concurring) that (a) since the delivery of judgment in the WLD the AppellateDivision had held that

"its previous decision in Owsianick's case was wrong and that there (was) no reason why an order for specificperformance should not be granted on the strength of a pre-emptive right such as that in issue. See AssociatedSouth African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd en Andere 1982 (3) SA 893 (A) ";

and (b) the Formalities Act was not a stumbling block in casu (judgment at 4H - 5E). This Courtthus overruled the grounds upon which the decision in the WLD had been reached.Nevertheless, the Court came to the conclusion that the application had been rightly dismissedsince there was no ground in law upon which second respondent could be held to be bound byclause 8 of the lease (judgment at 6F - 11D). It rejected a submission, which was argued "butfaintly", to the effect that appellant could succeed against first respondent in respect only of hisundivided share in the property (judgment at 11E).

In this Court the two main issues which were argued were (i) whether the Formalities Act wasan insuperable obstacle to appellant's claim, and

1985 (3) SA p757

CORBETT JA

(ii) whether second respondent was bound by the lease and, more particularly, by clause 8thereof. It was submitted by appellant's counsel that the Formalities Act had no application tothe present case and that second respondent became bound by clause 8 of the lease on one ormore of the following grounds, viz:

(1) that second respondent elected to be bound by all the terms of the lease, includingclause 8;

(2) that second respondent was aware of the right of pre-emption (at the latest) by thetime he received transfer of his undivided half-share of the farm, ie 11 May 1979, andthat he was therefore bound by the doctrine of notice;

(3) that second respondent, as a gratuitous successor in title, was bound by theobligations in personam incurred by his predecessor in title (Mrs Moolman) in respectof the farm;

(4) that second respondent was bound by the grant of the pre-emptive right by reason ofthe doctrine of huur gaat voor koop.

All these contentions were contested by respondent's counsel. During the course of argumentappellant's counsel intimated that he was not pursuing the contention based on the doctrine ofnotice.

I proceed to deal with the argument based on the Formalities Act. Here it is necessary toconsider and analyse the provisions of s 1 (1) of the Act, the common law relating to rights ofpre-emption and the relief sought by appellant in the present case. It is to be noted that theFormalities Act was repealed by the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 ("the new Act"). Therelevant portions of the new Act and the repeal came into operation on 19 October 1982 (see


Proc 148 of 1982, Government Gazette 8344 of 20 August 1982). The relevant facts in thiscase occurred, and judgment in the WLD was given, prior to the new Act coming into operation.In this Court counsel made no reference to the new Act and appeared to be agreed that theFormalities Act was the relevant legislation. This would seem to be correct. In any event, s 2 (1)of the new Act seems to have the same impact on sales of land as did s 1 (1) of the FormalitiesAct. I shall, therefore, proceed on the basis that the Formalities Act is the legislation to beconsidered and I shall speak of it as though still operative.

Section 1 (1) of the Formalities Act provides:

"(1) No contract of sale of land or any interest in land (other than a lease, mynpacht or mining claim or stand)shall be of any force or effect if concluded after the commencement of this Act unless it is reduced to writing andsigned by the parties thereto or by their agents acting on their written authority."

This subsection replaced s 1 (1) of the General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957, which was invirtually identical terms, save that it included a "cession in respect of land". Section 1 (1) of Act68 of 1957 repealed and replaced provisions in Transvaal and the Orange Free State (s 30 ofProc 8 of 1902 (T) and s 49 of Ord 12 of 1906 (O)) similarly requiring contracts for the sale offixed property to be in writing and signed by the parties thereto or by their agents dulyauthorized in writing. The object of the subsection and its predecessors was to avoid, as far aspracticable, uncertainty and disputes (possibly leading to litigation) regarding the contents ofcontracts for the sale of land (recognising that such contracts were, as a rule, transactions ofconsiderable value and importance) and

1985 (3) SA p758

CORBETT JA

to counter possible malpractices, including perjury and fraud in connection therewith (seeEstate Du Toit v Coronation Syndicate Ltd and Others 1929 AD 219 at 224; Neethling v Klopperen Andere 1967 (4) SA 459 (A) at 464E - F; Ferreira and Another v SAPDC (Trading) Ltd 1983(1) SA 235 (A) at 246B - D). What the subsection requires is that (at least) all the material termsof the contract be reduced to writing and signed by the parties. This does not mean that theterms of the contract and the signatures of the parties must necessarily be embodied in onedocument. Thus, a written and signed offer by one party in one document and a written andsigned acceptance thereof by the other in another document would constitute compliance withthe subsection, provided that these documents fully recorded the contract (see Johnston v Leal1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 937G - H; Trever Investments (Pty) Ltd v Friedhelm Investments (Pty)Ltd 1982 (1) SA 7 (A) at 18C - E and the authorities there cited).

