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The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by VetonSurroi, a young Kosovar jou rnalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Ko hasoon becam e a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be pub lished daily under thename of Ko ha Ditor. With the kind perm ission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted onhttp://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

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Koha Digest # 105FRONT PAGE: THE ALBANIAN QUESTION TODAYDATE: 29 May 1996

EDITORIAL

CYBER-POLITICAL KOSOVA

by VETON SURROI

It is sometimes unfortunate that my professional obligations are not associated with thepolitical work of the Republic of Kosova. It could happen that, for instance, when I wouldfeel indisposed to write, a decision to postpone my editorial for the next week or for the next

year, would be promulgated. The justifications would be found anyhow, from to the fact thatthe political and security situation has reached the level of direct threat and up to the fact thatthe editorial should be prepared better. There is no doubt that the editorial I would prepareduring a whole year would come out better than usual.

Fortunately, however, I don't expect, nor would I welcome similar decisions. And, thus, Ipermit myself to discover a new category of political life, a combination that could have beencreated only by Kosova: the politics of virtual reality.

So far, the virtual reality has existed only in the past few years and only inside the

cyber-space. Hundreds of thousands of computer programmers try, on a daily basis and usingthe newest software, to make it possible for various computer users to experience on theirscreens something that resembles a computer. Today, aviation pilots practice their professionon computer simulators that resemble almost fully a real flight, American policemen face

perilous situations by fighting terrorists and mobsters on their computer screens -- while somehardware manufacturer assures the improvement of a certain product enabling a person

projecting a pizza on his screen to actually smell its aroma, and while searching for someflower through numerous files, the aroma would change into the flower's favor.With no significant investment in hardware or software, Kosova created an image of anorganized state. So real, that last week's main event was - to postpone or not the elections forthe Parliament of Kosova, because according to laws of virtual reality, the mandate of the

Parliament that was elected four years ago had expired. Thus, few days ago, we wereannounced that the elections will be held next year: in the meantime, the Parliament of virtualreality can, for another year, continue with its virtual reality work. This was proclaimed by thePresident of the Republic, using no computer whatsoever. There is no doubt that theadvantages of the flight-simulators for airplane pilots could be related to the fact that themiscalculations done during this sort of practice will not be paid with the passengers' lives.The same goes for the policemen and their virtual combat with the terrorists and mobsters.Finally, in this regard, there are opinions that the virtual reality of Kosova has helpedavoiding a hotter confrontation spot with Serbia.

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This is true. As it is true, the critics would add, that the best way to avoid the conflict withSerbia is also by refusing to get up from bed. The number of those beaten and arrested whilein bed, in the Kosova of the last decades, appears proportionally much lower than of thosewho got up.

I believe, nevertheless, that in the near future, in regard to our computer experience, we willsee two parallel processes. On one hand, the number of people inside the virtual reality thatwill become opposition to the virtual president Rugova will increase. On the other, there will

be efforts - for some quite voluntary, and for others quite involuntary - to advance fromvirtual reality to the simple reality. With government and opposition.

Things that remained incomprehensive even to the greatest visionaries of the cyberneticscould happen. In order to advance from our collective screen to something that our sensescould identify as the reality.

KOSOVA

THE FISTS OF THE PRESIDENT

by YLBER HYSA \ Prishtina

Those who responded so willingly to, probably the most original,elections of the '92 spring, could have never imagined that the

elected MPs of the Kosova Parliament would never hold the firstsession. Moreover, they will hardly understand the situation, inthe end of May '96 that denotes the very expiration of theelected multi-party Parliament, that never (ever) reallycongregated, of the extension of the MPs' mandate that neverreally assembled and the postponement of the new elections untilnext year - 24 May 1997!

The very first question in this regard would probably be thisone: how is it that the situation in 1992 was perceived as morefavourable than today's, after Dayton and with no ongoing war --

as it was during the first parliamentary elections in Kosova??This appears impossible to answer properly, both by politiciansand jurists. But not all of them, we would say.

It was the decision of the President of the Republic of Kosova,Ibrahim Rugova, that enabled "the postponement of the

parliamentary elections in Kosova", according to the"Constitution of the Republic of Kosova, amendment III, point 2,having in mind the agreement among the political subjectsrepresented in the Parliament of the Republic". Thus, it was the

decision approved in regard to the "extension of the mandate ofthe MPs to the Parliament of the Republic of Kosova, electedduring the multi-party elections on 24 May 1992." Further on, itis stated that the "extension of the mandate considers the time-

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interval until 24 May 1997". Meanwhile, "until the constitutionof the Parliament, it's commissions will continue functioning, asso far. The decision comes into force as of now" - statesRugova's decree.

But then again, this decision, despite numerous "originalities",could perhaps be justified if the storm of criticism which arosefollowing the failure to celebrate any parliamentary sessioncould have been avoided. The storm reached it's peak with the

proposal of certain electoral units, in regard to the engagementof Adem Demai in the Parliament - a proposal obstructedimmediately and quite directly from the levels which only a fewdays ago approved the decision on the "postponement of theelections..."

Even during the obstructions of the work of the parliament, therewere some legal justifications cruising, but however, as theexpiration of the mandate term was approaching, a hugeresponsibility was felt in regard to explorations of a legalcatch that could justify the "postponement..."

Moreover, this legal hyper-sensitivity went so far that it evencaused the gathering of the Central Council of the LDK (after aneight months' pause), and even the Coordinating Body of PoliticalParties of Kosova itself (with the delay of "only" two years)!

But, first things first...

Firstly, president Rugova, during the meeting with Kosovanpolitical parties on Monday, 21 May, stated that he had invitedthem for consultation purposes (although the agenda of themeeting was completely unknown to all participants), about theissue of the Parliament's mandate, although, he stated, thesolution of this problem, was in his competencies, on grounds ofconstitutional amendments. After the abrupt conclusion of thisurgently assembled meeting, as president Rugova was rushing tomeet Belgrade US Embassy official Blake, and after failing to

reach an unanimous decision, the meeting was agreed to continuewithin two days. However, the next day, on Tuesday 22 May, themeeting of the Central Council of the LDK took place. It is ahighly important institution for the topic of our discussion,

particularly due to the fact that the LDK has the absolutemajority of MPs, so, before deciding in favor of whateverdecision, this is the body to be asked about it. Finally, it isconsisted of the majority of the members of the mentioned

parliament. However, what happened was far from the "coordinationof the viewpoints". At the very beginning there was an incident,

that, even to those well-informed on the political situation ofKosova, would seem rather odd. After taking the floor, BeratLuzha, who in fact conducted a sort of an introduction over whathe considered the "indolence" and "mafioso behavior" of a certain

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segment of the party, particularly the one seated outside thecountry, establishing "double funds" and by ignoring theGovernment of Kosova and the institution of the 3 % tax. Also,Luzha spoke of some abuses regarding LDK's organ, "ORA" (weekly),

what made president Rugova demonstrate publicly his, so farunknown temperament, by hitting the table with the fist that wasfollowed by an "Enough!" - in his attempts to stop Luzha'sspeech. Afterwards, the first confrontation in the meetinghappened. The participants complained that, "anyway, they gettogether only once in a year" and even then they are disallowedto express their opinion...

Luzha continued...

