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The weekly Koha (The T imes) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. E dited by VetonSurroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Y ugoslavia, Koha

soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the

name of Koha Ditor. With the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on

http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

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Koha Digest # 77

EDITORIAL

BESNIK DEFENDS TUZLA

by VETON SURROI

The radio inside the BMW informs automatically that it is 21:30. One week before, this was a

sign that curfew starts thirty minutes later. Besnik does not care. No only because there is no

more curfew in Tuzla and many other parts in Bosnia, but because there was never any

curfew for him. His BMW is known to the whole town, as the car of one of the best warriors

of this area.

We pass through the middle of the town. Near the cafe where several months ago a grenade

killed 77 youths - another sign of resistance. The youths are again on the streets: Italian

fashion on men, girls compete whose skirts are shorter. Fingernails and hair fashion reflect

the seducing smiles. Essentially different from the camp inhabited by refugees from

Srebrenica. In the morning, a foreigner bought 180 bubble gums for refugee children: as soon

as they saw them, the mothers started pushing the children and taking the gums for

themselves.

Besnik glances discretely. He just turned twenty two and for a moment, interrupts his story

about war. Looks at the youths on the street in the last days of October. "You see them today,but they could surprise you tomorrow. If needed, all would be on the first line of the front".

He probably knows what he is talking about. He is a Captain of the Bosnian Army, its elite

part, the special units. Together with his commander, also Albanian, he was one of the first

who entered Gorazde, with the special mission to send explosives to fill up the ammunition

which would defend this enclave. He was also among the first to see the surprise of the locals:

"We were masked as we entered the town, and our only signs of identification were the

Albanian and Bosnian flags. When the locals saw the Albanian flag, they asked whether

Albania had joined the war too".

One of his commanders is in Sarajevo, and the other one is in Doboj. Both of them are

Albanians, and this I stress not because of curiosity or national feelings, but because it is avery important element for Tuzla. When was started, states the secretary of the municipality

and member of the Tuzla crisis headquarters, the organization of the defence of Bosnia was

lead by now a legendary Albanian officer, deserted from the YPA. Not only did he organize

the excellent military formation which didn't allow the fall of this town, but Serbian forces

saw themselves forced to retreat some thirty kilometers. The radio commanding orders were

given in Albanian, so Karadzic's forces wouldn't understand a thing. "At one stage, we could

hear them say: Albanians are attacking us!", claims the secretary.

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The car is leaving the center. We pass by his shop, Levi's exclusive representative in Tuzla. In

front of his shop, a bookstore. As soon as the door opens, a huge picture of Alija Izetbegovic

stands up front and some twenty versions of the Koran. On the right hand side, Tudjman's

works (who is indirectly responsible for Besnik's wounding in the kidney) and Momo Kapor

(who is bit more directly responsible for Besnik's life in state of war) together. On the left, thewhole old edition of philosophy and sociology. On the top, Latin-American and French

novels. "Can you find anything similar to Tuzla anywhere?", asks Besnik. Nowhere.

"When will war stop?", I ask him. "When the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes

ours", says.

I still hear "ours" echoing in my ears. Everything is so relative in this town.

DIALOGUE

IS KOSOVA CHECHENYA?

by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

"There are important rumors that Slobodan Milosevic, in the same

way Yeltsin calls Ruslan Hasbulatov to settle the problems with the

Chechens, - is willing to call Mahmut Bakalli and Azem Vllasi to

actively become part of the process to find a solution for Kosova"

- says Nasa Borba on last Saturday's edition, in a comment which

has "upset" the Albanian readers. The article actually departs fromthe idea that "Rugova is now between the radicals and the moderate"

in regard to the dialogue with the Serbian side, grounded on their

interpretation of the interview with Adem Demai, as well as the

internal divisions of the political structure of the Albanians and

the largest Albanian political party in regional groups - "Llap",

"Gjakova", etc.

Thus, according to the author of the comment, Vice-Chairman Hyseni

is part of the "Llap Group" (LLAP is the area comprising Podujeva

municipality), although he was born in Gjilan, and allegedly this

clan is mainly composed of young people and the "Marxist-Leninists"of '81, while the "Gjakovans" are comprised of the former political

establishment. Rugova has allegedly been isolated by the radicals

and the moderate who accuse him of not being able to take advantage

of the situation and get out more for Kosova, and according to Nasa

Borba, in the expected turmoil, Rugova could "be burned", and

instead, he would be replaced by Vllasi and Bakalli. This is not

the first article of the kind and it could be a trend which is

"discovering" "blasts", "changes", etc. among Kosova Albanians...

but, what to the "actors" of these rumors say?

Asked by KOHA to comment on these claims, Mahmut Bakalli considers

that "we should not waste our political energies giving a reply to

a journalist of Nasa Borba, as one our parties did..." Our

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collocutor considers that the article is a poor comment which

doesn't reflect Kosova's reality, but takes some "stereotypes" and

invented differences, as is the case with the alleged regionalist

groups, as a starting point... Our collocutor further states that

he never belonged to any group, including the "Gjakova group"."This is an invention of the UBD (secret police) created in

Rankovic's time, and which was revived after 1981 and was helped by

some Albanian officials longing for a career...

"The only division ever possible in Kosova would be who is in favor

of the independence of Kosova and who is not!". "I and all the

other names mentioned in the article, and I believe the Albanian

people in general", continues our collocutor, "is in favor of the

independence of Kosova. In case there are differences between us,

further considers Bakalli, those are "secondary", therefore it is

useless to try and find a "realist" among us, who would agree tokeep Kosova under the Serbian rule, says Bakalli, and continues:

"The comparisons with Chechenya are crazy. Kosova is not Chechenya,

and here there are no Hasbulatovs, and Serbia is not Russia nor is

Milosevic Yeltsin!" Thus, considers Bakalli, the only ones to be

"burned" in the Kosovan political scene are only the ones against

the independence of Kosova. I have no ambitions for a political

career, but I am fighting for the independence of Kosova as Rugova

and all the others who are mentioned in this article". In regard to

the qualifications "radical" and "moderate", he said that this is

not primary in Kosova and stresses that "all are in favor ofpolitical solutions through negotiations, but we are also all

determined to establish the independence of Kosova". Bakalli

considers that there are no Albanian-Serb contacts, and "as far as

it concerns me, I do not contact or negotiate with the regime in

Serbia and its political parties, because I would tell all of them

to talk to Ibrahim Rugova as the legitimate representative...",

concludes Bakalli.

