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Impressum

Izdava~:Fondacija Heinrich BöllUred za Bosnu i Hercegovinu

Za izdava~a:Mirela Grünther-\e~evi}

Priredili:Mirela Grünther-\e~evi}Amela Sejmenovi}

Prijevod:Nermana Mr{o (njema~ki jezik)Svjetlana Pavi~i} (engleski jezik)Amira Sadikovi} (engleski jezik)

Lektor: Ferida Durakovi}Korektor: Alen Kalajdìja

Layout: JORDAN Studio, Sarajevo - Amer Ekmi}

Tira`: 1.000

[tampa: Tipografija d.o.o., Sarajevo

COPYRIGHT 2007

Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Ured za Bosnu i Hercegovinu

Stavovi i mi{ljenja iznesena u ovom tekstu su autorska i ne predstavljaju izri~ite stavove imi{ljenja izdava~a.

Views and opinions presented in this text are the autor’s own and do not reflect the views andopinions of the publisher.


Zbornik radova i izbor iz diskusije sa konferencije:

PRIMJER BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE: ODR@IVI KONCEPTI ILI STRANPUTICE

ME\UNARODNE ZAJEDNICE?

Sarajevo, 2007.



S A D R @ A J

Uvod9 Mirela Grünther-\e~evi}

Pozdravni govor11 Nj. E. Christian Schwarz-Schilling15 Nj. E. Michael Schmunk

1. UTICAJ ME\UNARODNE ZAJEDNICE NA POLITI^KI RAZVOJ BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE

Uvodno izlaganje21 Nermina [a~i}

Komentar28 Nj. E. Christian Schwarz-Schilling 30 Zlatko Dizdarevi}

Diskusija38 Du{anka Majki}40 Miro Lazovi}42 Senad Pe}anin 44 Nurko Pobri}45 Jerko Ivankovi}-Lijanovi}

Studija 47 Nermina [a~i}: Me|unarodna zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini

- od decembra 1995. do marta 2007. - politolo{ki uvidi47 I. Uvod48 II. Filozofija 'mirovnog procesa'50 III. Etnostrana~ki pluralizam - la`ni politi~ki pluralitet52 IV. Kontroverze u praksi56 V. Reforme u Bosni i Hercegovini vs. reforme u me|unarodnoj zajednici?62 VI. Ocjena i analize

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Sadràj


2. PRAVNE REFORME U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI I UTICAJ ME\UNARODNE ZAJEDNICE

Uvodno izlaganje69 Manfred Dauster

Komentar 73 Zdravko Grebo78 Nedim Ademovi}

Diskusija83 Nurija Omerba{i} 84 Mirsad ]eman84 Manfred Dauster

Studija85 Manfred Dauster: Bilans djelovanja me|unarodne zajednice u Bosni

i Hercegovini – od decembra 1995. do marta 2007. - pravni aspekti85 I. Uvod90 II. Bitni koraci na reformskom putu Bosne i Hercegovine kojim je

pe~at dala me|unarodna zajednica ili ih je sama donijela 101 III. Ocjena i perspektive

3. REFLEKSIJA PRISUTNOSTI ME\UNARODNE ZAJEDNICE U BOSANSKOHERCEGOVA^KOM DRU[TVU

Uvodno izlaganje111 Dino Abazovi}

Komentar 118 Nada Ler Sofroni}121 \or|e êkrlija

Diskusija124 Tarik Haveri}126 Zdravko Grebo128 Tarik Haveri} 129 Zlatko Hadìdedi}130 Dino Abazovi}

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Studija 133 Dino Abazovi}: O me|ubilansu u~inka rada me|unarodne zajednice

u Bosni i Hercegovini – od decembra 1995. do marta 2007. - sociolo{ki aspekti

133 I. Uvod136 II. [ta je sve po{lo krivo?139 III. Demokratiziranje nedemokratskim snagama i (ne)civilno dru{tvo!?143 IV. Zaklju~na razmatranja

Zavr{na rije~147 Dragoslav Dedovi}

149 Zaklju~ci i preporuke

151 Kratke biografije autora studija

155 Examples of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sustainable Concepts or Lost Ways of the International Community?

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UVOD

Me|unarodna zajednica nastoji da doprinese izgradnji funkcionalnedràve i da podrì politi~ke snage koje su u stanju nastaviti i iznijeti procesreformi. Me|utim, u dosada{njem radu me|unarodne zajednice u Bosni iHercegovini mogu se prepoznati uspjesi i neuspjesi. S obzirom na trenutnupoliti~ku situaciju i pritisak me|unarodne zajednice na bosanskohercego-va~ke politi~ke elite da {to brè preuzmu cjelokupnu odgovornost za vlasti-tu dràvu i dru{tvo, te na zapo~eti ali veoma spor proces evropskih inte-gracija, javlja se potreba za sagledavanjem u~inka prisutnosti me|unarodnezajednice i procjenom njene uloge u budu}nosti.

Imaju}i u vidu ovu ~injenicu, Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Ured za Bosnu iHercegovinu, 17. aprila 2007. u Sarajevu organizirala je konferenciju podnaslovom „Primjer Bosne i Hercegovine: odrìvi koncepti ili stran-putice me|unarodne zajednice?”. U pripremama za konferencijuizra|ena je studija koja sa politolo{kog, pravnog i sociolo{kog aspekta nudibilansu u~inka rada me|unarodne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini. Studija,koju su pripremili Nermina [a~i} (Fakultet politi~kih nauka, Univerzitet uSarajevu), Manfred Dauster (Sud BiH) i Dino Abazovi} (Fakultet politi~kihnauka, Univerzitet u Sarajevu), ~ini polaznu osnovu za diskusiju na konfe-renciji na kojoj su u~estvovali predstavnici me|unarodne zajednice, civilnogdru{tva i politi~kog ̀ ivota u Bosni i Hercegovini. Zahvaljuju}i aktivnom radui iskustvima ste~enim u postjugoslavenskim zemljama a slijede}i svoju te-meljnu postavku o nu`nosti politi~kog obrazovanja kao pretpostavke istin-skog demokratskog dru{tva, Fondacija Heinrich Böll èli na ovaj na~in do-prinijeti istinskom demokratskom politi~kom dijalogu.

Konferencija kao i studija imaju za cilju da kroz bilans u~inka radame|unarodne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini potaknu diskusiju o onome{to je za Bosnu i Hercegovinu zna~ilo a i dalje zna~i prisustvo me|unaro-dne zajednice, budu}i da se u bosanskohercegova~koj javnosti sve vi{e go-vori o zatvaranje Ureda Visokog predstavnika za Bosnu i Hercegovinu(OHR-a) i redefiniranju uloge me|unarodne zajednice. U Bosni i Herce-govini se svakodnevnim jezikom sve vi{e govori o „odlasku stranaca”, pasmatramo da je vrijeme da se intenzivira javni dijalog izme|u me|unarodnezajednice te politi~kih i gra|anskih aktera bosanskohercegova~kog dru{tvao biv{im sada{njim i budu}im konceptima, ali i o stranputicama me|unaro-dne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini i njihovih partnera na bosanskoherce-gova~koj politi~koj sceni. Pri tome treba po{tovati pravila o~uvanja onoga

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Uvod


{to se pokazalo dobrim, uz istovremeno prevazilaènje prepreka koje stojena putu daljem razvoju Bosne i Hercegovine.

Bosni i Hercegovini je jo{ uvijek potrebna pomo} me|unarodne zajed-nice. No, i me|unarodnoj zajednici, a posebno Evropi, potrebna je stabilnai prosperitetna Bosna i Hercegovina – kao konkretan znak uspje{ne mirovnepolitike. Stoga je postojanje koncepta ubrzavanja, ali i njegova efikasnost upribliàvanju Bosne i Hercegovine Evropskoj uniji, jedno od najbitnijih mjer-ila ukupne uspje{nosti me|unarodne zajednice.

Na stranicama zbornika koji je pred vama nalaze se uvodna izlaganja,komentari i izbor iz diskusije sa spomenute konferencije te autorske studijedate na kraju svakog od tri tematska poglavlja ovog zbornika. FondacijaHeinrich Böll najsrda~nije zahvaljuje autorima studije kao i svim u~esnicimakonferencije za njihov doprinos i anga`man u pripremama same konferen-cije kao i za izuzetno vrijedne komentare, diskusije, zaklju~ke i preporukekoje }ete ~itati na sljede}im stranama.

Mirela Grünther-\e~evi}Direktorica Fondacije Heinrich Böll,

Ured za Bosnu i Hercegovinu

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Uvod


POZDRAVNI GOVORI

NJ. E. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, Visoki predstavnik u Bosni i Hercegovini i Specijalni predstavnik Evropske unije

Ekselencijo, dame i gospodo,

hvala vam na va{em pozivu za ovu konferenciju. Ovo je vrlo zanimljivatema, koja je do{la u pravo vrijeme. Tako|er vam se zahvaljujem naodli~nom materijalu koji ste dostavili unaprijed. Radi se o studiji koja je odvelike pomo}i jer se njom ponavlja, nagla{ava i ponovo vr{i ocjena razvojasituacije od kraja rata, od vremena kada su se sve one grozne stvaridoga|ale s po~etka 1990-ih.

Prije svega, zahvalio bih se Fondaciji Heinrich Böll na njenom izvanred-nom radu, te na korisnom razgovoru i idejama koje pomaù pobolj{anjusituacije. Otkako sam do{ao u Bosnu i Hercegovinu, znam da Fondacijaupravo tako radi. Ne mogu se sjetiti koliko sam se puta do sada sastao sapredstavnicima Fondacije Heinrich Böll. Jo{ jednom ̀ elim naglasiti koliko suova tema i ova konferencija bitne, jer mi treba da unaprijedimo razumijeva-nje politi~ke situacije i procesa tranzicije u ovoj zemlji.

Zato, smatram da je jako bitno organizirati ovakve konferencije; ~ini mise, ispri~avam se {to }u to sada re}i, da u ovom regionu postoji obi~aj dase, jednostavno, vrlo brzo odredi krivac za neke stvari. Me|utim, u ovomslu~aju situacija je mnogo sloènija. Pristup 'ko je kriv' nije pravi za razma-tranje budu}nosti. Na samom po~etku diskusije èlim postaviti sljede}epitanje: kako smo do{li do ovog trenutka? Kako su zemlje biv{eg isto~nogbloka napredovale ka Evropi?

Proces tranzicije u Jugoisto~noj Evropi i Srednjoj Evropi bio je teàk.Me|utim, s druge strane, imali smo ratove koje je vodio Milo{evi} i naciona-listi~ke politike koje su imale za cilj genocid i etni~ko ~i{}enje. Me|utim,prije svega, èlio bih s vama podijeliti jednu osnovnu misao o svemu ovo-me. Nije ba{ lako re}i da su sve pote{ko}e kroz koje smo ovdje pro{li po-te{ko}e koje je izazvala me|unarodna zajednica.

Naravno da ima mjesta i za kritiku. Me|utim, prostor biv{e Jugoslavije jepokazao razliku u odnosu na neke druge zemlje. Bilo je osobito te{ko djelo-vati u ovom regionu zbog velikog broja ljudi razli~itih religija i historije. To subile oteàvaju}e okolnosti u kojima se tranzicija odvija s mnogo vi{e te{ko}a.Moramo re}i da je ono {to se ovdje dogodilo, prije svega, bio neuspjeh politi-~ara ove zemlje, koji su stvorili situaciju s kojom se upravo suo~avamo.

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Dakle, prvo, smatram da svaki doma}i politi~ar mora sa svoje strane pri-hvatiti ~injenicu da nije me|unarodna zajednica ta koja je napravila gre{ke,nego je bilo potrebno da me|unarodna zajednica do|e ovdje, a da takve po-trebe jednostavno nije bilo u drugim zemljama Isto~ne Evrope, koje su posli-je komunizma prolazile kroz tranziciju i krenule putem demokratizacije.

Zaista je bilo tragi~no vidjeti, na primjer, pokrete u Ma|arskoj, Poljskoj,pokrete liberalizacije, a istovremeno je prostor biv{e Jugoslavije imao vrlozaostalog lidera i generalnog sekretara Komunisti~ke partije, koji je naprostovodio ka nacionalizmu i etni~kom razmi{ljanju.

To je bila stvarnost krajem osamdesetih i po~etkom devedesetih godinapro{log stolje}a. Bez obzira na sve to, od samoga po~etka smo znali da jeme|unarodna zajednica napravila izuzetno mnogo gre{aka.

Mi, sa svoje strane, nismo uspjeli zaustaviti ratove u Hrvatskoj; u Bosni iHercegovini nismo uspjeli sprije~iti genocid zato {to je politika me|unaro-dne zajednice bila previ{e fragmentirana. Me|utim, s druge strane, pak,situacija je bila takva da apsolutno niko nije vjerovao da }e se rat dogoditi.Neki su smatrali da po zavr{etku Hladnog rata vi{e ne}e biti ratova.Me|utim, stvarnost se pokazala druga~ijom. Bile su to, na koncu, SjedinjeneDràve koje su u Bosni i Hercegovini zaustavile rat i stvorile uvjete za Dej-tonski mirovni sporazum.

Me|utim, to nije bilo prvi put da Evropa doìvi neuspjeh. Evropa je vid-jela da se rat de{ava. Poznato je da su se SAD ve} od po~etka èljeleuklju~iti, ali tada Evropa nije bila spremna podràti uplitanje SAD-a u rat, iupravo to je bio razlog zbog kojeg sam se ja itekako suprotstavljao svojojvladi. Ja sam tada bio ministar u vladi i podnio sam ostavku zato {to je mojaocjena situacije bila potpuno druga~ija. U Evropi se u to vrijeme smatralo dasituacija nakon Hladnog rata jo{ nije sazrela za preuzimanje odgovornosti.Ali, SAD su prepoznale da Evropa nije spremna preuzeti odgovornost, pa supreuzele odgovornost umjesto nje i okon~ale rat. To je puka ~injenica – tovi{e nije samo mi{ljenje.

Stoga bi trebalo znati da Dejtonski mirovni sporazum nije bio poraz niMilo{evi}a ni Tu|mana, nego politi~ki kompromis koji je jednostavno raz-dvojio strane. Bitna razlika izme|u toga mirovnog sporazuma i onog s krajaDrugog svjetskog rata je ta {to su na mirovnim pregovorima akteri rata i ratnizlo~inci zajedno sjedili za pregovara~kim stolom. I to je bilo ne{to potpunodruga~ije u odnosu na ono {to smo imali kada su neonacisti pobije|eni ikada je Njema~ka kapitulirala. Dakle, ovdje smo, prije svega, imali kompro-mis s ratnim zlo~incima, {to zna~i da nas uop}e ne smije iznenaditi ~injeni-ca da pravila Dejtona nisu pravila za neki novi liberalni demokratski

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po~etak. Krajem 1995. godine u toku je bio razaraju}i ~etverogodi{nji rat ibudu}nost je bila neizvjesna. Vi{e od 5% stanovni{tva Bosne i Hercegovineje ubijeno, vi{e od 20% stanovni{tva je nasilu protjerano, vi{e od milionvojnika je bilo naoruàno, imali smo ogroman broj izbjeglica; tako|er,ekonomija je u cijeloj zemlji bila razorena i zamijenjena crnim trì{tem.

Dejtonski mirovni sporazum i njegova vizija Bosne i Hercegovine ovisilisu o podr{ci koja je dolazila od biv{ih zara}enih strana; o tome su ovisili io~ekivanja i budu}nost. Me|utim, Dejtonskim mirovnim sporazumom samoje zaustavljen rat, iako su postojala velika o~ekivanja u pogledu budu}nosti.Ali, osnovna funkcija i osnovni cilj Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma bio jezaustaviti rat. Prioritet Bosne i Hercegovine jeste da se prihvati barem mini-malni kompromis, uz nekoliko logi~nih konsekvenci. Isto tako, taj je periodzloupotrijebljen, a za sobom smo jo{ imali naslije|e troipogodi{njeg rata.Me|unarodna zajednica je bila tu kako bi sprije~ila to ratno naslije|e.Drugim rije~ima, me|unarodna zajednica je poku{ala da uspostavi mir. IFORje bio prisutan i odlu~an u ostvarenju svojih zadataka. Zatim je uspostavljenUred visokog predstavnika. Donatorske agencije i vlade su, isto tako, nasto-jale primorati biv{e zara}ene strane, koje su bile nepomirljive u vezi s bilokakvim dogovorom, da osiguraju pravo povratka raseljenim i izbjeglim i daosiguraju kompletno politi~ko zastupanje svih gra|ana.

Drugi razlog uspjeha Dejtona je promjena u regionu 1995. godine. Velikibroj Srba i Hrvata u Bosni i Hercegovini ̀ eljeli su podijeliti zemlju i pridruìtise Srbiji i Hrvatskoj. Me|utim, takva nastojanja su nestala. Sada, naprimjer,oni koji podràvaju Dodika, ne podràvaju njegove pozive na referendum.

[ta je sa Bonskim ovlastima? Prve godine implementacije Dejtonskog spo-razuma postalo je jasno da vi{e nije mogu}e provoditi mir bez mnogo ja~ihovlasti koje bi bile date Visokom predstavniku. Tada je donesena odluka dase Visokom predstavniku daju tzv. Bonske ovlasti. I moram vam, tako|er, ka-zati da sam ja u to vrijeme, 1993/1994. godine, bio medijator u BiH. Putovaosam po zemlji, od op}ine do op}ine, od grada do grada, i zaista sam vidioda jo{ ima na~elnika op}ina koji jednostavno ne èle provoditi Dejtonskimirovni sporazum. Oni su zahtjeve za povrat imovine naprosto gurali negdjeu }o{ak, nisu ih razmatrali i ignorirali su sudske presude i odluke.

To je, me|utim, nedopustivo. Jedanaest godina poslije toga, Bosna iHercegovina je na putu potpisivanja Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruìva-nju s Evropskom unijom i uspostave prvih ugovornih odnosa koji }e u ko-na~nici dovesti do ~lanstva Bosne i Hercegovine u Evropskoj uniji. Bosna iHercegovina je pristupila Partnerstvu za mir i CEFTA-i, a vi{e od milion ljudivratilo se u svoje domove.

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Bosna i Hercegovina je jedna od ekonomija na Balkanu koje najbrèrastu; ona ima politi~ki sistem uspostavljen u Daytonu, i njen napredak jestalan, kao kompromis za nemo} Bosne i Hercegovine da pobjegne odzamke siroma{tva, koje je posljedica ratnog razaranja i lo{eg upravljanjanacionalisti~kih politika. To zna~i da su Bonske ovlasti u ovoj zemlji jo{potrebne. Potrebne su zbog osjetljive situacije u regionu, u Bosni iHercegovini, jer bez njih se ova zemlja ne moè kretati naprijed. Neki kaùda je me|unarodna zajednica zauzela mjesto politi~kih stranaka i da mi do-nosimo politi~ki te{ke reforme, a politi~ki nacionalisti~ki lideri zanemarujusvoju odgovornost.

Dozvolite mi da vam kaèm: ja znam kakve kritike dolaze s obje strane.S jedne strane, imamo kritike koje kaù: za{to niste iskoristili bonske ovlasti?Za{to ih niste koristili stalno? Mo`da se sje}ate da je me|unarodna zajedni-ca donijela ~vrstu odluku da se zatvori OHR krajem juna ove godine. I to jedatum na koji sam i ja ra~unao, jer sam smatrao da misiju treba ispuniti dokraja 2006. godine ili u prvom ili drugom kvartalu ove godine. To je biozaista ~vrst stav svih dràva ~lanica me|unarodne zajednice i mislim da je tobilo ispravno: dati jedan prelazni period dok je OHR jo{ prisutan, a ne dase stalno donose odre|ene odluke umjesto da to ~ine odgovorni ljudi,odgovorni politi~ari u ovoj zemlji, dok OHR kao institucija ne bi vi{e imaoiste ovlasti.

Kada je uvedena ova promjena u na{u politiku, ja sam zapravo na sa-mom po~etku mog dolaska èlio pokazati koliko je bitno da politi~ari buduzreli i da preuzmu na{u ulogu. Bosna i Hercegovina je na putu prema Ev-ropskoj uniji, i ova zemlja ve} sudjeluje u tom pripremnom procesu. Spo-razum o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju }e biti potpisan ~im se ispune svi uvjeti.Ovdje imamo predsjednika Vije}a Evropske unije, a to je ambasador Nje-ma~ke u Bosni i Hercegovini. Mislim da zapravo niko ne moè ni zamislitikoliko smo sati proveli zajedno kako bismo rije{ili situaciju prouzrokovanusada{njom politi~kom retorikom i poku{ali da jasno definiramo uvjete dooktobra 2006. godine. Evropska unija }e i dalje u~estvovati i biti uklju~enau promociji dru{tva u zemljama budu}im ~lanicama Evropske unije i ovo jezaista faza u kojoj sveobuhvatne reforme treba zavr{iti i prevazi}i sve pos-toje}e prepreke.

Izazov za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, kao postkonfliktno dru{tvo, jeste poli-ti~ka integracija u Evropsku uniju, a u isto vrijeme to predstavlja jedini modelza trajni mir na ovom podru~ju zapadnog Balkana. Pridruìvanje Evropskojuniji je promijenilo politi~ko djelovanje u ovoj zemlji, a sinergije u cijelomregionu Zapadnog Balkana treba iskoristiti kako bi se sve zemlje pribliìle

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Evropskoj uniji. Tako|er je potrebno uloìti resurse kako bi se pomoglozemljama zapadnog Balkana da {to prije postanu ~lanice Evropske unije.

Me|utim, sve ovo }e ovisiti i o spremnosti i èlji lokalnih aktera dau~estvuju u ovim procesima, i Bosna i Hercegovina }e se pridruìti konvo-ju zemalja koje se spremaju za Evropsku uniju. Crna Gora se priprema. [tose ti~e Kosova, rje{enje vi{e tamo nije veliki problem i znamo da ne}e bitidobro ukoliko samo ova zemlja, koja je najvi{e propatila u proteklom ratu,bude posljednja zemlja koja }e se priklju~iti Evropskoj uniji. Sada je zadatakna politi~kim liderima da pomognu Bosni i Hercegovini.

Nj. E. Michael Schmunk, ambasador Savezne Republike Njema~ke isada{njeg Predsjedni{tva Evropske unije u Bosni i Hercegovini

Gospodine Visoki predstavni~e, dame i gospodo,

dozvolite mi, prije svega, da se zahvalim Fondaciji Heinrich Böll za orga-nizaciju ove konferencije, koja se desila u pravom trenutku i na kojoj seokupilo toliko uvaènih eksperata. Meni je izuzetna ~ast {to sam pozvan davam se odmah na po~etku konferencije obratim. Tema i sredi{nje pitanjeove konferencije i dalje su izuzetno va`ni: da li je doprinos me|unarodnezajednice procesu izgradnje mira, nacije i dràve u Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH)uistinu odgovaraju}i, djelotvoran i odrìv? Poku{at }u dati odgovor iz vlasti-tog iskustva koje sam stekao u ovoj zemlji, kao i iz 'lekcija' koje sam nau~iorade}i u pet poslijeratnih dru{tava na raznim stranama svijeta. Tako|er }upoku{ati iskoristiti i iskustvo ste~eno tokom istraìvanja koje sam kaoznanstvenik Harvarda obavio vezano za temu izgradnje mira, nacije i dràve2005/2006. godine. [to se ti~e analize trenutne politi~ke situacije, svakako,nema se mnogo toga dodati na ono {to je ve} danas izloìo na{ prijatelj, dr.Christian Schwarz-Schilling – u potpunosti dijelim njegovo mi{ljenje.

Od po~etka hiljadu devetsto devedesetih godina svjedoci smo va`ne pro-mjene paradigme na planu me|unarodne sigurnosti. Pomo} u izgradnji mira,nacije i dràve propalim dràvama i poslijeratnim dru{tvima postala je i oba-veza i prioritet zapadnih vanjskih i sigurnosnih politika. Sve vi{e takozvane„koalicije sposobnih i politi~ki voljnih” poku{avaju iza}i nakraj s problemompropalih dràva i dru{tava koja su doìvjela kolaps. Ta nastojanja u pravcustabilizacije i rekonstrukcije pratila su novu vrstu me|unarodne intervencije,~iji je cilj bio zaustaviti brutalne napade na nedu`ne civile, kao i genocid imasovne povrede ljudskih prava. Kada smo zakora~ili u takva nastojanja,

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Pozdravni govori


imali smo vrlo malo iskustva u pogledu onoga {to sa svoje strane trebamodoprinijeti, te kako to uraditi na pravi na~in. Na{i priru~nici o temi izgradnjemira, nacije i dràve nisu nam pruìli mnogo savjeta, a u kutijama za alat kojismo imali na raspolaganju nedostajalo je djelotvornih instrumenata. Morampriznati da svi mi skupa nismo bili dovoljno pripremljeni za toliko zahtjevanzadatak. Prije dvanaest godina, ustvari, Bosna i Hercegovina je postala na{prvi 'slu~aj' izgradnje mira, nacije i dràve – 'majka' na{eg anga`mana na Ko-sovu, u Isto~nom Timoru, Makedoniji, Afganistanu i na Srednjem istoku, kojije uslijedio ne{to kasnije. Kako su godine odmicale, uspijevali smo prilagodi-ti svoje koncepte, usavr{iti svoje priru~nike i stvoriti bolje instrumente.