The juridical nature of a right of pre-emption (or "voorkoopsreg" or "voorkeur van koop") wasfully considered by this Court in Owsianick's case supra and in the ASA Bakeries case supra. Itis important to determine what precisely was decided in these cases. In the former case theessential facts (somewhat simplified) were as follows. The appellant owned certain cinemapremises in Johannesburg. A clause (clause 7) in a written lease of the premises, in respect ofwhich the respondent had become the lessee by assignment, provided that if during thecurrency of the lease the lessor (appellant) desired to sell the leased premises she should,before concluding any sale, offer the premises for sale to the lessee at the same price and


upon the same terms and conditions as she was prepared to sell the premises to any bona fidepurchaser; and that the lessee should be entitled to accept the offer within a period of sevendays. During the currency of the lease the appellant concluded with one P a written contract oflease of the cinema property, the lease to commence after the termination of respondent'slease. The lease to P contained a clause giving the lessee the option to purchase the propertyleased at a price of R30 000. Respondent instituted action against appellant claiming an orderdirecting appellant, within a time to be fixed by the Court, to offer in writing to sell the leasedpremises to respondent at the same price and upon the same conditions as she was preparedto sell the property to P and directing further that respondent be entitled to accept the offerwithin a period of seven days. In its declaration respondent alleged that by concluding the leasewith P (and thereby conferring the option on P) appellant had formed and manifested a desireto sell the leased premises (within the meaning of clause 7), but had refused to offer thepremises to respondent. Appellant filed a plea in which she admitted the conclusion andcontents of the two leases, but (and here I summarize the effect of the plea) denied that theconclusion of the lease with, and the grant of the option to, P brought into operation thepre-emptive right contained in clause 7 of the lease to respondent. Respondent took exceptionto the plea on the ground that it disclosed no defence. The issue raised was whether or not onthe facts which were common cause on the pleadings the right of pre-emption provided for inclause 7 had come into operation.

1985 (3) SA p759

CORBETT JA

The matter was heard at first instance in the Transvaal Provincial Division and the exceptionwas upheld, ie it was found that the right of pre-emption had come into operation.

On appeal to this Court, counsel for the appellant, in addition to arguing that the right had notcome into operation, raised a new point, viz that in any event respondent had no enforceablerights prior to appellant actually concluding a contract of sale with P and that then respondent'srights were confined to a claim for damages, should appellant so sell, or for an interdictrestraining transfer pursuant to any such sale. The Court reached divergent conclusions onthese issues. OGILVIE THOMPSON JA held that the grant of the option to P had brought intooperation the right of pre-emption contained in clause 7 and in coming to this conclusion herejected the argument (advanced by appellant's counsel) that clause 7 applied only to a saleconcluded or proposed to be concluded during the currency of the lease to respondent. He heldthat by granting the option to P appellant had demonstrated during the currency of the lease torespondent a "desire to sell" the premises, within the meaning of clause 7. The learned Judgeof Appeal further held that (at 320G):

"Subject... to the discretion of the Court to decline, in any particular case, to order specific performance, I am ofthe opinion that the holder of a right of pre-emption is, once the contingency giving rise to that right hassupervened, entitled by due exercise of his right to become a purchaser."