The other actor of this critical text, Azem Vllasi responded from

Texas, where he has been for some time. Vllasi considers that the

conditions to start the dialogue are more favorable than in thebeginning of the crisis, before all because of Milosevic's changed

behavior, who was now forced to "become pragmatic and finally was

convinced that his aspiration to create Greater Serbia by war and

hurting the others is not accomplishable. "Serbia and Serbs are

sick of war", says Vllasi.

In the case of Kosova, Milosevic got convinced that Albanians are

patient, that they can't be broken by violence, while Kosova can

not be held by force forever, and meanwhile he was forced by the

international community to cooperate, which at the same time,stated that the problem of Kosova exists and it seeks a solution -

considers Vllasi. "These factors" - further says Vllasi - "also

insist that the problem of Kosova should be solved by dialogue and

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political methods, and the Albanians chose this option as the only

way to solve their problem". Vllasi thinks that none of the parties

should put conditions for dialogue, but one precondition would be

that none of the parties can't choose the "desired" collocutor...;

the other would be to accept the mediation of the third party, i.e.the international community (because this is the only way to

achieve something); the principle of equality should be applied,

and not that "Albanians are asking for something and the Serbs are

giving it to them".

"The hesitations of the author of the text in Nasa Borba that

Mahmut Bakalli and myself are Milosevic's "desired favorites" in

conversations about Kosova, are first of all ill-purposed

speculations coming from Belgrade, so we would get disqualified in

the eyes of the local Albanians... "Anyhow, this is not a private

issue, or something that depends on someone's wish, therefore mineneither. It is quite well known how the people who participate in

official conversations are selected!"

If something can be concluded from these direct statements, then

one thing is sure: Kosova is far away from Caucasus and that there

are no essential differences between these two Kosovan politicians

and the Kosovan political center which according to the 1992

elections has the mandate to talk. It seems that our collocutors

don't dispute this mandate and that, as a determination line, they

are both in favor of the independence of Kosova. It is very hard tofind the "moderate" and "radical" groups in this unison

determination.

Asked by KOHA whether the LDK has authorized anyone to contact or

start a dialogue with the Serbian party, the vice-chairman of this

party Hydajet Hyseni denies this possibility by saying "that this

didn't happen in our presidency".

In fact, having in mind the actualization of this issue in Serbia

media, now repeated also by some Serb media, as was the case of

"Nova Demokratija", the impression is that Belgrade wishes to speakmore of the problems regarding the dialogue rather than have the

dialogue running. This impression is also gotten by accusing the

Albanian party that Albanians have internal problems, and that in

fact this was the reason why dialogue wasn't starting! This is also

how one can start thinking after reading the Serbian media and

their pronunciations about the "moderate" and "the suitable" and

the others with "whom it is very hard to talk to!" This leads

towards the conclusion that the intention is to find "suitable"

Albanian collocutors, and that the problem is elsewhere and not in

Belgrade. Nevertheless, without wanting to justify the postures ofKosovan political parties and individuals, there is no way to evade

the ascertainment that the key to the dialogue and the beginning of

the conversations stands in Belgrade! The Albanian party has,

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An idea to include even more political personalities in this

dialogue which would be valid for both sides (it would, e.g. be

good to have Draskovic on the Serbian side) would rather have the

purpose to expand the negotiating teams which would make

conversations easier, says Tanic.

"Our posture is that a problem as Kosova, even though it should be

observed respecting the sovereignty of Serbia, should be solved, in

fact, in a wider scope of contemporary reintegrations in the former

Yugoslavia in the political, economic aspect and that of collective

security, etc.", states Tanic. "This would be an optimal solution

for the region, including the Kosovan problem", concludes the high

ranked "Nova Demokratija" official.

ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CHECKER BOARD

Hydajet Hyseni, vice-chairman of the LDK speaks of the problem of

Serb-Albanian dialogue, postures, obstacles...

KOHA: What is LDK's posture about dialogue?

HYSENI: LDK's and the democratic movement's orientation, in

general, about dialogue for the solution of Kosova's issue

peacefully, implies dialogue as a way to solve the problem. Thereare many speculations about dialogue, lately. It is very

understandable that political dialogue also implies a portion of

shrewdness. But when this comes out on the surface, when the

schemes are done on purpose, then dialogue has not many chances to

succeed. The impression is that the Serbian politics is not ready

to have a real dialogue and a just solution for the issue of

Kosova. If it were interested for this, Serbia wouldn't have even

created the unbearable and dangerous situation. In a way, dialogue

is accepted, however this is done just formally, as a consequence

of the pressure it undergoes. The dialogue is accepted just to make

it fail.

KOHA: Do you think the contrary will happen, now with the

"cooperative policy" Belgrade is applying...?

HYSENI: It would be normal, but we have no signs that something of

the kind will happen. A good sign for this would be the immediate

halt of repression. Exerting pressure and at the same time asking

you to talk with them is the same as to shut someone's mouth and

invite him to have a chat! On the other hand, every time dialogue

is mentioned, Serbian media starts a propaganda campaign full ofintrigues, misinformation and disqualification... As if the Serbian

leadership were interested to have a dialogue start but not to have

a real dialogue, but actually have a monologue. It actually wants

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to be on both sides of the checker board. We would also want to

have as collocutors people who are not chauvinists, who have done

no harm to our people, who are democrats. But it is not our

business to determine the members of the Serbian delegation. This

is a matter of the Serbian government, people and public. In thesame way, it is not Serbia's business to determine the

representatives of Kosova. Kosova and Serbia should talk as equal

subjects. I would say as a conversations between two republics...

Kosova could be represented only by the representatives which were

elected in the free elections and who have the mandate. Only those

who have created the republic can speak in the name of the Republic

of Kosova, and not those who are against it. Time of Esat Pasha

Toptani's diplomacy is over.

KOHA: You believe then, that there are Hasbulatovs among Albanians?

HYSENI: I don't, because the previous experience has proven what

would their end be... I am glad that some former politicians of

Kosova do understand this and are not allowing themselves to be

trapped.

KOHA: Does the LDK believe in dialogue with the Serbs?

HYSENI: The LDK and I would say the whole democratic movement has

no reason to avoid dialogue. On the contrary, our chances are in

the dialogue. We have invested a lot in dialogue, but in an equaldialogue which would be also serious and fruitful. To have it so,

we believe that there must be dialogue in the presence of a third

party.