Me|utim, upravo u Bosni i Hercegovini suo~ili smo se s ograni~enjimame|unarodne, odnosno 'izvanjske' pomo}i u izgradnji mira, nacije i dràve.U po~etku, na{e intervencije u Bosni i Hercegovini imale su dva cilja: zaus-taviti etnonacionalisti~ko krvoproli}e i masovne povrede ljudskih prava, idrugo, ponovo ujediniti i reintegrirati podijeljeno bosanskohercegova~kodru{tvo nakon sukoba – uvesti ljudska i gra|anska prava, vladavinu prava idemokratiju. Osnovni koncepti s kojima smo po~eli ovaj proces bili su Dej-tonski i Va{ingtonski sporazum. I jedan i drugi su obavili dobar posao – su-kob obiljeèn nasiljem je uspje{no zaustavljen, s perspektivnom odrìvosti.

Me|utim, poslijeratni poredak pokazao se nedovoljnim za uspostavlja-nje pomirenog, demokratskog dru{tva, imunog na propadanje a spremnogza ispunjavanje vrijednosti i standarda Evropske unije, kako bi ~lanstvoBosne i Hercegovine u njoj bilo ostvarivo. Saradnja na pitanjima pomo}i uizgradnji mira, nacije i dràve izme|u Bosanaca i Hercegovaca i me|unaro-dne zajednice dovela je do velikog broja dobrih rezultata – napredak u sta-bilizaciji, rekonstrukciji i reformama bio je vi{e nego o~igledan. Posebno jeveliki uspjeh postignut u procesu fizi~ke rekonstrukcije, pokretanja privredei izgradnje institucija. Me|utim, vremenom smo postali svjesni ograni~enja skojima se suo~avamo u izgradnji mira, nacije i dràve kada se radilo otemeljnijim problemima propalog bosanskohercegova~kog dru{tva. Jo{ uvi-jek je potrebno rje{avati vjersko-etni~ke podjele, nedefinirana individualnaprava i nedovoljno razvijenu ulogu civilnog dru{tva u BiH. I to dru{tvo i me-|unarodna zajednica do sada nisu ostvarili uspjeh na polju izgradnje povje-renja i po~etka procesa iznalaènja istine i pomirenja.

U vezi s tim, na{i priru~nici za izgradnju mira, nacije i dràve i na{e kuti-je s alatom nisu nam ponudili ono {to je bilo potrebno na terenu. Osim toga,potrebno je mnogo vi{e kreativnosti – kreativnosti koja, naàlost, nedostajei Bosancima i Hercegovcima i me|unarodnoj zajednici. Ali, to nas ne oslo-ba|a odgovornosti i to ne zna~i da ne treba kvalitetnije raditi. Jedna stvar

16

Pozdravni govori


ipak mora biti vrlo jasna u ovom kontekstu – najve}a odgovornost u ovompogledu prvenstveno leì na bosanskohercegova~kom dru{tvu. [irok pros-tor za vo|stvo i vlastitu odgovornost, koji je omogu}io Visoki predstavnik uproteklih godinu i po dana, prakti~no nije uop}e iskori{ten.

Me|unarodna zajednica nije savr{ena kada se radi o zadatku postavlja-nja propalog dru{tva na noge. Me|unarodna zajednica nije nikad bila niti }ebiti homogena. Nemojte nâs kriviti za na{u razli~itost – umjesto da krivitenâs, prepoznajte na{u volju da pruìmo znatnu pomo}, i to dugoro~no.Me|unarodna zajednica je pravila gre{ke, i dalje }e praviti gre{ke. Me|utim,i ovdje se slaèm s Visokim predstavnikom: Bosanci i Hercegovci jedno-stavno ~ine sebi ìvot lak{im time {to svu krivicu prebacuju na me|unaro-dnu zajednicu. Mi konstantno vr{imo procjene i prilagodbe u nastojanju dapobolj{amo svoje koncepte, svoje instrumente i svoj cjelokupni rad naizgradnji mira, nacije i dràve. Daleko bitnije od toga, me|utim, jeste nasto-janje koje dolazi iz samog poslijeratnog dru{tva. Prava izgradnja nacije tre-balo bi da bude posao i politi~kog vo|stva Bosne i Hercegovine i gra|anaove zemlje. Da, izborno tijelo mora biti odgovorno – rezignirano povla~enjeu sferu privatnosti i porodi~nog ìvota politi~ki je opasno i nedemokratsko.

Sloìo bih se da je takozvani pristup „od vrha prema bazi”, kada se radio reformama u ovoj zemlji, dobrano propao. Izgleda kao da je u proteklihdvanaest godina me|unarodna zajednica mo`da previ{e fokusirala svojanastojanja i podr{ku na lidere politi~kih stranaka i vi{e du`nosnike. Rezultattoga je, manje-vi{e, samoblokada na bosanskohercegova~koj strani i para-liziranje BiH ve} neko vrijeme. Jedan od najnegativnijih rezultata te samo-blokade je neuspjeh Bosne i Hercegovine da se blagovremeno uklju~i u pro-ces stabilizacije i pridruìvanja – ~ime riskira da je 'prestignu' neki od njenihsusjeda u natjecanju da postanu punopravni ~lanovi Evropske unije jedno-ga dana. Kada pogledamo rezultate nedavno provedenih anketa u BiH,o~igledan je cilj koji pred sobom ima velika ve}ina gra|ana ove zemlje –potpuna integracija BiH u EU {to je prije mogu}e. Otuda i moj dojam, otkadsam do{ao u ovu zemlju pro{le godine, da takozvani pristup „od baze premavrhu”, kada se radi o izgradnji mira, nacije i dràve, zahtijeva daleko ve}iprioritet s na{e strane. To je ve} urodilo rezultatima na op}inskom nivou, nakojem je pragmati~an, neideolo{ki rad pokazao kako bi se zemlja eventual-no mogla kretati u pravom smjeru. Bilo je ohrabruju}e vidjeti da je naop}inskom nivou ideja multietni~ke saradnje napredovala daleko vi{e negona entitetskom i dràvnom nivou. Govore}i u ime Njema~ke, ali i u imeEvropske unije, mogu kazati da smo do{li do zaklju~ka da je potrebnopruìti daleko vi{e politi~ke, stru~ne i finansijske podr{ke gradovima i seli-

17

Pozdravni govori


ma {irom Bosne i Hercegovine kako bi te op}ine, koje rade na integriran,nenacionalisti~ki na~in, mogle postati 'kvasac' procesa politi~ke reformeBiH.

Da naglasim: izgradnja nacije je prvenstveno osnovna du`nost zemlje,dru{tva. Me|unarodni, vanjski graditelj nacije nikad to ne smije zaboraviti.Vanjski graditelj nacije trebalo bi da koncentrira svoju pomo} na one oblastiu kojima poslijeratno dru{tvo ne moè uspjeti bez pomo}i izvana. Ta „crve-na linija” nikad se ne smije pre}i. Samoobuzdavanje u izgradnji mira, nacijei dràve je klju~no. Naàlost, anga`man me|unarodne zajednice u mnogimnaporima koju su za cilj imali stabilizaciju i rekonstrukciju pokazali su daovo „~eli~no pravilo” nije uvijek po{tovano.

Tokom svog nedavnog obra}anja na ceremoniji obiljeàvanja pedesetegodi{njice Evropske unije istakao sam dvije klju~ne oblasti u kojima samiBosanci i Hercegovci treba da pokaù vi{e inicijative. Jedna se odnosi nastvaranje „dru{tvenog ljepila” koje je potrebno u svakom pojedinom dru{tvukako bi se stvorila zemlja, ako ne i nacija. To podrazumijeva izgradnjudaleko vitalnijeg civilnog dru{tva od onoga koje danas imamo. Drugi potre-ban sastojak su djelotvorni, demokratski osnovni zakoni orijentirani na stan-darde EU i politi~ki poredak u BiH. Krajnje je vrijeme da se do sada ne-djelotvorni dejtonski poredak zamijeni modernim, manje kompleksnim i jef-tinijim ustavom. Me|unarodna zajednica, prije svega Njema~ka i EU, ~vrstosu obe}ale da }e obezbijediti okvir za proces pisanja ustava, bilo da su toeksperti ili finansijska podr{ka. A sada je na Parlamentu Bosne i Hercegovi-ne i na politi~kim strankama da usaglase put i su{tinu.

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Pozdravni govori


1. UTICAJ ME\UNARODNE ZAJEDNICE NA POLITI^KIRAZVOJ BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE



UVODNO IZLAGANJE

Nermina [a~i}, Fakultet politi~kih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu

Dozvolite mi da vas sve toplo pozdravim i da kaèm da mi je zaista zado-voljstvo prisustvovati dana{njem skupu, jer smatram da je tema o kojojdanas razgovaramo veoma bitna za budu}nost i razvoj bosanskohercego-va~ke demokratije.

Najprije, jedna re~enica o metodolo{kom pristupu. U svome tekstupoku{ala sam se vi{e osloniti na empirijsku argumentaciju, bez neke veliketeorijske naracije. Ipak, odmah na po~etku èlim da s vama podijelim neketeorijske dileme, a nakon toga }u izvu}i samo zaklju~ke koje sam crpila izempirijske argumentacije. Za po~etak, evo prve moje dileme.

S obzirom da govorimo o pojmu me|unarodna zajednica, èlim prvoukazati na to da se radi o pojmu koji figurira u javnoj upotrebi, ali njegovoznanstveno odre|enje, barem u literaturi koja se bavi ovim pitanjima, nijedo kraja odre|eno. Zbog toga èlim problematizirati sljede}e pitanje: [ta jeto me|unarodna zajednica? [ta je to me|unarodna zajednica u Bosni iHercegovini? Ko je predstavlja? Jesu li to Ujedinjene nacije? Jesu li to pri-marno ~lanice Evropske unije i Ruska Federacija? Jesu li to SjedinjeneAmeri~ke Dràve i NATO, SFOR, itd.? Da li su to OHR, OSCE, EUPM i nekedruge vladine i nevladine organizacije? Da li je to MMF, svjetska banka,WTO, predstavnici ambasada, me|unarodne korporacije i drugi?

Naravno, poku{ala sam definirati ovaj pojam i, evo, mogu samo primi-jetiti: kada kaèm „me|unarodna zajednica”, referiram na skup razli~itihanglosaksonskih i evropskokontinentalnih politi~kih aran`mana o rje{ava-nju bosanskohercegova~kog problema, izme|u kojih - nadam se da }ete sesvi ovdje sloìti - zaista postoje neke teorijske proturje~nosti kada govorimoo pogledu na demokratiju, na naciju, na dràvu, i o tome }emo govoriti udiskusiji.

Me|utim, politi~ka participacija i odlu~ivanje o sudbini Bosne i Hercego-vine, posebno u Dejtonu, problematizira pitanje da li je Bosna i Hercegovinapoluprotektorat ili stvarni protektorat me|unarodne zajednice, i da li je onau tom smislu i ogledalo fundamentalne napetosti izme|u evropske i ameri-~ke politike? Moèmo re}i da najve}a specifi~nost me|unarodne zajednicejeste upravo njeno djelovanje pod drugima. „Djelovanje pod drugima” nagla-{avam, dakle po diktatu izmje{tenih centara geopoliti~ke i geoekonomskemo}i, ~iji su predstavnici direktno ili indirektno uklju~eni u bosanskoherce-gova~ki politi~ki ìvot, me|unarodnoj zajednici daje legitimitet da pomogne

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Uticaj me|unarodne zajednice na politi~ki razvoj Bosne i Hercegovine


u razvoju institucija jednakosti gra|ana, kao i mehanizama za za{titu osnov-nih prava i sloboda gra|ana Bosne i Hercegovine, ali onih koje korespondi-raju sa svjetskim standardima.

Sa stajali{ta me|unarodnih odnosa, procesa globalizacije i politika veli-kih sila, me|unarodnu zajednicu moèmo doìvjeti i kao izvjestan eksperi-ment, kojem je cilj po~eti izgradnju prakti~nog modela svjetskog dru{tvakroz sistem globalnog upravljanja u lokalnoj zajednici. Mislim na politi~koangaòvanje razli~itih institucija me|unarodne zajednice u svjetskoj lokalnojzajednici Bosni i Hercegovini. Postoje mi{ljenja, u teoriji, da je Bosna i Her-cegovina prva autenti~na dràva Europske unije, prvenstveno zbog institu-cija Europske unije koje djeluju izvan svojih mati~nih nacionalnih okvira -govorim o EUFOR-u, EUPM-u i tako dalje. To me|unarodnu zajednicu svodina realizaciju nacionalnih interesa imperijalnih sila. U prvoj fazi postdejton-ske Bosne i Hercegovine biljeìmo ja~i ameri~ki uticaj, dok u drugoj fazipostdejtonske Bosne i Hercegovine biljeìmo kona~no prisustvo i budnostEvrope.

Generalno, me|unarodna zajednica jeste uloìla ogromne napore u tran-ziciji, posebno u Bosni i Hercegovini, ali ~ini mi se, ne u onoj klasi~nojtranziciji koju su pro{le druge zemlje, dakle tranziciji prema punoj trì{nojekonomiji, parlamentarnoj dràvi i uop}e civilnom dru{tvu, ve} u tranziciji,i to èlim naglasiti - u tranziciji iz rata u mir. S obzirom da ta tranzicija trajeduè nego {to se o~ekivalo, zaista pozdravljam ovaj dana{nji skup i ~ini mise da je opravdano govoriti o ovoj temi. Opravdano je, dakle, napraviti bi-lans u~inaka me|unarodne zajednice u proteklih dvanaest godina u Bosni iHercegovini.

Pre}i }u sada na empirijsku argumentaciju. Dakle, analizirala sam neko-liko politi~kih segmenata dru{tva u okviru kojih su se provodile reformekoje je pomagala me|unarodna zajednica. Rije~ je o zakonodavnoj, sudskoj,medijskoj i reformi unutar politi~kih stranaka i civilnog dru{tva. I evozaklju~aka do kojih sam do{la. Naime, da bi se premostile blokade u zako-nodavnim tijelima koje su uzrokovale (nama je to poznato) etnopoliti~kestranke, Visokom predstavniku data su posebna ovla{tenja, takozvane Bon-ske ovlasti. Nametnuto je niz zakonskih rje{enja iz razli~itih oblasti, kao i od-luka; da podsjetim, odluke o uvo|enju jedinstvene valute, jedinstvenih regi-starskih oznaka, pa nametanje zakona o himni, zastavi i tako dalje. Me|utim,u dono{enju tih novih zakonskih rje{enja ima nedostataka, koji uglavnomleè u ~injenici da su se ta zakonska rje{enja donosila bez konsultacije sa{irom dru{tvenom javno{}u. Isti je slu~aj i sa Dejtonom. Ilustrativan primjerbio je Nacrt Izbornog zakona, koji je dobio podr{ku svih glavnih aktera

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me|unarodne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini. On je dva puta nai{ao naskoro jedinstveno odbijanje doma}ih pravnih eksperata. Opozicione strankenisu bile predstavljene i nisu participirale u dono{enju izbornih pravila, togase moèmo sjetiti. Dakle, klju~ni mehanizam razvoja bosanskohercegova~kedemokratije - izborni sistem, ostao je diskriminiraju}i za gra|ane Bosne iHercegovine. On je kao takav, po mom mi{ljenju, legitimirao etnopoliti~kidru{tveni poredak u kojem etni~ke elite, a ne narodi koje one predstavljaju,imaju monopol nad Bosnom i Hercegovinom i njenim gra|anima.

Najve}i prioritet me|unarodne zajednice u reformskim oblastima odno-sio se i na uspostavljanje nezavisnog sudstva i izgradnju vladavine prava.Veliki napredak postignut je i u razvoju institucija, naro~ito uvo|enjem infor-macionih tehnologija. Me|unarodna zajednica je, treba tako|er podsjetiti,omogu}ila i osigurala konstituisanje i nesmetano funkcionisanje Ustavnogsuda Bosne i Hercegovine, i pomogla je u formiranju raznih instituta zaobuku sudija, te u formiranju nekih pravnih udruènja. U drugom panelu,koji }e se baviti pravnim aspektom, ~ut }emo vi{e o tome. Me|utim, meneovdje zanima (i u ovoj studiji je to, tako|er, nagla{eno) ovo: da li je do poli-tiziranja do{lo s me|unarodne strane? Naime, nepristrano i nezavisno sud-stvo, odnosno njegovo depolitiziranje bilo je uslov za primanje Bosne iHercegovine u Vije}e Evrope. Me|utim, prema me|unarodnim standardima,ono podrazumijeva eliminaciju svih utjecaja na sudstvo koji mogu bitiizvr{eni izvana, pri ~emu se pod onim 'izvana' misli zaista na sve i svakogaizvan sudske vlasti. Iako danas postoji pravni okvir koji bi trebao eliminisatipoliti~ke pritiske na sudstvo, mogli bismo govoriti i o njihovoj izloènostipritiscima me|unarodne zajednice.

Nekoliko rije~i i o medijskoj reformi. Me|unarodna zajednica je biladuboko uklju~ena u reformu medijske scene nakon dono{enja Dejtonskogmirovnog sporazuma. Pod uticajem nacionalnih oligarhija, u vrijeme rata navojno osvojenim ili sa~uvanim teritorijama nastala su tri tehni~ki, programs-ki i statusno odvojena RTV sistema. Znamo da su mediji iz Srbije i Hrvatskenesmetano {irili svoj utjecaj i interese svojih dràva na prostoru Bosne iHercegovine. Me|unarodna zajednica }e zbog toga, u prvoj fazi svojepomo}i podràti medijsku ekspanziju, prvenstveno svojim obilnim donaci-jama medijima koji su tvrdili da afirmiraju nezavisnu orijentaciju. Cilj me|u-narodne intervencije bilo je, dakle, stvaranje pluralizma medija. Me|utim,pitanje je da li je on zaista doprinio demokratizaciji i profesionalizaciji medij-ske scene u Bosni i Hercegovini? Dakle, uprkos dobroj finansijskoj voljime|unarodne zajednice, prvi poslijeratni period obiljeèn je verbalnim ra-tom koji se vodio preko medija. Godine 1998. me|unarodna zajednica }e

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otvoriti proces transformacije dràvne radio i TV stanice u javni servis. Njegaje, tako|er, da se podsjetimo, nametnuo svojim odlukama i zakonima Visokipredstavnik nakon neuspjelih poku{aja da taj posao urade doma}e vlasti,menad`ment i uredni{tva postoje}ih RTV sistema. Nametnuto je da u Bosnii Hercegovini rade dvije entitetske radio i TV stanice i javni servis za cijeluBosnu i Hercegovinu. Time je medijski prostor, po mom mi{ljenju, zaista for-malno-pravno entitetizovan, pri ~emu je izgubljen kontinuitet Radio-televizi-je Sarajevo, koja je osnovana 1945. godine. Mi smo pro{le godine u Sarajevuobiljeàvali pet godina postojanja Federalne televizije i pet godina postoja-nja Javnog servisa Bosne i Hercegovine. Dakle, u okviru zakonskih rje{enja,medijska reforma je zaista na zavidnom nivou u odnosu na druge zemlje izregiona, pa ~ak i u odnosu na susjede, na Srbiju i na Hrvatsku. Uzmimosamo Zakon o slobodi pristupa informacijama. Me|utim, ako pogledamopraksu, o~evidan je nedostatak strategije, dakle, primjene tog zakona. On jefakti~ki samo formalno na papiru, a u praksi se uop}e ne primjenjuje.

Jo{ nekoliko rije~i i o civilnom dru{tvu. Pod sintagmom 'razvoj civilnogdru{tva' me|unarodna zajednica je uglavnom podrazumijevala davanje podr{kerazvoju i radu nevladinih organizacija, ~esto previ|aju}i da je civilno dru{tvomnogo {ire od nevladinog sektora. Iskustva drugih zemalja pokazuju dademokratizaciju nose i iznose, barem tako teorija kaè, i neke druge gra-|anske grupe: sindikati, udruènja mladih, udruènja penzionera i druge. Uposljednjim godinama primje}ujemo smanjenje me|unarodne pomo}i u Bo-sni i Hercegovini i prebacivanje fokusa interesovanja na neke druge zemlje,neke druge krizne regione kao {to je, naprimjer, Kosovo. Zbog toga je do{lodo zna~ajnog zastoja u razvoju mnogih nevladinih organizacija koje, ~ini mise, a i empirija tako govori, nisu razvile strategiju nastavka razvoja nakon ne-stanka pomo}i me|unarodne zajednice. Kriti~ari navode da su mnoge nevla-dine organizacije poprili~no udaljene od dru{tva i gra|ana, {to je svojevrsnaparadoksalna posljedica pomo}i civilnom dru{tvu. @arko Papi} nas upozoravada metod podr{ke pokriva veoma, veoma malu elitu.

I evo, na kraju, mo`da je ovo zapravo klju~ni problem koji sprje~ava ve-}u efikasnost me|unarodne zajednice: naime, me|unarodna zajednica po-ku{ala je demokratizovati nacionaliste u Bosni i Hercegovini. S velikim na-porom se zaista spoznaje da bosanskohercegova~ke elite opstaju na vlastizahvaljuju}i podsticaju, ovo nagla{avam - podsticaju nesigurnosti, sukoba inestabilnosti. One kao takve ne mogu producirati stabilnost jer opstaju navode}oj poziciji upravo zahvaljuju}i konfliktu. Kada su tri nacionalne strankeu Bosni i Hercegovini - SDA, HDZ i SDS - pod me|unarodnim pritiskombile prisiljene ublaìti nacionalisti~ku retoriku, rivali unutar nacionalnih

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blokova, Stranka za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, HDZ 1990. i SNSD prisvojili su tajvokabular, {to im se isplatilo na izborima 2006. godine. Postoje mi{ljenja daposljednji izbori uop}e nisu pokazali da su najradikalnije stranke postaleumjerene nego da su najradikalnije upravo umjerene stranke. Zbog toga imavi{e razloga za tvrdnju da je u Bosni i Hercegovini do{lo do radikalizacijenacionalizma prije nego do njegovog smanjivanja.

Me|unarodnoj zajednici, ~ini se, kao da je nedostajala informacija da ratu Bosni i Hercegovini nije bio produkt etni~ke drevne mr`nje koja je vladalana ovim prostorima, ve} da je isti uvezen i da nije imao uzroke u samojzemlji. Etni~ko ~i{}enje je bilo cilj ratova, a ne njihova posljedica. Povrataknije bio mogu} upravo zbog toga {to se nije slomila politika koja je isplani-rala etni~ko ~i{}enje; povratak nije osiguran jer nisu uklonjeni politi~ki na-logodavci etni~kog ~i{}enja, a da ne govorimo o hap{enju ratnih zlo~inacaRadovana Karadì}a i Ratka Mladi}a. Zato mislim da me|unarodna zajedni-ca danas potpuno ignori{e pitanje konstitutivnih manjina smatraju}i povra-tak u Bosni i Hercegovini zavr{enom pri~om. Postoje naznake, i to smo ve}~uli, da }e me|unarodna zajednica smanjiti svoj anga`man; me|utim, neko-liko autora spominje da je me|unarodna zajednica zapravo i umorna. Bezobzira na to, Vije}e za implementaciju mira u Briselu odlu~ilo je da OHR iBonske ovlasti ostaju do juna 2008. godine, jer pomaci u smjeru evropskihintegracija u protekloj godini nisu bili dovoljni. Mandat OHR-a je produèn- nagla{avam, ~ini mi se i zbog sazrijevanja svijesti i unutar same me|una-rodne zajednice da su Bosni i Hercegovini zaista potrebne ustavne reforme.Zahvaljuju}i etniciziranom Ustavu, pa samim tim i etniciziranom pravu kojeje dobilo dovoljno vremena za promid`bu, afirmacija prava individue je pot-puno izostala. Mislim da ovaj uvaèni skup zna o kojim ustavnim odredba-ma govorim i nema potrebe da ih ponavljam.

@elim samo naglasiti da su prevagu u bosanskohercegova~kom dru{tvu,naàlost, odnijela etni~ka, odnosno kolektivna prava, za koja su se najglas-nije zalagali predstavnici etni~kih elita, predsjednici nacionalnih stranaka uBiH. S obzirom da je me|unarodno partnerstvo sa doma}im etno-politi~kimstrankama trajalo dulje, svaka od njih je imala dovoljno vremena da zago-vara upravo ovaj mirovni proces kao svrhu politi~kog ìvota u Bosni i Her-cegovini, a ne mir kao politi~ku vrijednosnu orijentaciju.

Etno-politi~ari su danas gospodari mirovnog procesa i oni tako kontroli{ui rat i mir u Bosni i Hercegovini, {to je istovremeno negacija demokratskihprincipa i latentna destrukcija bosanske dràve.

Evo kako to izgleda u postdejtonskoj politi~koj praksi, tj. kako etno-elitegledaju na mirovni proces, pa samim tim i na me|unarodnu zajednicu.