(It would seem from the context and the authorities cited that the learned Judge of Appeal wasreferring to the specific performance of the contract of sale resulting from the exercise by theholder of his right of pre-emption.) Applying this principle to the facts, he concluded thatappellant was "obliged to offer respondent the premises for sale" upon the terms stipulated in


the option. Appellant's plea accordingly disclosed no defence and the exception had beencorrectly upheld by the Court below. OGILVIE THOMPSON JA was thus of the opinion that theappeal should be dismissed. WILLIAMSON JA concurred in the judgment of OGILVIETHOMPSON JA on the issue as to whether on the facts alleged the respondent's right ofpre-emption had come into operation and agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. He wasof the opinion, however, that on the pleadings the only issue which arose, and had to bedecided on appeal, was whether the right of pre-emption had come into operation. As to theremedies available to the holder of a right of pre-emption, when his right comes into operation,and the new argument raised by appellant's counsel, WILLIAMSON JA was of the opinion thatit was unnecessary and undesirable to decide this issue. He nevertheless expressed the "primafacie view" that the conclusion of OGILVIE THOMPSON JA on this issue was correct. BOTHAJA, in whose judgment POTGIETER JA concurred, held that the grant of the option to P did notbring the right of pre-emption contained in clause 7 of the lease into operation and wasaccordingly of the view that the appeal should succeed and the order of the Court a quo bealtered to one dismissing the exception with costs. In his judgment he considered the natureand legal effect of a right of pre-emption. In the course of doing so he expressed, or appearedto express, the following views: (i) that a right of pre-emption does not normally impose anyenforceable positive obligation upon the grantor of the right, but merely restrains him fromselling to a third party; save under the conditions

1985 (3) SA p760

CORBETT JA

prescribed in the agreement creating that right (see at 321F and 323G - H); (ii) that upon a saleof the property subject to a right of pre-emption in disregard to the rights of the grantee of theright of pre-emption, the latter may claim damages from the grantor, but that there is noprocedure known to our law whereby the grantee may in that event demand to be allowed tostep into the buyer's place and compel a sale of the property to himself (see at 321G - 323E, inwhich the contrary views expressed by Van Zutphen Nederlandtsche Prac˜cke, s v "Voorcoop",were considered and rejected, principally on the ground that Van Zutphen had wronglyimported, in relation to a conventional "voorkoopsreg", the legal position applicable under theDutch law of "naesting" or the legal "jus retractus"); and (iii) that the grantee of a right ofpre-emption may in our law, in appropriate circumstances, by interdict restrain a sale about tobe concluded with a third party in breach of his rights (see at 322H). It would follow from theviews expressed by BOTHA JA that, a fortiori, the grantee of a right of pre-emption would haveno right to positively enforce his rights where there had not been a sale to a third party, butmerely the granting to him of an option to purchase. The fifth member of the Court, WESSELSJA, agreed that the appeal should be allowed on the ground that upon a proper construction ofclause 7 the lessor (appellant) could only be in breach thereof when a sale to a third party wasactually concluded during the currency of the lease to respondent. He added (at 328F):

"A threatened breach may entitle the lessee to an interdict, but that circumstance could not give rise to an actionfor specific performance. The Court lacks power to issue a command in wider terms than that incorporated inclause 7."

That this statement was merely an interpretation of the effect of clause 7 itself and was notintended as a general exposition of the law relating to the remedies available to the grantee of a


right of pre-emption, was made clear in the last paragraph of the judgment, which reads (see at328G - H):

"I regard it as unnecessary for the purposes of my conclusion to deal with the remedies which are available to theholder of a right of pre-emption or to consider whether a clause primarily designed to create a right ofpre-emption could be so formulated as to impose on the grantor of the right a concurrent positive obligation tooffer the subject-matter in question for sale to the grantee in certain specified circumstances."

It is to be noted that, contrary to what has on occasion been said in comments on this case,there was no majority decision on the legal issues raised in regard to the remedies available tothe holder of a right of pre-emption; there was a majority decision only on the question as towhether the pre-emptive right had come into operation and this decision determined the resultof the appeal.

The facts in the ASA Bakeries case supra were complex, but essentially the case related to aright of pre-emption in respect of shares in and claims against a certain private company. Theholder of the right of pre-emption (a company) alleged that a sale in conflict with its rights hadtaken place and brought an application, making claims which in the main were directed to apositive enforcement of its right of pre-emption. At first instance the application was refused, ongrounds which are not relevant. On appeal, this Court (by a majority decision) made an ordergranting the appellant certain relief. In the course of his judgment (which was the majorityjudgment) VAN HEERDEN AJA, having considered the judgments

1985 (3) SA p761

CORBETT JA

in the Owsianick case and the views of a number of writers on Roman-Dutch and Germancommon law, summarized the position as follows (see at 907E - G):

"Die voorgaande uiteensetting van die menings van skrywers oor die Romeins-Hollandse en Duitse gemene regkan nou soos volg saamgevat word:

(a) Behalwe dat die houer van 'n voorkoopsreg 'n bloot persoonlike reg het, word geen tersaaklike onderskeidtussen enersyds, sy reg en, andersyds, 'n naastingsreg wat ex lege voortspruit en 'n jus retractus getrek nie.