Then followed various criticisms, but as far as the issue of the

Parliament, there were some objections made (even that theParliament should assemble in ad-hoc sessions in case of

potential talks with the Serbs, as suggested by one of the seniorfemale activists of the LDK). There were no dilemmas, however,regarding the extension of the MP's mandate - only the insistingfor conditioning the schedule of new elections within a year to

be held parallel to the presidential elections; on completing theGovernment and enabling it to come back and work in Kosova; ontrying to hold local-level elections; and finally, on approvingdecisions regarding the vacant seats in the Parliament of Kosova.

This stances were, according to our information, respected by themajority of participants, but not those chairing the meeting. Infact, the meeting ended with approving no obligative conclusion.The second meeting, that of the Coordinating Body, held onWednesday, 23 May, witnessed another fist of the presidentRugova, following Luljeta Pula-Beqiri's suggestion (Chairpersonof the Social-Democratic Party of Kosova) for the completion ofthe parliamentary seats, i.e. the representation of Adem Demaiin it, a proposal that got an apparent support from LDK's Vice-Chairman, Hydajet Hyseni. It is said that Rugova reactednervously by stating that "he [Demai] is the second best...";

and "...He's OK where he's now!" (the Council for the Defence ofHuman Rights and Freedoms). After the famous meeting of 1994,when Fehmi Agani resigned from the LDK, this would be the secondtime that Rugova betrayed his temperament and his image ofextreme endurance.

But, let us get back to the meeting of the Coordinating Body,that concluded with the idea of compiling a joint declaration,signed by all chairmen of political parties in Kosova. This neverreally happened. After two rounds of meetings in various

sections, the same night, the satellite program of the AlbanianRadio Television, broadcast president Rugova's statement aboutthe extension of the MPs' mandate.

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Thus, it seems that the course of events at the finale ofexpiration of MP's mandates brought not only their extension, butalso the postponement of the elections for another year.It seems that after this `ad acta', there are two dilemmas

remaining: firstly, how will the other accentuated actors actupon the decision of the president, and how will this act beobserved from the legal aspect.

As far as it can be seen, the MPs will react in differentmanners. Some of them are incensed with the course and do not

perceive themselves as MPs any longer.

On the other hand, every careful observers among legal experts,has a clear definition of the situation: it is slightlyconfusing! The President of the Republic of Kosova has indeed the

right to promulgate the decision (he already did), according tothe respective provisions, even though this could be interpretedas contrary Article 101 of the Constitution of the Republic ofKosova which explicitly states that "The Parliament of theRepublic, facing the direct threat of war, or in case of anongoing war, has the right to decide over the extension of themandate of its MPs, in the municipal and city assemblies". Apartfrom this, nothing else is stated on the possibility to"postpone the elections"!

Nevertheless, the decision of the president would be fully legalif the exceptional situation (upon which president Rugova groundshis decision based on Amendment III:1) was at least proclaimed assuch! That did not happen for four years now, and juridicalsciences know that as long as nothing is proclaimed, it doesn'texist! So, what happened? Some jurists even say that whathappened is fine, because this is the first decision made by thePresident, and whatever it may be, it is a precedent!

However, if the President would have been careful to see (or atleast read or listen to interpretations of articles published in

the press), he could have easily ascertained the unsupportedjuridical situation in the past years. Instead of praising at alltimes the functioning of Kosova's institutions, society andstate, he should have at least remembered to, to fulfil someformalities, make previous juridical adjustments to declare theneeded substitutes that would serve to find a juridical cure inorder to function in the Kosova of the past years. And if thefact that Kosova is under occupation has been so often repeated

by the President and his collaborators, then how was it possiblefor the juridical and state institutions to function (or even

more, how can free elections take place in these conditions)!However, the polemics over what is more "just" and "legal" inthis situation could take us deeper into mud, although there is afact that cannot remain unnoticed: after all that negligence,

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what is the reason of such juridical hyper-sensitivity? Somerecall that Amendment IV, among others, foresees that "in case ofdeath, resignation, or the permanent obstruction of the presidentof the Republic to accomplish his duty, something to be

ascertained by the Constitutional Court of Kosova upon thesuggestion of the Government of Kosova, then his duties will betaken over by the President (Speaker) of the Parliament! Notforgetting that the sensitivity of the situation made it evenimpossible for the others to be coopted to the Parliament....

INTERVIEW

GABRIEL PARTOS, BBC analyst and commentator

AROUND THE TABLE OR IN THE BATTLEFIELD, THE CONFLICT IS INEVITABLE!

Interviewed by DUKAGJIN GORANI \ Prishtina

KOHA: Your views on the post-Dayton prospects. How do you see theposition of Kosova after the, at least formal, end of the war inBosnia?

PARTOS: Dayton has once again put Kosova on the international

agenda. It is now an issue that has to be addressed, becauseAmericans are saying that what they wanted with Dayton was acomprehensive solution towards the problems of former Yugoslavia,and even beyond. Of course, Dayton did not bring a comprehensivesolution, having concentrated almost entirely on Bosnia and,

partly, Croatia. Kosova was left out of consideration, however,now it has to be brought in the solution. We have seen clearlythe renewed international interest through the visit of ElizabethRehn, the forthcoming visit of Mr. Bildt or through the expectedopening of the US information resource center in Prishtina - asuggestion of the US government over the support of the Albanian

people's aspirations here. So, we have seen the need to providesome kind of solution, to begin the process that will lead to asolution in Kosova. And, it is all happening because the flamesof the Bosnian war have been put out, at least for the time

being. That means that the opportunity is now available toaddress the Kosova issue with a much greater determination thanit was possible to do when the attention of the internationalcommunity was focused entirely on the greater dangers, the biggerconflicts as in Bosnia & Herzegovina.

KOHA: How would you explain the rather big American interest inthe region, considering here the close cooperation with Albania,their military deployment in Macedonia, or the Information Officein Prishtina?

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PARTOS: Of course, it succeeded through other means. In a senseone could argue that a form of ethnic cleansing had succeededhere. But, whether a Serbian victory, a kind of nock-out victoryin Bosnia in 1992, might have presented Kosova as an opportunity

for the next one, I wouldn't throw it out completely, eventhough, as you've said in your question, in a fact, Kosova wasalready under control. It was actually the first, apart fromVojvodina, to be "pacified" in 1989.

Just to go back to the LDK and the criticism of theadministration. It achieved some successes, initially, in

building up the parallel system, ascertaining its independencefrom Serbia, but is it now reaching a stage when this policy isno more productive. Personally, I can't make up my mind about theargument here, about the need for more assertive action,

demonstrations, occupation of buildings, hospitals... I believethat there is a great danger in this. The adoption of the moredynamic policies will lead to the renewed violence, the policerepression and deaths, once again.

Of course, they that do support that policy say it is worth theprice. It has to be decided here, by the local representatives,what is the best course of actions to take. But, in a sense Iwould certainly agree with the critiques by saying that maybethis policy of passive resistance has reached a kind of deadlock,

a kind of dead end, that it is not taking steps any further. ButI can also understand the supporters of that policy when they say"all right, maybe we are not achieving much, but on the otherhand the dangers of changing the tactics now could be immenselycostly". Ultimately, this would have to be a matter that should

be argued and debated in public.

KOHA: Could we say that the demands of the LDK and the presidentRugova do no longer fit within the framework of the world's"Realpolitik" concepts?

PARTOS: Yes, I think it is maybe unfair or unjust, butinternational politics is not about fairness or justice. It isabout interest. As some diplomat put it a very long time ago:"States do not have friends, they have only interests." I thinkthe international interest at the moment is concentrated on notchanging the borders, but whatever the justification may be, theAlbanians who are in such a big majority here, should have theright to have their country, the right to self-determination.