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Bo{nja~ka politi~ka javnost egzistira na tezi da je me|unarodna zajednicaprisilila gra|ane Bosne i Hercegovine da prihvate entitetsku podjelu, te datakva struktura Bosne i Hercegovine nema ni historijskog, ni ekonomskog,niti ekonomsko-geografskog opravdanja, i da su jedino upori{te za nastajan-je takve Bosne i Hercegovine agresija i genocid. Srpska politi~ka javnostsmatra da je Republika Srpska stekla i odràla teritorijalni i legalni kontinu-itet od devedeset i druge do danas, te da ista nije, kao {to Bo{njaci i Hrvatismatraju, nastala Dejtonskim mirovnim sporazumom, nego da je istim veri-ficirana i da zbog toga postojanje Republike Srpske ne moè biti dovedenou pitanje. Hrvatska, pak, politi~ka javnost smatra da je Dejtonski sporazumotvorio hrvatsko nacionalno pitanje tako {to je me|unarodne odnose ure-dio na {tetu hrvatskog naroda. Nezadovoljstvo se poku{ava rije{iti zahtjevi-ma za uspostavljanje tre}eg entiteta, koji bi trebalo promatrati „kao logi~an,opravdan i pravedan” programski cilj hrvatskog naroda u Bosni i Herce-govini sve dotle dok je ona entitetski ure|ena i dok u njoj postoji RepublikaSrpska.

U ovako politi~ki dezorijentisanom sistemu vrijednosti, ovakve centrifu-galne, divergentne, reducirane javnosti - koje su posljedica politi~kog suko-ba u Bosni i Hercegovini u vezi s teritorijalnim, administrativnim i pravno-po-liti~kim ustrojstvom Bosne i Hercegovine - djeluju razaraju}e na bosansko-hercegova~ku politiku i uop}e na bosanskohercegova~ke politi~ke slobode.

Ako je suditi po kontroverzama vezanim za ustavne reforme - posebnoone koje su propale u bosanskohercegova~kom Parlamentu - onda je po-novno jednakost gra|ana uglavnom ostavljena pritisku izvana. Takvi politi-~ki sukobi koje imamo u Bosni i Hercegovini sigurno umanjuju i efikasnostme|unarodne zajednice. Treba biti po{ten pa re}i da je Dejton zapravoograni~io i njenu ulogu. Naime, u postoje}em Ustavu bosanskohercegova-~ko dru{tvo, kao pretpostavljeni nosilac suvereniteta, nije koncipirano kaocjelina nego kao mehani~ki zbir tri konstitutivna naroda koji su, opet, na ne-ki na~in projektovani kao nosioci suvereniteta. Dakle, konstitutivni narodisu koncipirani kao tri zasebne etnonacionalne cjeline koje, po logici ugra-|enoj u Ustavu, u perspektivi funkcioniraju kao odvojeno dru{tvo sa vlasti-tim suverenitetom.

Ustavna ograni~enja sprije~ila su i me|unarodnu zajednicu u razvojumehanizama za za{titu ljudskih prava i sloboda. Tako nam se ~ini da je OHRdanas nova bosanskohercegova~ka politi~ka institucija.

Me|unarodna zajednica je zamijenila dràvu u ulozi novog patrona; kao{to se nekada u socijalizmu o~ekivalo da svemogu}a dràva rje{ava prob-leme gra|ana, preduze}a i lokalnih zajednica, danas se to isto o~ekuje od

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me|unarodne zajednice. Nametanje mnogih zakona od Visokog predstavni-ka, s jedne strane, umanjuje povjerenje bosanskohercegova~kih gra|ana ukompetencije vlasti tako da se ~esto doga|alo da odre|ene grupe protestu-ju i traè pomo} ne od doma}ih institucija nego od OHR-a na primjer. Dakle,iz }orsokaka etni~ki monolitnog identiteta koji je legaliziran ustavnim odred-bama bilo je te{ko raditi na dràvljanskom identitetu ~ak i za predstavnikeme|unarodne zajednice. [tavi{e, veoma mali broj predstavnika me|unaro-dne zajednice pridavao je va`nost tome da bi bilo neophodno pripomo}iuspjehu misaone alternative identiteta na temelju dràvljanstva. îni mi seda bi koncept dràvljanskog identiteta mo`da mogao vratiti izgubljeno po-vjerenje gra|ana u dràvu, koja je du`na da {titi sve svoje gra|ane na jed-nak na~in.

êste smjene aktualnih politi~ara od visokih predstavnika za BiH zaistasu ohrabrivale jedan dio populacije, tako da je poraslo povjerenje u me|u-narodnu zajednicu koje je izgubljeno u ratu - nadam se da }ete se sloìti samnom - na svim stranama.

Kod nekih politi~kih stranaka koji su bili meta Visokog predstavnika,odnosno njihovih lidera, poja~an je strah tako da se njihova odgovornostvi{e usmjeravala prema OHR-u, a ne prema gra|anima koji su ih tu izabrali.Bilo je i onih politi~kih stranaka koje su takve smjene iskoristile za vlastitepredizborne kampanje, pa su smijenjeni postali miljenici samo zato {to ihstranci ne vole.

Me|unarodna zajednica je, bez sumnje, mnogo pomogla Bosni i Herce-govini. Me|utim, nije uvijek bila funkcionalna, a da bi bila funkcionalna, pomom mi{ljenju, morala bi rije{iti strukturalni problem Bosne i Hercegovine,a to je slamanje politike etni~kog ~i{}enja, i svih politika koje producirajusukob, nesigurnost i nestabilnost. Mislim da je onda, u skladu s tim, zaistamogu}e raditi na izgradnji ne zajedni~kih vjerovanja nego zajedni~kih insti-tucija, jer se upravo preko zajedni~kih institucija mogu rije{iti nagomilanipoliti~ki konflikti i politi~ki problemi kako na individualnom tako na kolek-tivnom planu, a to je jedini na~in da gra|ani Bosne i Hercegovine imaju jed-naka prava.

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KOMENTAR

Nj. E. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, Visoki predstavnik u Bosni iHercegovini i Specijalni predstavnik Evropske unije

Gospo|o [a~i}, prvo mi dozvolite da vam se zahvalim na Va{em dobromizlaganju u kojem ste razmotrili razli~ita pitanja. Mo`da niste iznena|eni, aliako ste upoznati s mojom karijerom ovdje, u ovoj regiji, znate da sam uvi-jek imao kriti~ko razmi{ljanje i prema me|unarodnoj zajednici, tako da semeni nije te{ko sloìti s mnogim stvarima koje ste pomenuli.

Prvo pitanje: Ko je me|unarodna zajednica? To je vrlo dobro pitanje.Moram vam re}i da kao Visoki predstavnik svaki dan u~im nove stvari ome|unarodnoj zajednici. Kada govorimo o me|unarodnoj zajednici, moramoimati u vidu jednu {iru sliku anglosaksonskog, evropskog i kontinentalnogkoncepta dràva i nacija. Dakle, sve je to jedan vrlo zanimljiv sastav razli~itihorganizacija. Me|utim, razli~ite su slike o me|unarodnoj zajednici, ovisno orazli~itim dràvama i razli~itim konfliktima. Ovdje je sagledana jedna {irokaslika, {iroka perspektiva. Me|utim, ~ak i meni je ponekad te{ko vidjeti gdjesu zaista osnovni izvori politi~ke vlasti, gdje se oni formuliraju i gdje seprovode politike me|unarodne zajednice. To je vrlo te{ko analizirati i znati{ta dolazi iz Brusselsa, {ta dolazi iz Washingtona, Londona, Berlina itd.Moram re}i da je va{e pitanje {ta je me|unarodna zajednica vrlo sloèno, ija se ne bih usudio odgovoriti na to pitanje.

Drugo, u va{oj studiji navodite da se radi o provedbi nacionalnih intere-sa imperijalisti~kih sila. Ovdje ja, zapravo, vidim neke klju~ne ta~ke. Mislimda politi~ari Bosne i Hercegovine vide me|unarodnu zajednicu kao zajed-nicu koja ima svoje interese, svoju tradiciju, svoju historiju. Me|utim, posto-je velike razlike izme|u razli~itih nacija koje su dio ove me|unarodne zajed-nice. Ako, na primjer, poku{am, a usudi}u se, napraviti odre|ene razlike: napo~etku, krajem osamdesetih i po~etkom devedesetih godina pro{log sto-lje}a, na kraju Hladnog rata, Evropa nije bila spremna preuzeti odgovornostza ovaj region na na~in na koji su to uradile Sjedinjene Ameri~ke Dràve.

No, to je ujedno bilo prvi put u historiji da je Evropa, kao unija suverenihnacija, i kao Evropska unija, trebala preuzeti takvu odgovornost. Me|utim,moramo sve to posmatrati u historijskom kontekstu. Naprimjer, Njema~ka jeimala jednu drugu poziciju. Ne moète izbje}i spominjanje nacionalizma kojije bio prisutan u toj zemlji i ne moète re}i da mi nismo imali dovoljno pot-icaja da preuzmemo odgovornost u pravo vrijeme. Isto vaì i za Veliku Bri-taniju. Britanija je imala svoj interes jer je Jugoslavija imala sli~no iskustvo

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kao {to su imali oni nakon Prvog svjetskog rata. Francuska je, s druge strane,imala sasvim druga~iju poziciju, koja je bila zvani~an, nacionalni stavFrancuske, koji se odnosio na stvaranje protunjema~ke, fa{isti~ke alijanse saSrbima. Dakle, i tu postoji historijska veza, historijski kontekst. Nijemci sunekako bili u isku{enju da potpuno nestanu sa scene jer su bili uklju~eni ugrozne stvari koje su se doga|ale u Drugom svjetskom ratu.

S druge strane, imali smo ustavni problem da u~estvujemo u razli~itimaktivnostima. Ali, ja ne smatram da su ovo bili pravi razlozi. Pravi razlozi su,zapravo, izgovori koje smo poku{avali izna}i za ono {to nismo radili. I upra-vo kao {to ste vi i rekli, spomenuli ste nacionalne interese razli~itih mo}nihdràva, i moram re}i da ste upravu, i to je ono {to sam kritizirao davno, ato je da je provedba zakona u ovoj zemlji ra|ena u jednom procesu koji jei{ao od vrha prema bazi, a ne suprotno, {to je dovelo do toga da nije bilodebate u ovoj zemlji koja bi pomogla razvoju dru{tva, i mislim da je to pravagre{ka me|unarodne zajednice.

No, bilo je i dobrih stvari, bilo je i kriti~nih pitanja. Me|utim, mi smo svjes-ni da postoje razli~iti izborni sistemi u SAD i u Evropi, i ovdje se poku{avanapraviti jedna mje{avina onoga {to je prisutno u drugim dràvama. Tako|er,spomenuli ste Ustav i citirali ne{to {to sam ja govorio i ono {to je ambasadorSchmunk ve} spomenuo. Ustav je jedna od osnovnih stvari i moram re}i danisam sretan {to je ovakva situacija u vezi s tim, ali je ovo ponovno neusp-jeh Evrope. Tek su prije dvije ili tri godine zapo~ele temeljne rasprave opromjenama Ustava. Uloga je bila dodijeljena SAD-u. A kada sam na po~etkusvog mandata postavio pitanje: „[ta }e Evropa raditi?”, vidio sam da u mommandatu uop}e ne stoji da trebam pri~ati o tome, a da ne govorim o tomeda treba da pomognem tom procesu. Ja sam se u Brusselsu borio svim sila-ma da se ovo uklju~i u moj mandat, {to sa na koncu i desilo, tako da smood po~etka marta po~eli i mi da radimo na tom pitanju. Dakle, sada }emo imi raditi na tome, naravno zajedno sa Sjedinjenim Ameri~kim Dràvama.Naravno, ne moète sada izbrisati ~injenicu da su oni po~eli raspravu o tome.I ne moèmo sada re}i: „E dobro, mi }emo odavde preuzeti i sada biti glavni”.Mi }emo to zajedno raditi u okviru mandata Specijalnog predstavnika EU, ukoordinaciji s ameri~kim mandatom i s politi~arima ove zemlje. Ali, mi znamo{ta se ovdje desilo. Bilo bi vrlo te{ko zapo~eti ustavne reforme ukoliko nijemogu}a reforma policije. Sjedinjene Ameri~ke Dràve su rekle da trebamopo~eti nakon {to se zavr{i reforma policije.

Me|utim, vidimo sad da to nije mogu}e i da se sve mora raditi paralelno.U suprotnom, ne}emo posti}i uspjeh. Mislim da je reforma Ustava jedan odnajbitnijih elemenata i mislim da }emo sada svi uloìti zajedni~ke napore.

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Me|utim, zaista smatram da Evropa nije uspjela prepoznati zna~aj otpo~inja-nja ovih pregovora, i da svi gra|ani dobiju ista prava, i da se isklju~i domi-nacija etni~kog glasanja. Sve su to elementi koje }e u su{tini promijeniti si-tuaciju u Bosni i Hercegovini. Imamo jednostavno dvije razli~ite stvari i tre-bamo na}i na~in na koji }emo ih iskombinirati. Na kraju, èlim kazati da steme zaista ohrabrili svojim dokumentom i drago mi je {to vidim da doma}iljudi to rade i da su ljudi iz ove zemlje uklju~eni u ove procese. Me|unaro-dnih studija o ovim pitanjima ima koliko god ho}ete. Zato mi je bitno daintelektualci ove zemlje, da ljudi poput vas, rade na ovim pitanjima. I mojzahtjev svima vama je da vi, intelektualci ove zemlje, preuzimate va`nijuulogu u politi~kim diskusijama koje se vode. Tek u ovoj kombinaciji mo-èmo vidjeti kako se moè utjecati na politi~ke stranke kroz pritisak civilnogdru{tva i njegovih organizacija. I drago mi je {to moèmo re}i da se sve vi{ei vi{e glasova ~uje upravo sa te strane i da se sve vi{e vide ove aktivnostikoje vi preduzimate da biste napravili va{u studiju. Svima vama ~estitam.

Zlatko Dizdarevi}, novinar i diplomata

Kako danas ovdje nisam u funkciji predstavnika nijedne organizacije nitizajednice, a ne pripadam ni akademskoj zajednici koja se bavi ovim pita-njem, sve {to }u re}i bit }e prezentovano iz ne{to druga~ije perspektive,vjerovatno iz prili~no specifi~nog ugla. Na samom po~etku èlim kazati davjerujem kako je ova konferencija vrlo va`na, a radi se o temi o kojoj imamnogo razloga raspravljati.

Kada kaèm 'mi', tu podrazumijevam i strance, me|unarodne predstav-nike, podjednako kao i doma}e predstavnike. Jer jednog dana, a nemam ni-kakvih iluzija da }e se to dogoditi uskoro, doznat }e se potpuna istina otome {ta je me|unarodna zajednica – ma {ta mi pod tim podrazumijevali –uradila u Bosni i Hercegovini za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, ali ni{ta manje i zasamu sebe. Istina }e, uvjeren sam, biti u mnogim elementima druga~ija odsvega {to znamo i govorimo sada. Vrijeme }e na neka pitanja baciti druga~ijesvjetlo od ovog danas i bit }e interesantno vidjeti u budu}nosti koja }e vrstaistine o svemu biti relevantna.

Dozvolite mi u uvodu da tako|er kaèm da ne pripadam ljudima kojivjeruje da je me|unarodna zajednica kriva za sve {to se ovdje dogodilo.Li~no vjerujem da je na{e „pravo na krivicu” za sve {to se de{avalo prili~noekskluzivno. To se pravo odnosi na sve nas koji ìvimo u ovom regionu. Nekrivim, dakle, me|unarodnu zajednicu za sve ono {to nam se dogodilo.

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Imam mnogo rigoroznije mi{ljenje o nama samima nego o me|unarodnojzajednici, ali je ~injenica da je me|unarodna zajednica tema dana{nje kon-ferencije, pa zato mislim da se ovaj put treba fokusirati na ono {to mislimoi znamo o njima.

Posmatraju}i iz dana{nje perspektive - kada govorimo o odgovornostisvijeta za ono {to se desilo i jo{ de{ava u nas – ~vrsto vjerujem da svijet nijeznao ili nije èlio znati kako pomo}i ovoj zemlji. Izme|u ostalog i zato {tome|unarodna zajednica - kad je trebalo - nije imala koncept rje{enja krizeu regionu. Podjednako, nije imala jasne odgovore i u odnosu na vlastiteunutra{nje odnose i mogu}nosti. U to vrijeme nije bilo jasno ni kako provestisve {to je progla{eno me|unarodnim standardima i vrijednostima u uslovi-ma koji su se stvorili u ratu i poslijeratnoj situaciji. O tome danas moèmogovoriti iz perspektive one vama znane stare pri~e o ~a{i i dilemi da li jenapola prazna ili napola puna. Svakako da }e svako govoriti iz vlastite pozi-cije, pa i na temelju vlastitog interesa i interesa onoga koga je zastupao sveove godine.

Istina je da danas moèmo re}i da je Bosna i Hercegovina postigla zna-~ajan napredak u evroatlantskim integracijama i da je na putu ka Evropi, alije isto tako istina da je ova zemlja posljednja na tom putu u ovom regionu,da }emo Sporazumom o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju koji otvara dalje putprema Evropi potpisati izvjesno nakon {to ga potpi{u svi na{i susjedi i svezemlje regiona.

Sli~no je i sa ekonomskom situacijom: Bosna i Hercegovina jeste napre-dovala i, prema nekim parametrima, izolirano posmatrano, moè se re}i, ~akvrlo dobro. Ekonomski rast dràve je, recimo, vrlo dinami~an, ali u odnosuna {ta, na koje polazne osnove? înjenica je, recimo, da je 1990. godineizvoz sarajevskog Energoinvesta, dakle samo jednog tada{njeg preduze}a uzemlji, bio jednak bezmalo cjelokupnom izvozu Bosne i Hercegovine pos-ljednjih godina. Danas, podjednako tako, moèmo re}i da smo postigli veli-ki uspjeh u obrazovanju, ali moèmo isto tako vidjeti da je 1991. godine brojnepismenih u zemlji iznosio 5 posto, dok se sada spominje dramati~an pro-cenat od 20 posto. Prije rata je bio postignut skoro potpuni obuhvat djeceosnovnom {kolom, danas djeca iz ~itavih sela pa i regiona uop}e ne idu u{kolu niti imaju ikakav stalni vid elementarnog obrazovanja.

To su sve perspektive iz kojih moèmo posmatrati dana{nju situaciju.Ovo {to govorim je samo moj vlastiti ugao posmatranja, a proisti~e iz svegaonoga {to sam u minulih petnaestak godina vidio, doìvio, ~ime sam sebavio. Neke od tih pri~a ostavile su na mene veoma snaàn i, rekao bih, tra-jan utisak, i ja ih ne mogu zaboraviti kada sklapam generalnu sliku o onome

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{to nam se desilo i {ta nam se de{ava danas, posebno o onome {to naziva-mo 'me|unarodnom zajednicom' u ovoj na{oj realnosti. Pri tome moram dakaèm da razmi{ljam iz perspektive nekoga ko je iz Sarajeva i kome je ratpotpuno promijenio stajali{ta o svijetu i me|unarodnoj politici. Tako|er go-vorim i kao novinar, koji je u toj funkciji, kao reporter i dopisnik iz inos-transtva, vidio mnoge ratove {irom svijeta i danas moè povla~iti paralelu sratovima u Afganistanu, u Libanonu, na Bliskom istoku i dalje. Govorim ikao ~ovjek koji je aktivni diplomata. Bio sam ambasador u susjednoj zemlji,u Hrvatskoj, zemlji koja je neraskidivi dio bosanske ratne pri~e. Dozvolitezbog svega ovoga da kaèm da o ulozi me|unarodne zajednice u nas danasne govorim iz pozicije gra|anina koji saznanja o svijetu i njegovom odnosuprema nama sti~e samo na osnovu informacija u medijima. Mo`da zato ijesam u izvjesnoj mjeri nesklon eufori~nim osje}anjima ovim povodom.

Evo, u ovom svjetlu, nekoliko intimnih pri~a koje bih vam èlio ispri~atia koje su – bar tako mislim – vrlo bitne za razumijevanje mojih ocjena u vezis dana{njom temom. Mo`da na prvi pogled nije tako, ali ja }u poku{ati daih ispri~am na na~in koji moète razumjeti.

Prva pri~a se de{ava u zimu izme|u 1992. i 1993. godine. Tada{nji ko-mandant UNPROFOR-a britanski general Rose organizovao je u svom {tabuneki prijem na kojem je bilo i nekoliko nas novinara 'lokalaca'. U to vrijemeu Sarajevu nije bilo ni~eg – bio je stalni i potpuni mrak, nije bilo struje, vode,hrane... Minula je ~ak i ona po~etna iluzija da }e sve biti gotovo za par sed-mica i da }e ̀ ivot nastaviti tamo gdje je stao. Grad je bio u ~eli~nom obru~u,bilo je jasno da nema ni vojne intervencije koju su nam obe}avali. Depresijaje bila potpuna. I, kada sam kod generala to ve~e vidio vino i meso, sir ikola~e, nisam mogao vjerovati da takvo {to u Sarajevu uop}e postoji. Raz-govaraju}i s generalom, pun emocija u to vrijeme, ~ak pomalo i pateti~an,upitao sam, naivno vjeruju}i da }e ga pitanje uznemiriti: „Shvatate li, gene-rale, da }ete, ako se ovo {to se de{ava ovdje zavr{i bez minimuma pravde,sutra po evropskim prijestonicama imati na desetine bosanskih mladi}a koji}e podmetati bombe i eksploziv?” General me hladno pogledao i rekao:„Gospodine Dizdarevi}u, slaèm se s vama da moèmo imati desetinebosanskih momaka koji }e podmetati eksploziv. Ali, znate li {ta moè bitimnogo gore od tih desetina bosanskih momaka sa bombama? Mnogo jegore ako budemo imali hiljade srpskih mladi}a koji su u stanju uraditi istustvar!” Sasvim iskreno, nisam zaspao te no}i jer sam po~eo otkrivati novi svi-jet koji mi je do tada bio nepoznat. Svijet tzv. realpolitike, koji s pitanjimapravde i posebno pravednosti nema nikakve veze. Mnogi od ljudi ovdje tudimenziju tzv. me|unarodne zajednice ne razumiju ni danas, a ona je ~esto

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presudna. Pogledajte samo tu stra{nu aktuelnu fokusiranost na Srbijupovodom Kosova i potpunu ignoranciju spram svih drugih pitanja u regionuzbog tog odnosa prema Srbiji i pitanju Kosova.

Druga pri~a nije ni{ta manje zna~ajna za razumijevanje karaktera ovda{-njeg dru{tva, pri~a koju tzv. me|unarodna zajednica nikada nije shvatila, {toje bila ogromna gre{ka. Svi gra|ani Sarajeva koji su ovdje bili u vrijemesamog po~etka rata, dok se TV program jo{ mogao emitovati, tu pri~u znaju.Snajperista s brda pogodio je djevoj~icu u glavu. Snajper, da podsjetim, nijeisto {to i granata: snajper ~eka, odabere, cilja, vidi i okida. Treba sve to imatiu vidu kada se govori o ~etverogodi{njoj djevoj~ici kao `rtvi. I, dok je tadjevoj~ica u bolnici umirala, njen otac, radnik jednog sarajevskog preduze}a,rekao je, skrhan bolom i u suzama TV novinaru: „Volio bih popiti kafu s~ovjekom koji je pucao u moju k}erku i pitati ga za{to je to uradio”!?

Nikada nigdje na zemaljskoj kugli novinar ne bi dobio ovakav odgovorod oca umiru}e djevoj~ice. On bi pozvao ubicu na kafu i upitao za{to!? Takafa je, tada, bila dio vjekovne kulture odnosa u Bosni i Hercegovini. 'Real-politike' me|unarodne zajednice ona se nikada nije ticala. Za krajnje razu-mijevanje prilika ovdje, kao i za krajnji u~inak tzv. me|unarodne zajedniceto je, po meni, veoma zna~ajna dimenzija.

Tre}a pri~a danas tako|er ima poseban smisao u mom odnosu premaovoj temi i svemu {to nam se minulih petnaestak godina desilo: sreo sam seposlije rata na jednoj od onih mnogih navodno va`nih a prili~no besmislenihkonferencija o ”geostrate{koj budu}nosti Balkana” {to su se odràvale u luk-suznim ljetovali{tima Evrope, sa ser Maracom Goldingom. On je na po~etkurata bio {ef vojnih operacija i savjetnik Boutrosa Boutrosa Ghalija, tada gen-eralnog sekretara UN-a. Bio je to stari, iskusan diplomata. Njegov stav je biokrucijalan za odluku UN-a 1992. godine da li treba plave {ljemove rasporeditiu Bosnu i Hercegovinu i s kojim mandatom; ho}e li, kasnije, biti uspostavljenetzv. sigurnosne zone, me|u kojima je bila i Srebrenica, ili ne. Bio sam tadanovinar i iskoristio sam priliku da ga intervjui{em. Pored ostalog, pitao samga, vjeruju}i da je moje pitanje provokativno: „Gospodine Golding, imate limiran san nakon svega {to se dogodilo u Bosni i Hercegovini, nakon odlukeo potpuno neu~inkovitom razmje{tanju plavih {ljemova u Bosnu i Herce-govinu?” Mislio sam pri tome prvenstveno na Srebrenicu i genocid koji setamo desio pred o~ima vojnika UN-a, ali ne samo na to. Na moje ogromnoiznena|enje, on je rekao: „U pravu ste s tim pitanjem. Nemam miran san.Dozvolite mi da vam objasnim za{to. Zato {to sam 1992. godine, kada sampredlagao Boutrosu Ghaliju da se plavi {ljemovi razmjeste u Bosnu, znao danjihova misija ne}e i ne moè biti uspje{na. Znao sam da Ujedinjeni narodi

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nemaju svoju pravu vojsku, nemaju sistem, mandat, kapacitet i resurseneophodne za pravu vojnu operaciju, da ne mogu da se suprotstave vojnojma{ineriji koja je harala tamo. Znao sam da }e to biti vojska koja moè samola`no da prijeti. Pa ipak, zbog raznih pritisaka i zbog 'realpolitike' predloìosam raspore|ivanje plavih {ljemova. Posljedice su poznate. Eto, zbog toganemam miran san.”