(b) Indien 'n verkoper in stryd met 'n voorkoopsreg 'n koopkontrak met 'n derde aangaan, kan die koper deur 'neensydige wilsverklaring in die plek van die derde tree. 'n Koopkontrak word dan geag aangegaan te gewees hettussen die verkoper en die houer van die voorkoopsreg.

(c ) Indien lewering reeds geskied het, kan die reghebbende nie met sy persoonlike reg die koopgoed in diehande van die derde opvolg nie tensy laasgenoemde bewus was van die bestaan van die voorkoopsreg."

(The first of these propositions has relevance to the grounds advanced by BOTHA JA in theOwsianick case for rejecting the authority of Van Zutphen. With reference to proposition (b) it isclear that the word "koper" has reference to the holder of the right of pre-emption or"voorkoopsreg".) After referring to similar principles in modern German and American law, VANHEERDEN AJA concluded that there was no reason why South African law should not giveeffect to the common law view of the nature of the right of pre-emption, as set forth in (a) to (c)above. In this respect he disagreed with the conclusions of BOTHA JA (in the Owsianick case)as to the remedies available to the holder of a right of pre-emption. VAN HEERDEN AJA


added, for sake of clarity, that it was not necessary for the purposes of the case under appealto express any opinion in regard to the following questions (see at 908E - G):

"(i) Of die houer van 'n voorkoopsreg 'n koopkontrak tussen hom en die verkoper tot stand kan bringslegs nadat 'n koopkontrak met 'n derde aangegaan is en nie ook, bv, indien die verkoper 'n aanbodaan die derde gemaak het nie. Moontlik kan die presiese bewoording van die voorkoopsreg inhierdie verband van belang wees.

(ii) Of die reghebbende in die plek van die derde kan tree indien die betrokke koopkontrakaan bepaalde vormvereistes, soos bv in geval van verkoop van onroerende goed,moet voldoen.

(iii) Of die tydstip waarop die al of nie kennis van die derde aangaande die voorkoopsregvan belang is, verband hou met die sluiting van die koopkontrak of met die leweringvan die koopgoed."

In further explanation of his views, VAN HEERDEN AJA emphasized that, although the holder(grantee) of the right of pre-emption is said to step into the shoes of the third party ("in die plekvan die derde tree"), he does not take the place of the third party in relation to that contract.The true position is that upon the grantee exercising his rights after the conclusion of a contractof sale with a third party, a new independent contract - and not a substitutionary one - comesinto existence between the grantor and the grantee and this does not affect the validity of thecontract between the grantor and the

third party (at 919C - E). The learned Judge found it unnecessary to decide whether the Courtcan order a grantor who has acted contrary to the provisions of a right of pre-emption to makean offer to the holder of the right, but expressed grave doubt ("sterk twyfel") as to whether theCourt had the power to do so.

BOTHA AJA who delivered the minority judgment agreed with the conclusion of VANHEERDEN AJA that in principle the holder of the right

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CORBETT JA

of pre-emption in casu could claim the positive enforcement of his right; he, however, found itunnecessary to consider the interpretation of the authorities discussed by VAN HEERDEN AJAor the jurisprudential interpretation of what occurs when the right is breached and the holderwishes to enforce his right; but, for the sake of argument, he accepted the exposition of VANHEERDEN AJA in this connection.

The impact of the majority judgment in the ASA Bakeries case upon the divergent standpointsadopted in the Owsianick case may, I think, be summed up as follows:

(1) The views of BOTHA JA (in the Owsianick case) that a right of pre-emption does notimpose on the grantor any enforceable positive obligation, but that the grantee mayonly claim damages in the event of a sale in disregard of his rights or, in appropriatecircumstances, an interdict to restrain such a proposed sale, were rejected; as also


were his views on Van Zutphen and the latter's reliability as an authority on the subject.