KOHA: What about the "internal divisions" and "Llap or Gjakova

groups" inside the LDK? Would these represent an obstacle to create

an Albanian team to start conversations?

HYSENI: These are speculations which don't deserve our attention.

BS!

BBC INTERVIEWS

ILIJAZ KURTESHI, Former politician

INDEPENDENCE - THE BEST SOLUTION

* Having in mind the current situation in Kosova, as well as the

latest developments in the former Yugoslavia, but also the actualrelation of forces in the Balkans, which would, according to you,

be the best solution for Kosova?

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KURTESHI: The best and most realistic solution would be full

independence of Kosova. We must have in mind the realistic and

objective situation we are facing, therefore, we must discuss all

other options and alternatives, so we can come to an adequate and

possible solution right now.

This means that we must orient our engagement in the direction of

those solutions which are more suitable, but not forgetting that

both our preparation and the influence of the international factor

will be decisive.

* You used to be one of the high ranked party and political

officials in the former federation. You were even President of the

Federal Parliament during one mandate. Perceived from this

position, which would be the importance of the constitutive element

which Kosova had in the former Yugoslav federation in the solutionof its status today?

KURTESHI: We always must refer to the constitutional position of

1974. According to that constitution, Kosova was an equal unit of

the federation, and it was part of Serbia only formally. Looked

upon from this position, it comes out that independence of Kosova

is not only grounded on the historic right, but also on the rights

it had in the former Yugoslav system.

* How do you explain the fact that one of the reasons why Belgradeinsisted on lifting the autonomy was the so called "existence of a

state in a state"?

KURTESHI: I said that Kosova's independence in that system was

quite big, and this bothered Belgrade a lot. I can say that after

the adoption of the '74 constitution, some processes to restrict or

annul the positions of the provinces had started. The attempts

failed, because the system had some defending mechanisms for what

it adopted itself.

The 1974 Constitution and the position of Kosova in it has alwaysbeen object of discussion for Serbia. Therefore, the attempts to

suspend the autonomy started in 1974.

* Who do you think is the most responsible for the loss of, how you

say, the independence of Kosova in the former Yugoslav system?

KURTESHI: The main to blame is Serbia's leadership which wouldn't

agree to the position of the Provinces in that system. I believe

that the other republics are also to blame, for they haven't

supported us to defend the constitutional right of Kosova.Kosova's officials are also guilty, because they failed to mobilize

all the forces we had to defend the position we had. They allowed

Serbia to suspend everything Kosova had in that period.

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* How do you comment the requests of some individuals and circles

to have the former politicians return to politics, you being one of

those former politicians?

KURTESHI: I believe it is necessary and a very big responsibilityof the present structures to use the existing human potential they

have at their disposal, in Kosova and the diaspora. I believe that

here we have many unexploited resources. I also believe that

capable people, regardless of what they do or where they are,

should be engaged, and finally I think that young, energetic and

dynamic people should also invited to join the activities.

In regard to my person, I believe it would be much better to engage

younger people who have not be used properly. But, I believe that

whoever wishes good to Kosova, including myself, have to be ready

to give due contributions for Kosova.

BBC INTERVIEW

AZEM VLLASI, former politician & attorney at law

CREDIBILITY DOESN'T RUN OUT?

* It seems that there must be consent of Belgrade for any political

solution regarding Kosova. What do you think about some rumors thatBelgrade would be ready to offer Kosova the status of a republic in

the "FRY", and would this solution be acceptable?

VLLASI: We should be careful with these things, for it could be a

deception as it happened so many times in regard to Bosnia and

Croatia during the past 4 years. But, if that solution would be a

compromise, and politics in the Balkans (including the solution to

the former Yugoslav issue) is full of compromises, then relevant

factors of the international community must be the warrant of such

relations in a Yugoslavia which would eventually be a Union of

equal sovereign states in which Albanians would be completely equalpolitical subjects, with the right to secession from that

Yugoslavia if freedom, equality and the democratic right are

endangered.

But we must not hurry. Our determination for independence still

remains just and legitimate. Serbia knows this very well,

especially knowing that Serbs do not want to live with anyone in a

common and equal state. One day, world will have to agree with

this.

* Several days ago, you met British Secretary of State, Nicholas

Bonsor in Prishtina. What do you think is the role of Great Britain

in overcoming the actual contradictions and the situation in

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Kosova?

VLLASI: The British diplomacy is quite active and mainly respects

the determinations of the other international factors about

Kosova's question. It has no special posture and in essence it isin favor of the compromise solution acceptable for both sides and

thus evade war.

They are willing to mediate in the eventual Serb-Albanian dialogue

in concrete issues, as education, the end of repression for

political motives, etc. until a global solution for Kosova is

found.

* You used to be Kosova's top official, even in the times when

Belgrade started taking away Kosova's competencies. Having in this

in mind, can there be any talk about of your responsibility andthat of other officials in Kosova for what happened later?

VLLASI: It is true that since 1981 there were huge pressures coming

from Serbia to restrict the constitutional functions of Kosova.

And, until the end of 1988 and beginning of 1989, we defended our

constitutional competencies and the government mechanism in Kosova

functioned, when Serbs, facing our resistance, the strong

resistance of the people, started penetrating in Kosova through the

federal organs which had competencies over the federal units,

including us, and especially in some extraordinary cases. Then, thePresidency of Yugoslavia decided to use the force, I was arrested,

and the constitutional autonomy was stepped on, by violence. The

other instrument of violence was the Communist League as the ruling

party, and the reason was that the Albanians stepped out from it

massively.

There would be talk about responsibility if Kosova would have been

handed over without resistance and political manipulations. There

were no conditions whatsoever for armed resistance.

* How do you comment Adem Demai's suggestions but also of someothers to see you involved in politics again, and on the other

hand, what doo you think about the comments by some circles that

you have wore out your political credibility?

VLLASI: I take this as one of Vllasi's proposals, within the frame

of real evaluation of our general situation. Evaluations,

suggestions and proposals coming from Adem should be respected. He

is very realistic and thinks and suggests the engagement of all

political forces, including all individuals which could contribute

for the cause.

Political credibility, which you refer to, is not something that

wears out. Credibility only grows, with fails and losses, and the

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lessons it teaches - meaning that only by learning something from

the political situation, one can contribute in a way.