I kona~no, iz te perspektive, iz perspektive ove tri pri~e - a takvih jemnogo - neozbiljno bi bilo zanemariti bitnu ~injenicu: mi razgovaramo omaloj Bosni usred ogromnog geostrate{kog prostora. To je sve o ~emudanas razgovaramo. Bosna i Hercegovina je jo{ uvijek prvenstveno mali diokrupne globalne slike. I odgovorno tvrdim da je Bosna i Hercegovina - po-red svih internih problema i ljudi malih kategorija koji su joj na vrhu - talacsvega onoga {to se de{ava okolo, a prije svega u Srbiji, {to }e se desiti sutrana Kosovu ili drugdje. Ona je talac predrasuda o islamu u Evropi. Ona jetalac neke 'realpolitike' u tzv. me|unarodnoj zajednici, ona je talac odsust-va dugoro~nog i strate{kog rje{enja za zemlje koje nisu u EU; ona je talacpragmati~nog opreza prema mogu}nostima multikulturalizma i susreta civi-lizacija nasuprot teorijama o sukobu civilizacija. O svemu tome mi malo ilinikako ne govorimo. Stranci se ovdje bave poku{ajima preslikavanja inos-tranih modela demokracije, ekonomije, politike, kulture, sociologije, a nepada im na pamet da proniknu u ovda{nju autenti~nost, koja ima korijenemnogo dublje i mnogo ìvotnije nego {to to njima pada na pamet. Ovdje sedanas svi bave dràvom, ustavom, formom, a malo kome pada na pamet daje drama Bosne i Hercegovine u uru{avanju dru{tva a ne u uru{avanjudràve.

Moram, u ovom kontekstu, na kraju da ispri~am jo{ jednu pri~u. Mo`dai najdramati~niju i najznakovitiju, pri~u opet iz rata. Taj je rat paradigma zasve najgore {to se ovom dru{tvu desilo, a tzv. me|unarodna zajednica nijeprepoznala, zbog 'realpolitike' i odluke da istraje na nemogu}oj {emi: ovdjeniko nije zlo~inac i niko nije `rtva, ovdje su svi podjednako ludi i podjed-nako odgovorni, ovdje nema pobjednika i pobije|enog. Savr{eni rezultattog pristupa je Dejtonski sporazum, Dejtonski ustav. Ta je {ifra bila idealanzabran da se u njega smjeste svi zlikovci i svi pogre{ni koncepti koji stoje uosnovi ju~era{nje i dana{nje bh. drame.

Pri~a glasi: Prisustvovao sam nevjerovatnom dijalogu izme|u jednogvisokog zvani~nika s 'druge strane' koji je danas u Hagu i nekoga ko je jo{prisutan u ovda{njoj politici. Granatom koja je pogodila Alipa{ino polje,kvart u Sarajevu, ubijeno je devetoro djece. Bila je zima i informacija je stiglado Aerodroma, gdje su dvije delegacije razgovarale o tehni~kim pitanjima,

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o vodi i struji za grad. Predstavnik sarajevske strane je na vijest o ovome savo~ajan upitao predstavnika 'druge strane' (Boutros Ghali je to u jednomintervjuu rimskoj ”La Repubblici” tokom rata nazvao ”strana A i strana B”)koji je danas u Hagu: „Dokle }ete ubijati na{u djecu?” Ovaj je sasvim hlad-no odgovorio: „Sve dotle dok budete vjerovali da moèmo da ìvimo zajed-no”. Njegov odgovor je bio sasvim precizan i hladan. Uslijedio je odmah,refleksno, na postavljeno pitanje. Ovo je jako bitno, ali se ovdje potpuno ig-nori{e. Svi o tome {ute u Bosni i Hercegovini. Dru{tvo u Bosni i Hercegovinije fragmentirano, rasto~eno, uni{tavano u svojoj supstanci daleko brutalnijei daleko dramati~nije nego sama dràva. A to dru{tvo je na ovim prostorimauvijek bilo mnogo va`nije od same dràve. Bosanci i Hercegovci nikad nisubili opsjednuti dràvom. Za razliku od Hrvatske ili Srbije, gdje su vlastitiidentitet pronalazili u dràvi ome|enoj granicama, ~ovjek je u Bosni iden-titet dokazivao na odnosu prema kom{iji i kom{ije prema njemu. Na onojkafi o kojoj sam govorio ranije. Sasvim precizno, u Bosni i Hercegovini vamje kom{ija bio daleko va`niji od toga da li imate dràvu ili ne. Zato je etni~kapodjela u {kolama u Bosni i Hercegovini za mene mnogo dramati~niji ikrupniji problem nego izgradnja ili ukidanje entiteta, kantona itd. Ho}u re}i,nedostatak volje da se shvati ova realnost u Bosni i Hercegovini, nedostatakvolje da se prepoznaju u ovom kontekstu objektivni neprijatelji Bosne iHercegovine, kardinalni je propust tzv. me|unarodne zajednice. Funk-cioni{u}i na temelju perspektiva vlastitih 'savr{enih dru{tava' koja su èljelida precrtaju na ove prostore, inostrani protektori u Bosni nisu mogli ni{tavi{e da urade. Oni nikad nisu shvatili da je razaranje duhovne multikulturnei multireligijske supstance ovda{njeg dru{tva dugoro~no pogubniji udaracmogu}nostima novog konstituisanja dràve nego nedovr{ene ustavne prom-jene. Sasvim li~no, to je moja najve}a zamjerka tzv. me|unarodnoj zajedni-ci koja, zapravo, nije ni mogla dose}i taj nivo razumijevanja ovda{nje stvar-nosti, s niskim kalibrom birokrata na koje se oslonila u BiH (~ast izuzecima).

O svemu ovome moè se govoriti satima pa i danima; veli~ina bosansketragedije to omogu}ava, ali tog vremena, pa i tog interesa, nema. Evo, zato,samo nekih naznaka o tome {ta je sve u BiH od strane svijeta bila gre{ka.Neke se od tih gre{aka vi{e nikada ne}e mo}i ispraviti, a neke bi eventual-no i mogle da se koriguju. Redoslijed nabrajanja nije u~injen po va`nosti:

Ignorisana je priroda biv{eg dru{tva. Neka rje{enja su nametnuta kao daovdje ranije ni~ega i nikad nije bilo. Kao da nije postojao prili~no konzisten-tan i s evropskim vrijednostima prili~no usagla{en sistem vrijednosti. I{lo seu pravcu nametanja nekih aran`mana i rje{enja koja su zahtijevala eliminacijusvega {to je prije postojalo, da bi se onda izgradilo ne{to novo {to nikada

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nije moglo korespondirati s ovda{njom stvarno{}u i dru{tvenim i historijskimgenetskim kodovima.

Privreda je i mimo rata, u ime 'novog sistema' i novih interesa potpunouni{tena. Insistiralo se na ”poni{tavanju starog i prevazi|enog” koje je funk-cionisalo i davalo rezultat u ime ”novog i savremenog” koje nikada nije us-postavljeno. Pobijedio je kriminal privatizacije i povratak na apsolutne vri-jednosti i pokazatelje koji su jo{ uvijek decenijama ispod predratnih.

Postoje}i visoki standardi u kulturi, obrazovanju, medijima, eliminisani suu ime ne~ega {to jo{ uvijek nismo vidjeli na djelu. Kada govorimo o pro-moviranju javnih medija u Bosni i Hercegovini, svjedok sam poku{aja da sepromovi{u projekti i standardi sa sanitetskim kapetanima britanske vojskekoji su oktroisani kao lideri reforme, a oni su se bavili tzv. reformom nana~in koji je bio totalno suprotan doma}im potrebama, mogu}nostima imentalitetu. S kraja devedesetih godina dolazili su nam 'instruktori' iz SAD-ada nam drè lekcije o ure|ivanju dvojezi~nih programa, a mi smo naTeleviziji Sarajevo 1984. godine imali simultano preno{enje Olimpijskih igarana vi{e od deset jezika. Najve}i broj ljudi koji su to tada realizovali jo{ ìviu Sarajevu i u stanju su da u~estvuju u izgradnji TV sistema, ali se njihovoprofesionalno slobodoumlje nije poklapalo s idejama spomenutih kapetana.

Zbog nepoznavanja realnosti, ali i prepotencije i ispraznog osje}anja 'eli-tizma' spram ”balkanske sredine” s jedne strane, i straha od konkurencije koddoma}ih tre}ekategornika na vlasti s druge, ovda{nji resursi se naj~e{}e igno-ri{u. Kvalitetni resursi se odbacuju, a mladi i obrazovani ljudi obeshrabruju unamjerama da se vrate u zemlju i uklju~e u njenu izgradnju. Ma{e se okolotvrdnjom da je demokratija uvedena i da je sve {to imamo na doma}emterenu ”rezultat demokratskog opredjeljenja bira~a”. Cinizam je pri ovomeogroman: kako se moè govoriti o demokratskim izborima mimo demo-kratskih institucija, slobodnih i nezavisnih medija, neutralisanja klju~ne ulogecrkve i dàmije u politici, mimo obrazovanja i koliko-toliko ozbiljnog ne-vladinog i sektora i civilnog dru{tva? Percepcija politike ovdje je jo{ uvijeksamo i isklju~ivo vlast i ni{ta vi{e. Formalno, krug se zatvorio na tri tvrdnje:Dejton je zavr{io rat i zato ga ne treba dirati; u biv{u komunisti~ku zemlju jeuvedena demokracija i to se pokazuje na izborima - to {to imate, rezultat jedemokracije. I tre}e, popravljene su fasade ku}a po gradovima, otvorenikafi}i i restorani, prodate stare socijalisti~ke tvornice, zna~i – rekonstrukcija jezavr{ena! A u sva ta tri segmenta u pitanju je velika iluzija, najblaè re~eno.Gospodin Schwarz-Schilling na{u situaciju upore|uje sa situacijom u Njema-~koj 1945. godine. Vidim ovih dana u novinama i izjavu jednog zapadnogdiplomate koji se ~udi: „Kako su Njema~ka i Francuska deset godina nakon

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rata mogle kreirati EZ, a u BiH jo{ ne mogu sa mrtve ta~ke”. Moram kazatida me u ovakvim situacijama stomak zaboli od muke. Gospoda ne}e da kaùda su 1945. godine fa{isti, zlo~inci, neprijatelji, nacisti, kolaboracionisti napro-sto preko no}i spometeni sa historijske scene. Kod nas, mnogi od njih su da-nas na vlasti. Znalo se onda ko je pobjednik a ko poraèni. Danas se ovdjeto ne moè ni pomenuti. Svi su isti. Moète li na}i tada tuma~enje u ud`be-nicima historije koje hvali Hitlera i pravda fa{izam? A pogledajte {ta djeca sveu~e danas u {kolama o zbivanjima od prije 15 godina. Da vidimo {ta je svi-jet tada uloìo u Njema~ku da bi je digao na noge, a {ta je od postoje}eprivrede uni{teno kod nas nakon rata da bi se obogatili kriminalci i profiteri,{to doma}i, {to inozemni. Sud u Nürnbergu je tada, po najkra}em mogu}empostupku, likvidirao lidere fa{isti~kog pokreta, a Karadì} i Mladi} se danas,12 godina nakon kraja rata, izruguju sa slobode cijelom svijetu s kojim, sasvimizvjesno, imaju ~ak i razli~ite tajne aran`mane. âk i njihovi mla|i pulenibjeè iz zatvora uz punu logistiku zatvorskih ~uvara, njihovih prijatelja iz rata,koji nose uniforme zvani~nika ”nove dràve”. U ime 'realpolitike' se na takavna~in u Bosni ne govori. Moè zasmetati Srbiji i Kosovu!

Ukratko, umjesto zaklju~ka, evo natuknice o ~etiri nezaobilazne stvarikoje se moraju imati na umu kada govorimo o ulozi me|unarodne zajed-nice (ma {ta to bilo) u minuloj deceniji u BiH.

Prije svega, konstruktivna gre{ka je napravljena na po~etku. GospodinSchwarz-Schilling je rekao da je Mirovni sporazum napravljen kao kompro-mis sa zlo~incima koji ~ak i danas djeluju na politi~koj sceni. Cijenu te ~inje-nice svi jo{ uvijek pla}amo.

Drugo, ne moè se zaobi}i strate{ka ~injenica da je Evropska unija zajed-nica nacionalnih dràva, i prema toj ~injenici je strukturirana. Bosna i Herce-govina nije nacionalna dràva u tom smislu, a Evropska unija, ili tzv. me-|unarodna zajednica, nema odgovor na tu ~injenicu. Oni na Bosnu i Herce-govinu poku{avaju primijeniti ona ista pravila koja vaè kod njih, a ona suovdje neprimjenjiva.

Tre}e, u Bosni i Hercegovini aktuelno pitanje je kako primijeniti samoone standarde koji ne vrijede ni u jednoj drugoj zemlji svijeta i kako ne pri-mijeniti neka konkretna rje{enja za ovu zemlju koja vaè kod svih drugih.Ne moè se tolerisanje zlo~ina~kih projekata nazivati realpolitikom i u to imevoditi prakti~na politika.

êtvrto, neko mora povesti ra~una o tome da kolektivni PTSP koji jeproizveden minule decenije u BiH ima limite unutar kojih se moè kon-trolisati. Nerje{avanje klju~nih civilizacijskih problema u BiH na temeljimame|unarodnih standarda, vaè}ih za sve druge, u jednom }e momentu

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postati veliki, novi problem za sve one koji su poku{ali ”Bosnu gurnuti podtepih”.

Nemam utisak da su predstavnici tzv. me|unarodne zajednice ovogasvjesni u punoj mjeri.

DISKUSIJA

Du{anka Majki}, Dom naroda Parlamentarne skup{tine BiH

Po{tovane ekselencije, dame i gospodine, dolazim iz Parlamentarne skup{tine Bosne i Hercegovine, dolazim iz

najvi{eg zakonodavnog organa ove zemlje i pripadam politi~koj stranci kojaje do sada pomenuta mnogo puta, Savezu nezavisnih socijaldemokrata(SNSD).

@eljela bih se zahvaliti organizatorima na organizaciji ove konferencije, jersmatram da ovakve konferencije pomaù da se okupimo i saslu{amorazli~ita mi{ljenja i stajali{ta i poku{amo ih uskladiti. U ovoj zemlji smodavno zaboravili kako se razgovara i, ako je klju~na rije~ dijalog, onda je todefinitivno ne{to {to nam je sada potrebno. Ali ne samo da }emo nau~itikako da razgovaramo, nego }emo nau~iti kako da postignemo dogovor. Nepripadam grupi ljudi koji uveliko kritikuju me|unarodnu zajednicu, iakosam potpuno svjesna propusta u proteklom periodu, jer jednostavno sma-tram da nije pristojno da onoga od koga si dobijao pomo} i od koga jo{ uvi-jek o~ekuje{ pomo} previ{e kritikuje{. Ja doista po{tujem to {to je ovdjeuloèna ogromna snaga i energija, i kao pojedinac, kao ~ovjek prvenstveno,nosim dobar dio rezultata koje je me|unarodna zajednica ostavila ovdje;zato moja rije~ u tom dijelu ne moè biti previ{e kriti~na, iako bih imalamnogo {ta kriti~no re}i o samoj zemlji u kojoj ìvim. Bilo bi logi~no da ja,kao parlamentarac, progovorim o ne~emu {to se zove parlamentarnademokratija, odnosno, da li je Bosna i Hercegovina postigla dovoljno urazvoju parlamentarne demokratije. Za po~etak, kada sam razmi{ljala o tompitanju, odgovori su slijedili sami po sebi. Mi smo zemlja koja ima oktroisaniustav, mi smo zemlja koja jo{ uvijek dobrim dijelom donosi zakone pod uti-cajem me|unarodne zajednice, ili u saradnji s njom. Mi smo zemlja u kojojje evidentan problem same implementacije zakona, dakle, i za one zakonekoje smo donijeli pitanje je kako i kada }e oni biti implementirani. Mi smozemlja u kojoj ni parlament ni izvr{na vlast nemaju kapacitet potreban za dono{enje odluka koje su toliko potrebne ovoj zemlji. Kakva nam je

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kontrola izvr{ne vlasti od strane parlamenta, posebno kada je u pitanjubudèt? Kakvi su nam nalazi revizorskih izvje{taja i koliko je ova zemljapodlo`na prevarama i korupciji? Kakav nam je izborni zakon, i nije li to veli-ka gre{ka me|unarodne zajednice - da smo dobili izborni zakon kakvognema nigdje, a trebalo bi da bude dobar i da vrijedi jedino za nas? Dakle, tosu neka pitanja koja su vezana i na koja svako od nas pojedina~no znaodgovore.

Krucijalno pitanje koje mislim da treba postaviti ovdje jeste: Znamo likakvu dràvu èlimo? Kakvu dràvu uop{te èle gra|ani ove zemlje? I da-nas, u toku ove konferencije, moè se prepoznati odakle, iz kojeg korpusa,iz kojeg naroda koji od govornika dolazi. Mislim na doma}e govornike, ovekoji dolaze iz Bosne i Hercegovine. Na{i govori su prepoznatljivi po tome{to nam se uvijek ~ini da preko ograde ima vi{e problema nego u na{emdvori{tu, a ima ih svuda. I tu moramo biti realni. Kakvu dràvu èlimo?Jesmo li pri~ali o tome? Ima li smisla pri~ati o bilo ~emu drugom prije nego{to se dogovorimo u kakvoj zemlji èlimo da ìvimo?

Evo ~uli smo maloprije: ako pitamo predstavnike bo{nja~kog naroda,ve}ina njih }e veoma èstoko zastupati stav ‘jedan gra|anin jedan glas’, a tozna~i unitarnu Bosnu i Hercegovinu s kojom ne}e biti zadovoljna druga dvanaroda. Ako pitamo predstavnike hrvatskog naroda, oni }e zdu{no re}i danjihova ljudska prava nisu za{ti}ena u ovom dijelu koji se zove FederacijaBosna i Hercegovina i da bi oni najvi{e voljeli da budu u nekoj svojoj poli-ti~koj zajednici. A ako pitate Republiku Srpsku, i tamo vam je odgovor poz-nat. Odgovor na pitanje referunduma nije pitanje koje se postavilo samo posebi. Politi~ari iz Republike Srpske su rekli: svako onaj ko vr{i nasrtaj naDejtonski mirovni sporazum, dakle, vr{i nasrtaj na Republiku Srpsku, dobi}ereferendum po prstima.

Pona{ajmo se korektno i mijenjajmo, vodimo ustavne reforme u smjerukako to zajedni~ki dogovorimo. U ovoj zemlji nikada niko ne}e dobiti sve,i to je pravilo kojeg moramo biti svjesni. Svi moèmo dobiti pomalo, ali topomalo mora biti zajedni~ki dogovoreno.

Ja sam kao parlamentarac u pro{lom sazivu imala ~vrstu vjeru da se uovoj zemlji moè mnogo stvari promijeniti nabolje sve do momenta kad sudo{la pitanja ustavnih promjena. I kada je na sjednici Parlementa ~etrnaestambasadora stranih zemalja sjedilo, a zbog dva glasa prestao da bude aktue-lan, odnosno izgubio na podr{ci cijeli paket ustavnih promjena. Onda samse zapitala gdje sam u stvari, gdje ìvim, na {ta ta zemlja, na koju pozicijutreba ona da do|e? I bez obzira na sve to, svoj posao parlamentarca obavl-jam korektno, zdu{no, i radi}u na njemu, ali ne dozvoljavam - i mislim da

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je takav stav mnogih politi~ara koji dolaze iz Republike Srpske - pitanje togakako }emo ìvjeti i kako ova zemlja treba da izgleda prije pitanja o reformipolicije, prije mnogih drugih pitanja koja se postavljaju; to je osnovno pitan-je za koje treba da traìmo odgovor.

Dakle, i dalje nam je potrebna pomo} me|unarodne zajednice, mislimposebno u ovom dijelu koji se odnosi na pitanje teme ustavnih promjena okojoj }emo morati da sjednemo i da razgovaramo. A i na kraju, ovaj dijalogu Bosni i Hercegovini, u tome tako|er o~ekujem pomo} me|unarodnezajednice koja }e nam pomo}i da nas iz sada{njeg stanja paralize na{eenergije, povede na put budu}nosti.

Miro Lazovi}, Forum parlamentaraca 1991-1996.

Poku{a}u u kratkim crtama iznijeti svoju diskusiju s obzirom na broju~esnika i zna~aj ove konferencije, te zaklju~ke koji }e vjerovatno uslijeditinakon konferencije. Odmah da kaèm da ja i gospo|a Majki} pripadamoistom narodu, dakle, srpskom narodu, ali su nam pri~e druga~ije. Kao ~ovjekkoji je proteklih petnaest-{esnaest godina proveo u Bosni i Hercegovini - ikao jedan od rijetkih Srba, koji je ostao u Skup{tini Bosne i Hercegovine iglasao za odluku o referendumu, te kao ~ovjek koji je u~estvovao u svimmirovnim pregovorima o Bosni i Hercegovini - imam mnogo toga re}i. Neèlim sada iznositi svoje impresije, niti mi je ambicija da govorim o svim pro-cesima u kojima je me|unarodna zajednica imala i pozitivnu ulogu, ali je~esto i lutala. Da je lutala od 1992. do 1995. godine govori i ~injenica da jeza Bosnu i Hercegovinu ponu|eno pet ili {est mirovnih pregovora. Sje}amse 1994. godine, kada je pravljen Va{ingtonski sporazum. Kao u~esnik tihsporazuma upitao sam ârlsa Redmana: Za{to se ime Federacija Bosne iHercegovine daje samo za jedan dio Bosne i Hercegovine? [ta je s drugimdijelom? Dobio sam odgovor da }e u drugoj fazi teritorij, koji je sada podkontrolom srpskih snaga, u}i u taj prostor Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine ida }e se onda cijela Bosna i Hercegovina zvati Federacija Bosna i Herce-govina - {to je bilo logi~no i prihvatljivo za na{u delegaciju. Na ovopodsje}am zbog ~injenice da su procesi oti{li nekim drugim smjerom i da jeformirana Republika Srpska, koju je Muhamed [a}irbegovi} kao ministarvanjskih poslova prihvatio 8. septembra 1995. godine, i u Dejton se do{losa ve} formirana dva entiteta. Dakle, Dejtonski sporazum nije napravio Re-publiku Srpsku, on ju je prihvatio. Ovo nagla{avam jer pripadam onim ljudi-ma koji smatraju da je me|unarodna zajednica odigrala zna~ajnu ulogu u

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Bosni i Hercegovini bez obzira na sva njena lutanja, i pripadam onim poli-ti~kim snagama koje se zalaù za daljnji ostanak me|unarodne zajedniceupravo zbog ~injenice da je na sceni jedan ustavnopravni teritorijalni pore-dak koji je u su{tini pogre{an. Mi ovdje moèmo govoriti o nekim stvarima,ekonomskim pobolj{anjima standarda ìvota, i u Republici Srpskoj i u Fede-raciji Bosne i Hercegovine - ali time ne}emo rije{iti problem. Problem je lo{epostavljen u temelju. Bosna i Hercegovina ne}e nikada mo}i izgraditi svojusigurnu, stabilnu strukturu sa dva entiteta, s Federacijom BiH i RepublikomSrpskom, i to je ono {to je bolno i to je ono {to se mora mijenjati. Sva osta-la pitanja su kozmeti~ke prirode.

Ne moè se govoriti ni o tome kako ovom narodu ne treba istina. Tu sene slaèm sa gospodinom [ilingom, kada kaè da se stalno traì krivac, pet-naest godina se traì krivac. Evo, ne traìmo krivca. Traìmo istinu. [ta je saistinom? Moè li se bez istine posti}i pravda? Moè li se bez pravde posti}ipomirenje i pra{tanje? Moè li bez pra{tanja i pomirenja biti stabilna i sigur-na budu}nost ove dràve? Ja sam siguran da ne moè. Ja ho}u da moja djecaìve u jednoj sigurnoj Bosni i Hercegovini, ujedinjenoj Bosni i Hercegovini,i ne}u da ìve u dràvi Bosni i Hercegovini u kojoj }e se jedan dio zvatietni~kim ‘prefiksom’ Republika Srpska. Sve dok postoji taj naziv on je su{tin-ski za budu}nost ove dràve. Ako se ve} ne moè promijeniti teritorij,promijenite mu ime. Moè li me|unarodna zajednica promijeniti ime Re-publike Srpske? Budite sigurni da }e svi gra|ani, i oni srpske nacionalnosti,zdu{no prihvatiti Bosnu i Hercegovinu, a pogotovo Bo{njaci i Hrvati, i gra-diti je zajedni~ki. Dok postoji taj etni~ki ‘prefiks’ postoja}e problem u Bosnii Hercegovini, postoja}e problem za Srbe, ovdje u Sarajevu, u Federaciji.Nikakva garancija i za{tita na{ih ljudskih prava ne}e nam omogu}iti ravno-pravan status sa Bo{njacima i Hrvatima sve dok postoji ime RepublikaSrpska. U to budite sigurni, jer govorim na osnovu iskustva. Dakle, gospo-do iz me|unarodne zajednice, razmi{ljajte na taj na~in. Pred nama je noviUstav, razgovor o novom ustavu, i uzmite u obzir te ~injenice. Nikakvekozmeti~ke promjene odba~enih ustavnih amandmana koji bi se ponovovratili na sto ne}e rije{iti problem. Dakle, razgovor o novom ustavu i jednapotpuno druga~ija ustavnopravna i teritorijalna konfiguracija Bosne i Herce-govine moè dovesti do stabilnosti i budu}nosti ove dràve.