However, because Kosova had been included within a former

Yugoslavia and much excessively within the Serbia itself, it didnot enjoy this kind of chance to become independent, as far asthe international community is concerned. The primary interesttoday are focused in stopping any further danger of conflict, the

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building of security and stability in the region that is in asense rewarding Milosevic -- by seeing relatively strong Serbiaas a stabilizing factor, as far as it stops its attempts toexpand. So, for variety of reasons, one could argue that the

Albanians of Kosova have been the losers: they have not fought awar, so why should the international community reward them...

KOHA: Let us consider the recent happenings in Kosova: thekillings of Albanians and Serbs that took place a month ago, andthe silence of Belgrade. How do you look upon what has beencalled by some, "a final change of the course" here?

PARTOS: I can understand the silence in Belgrade. It does notlook good for the president Milosevic in the year when he isheading for the presidential elections, it does not look good for

him to see that things are getting "hotter" in Kosova, and thelast thing he would want now is some kind of a conflictsituation. It would only encourage his ultra-nationalistopponents. I think that the events were more of spontaneousresponse, coming out of the frustration of many Albanians fed upwith the Serb police repression and the policy of the Albanianleadership here, that is by many defined as sterile and counter-

productive. This could be the danger -- unless some kind of a newinitiative or a new approach is taken -- for these spontaneousincidents to multiply. It seems to me that the great danger is

that any further incident could trigger off and gain response inviolence. That is something that cannot be ruled out. Clearly,the leadership in Serbia wants a status-quo, it wants Kosova toremain relatively calm, and certainly, the Albanian leadershiphere is ready to deny any support to the methods of the violence.It's maybe that the situation can't be kept relatively quiet, butthe recent events are absolutely a warning, a warning signal thatmaybe the time has come for a new course.

KOHA: Albania and the forthcoming elections. How do you see theposition of Berisha, who is, as it could be seen, highly

supported by the international media and western officials?

PARTOS: By a large, I think that we should return to the point ofpragmatism, and on this particular matter I will try to be veryunderstanding towards the political leadership in any of thecountries in transition, where many reversals can take place. The

primal importance is to preserve stability and not to criticiseexcessively the leaders who may be seen as being perhaps toauthoritarian. President Berisha has been extremely skilful andcooperative, he was given as much support as possible, he

provided an inestimable space to Americans by allowing theestablishment of their military facilities and the intelligenceservices due to the war in Bosnia; he has also been very cautiousover the Albanian issue in Kosova and in Macedonia. By a large he

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is being seen as a person pursuing a very realistic policy ofAlbania with its neighbors, even in their conflicts. So, thegeneral attitude of the West would sound: let's give a man oursupport, he has given us proofs that he is responsible, that he

is not going to involve in any adventure in the region, and forthat reason we may be ready to be more forgiving when it comes tocertain problems over internal matters, whether it is the problemof independent judiciary, or the occasions when media wereintimidated, and so on.

KOHA: There are opinions that Albania might lose itsinternational support if Berisha fails to remain in power afterthe elections. Do you believe that the world would that easilychange its political attitudes?

PARTOS: No, I don't think so. After all, international aid forAlbania begun when Fatos Nano was prime minister, and he is in

prison on the grounds of misusing that aid. Surely, it begunbefore. It was the Democrats' promise that the international aidwill increase if they sustain the political power in the country.To some extent that has been justified, but I don't think that asocialist victory would lead to a reversal in Albania's foreign

policy, or in it's economic policies. As a matter of fact, thesimilar cases of Socialists coming to power after the fall of theCommunism, as in Bulgaria, Hungary or Poland, show that the new

governments are actually pursuing more market-oriented policies,more vigorous forms of privatization. The main problem with theSocialists in Albania is that there is still a coalition with theold-time former communists and the people with more up-to-datedmentality; it is also a problem of being in a kind of a stataldisarray and confusion, partly because its leadership has beendecapitated: Nano is in jail, many of their leaders were bannedthe participation in the elections, so instead of coming out withclear alternatives, they are stuck in criticising the governmentonly.

In any case, I don't think that the issue there will be theturning back of the clock. Albania has entered a course thatshould be followed, whatever the minor variations that could take

place and that would be related to the leading party concepts.

KOHA: How do you see the situation in Macedonia, after the mutualrecognition with FRY, after the recent scandal of the collectionof signatures (initiated by VMRO-DPMNE opposition) for a nationalreferendum on parliamentary elections -- and, finally, regardingthe increasing dissatisfaction of Albanians with their inadequate

participation in power?

PARTOS: Macedonia has had this tremendous problem with Greece, ofcourse, and with Serbia to some extent. But, in a sense I have

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never felt that these were the key problems the country is or wasfacing, although they are very serious. But, what is seen now inthe last months, particularly after the Dayton accord, is agradual resolution of problems with Greece, and with Serbia as

well, which I see also as a part of the Dayton process. Serbiahas now decided to start a clean sheet with Macedonia, and therecognition (although, to some extent, on Serbia's terms) is inBelgrade's interest. What is left is the key problem -- theAlbanians of Macedonia, their denied access or obstructed fairrepresentation in almost all aspects of public life. This issomething that leads to a kind of an apartheid system -- thatthere are two communities so far apart: Macedonians feeling underthreat and the Albanians considering themselves treated assecond-class citizens. However, once again, because there was nofighting, the international community feels that this is just a

secondary issue, supporting the negotiations and the policy ofsmall steps, that is producing no visible results. The situationhasn't been changed and unless there is some kind of the re-alignment of forces in Macedonia that should result through newelections, and of course, the greater presence of Albanians inthe parliament, I don't think the prospects will change, at leastfor the time being. And then, there will be e proper space

provided for national frustrations, the same way as it was and isin Kosova.

KOHA: What is your view about, what is now called, the "Albaniancommon space" in the Balkans, including the present situation inAlbania, in Kosova and Western Macedonia? Its development and the

possible course of events that might follow, accounting theultimate aim and the aspiration of the population?

PARTOS: I don't think that a solution could come through thebuilding of a Greater Albania, or an Albania that would includeall Albanians living in the Balkans. I don't think that solutionsas this will ever work in the Balkans. We have seen that theattempt to provide a common state for all Serbs, for instance,

has meant not a Greater Serbia, it meant the enormous loss, itmeant that the Serbs from elsewhere, Croatia and parts of Bosnia,had fled into Serbia itself. This is not a solution. As forSerbia, which is or was considered the strongest country in theregion, this attempt meant a tremendous and humiliating defeat,actually. So, how could it work for Albanians who are, at leastfor now, a less stronger nation or state?

I believe that the solution should come through some form ofopening the borders, the free-trade, the exchange of cultural

experience and economic goods -- through free movement of people.Perhaps this is a rather idealistic approach. Perhaps we arestill very much connected to the ideal of national states or the

borders of nineteenth-century nationalism, that had returned with

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a vengeance in a last ten years. I don't think it will be an easyprocess, but I don't see any other alternative for this. I alsobelieve that it is impossible to see the solution in the nearfuture. It has to be in a longer term. The conflict here will

hardly be avoided. The only hope is that conflict will be playedthrough political means and not with the use of repressive policeforces, army and repression.

ALBANIA

ALBANIAN ELECTORAL FEVER

by AGIM ISAKU \ Tirana

In the last days before the elections, the campaign was givingsigns of the increase of temperature. Various incidents, clasheswith the police, vandalism, swearing... Nevertheless, as noticed

by various analysts, nothing as intense as announced by theopposition.

