KOŠICKÁ BEZPEČNOSTNÁ REVUE 2 /2016

KOŠICKÁ BEZPEČNOSTNÁ REVUE Recenzovaný vedecký časopis so zameraním na bezpečnosť. Ročník 6, číslo 2 vychádza polročne dátum vydania 01. 12. 2016 Evidenčné číslo MK SR: EV 4234/10 ISSN 1338-4880 (tlačené vydanie) ISSN 1338-6956 (online) Vydáva: Vysoká škola bezpečnostného manažérstva v Košiciach Redakčno - vydavateľské stredisko Kukučínova 17 040 01 Košice IČO vydaveteľa – IČO: 35 577 720 www.vsbm.sk e-mail: rvs@vsbm.sk tel./fax: + 421 (0) 55 72 010 71 Hlavný editor: Dr.h.c. prof.h.c. prof. Ing. Marián Mesároš, DrSc. MBA LL.M. Kopírovanie povolené len s písomným súhlasom redakcie. Za obsah, pôvodnosť a pravdivosť príspevkov zodpovedajú samotní autori. Vedúci redaktor: Dr.h.c. prof.h.c. prof. Ing. Marián Mesároš, DrSc. MBA LL.M. Redakčná rada: Interní členovia vydavateľa: prof. Ing. Josef Blažek, CSc. prof. Ing. Josef Reitšpís, PhD. Dr.h.c. doc. JUDr. Stanislav Križovský, PhD., MBA LL.M., mim. prof. prof. Ing. Ľudovít Naď, PhD. prof. Ing. Dušan Repčík, CSc. Ing. Peter Havaj, PhD. Ing. Lucia Kováčová, PhD. Ing. Peter Lošonczi, PhD. MBA Ing. Martina Vacková, PhD. Ing. Monika Blišťanová, PhD. Externí členovia z odbornej praxe prof. dr hab. inż. Paweł Czarnecki, MBA, LL.M, MPH, Dr h.c.,

insp. dr. Piotr Bogdalski doc. dr. Jacek Dworzeczki, PhD. Juliusz Piwowarski doktor prof. Dr.h.c. doc. Ing. Stanislav Szabo, PhD., MBA Doc. PhDr. Branislav Kováčik, PhD. plk. Mgr. Štěpán Kavan, Ph.D. Redakcia: Ing. Peter Lošonczi, PhD. MBA