* If you were the creator of the politics in Kosova, or its leader,

how would this policy develop or look like?

VLLASI: The determination for independence from Serbia must remain

strong. The eighty years' long experience taught us. We need

dynamics and bigger invention. All means and methods of the

political and democratic struggle, excluding terrorism, accepted

and applied by the world, should be applied by us, as well.

I don't understand the peaceful policy as a passive politics and

politics of just sitting, but as a politic which implies more

activity to have something happen on a daily basis or the

realization of the democratic rights.

MONUMENTS

HISTORY IN GARBAGE CANS

by ASTRIT SALIHU / Prishtina

Kosova is more and more looking like a Serbian province. Regardlessof the fact that it is inhabited by 90% Albanians. The names of

streets on the facades of the buildings are written in cyrillic,

while the inscriptions in the shops, even though they mean

something only in Albanian or a foreign language, must by all means

be written also in cyrillic.

In the offices of the Serbian administration we find pictures of

the Serbian leader Milosevic and Arkan the criminal hanging, beside

the orthodox icons or a medieval Serbian saint, cyrillic

documentations and by all means accompanied by the tunes of Serb

folkloric music coming from small transistors broadcasting firstprogram of Radio Prishtina, which "speaks" only in Serbian since

five years ago.

And not only this, but different centers of Kosova there are always

more busts of personalities from the Serbian past and history and

less and less Albanian figures. It wouldn't be strange to find a

bust of an Albanian personality in sewage recipient holes or

garbage containers, as it happened with Emin Duraku's bust in

Gjakova and Hasan Prishtina's in Prishtina.

In Kosova, Albanian history and culture are thrown into garbage

cans. After each discharge of Albanian historic facts, something

Serb erects.

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Therefore, all Kosova's facades are full of cyrillic inscriptions

and all urban centers are being filled up with monuments and busts

of Serbian personalities.

Walking down the core of Prishtina, one can see the achievements ofSerb "reconstruction". The Serb Orthodox Church is being

constructed in the University Campus, in front of the Rectorate

stands the monument to Dositej Obradovic, on the grounds of the

Faculty of Philosophy stands the bust of Vuk Karadzic. All of this

would imply the existence of a Serbian culture if those monuments,

temples and busts were erected in an unused location or a location

not comprised by the urbanism plan. However, Vuk Karadzic's

monument was erected on the fundament of the monument to 104

victims of fascism - created by sculptor Radoslav Musa Miketic -

while the bust of Dositej Obradovic was placed in front of the

building of the Rectorate when the sculptures of the Symposium ofContemporary Sculpture which aimed at becoming an international

event, were removed from the grounds.

The idea was to have these sculptures spread on all areas of the

University Center. Naturally, these pieces had no national or

ideological determinations; the themes were various and sculptors

from all parts of the Former Yugoslavia participated, including

Vojislav Vujisic, Agim avdrbasha, Svetomir Arsic, etc. We could

say that such "cultural" initiatives of Serbia have very low

motives and the least they have are cultural purposes. Behind standthe political purposes aiming at the Serbianization of any Albanian

trace, be it cultural, traditional, urban or architectural.

All monuments of Serb "reconstruction" of the living environment in

Kosova are in a way, artificial implantation of the rigid bodies of

the Serbian past in the Albanian cultural ind. These are cruel aims

to de-historicize, marginalize and ignore one people. The fact that

out of 417 streets in Prishtina, only 8 hold the names of Albanian

personalities, of those who can hardly be found in books of

Albanian history, proves this. The background of this whole thing

is clear: Albanians must feel de-historicized, they must feel as apeople without a past and at the same time must have implanted the

feeling of the lack of future in these lands.

What is more disappointing in this row of political barbarianism is

the fact that it didn't happen in Prishtina alone or another town,

but it is happening all over Kosova. In Prizren's old core, near

the Serbian orthodox church, Czar Dusan's monument was placed, and

it's location is very close to the department store which was

constructed when the motto "let's ruin the old and build the new"

was in fashion. Naturally, the urban center near the orthodoxchurch where the largest concentration of silver filigran shops

originating from the 19th century, was destroyed. This motto was

radically applied especially in Kosova in the name of communist

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ideology, which destroyed or disfigured towns, as happened with the

ancient core of Prishtina, along with the mosques from the 14th

century, the synagogue and the catholic church (the same location

where the new church was built), which were "replaced" also by a

department store. The experts on the construction policy interpretthis as a trademark of Serbia and Yugoslavia in these areas without

urban culture and tradition, whose "style" is noticeable throughout

Kosova, where the towns are completely "new" and "constructed" with

the application of Yugoslav socialism in them.

All of those which have no urban continuity are being changed with

the installation of Serbian monuments or busts. Even those which

were constructed to the memory of the triumph against fascism here

- are disappearing, maybe even on purpose, on the fiftieth

anniversary of the victory against fascism! The removal of the

monument to brotherhood and unity of the Kosova people in Gjakovawas also cynical. It happened in the time when the Serbian

president again referred to this ex-Communist political slogan in

his policy towards Kosova. The reasons why this monument was

removed are found in the great Serbian religiousness! They needed

another orthodox church.

The monument in Klina was ruined in the most vandal way possible.

It was projected by Slobodan Maldini (student of famous Bogdan

Bogdanovic). What is paradoxical in all of this, as the well known

attorney and human rights activist Nekibe Kelmendi says, is thatthis monument cost as much as twenty apartments, while the contract

for its construction was signed in 1985 by Milos Jeremic, then

President of the Municipality of Klina.

But, these don't happen only because of the individual initiatives

of the people who hold the power in the local administration in

Kosova.

These acts are result of decisions and acts adopted by the highest

legislative organ - the parliament. As Kelmendi stresses, referring

to the construction of the church inside the University Campus, the"Parliament of Serbia, with a Decision on the supplement to the

Decision for the Adoption of the Detailed Urbanism Plan of the

University Center in Prishtina, adopted on 15 December 1990, and

published in the "Official Herald of the RS" #18/90, added

paragraph 4 which states: "A Serbian orthodox temple will be built

in the part of cadastre lot # 7090 of the municipality of

Prishtina, and so will the Institute for Serb ecumenical history

and its accompanying buildings." So, in a complex exclusively

foreseen for superior education, a religious temple was to be

forcibly constructed, and what is worse, by violating the law.These violations were evidenced in many aspects: the elaboration

and adoption of the act was done without the participation of the

local authorities where the site is located; the act was not

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adopted by the competent organ - the Municipal Assembly of

Prishtina; the draft program for the preparation of the space plan

was not done by the competent organ - The Planning and Development

Institute of Prishtina; the local association never discussed about

the proposal, and the proposal never came from the executive organof the municipality, which is a legal must. This Decision was also

contrary to the Decision for the adoption of the Urbanistic Plan of

Prishtina until the year 2000. But, the authors of this plan were

not only Albanians. The plan was elaborated during autonomy which

tends to be presented by Serbs as the period of Albanization of

Kosova. The co-authors of this plan were also the Institute for the

Construction of the Town of Belgrade, the Road Institute in

Belgrade, the Center for the Urban Planning and Development in

Belgrade and the Urbanism Institute of the SR of Croatia.