It seems that there will be two major parties about to carry thelions' role in these elections: the Democratic Party and theSocialist Party of Albania - the latter feeling far more secure

due to its inherited organization structure. Meanwhile, anunpredictable increase of the electorate of the DemocraticAlliance and the Social-Democratic Party took place. Thesituation continued misty for the so-called Right Front. Besidesof what was believed, there is a far less number of independentcandidates in the horizon. The party-atmosphere rules over thecampaign.

Very few persons were able to say anything on the change of partyprograms. Political analysts notice that the programs itselfvaried slightly from each other, at least those of the main

parties. Also, there is a certain number of those claiming thatthe program of the Socialist Party is much "right oriented" thanthat of the Democratic Party. To the accusations of Berisha thatthe Socialists will vote the rhythm of reforms, the latterresponded that, on the contrary, they are dissatisfied with therhythms Berisha is following, that they will enhance particularlythose regarding the integration of Albania in Western Europe andthe North Atlantic Alliance. However, programs were the concernof no one, really. People got together in party rallies to hearas much offenses against the opponents, as much gratitude for the

candidates and as much promises as possible. But, nothing onprograms.

Thus, it seemed that the electoral war will again remain only a

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mere emotional one. Gramoz Pashko, in one of his interviews,called the forthcoming elections as another referendum, this timeon Berisha. This feeling becomes even more fragile consideringthe fact that Berisha placed himself at the top of the Democratic

Party campaign, that, according to the observers, displays thesurpassing of the constitutional duties of the president whoshould represent the national unity and not the unity of one

party.

According to the evidences of the MP candidates, the most oftenproblems that they had to face while contacting the populationwere: unemployment in the cities, insecurity of life, the levelof social assistance, the absence of the real state, thedisastrous condition of the infrastructure, the growing crime,the privatization conducted unjustly by the government, etc. It

is not difficult to understand that being used to an extremelystrong state, as was the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, Albanianswill need more time to accept the new capitalist state.

Differing from the previous campaigns, this time there was aninauguration of phrases not only for the use of the party, butalso for the MP candidates: "Everyone wins with us!" ofDemocratic Party, "For a normal Albania, the Albania of all!" ofDemocratic Alliance, or "I am the same as You!", "Let's end this,

before we get finished!"...

Nevertheless, below all these catchy jingles it can be felt thatthe real owners of the campaign were Berisha and his jailedrival, Fatos Nano, who has become the leader and the flag of theopposition. For many analysts, the incomprehensive continuationof his imprisonment gave the Socialists and the others the charmof the victim, it created the possibility to reveal theelectorate the profile of champions in human rights. Nano's nameis present even within Social-Democrats, the Alliance and other

parties, qualified by Berisha to be annexes to the Socialists andmembers of the so-called Red Front. Moreover, a few days ago, it

is been said that in a rally, Neritan Ceka from the DemocraticAlliance, called Nano a hero.

Meanwhile, Berisha conducted numerous aggressive meetings in astyle here called as "American", associated with singers and

ballet-dancers, in stadiums and open squares, highly supported bythe television controlled by him. This is not to say forSocialists that were facing the obstructions to gain even the

permissions of the local authorities for their meetings. Anyway,the rallies of the Socialists are noticed to have had an

increasing number of enthusiastic youth.

It is not difficult to notice also that during this campaign, asnever before, there was a complete absence of discussion over the

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various issues regarding the national question. With theexception of the old nationalistic parties of the right front,other parties overlooked this problem. The severe situation ofAlbanians in Kosova and Macedonia was accepted in silence,

however no one offered an option that would differ to that ofBerisha.

The most often used argument in this campaign was the westernargument, regarding the support or the rejection of some party.Utilizing the popular wish for orientating Albania towards theWest, the Democratic Party attempted anything that woulddemonstrate the people that it is the only subject capable toaccomplish such a thing, to integrate Albania in Europe. Manytimes, in its propaganda, it was emphasized that the vote givento the Socialists is the vote for another isolation of the

country, another division of Albania from the prosperous world.

This was immediately followed by the Socialists' fevers engagedin convincing Albanians that something alike will never everhappen. Socialists tended to convince fellow-Albanians that theyare renewed, or that at least Berisha is a not a lesser communistthan they are.

Undoubtedly, this confrontation was revealed as harsh as ever inrelation to the USA, until recently presented as the only biggest

friend of the Democratic Party and Berisha. An unexpected visitof some Socialist Party leaders to the Department of State,turned pale the image of Berisha's friendship, who rushed todeclare that Socialists were not invited in the US and that they"met in US the anti-Albanian and pro-Greek circles..."

Another wrongdoing here represents the deflect of the statementsof various western politicians, who stated their support todemocracy and democratic processes in Albania. Those statementswere brought to the public opinion as the western support of theDemocratic Party. That was quite unnecessary to do, since it

appears obvious that Berisha is really backed by the West.

Independently of the using or misusing, one thing is certain:Albanian politics remains amateur, alike the countryside politicswhere people boast to one another counting their friends theyhave in the "offices", there, in "town".

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MACEDONIA

THE USE OF THE ATTEMPT

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

What would be the common denominator of the events that tookplace in the past 30 days: the broadcast of the spectacularcommentary in one of the most popular Saturday programs of thestate-run radio "Radio-Spectre", with a refined "class-worker"language, that arose reactions of the Ministry of Interior; thewriting in the organ of the "reconstructed" Liberal Party, called"Liberal", published in the independent paper "Dnevnik", thereaction over the dismissal of the MTV executive? Adding here theinterview of the once renowned bodyguard of the former minister

of interior, who died under mysterious circumstances... the staffreplacements in the Ministry of Interior and the short statementof the president of the republic Kiro Gligorov in the renownedSpanish "El Pais".

The response is simple - in the assassination attempt on Gligorovand its (mis)use, none of the sides involved seem innocent.During one of the most popular programs of Radio-Shkupi, thefirst program of the statal radio almost unexpectedly broadcastthe program by Elizabeta Blazevska, on the assassination attempt

against president Gligorov and the ongoing investigations. Theprogram itself was quite worthless of mentioning if it weren't,in a quite "silly" manner, for the revelation of some details,which were used by the well-informed circles for openspeculations. The mentioning of the division of the "Multigroup"company in Shkupi and the appellation of the persons that wererunning the main office, not as businessmen, but as highofficials of the secret Russian and Bulgarian services, impliesnothing new, since the former minister of interior launched

personally the thesis about the penetration of the capital ofsome foreign secret services in Macedonia. Even the suicide of

the executive of the Shkupi division of "Multigroup" - IvoJancev, was also mentioned, that itself cannot be considered a

journalistic exclusiveness. What was later proved inciting forthe new minister of interior in the reconstructed government,Cokrevski, is the fact that this radio-broadcast was based mainlyin the "out-flow" of information from inside the MI of Macedonia.In fact, Jancev was considered "next in line for elimination",with a specific accent on "the first assassination occurred inBratislava" - a town that will later be related to another news- the recalling of the identity of the woman driver of the car-

bomb, the information that "leaked" from the MI itself. Regardingthe identity of the car-bomb driver, it was said that"previously" she was seen by even "six witnesses" and that she"was a professional cafe-singer, confirming her vocal potentials

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enigmatic Liberal editorial board, which repeats the posture ofthe Liberals in regard to the investigations on the attemptagainst Gligorov. "The motives of the Liberal Party to initiatethe issue of responsibility for the attempt relies, before all,

on the deep political conviction that the largest democraticright of a democratically regulated state is to prevent to cometo power by murder or inheritance... The suggested conviction ofthe ruling party that the attempt shouldn't be used for any

political changes, is considered as another premeditated actaiming at garbling the most tragic event so far, that hasattacked the existing political system."