KOŠICKÁ BEZPEČNOSTNÁ REVUE 2 /2016

OBSAH DIE IDENTITÄT DER EU UND IHRE PERSPEKTIVE NACH DEM BREXIT Anna BARWIŃSKA-MAŁAJOWICZ - Bogusław ŚLUSARCZYK - Bożena SOWA.......................................................................6 TRANSFER POZNATKOV VÝSKUMU DO PRAKTICKEJ PRÍPRAVY ŠTUDENTOV V SIMULAČNOM CENTRE Vladimír BLAŽEK ............................................................................................................................................................ 15 ÚČINNOSŤ KAMEROVÉHO SYSTÉMU V KOŠICIACH - STAROM MESTE Monika BLIŠŤANOVÁ - Stanislav KRIŽOVSKÝ ................................................................................................................ 23 NÁVRH PREVENTÍVNYCH OPATRENÍ V OBLASTI KRIMINALITY DETÍ A MLÁDEŽE Mikuláš BODOR .............................................................................................................................................................. 30 KYBERNETICKÁ BEZPEČNOSŤ A JEJ MOŽNÝ VPLYV NA ROZVOJ KRÍZOVÉHO MANAŽMENTU Miroslav BRVNIŠŤAN ...................................................................................................................................................... 37 ROZVOJ TEÓRIE BEZPEČNOSTNÝCH RIZÍK Ján BUZALKA ................................................................................................................................................................. 46 ROZVOJ DOBROVOĽNEJ POŽIARNEJ OCHRANY NA VYSOKEJ ŠKOLE BEZPEČNOSTNÉHO MANAŽÉRSTVA V KOŠICIACH Jozefína DROTÁROVÁ - Peter PALKO ............................................................................................................................. 53 BEZPEČNÉ VYJEDNÁVANIE Imrich DUFINEC ............................................................................................................................................................. 58 ZAŁOŻENIA POLSKIEJ USTAWY Z DNIA 10 CZERWCA 2016 R. O DZIAŁANIACH ANTYTERRORYSTYCZNYCH Jacek DWORZECKI - Izabela NOWICKA ......................................................................................................................... 61 SYNTHETIC EVALUATION OF CITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY MATRIX. THE RELATION OF FINANCE, ENVIRONMENT AND INFRASTRUCTURE Paweł DZIEKAŃSKI ........................................................................................................................................................ 69 OCHRONA GRANIC ZEWNĘTRZNYCH UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ A NOWE ZAGROŻENIA DLA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA Katarzyna DZIUBIŃSKA-WÓJCIK ................................................................................................................................... 76 BEZPEČNÁ LETECKÁ PREPRAVA NESPREVÁDZANÝCH DETÍ Eva ENDRIZALOVÁ - Martin TILŠAR .............................................................................................................................. 81 MODEL PRÍPRAVY KRÍZOVÝCH ŠTÁBOV S PODPOROU CAX Matúš GREGA - Vladimír ANDRASSY .............................................................................................................................. 88 DETEKCIA NELEGÁLNEHO PRENOSU CITLIVÝCH INFORMÁCIÍ Vladimír HAJDUK - Dušan LEVICKÝ .............................................................................................................................. 96 PREČO MOSUL NEBOJUJE PROTI ISLAMSKÉMU ŠTÁTU Peter HAVAJ - Dušan REPČÍK ....................................................................................................................................... 100 K NIEKTORÝM ČINITEĽOM GLOBÁLNEJ BEZPEČNOSTI Ladislav HOFREITER .................................................................................................................................................... 104 DECADE 2020 – ILLICIT MONEY AS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE CURRENCIES IN TERRORIST FINANCING Miloslav HOSCHEK ....................................................................................................................................................... 112 BEZPIECZEŃSTWO RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ A BEZPIECZEŃSTWO UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ Lech HYB ....................................................................................................................................................................... 116 BUSINESS RISK MANAGEMENT IN VIEW OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS IN POLAND Sebastian JABŁOŃSKI ................................................................................................................................................... 127

KOŠICKÁ BEZPEČNOSTNÁ REVUE 2 /2016

112

DECADE 2020 – ILLICIT MONEY AS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND

THE CURRENCIES IN TERRORIST FINANCING

Miloslav HOSCHEK1 Abstrakt: Následky pôsobenia špinavých peňazí majú rovnakú ničiacu energiu, ako zbrane hromadného ničenia. V Európskej únii umožňuje kybernetická bezpečnosť v reálnom čase sledovať toky financovania podvodov súvisiacich s terorizmom a praním špinavých peňazí. Teroristické útoky vo Francúzsku a Belgicku spustili viacero nových iniciatív a akčných programov európskych vlád a finančných inštitúcií v boji voči praniu špinavých peňazí a voči finančnej kriminalite. Kľúčové slová: Financovanie terorizmu, štvrtá direktíva proti praniu špinavých peňazí, boj proti financovaniu terorizmu, kybernetická bezpečnosť, sledovanie tokov peňazí v EÚ. Abstract: The illicit money has same energy as weapons of mass destruction. A money tracking EU cybersecurity could identify financing, money laundering and online financial fraud related to terrorism. The terrorist attacks in France and Belgium launched a several new initiatives, where European governments or financial institutions take action programmes in the fight that illicit money might be used in financial crimes. Key words: Terrorist Financing, Fourth Anti-Money Laundering Directive, combating terrorism financing, a money tracking EU, cybersecurity. Introduction

The European and U.S. investigations of anti-money laundering schemes shows, that financial industry met with many kinds of violations, such as accounting fraud, market manipulation, public offerings, misconduct by regulated entities or insider trading. The major global financial institutions investment banks, investment advisers, broker-dealers, mutual funds or hedge funds are providing real time management of compliance staff and assisting them with implementing enhancements to their anti-money laundering programs to the accounting practises , revenue-sharing and market-timing practises of mutual funds.