(2) The view of OGILVIE THOMPSON JA that in principle the holder of a right ofpre-emption is entitled (in addition to claiming an interdict or damages in appropriatecircumstances), to seek the positive enforcement of his rights was endorsed, but in anumber of respects (listed in (3), (4) and (5) below), the majority judgment in the ASABakeries case did not go as far as OGILVIE THOMPSON JA (and apparentlyWILLIAMSON JA) were prepared to go.

(3) It was held by OGILVIE THOMPSON JA that, once the contingency bringing his rightof pre-emption into operation had supervened, the holder could under the common lawclaim implementation of his contract with the grantor before actual breach by the latter(see the Owsianick case at 319H - 320A). In the judgment of VAN HEERDEN AJA thispoint was left open (ASA Bakeries case at 908F, point (i)).

(4) It was held by OGILVIE THOMPSON JA that, when the right of pre-emption comesinto operation, the grantor is subject to an enforceable obligation to offer the properyfor sale to the grantee upon the terms offered to the third party (Owsianick case at320G - H). As I have indicated, VAN HEERDEN AJA had grave doubts as to whetherin such circumstances the Court had the power to order the grantor to offer theproperty to the grantee (ASA Bakeries case at 919H).

(5) The property concerned in the Owsianick case was immovable property. The questionof the effect of the Formalities Act was not raised. In the ASA Bakeries case theproperty concerned was movable and VAN HEERDEN AJA expressly left open (at908G, point (ii)) the question as to whether the grantee of the right of pre-emptioncould step into the shoes of the third party where the contract had to comply withrequirements as to form, as in the case of the sale of immovable property.

I return now to the facts of the present case. In discussing the argument based on theFormalities Act I shall proceed on the premise that second

1985 (3) SA p763

CORBETT JA

respondent became bound by clause 8 of the lease, which conferred the pre-emptive right uponthe appellant, on one or other of the legal grounds advanced by the appellant. Were itotherwise, cadit quaestio.

It is to be noted that in this case the grantors of the right of pre-emption (first and secondrespondents) have not sold the farm to a third party in disregard of appellant's rights as theholder of the right of pre-emption: they have merely granted to the third party an option topurchase the farm. Now, the grant by an owner of property of an option to purchase theproperty amounts in law to an offer to the grantee of the option to sell the property to him andan agreement to keep that offer open for a certain period. The grantee acquires the right toaccept the offer at any time during the stipulated period and, if he does so, a contract ofpurchase and sale immediately comes about. (See generally Venter v Birchholtz 1972 (1) SA


276 (A) at 283 - 4.) In the Owsianick case the grant of an option, even though it could not beexercised by the option-holder until after the termination of the right of pre-emption, was held byOGILVIE THOMPSON JA and WILLIAMSON JA to bring into operation the right of pre-emptionthere provided for and to entitle the grantee to claim the positive enforcement thereof. The rightin that case was contingent on the grantor desiring to sell the property (cf "die eiendom wens teverkoop" in clause 8 of the lease in casu ). The reasoning of OGILVIE THOMPSON andWILLIAMSON JJA would apply a fortiori in the present case where the option could beexercised during the currency of the right of pre-emption. The correctness of his approach wasleft open in the ASA Bakeries case (see point (i) at 908F, quoted above).

I shall assume for the purposes of this case that the grant of the option to Dorstfontein broughtinto operation appellant's right of pre-emption, in that it established that first and secondrespondents wished to sell the property, and that at common law this entitled appellant by aunilateral declaration of intent ("eensydige wilsverklaring") to step into the shoes ofDorstfontein, with the result that an independent contract of purchase and sale would byoperation of law then be deemed to have been concluded between appellant and respondentsat the option price (see Sher v Allan 1929 OPD 137; Hattingh v Van Rensburg 1964 (1) SA 578(T) at 582E). I shall furthermore accept that, although this was not appellant's case, the signingof the draft deed of sale on 10 December amounted to a written declaration of intent on the partof appellant, capable at common law of bringing about an independent contract of purchaseand sale. The question is whether such a contract could be said to conform to the requirementsof the Formalities Act. There are certain difficulties. It is true that the appellant's declaration ofintent was written and signed by him. Even if this be regarded as the acceptance of an offer,which by operation of law was deemed to be made to appellant when the option was granted toDorstfontein, it is arguable that what the Formalities Act requires (where the contract consists ofa separate offer and acceptance) is an offer and acceptance in the ordinary contractual sense,ie a written and signed offer in fact (and not merely notionally) made by one party and a writtenand signed acceptance by the person to whom it was directed. It is also true that first andsecond respondents signed the written lease containing the option to Dorstfontein, but the offer