The last case is that regarding the League of Prizren, which is ofbig cultural importance, since it is one of the main monuments of

the national movement in the 19th century. This case illustrates

the lack of respect and devaluation of everything Albanian by the

Serbs. By decision of a municipal organ, all valuable historical

and cultural objects were removed from the building, for the

accommodation needs of Serbian refugees from Croatia. Ethnographer

Shpresa Sieca evaluates this decision, as well as that for the

erection of Czar Dusan's monument as "vandal and barbarian acts

which respect no civilizing norms. These works are only Serbian

folkloric decorations which don't respect the cultural traditionand continuity and whose purpose is the Serbianization of the

environment". Many things were Serbianized in Kosova. Only

Albanians that have nothing Serbian in them remain. As if the

dilemmas how to Serbianize Albanian are making Serbs more

aggressive. Thus it happened with a young Albanian who was "drawn"

the four "s" Serbian cross on his skin by the Serbian police. Maybe

this Albanian will become one of the most original monuments of the

Serbian culture in Kosova...

MACEDONIA

CONTROLLED INSTABILITY TRAINING!

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

Twenty four days after the attempt against President Gligorov's

life, the Macedonian public was given the first details on the

investigation conducted by the Macedonian police in cooperation

with experts from 12 other states. In a press conference, theMinister of Interior of Macedonia, in his first appearance in

public after the attempt, confirmed that a strong financial-

economic group from the neighboring country stands behind the

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attempt, and that its representative remained in Shkup on September

28, and set up the explosive device!

The purpose of the attempt to physically liquidate Gligorov, was to

create a situation "of controlled instability" in Macedonia. Asexpected, the minister communicated that he offered his resignation

to the Premier Crvenkovski. Only several days before this, the

President of Macedonia was released from the hospital and is now at

home. The main surgeon, Jovica Ugrinovski, who conducted the

complicated surgery on Gligorov, announced the President's comeback

to the political scene, in "Nova Makedonija": "We consider that the

recovery was fast. The public shouldn't be surprised if within a

couple of weeks, Gligorov will be talking to the journalists at a

press conference".

At the press conference, Frckovski declared that investigationswere organized and conducted on two levels: the criminal and

counter-informative. On the first level, 25 experts from the USA,

Great Britain and Germany, besides the local experts, participated

actively the maximum was reached. On the second level,

investigations were conducted in cooperation with other 12 experts

(which do not include the experts from Serbia, Bulgaria and

Russia). This group managed to establish only one fact: the name

and last name of the representative of this grouping seated in the

neighboring country, who remained one day in Shkup and set the

bomb.

Frckovski considers that the attempt was realized in three steps:

first, the inspirator, second the organizer and third - the

executioner. For the time being, there are facts about the first

and second level. The political motives for the attempt, according

to Frckovski, are the following: first, Gligorov's elimination -

would cause the controlled instability in the state, i.e. the

restriction of its political and economic sovereignty, and the

subjugation to all possible interests of the inspirator. The

purpose of the attempt was also the restructuring of the political

team, now in power, meaning that the new team would function inaccordance with the political interests of the inspirator. The

chosen moment was, conditionally said, the second round of

Macedonia's independence and economic stability, which would allow

the "clean capital" to get into the country.

Frckovski also said that the attempt could have been directed

against the governmental organs, the Ministry of Interior in

particular. At the end of his statement, Frckovski said that he was

politically responsible, and immediately after the press

conference, he offered his resignation to Premier Crvenkovski.The journalists were very much interested to listen to as many

details as possible about the attempt, but Frckovski gave evasive

answers. This was explained by the need of secrecy at this stage of

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investigations. There was no answer to the question which was the

neighboring country, what was the name of the "representative",

whether Macedonian nationals were involved, whether foreign secret

services were involved, and why was the impression that opposition

parties were involved created, with the permanent interrogations oftheir members... The name of the former Interior functionary Pavle

Trajanov was mentioned several times, and he was the first one to

mention that organized crime was active in Macedonia, and that high

ranked officials were involved in it. Frckovski declared that this

had nothing to do with the attempt, and then stated that the

changes in the leading posts of the Ministry of Interior are result

of the new organization of the Ministry, done in accordance with

the law. Asked when could the public expect full information on the

case, or whether the police has everything under control, the reply

was direct: "The police does not have everything under control.

This form of criminal acts are very hard to discover even in moreserious states".

It seemed that the press conference confirmed what was supposed -

that investigations "at the first level didn't lead to the

perpetrators, while the results achieved in the following two steps

were reached thanks to the cooperation with the foreign police

services. If Frckovski is proven to be right, then it will confirm

Reuters's supposition that financial interests of organized crime

are behind the attempt against Gligorov.

To be honest, one year ago, Frckovski himself declared that there

are attempts to introduce the capital lead by the former foreign

(neighboring) secret services in Macedonia. In this context, the

KOS (Yugoslav military secret service) and the Bulgarian secret

service, as well as some banks and firms were mentioned, as

allegedly linked to them. The statements stopped there, and it is

not clear what was the Ministry of Interior doing in the meantime,

and whether it did anything in that direction. To claim that the

seat of this grouping is in a neighbouring country, opens the path

to many combinations. In this direction, some mention Frckovski's

statement that the attempt has destabilized Bulgaria more thanMacedonia...

On the other hand, having in mind the often repeated confirmation

that organized crime in Macedonia also comprises a part of the

establishment, and if the recent confirmation about the background

of the attempt is proven, it de facto supports the opposition

leader's statement that the attempt is a part "of the quarrel at

home".