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Senad Pe}anin, nezavisni magazin Dani

Moram re}i da sam jako razo~aran ovim {to smo ~uli od gospodinaSchwarz-Shillinga. Mislim da je naslov ovih razgovora, s obzirom na nivona{ih rasprava, malo pretenciozan; vjerujem da bi se prakti~na korist ovogdruènja mogla pokazati u razgovoru o vrlo konkretnim temama.

Ja sam ju~er radio intervju sa gospodinom Gregorijanom, zamjenikomVisokog predstavnika. Tom prilikom izrekao sam jednu konstataciju koja gaje jako pogodila. Nije mi bila namjera da ga uvrijedim, mada ne isklju~ujemmogu}nost da se i to dogodilo. No, istu konstataciju ponovit }u i gospodinuSchwarz-Shillingu. Dakle, ve} godinama imamo istu pri~u, sada ve} mantru,o gre{kama me|unarodne zajednice tokom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini.Naàlost, imali smo klasi~ni obrazac: tri zara}ene strane, vjekovna mr`nja ime|unarodna zajednica, ovdje predstavljena UNPROFOR-om, a to su snageUjedinjenih nacija, koje imaju ekvidistancu prema svim „zara}enim strana-ma”. To nije ni{ta novo; svi danas o tome mogu mnogo govoriti, i gospodinSchwarz-Schilling, a naro~ito ambasador Schmunk, s obzirom na njegoveakademske reference. Anga`man Ujedinjenih nacija u ratu u Bosni i Herce-govini, tj. UNPROFOR-a, ve} se godinama u teoriji, u stru~noj literaturi,uzima kao primjer katastrofalnog proma{aja s tragi~nim posljedicama.Me|utim, {ta imamo danas? Pozicija gospodina Schwarz-Schillinga u dlakuje ista poziciji UNPROFOR-a tokom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini! Pokazat }u tona samo jednom primjeru - aktuelnoj raspravi oko reforme policije. Nakonpresuda dva me|unarodna suda, a posebno Me|unarodnog suda pravde, ukojim se izri~ito kaè da je policija Republike Srpske, zajedno sa VojskomRepublike Srpske, po~inila genocid, imamo - s jedne strane - one koji go-vore da nakon te presude treba postojati minimum ne~ega {to bi moglo bitiljudski, humano, moralno... te da takva institucija ne moè dalje postojati,naro~ito u kontekstu ve} postoje}ih reformi policije. S druge strane, imamopoziciju srpskih lidera, koji jednostavno ne vide ni{ta problemati~no u tomeda institucija koja je po~inila genocid nastavi i dalje postojati. I, sada, imamoVas, gospodine Schwarz-Schilling, Vas koji ste „neutralni” u sporu koji bloki-ra evropski put Bosne i Hercegovine, sporu oko toga moè li organ koji jepo~inio genocid postojati u reformiranoj, evropskoj Bosni i Hercegovini!?Znate li koja je posljedica va{e neutralnosti? Posljedica va{e neutralnosti jeta da se zbiva ta~no ono o ~emu je gospo|a Majki} govorila maloprije: dase ta~no prepoznaje me|u lokalnim akterima - i ovdje i u parlamentu i umedijima - ko je iz koje nacije. To je najve}i problem, a nije problem refor-ma policije. Takvim Va{im stavom Vi direktno destruirate ono malo oaza {to

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je ostalo u Bosni i Hercegovini, ono {to smo zvali nenacionalisti~kim ili civil-nim sektorom ili sektorom, koji je budio i podgrijavao nadu u mogu}nostzajedni~kog ìvota u Bosni i Hercegovini. @alosno je ako su zalaganja onihkoji smatraju da nakon presude Me|unarodnog suda pravde o genocidu nemoè postojati organ koji se zove „Policija Republike Srpske”, àlosno je,dakle, ako su to „bo{nja~ki stavovi” i „bo{nja~ki zahtjevi” - ̀ alosno je i sram-no je da to nisu i Va{i stavovi, gospodine Schwarz-Schilling. Vi se pona{ateudlaku isto kao UNPROFOR, mislim na Vas osobno: znamo da ste znali pot-puno druga~ije govoriti o istoj temi u vrijeme kada se genocid doga|ao.Pona{ate se ovdje kao lider neke nevladine organizacije, iako znate kakvesu vam ovlasti. Posljedica takvog Va{eg pona{anja je da }ete ostatke multiet-ni~nosti u ovoj zemlji – koju nisu uspjeli uni{titi ni genocid, ni zlo~ini, ni vjer-ske zajednice, ni nacionalisti~ki lideri – uni{titi Vi.

Na primjer, Socijaldemokratska partija BiH je bila prakti~no jedina rele-vantna multietni~ka politi~ka stranka. No, ponajvi{e zbog protivljenja posto-janju „Policije Republike Srpske” i zbog Va{e „neutralnosti”, za najve}i dioSrba SDPBiH je pretvoren je u bo{nja~ku politi~ku stranku. A to je - {ta godmislili o SDP-u, a ni ja ne mislim previ{e dobro - {teta za Bosnu i Hercego-vinu. I to je katastrofalan u~inak Va{e politike, politike ekvidistance, koju stespremni prepoznati u djelovanju UNPROFOR-a i anga`manu me|unarodnezajednice tokom rata i osuditi je, a koju na potpuno isti na~in provodite idemonstrirate sada. Sre}om, trenutno jo{ uvijek ne padaju granate, pa zbogtoga Va{a odgovornost izgleda manja.

Sa ovakvim Va{im stavovima, i Va{ih kolega koji predstavljaju me|una-rodnu zajednicu i zapadne dràve u Bosni i Hercegovini, gubimo mogu}-nost da i mediji ne budu prepoznavani isklju~ivo u nacionalnom klju~u, uzavisnosti od sredine u kojoj se nalaze.

Ja sam recimo – dok nisam ~uo Va{ stav - bio naivnog uvjerenja da, akomislim da „Policija Republike Srpske” ne moè postojati pod tim imenom,to nije moj „bo{nja~ki stav”. Ja sam mislio da je to evropski, na{, i moj i Va{,zajedni~ki zahtjev. Mislio sam da ga niko ko ima minimum morala i osje-}anja pijeteta prema `rtvama genocida ne moè osporavati. Me|utim, ne! Vikaète: „Neka se dogovore Dodik i Silajdì}”. Pa, ako ve} nemate problemas moralom, zar ne shvatate da upravo takvim svojim stavom hranite i Dodikai Silajdì}a i njihove nacionalisti~ke politike?!

I na kraju, nemojte potcijeniti mogu}nost da, naàlost, ovakvi skupovi zanekoliko godina, upravo zahvaljuju}i ovakvim Va{im stavovima, budu mogu}ijedino s mnogo manje predstavnika iz razli~itih etni~kih grupa i mnogo vi{esigurnosnih provjera i rendgena na ulazima u prostoriju u kojoj se debatira.

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Nurko Pobri}, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta „Dèmal Bijedi}” u Mostaru

Gospodin Zlatko Dizdarevi} je ve} kazao da postoje neke konstruktivneili konstitutivne gre{ke u Dejtonskom sporazumu koje su proizvele politi~kei dru{tvene prakse i doga|aje u Bosni i Hercegovini u postdejtonskom peri-odu. Ja bih, ukratko, u vezi s navedenim dodao slijede}e: Prvo, pogre{na jepravna kvalifikacija rata u Bosni i Hercegovini, koji je u preambuli Dejton-skog sporazuma ozna~en kao „tragi~ni sukob u regionu”. Dakle, rat u Bosnii Hercegovini ne moè se kvalificirati kao „tragi~an sukob u regionu”, madasvakako jeste tragi~an, ali op}epoznata je (bar sada) ~injenica o karakterurata u Bosni i Hercegovini. Drugo, Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine, kao AneksIV Dejtonskog sporazuma, jeste oktroirani i ta~no je da taj ustav, neko je ve}to rekao, nije trebalo da bude rezultat kompromisa s ratnim zlo~incima, a jabih jo{ dodao da je taj ustav, bar djelimi~no, i rezultat kompromisa ratnihzlo~inaca, {to se, razumljivo, nije trebalo dopustiti. Ustav Bosne i Herce-govine de facto su donijeli ovi me|unarodni ~inioci koji se u Dejtonskomsporazumu nazivaju 'svjedoci', pa su 'svjedoci' Dejtonskog sporazuma, akoje me|u njima postojala saglasnost, mogli Bosni i Hercegovini oktroirati('podariti) bilo kakav ustav, pa i sadràjno demokratski ustav, da kaèmjedan 'normalan ustav'. Me|utim, Bosna i Hercegovina je dobila ustav kojije vjerovatno jedini ustav u svijetu koji sadrì diskriminatorske norme (ustavistovremeno i dozvoljava i zabranjuje diskriminaciju), pa je posljedica takvogustava politi~ka i svaka druga praksa koja se doga|a u bosanskohercego-va~kom dru{tvu.

Prema tome, ~ini mi se da bilo kakve parcijalne ustavne reforme (revizi-je), ma koliko one polu~ivale odre|ene rezultate, ne}e biti dovoljne da bise su{tinski primijenila politi~ka i dru{tvena zbilja u Bosni i Hercegovini.Samo dono{enje novog, od Dejtonskog zna~ajno druga~ijeg ustava, moèproducirati druga~iju, dakako, pozitivnu politi~ku i dru{tvenu realnost uBosni i Hercegovini. U sada{njem trenutku, naàlost, ne postoji konsenzuso tome u kojem smjeru treba mijenjati Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine. Za{to tajkonsenzus ne postoji? Zato {to ne postoji ni konsenzus o postojanju dràveBosne i Hercegovine kao takve, odnosno neki stanovnici Bosne i Hercego-vine ne smatraju sebe gra|anima Bosne i Hercegovine i ne priznaju je zasvoju dràvu.

Svakako, moè se re}i da u dovoljnoj mjeri ne postoji 'pojavnost' koja jeu njema~koj pravnoj teoriji nazvana 'ustavnim patriotizmom'. Naravno, nepostoji u dovoljnoj mjeri ni patriotizam pojmljen u uobi~ajenom zna~enju te

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rije~i. Kao posljedica navedenog, ne postoji ni tzv. 'ustavni trenutak' (terminiz ameri~ke pravne teorije), odnosno u dovoljnoj mjeri ne postoji volja i svi-jest gra|ana Bosne i Hercegovine da im je potreban novi ustav.

Da odgovorim i gospo|i Du{anki Majki}. Vi kaète kako je princip 'jedan~ovjek jedan glas' ne{to {to ne odgovara Bosni i Hercegovini. Pa zar je danasuop}e mogu}e da jedan ~ovjek ima dva ili tri glasa? Politi~ke grupacije kojese zalaù da Bosna i Hercegovina ne treba biti ure|ena po navedenom kon-ceptu ('jedan ~ovjek jedan glas') vr{e zloupotrebu prava koje postoji u sva-koj demokratskoj zemlji, da jedan ~ovjek moè imati samo jedan glas. Jer,vrijeme pluralnih votuma je davno pro{lo. Drugo je pitanje za{tite manjinabilo koje vrste, za{tite ljudskih prava i tako dalje; za za{titu manjinskih i ljud-skih prava uop}e postoje odgovaraju}a ustavnopravna rje{enja nezavisno odprincipa 'jedan ~ovjek jedan glas'.

Jerko Ivankovi}-Lijanovi}, Zastupni~ki dom Parlamentarneskup{tine Bosne i Hercegovine

U na{oj Narodnoj stranci Radom za boljitak poku{avamo se baviti uzroci-ma kako se ne bismo morali baviti posljedicama, i mislimo da je to dalekou~inkovitiji rad. Po na{im gledanjima, uzroci svih problema u Bosni iHercegovini su etni~ko politi~ko organiziranje i etni~ko glasanje. Da je ovojednoetni~ka dràva, onda bi to bilo sasvim uredu i sasvim normalno; alipo{to je ovo vi{eetni~ka dràva, onda u vi{eetni~koj dràvi etni~ko politi~koorganiziranje i etni~ko glasanje je u kontradikciji s vlastitom dràvom. Izlaziz te situacije je vi{eetni~ko politi~ko organiziranje i onda vi{e ne}e bitietni~kog glasanja, jer }e se to samo po sebi eliminirati. Do vi{eetni~kog poli-ti~kog organiziranja moèmo do}i na dva na~ina. Jedan je da se postoje}eetni~ke stranke udruè, a drugi je da nastanu nove vi{eetni~ke stranke. Toje veoma teàk proces, ali da bi ova zemlja bila uspje{na, on }e se moratipre}i, jer dok god se on ne pro|e, morat }e postojati Visoki predstavnik, ata kombinacije, vi{e jednoetni~kih stranaka plus Visoki predstavnik, nemoè imati dobar plan, dobru strategiju i njenu realizaciju. To }u potkrijepi-ti primjerom Parlamenta Europske unije. U Parlamentu Europske unijeimamo stranke koje dolaze iz svih dràva, imamo socijaldemokrate, liberale,zelene, narodnjake i tako dalje, i prvo su nastale europske stranke, pa jeonda nastao Europski parlament, i dalje se proces razvija jednim normalnim,prirodnim putem. Mi smo malo oti{li, zapravo pobrkali redoslijed, pa smoprvo dobili parlament, a nemamo nijednu stranku koja je u tom parlamentu,

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a koja djeluje na ~itavom prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine i koja uspijeva dobitipodr{ku bira~a iz sva tri naroda, osim mo`da, jednim malim dijelom, stran-ka iz koje dolazim. To se u praksi u Parlamentu svakodnevno proìv-ljava.Moja kolegica iz SNSD-a je govorila, i oni su na izborima imali jako dobarizborni rezultat, imaju prijedlog ustavnih promjena, imaju prijedlog reformepolicije, ali to ne mogu provesti jer nemaju partnera u Federaciji koji bi topodrào. Isti takav problem imaju stranke iz Federacije: imaju prijedlogreforme policije, imaju prijedlog ustavnih promjena, ali to ne mogu provestijer nemaju partnere iz Republike Srpske da to provedu. Kada bismo, reci-mo, ujedinili SNSD i SDP, oni bi mogli suvereno nositi i ustavne promjene ireformu policije, bez ikakvih posredovanja, vrlo brzo i vrlo efikasno, jer nebismo imali tih prepreka. Ili kad bismo ujedinili HDZ, SDA i SDS u jednustranku, oni bi bili stranka koja to moè sna`no nositi. Ili kad bismo imalineku novu stranku koja dobije podr{ku i na jednoj i drugoj strani, to bi biojedan uspje{an rad. Mi poku{avamo sve to sami. Znamo da je jako teàkput. Na{i su favoriti na{a stranka. Mi sami poku{avamo dobiti parlamentar-nu ve}inu sa ~itavog prostora BiH i znamo da je to dug i teàk put i nismosigurni da li }emo ga ikada dosti}i, ali }emo poku{ati. Ono {to bi bila mojamolba predstavnicima me|unarodne zajednice jeste da pomognu u rje{a-vanjima uzroka, jer ako rije{e ove uzroke, na~in politi~kog organiziranja,onda se ne}e morati uop}e baviti kasnije posljedicama, jer do sada je bilapraksa da su se morali uvijek baviti nekim posljedicama.

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STUDIJANermina [a~i}

Me|unarodna zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini - od decembra 1995. do marta 2007. godine

Politolo{ki uvidi

I. Uvod

[ta je to 'me|unarodna zajednica' (MZ) u Bosni i Hercegovini? Ko jepredstavlja? Jesu li to Ujedinjeni narodi ili nacija? Jesu li to primarno ~laniceEvropske unije plus Ruska Federacija? Jesu li to Sjedinjene Ameri~ke Dràveplus NATO, SFOR, IFOR, KFOR, itd.? Da li su to OHR, OSCE, IPTF i nekedruge vladine i nevladine organizacije? Je su li to MMF, Svjetska banka,WTO, predstavnici ambasada, me|unarodne korporacije? Je li Bosna i Her-cegovina polu- ili stvarni protektorat me|unarodne zajednice? Koliko je ta'zajednica' zbiljski za BiH i kakvu BiH ona èli: trodijelnu, gra|ansku, odr-ìvu, neodrìvu?

S politolo{kog aspekta te{ko je definisati me|unarodnu zajednicu jer seradi o pojmu koji figurira u javnoj upotrebi, a njegovo zna~enje u politolo-{koj literaturi nije znanstveno odre|eno. Na osnovu anga`mana predstavni-ka me|unarodne zajednice u krizi na Balkanu, pogotovu u BiH, moèmokazati da je MZ skup razli~itih anglosaksonskih i evrokontinentalnih politi-~kih mi{ljenja o rje{avanju bh. problema.

U naj{irem smislu moglo bi se re}i ovo: od institucija me|unarodne za-jednice o~ekivalo se da pomognu ovoj zemlji da obezbijedi siguran okoli{za sve gra|ane, da razvije institucije za{tite njihovih osnovnih sloboda i pra-va, te da provede demokratsku tranziciju zemlje. Naàlost, nakon dvanaesto-godi{njeg anga`mana raznih me|unarodnih institucija koji se u naj{iremsmislu mogu odrediti kao MZ u BiH, moglo bi se zaklju~iti da se anga`manme|unarodne zajednice u BiH svodi na realizaciju nacionalnih interesa im-perijalnih sila. Putem umreènih institucionalnih struktura me|unarodna za-jednica djeluje s ciljem isijavanja mo}i, interesa i potreba velikih sila.

Politika me|unarodne zajednice u BiH je ogledalo fundamentalne nape-tosti izme|u evropskog i anglosaksonskog pogleda na demokratiju, naciju idràvu.

Dràva ili dràvnost na razli~itim razinama u Evropi ne sluì samo za si-gurnost i izvr{enje socijalnih zada}a, nego je dràvnost struktura poretka

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dru{tva uop}e. Evropska dràva nadilazi horizontalni dru{tveni ugovor,specifi~an za Ameriku. U Evropi je ”narodni suverenitet” igrao va`nu ulogu.Evropska demokratska tradicija kao arenu razra~unavanja poznaje politikukoja se zbiva u parlamentima. Rasprave oko raspodjele mo}i vode se u poli-ti~kom procesu ~ija su sredi{nja politi~ka arena parlamenti. Borba se vodi okozakona.

Ameri~ki Ustav nikad nije imao funkciju da apsolutnog vladara zamijenisuverenim narodom, nego se radilo o tome da se stvore minimalne struk-ture kako bi se osiguralo daljnje postojanje ameri~ke nacije. U SjedinjenimAmeri~kim Dràvama demokratija je mnogo ja~e povezana s pravosu|em.Institucije suda su najvi{i rang i posljednja garancija individualne sigurnostii gra|anskog priznanja. Ameri~ka demokratska tradicija pridaje va`nostartikulisanju interesa pojedinaca i manjina. Rasprave oko raspodjele mo}iodvijaju se direktno – horizontalno, a samo jednim malim dijelom u Senatu.U SAD-u borba se vodi oko prava.1

„Evropljani su bili zahvalni Sjedinjenim Dràvama {to su povele borbukoja je napokon okon~ala rat u Bosni, ali su... evropski zvani~nici bili zbun-jeni zbog potrebe za ameri~kim uklju~enjem”, navodi Richard Holbrooke usvojoj knjizi Zavr{iti rat (Holbrook, 1998; 318). U tom pogledu najve}a spe-cifi~nost me|unarodne zajednice jeste njeno 'djelovanje po drugima' kojemoèmo ilustrovati pomo}u ceremonijalne inauguracije Dejtonskog mirov-nog sporazuma koja je odràna u Parizu, mada je isti parafiran u ameri~kojzra~noj luci u Ohaju. „Me|unarodna zajednica je gabarite svoje mo}i predalaFrancuskoj, koja ih je za potrebe isforsirane imperijalne glume i deamerika-nizacije mira u Bosni prigrabila kao isklju~ivo svoje, pravilno procjenjuju-}i da Sjedinjene Dràve ne}e reagovati kako bi upravo potvrdile interna-cionalnost Dejtonskog sporazuma” (]urak, 2002: 126). Takvo djelovanje, po drugima, dakle po diktatu izmje{tenih centara geopoliti~ke i geoekonom-ske mo}i, me|unarodnu zajednicu smje{ta u okvir institucije bez posebnogkoncepta.

II. Filozofija 'mirovnog procesa'

Postoje mi{ljenja da je me|unarodna zajednica i „multilateralni proizvodSAD-a, simbioza ameri~kog nacionalnog interesa i ameri~kog Ethosa kao

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1 Detaljnije u: Haller Gret, Granice solidarnosti: Evropa i SAD u opho|enju sa dràvom, nacijom,i religijom, Buybook, Sarajevo, 2006.


svjetskog” (Ibid., 129) koja je zaustavila „simulaciju la`nih suosje}anja i puto-vanje Bosne u kona~nu agoniju” (Ibid., 130) koji su permanentno dolaziliod mnogobrojih 'demokratskih' politika evropskih sila kojim je nedostajaoeti~ki imperativ.

Drugo mi{ljenje koje figurira u znanstvenoj literaturi me|unarodnu zajed-nicu vidi kao vrstu eksperimenta kojoj je cilj prakti~no zapo~eti izgradnjusvjetskog dru{tva kroz sistem globalnog upravljanja u lokalnoj zajednici.Nakon rata, ta~nije nakon potpisivanja Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma1995. godine, taj prakticizam formalno je zapo~et u Bosni i Hercegovini kaolokalnoj zajednici, i on }e u ovom tekstu biti predmet politolo{kih uvida.

Me|unarodna zajednica u BiH je vi{e promovisala kategoriju 'mirovnogprocesa' nego mira kao vrijednosne politi~ke / demokratske orijentacije.Politi~ka filozofija 'mirovnog procesa' zapravo je instrument me|unarodnezajednice kojim se kontroli{u rat i mir permanentnom proizvodnjom ni ratani mira. To je oblik politi~ke vladavine me|unarodne zajednice u postkon-fliktnim zemljama. „Mirovni proces (...) upravo na slu~aju Bosna potvr|ujeda je Evropa mnogo bliè mirovnom procesu nego miru. PostdejtonskaBosna je obiljeèna mirovnim procesom kao negacijom demokratskih prin-cipa i latentnom destrukcijom bosanske dràve kojoj se ne dozvoljava mir iono {to je sadràno u miru, dakle demokratija” (Ibid., 157). 'Dayton'2 kaomirovni sporazum, odnosno kao ~uvar 'mirovnog procesa' nije samo instru-ment me|unarodne zajednice kojim je trebalo kontrolisati sukobe i nasiljena ovom podru~ju. Njegova najve}a slabost jeste {to je nametnut kaonorma, konstitucija Bosne i Hercegovine (Aneks IV Dejtonskog sporazumaje Ustav BiH, {to je apsurdno) na osnovu zate~enog ratnog stanja i nedo-voljnog uvaàvanja kulturno-historijske povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine, {to }upoku{ati elaborirati u nastavku teksta.

Nakon parafiranja Dejtonskog sporazuma 'mirovni proces' se po~injeimplementirati prvo prezentacijom onoga {to je dogovoreno izvan Bosne,daleko od o~iju bh. javnosti, ali i bh. Parlamenta (BiH ima Ustav koji nije veri-ficirao njen Parlament, {to je non-sens). U Daytonu je dogovoreno da BiHjeste dràva ali koja je sastavljena od dva entiteta, i to Federacije Bosne iHercegovine i Republike Srpske. Status grada Br~ko nije bio rije{en u Day-tonu, ali je na osnovu ranijih dogovora odlu~eno da kona~nu odluku o sud-bini grada donese Arbitra`ni sud za Br~ko, ina~e osnovan u ljeto 1996.godine. Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine je doìvljena kao dràva Bo{njaka i

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2 Pojam 'Dejton' u ovom tekstu ozna~ava ono {to je Mirovni sporazum potpisan u Daytonu.


Hrvata, a Republika Srpska kao dràva srpskog naroda. Br~ko je dobilosupervizora do kona~ne odluke o 'Distriktu Br~ko' (mart 2000. godine),kojom je Br~ko pripalo i Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine i Republici Srpskoj,pa time i svim gra|anima BiH.

Svako iole upu}en u politolo{ku znanost zna da je postojanje Republikeu Dràvi doista novum koji bi valjalo detaljnije istraìti. Takav politi~ki skan-dal onemogu}io je realizaciju u javnosti poznatog cilja me|unarodne zajed-nice, a to je 'izgradnja dru{tva i dràve koja je ratom poljuljana'. Prvi problemza realizaciju ovog cilja leì u ustavnoj diskriminaciji politi~kih prava gra|anaBiH. Etni~ki identiteti su ustavno-pravno i institucionalno fiksirani, i sve indi-vidue unutar bh. dru{tva bivaju prisiljene da se svrstaju unutar jednog od trizadata i fiksirana etni~ka identiteta; nijedna individua ne moè realiziratisvoja politi~ka prava (niti ra~unati na prakti~nu dru{tvenu promociju) izvannjih. [tavi{e, individua ne funkcioni{e na politi~kom planu kao gra|anin, nitina dru{tvenom planu kao individua, ve} isklju~ivo kao pripadnik zadatogetni~kog identiteta.