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CORBETT JA

contained in this option was in fact made to Dorstfontein and not to the appellant. It is notnecessary, however, to decide this question for there is, in my opinion, a more fundamentaldifficulty confronting the appellant, viz the fact that the contract granting the right of pre-emptionwas not signed by one of the persons against whom appellant seeks to enforce the right ofpre-emption.

Before elaborating upon this difficulty I would just point out that in a case where the grantor ofthe right of pre-emption respects the rights of the grantee and, as is usually provided, gives himwritten notice of his desire to sell and of the terms thereof and the grantee exercises his right topurchase in writing, there would normally be no difficulty in spelling out a contract in writing,which would satisfy the Formalities Act. Such a notice was given in the present case by theattorneys acting for first and second respondents, but their authority to do so (which also had tobe in writing) was denied on affidavit and it was not suggested that the Court can go behind this


denial.

As I have mentioned, appellant did not advance the case that the signing of the draft deed ofsale on 10 December amounted to a declaration of intent, with the possible consequencesdiscussed above. And here I must again point out that the application came before the WLDprior to the decision in the ASA Bakeries case. Appellant's case is, and always has been, thathe is entitled to claim specific performance of his right of pre-emption; that consequently firstand second respondents may be ordered to offer the farm to appellants upon the termscontained in the option to Dorstfontein, such offer to comply with the requirements of theFormalities Act; and that the right of pre-emption itself was not hit by the Formalities Act. (Seethe claims in the notice of motion, quoted above - claim 1.C does not seem to have beenpressed.)

As appears from my analysis of the ASA Bakeries case, the majority judgment expressed gravedoubt as to whether the Court has the power to order a seller who has acted contrary to a rightof pre-emption to make an offer to the holder of the right. I do not think that this expression ofopinion was confined, or intended to be confined, to the case where the seller concluded acontract of sale with a third party, as distinct from granting him an option to purchase.Nevertheless, I shall assume in appellant's favour that at common law a right of pre-emptionmay be specifically enforced in the manner claimed by appellant in this case.

In concluding that the Formalities Act was "not a stumbling block" in this case, the Court a quorelied on the case of Van der Hoven v Cutting 1903 TS 299 (see judgment at 5D). But theproblem here under consideration did not arise for decision in Van der Hoven's case. Asimplified version of the facts in that case may be stated as follows. Cutting granted to S awritten lease of certain stands in a township. The lease contained a clause giving the lessee therefusal of the properties for 30000, provided that he exercised this right within 14 days afterwritten notice from the lessor that he wished to sell. S ceded all his rights under the lease to P.His right to do so was not disputed. It was not clear whether this cession was in writing, butINNES CJ at any rate, took it for granted that it was. The cession stipulated that the right ofpre-emption be exercised by the cessionary, P, within 10 days after notice from S. Cutting

1985 (3) SA p765

CORBETT JA

gave notice to S calling upon him to decide whether to exercise his right of pre-emption. Snotified P. P exercised the right of pre-emption within the 14 days allowed by the original lease,but not within the 10 days provided for by the cession. In an action between Cutting, as plaintiff,and Van der Hoven, as defendant, the details of which are irrelevant, the issue arose as towhether the right of pre-emption had been validly exercised. Cutting alleged in his replicationthat the 10 days provided for in the cession had been verbally extended to the full term of 14days provided for in the lease. Van der Hoven applied to have this allegation expunged from thereplication on the ground that such a verbal extension was in conflict with s 30 of Proc 8 of 1902(T) and, therefore, invalid. The Court of first instance refused the application (see Cutting v Vander Hoven 1903 TH 110) and an appeal against this decision was dismissed by the SupremeCourt. It was held that at common law a cession of a right could be verbally effected; that the


cession of the right of pre-emption, ie the agreement between S and P, which was "presumablyfor good consideration" was neither a sale of land nor a sale of a limited interest in land, withinthe meaning of s 30, read together with s 2, of the proclamation; and that the right ofpre-emption had been validly exercised.