Another question was evaded during the press conference: what doesFrckovski's resignation really mean, whether it was irrevocable or

maybe there is a chance for the premier not to accept it. It is

clear that the premier is in a very delicate position: it would be

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normal if he would accept the resignation as well as the opinion of

the minister himself about his political responsibility. But, on

the other hand, the Ministry of Interior is in the phase of

reorganization - classical police is created and the former secret

services are being put aside - and a counter-informing service iscreated and it will be under direct subordination of the President

of the Republic. New posts are created, others ceased to exist.

Many people consider that the departure of the first man of

Interior in Macedonia would cause chaos, because allegedly the ones

who are leaving would like to take advantage of the situation and

gain space for domination. A similar situation by the end of the

eighties and the "case of the eight suspended" created real chaos,

then supported by Frckovski's statement that it is not known how

deep have the foreign informative services penetrated in the

Ministry of Interior.

The departure of Frckovski would be also expressed in the balance

of the government and the coalition. It would by all means mean the

weakening of premier Crvenkovski's line, if not also the

announcement for his departure. And this, according to the

majority, would mean a step backwards for many processes in

Macedonia, because the domination would be of the conservative

line.

Naturally, again, it all depends of when and will the first man of

the state come back.

MACEDONIA

A STATE WITHOUT THE "COLUMNS" OF STABILITY

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

One of the main arguments proving that Macedonia is functioning as

a state, regardless of the consequences of the attempt againstGligorov's life, was and still is that all the institutions of the

system are functioning without any problems. On this occasion, it

was more than important to stress that two days after the attempt

against President Gligorov, the Parliament adopted the decision to

change the form of the flag, and later it ratified the agreement

with Greece, then the statal structures met and agreed to sign a

series of documents with the Greeks, despite all stories about who

won and who lost in the whole thing. This means that the attack

against Gligorov doesn't mean that the state can't function, nor

does this imply the alteration of the harmonized, statal policy.

The celebration of the 50th anniversary of the UN in which Stojan

Andov, Speaker of the Parliament, participated as acting President

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of the Republic, who according to the Constitution replaces the

president in his absence or his incapacity (leaving aside that

there is nothing written about who is competent to detrmine this

and when) is one of the newest proofs that the state, in times of

Gligorov's incapacitation, functions without any problems. What'smore, the Macedonian delegation gathered additional political

points with the official inauguration of the Macedonian flag in

front of the UN building, and after signing the agreement with the

neighboring countries (but Greece) for the East-West communication

line...

Nevertheless, there is a delicate topic of discussion, and it seems

to be the Law on Local Self-Administration. The idea for the

adoption of this law goes as far as the constitution of the

Macedonian pluralist system, i.e five years ago. In that process,

the first victim of the first draft was the only woman minister ofthe "experts' government" Gordana Siljanovska, whose only task was

to draft this act, meanwhile on the other hand, the undisputable

participation of her colleague Frckovski, first in charge of the

changes in the political system and then (after the - for some

enigmatic - death of the Minister of Interior Jordan Mijalkov) as

his replacement, a position he held in the next two government (the

first governmental coalition and now in the League for Macedonia),

brought him to the surface. In different phases, and with different

competencies, Lubomir Danailov Frckovski, had broad authority and

manoeuvring space - as one of the authors of the Constitution ofMacedonia, as one of them who had been involved in many variants of

the mentioned law on local self-administration not without elements

of confirmation that this law revises the Constitution of

Macedonia, or let's say, improves it, among others, also as a

result of the different pressures from abroad in which he also

participated directly as one of the sides in conversations or

negotiations, whichever.

It must be stated, that in all these phases, including the adoption

of the act, the impression was that this law was supposed to be

used for "overcoming" other present misunderstandings, first ofall, regarding the use of the language.

The Law on Local Self-Administration is the object of dispute which

can easily be placed in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations in

Macedonia.

The constitutional amendments adopted before the first multi-party

elections at the end of the eighties, aimed at stopping the

Albanian "invasion" - an idea supported by "easy-minded" Petar

Gosev, assisted by the last socialist government which he wasstruggling against all the time. The deprivation of the

municipalities from the "statal" rights, which had been established

according to Kardelj's pattern, was first of all motivated by the

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fear that after the elections, the Macedonian representatives would

lose participation in decision making, because the municipalities

were dominated by the "others". When the first "free" elections

took place, this tendency was enforced when the electoral units

were disfigured (the difference of the number of voters were thebest proof of this "fishy business").

After the electoral victory of the tripartite League for Macedonia,

the new government and parliament, among others, could deal with

the so called system laws, which couldn't be adopted because they

needed two thirds of the votes or the votes of 80 MPs. Thus came

the Local Administration Law's turn. The discussion about it,

especially after the deterioration of the relations between

Macedonians and Albanians following the events in Tetova and the

university, just completed the delicate picture. One of the key

issues, besides the existence of two "local governments", was alsothe issue of determining the right for the official use of the

mother tongue as an official language. Right in the beginning, the

problems appeared with the percentage of the population which

guaranteed this right. The differences were evident: (National)

Macedonian parties requested the number to be 50%, meanwhile the

Albanians wanted that percentage to be at least 10%. The proposal

of the previous government was allegedly 40%. When it became

evident than none of the options could get 80 votes, the law simply

froze and awaited better times to come. Those times finally came,

and definitely the discussion about this law began. The amendmentswere discussed on the 26th session of the Parliament. There were

150 amendments. The Government adopted some ten, which were really

"cosmetic". The whole thing ended up quite smoothly. Finally, as

supposed, the law was adopted - 83 MPs voted in favor, 8 were

against, two abstained, and five dissatisfied MPs demonstratively

left the session. Needn't say that the ones who voted against and

abstained belong to the PPD and/or were the independent, and the

ones who left were from the PPDSH.

The debate and adoption of the law on local self-administration

proved that the essence of the dispute was the use of otherlanguages as official. The Government, as the proposer considered

that the constitutional foundations must be defined thus: the

percentage to determine the majority is over 50%, the category "a

considerable number of members of nationalities" is 20%. The

disputable figure was the second one. PPD's chairman, Abdurrahman

Aliti considered that there are no facts which would prove that 19

or 21 percent does not represent "a considerable number". According

to him, this is pure political voluntarism which depends on the

relation of forces. His evaluation is that the law is contrary to

the Constitution of the RM. The impression is that the wholeproblem was reduced to the Macedonian-Albanian relations, even

though there are members of other ethnicities living in Macedonia,

and who get a quite relative right to use their language in

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official communication (especially the Turks).