The new requirement is to prepare an evidence how to identify, assess, understand, and mitigate anti-money laundering and combating terrorism financing risk, with respect to the on-going monitoring of customers. The problem with this provision is that one cannot identify all payment instruments (e.g. prepaid credit cards) as e-money. As a consequence, acquirers are no longer allowed to accept any payment cards from certain countries. SWIFT ´AML regulations

The global financial messaging network SWIFT, doing international funds transfers, is developing a new anti-money-laundering regulation initiative report to help banks to spot their red flags problems. This initiative „ Know Your Customer (KYC) “ helps to the member banks to provide a global overview of an institution’s correspondent banking traffic data. This demonstrate the due-diligence requirements of KYC and more transparency to banking activities supported by potential risk within specific jurisdictions. . That will improve to monitor a hard time spotting transactions from apparently innocuous customers who are actually fronting for other entities. Banks have the option of asking SWIFT to create their institution’s SWIFT Profile that can also act as a business enabler for institutions that want to demonstrate more transparency on their banking activities to potential customers. More adoptive pillars should be implemented, due to the criminalisation of money laundering. To prevent identity theft and frauds a new measures must be done. Banks that contribute their financial network KYC data to the KYC Registry plans an additional value-added KYC and customer due-diligence services based on the KYC Registry. Using SWIFT’s KYC Registr and Cash and Treasury File Management Reporting help banks to share with their counter parties at their discretion. These are are to identify, trace seize and confiscate the proceeds of crime and to monitor of transactions and behaviours of world terrorism and money laundering:

1Ing. Miloslav Hoschek, PhD. e-Silk Road, NGO (Elektronická Hodvábna Cesta, o.z.). Záhrebská 10, 811 05 Bratislava. E-mail: mhoschek@gmail.com

KOŠICKÁ BEZPEČNOSTNÁ REVUE 2 /2016

113

engaging KYC (know your customer) a complex policy customer identification for restriction of anti-money laundering and terrorism financing

addressing the constructive conditions against the spread of terrorism preventing and combating terrorism ensuring human rights and the rule of Law

Here are important for anti-money laundering programs the tasks of regulatory and data governance, risk

analytics and assessments, risk assessment polices, procedures and standards. anti-money laundering compliance leadership positions at in the identification and remediation of issues of regulatory compliance including, corporate governance, sustainability, customer due diligence, activity monitoring, investigations and reporting. Several administrative corruption remains to be important, such as falsification of the company books, making false representations to the creditors, fraudulent trading, using stolen identity. Banks have the option of asking SWIFT to create their institution’s SWIFT Profile, which the banks can then share with their counter parties at their discretion, using SWIFT’s KYC Registry. Along with SWIFT Profile, the financial network plans additional value-added KYC and customer due-diligence services based on the KYC Registry and enable banks to better assess their counterparties’ own declared behavior and gain insights into potential risks posed by the activities of their counter parties and those institutions’ customers. The virtual currencies in terrorist financing Bordering Afghanistan, which equals Taliban and the heroin trade, and with its own struggle to combat capital flight of both legal and illicit funds, Pakistan is just beginning to grapple with the scale of money laundering and terrorist financing it faces. Conflict rages just over the border in Syria yet Turkey goes slow (even backwards with recent amendment of its customs code) on terrorist financing. Hizbullah has long been on the terrorism radar and despite current focus on Islamic State, the United States is attempting to maintain pressure on the group’s finances through specific legislation. The virtual currencies in terrorist financing don’t have to dig too deeply into the dark web to find vendors offering anything from an AK47 to a lump of polonium - with Bitcoin as the preferred payment method. The perceived anonymity and unregulated nature of virtual currencies has also raised concerns that they could be the ideal conduit for terrorist financing. In February, three months after the Paris attacks, the European Commission announced plans to address this issue. The European Commission has released a detailed action plan of reforms designed to choke off the supply of money to terrorist organisations, including amending the recently agreed European Union (EU) Fourth Money Laundering Directive (4MLD), which it now envisages would enter into force “at the latest by 4th quarter 2016”. US intelligence has access to European Union citizens’ banking transfer records by virtue of a controversial 2010 agreement which examines the Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme, currently set for renegotiation.The horrific events in Paris will sharpen focus on how such attacks are funded. The Financial Action Task Force had already revisited the evolving threat in a report issued after its October 2015 plenary. THe latest terrorist financing methods and evidence.The Paris terror attacks have prompted an urgent meeting of the EU Council of Ministers (for justice and home affairs) to back strengthening and improving the operation of member states’ financial intelligence units (FIU). A Cyber Intelligence in Terrorist Financing Controls