As I read it, the case of Van der Hoven v Cutting is not authority for the proposition that a rightof pre-emption in respect of land need not be in writing. In fact, in that case the right ofpre-emption in question was in writing, and was given effect to in writing and, in the opinion ofINNES CJ, a written and valid contract of sale came into existence (see at 306). Nor is the caseauthority for the proposition that the holder of a verbal right of pre-emption in respect of landmay, when the right comes into operation, seek to enforce it by obtaining from the Court anorder compelling the grantor to make to him a written offer complying with the Formalities Act.

It may be accepted, as conceded by counsel for respondents, that where A grants to B a rightof pre-emption in respect of A's land, A does not thereby enter into a contract for the sale ofthat land or even offer to sell that land to B. Respondent's counsel submitted, however (a) thatthe grant of such a right is a contract whereby A undertakes and is obliged to sell the land to Bif (i) the contingency bringing the right of pre-emption into operation has supervened and (ii) Bhas exercised the right of pre-emption in writing; (b) that the grant amounts to a promise by A tosell the land to B upon the happening of certain events, ie a pactum de contrahendo; and (c)that a pactum de contrahendo must itself comply with any formalities which are requisite to thevalidity of the proposed second contract. This submission seems to me to be sound.

A pactum de contrahendo is simply an agreement to make a contract in the future (seeMontrose Diamond Mining Co v Dyer 1912 TPD 1 at 5; Lugtenborg v Nichols 1936 TPD 76 at79; Wessels Law of Contract 2nd ed para 217; De Wet and Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg4th ed at 29; Joubert Law of South Africa vol 5 para 117). It was a class of contract "very wellknown in the Civil Law" (see McIlrath v Pretoria Municipality 1912 TPD 1027 at 1037 - perWESSELS J, BRISTOWE J concurring). Often the pactum provides that the conclusion of thesecond (future) contract is to depend upon some contingency. In McIlrath's case, for example,the

1985 (3) SA p766

CORBETT JA

plaintiff contracted with the municipality to execute for a term of years such cartage work as themunicipality might from time to time require at certain specified cartage rates. The contract wasconstrued as placing no legal duty upon the municipality to employ the plaintiff; but once itdecided to call upon plaintiff to do certain work, it was obliged to pay him for the work at thestipulated rates. Similarly, the portion of an option constituting the agreement to keep the offeropen is often referred to as a species pactum de contrahendo (see Anglo Carpets (Pty) Ltd vSnyman 1978 (3) SA 582 (T) at 585H; De Wet and Yeats (op cit at 29 - 30);Joubert Law ofSouth Africa vol 5 paras 117 and 118; Kerr Law of Contract 3rd ed at 47). Here the conclusionof the "second" contract is dependent upon the contingency of the option-holder deciding toaccept the offer contained in the option. In my view the grant of a right of pre-emption alsoconstitutes a kind of pactum de contrahendo, the conclusion of the "second" contract being


dependent on the contingencies mentioned above.

In general a pactum de contrahendo is required to comply with the requisites for validity,including requirements as to form, applicable to the second or main contract to which theparties have bound themselves; Montrose Diamond Mining Co v Dyer 1912 TPD 1 at 5. In thiscase the plaintiff alleged in its declaration that defendant had purchased a certain leasehold ata public auction and, tendering the grant of a notarial lease (notarial execution was required bys 29 of Proc 8 of 1902), plaintiff claimed that defendant be ordered to execute the lease beforea notary. Defendant's exception to the declaration on the ground that it disclosed no cause ofaction was upheld. DE VILLIERS JP, having referred to the terms of s 29 of the proclamation,stated (at 5):