This is why the Minister of Justice, Vlado Popovski, saw it

necessary to comment on the "Albanian position" after the adoption

of the law, saying that Albanians have actively participated in theadoption of all legal acts so far, and that the majority of their

efforts were incorporated in the legal acts. From the point of view

of Turks in Macedonia, the minister declared that the Turkish

nationality is fully integrated in the society as a whole, because

we are referring to a nationality which has professionals and

qualified people. When it comes to the cultural rights - education,

culture, traditions, religion, the private and public use of the

language, of the media etc., their application "is endless".

The adoption of the law proved the variety of internal Albanian

methods of political action. PPDSH's MPs showed their disagreement

not only by strongly opposing the governing coalition, but alsocriticizing the PPD. Nevertheless, they "canalized" their

reactions. MP Ismet Ramadani clarified this by saying that they

tried the best they could to have the provisions change for the

better, but the relation of forces is such that they couldn't,

which doesn't mean that they will give up on their political

struggle and that their political life will end here: "our

political goal is to have the Albanian language become official,

along with the Macedonian language. But it seems that there is no

disposition of this Parliament to understand that Macedonia

represents a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual environment, and thatrelations must be regulated accordingly. This is why we believe

that this very important law didn't fulfil our hopes".

Thus, this episode in the political scene of Macedonia can be

observed in two ways: as a system which is functioning despite the

temporary absence of the stability "column", but also as a

determined posture in the policy of postponing the problems for

times to come.

KOSOVA

A PRIVILEGE CALLED DILEMMA

by DUKAGJIN GORANI / Prishtina

After the "everything is done" promises of Warren Zimmerman in

1989, after Mother Teresa's visit to Kosova in September 1990,

after the proclamation and recognition of the constant independence

of Kosova and the issue of Kosova on all international levels;after the political professional organization of Albanians in their

political parties (and the golden Kosovan promises to the Albanian

people about its dilemmas in regard to the results of the western

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democracy and the local draft-constitution) - maybe time for

political standstill in such an energetic and effective state. And,

which it is said to last at least three years.

And since it was a policy of stagnation, maybe it would be too muchto repeat, once again, the unimportant political events occurred

since the end of 1990 till the end of 1995: the destruction of

Yugoslavia; war in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and their

recognition in the UN; the foundation and recognition of Macedonia;

the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, of the USSR...

Political Kosova, declared in favor of the "three options" and the

evasion of provocations, constantly lived the "insecure peace".

But, peace, nevertheless.

But, thanks to God and the "moisty rain in our political drought",and thanks to the constellation in general, the last months did

evidence some important events and by all means useful to further

explain our national fate in the repressive daily life: thus, we

experienced the women mega-conference in Beijing, Adem Demai's

mega-interview in "Zri", Rugova's and Bakalli's interviews by BBC

- Albanian section and Rexhep Qosja's interview in Belgrade's

"Intervju".

Let's put aside the cliched practice to claim that the harshest

criticism to the political flows in Kosova usually were andcontinue being articulated by the most "independent" and the most

"marginalized" politically - the above interviews (apart from Dr.

Rugova's, "in accordance to the postures adopted by the

Presidency.."), would easily become part of the anthology of harsh

accusations against the (so far) one and only untouchable among us:

the LDK, its leadership and its chairman.

Hence, Adem Demai in "Between War and Capitulation" and Qosja in

"Rugova is a Decoration of Milosevic's Democracy", each one on his

own, described the situation in Kosova. As well as all the failures

and illusions of political Kosova about the solution of it'squestion. But they also burdened the future responsibility on the

political staff in Kosova, first of all the LDK and it's

leadership.

Maybe Demai and Rugova are not spokespersons of any political

subject in Kosova. They claim they speak on their own behalf, as

engaged personalities, each one on his own. But, nevertheless, it

is hard to believe that there is not a considerable number of

people who support these critical standpoints. And which would be

comprised in stressing the basic problems of our national fate: theinternal organization - monopolized and "abused" by the LDK; the

unpreparedness for the inevitable dialogue with official Serbia,

and the continued propagation of the tragic illusion of the

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invented independence and that "of the certain realization of our

national aspirations for freedom within the parallel system".

Adem Demai, enumerating the structural paradoxes in the Albanian

organization in Kosova, among the known - the farce of the MPs, thenon-functioning of the Parliament, the Coordinating Body, the

political and moral monopoly of the LDK - openly criticizes five

functions of the "Head" , as he refers to Ibrahim Rugova, and

suggests his discharge from this "serious" responsibility, as well

as the creation of a circle of officials and counsellors from

people excluded from the political life, who have knowledge,

capacities, energy and ambitions...

Rexhep Qosja sees the "parallel system", the political iconography,

as well as the Albanian media as a decoration of the Serbian regime

to prove "the existence of the rights and freedoms of KosovaAlbanians". Qosja thus states that, the symbiotic relations between

the political structures in Kosova were inevitably created -

especially between the LDK and the Presidency - with the Serbian

authorities in Belgrade. Qosja claims that dialogue with Serbs

never really started, but the contacts between the Presidency and

Belgrade have a continuance, for they are grounded on a profitable

political coexistence.

Mahmut Bakalli, on the other hand, doesn't exclude the possibility

of discussing about an eventual (provisional) solution which wouldinsist on the permanence of Albanians in FRY, as a republic, which

would depend on the "final declaration of the people". In regard to

the (inevitable) dialogue, Bakalli claims that the politics

practiced today - closed and monopolist - by the Kosovan political

leadership, does not allow any advances. Any qualitative changes,

according to him, would be done only after the elimination of

political isolation - with the creation of a broader decision-

making center, which would include capable and inventive people who

know and want to contribute...

What are Dr. Rugova's postures in regard to all of these? "Kosovashould not be perceived as an isolated problem, but as an issue

linked to all problems of the region in the former Yugoslavia",

states the President of the republic of Kosova, who remains

optimistic because of the political successes of Kosova in these

stormy years. The internationalization of the question of Kosova is

growing, he claims, while the efforts for dialogue do not stop,

through the ICFY and the insistent of the members of the EU.

According to Dr. Rugova, the parliament of Kosova functions, not in

parliamentary sessions but by commissions, the Coordinating Body ofthe Political Parties functions, and so do the political parties,

"including the LDK". Therefore, he concludes, "pluralism and the

parties compose the people and work in favor of the vitalization of

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the interests of the people and the nation...". Full stop.