We see, that globally is unprecedented, and modern technologies are presenting new and evolving threats. In euro zone a modern technologies are presenting new and evolving threats, here should more actively protect its regions, states, people, economy. A cyber intelligence in order to combat rising threats to multi- national security in eurozone could be that way to improve the present situation. The use of cyberintelligence fraudulent identities and strengthen the EU cybersecurity tactics to be a key enabler of serious and organised crime and terrorism. There are many new sophististicated forms and other measures of anti-money laundering and legal sources of terrorist financing at present, such as:

• Collection of Membership Dues Sales of Publications • Cultural and Social Events • Door to Door Solicitation within Community • Request to wealthy members of the Community • Donation Collection of Dirty Money • Terrorist Financing internal controls • Banking and Deposit Taking Institutions

KOŠICKÁ BEZPEČNOSTNÁ REVUE 2 /2016

114

A new cyberintelligence should more effectively work with government to curb the recruitment scams that criminal syndicates often use to trick unwitting individuals into trafficking money between different European jurisdictions. That means to reduce money laundering and the presence of criminal networks by investigating online payments platforms and financial cybercrime. As the money moves to finance illicid WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) in non-cooperative countries and territories programmes against. These are the in U.S., OFAC – US Patriot Acts, Crime Act 2002, Organised Crime and Police Act, U.S.Terrorism Act 2000. For instance the U.S. FATF – Financial Action Task Force gave in recent years 40 recommendations and over dozen of special recommendations and regulatory initiatives about anti-money laundering regulations, stretching from tax evasion into grey edges of avoidance and the identification of true beneficial owners of legal entities. Also U.S. Bribery Act 2010 tracks about suspicious money laundering, using regulatory initiatives ongoing monitoring, record keeping programmes. The system is a “futile and impotent weapon in the global fight against money laundering and corruption. Trillions of dollars may be missing from U.S. government coffers due to widespread corporate tax evasion and criminal money laundering strategies. The fourth and fifth AML directives

The so-called ‘Fifth Directive’ – which contemplate, inter alia, centralised registers of bank and payment accounts, regulation of virtual currency exchanges, lower identification thresholds for prepaid cards and full public access to beneficial ownership registers of both companies and business-related trusts. The Fourth anti-money laundering directive introduces more stringent sanctions for financial institutions who fail in meeting their anti-money laundering obligations. For financial institutions the fourth anti-money laundering directive enable to identify the hazards and assist together with the customers due diligence measures should be applied. The purpose of the Directive is to improve consistency of anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing rules across all EU Member States. European financial institutions under the fourth anti-money laundering directive continue to struggle with the high-risk accounts. New sanctions include the issuance of a public statement of anti-money laundering procedures, cease and desist orders, revocation of financial licenses and higher monetary sanctions. With 5AMLD, the Commission seeks to address those gaps. In particular, the Commission wants to provide for more transparency regarding beneficial owners of companies and trust and holders of anonymous prepaid products. Under 5AMLD, the legal requirements that allow the issuance of anonymous e-money products shall become significantly more restrictive than under 4AMLD. Acquirers are no longer allowed to accept payments carried out with prepaid cards issued in third countries where such cards do not meet requirements equivalent to the prevention of money laundering under 5AMLD. Data Protection and Financial Intelligence

A financial intelligence service monitor fund flows as part of the authorities’ efforts against money laundering and tax evasion. In respect of exchanging information, specific requirements will be introduced. This will extend to fianancial intelligence units: having access to financial, administrative and law enforcement information; being empowered to take early action in response to requests from law enforcement authorities within the Member State. The service, which might be independent or located within the Finance Ministry or Central Bank, should employ civilian staff who would not have the right to compel people to give evidence. They would concentrate on document and data analysis. In this way their contact with business and entrepreneurs, and the corresponding scope for corruption, would be limited. Suspicious transactions would be investigated by the police.

With the aim of providing clarity around the interaction between and data protection, the new Directive introduces a provision in respect of policies and procedures, which requires that data protection elements are considered within anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing policies and procedures for sharing of customer information. The purpose of this addition is to strike an appropriate balance between robust controls and the protection of the rights of data subjects. Pretending to be one to win the trust of the biggest Colombian drug cartel and launder millions of dollars for them is threat of an altogether different order. The shift towards stronger enforcement actions within the anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing sphere is noticeable in other jurisdictions as well. For instance, US regulators are imposing larger monetary penalties for alleged anti-money laundering compliance violations. Conclusion

Financial and administrative corruption remains a major financial crime. Investigating allegations to tackle the issue of money laundering, especially with regard to of illicit gains or corruption of public figures and