III. Etnostrana~ki pluralizam - la`ni politi~ki pluralitet

S obzirom da je me|unarodno partnerstvo s doma}im etnopoliti~kim eli-tama trajalo duè, svaka od njih imala je dovoljno vremena da zagovara'mirovni proces' kao svrhu politi~kog ìvota u Bosni i Hercegovini. Zbogtoga se na Dayton u postdejtonskoj politi~koj praksi gleda ovako: Bo{nja~kapoliti~ka javnost egzistira na tezi da je me|unarodna zajednica prisililagra|ane BiH da prihvate entitetsku podjelu, te da takva struktura BiH nemani historijskog, ni ekonomskog, ni ekonomsko-geografskog opravdanja, i dasu jedino upori{te za nastajanje takve BiH agresija i genocid. Srpska politi~kajavnost smatra da je Republika Srpska stekla i odràla teritorijalni i legalnikontinuitet od 1992. do danas, te da ona nije, kao {to Bo{njaci i Hrvati sma-traju, nastala Dejtonskim mirovnim sporazumom nego je istim verificirana,te zbog toga postojanje Republike Srpske ne moè biti dovedeno u pitanje.Hrvatska politi~ka javnost smatra da je Dejtonski sporazum 'otvorio' hrvatskonacionalno pitanje tako {to je ”me|unacionalne odnose uredio na {tetuhrvatskog naroda”. Nezadovoljstvo se poku{ava rije{iti zahtjevima za uspos-tavljenje tre}eg – etni~kog entiteta, koji bi trebalo promatrati kao ”logi~an,opravdan i pravedan programski cilj hrvatskog naroda u BiH sve dotle dokje ona entitetski ure|ena i dok u njoj postoji Republika Srpska” (@epi}, 2002:27). U politi~ki dezorijentisanom sistemu vrijednosti ovakve centrifugalne,

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divergentne, redukovane javnosti (koje su posljedica politi~kog sukoba uBiH oko teritorijalno-administrativnog i pravno-politi~kog ustrojstva BiH)djeluju razaraju}e na bh. politiku uop}e i na politi~ke slobode.

Problem koji je Dejton tako|er nametnuo, pa samim tim i ograni~io ulogume|unarodne zajednice, ti~e se strukture bosanskohercegova~kog dru{tva.Pojednostavljeno, to se svodi na pitanje da li bh. dru{tvo postoji kao cjelinaili je nepovratno podijeljeno u tri zasebne etnonacionalne cjeline? U posto-je}em Ustavu bh. dru{tvo (kao pretpostavljeni nosilac suvereniteta) nije kon-cipirano kao cjelina, nego kao mehani~ki zbir tri 'konstitutivna naroda'(neodre|enost pojma – op. aut.), koji su na taj na~in projektovani kao nosio-ci suvereniteta. 'Konstitutivni narodi' koncipirani su kao tri zasebne etnona-cionalne cjeline koje, opet, po logici ugra|enoj u Ustav, u perspektivi funk-cioni{u kao odvojeno dru{tvo s vlastitim suverenitetom.

Iz }orsokaka etni~ki monolitnog identiteta koji je legalizovan ustavnimodredbama bilo je uistinu te{ko raditi na dràvljanskom identitetu, pa ~ak iza predstavnike me|unarodne zajednice u BiH. [tavi{e, „veoma mali brojpredstavnika me|unarodne zajednice pridavao je va`nost i rijetko jedno-du{no izraàvao jasno uvjerenje da bi bilo neophodno pripomo}i uspjehumisaone alternative identiteta na temelju dràvljanstva” (Gret Haller, 2006:38). Hallerova primje}uje da Dejtonski sporazum u podru~ju ljudskih pravasadrì velika proturje~ja. Evropska konvencija o ljudskim pravima progla-{ena je direktno primjenjivim zakonom zemlje; me|utim, njezin sadràj nijebio dovoljno poznat u javnosti. U tom bi slu~aju bilo poznato da je dràvaBiH trebalo da uspostavi ustavni sud u 'civilnim i krivi~nim stvarima' kojeKonvencija prinudno propisuje. 'Evropska komisija za demokratiju putemprava', tzv. Venecijanska komisija, koja djeluje u okviru Vije}a Evrope, podr-àla je osnivanje jednog takvog suda. Tek je u maju 2002. godine Visokipredstavnik imenovao sedam sudija za Sud i time otklonio bitan nedostatakDejtonskog sporazuma. Me|unarodna sudska kontrola takvih pitanja tako-|er nije postojala jer Evropska konvencija o ljudskim pravima nije bila me-|unarodno verificirana sve dok BiH nije postala ~lanicom Vije}a Evrope (u aprilu 2002.). Prema Hallerovoj, koncept dràvljanskog identiteta vratio biizgubljeno povjerenje gra|ana u dràvu, koja je, pak, du`na na jednak na~in{tititi svoje gra|ane, koji imaju pravo da sudjeluju i u~estvuju u poslovimajavne vlasti. Zahvaljuju}i etniciziranom ustavu, pa samim tim i etnicizira-nom pravu koje je dobilo dovoljno vremena za promid`bu, posustalo se uafirmaciji prava pojedinca. Prevagu su, naàlost, odnijela etni~ka/kolektivnaprava – za koja su se najglasnije zalagali predstavnici nacionalnih stranakau Bosni i Hercegovini. Oni su, ina~e, smatrani jedinim reprezentativnim

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partnerima doma}e vlasti u pregovorima s me|unarodnom zajednicom(opozicija je ~esto bila izostavljena). Uzmimo za primjer Izborni zakon.

Opozicione stranke nisu bile predstavljene u PIK-u i nisu participirale udono{enju izbornih pravila jer je {ef OSCE-a izabrao da radi isklju~ivo svladaju}im etnopoliti~kim strankama. Iz ovoga se moè pretpostaviti da je rije~ o interesima me|unarodne zajednice (jer nadgledanje i provo|e-nje izbora finansijski je isplativ posao) i isklju~ivo etni~ko-vjerskim intere-sima nacionalnih stranaka, koje su su{tinski protiv gra|anske Bosne iHercegovine.

Razli~ita ratna iskustva izdiferencirala su i glasa~ko bira~ko tijelo BiH poetni~ko-vjerskoj osnovi, tako da je ono jo{ uvijek, naàlost, usmjereno daglasa samo za kandidate vlastite etni~ke grupe.

Nosioci kandidatskih lista traìli su glasove samo svoje etni~ke baze, jerna druge dvije nikad nisu ni ra~unali, samo da bi pobijedili. Bo{njaci subirani zahvaljuju}i glasovima samo Bo{njaka, a ne Srba i Hrvata. Srbi tako|ermogu biti izabrani a da nemaju podr{ku Bo{njaka i Hrvata, Hrvati bezpodr{ke Srba i Bo{njaka. Etnopoliti~ke stranke nikada nisu napravile isko-rak i poku{ale pridobiti glasa~ka tijela drugih naroda. Klju~na njihova bitkavodila se oko registracije bira~a. [to se vi{e Srba registruje u pojedinoj izbor-noj jedinici, samim tim 'vi{e' zna~i vi{e glasova za SDS; i {to se vi{e Bo{njakaregistruje, to zna~i vi{e glasova za SDA, a {to vi{e Hrvata – vi{e glasova zaHDZ.

IV. Kontraverze u praksi

Imaju}i u vidu da ovi prostori ìve na kontradikcijama, kao {to re~ePredrag Matvejevi}, me|unarodnoj zajednici se posre}ilo da se uklopi u ovajkoncept ìvota. Tako se desio paradoks da se, zahvaljuju}i i me|unarodnojzajednici, u posljednjih nekoliko godina ozbiljno diskutuje o ustavnim refor-mama. Naime, pored doma}ih eksperata, raspravu o potrebi promjeneDejtonskog ustava podupirale su i razli~ite me|unarodne institucije. Povo-dom obiljeàvanja osme godi{njice potpisivanja Dejtonskog sporazuma do-nesena je deklaracija „Osigurati mir u BiH daljom nadogradnjom Dajtonskogsporazuma”, iza koje su stajali brojni evropski politi~ki zvani~nici. Po njiho-vom mi{ljenju, „dejtonska konstrukcija Bosne je dostigla svoje granice”(decembar 2003). Ustavna reorganizacija BiH zatraèna je i inicijativom ESI(Evropske inicijative za stabilnost) po~etkom 2004. godine. Iste godine uaprilu Komitet za politi~ka pitanja Parlamentarne skup{tine Vije}a Evrope

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donio je Rezoluciju 1384: Ja~anje demokratskih institucija u BiH, premakojoj je dejtonsko ustavno rje{enje „sloèno i kontradiktorno, te na duì rokne moè osigurati djelotvorno funkcionisanje dràve”. I, na kraju, doprinosraspravama o ustavnim reformama dala je i Evropska komisija za demokrati-ju kroz pravo (Venecijanska komisija), po ~ijem mi{ljenju je „ustavna refor-ma neizostavna”.3

Ako je suditi po kontroverzama vezanim za ustavne reforme, posebnoone koje su propale u bh. parlamentu, onda je jednakost gra|ana uglavnomostavljena pritisku izvana.

Po mi{ljenju ve}ine stanovnika BiH, me|unarodna zajednica je zamijeni-la dràvu u ulozi novog patrona. Kao {to se nekad u socijalizmu o~ekivaloda svemogu}a dràva rije{i sve probleme gra|ana, preduze}a i lokalnihzajednica, danas se to isto o~ekuje od me|unarodne zajednice.

Nametanje mnogih zakona od Visokog predstavnika, s jedne strane, uma-njuje povjerenje bh. gra|ana u kompetencije vlasti, tako da se ~esto de{avada odre|ene grupe protestuju i traè pomo}, ali ne od doma}ih institucijavlasti nego, naprimjer, od istog tog OHR-a. S druge strane, da nije bilo inter-vencija u tom pogledu, BiH bi u mnogim dru{tveno-politi~kim nivoimazaostajala u reformama koje je vode prema evropskim integracijama. Danasmoèmo re}i da je BiH po~ela razgovarati o prelasku iz dejtonske u briselskufazu. Dejtonska faza obiljeìla je BiH kao zemlju kolektivnih prava, gdje nemamjesta za individualna prava i slobode zbog favoriziranja etni~kog principa nara~un gra|anskog, a briselska faza trebalo bi da oja~a prisustvo i uticaj Evropeu regionu, zatim izgradnju i ja~anje dràve Bosne i Hercegovine i njenih cen-tralnih institucija. U tom kontekstu treba razmi{ljati da li ja~anje EU i intenzivi-ranje odnosa BiH sa EU zna~i i svojevrsnu dezamerikanizaciju dejtonske Bo-sne? Kad govorimo o me|unarodnoj zajednici u BiH, jo{ uvijek podrazu-mijevamo i politiku Ameri~ke ambasade, USAID-a, Washingtona itd.

Osim kolektivnih, Brisel sugerira i individualna prava. „Ulazak u brisel-sku fazu ozna~ava zavr{etak procesa upravljanja krizom i po~etak tranzici-je, odlazak IPTF-a i SFOR-a, pripremu odlaska OHR-a i nestanak drugih dej-tonskih tekovina” (Hadìkaduni}, 2005: 17). Evropska unija intenzivira svojeodnose i postaje, kroz razli~ite oblike suradnje, sve je prisutnija u BiH.Me|unarodne policijske snage UN-a (IPTF) i Stabilizacijske snage NATO-a(SFOR) ve} su oti{le iz BiH. O zatvaranju OHR u nastavku teksta.

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3 Vidi opse`niji uvid u: Slavo Kuki}, "Postdejtonske ustavne kontroverze" u: Analiti~ki pogled:ùrnal dru{tvenih nauka, br. 2, Udruènje "Dayton projekt - program za civilni dijelog u BiH",Sarajevo, 2007, 41-57.


êste smjene aktuelih politi~ara od strane visokih predstavnika za BiH(posebno u vrijeme Wolfganga Petritscha) ohrabrivale su jedan dio popu-lacije, pa je tako raslo povjerenje u me|unarodnu zajednicu. S obzirom nato da se u vi{e navrata mogla primijetiti nacionalna izbalansiranost u tomsmjenjivanju, povjerenje se smanjivalo. Kod nekih politi~kih stranaka, odno-sno njihovih lidera koji su bili meta Visokog predstavnika, poja~an je strah,tako da se njihova odgovornost vi{e usmjeravala prema Uredu OHR-a, a neprema bh. gra|anima koji su ih na tu poziciju izabrali. Bilo je i onih politi-~kih stranaka koje su takve smjene iskoristile za vlastitu predizbornu kam-panju, pa bi smijenjeni postali miljenici samo zato {to ih 'stranci ne vole'.

Nu|enje nepoliti~kih rje{enja s ciljem rje{avanja politi~ke krize i sukobapodsje}a na davanje pogre{ne terapije pacijentu koji ne moè uticati da seterapija promijeni, a jo{ manje je u stanju da promijeni doktora. Ako doktorpoku{a da modifikuje terapiju tokom bolesti nakon nekoliko godina, on nemoè nadoknaditi ni izgubljeni novac niti izgubljeno vrijeme i patnje paci-jenta. Obnovimo na{e politi~ko sje}anje.

Za vrijeme prvog Visokog predstavnika u BiH Carla Bildta4 goru}e pita-nje nije bilo kako otkloniti posljedice rata ili kako poru{enu infrastrukturuponovo osposobiti; on je „postavio pitanje kako komunisti~ku privredu pre-obraziti u savremenu trì{nu privredu” (Petritsch, 2002: 77). Stvaranje uslo-va za slobodnu trgovinu u ~itavom regionu sigurno bi osiguralo brù inte-graciju zemlje da je ekonomski faktor uistinu bio uzrok rata u Bosni iHercegovini. „Za mene je privredna integracija klju~ integracije zemlje, i toje ujedno klju~ za dugoro~nu integraciju u evropske strukture... U ime togaja }u svoje gledi{te pomjeriti sa politi~kih na socijalne i privredne problemeBiH.” (Petritsch, 2002, 78 – podvukla N. [ ).

Carlos Westendorp 5 imao je i formalne uslove da reaguje na politi~ke blo-kade, koje su provodile uglavnom nacionalne stranke. Naime, zbog poli-

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4 Carl Bildt, prvi visoki predstavnik u BiH, bio je predstavnik Evropske unije u biv{oj Jugoslaviji.Bildt preuzima svoju poziciju u atmosferi nepovjerenja prema me|unarodnoj zajednici. Bo{-nja~ka politi~ka javnost bila je ljuta jer me|unarodna zajednica nije sprije~ila stravi~ne zlo~inekoji su po~injeni nad nesrpskim stanovni{tvom. Srpska politi~ka javnost reagovala je tako|erskepti~no i s nepovjerenjem. Ve}ina Srba je u jedinicama IFOR-a vidjela saveznika svojih 'nepri-jatelja'. U hrvatskoj politi~koj javnosti vladalo je mi{ljenje da su rat dobili Hrvati, iako je u Day-tonu pokopan san o priklju~nju jednog dijela BiH Hrvatskoj.

5 Carlos Westendorp stupio je na du`nost 18. juna 1997. godine. Bio je ministar vanjskih poslo-va u vladi Felipea Gonzalesa. Ubrzo nakon {to je preuzeo du`nost, odràni su poslijeratni izboriu BiH, na kojima su ponovo pobijedile nacionalne stranke. On je zatekao tri valute u Bosni iHercegovini (hrvatsku kunu, jugoslavenski dinar i bosanski dinar odnosno kupon). Jugoslaven-ski dinar i kuna bili su simboli za zajedni~ki privredni prostor Jugoslavije i RS-a, odnosno tzv.Herceg-Bosne i Hrvatske.


ti~kih opstrukcija na konferenciji Vije}a za implementaciju mira, koja je naministarskom nivou odràna 9. i 10. decembra u Bonu, Visokom predstav-niku je potvr|eno da ima glavnu rije~ u politici implementacije mira. Viso-kom predstavniku date su ovlasti da moè proglasiti zakone ukoliko ih za-konodavni organi regularno ne donesu. Ovlasti su podrazumijevale da Vi-soki predstavnik moè razrije{iti du`nosti predstavnike parlamentarnih stra-naka koji se suprotstavljaju implementaciji Sporazuma o miru, ali ne i samenacionalne stranke, koje su po mi{ljenju stru~ne javnosti bile nosioci kon-flikta u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Westendorp je 1. januara 1998. udario granice politi~kim blokadama. BiHje dobila svoje dràvne / politi~ke simbole. Westendorp je u dijelu medijskejavnosti zadobio simpatije jer je prvi visoki predstavnik koji je smjenjivao po-liti~are koji su opstruirali provedbu Dejtona.6 Smjenjivanjem osoba, {to je bi-lo novum u odnosu na prvog visokog predstavnika, oduzeta je djelimi~namo} snagama opstrukcije. Ukoliko bi do{lo do ponovnih opstrukcija, Visokipredstavnik mogao je uskratiti 'socijalnu pomo}', {to je eti~ki problemati~no.Ovakve odluke etno-politi~ari su koristili za ja~anje argumentacije u vezi stezom da je me|unarodna zajednica protiv „naroda koji oni predstavljaju”.

Wolfgang Petritsch7 bio je siguran kako je problem BiH u nedostatku svi-jesti o vlastitoj odgovornosti. Smatrao je da politi~ari i gra|ani BiH morajusvoju zemlju, njene probleme i potrebe shvatiti kao svoje vlasni{tvo (own-ershi'): „Prihvatanje vlastite odgovornosti za politi~ke vo|e u Bosni koji suza vrijeme rata bili na pozicijama mo}i i ~ije mi{ljenje jo{ vaì kao prevla-|uju}a ideologija iziskuje potpuni zaokret” (Petritsch, 2002: 125). „Kada sam1999. godine stupio na du`nost visokog predstavnika, postavio sam sebi zacilj da BiH izvedem na put samoodgovornosti, a od politi~ara i gra|ana zah-tijevao sam da prihvate odgovornost (ownership) kao sudbinu zemlje”(Petritsch, 2002: 5), kaè Petritsch u svojoj knjizi BiH od Daytona do Evrope.O~igledno je da je, u odnosu na druge, Petritsch imao politi~ku strategiju uBiH – demokratiziranje nacionalista.

Vrlo brzo je zadobio simpatije u javnosti, posebno nakon prve odluke osmjeni 22 funkcionera. Me|u smijenjenim na{li su se kantonalni guverneri,ministri, gradona~elnici, {efovi stambenih komisija... Me|utim, prilikomsmjenjivanja vo|eno je ra~una o etni~kom balansu: smijenjeno je 9 Srba, 7

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6 U Westendorpovom mandatu smjenjeno je 12 bh. politi~ara.7 Wolfgang Petritsch preuzeo je du`nost 1999. godine. Bio je specijalni izaslanik Evropske unije

za Kosovo i {ef pregovara~ke misije u Rombouilletu i Parizu. Godine 2001. produèn mu je man-dat, tako da je du`nost visokog predstvnika obavljao 3 godine.


Bo{njaka i 6 Hrvata. Me|utim, stranke su bile one koji su suspendovanezamjenjivale jednako opstruktivnim sljedbenicima, a smijenjeni bi ~esto do-bio unapre|enje ili neko va`no mjesto u privredi.

Dok je Petritsch promovisao politiku partnerstva sa doma}om vla{}u –uz sankcije za opstrukcije, Paddy Ashdown je na samom po~etku svog man-data pokazao sklonost ka naredbodavnoj opciji,8 s ciljem da BiH potpi{eSporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruìvanju Evropskoj uniji. U toku 2002. godineVisoki predstavnik je nametnuo 32 zakona, godinu dana kasnije 14 zakona,a do sredine druge polovine 2004. godine svega 3 zakona. Po stupanju naovu funkciju on je kao prioritetni zadatak potvrdio reformu pravosu|a, i tou tri pravca. Prvi segment je reforma sudske vlasti, drugi izbor sudija ituìlaca,9 a tre}i reforma zakonodavstva.10 Sva tri segmenta reforme odvijajuse paralelno i trenutno su u zavr{noj fazi.

V. Reforme u Bosni i Hercegovini vs. reforme u me|unarodnoj zajednici?

Novije politolo{ke teorije podsje}aju nas na to da se politi~ka demokra-tizacija zemlje prati kroz njenu zakonodavnu, sudsku, izvr{nu, medijsku i ci-vilnu sferu. Klasi~ne teorije uglavnom su se zadràvale na prve tri; me|utim,novije sve ~e{}e govore da politika zauzima sve va`nije mjesto u medijskogsferi i civilnom / gra|anskom dru{tvu. Ako ho}emo prikazati u~inak djelo-vanja me|unarodne zajednice u BiH od decembra 1995. do marta 2007. go-dine, moramo se ograni~iti na ovih pet politi~kih segmenata dru{tva, s timda }emo izostaviti druge aktivnosti me|unarodne zajednice, koje su sigurnovrijedne pa`nje i analize.

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8 Paddy Ashdown je du`nost visokog predstavnika pruzeo 27. marta 2002. godine.9 Drugi vid reforme je reizbor sudija u Bosni i Hercegovini. Visoki predstavnik je uspostavio viso-

ka sudska i tuìla~ka vije}a koja su sa~injena od doma}ih sudija i tuìlaca i stranih eksperata, sciljem da imenuje nove sudije i tuìoce. Prema rezultatima moè se zaklju~iti da su visoka sud-ska i tuìla~ka vije}a imala dovoljno kriti~an stav prilikom izbora sudija i tuìlaca i da su uvaà-vali nacionalni balans. Ovdje posebno treba imati u vidu da su izabrane sudije i tuìoci po prviput u situaciji da budu birani doìvotno.

10Postupak reforme zakonodavstva je gotovo okon~an dono{enjem novih zakona, a to je Zakono krivi~nom postupku i Zakon o parni~nom postupku, kao i dono{enjem novih krivi~nih zakonau gotovo identi~nom tekstu za BiH i oba entiteta.


V.a Zakonodavna vlast

Na nivou dràve Bosne i Hercegovine zakonodavna vlast je u rukamadvodomne Parlamentarne skup{tine, u ~ijoj je nadle`nosti dono{enje zako-na, usvajanje budèta za institucije BiH i davanje saglasnosti na ratifikacijume|unarodnih ugovora. Kako je ista bila blokirana u radu sve do konstitui-sanja novog saziva nakon izbora 2000. godine, ve}i broj zakona neophod-nih za normalno funkcionisanje dràve ili nije donesen ili ga je nametnuoVisoki predstavnik.

Na konferenciji u Bonu 10. decembra 1997. godine Visokom predstav-niku data su veoma visoka ovla{tenja kako bi se premostile blokade uzakonodavnim tijelima koje su uzrokovali predstavnici tada{njih nacionalnih/ nacionalisti~kih stranaka.

Iz dana{nje perspektive, moèmo biti zadovoljni zato {to je Visoki pred-stavnik nametno simboli~ka demokratska obilje`ja dràve BiH po{to u vezis tim nacionalne stranke nisu uspjele posti}i konsenzus.

Me|utim, tu je i niz drugih pozitivnih zakonskih rje{enja, ~iji nedostaciuglavnom leè u tome {to su dono{eni bez konsultacija {ire dru{tvene jav-nosti. Ilustrativan primjer za to je bio Nacrt izbornog zakona, koji je dobiopodr{ku svih glavnih aktera me|unarodne zajednice u BiH (napravljen jepod okriljem OSCE-a, a podràli su ga OHR, Vije}e Evrope, UNMIBH), a dvaputa je nai{ao na skoro jedinstveno odbijanje doma}ih pravnih eksperata.11

Drugi nedostatak leì u tome {to je ~esto izostala strategija primjene za-konodavnih ovla{tenja (npr. Zakon o pristupu informacijama).

V.b Sudska reforma

Najve}i prioritet me|unarodne zajednice u reformskim oblastima odno-sio se na uspostavljanje nezavisnog sudstva i izgradnju vladavine prava.Nepristrasno i nezavisno sudstvo, te njegovo depolitizovanje, bili su zahtje-vi koji je Vije}a Evrope postavilo kao uslov Bosni i Hercegovini za prijem uVije}e Evrope. Prema me|unarodnim standardima, to podrazumijeva elimi-naciju svih uticaja koji na sudstvo mogu biti izvr{eni izvana, pri ~emu ono'izvana' podrazumijeva svakog izvan sudske vlasti. Na osnovu ostvarenog,

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11"Najve}a zamjerka koja se stavlja Zakonu bila je potvr|ivanje diskriminacije… naro~ito kod izbo-ra ~lanova Predsjedni{tva, koji je diskriminatorski i ograni~ava pasivno bira~ko pravo", navodiSevima Sali-Terzi} u svojoj studiji "Pravni sistem" u zborniku Me|unarodne politike podr{ke zem-ljama Jugoisto~ne Evrope: lekcije (ne)nau~ene u BiH, (ur. @arko Papi}), Müller, Sarajevo, str. 161.


~ini se da je bh. sudstvo u eliminaciji 'doma}e' vlasti postalo ovisno ome|unarodnoj.