In regard to the interviews and the postures expressed on them:

harsh criticism, we would say, almost accusing, and which for the

first time, does not spare the work and personality of Dr. Rugova.But, not without any content: this time, the series of

dissatisfactions of the mentioned personalities didn't end with the

famous: "many forums and almost no work..." (?). The ones who read

carefully, will find suggestions in what Demai, Qosja or Bakalli

say, and not only that, but also quite pragmatic approaches, even

real-political ones.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to know what would have happened if

the same things would have been said two or even four years ago? We

can agree that (at least) in the past two years, apart from the

conventions of silence and of empty words, there was totalpolitical stagnation in Kosova, and not only political. And, since

the failures and serious mistakes described with the words of these

personalities, are usually referred to the ones committed "at the

beginning".

Or, how much is it worth to be ceratin in politics today? Let's set

aside all ICFYs, where Kosova Albanians achieved to be recognized

as an "ethnic community" (London, summer 1993); set aside Robert

Dole's statements about autonomy for Kosova and Berisha's meeting

with actual US president in Washington and the "strong support forthe autonomy of Kosova" - how worth are the apocalyptic prophecies,

the regretful declarations, the critical discourses or postures for

the Albanian political engagement in Kosova today?

"There is no use to cry over spilled milk". Something could be said

almost for sure: there is not much interest among people - maybe

because of the medial gymnastics while verifying the "just and

pragmatic" course, or because of the search for the scapegoat for

the committed mistakes. This is illustrated by the very few

reactions to the mentioned critiques, which are so disclosed,

against the untouchable leadership among us (having in mind thatthis place remembers the punishing circular notes in branches and

sub-branches for much "smaller" mistakes of declaring the opinion

about the internal political flows).

Political interest for these flows, absolutely reduced to the

active membership in branches and sub-branches (and journalists...)

can only serve as a barometer to prove anything - but the trust in

the efficacious course of the Kosova policy. But, dealing with

politics does not belong "to broad masses", as claimed by those who

are best acquainted with the western democratic regimes. Somethingof the kind belongs only to the decision-making centers which won

the votes of the people. Fine.

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Without elaborating how come the issue of national liberation was

defined (so quickly) as professionalized politics, a reserved one

and with the tendency to restrict even more the decision making

circle - the question would be: Who can profit from all this lack

of interest? The ones who propagated it, and who according to Qosjaand Demai (and not only them) are precisely the LDK and it's

leadership, which through "exclusions, exclusiveness and tagging"

got hold of the complete monopoly over the Kosova Albanians? Or the

contrary: this stagnation will turn into a silent witness of the

political lynch which would follow while looking for the

responsible of the capital failure which is more and more

emphasized - remaining in FRY?

Maybe even silence is news.

Do Kosova Albanians have dilemmas about their political fate today?

Do they have this privilege?

The resolutions of international organizations and "moisty rains"

have, so far, approved the existence of all the Albanian misery in

Kosova and condemned all the, for decades, unstoppable repression.

And, have openly excluded the recognition of the "independent and

neutral state" of Kosova. And, this was not only one week ago.

There are no dilemmas.

On the other hand, even the most diletant Serbian journalists is in

a situation to, through a high-rated Serbian newspapers among

Albanians (!), as is Nasa Borba, cause confusion and "sensation" by

making his own list of possible negotiators from Kosova. And not

only this, but manages to cause so many speculations which don't

stop in weeks: Is it really true that Bakalli and Vllasi are in the

combination?, Demai? Qosja? Surroi? Maliqi? We must not forget

that this place remembers the times when the Belgrade media would

publish whatever - the eyes of Kosova were turned towards the

democratic West. To the place where our fate would be sealed,

through the internationalization, the exodus of the MPs and 400thousand Albanians, the fruitful meetings and other historical

successes. It seems that the Western institutions have sealed what

they planned to seal so far.

Who knows, maybe our political leadership knows something that the

mortal human is not allowed to know: maybe it knows "about the

politics of mimicry, conspiracies, gesticulations...". However,

Nasa Borba is often more read carefully. And here, there are no

dilemmas.

UNTANS? The idea of the UN trusteeship on Kosova, however explained

optimistically, doesn't perceive Kosova as an independent subject.

The engagement of a foreign NGO, which offered it's services as a

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political mediator between Belgrade and Prishtina, based on its

plan known as UNTANS - United Nations Temporary Authority for

Negotiated Settlement in Kosovo, foresees also the withdrawal of

the Serbian police and the reduction of the army troops (only for

defending purposes), also the appointment of a foreignAdministrator - but not the abrogation of the discriminating laws

of Serbia or the dispute of the autonomy as something which evolves

towards the independence through political declaration. There are

no dilemmas here either.

Perceived in this way, it is hard to classify the political

discourses articulated in the interviews as "dilemmas" about the

strategies and the political fate. There is no doubt that they come

from public personalities of Kosova, which, individually, gained at

least one "moral-political" attribute in the past four years, be it

in party sessions or the media which commented "justly" thecontents of the party meetings: Qosja was the "radical and the

fatalist" without a clear vision about politics, the self-

proclaimed "father of the nation", a man who represents only

himself. Time "had ran over" Demai, he was a "Marxist-Leninist",

a Serb-lover, dictator, adventurist and he wants war" (he is the

guy!); on the other hand, Bakalli was a "compromiser, an

autonomist, Serbia's man, a phantom of the past".

Whatever they may be, they published their thoughts. They stated

that the political fate of Kosova is not and was never in their

hands, because they never dealt with active policy. Because theyare as they are. And because they were identified so "on time".

Maybe there is no dilemma in this case either.

Are such dilemmas a privilege today? Have times "when nothing was

known yet..." become a privilege? Cyrillic inscriptions all

around Kosova, sculptures of Dositejs and the destruction of the

complex of the League of Prizren didn't incite the minimal civil

disobedience, because we have people who will deal with politics.

The ones who stated 15 years ago that going to the hotels in Ulqin

was "an irrational torture" - tell me that the buildings have

become beautiful and comfortable (?). The beauty of compromise and

the rhetoric, we would add.

Could this be similar to the possible dilemmas of our political

future: How will be dress up the old body into new fashion? Bigger

possibilities or concealed beauties? Trusteeship? Autonomy?...