Then follows the part that has caused the most reactions: "Onthe contrary, our posture is that political changes must take

place. Those who in any way (even in silence) support any

possibility to exclude the government from murder and terrorism.The opponents of the democratic will of the citizens, who havenot voted for violence, terrorism and the illegal change of

power, should be replaced. The government, although trying todeny it, after the attempt, has been changed in a way that hasnothing to do with parliamentary proceedings, the free will ofthe citizens and the free elections. The government was"recomposed", and in fact it was changed, without previouslyconsulting the citizens.

A bit later, in the same rubric, columnist Saso Ordanovski willask: "A week ago, the press published an article revealing theinspirer of the attempt against President Gligorov. How comenobody reacted?" Ordanovski considers the case to be so clearthat there are two issues: the proofs presented by the Liberalsare so serious that either Premier Crvenkovski should be arrestedfor treason, inciting and organization of the attempt againstGligorov, or the leader of the Liberals, Stojan Andov should bearrested for having upset the public. There is no third option tothis".

It seems that the silence the Liberals refer to, speaks quitemuch of the seriousness with which the postures of this grouphave been accepted by the public. Several days later, on A1 TV,Foreign Minister Frckovski was asked to comment on "Liberal's"article and an interview of a former policeman in "FOKUS", inwhich the MI is accused of organizing the attempt againstGligorov. The minister ignored the second part of the question,

but was clear enough regarding the Liberals. He qualified thearticle as "a primitive manner of political communication" whichreveals "the nature of the author" which illustrates the quasi-

Liberal party which "at one stage" pretends to stop the Liberaltheoretical categories in order to "in another stage, switch topolitical extremism of the worst kind". The Minister considersthat the Liberals, now outside the ruling coalition, think that

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they are entitled to anything, and that the party can do thiswithout putting anything at stake, since it has no electorate andthis whole scheme is a premeditated irresponsible despotism!

The attempt against Gligorov and the investigations, were in away the main battle-field of the main coalition partners in thestruggle for the disintegration of the League for Macedonia.Seven months after the attempt, nothing is as it used to be. MI'sexplanations about the inspirers and details about theorganization of the attempt which are directly linked to theenterprises held by the people of the Liberals, were broadlydisputed by the latter. Having in mind the place we live in andwhat is the political milieu here, there is sufficient space, wewould say, for the "use of the attempt"!

DOSSIER:THE ALBANIAN QUESTION TODAY

The monthly magazine of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting

(IPWR), WAR REPORT, published it's last issue titled "Albanian

National Question", a joint effort of IPWR and KOHA to

analytically present the situation and status of Albanians in the

Balkans today. As a concept, the issue is composed of articles

written by authors from Albania, Macedonia, Kosova and the

Albanian diaspora in Western Europe and the USA. It also haspublished a series of articles and analyses by different

political experts and analysts.

TOWARDS DIALOGUE, OR DIVISION?

by DUSAN JANJIC / Belgrade

Do the violent events in Kosova at the end of last month mark apolitical escalation and radicalisation, and indeed a threat ofnew armed conflict?

This question is impossible to answer with any degree ofcertainty. But some political signals are already clear:First, the efforts of the authorities of Serbia and the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to ignore problem of Kosova areinsupportable, as are their attempts to suppress it from publicdiscussion or, through firm repressive measures, to calm the

(Serb) public in Kosova.

Second, the conviction of the Albanian leadership that it can

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achieve an independent Kosova by controlling the Albanian opinionand actions, creating separate institutions and waiting for theauthorities to become exhausted is also seriously shaken. Withouta democratisation of the Albanian political life, and a more

flexible attitude towards participating in the political life ofSerbia and FR Yugoslavia, the Albanian movement is bound to splitinto a political wing and violent military wing.

Third, foreign actors involved in the issue, especially the USand NATO, must make more comprehensive and responsible efforts tounderstand the risks of the Kosova question and must intensifyinitiatives to build stability in the region.

With the collapse of the old Yugoslavia, and the Greater Serbiadesigns of the Belgrade authorities, president Slobodan Milosevic

tried to establish direct jurisdiction over Kosova by restrictingthe rights of Albanians. Famously, his championing of the rightsof Serbs in Kosova became the rallying cry of his politicalmovement. In 1989 and 1990, extraordinary measures wereintroduced, with mass arrests and various forms of violence, andmany measures to restrict the autonomy of Kosova and Albaniansthere. In response, Albanian political demands grew increasinglyradical, calling by 1990 for an independent Republic of Kosovaand establishing, in 1992, a shadow Parliament and presidency, aswell as other parallel structures. Separate taxes were

introduced, and state institutions, including the army, wereboycotted. The stand-off lead to a kind of a Balkan fairy tale,with both sides convincing themselves that they did not need toengage in dialogue with the other. Problems were suppressed orrepressed rather than resolved, and Serbian-Albanian relationswere brought into a deep freeze. The creation of parallel liveswas actually a function of severely affected communications. Eachof the parties sought to fully implement its pretensions, whichwere in fact the same: to achieve state sovereignty. For both,the aim was to institutionalise their domination. In a small andtense territory, the effect has been to forge a collision course.

Following the suspension of the federal constitution and federalinstitutions, the parties lost any control framework. Theseparation of institutions deprived the main political actors ofany possibility for resolving the problem themselves. The Serbianauthorities and Albanian leadership have managed to control thesituation, and the province has remained stable. But Kosova brimswith the danger of a possible explosion, and the risk increaseswith every new incident. Indeed, many observers have speculatedabout the possibility of an armed conflict in or because of

Kosova.

Yet Kosova appears to be closer to peace than to war. Thewarlords in the territories are weary, and it is widely assumed

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that the US and NATO will not allow the conflict to spread. Aboveall, the inability of the parties to realise their aspirationscreates the circumstances in which both sides will be forced tostart a dialogue.

Indeed, with the recent violence as an important exception, andcritical warning, the prospect for peaceful resolution of theKosova conflict has opened. Within Serbian politics, almost all

parties support some kind of dialogue. The distinctions may ormay not be important: the Serbian Renewal Movement of VukDraskovic has argued in favour of a high level of autonomy;the nationalist Democratic Party of Vojislav Kostunica has backeda limited local decentralisation, while the Democratic Party ofZoran Djindjic supports a kind of regionalism. Certainly, their

predominant aim is to be able to attack Milosevic for his failure

to resolve the problem.

The most relevant question, however, is the position of Milosevicand the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia. Notably, last summer,the Socialists were ready to take part in a conference, inWashington, with Kosova Albanians. Yet after Dayton, they haverefused initiatives to engage in substantive dialogue. Even smallsteps, such as the opening of a US information office inPrishtina, have been promised and then refused. In the absence ofany clear statements, the reasons for this shift remain a matter

of speculation. It may be that the American hard line on Kosova(the issue was broached several times by then Assistant Secretaryof State Richard Holbrooke) raised the Socialists backs. Morelikely, however, Milosevic has observed the underlying lesson ofthe Dayton accord that is, the recognition of ethnic territorieswithin state borders and is bidding time, keeping Kosova off theagenda for now.

For Milosevic, there are two fundamental options: either provideguarantees for the rights of the Albanians withinSerbia/Yugoslavia or divide the territory along ethnic lines.