Iako danas postoji pravni okvir koji bi trebao eliminisati politi~ke pritiskena sudstvo, mogli bismo govoriti i o njegovoj izloènosti pritiscima me|u-narodne zajednice. S jedne strane, ta kontrola vodi bojazni da }e rad do-ma}ih sudija i tuìlaca biti predmet ispitivanja i revizije, uz nadzor me|una-rodne zajednice i uz mogu}nost kori{tenja ovla{tenja Visokog predstavnika.12

Veliki napredak postignut je u razvoju institucija i njihovom osavreme-njivanju, naro~ito uvo|enjem informacionih tehnologija. Dobar su primjer inapori na uspostavljanju sudske vlasti na nivou dràve, u skladu s preporu-kama Venecijanske komisije. Opstrukcije tog procesa su uglavnom dolazile'iznutra'. Me|unarodna zajednica je omogu}ila i osigurala konstituisanje inesmatano funkcionisanje Ustavnog suda BiH i Ustavnog suda FBiH, te jepomogla u formiranju Instituta za obuku sudija na nivou dràve i formira-nju nekih pravnih udruènja.

Pored aktivnosti koje se odnose na zakonsku regulativu, a njih je bilouistinu mnogo, me|unarodna zajednica je radi ostvarivanja svoga cilja nudi-la programe obuke za pravnike, uklju~uju}i sudije i advokate. Me|utim, uokviru tih aktivnosti napravljeni su i neki previdi, koji su u zna~ajnoj mjeridoveli u pitanje postizanje ovih rezultata. êsto se de{avalo da doma}ipravnici, naro~ito sudije i tuìoci, doìve ove programe kao napad na vlasti-tu kompetentnost i identitet.

Naro~ito „zbunjuju}e i neefikasno pokazalo se mije{anje common lawtradicije sa civil law tradicijom” (Sali-Terzi}, 2001: 172). Me|utim, programisu imali smisla u ponovnom uspostavljanju pokidanih veza, tj. u obnovikontakata s kolegama preko 'entitetskih razgrani~enja'.

S obzirom na sredstva koja su potro{ena u ovu reformu i na u~e{}evelikog broja stranih eksperata me|unarodne zajednice, nisu postignutirezultati koji odgovaraju uloènim naporima i sredstvima. Tome su doprini-jeli lo{a politi~ka klima i nespremnost pravni~ke zajednice u BiH da prihvatiogroman priliv me|unarodne pomo}i. S druge strane, protivljenje prijedlo-zima me|unarodne zajednice naj~e{}e se karakteri{e kao 'blokiranje proce-sa reforme' ili 'nepostojanje èlje da se BiH odvede u Evropu'. U promo-visanju nezavisnosti sudstva i njegove depolitizacije dovedeni su pod znakpitanja ista ta nezavisnost i depolitizacija.

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12Na~in i postupak smjene sudija i tuìlaca regulisani su zakonima koje je u oba entiteta namet-nuo Visoki predstavnik.


V.c Medijska reforma

Dejtonski sporazum i Ustav BiH gotovo da ni{ta nisu rekli o medijima.U Ustavu BiH u nadle`nostima dràve nema ni rije~i o medijima, ~ak ni oonim kojima se osigurava identitet dràve – o dràvnoj ili javnoj radio-tele-viziji. Mediji su ostavljeni u nadle`nosti entitetima. U Federaciji BiH oni su~ak potisnuti u nadle`nost kantona.

Vije}e za implementaciju mira ~esto je na svojim sjednicama raspravljaloo medijima. U Sintri je u maju 1997. godine prvi put odgovoreno na pita-nja {ta da se radi s medijima koji nastavljaju sa {irenjem ratnohu{ka~ke pro-pagande. Re~eno je da „Visoki predstavnik moè suspendovati bilo kojumedijsku mreù ~iji je program u stalnoj i dubokoj suprotnosti sa duhom islovom Mirovnog sporazuma” (www.ohr.int). Iste godine u decembru u Bo-nu dat je nalog da se osnuje Nezavisna komisija za medije, koja treba da re-guli{e stanje u elektronskim medijima. Na Madridskoj konferenciji u de-cembru 1998. godine donesen je dokument 'Reforma medija', kojim je podr-àn Visoki predstavnik u svojim aktivnostima na pretvaranju dràvnih medi-ja u javne servise. Tako|er je zatraèno od zemalja donatora da pomognurad Nezavisne komisije za medije i da podstaknu dono{enje medijskih za-kona u oba entiteta. Od OSCE-a i IMC-a zatraèno je da donesu jasna izbo-rna pravila o pona{anju medija.

Me|unarodna zajednica je bila duboko uklju~ena u reformu medijskescene nakon dono{enja Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma. Pod uticajem na-cionalnih oligarhija u vrijeme rata na vojno osvojenim ili sa~uvanim teritori-jama nastala su tri tehni~ki, programski i statusno odvojena RTV sistema.Mediji iz Srbije i Hrvatske nesmetano su {irili svoj uticaj i interese svojih dr-àva na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine. Ve}ina medija je bila propagandnosredstvo, a vrlo mali broj je uspio sa~uvati svoju nezavisnu orijentaciju. Me-|unarodna zajednica }e u prvoj fazi svoje pomo}i podràti medijsku eks-panziju prvenstveno svojim obilnim donacijama medijima koji su tvrdili daafirmi{u nezavisnu orijentaciju. Cilj me|unarodne intervencije bio je stvara-nje pluralizma medija, koji nije doprinio demokratizaciji medijske scene.Uprkos dobroj finansijskoj volji me|unarodne zajednice, prvi poslijeratni pe-riod obiljeèn je 'verbalnim ratom' koji se vodio preko medija. Medijski pros-tor je podijeljen na nacionalno-vjerskoj osnovi, a govor mr`nje je gospodariou medijskim sadràjima.

Uo~i prvih poslijeratnih izbora u jesen 1996. godine osnovano je mno{tvolokalnih medija nezavisnih od politike lokalnih vlasti i uz pomo} inostranihmedija. OHR i OSCE u BiH osnivaju i dva velika internacionalna projekta –

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televiziju OBN13 i radio FERN, s ciljem da se izvr{i presudan uticaj na stvara-nje povoljnijeg ambijenta na izborima. Me|utim, u to vrijeme i dalje suaktivno djelovali mediji iz susjedstva, {to je oteàvalo 'medijsku demokrati-zaciju'. Doma}e vlasti su medije finansirane od me|unarodne zajedniceprogla{avali nepatriotskim i neprijateljskim, izme|u ostalog i zbog ~injeniceda se 'novac nije àlio' kada su mediji u pitanju.14

Godine 1998. otvoren je proces transformacije dràvnih radio i TV sta-nica u javne servise. Njega je nametnuo svojim odlukama i zakonimatako|er Visoki predstavnik, nakon neuspjelih poku{aja da taj posao uradedoma}e vlasti, menad`ment i uredni{tva postoje}ih dràvnih RTV stanica.15

Nametnuto je da u BiH rade dvije javne entitetske radio i TV stanice i JavniRTV servis za cijelu Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Time je medijski prostor BiH for-malno-pravno entitetizovan.

Nakon osnivanja Nezavisne komisije za medije uga{en je nelegalno us-postavljeni sistem hrvatske radio-televizije u Federaciji BiH (rije~ je o filijaliHrvatske radio-televizije iz Zagreba), a govor mr`nje polako nestaje iz medij-skog prostora. S obzirom na to da je ovu Komisiju osnovao posebnom od-lukom Visoki predstavnik, u stru~nim doma}im krugovima ona je smatrana„paradràvnom institucijom s nadle`nostima me|unarodne zajednice” jer suje uglavnom vodili inostrani eksperti. Stru~na javnost vidjela je nedostatak ufunkcionisanju ove Komisije jer je nadle`na za dono{enje, pra}enje i sank-cionisanje pravila pona{anja. Primjedbi ima i na transparentnost Komisije,kao i na àlbeni postupak koji se zavr{ava u Komisiji bez prava na vi{u ad-ministrativnu instancu ili sudsku tu`bu. Njeno inkorporiranje u Regulatornuagenciju za telekomunikacije izazvalo je negodovanje doma}ih stru~njaka.

Po~etkom 2000. godine me|unarodna zajednica ~ini nagli zaokret upodr{ci medijima. Ona odustaje od podr{ke koju je davala internacionalnimprojektima – OBN-u i FERN-u. Prvi je ostavila lokalnom osoblju da ga dalje

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13U stru~noj javnosti ova televizija se zvala 'Bildtova televizija'.14Najve}i donatori u oblasti medija bili su Evropska unija, Soros i USAID. Evropska unija je od

1995. do 2000. godine donirala za razvoj medija u BiH 33 miliona i 249 hiljada njema~kih mara-ka. USAID je za iste potrebe izdvojio 74 miliona maraka. Soros je za sedam godina (od 1993. do1999) za podr{ku medijima uloìo 7 miliona i 583 hiljade maraka. U 2000. godini on je napus-tio program direktne pomo}i medijima opredjeljuju}i se za regionale programe u oblasti komu-nikacija. Bez sumnje se radi o velikim finansijskim sredstvima.

15Visoki predstavnik je poku{ao dobiti podr{ku od tri lidera nacionalnih stranaka, tada ~lanovaPredsjedni{tva. Po{to je srpski ~lan predsjedni{tva Mom~ilo Kraji{nik odbio da potpi{e Memo-randum o saradnji, Visoki je predstavnik u julu 1999. godine nametnuo vi{e odluka kojima seuspostavljaju javni servisi na nivou dràve i Federacije BiH, dok se Srpskoj RTV naloèno da pro-mijeni ime u RTV Republike Srpske.


vodi kako zna i umije, a drugi je sa svojim kadrovskim i tehni~kim sredstvi-ma uklju~ila u Javni radio BiH (BH radio 1). Ina~e, u toj fazi prioritet se dajetransformaciji dràvnih u javne elektronske servise. Ovu fazu pratila je tihaopstrukcija i potpuna nezainteresovanost doma}ih vlasti.

U odsustvu politi~ke spremnosti vlasti da predloè odgovaraju}e zakone,OSCE je izradio Prijedloge Zakona o slobodnom pristupu informacijama ikleveti.

V.d Civilno dru{tvo

Ustavom BiH, ali i ustavima oba entiteta, garantovano je pravo na slobo-du udruìvanja, koje je temelj postojanja civilnog dru{tva, odnosno njego-vih institucija uop}e. S obzirom da je ustavni pravni okvir u BiH takav dacentralni dràvni organi imaju veoma ograni~enu nadle`nost, te da entitetiimaju veliku autonomiju, pitanje prava na slobodu udruìvanja razli~ito je uentitetima. U Federaciji BiH postoje tri zakona koji odre|uju djelovanjenevladinog sektora, i to: Zakon o udruìvanju gra|ana, Zakon o humani-tarnim organizacijama i Zakon o fondacijama. U Republici Srpskoj to pita-nje je regulisano Zakonom o udruìvanju gra|ana koji je preuzet iz biv{eSFRJ. Dok sloboda udruìvanja u svijetu prelazi nacionalne (dràvne)granice, u BiH to udruìvanje je, zbog Ustava, politi~ke nezainteresovanostii pasivnosti me|unarodne zajednice, ostalo na entitetskoj razini.

Pod sintagmom 'razvoj civilnog dru{tva' uglavnom je me|unarodna za-jednica podrazumijevala davanje podr{ke razvoju i radu nevladinih organi-zacija, ~esto predvi|aju}i da je civilno dru{tvo mnogo {ire od nevladinogsektora. Iskustva drugih zemalja nam pokazuju da demokratizaciju nose i iz-nose druge gra|anske grupe. Uprkos tome, me|unarodni donatori u nevla-dinim organizacijama vidjeli su centralni segment civilnog dru{tva, smatraju}ida tako ja~aju civilno dru{tvo u BiH. Ovaj na~in davanja i usmjeravanja po-mo}i naj~e{}e su provodili UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, Svjetska banaka i Me-|unarodni monetarni fond.

Posljednjih godina primje}ujemo smanjenje me|unarodne pomo}i u BiHi prebacivanje fokusa interesovanja na neke druge krizne regione (Kosovo).Zbog toga je do{lo do zna~ajnog zastoja u razvoju mnogih nevladinih orga-nizacija koje nisu razvile strategiju razvoja nakon nestanka pomo}i me|u-narodne zajednice: „Umjesto da se odgovora potrebama i zahtjevima koris-nika, stvorena je situacija u kojoj korisnici odgovaraju potrebama i zahtjevi-ma donatora” (Sali-Terzi}, 2001: 183).

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Kriti~ari navode da su mnoge nevladine organizacije prili~no udaljene oddru{tva i gra|ana, {to je svojevrsna „paradoksalna posljedica pomo}i civil-nom dru{tvu”. Tako nas @arko Papi} upozorava da metod podr{ke 'pokri-va' veoma malu elitu (Papi}, 2001: 28). 'Elita' u tzv. civilnom dru{tvu se 'pro-fesionalizira', odvaja od problema 'baze' i 'socijalne realnosti' tako da se sti~efiktivna slika o velikim naporima koji su uloèni.

Drugi problem je {to veliki broj nevladinih organizacija nije koordinisan.Mada je bilo poku{aja koordinacije, desio se bum u formiranju koordinacij-skih tijela. Dugo su vremena 'umreàvanje' i 'koordinacija' bile magi~ne rije~ikoje mogu otvoriti mnoga vrata za dobijanje novih finansijskih sredstava.

Doma}im nevladinim organizacijama jo{ uvijek nedostaje znanja i vje{-tina, a ponekad i motiv da poku{aju uticati na vlast i proces dono{enja odlu-ka. U pogledu izbornih rezultata, do promjena u politi~kom opredjeljenjugra|ana dolazilo je uglavnom tamo gdje su locirane najzna~ajnije i najak-tivnije nevladine organizacije. U podru~jima u kojima je njihovo prisustvobilo minimalno rezultati su bili daleko ispod o~ekivanja.

Uz izuzetke, naravno, ozbiljno pitanje koje se moè postaviti odnosi sena legitimitet i kredibilitet nevladinih organizacija.

VI. Ocjena i analize

Ono {to je do sada pozitivno u djelovanju me|unarodne zajednice BiHjeste pomo} u tranziciji, ali ne u onoj klasi~noj tranziciji koju su druge zem-lje pro{le – tranziciji ka punoj trì{noj ekonomiji, parlamentarnoj dràvi iuop}e civilnom dru{tvu. U osnovi, me|unarodna zajednica je uloìla ogrom-ne napore u tranziciju iz rata u mir, pri tome je finanisiraju}i. Iako ta tranzi-cija traje duè nego {to se o~ekivalo, u politi~kom smislu omogu}ila je Bosnii Hercegovini stvaranje pretpostavki za ulazak u evroatlanske integracije.

Me|unarodna zajednica kao da nije imala informaciju da rat u BiH nijebio produkt drevne etni~ke mr`nje koja je vladala na ovim prostorima, ve}da je isti uvezen i nije imao osnovne uzroke u samoj zemlji. Etni~ko ~i{}enjebilo je cilj ratova, ne njihova posljedica. Povratak {irih razmjera nije biomogu} bez slamanja politike koja je isplanirala premje{tanje stanovni{tva.Povratak nije osiguran jer nisu uklonjeni politi~ki nalogodavci etni~kog~i{}enja. Velike sume novca potro{ene su prvih godina nakon Dejtona, kadaje stopa povratka bila mala, a sada, kada je povratak intenziviran, nedosta-je finansijska podr{ka. Me|unarodna zajednica danas potpuno ignori{e pita-nje 'konstitutivnih manjina', smatraju}i povratak u BiH zavr{enom pri~om.

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Me|unarodna zajednica poku{ala je 'demokratizovati nacionaliste' u BiH.Zbog toga s velikim naporom spoznaje da bh. politi~ke elite opstaju na vla-sti zahvaljuju}i podsticaju nesigurnosti, sukoba i nestabilnosti. One kao tak-ve ne mogu proizvesti stabilnost jer opstaju na vode}oj poziciji zahvaljuju}ikonfliktu. Kada su tri nacionalne stranke u BiH (SDA, HDZ i SDS) podme|unarodnim pritiskom bile prisiljene ublaìti nacionalisti~ku retoriku, ri-vali unutar nacionalnih blokova (SBiH, HDZ 1990. i SNSD) prisvojili su takavvokabular, {to im se isplatilo na narednim izborima. Postoje mi{ljenja daposljednji izbori nisu pokazali da su najradikalnije stranke postale umjerene,nego da su najradikalnije upravo umjerene stranke. Ima vi{e razloga za tvrd-nju da je u BiH do{lo do radikalizacije nacionalizma, a ne njegovog smanji-vanja. Analiziramo li predizbornu retoriku uo~i, tokom i poslije izbora tzv.umjerenih stranaka, ne}emo mo}i zaklju~iti da su na posljednjim izborimapobijedile reformisane nad nereformisanim strankama. 'Demokratizacija' na-cionalnih stranaka, koju je izme|u ostalog podràvala i me|unarodna zajed-nica, dovela je do njihovog umnoàvanja, udvostru~avanja.

înjenica je da se OHR ponekad pona{a kao nova politi~ka institucija uBiH. Iako danas postoji pravni okvir koji je eliminisao politi~ke pritiske nabh. sudstvo i bh. medije, mogli bismo govoriti i o njihovoj izloènosti pri-tiscima me|unarodne zajednice.

Postoje naznake da je me|unarodna zajednica umorna i da bi htjela sma-njiti svoj anga`man u BiH.16 Uprkos tome, Vije}e za implementaciju mira jeu Briselu (23. februara 2007.) odlu~ilo da OHR i Bonske ovlasti ostaju do ju-na 2008. godine jer pomaci u procesu evropskih integracija u protekloj godi-ni nisu bili dovoljni.

Tako|er, mandat OHR-a je produèn zbog sazrijevanja svijesti unutar sa-me me|unarodne zajednice da su BiH potrebne ustavne reforme. Iako ve}dvije godine to nije tabu tema, aktuelni Visoki predstavnik u BiH ChristianSchwarz-Schilling povodom produètka svoga mandata isti~e: „Tokom pred-stoje}ih mjeseci namjeravam pokrenuti i proces ustavne reforme zajedno spredstavnicima Sjedinjenih Ameri~kih Dràva, kako bismo pomogli razvojuustavne strukture, koja je ovoj zemlji potrebna da bi postala moderna i efikas-na dràva. Iz tog razloga, od 1. marta imam pro{iren mandat i dodatne resur-se u svojstvu specijalnog predstavnika EU” (Dnevni avaz, 2. mart 2007).

U poku{aju identifikacije i kriti~ke elaboracije reformskih oblasti koje jepokretala me|unarodna zajednica, dolazimo do slijede}ih zaklju~aka: politi-

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16Vidi: International Crisis Croup, Europe Report, No. 180, od 15. februara 2007. godine


ka me|unarodne zajednice bila je reduciraju}a / nedemokratska, dakle usuprotnosti s demokratskim duhom, jer je veliki broj zakonskih regulativadonesen bez konsultovanja {ire dru{tvene javnosti. Zato se ~ini va`nimrazmisliti o tome da se gre{ke u BiH ne ponove u nekim drugim zemljamaJugoisto~ne Evrope.

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Literatura:

Bieber, Florian (2004): Institucionaliziranje etni~nosti, Me|unarodni Fo-rum Bosna

]urak, Nerzuk (2002): Geopolitika kao sudbina: slu~aj Bosna – post-modernisti~ki ogled o perifernoj zemlji, Fakultet politi~kih nauka,Sarajevo

Hadìkaduni}, Emir (2005): Od Dejtona do Brisela, ACIPS, SarajevoHaller, Gret (2006): Granice solidarnosti: Evropa i SAD u opho|enju sadràvom, nacijom, i religijom, Buybook, Sarajevo

Holbrook, Richard (1998): Zavr{iti rat, [ahinpa{i}, Sarajevo

Mujki}, Asim (2006): „We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis”, Constellations,Volume 14, Number 1, 2007

Paji}, Zoran (2001): Uloga institucija u izgradnji mira, u zborniku:Me|unarodne politike podr{ke zemljama Jugoisto~ne Evrope: lekcije(ne)nau~ene u BiH, (ur. @arko Papi}), Müller, Sarajevo

Papi}, @arko (2001): „Op}a situacija u BiH i politika me|unarodne podr-{ke”, u zborniku: Me|unarodne politike podr{ke zemljama Jugoisto~neEvrope: lekcije (ne)nau~ene u BiH, (ur. @arko Papi}), Müller, Sarajevo

Papi}, @arko (2002): „Bosna i Balkan: mogu}nosti i uslovi oporavka”,Forum Bosna, broj 17/02, Sarajevo

Petritsch, Wolfgang (2002): Bosna i Hercegovina od Daytona do Evrope,Svjetlost, Sarajevo

Sali-Terzi}, Sevima (2001): „Civilno dru{tvo”, u zborniku: Me|unarodnepolitike podr{ke zemljama Jugoisto~ne Evrope: lekcije (ne) nau~ene u BiH,(ur. @arko Papi}), Müller, Sarajevo

Sali-Terzi}, Sevima (2001): „Pravni sistem”, u zborniku: Me|unarodnepolitike podr{ke zemljama Jugoisto~ne Evrope: lekcije (ne)nau~ene u BiH,(ur. @arko Papi}), Müller, Sarajevo

[ar~evi}, Edin (1997): Ustav i politika: kritika etni~kih ustava i postrepub-li~kih ustavotvorstava u Bosni i Hercegovini, VKBI, Sarajevo

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[a~i}, Nermina (2005): „Etnopoliti~ko koloniziranje RTVBiH”, Preporod,Sarajevo

Udovi~i}, Zoran (2001): „Mediji u BiH - dometi intervencije me|unarodnezajednice”, u zborniku: Me|unarodne politike podr{ke zemljamaJugoisto~ne Evrope: lekcije (ne)nau~ene u BiH, (ur. @arko Papi}), Müller,Sarajevo

@epi}, Boò (2002): Enigma Bosne i Hercegovine, Matica hrvatska,Mostar

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2. PRAVNE REFORME U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI I UTICAJ ME\UNARODNE ZAJEDNICE



UVODNO IZLAGANJE

Manfred Dauster, Sud Bosne i Hercegovine

@elio bih vas sve pozdraviti. Veoma sam po~astvovan da po~nem s pane-lom dva. Napraviti bilans proteklih jedanaest godina u Bosni i Hercegovininije jednostavno. Prethodni referenti poku{ali su da se osvrnu na historiju irazvoj; ja to ne}u raditi. Prave}i bilans, usredoto~it }u se na nekoliko ta~akaza koje smatram da mogu dati profesionalni pogled. Prvo bih malo pred-stavio atmosferu, na~in na koji percipiram situaciju u Bosni i Hercegovini.Imam dosta prijatelja Bosanaca i Hercegovaca, i kolega u Sudu s kojima ~e-sto razgovaram. Ne tvrdim da su njihovi glasovi reprezentativni, ali oni dajuperspektivu i ocjenu kako normalan gra|anin posmatra to {to je bilo i to {tose doga|a. Jedan dio je i to da se ve}ina ljudi pita je li kasno i koliko vre-mena je ostalo? âk je i Visoki predstavnik jutros priznao da smo izgubilidosta vremena i sada moramo da mislimo o tome koliko vremena je ostalome|unarodnoj zajednici za saradnju s lokalnim vlastima. Malo sam zabrinutkad ~ujem da se javno navode datumi o zatvaranju OHR-a. Prvo smo ~uli ozatvaranju OHR-a u junu 2007. godine, a sada mo`da postoje neki odre|eniuvjeti za zatvaranje toga ureda naredne godine u junu. Apsolutno svi s koji-ma sam razgovarao postavili su pitanje: ”Moèmo li mi jednostavno ikakoda ne razmatramo su{tinu? Moèmo li nekako, recimo, da ne razgovaramoo su{tini?” Me|utim, mislim da su kolege iz Bosne u pravu s obzirom danama jednostavno nije jasna su{tina. Ona nam nije bila jasna nikako do da-nas, i oni pitaju {to je s tom su{tinom? Isto tako smo shvatili i shvatamo dame|unarodna zajednica finansira samu sebe, i do{la je u odre|enu fazu za-morenosti pa bi èljela iza}i iz ove zemlje. Svako povla~enje iz ove zemljeko{ta. Ali, {to se ti~e pitanja koliko finansijskih sredstava me|unarodnezajednice }e preostati za planirane reforme, opet, i kad postavimo to pitan-je, trebamo se upitati {ta je su{tina. Opet se vra}am na ono pitanje, pitanjegra|ana, pitanje su{tine, su{tine me|unarodne zajednice i doma}ih nad-le`nih tijela. Dakle, kakav je njihov dogovor i {ta oni èle da pro|e kroz re-formu? Ja, ipak, s obzirom na ono {to se dogodilo do sada, ne mogu vidjetitu su{tinu. Naime, kori{tena je formula 'ustavna reforma'. Na {ta se onaodnosi? [ta je to? Isto tako postoji toliko ustavnih modela na svijetu, da seja kao sudac, dakle ~ovjek iz pravne profesije, pitam: ako pro|e ustavnareforma, kako }e ustav izgledati? Reforma policije je sada drugo pitanje. Pase pitam: za{to je toliko ta diskusija netransparentna? Postoji toliko modelapolicije na svijetu, na ovoj zemaljskoj kugli; pa kako }e izgledati ta policija?