"Where the parties, therefore, have agreed upon all the terms of such a lease, and have embodied them in awritten document duly signed, but have not executed the lease before a notary public, the proclamation laysdown that the lease shall have no force or effect in law. In such a case the one party cannot sue the other partyto execute the lease before a notary public. As there is no lease before the execution, there is no obligation, andconsequently no vinculum juris !between the parties: Justinian Institutes 3.13 prin. Jolly v Herman's Executors1903 TS 515; Goudsmit Pand vol 2 chap 1 para 27 (c)). If this be so, there is equally no vinculum juris betweenthe parties where they purport to have sold and bought such a lease. If the inchoate agreement cannot beenforced against the lessee against his will when the parties purport to enter into it without payment, it has nogreater validity when the lessee undertakes to pay a lump sum for it, as in this case. If it be said that this is thesale of a lease, it must be pointed out that there cannot be a sale, for the res, or the thing sold, is not in existenceand its coming into existence depends entirely on the free will of the purchaser. It is quite true our law recogniseswhat are known as pacta de contrahendo - that is, agreements to enter into a contract. But, as is well expressedby Goudsmit in the passage cited (para 27 (a)), the requisites for validity, as well as the forms to be observed insuch agreements, are the same as those for the contract to which the parties have bound themselves."

(See also Sturt v Roos 1907 ORC 4; Olivier v South African Townships Mining and FinanceCorporation Ltd 1927 WLD 113 at 120; Royker v Medicine 1962 (4) SA 281 (C) ; Fuls v LeslieChrome (Pty) Ltd and Another 1962 (4) SA 784 (W) at 787C - D.) GoudsmitPandecten-Systeem

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para 27 (a), referred to by DE VILLIERS JP, supports the proposition for which it is cited.Paragraph 27 (a) contains the following statement with reference to pacta de contrahendo :

"De vereischten tot geldigheid, als ook de vormen bij de overeenkomstbelofte in acht te nemen, zijn dezelfde alsvoor de overeenkomst, tot het aangaan waarvan men zich verbonden heeft,..."

Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 2 310, writing of the pactum de contrahendo,referred to by him as a "vorvertrag", also states that the requisites for the validity of the mainagreement ("hauptvertrage"), and in particular those relating to prescribed form, apply also tothe "vorvertrag".

In Souter v Norris 1933 AD 41 the appellant, as plaintiff, had instituted action in the WLDalleging certain cessions of a share in a patent owned by respondent (defendant) and claimingon order directing respondent to execute all the documents necessary to register appellant aspart-owner of the patent or alternatively authorising the Registrar of Patents to effect such


registration. On a special case submitted, this Court held that since the cessions (orassignments) had not been registered they were, in terms of s 45 of the Patents Act 9 of 1916of no force or effect against the respondent. In argument appellant's counsel raised the pointthat an executory contract to assign was not hit by s 45 and could be specifically enforced. Onlyone of the members of the Court (BEYERS JA) appears to have dealt with this argument andhe did so extremely briefly. Having referred to the Montrose case, he stated that this was theanswer to counsel's argument concerning pacta de contrahendo (see at 50).

In the case of an option, the option itself contains the offer which, when the option is exercisedby acceptance, forms the basis of the ensuing contract. It follows that in the case of an optionto purchase land the option must be in writing and signed by the grantor of the option (seeVenter v Birchholtz (supra at 284C - D)).

It seems to me that in order that the holder of a right of pre-emption over land should beentitled, on his right maturing and on the grantor failing to recognise or honour his right, to claimspecific performance against the grantor (assuming that ??e has such a right), the right ofpre-emption itself should comply with the Formalities Act. Were this not so, the anomaloussituation would arise that on the strength of a verbal contract the grantee of the right ofpre-emption could, on the happening of the relevant contingencies, become the purchaser ofland. This would be contrary to the intention and objects of the Formalities Act.

In the present case the contract containing the right of pre-emption was not signed by secondrespondent. Consequently I am of the view that GOLDSTONE J was correct in holding that theFormalities Act was an insuperable obstacle in the path of appellant's application. Indeed I didnot understand appellant's counsel to contend that, if the Formalities Act were applicable, therehad been compliance therewith. This conclusion renders unnecessary a consideration of thefurther question as to whether second appellant even became legally bound by the right ofpre-emption.

The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.

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CORBETT JA

MILLER JA, CILLIÉ JA, VAN HEERDEN JA and SMALBERGER AJA concurred.

Appellant's Attorneys: Moss, Cohen & Partners, Bethal; Lovius, Block, Meltz, Steyn & Yazbek,Bloemfontein. Respondents' Attorneys: Deneys Reitz, Johannesburg; Goodricke & Franklin,Bloemfontein.

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