There is little chance that the division of Kosova could beachieved without many local and regional conflicts. In

particular, the aspirations of Albanians in Macedonia to unifywith other Albanian lands would intensify, launching new anddestabilising regional alliances. Yet now the process, at leastin Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been legitimised, and Milosevic hasnever really given up the idea of building Serbia for Serbs andonly Serbs. After Dayton, the division scenario is possible. Inthe meantime, however, the Yugoslav United Left, lead by the

president's wife, Mirjana Markovic, has cultivated the more

moderate line, speaking of Albanians as citizens and even, insome documents, considering various autonomy proposals. CertainlyMilosevic's central aim is to really avoid the weakening ofSerbia and the federation, either through serious autonomy or

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independence, both of which would carry high political costs forhim.

Thus there are both pitfalls and prospects for Kosova. Short of

an eventual peaceful divorce, for now a solution should be soughtin providing protection for the national identity of Albaniansand the autonomy of Kosova, including guarantees in the cultural,economic, administrative and political spheres. A Kosova Region,within a decentralised and democratic Serbia, could provide theway out. This would require the majority population, theAlbanians, to renounce succession, and require Serbia torelinquish a part of its sovereignty with respect to the minority

population. Such a process would demand international guaranteesand control of the transition from conflict towards a joint life,confidence and cooperation. In the current political climate it

may seem a long way off. Nevertheless, as the recent violenceunderlines, in the long term Serbia cannot afford not to resolvethe Kosova problem.

FACING REALITY

by MILENKO KARAN / Prishtina

The Dayton Agreement formula for Bosnia (take it or leave it, andbe punished either way) is probably in the cards to play forKosova, as well. It seems that Europe has learned the lesson thatdisputes in the Balkans can hardly ever be resolved by accords

between local power-holders, who sign agreements only to breakthem the next day.

The greatest difficulty will be how to approximate and, ifpossible, reconcile the maximalist demands of the Albanians (fora Republic of Kosova) and a minimalist concession to Serbia(limited, i.e., controlled autonomy).

The Serb party is entering these talks with very littlemanoeuvring space because the Albanians have alreadyinternationalised their demands and, by their Gandhian behaviour,have won the sympathies of a world fed up with violence andobstinacy.

The Albanian party will therefore have a certain advantage. Itwill be able to justify failure, or results below expectations,as success, on the grounds that conditions were not easy for it

because it worked more or less "underground" with theconsequences which accompany any policy in such circumstances.The Serb party will have a much more difficult time, because itsunder-achievement is so much more obvious. The promised rule of

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law has not been established, the economy is generally at thelevel of "positive zero" (another of our inventions), Serbemigration has continued uninterrupted and the long announcedcolonisation of Kosova has not begun.

In fact, this is announced most frequently and most loudly bythose who are neither from here nor live here, but live and workin Belgrade, and are consequently known as "weekend politicians",like the Kosova district prefect, for example, who is also aminister in the Serbian government and permanently domiciled inBelgrade.

Kosova is small, so the possibilities for employment of itsinhabitants are also very limited. The Albanians currentlyconstitute about 90 per cent of the roughly 2 million population,

with an almost certain tendency to increase, since demographictrends are very slow to change. So in another ten years this

percentage will likely be larger and that of the Serbs evensmaller probably about 5 per cent, which means that they will bean ethnic group of concern to no one. The reduction ofunemployment, which is higher in Kosova than anywhere else inEurope, consisting of those on paid leave as well as those insearch of jobs, will demand a radical reorganisation of the

present employment structure.

Even in such unfavourable conditions, the Albanians seem to havemade adjustments more readily, and their consequenttransformation from peasants to merchants almost overnight is a

phenomenon which will certainly be the subject of sociologicaland even psychological studies in the future. In contrast tothem, the employed Serbs are struggling to live off their wageswhich makes them all, with the exception of a small number of

peasants whose livelihood is the land, vitally dependent on thestate which provides that much. The most peculiar consequence ofthis situation in Kosova lies in the sphere of culture, which isstrictly segregated between Albanian and Serbian, each

primitively enclosed within its own boundaries, instead of mixingand forming a civilised multi-cultural environment. Thisobstinately unchanging situation, useful to no one and harmfulfor everyone, results in both cultures knowing quite a lot aboutnations around the world but little, almost nothing, about eachother, although they are forced to share the same space that theyare forced to share.

Definitely for the Serbs, but also probably for the Albanians,who are likely to get less than they want, the most likely

consequence of a resolution of the Kosova problem will be bitterloss. Hence the still not obvious but certainly felt anxietyamong the Serb population, and their dilemma about whether tostay or leave. This fear is accompanied by a natural uneasiness

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due to uncertainty about what tomorrow may bring if they leave,will they meet with an even worse fate than their compatriotsfrom Croatia, or from Bosnia-Herzegovina? The Kosova Serbs havenot failed to notice how these refugees were received in Serbia,

especially by official institutions, and how eagerly they rushedto go back where they had come from.

Politically, what Kosova will experience will, above all, be achange. The Albanians will naturally have the greatest impact ondevelopments, in their Assembly (Parliament) and government, andit will now be impossible to abolish Kosova's autonomy bycoercion, unless Serbia is prepared again to wage war against thewhole world. The worst that could befall the Serb people ofKosova is that they alone pay the bill for a wrong policy aboutwhich, by the way, no one will particularly have bothered to

consult them or even to inform them. The current policy is a formof provincialism, manifested in a slowness, an unwillingness, toreach a solution in Kosova. Instead of facing reality with commonsense, it obstinately persists in using already exhaustedmechanisms, in rationalisation (it is someone else's fault) or projections(they hate us), but mostly in an autism which is interested onlyin itself and its own, and which therefore continues to giverigid answers which can for some time postpone the solution butcertainly cannot prevent it.

For this reason it is not out of the question that the Kosovaproblem may be solved by a simple cutting of the Gordian knot, asin the example of Sarajevo. A repetition of the Berlin Congressof 1898 or of the Yalta Agreement of 1945, this is, or will be,the reality of Kosova, and therefore of the Serbs who remainhere.

HEALING SOCIAL DIVISIONS

by HUGH MIALL / London

In 1996, the Albanians are still in the situation they faced in1912: surrounded by other, more powerful peoples, at risk fromneighbouring wars, and partly governed by other nations.Unification of the Albanians within a single state is a remote

prospect, nor is it one that many voices in the main Albaniancommunities seek. For the time being, the most realistic goalsof the three communities in Albania, Kosova, and Macedonia, andthe fourth in the Albanian diaspora are contact and

communication, together with political and economic cooperation.As in Ireland, where the development of civil society betweenNorth and South is gradually helping to make their cooperation afact and hence a factor in any ultimate peace settlement, so in

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the Balkans a stronger civil society among the Albanians shouldopen new political space.

But what are the prospects for bringing this about? The Albanians

are handicapped by ancient and more recent divisions which putformidable obstacles in the way of political cooperation. Formost of their history the Albanians have been subject to theinfluence or rule of more populous, prosperous and powerful

peoples. They fell under the Byzantine Empire, the Serbian Empirein the 14th Century and the Ottoman Empire from the 15th Century.The religious schism of 1054 divided the population intoCatholics in the north and Orthodox in the south. The Ottomanconquest led to large-scale conversions to Islam along theAlbanian coastal plains, in the centre of Albania, in Kosova andin western Macedonia. The mountainous terrain and geographical

divisions of the Albanian-speaking areas always made themdifficult either to subjugate or to unite. In part for thesereasons, the Albanians were the last of the Balkan peoples todevelop a national movement, and even well into the 20th Centuryclan identities remained strong.

Thus when the London conference of 1912-13 set up a smallindependent Albania, it left a third of the Albanian-speaking

population out of Albania, but also laid the basis for verydifferent historical experiences among the people in Albania and

the minority Albanians among the surrounding states.While the Albanians in Yugoslavia struggled for autonomy and anequal identity in the relatively modernised and prosperous southSlav state, those in Albania suffered years of economic privationand authoritarian rule under the Enver Hoxha regime. The years ofAlbania's isolation, and the particularly harsh conditions its

population had suffered, created a huge gap between the Albaniansin Albania (of whom two-thirds still lived on the land engaged insubsistence-type agriculture) and those outside.

When the borders were opened, the rush was to get into Italy or

Greece or anywhere outside of Albania and not to build contactsbetween the neighbouring Albanian peoples. Even now, the peoplehardly show a burning desire to unite. Even though there are oldfamily ties which cross the borders, most Albanians haverelatively little sense of identification with the Kosovans.Their resentment over rich Kosovans taking Albanian girls provestronger than their sense of solidarity with other Albanians indifficulties. Kosovan refugees do not have an easy life inAlbania, and Albanians in Macedonia have become increasinglyhostile to the arrival of refugees from Kosova.

Albania itself is subject to a number of divisions which make apost-communist civil society difficult enough to construct insidethe country without worrying about outside communities. One of

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these is the deep political polarisation between the Socialistsand President Sali Berisha's Democratic Party; another is thecultural and material gap between the (formerly Geg) north andnorth-east of the country, and the more modernised (formerly

Tosk) south. Religious identity divisions are also becoming morenoticeable in Albania as the Muslim, Catholic and Orthodoxchurches rebuild and compete for sites and influence. These tendto colour attitudes towards Kosova, whose population is Geg andMuslim. There are also important economic divisions appearing asthe post-communist transition proceeds, with the coastal areasand the cities gaining new opportunities for trade and tourismand work while the more remote areas of the north and north-eastare languishing.

In part because of the clan tradition and in part because of the

historical harshness of the Hoxha regime, Albanians find itdifficult to organize politically, or to trust one another. Forthis reason, the NGO sector, which is generously funded byoutside donors, is weakly organised and has few roots in society.Community-level and professional organisations were creatures ofthe Communist Party and will have to be rebuilt from scratch; thetrade unions are still, in considerable measure, arms of the

political parties. Institutions are very weak in Albania, with aweak judiciary, inadequately trained police, an independent pressthat is in a constant battle with the government, and a

politicised civil service. Local government too tends to beorganised on patron-client lines by political leaders. Thepolitical parties organise around strong figures, fissure easilyamid furious recriminations, and also have weak social bases. Atthe local level, Albanian communities are riven by conflicts overland, irrigation, ownership of buildings, and in some cases old

blood feuds. It is sometimes said that short-term economic gainis the only force strong enough to unite Albanians.

This is not to say that there is not a political lobby forunification and strong political contacts between the Albanian

communities. There are close ties between Ibrahim Rugova'sDemocratic League of Kosova, Berisha's Democratic Party and theMacedonian Party for Albanian Democratic Prosperity (PPDSH).Right-wing figures in Albania support a Greater Albania, andthere appear to be recent moves towards an electoral combination

between them and Berisha's embattled government. The SocialistParty, which has its roots in the Orthodox south of Albania,nevertheless strongly supports the Albanian movement in Kosovaand Macedonia. The Albanian diaspora also keeps alive, morestrongly than the local Albanians, a sense of common national

identity. But at the popular level the ties are relatively weak.Strengthening them will be a slow matter because it meansbuilding civil society from the ground up. This meansconsolidating an independent judiciary and a properly working

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legal system; it means training the police in human rights andmodern policing methods, supporting and strengthening theindependent media, encouraging the NGOs to become more

professional and better rooted, strengthening communities through

community development programmes and supporting a stronger senseof Albanian common interest by encouraging cross-party dialogues.

This is a long-term programme to go besides the more immediateneeds, such as attention to human rights violations, diplomatic

pressure on Serbia over Kosova, and other issues. For a long-termaccommodation between the Albanians and their neighbours, theAlbanians must empower themselves, and, with outside help,improve their capacity to organise the defence of their owninterests.

KOSOVA ON THE AGENDA

by Jan berg / Stockholm

The Kosova conflict is old, deep and extremely emotionallycharged. Grave mistakes have been committed by all sides fordecades and, thus, there are no longer any quick and goodsolutions. Positions are locked, also, on whether and how to

talk. Fortunately, today's conflict is not acted out militarily.That offers a unique opportunity, but it won't be there forever.Neither the Serbs nor the Albanians want, or have anything togain from war. They know this very well. But most conflicts havea logic and dynamic of their own, sometimes even independent ofthe intentions of powerful leaders. It is a matter of duty,indeed enlightened self-interest, of well-intentioned andimpartial actors in Europe to assist the parties now.

The international community can assist. But Europe, with all itsout-dated and predominantly military organisations, lacks a new

way of thinking, a set of norms and the political tools andinstitutions needed for a comprehensive approach to problems suchas that in Kosova. All mediation attempts during the past sevenyears have been ad hoc and come to nothing, among other things

because of the political isolation of rump Yugoslavia and theunwise exclusion of it from the Organisation for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Only the Serbs and Albanians themselves can find a mutuallyacceptable and sustainable solution. It is not for outsiders to

decide or enforce whether this solution is minority protection,various types of autonomy, partition, independence, condominiums,protectorate, confederation, a combination of some of these orsomething new. What Europe or the United States might want

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is irrelevant. In short, the process for Kosova can bear noresemblance with the Dayton process.

What third parties can do is limited to facilitation, mitigation,

professional negotiation expertise and good offices. Some kind oftransitional measures are needed that permit the partiescomfortably to rebuild a minimum of confidence upon whichlong-term solutions are conditioned. One possibility is toestablish a multinational, civil United Nations Authority,offering the parties an opportunity to address the roots of their

problem and stick to negotiations without threats. After all, theUN is in need of new tasks and has an excellent mission inMacedonia. The OSCE, as well as non-governmental (civil society)organisations, could also have specific roles.

In a recent initiative of the Transnational Foundation for Peaceand Future Research, this approach has been termed the United

Nations Temporary Authority for a Negotiated Settlement (UNTANS).Under the UNTANS proposal, which has already been discussed withthe parties, the following steps would be taken:

1) A memorandum would be signed between Yugoslavia and the UNSecurity Council to the effect that the UN, for a period of threeyears, takes over parts of the daily administration of the area,aimed to reduce tension.

2) All troops and police in Kosova are demilitarised during theagreed period, with the exception of what is needed forYugoslavia's legitimate self-defence.

3) A permanent Professional Negotiation Facility isestablished, to help the parties achieve a timely result. Theleadership of this facility must be selected from nations with nosignificant interests in the region.

4) The paramilitary troops and police are replaced by

international civil police and monitors who co-operate with theUN administration, the Negotiation Facility and with a broadspectrum of local and international civil society organisationsin the region.

5) Peace-building efforts, including peace education,conflict-mitigation, negotiation techniques and reconciliationand co-operative projects in local communities, are conductedthroughout the area to empower people to handle their own futureconflicts.

6) Some smaller group of countries, such as the Nordic states,take the initiative to establish a Helsinki Process for all ofthe Balkans, inviting all parties and civil society organisations

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to participate.

7) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is fully integrated intothe international community and inter-governmental organisations,

including the OSCE, as a pre-requisite for accepting anythinglike a UNTANS.

The UNTANS idea is the outcome of analyses, conversations and anindirect dialogue between Serbian and Kosova Albanian leaders andintellectuals during the past four years, conducted as silentcitizens diplomacy by the Transnational Foundation. It isviolence-prevention, peacekeeping and negotiation in one,respecting peoples' right to find solutions that fit them. Italso recognises that a broader definition of security implies theability to warn, analyze, manage and resolve conflicts as early

as possible and with the least amount of violence, if any.UNTANS, or something like it, could contribute to the ongoingsearch for new security structures that, finally, address thesimple fact that human beings are in the centre of all conflicts.In short, neither NATO, the Western European Union nor anymilitary coalition are relevant for solving the Kosova convict.It is imperative that the repression in Kosova stops. It is also

politically, economically and morally self-destructive forSerbia. At the same time, it is imperative that the desires ofthousands of nations worldwide for self-determination do not

create a war-torn world in chaotic disintegration.

There are many options between total state control and totalsecession. Gentler states and creative structures must be foundas alternatives to such either/or thinking. Such alternatives

become apparent the moment the discussion shifts from who iswrong and guilty towards a more constructive focus: what is thereal problem, how can it be solved, and how can outsideactors help? It would be a moral defeat for all should one moreof Yugoslavia's intractable conflicts blow up due tointernational ignorance and mismanagement.

THE ALBANIAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

by GRAMOZ PASHKO / Tirana

The Albanian ethnic territories are inhabited by more than 6million people.

But since the average per capita production is less than $700,potential consumption is very low, the total for the region beingabout equal to that of an average western European or Americancity. This greatly discourages foreign investment and foreign

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commerce. The Albanian territories remain a market of limitedpurchasing power, and for some time to come must expect to bewell below the levels of consumption characteristic of the modernworld.

Furthermore, unemployment is high in all three of the Albanianethnic regions, Albania, Kosova and western Macedonia. In Albaniait affects 19 percent of the active population, in Macedoniaalmost 28 percent, and in Kosova more than 40 percent. This is

blamed on the previous socialist economic development, whethercentralised as in communist Albania, or self-administered as informer Yugoslavia. In both cases it was under a controlledeconomy. In the new situation that emerged after 1990 there was afailure to mobilise the states financial and budgetary resourcesfor the provision of the hundreds of thousands of jobs needed.

Little will be achieved by the private sector, which consistsmainly of small enterprises that are very slow to create new

jobs. These countries will find themselves in budgetary andfinancial difficulties for years to come, with a concomitantimpact on human resources.

The economic prospects of the Albanian ethnic territories willdepend on the far-sightedness, and the goals, of the economic

policies adopted: how much room they can provide to manoeuvre,how liberal they will be, to what extent they will can encourage

a free market and how attractive they can make themselves toforeign investment. The recent decline in exports needs to bereversed in the respective states; they need to open up toforeign markets and cut tariffs where they still exist.

Macedonia, for example, has been a traditional exporting country,and should not encounter difficulties in restoring its marketconnections. Albania, where exports have been minimal, faces afar more difficult challenge.

In Kosova the situation is greatly aggravated by the chronic

delay of reforms in Yugoslavia which, even without sanctions orinternal turmoil, and with political integration into Europegoing speedily ahead, would still need three to five years totake effect. But while Serbia may encounter difficulties inrestoring the markets it has lost, Kosova, where privatisationhas been extensive, has real chances of integrating its economywith those of other regions and achieving development dynamicsindependently of Serbia. However, one of the preconditions for

proper development and integration is the free circulation ofcapital between the three Albanian ethnic regions.

None of there countries currently has the financial potential toeffect internal investments. Albania and Macedonia have internal

budgetary deficits of approximately 8 percent of GNP that will

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need about five years to become balanced. Yugoslavia, with a muchmore serious deficit of more than 20 percent of GNP, will takemuch longer to recover. In the Albanian regions there is anenormous influx of foreign currency from the Albanian Diaspora, a

great potential far in excess of anything that Yugoslaviasimilarly receives, although not as yet properly invested.

Potential foreign investors will seek stability and peace in theregion, financial and economic concessions, liberal policies, the

participation of domestic capital, public investment in theconstruction of necessary infrastructures and mere decenttreatment, none of which they will readily find. Frustratingforeigners is an instinct deeply rooted in the Albanian

psyche and in Albanian politics. The situation requires goodsense, as well as the political maturity which Albanians so

conspicuously lack. They need to rise above their frustrationsand coexist with their neighbours. A policy of liberalism, andinter-Albanian and inter-regional economic cooperation in yearsto come, may prove much more valuable than political debates forthe sake of politics. It is the psychological aspect ofinter-Albanian economic integration that currently appears mostintractable. How effective will the possible joint economic,fiscal and monetary policies be, or those dealing with structuraladaptation? How much reliance will governments or individual

politicians place upon their citizens?

After the Second World War, the Albanian economic environmentunderwent divergent developments. Kosova and Macedoniaexperienced the system of self-management, Albania that of super-centralism. The economies of Kosova and Macedonia were relativelyopen toward the international market, that ofAlbania was completely closed. Minimal private enterprise,

particularly in agriculture and commerce, flourished in Kosovaand Macedonia, while in Albania it was forbidden by law. Thiscaused the development of two different economic mentalities.Since 1990, along with political changes, Albania has undergone

very speedy development and inclusion in the free-market system.

However, the beginnings of free trade, privatisation and a newmonetary policy in this transition period involve a strongelement of spontaneity. There is a need for motivated people atthis early stage, but also for wise persons capable ofmaintaining and continuing the new practices.Are the Albanians able to provide them? Especially during thetransition period, will they accept joint tax policy and monetary

policy? In countries where democracy has deep roots, local

independence is a source of prosperity, but it should not go sofar as to resist central fiscal or monetary policies.

Secessionist has always had a strong economic component,

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expressed in the idea we can do better on our own. One need onlyrecall the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the basic economicmotives that inspired the seceding republics. It was thismentality that dissolved the former USSR and also another, far

more stable, state, the former Czechoslovakia. The same componentis extremely strong even in the liberation movements of Kosovaand western Macedonia. The individualism of Albania alsomanifests itself as a reaction to unitarism. In less than twoyears (1991-92) ten new districts were created in Albania; theregion of Malsi e Madhe refused to stay under that of Shkodra,Bulqiza under Dibra, Devolli under Kora, Kavaja under Durrs,Ballshi under Fier, Shkodra under Dukagjin, etc. Imagine the same

process repeated on the far larger scale of Albania, Kosova andwestern Macedonia. Will the demons of separatism arise to dividenorth from south, Geg from Tosk, Muslim from Christian?

Integration depends on rhythm and speed. Economic transition isdifficult and painful. The romantic rhetoric of nationalism pallsunder the necessity of raw survival, the promises of politiciansno longer carry weight. It is worth recalling that in recentyears 400,000 Albanians have abandoned Kosova, and that the samenumber have deserted Albania. Homo Economicus appears to be farstronger than Homo Sapiens.

Economic analysis of the Albanian regions reveals an intricate

puzzle impossible to decode. The prognosis seems far fromoptimistic. Integrating the Albanian mosaic promises to beextremely difficult, long and exhausting, less for economicreasons than as a consequence of the collective culture and

psychology. It will always be easier to produce formulas forspiritual and political unity than to find convergencies ofinterest, which are essential for economic development.