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Pravne reforme u Bosni i Hercegovini i uticaj me|unarodne zajednice


Koji je to model? I je li reforma policije ovisna, eventualno, o ustavnoj refor-mi, i obratno? Tre}a zagonetka koju sam shvatio je sljede}a: naime, zbog pri-sustva me|unarodne zajednice i odre|enih stavova predstavnika me|una-rodne zajednice, mi moramo priznati da dejtonski sistem saradnje izme|ume|unarodne zajednice koju zastupa Visoki predstavnik, s jedne strane, idoma}ih predstavnika – gotovo da nije uspio. Gre{ke su pravljene i s jednei s druge strane. Ja sigurno nisam ~ovjek koji bi mogao kvalifikovati ili dis-kvalifikovati doma}e i me|unarodne politi~are; ali zato sigurno mogu kaza-ti – ovo sada govorim o me|unarodnoj zajednici – moram kazati da samvidio toliko visokih predstavnika koji su do{li u ovu zemlju, sve sam ih ispra-tio osim jednoga koji je dosad oti{ao, vidio sam da neki nisu imali nikakveperspektive, nisu imali nikakve programe, neki su imali ad hoc programe i,jednostavno, pogled nisu apsolutno usmjerili na implementaciju zakona kojisu oktroisali. To je ono {to treba mijenjati, barem u ovom preostalom perio-du. Kada govorimo o nekim dostignu}ima, ja sada ne}u osporiti ta dostignu-}a, ne}u kazati da nisu postignuta. Jutros smo ~uli rije~ demokratizacija. Da,svakako, demokratski izbori se doga|aju, {to zna~i da se odràvaju pod do-ma}im nadzorom. Izborni zakon mo`da nije savr{en, ali izbori su gotovo de-mokratski. Ali {ta }e se dogoditi u naredne ~etiri godine mandata u Parla-mentu? Ja mislim da }e zapo~eti neka vrsta kampanje parlamentarizacije jer,kao stranac, vidim da Parlament postoji, donosi zakone, ali bez neke su{tin-ske rasprave, i to se ne radi transparentno. A isto tako Parlament ne vr{i kon-trolu vlade. Evo, da vam ispri~am jednu anegdotu, ne{to {to se nedavnodogodilo. To je bilo na seminaru OSCE-a, kada su se predstavnici parlamen-tarne komisije za budèt do{li na seminar da nau~e, da vide kako se vr{ikontrola budèta. Po{to najve}i dio dràvnog budèta odlazi na odbranu,predstavnici OSCE-a kazali su prisutnim ~lanovima kako se finansiranje od-brane ne odnosi samo na pla}anje vojnika nego i na pla}anje politi~ke stra-tegije, u su{tini, i da oni kao kontrolori vlade traè od vlade strategiju od-brambene politike Bosne i Hercegovine. I o tome niko ni{te nije znao. Kadaje predstavnik Ministarstva odbrane do{ao na seminar, ~lanovi Parlamentasu predstavniku Ministarstva odbrane postavili pitanje: ”Molim vas, moèteli nam vi kazati samu su{tinu ~etverogodi{nje odbrambene politike vlade?Koja je su{tina te politike? Odnosno, mi smo konkretno zainteresirani za fi-nansijski segment.” Tada je predstavnica kazala: ”Znate, taj finansijski seg-ment nije u nadle`nosti Ministarstva odbrane, pitajte Ministarstvo trezora.” Ionda su ti isti ~lanovi Parlamenta isto pitanje uputili predstavniku Mi-nistarstva trezora. I znate {ta je predstavnik Ministarstva trezora kazao? ”Panije to na{a nadle`nost, pitajte Ministarstvo odbrane.” I, sami ~lanovi

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Parlamenta su onda jednostavno zaklju~ili da naprosto niko nije odgovoran.To je lo{e, to se mora mijenjati, a mi }emo vam pomo}i upravo u postizan-ju tih promjena. E, sada, s druge strane, imamo pravosudnu reformu. Tojeste postignu}e, ali samo u odre|enom dijelu. Pod pritiskom me|unarodnezajednice 2002. godine, te kroz nametanje zakona, u to vrijeme visoki pred-stavnik Paddy Ashdown je Dràvnom sudu Bosne i Hercegovine dao nad-le`nost o krivi~nim zakonima. Imamo i ustavnu reformu, inicirali su je Ame-rikanci, {to zna~i oni su je inicirali i sad ne treba niko drugi biti uklju~en.Amerikanci su u to vrijeme, kada je bila krivi~na reforma u toku, kazali slje-de}e: Ukoliko vi, OHR, èlite od nas pomo} i èlite pomo} u uspostaviDràvnog suda, mi onda èlimo da se i na{ procesni sistem baremdjelomice uvede u ovu zemlju. I onda je ”mala Amerika” uvedena beznekog razmi{ljanja. Ali imamo sada to i u zakonu i u primjeni zakona, tupraksu. Me|utim, sada, kada iz ove perspektive pogledam Dràvnotuìteljstvo i Dràvni sud, malo se pribojavam u pogledu samoodrìvosti tedvije institucije. Dràvna nadle`nost u krivi~nim stvarima nije potpuna jer,recimo, ~ujem izjave politi~ara i koji su ovdje pozvani, ali koji nisu do{li, kojisu govorili u predizbornim kampanjama, odnosno, nazivali Dràvni sudsudom za Srbe. I to ostavlja prostora za tuma~enje. Onda, isto tako, vidimneka kretanja u Banjoj Luci. Dràvni sud Bosne i Hercegovine sasvim jasnoima jurisdikciju nad krivi~nim gonjenjem dijela organizovanog kriminala i toje njegova nadle`nost. Ukoliko Dràvni sud tu nadle`nost prenese na nièinstance, onda }e entiteti, entitetski sudovi to preuzeti. [ta se dogodilopro{le godine? I to je me|unarodna zajednica pozdravila. U Banjoj LuciNarodna skup{tina RS-a uspostavila je specijalne sudove za organizovanikriminal i, isto tako, uspostavila posebna tuìteljstva. Ustavnost takvih stvarisvakako podlijeè debati. Ali, niko nije poveo tu debatu. Visoki predstavnik,ne znaju}i zakon i ustavnu situaciju, ~estitao je premijeru na njegovim nas-tojanjima da se bori protiv organizovanog kriminala. U realnosti, u stvarnos-ti, entitet Republike Srpske je tiho ukrao polovinu na{e dràvne nadle`nostii to se mora jasno kazati. Me|unarodna zajednica se uveliko uklju~ila uuspostavu Dràvnog suda, ali samo poslije takozvanoga perioda tranzicije, iostat }e uklju~ena do kraja perioda tranzicije, do kraja 2009. godine. Prijesvega, finansiranje dràvnih institucija moè do}i u pitanje. Do sada nemamjo{ uvijek jasnu izjavu Vlade da }e preuzeti finansiranje dràvnih pravosud-nih institucija u potpunosti nakon 2009. godine, dakle, da }e Vlada zamijen-iti taj me|una-rodni finansijski anga`man.

To su oni propusti i gre{ke koje sigurno moète prepoznati skupa samnom. Ja znam da }e ova konferencija inicirati i debatu o ovoj jednoj

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nezgrapnoj situaciji. Svakako sve ovisi o ustavnoj reformi. Do sada se objestrane, me|unarodna zajednica s jedne strane i doma}i organi s drugestrane, mogu okriviti za svoje stavove i pona{anje u pro{losti. Svi su govo-rili o ustavnoj reformi; me|utim, niko od gra|ana nije znao ni{ta o tojustavnoj reformi. Za{to? Zato {to je ona ~uvana kao tajna, sve dotle dok nijezavr{ila pred Parlamentom. To se vi{e tako ne smije doga|ati. Isto vaì i zateku}e reforme krivi~nog sistema. Vi znate, novi krivi~nopravni sistem uve-den je, odnosno napisan je takvom brzinom koju nikada u ìvotu nisamvidio. Paddy Ashdown je naredio u junu 2002. godine da se napi{u novizakoni najkasnije do 1. oktobra iste godine. To je zaista bio ogroman posao.I ti zakoni, upravo zbog te brzine, zbog te ùrbe, nisu savr{eni. Oni sigurnoimaju u sebi gre{aka, propusta, manjkavosti. A sada, kad ponovo sve toanaliziram, odnosno kad je ta analiza potrebna, da vidimo sada {ta }e se ura-diti jer je me|unarodna zajednica u pro{losti bila toliko fokusirana nakrivi~nopravni sistem, jer je trebalo da me|unarodna zajednica obavi do-ma}u zada}u i sve to usaglasi sa doma}im vlastima. Me|utim, ja jednostavnone mogu da vidim da li iko uop}e radi na tom pitanju. I upravo je to ~injenicakoja moè dovesti i dràvu i entitete, odnosno njihove krivi~nopravne sis-teme do kolapsa. Osim toga, pravne reforme ne podrazumijevaju samokrivi~nopravnu reformu. Prvi put sam do{ao u ovu zemlju na ~elo Odjela zaborbu protiv korupcije pri OHR-u. To je bilo u augustu 2000. godine. I u tojjedinici, u tom odjelu OHR-a shvatio sam da gra|ansko pravo u ovoj zemljijeste staromodno i da vi{e apsolutno ne odgovara vremenu. Neki koraci jesupoduzeti; me|utim, jo{ nemamo savremeni zakon o obligacijama niti oimovini, nepokretnoj imovini, niti imamo sada neko novo komercijalnopravo na papiru, i tako dalje. Molim vas, kako to jednostavno srediti? Kakokad je takva situacija? Kako privu}i strane investitore kada }e se oni susrestis onim {to su uglavnom preostali socijalisti~ki zakoni? Oni ne}e pod takvimuvjetima do}i. S druge strane, izvr{enje sudskih presuda i rje{enja u gra|ansko-pravnim postupcima jednostavno izlu|uju strane investitore, kao i gra|ane,jer znate, to je vrlo te{ka procedura, pa tek kad se do|e do presude, tekonda dolazi do provedbe, do primjene. Dakle, gra|anskopravna procedurau ovoj zemlji obi~no traje nekoliko mjeseci, ~ak i godina, ~ak i ako se radio nekoj maloj, sitnoj stvari. Nakon toga, investitor, fakti~ki kad sve to do-~eka, mora jednostavno tr~ati traìti svoj novac. Isto je i sa Zakonom o likvi-daciji, isto je sa Zakonom o ste~aju. Ja sam samo pobrojao nekoliko zakona,nekoliko stvari; me|utim, to nije kraj spiska. Isto se odnosi na reformudràvne slu`be. Naime, neki koraci jesu poduzeti i uspostavljena je Agencijeza dràvnu slu`bu. Me|utim, niko do sada nije ocijenio koja su to pitanja

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koja moraju, odnosno koja mogu biti privatizirana i liberalizirana. Dakle, zato nema licence, a licence koje su potrebne prema zakonu uglavnom supodlo`ne korupciji. I ina~e, ako mene pitate, postoji cijela lista stvari koje jeme|unarodna zajednica mogla uraditi i me|unarodna zajednica ih moèraditi u saradnji sa doma}im organima, ali je potrebna i sasvim jasna defini-cija onoga {to se moè uraditi u narednih nekoliko godina, dvije-tri godine.Ja mislim da je to ono {to je hitno.

KOMENTAR

Zdravko Grebo, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Sarajevu

Rade}i doma}i zadatak za ovu konferenciju, namislio sam da svoje izla-ganje dizajniram i formuli{em krajnje provokativno, ostaju}i u obavezi da zasve izre~eno ponudim argumente. No, prije toga moram da kaèm da su,kako to obi~no biva, ljudi kojima sam namijenio svoje 'otrovne strelice' ve}oti{li. Pri tome mislim prvenstveno na gospodu Visokog predstavnika i am-basadora SR Njema~ke, jer sam o~ajni~ki htio da uz njihovu pomo} po-ku{am odagnati svoje no}ne more. Me|utim, doga|a se da uvijek govorim'pogre{nim' ljudima. Lo{i u~enici uvijek bjeè sa ~asova, a disciplinirani osta-ju i morat }e u narednim minutama trpjeti moju torturu.

Dakle, prvo pitanje za govornika koji je trebao da nas uvede u temu gla-si: da li se on ikada iskreno upitao za{to je ba{ on tu gdje jeste i koji je istin-ski smisao posla koji upravno on radi? Naravno, ja sam mu zahvalan za ono{to radi, ali da ne bih izgubio poentu, izgovorit }u jednu poluestradnudosko~icu. Kada me je neko maloprije upitao {ta mislim o ulozi me|unaro-dne zajednice u BiH, sjetio sam se jedne, dodu{e ljubavne, pjesme i njenogrefrena: „Te{ko meni sa tobom, a jo{ teè bez tebe”. Smatram da je to pri-li~no dobra dijagnoza na{e ambivalentne pozicije kada razgovaramo o ulozistvarne ili virtualne, precizno ili maglovito definisane 'me|unarodne zajed-nice', o balansiranju, aktualnoj situaciji i eventualnim perspektivama i prog-nozama. To bi bila moja prva teza.

Druga teza zasnovana je na pa`ljivom ~itanju predlo{ka koji smo dobilii, kao pravnik po svom temeljnom obrazovanju, rekao bih nekoliko rutin-skih opservacija, a potom bih se vratio na 'vru}e teme'. Gospodin Dauster,koji nas je uveo u temu, korektno je opisao aktuelnu situaciju i pobrojao us-pjehe i izostale rezultate u pogledu o~ekivanja me|unarodnih aktera u refor-mama pravnog sistema i institucija. To su ve} op}a mjesta. Tamo gdje uspjesi

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odista postoje, npr. imamo himnu (dodu{e bez teksta), imamo grb i zastavu,paso{, registarske tablice, konvertibilnu marku; imamo uspje{nu reformukrivi~nog zakonodavstva i ne tako uspje{nu reformu krivi~no-procesnogzakonodavstva, imamo katastrofalno propali poku{aj ustavne reforme, itd.,i takva procjena je apsolutno ta~na. Dakle, manji broj pitanja (problema) jerije{en, ne{to ve}i broj je od po~etka bio proma{en i isti broj je jednostavnoizostao. Stoga moje pitanje glasi: da li na{ uvaèni uvodni~ar, pogotovo {todolazi iz germanske pravno-politi~ke tradicije, ima komentar na moju kon-stataciju da je razgovor o temama o kojima danas treba da se potrudimo ini-cijalno besmislen? Takvo pitanje, u situaciji u kojoj dràva nema vrhovni suda ima sve atribute dràve, jeste elementarno, i studenti prve godine pravnogfakulteta koji ne znaju odgovoriti na pitanje da li dràva bez pravnog jedin-stva uop}e moè funkcionisati u punom kapacitetu, nikad ne do|u do dru-ge godine. Ova dràva - o Bosni i Hercegovini je rije~ - ili ovaj mozaik, lije-po re~eno (kamenolom bi bilo ta~nije) sa geografskim (a ne s ikakvim dr-àvno-pravnim) odre|enjem u svom oficijelnom nazivu, sa zapanjuju}imbrojem sastavnih jedinica: entiteti, kantoni, gradovi, op}ine - ima sve (dodu-{e ~esto nakaradno sklopljene i nefunkcionalne) institucije, ali nema Vrhovnisud. Postoji, dakle Ustavni sud na nivou dràve, ali - o~igledno iz dejtonsko-politi~kih razloga - nemamo najvi{u pravosudnu instancu koja bi morala daobezbijedi pravno jedinstvo. Svi razlozi i uzroci koji su doveli do temeljnogponi{tavanja normalnog ìvota ljudi u ovoj zemlji nemogu}nost otklanjanjadoìvljavaju na entitetskom nivou. I tu doìvljavaju i svoj kraj. Vi{e je negojasno da se ishodi sudske odluke protiv trajnih i masovnih kr{enja temeljnihljudskih prava i sloboda sudbonosno moraju zavr{iti na entitetskom nivou,a apelacione instance jednostavno nema.

Drugo, toboè stru~no pitanje glasi: na koji na~in u~estvovanje me|u-narodne zajednice u svim oblicima funkcionisanja vlasti (od EUFOR-a,EUPOL-a, me|unarodnih sudija, donedavno guvernera Centralne banke, uzogromna Bonska ovla{tenja OHR-a) u krajnjoj liniji, na na~ine o kojima smoslu{ali, ne predstavlja dodatni problem? Vjerovatno se u najboljoj namjeri -u dràvi koja je i po sastavu stanovni{tva i po ustavnopravnom ure|enju'unikatna' u lo{em smislu rije~i, poku{ava – slijedim valjda anglosaksonskuposlovicu „Jedan broj odgovara svakome” – implementirati unificirani mo-del, pa ìvjeli ljudi u Kanadi, Banglade{u, Pakistanu, Irskoj ili Bosni i Herce-govini. Uzmi ili ostavi. Povrh toga, dok smo jo{ u sferi prava: kako to i nakoji na~in, malo iz Haga, malo iz Strasbourga, malo iz Sarajeva (a bogami iBanje Luke) dobivamo sastojke ~udne miksture dviju razli~itih pravnih tradi-cija i dvaju razli~itih pravnih sistema, koji jednostavno nisu konzistentni? Ne

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mogu se neprotivrje~no mije{ati anglosaksonska sudska praksa i evropsko-kontinentalni pravni sistem - kojem smo mi i prije komunista, i za vrijemekomunista, a i poslije komunista pripadali - a da ne izazovete turbulencije.Ako bih htio da budem pateti~an, rekao bih da je sa stanovi{ta senzibilitetajavnosti apsolutno problemati~no uvoditi institucije za{ti}enog svjedoka ilisudske nagodbe u slu~ajevima su|enja za ratne zlo~ine. To jednostavno nijepojmljivo niti prihvatljivo za `rtve, ali i za ostale ljude u BiH, koji o~ekujuprvenstveno moralnu satisfakciju.

Tre}e, bitno pitanje iz domena pravne struke, ti~e se karaktera na{egUstava. Kolega Pobri} je u tom pravcu dobro poentirao. Pitam se, me|utim,da li je odgovor na to pitanje uop}e mogu}, i volio bih da nam je uvodni~arponudio elemente odgovora kao kolega, a ne kao neko ko na rje{avanjeustavnih nedoumica moè uticati. Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine, a to je AneksIV, jeste sastavni dio jednog mirovnog sporazuma. Koliko ja poznajem us-tavnu historiju, nikada se nije desila takva stvar - da je ustav jedne zemljedio mirovne nagodbe. Mirovni sporazumi se ne mogu mijenjati. Na{ Ustav,koji je sastavni dio Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma, predvi|a mogu}nostamandmanske promjene. Na koji na~in se moè promijeniti ne{to {to je dione~ega {to se ne moè promijeniti? Ili, da li je donosilac odluka - koji je bioovla{ten, a prije svega mo}an da u Daytonu ili Parizu, svejedno, verifikujetragi~nu situaciju u kojoj se nakon toga nalazimo - makar naknadno pomis-li i na vlastitu odgovornost. Ili }e se desiti da kao u onom vicu u ve{ ma{inikoja beskrajno vrti centrifugiranje jer nema niko da pritisne dugme zaprestanak operacije: konstatovat }emo da su nas zaboravili i po~eli da misleo Afganistanu, Iraku, Iranu ili ~emu drugom. Nepotrebno je, vjerovatno,podsje}ati na op}a mjesta. Ipak, sasvim je jasno da na{ Ustav spada u kate-goriju oktroisanih ustava. Potpisan je u vojnoj bazi na teritoriji druge dràve.Potpisan je i garantovan od strane tri supotpisnika od kojih je jedan umro uHagu, a drugu dvojicu je, dodu{e ne iz istih razloga, smrt sprije~ila da setamo na|u. Pri tome su dvojica, mislim na predsjednika Milo{evi}a i pred-sjednika Tu|mana, bili {efovi dràva koje su, ponovo ne u istom obimu,izvr{ile agresiju na dràvu (Republiku BiH), a garanti su dokumenta kojisadrì budu}i (sada aktuelni) Ustav te iste dràve. To ni u pravnom, ni u mo-ralnom, ni u metafizi~kom, ako ho}ete ni u Boànskom zakonu, nije odrìvakonstrukcija. Ako je to tako, i ako je taj, ne ba{ blistavi lik (Richard Hol-brooke) upotrijebio cini~nu konstrukciju „lu|a~ka ko{ulja navu~ena Bosni iHercegovini”, onda su sva naknadna i izvedena pitanja prili~no besmislena.Prema tome, ta ista 'me|unarodna zajednica', kada razgovaramo o njenojulozi u trasiranju pravog puta za BiH (ako pri tome i pribli`no znamo {ta

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mantra 'me|unarodna zajednica' uop{te zna~i), ne moè biti apsolviranazbog nametanja okvira u koje mi, kao muha bez glave, treba da kao stake-holdersi definitivno rije{imo probleme od kojih doslovno zavise na{i ìvoti.

êtvrto pitanje, na istom tragu (i veoma mi je ào {to }e zbog preranogodlaska g. Schwarz-Schillinga i g. Schmunka ostati neodgovoreno), ti~e sejedne temeljno uvrjedljive pedago{ke poduke koju smo jutros ~uli. Da pa-rafraziram: „Mi smo ovdje zato {to nas trebate, a trebate nas zato {to ste nes-posobni”. Apsolutno nemam nijednu dilemu u vezi s politi~kim i moralnimkompetencijama aktuelnih bh. elita, ali smatram da je to jeftin argumentkojim se opravdava vje~no prisustvo i legitimiziraju vladarske ovlasti tzv.me|unarodne zajednice. S druge strane, cijela pri~a koja se temelji na ter-minima ownership ili stakehoders, „stvar je va{a”, „izvolite se dogovoriti, a mi}emo prihvatiti” - jeste nepo{tena jer zaboravlja na mo} koju te institucije(prvenstveno mislim na tzv. Bonske ovlasti) imaju, te je takav na~in pro-mi{ljanja i djelovanja nagovje{taj smrtne presude Bosni i Hercegovini. Akokonstatujemo da se doma}i politi~ari ni o ~emu ne mogu dogovoriti (aktuel-no o ustavnim reformama, reformi policije, visokom obrazovanju, reformijavne uprave), onda morate re}i ko je u tom politi~kom cirkusu odgovoranza stanje u kojem se ni o ~emu ne mogu dogovoriti. Ne ekskulpiram niko-ga, ali ne moète stalno prebacivati odgovornost na nekompetentne doma}epoliti~are. Ilustruju}i primjere odgovornosti me|unarodne zajednice, upotri-jebit }u teàk argument iz izjave Jeffreyja Nicea za New York Times u povo-du presude Me|unarodnog suda pravde, koja je esnafski masterpiece, a umoralnom aspektu skandal. Konstatacija da se radi o „op{tinskom genocidukoji je trajao tri dana” duboko je frustrirala ljude u ovoj zemlji. @ao mi je {to}u taj podatak, vjerovatno nepristojno, iskoristiti za obrazlaganje negativneuloge me|unarodne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Vrhunac cinizma jeste da se i za tako bijedno definisan genocid ne moèutvrditi po~inilac. Jedan od transparenata na nedavnom protestnom skupuu Sarajevu imao je natpis „Marsovci su po~inili genocid!”. Me|unarodnazajednica nije u~inila ni{ta da sprije~i ono {to se makar u ta tri dana dogodi-lo u Srebrenici, koja je bila za{ti}ena zona i pod kontrolom UNPROFOR-a.Naravno da genocid traje od 1992. godine. Prema normama me|unarod-nog prava i Povelji Ujedinjenih nacija, koja govori o kolektivnoj bezbjednos-ti, elementarna interpretacija upu}uje na obavezu Savjeta bezbjednosti dasprije~i agresiju na suverenu dràvu, koja je u svojoj kona~nici rezultiralagenocidom!

Sasvim druge naravi je pri~a o harmonizovanom pristupu me|unarodnezajednice uàsu i mukama kroz koje smo pro{li. To je jednostavno la`. Ne}e

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biti bez svakog osnova da se u svim (da upotrijebim neutralan termin) bal-kanskim ratovima unaprijed znalo da }e Njema~ka i Austrija podràvati Slo-veniju i Hrvatsku. Nije bilo nikakvog razloga da posumnjamo da }e Rusija iGr~ka podràti Srbiju, a da }e Bo{njaci bezuvjetno o~ekivati pomo} svojearapske i, {ire, muslimanske bra}e. Ako to sinhrono poslaète, tu nema ninaznake jedinstvenog djelovanja 'me|unarodne zajednice'. Na djelu su goliinteresi i nepremostive politi~ke, tradicijske i ideolo{ke razlike.

Na samom kraju, jasno je daje presuda Me|unarodnog suda pravde, kojije jedan od najzna~ajnijih institucija Ujedinjenih nacija, najvi{a sudska instan-ca na planeti – bez obzira da li je za ishod kriva Karla del Ponte zbogne~injenja ili sutkinja Hastings zbog ~injenja – pokazala da je tzv. me|unar-odna pravda apsolutno osramo}ena u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ako govorimo osramno 'nje`nom' verdiktu po kojem je Srbija odgovorna za nesprje~avanjei neka`njavanje zlo~ina genocida, onda se cini~nim logiciranjem moè zak-lju~iti da su za isto djelo odgovorne sve dràve na svijetu, i Litvanija, Make-donija, Peru i Zimbabve. Naravno da svi pristojni i po{teni ljudi znaju kojaje dràva po~inilac genocida u Srebrenici (ako se o genocidu u BiH jo{ nemoè govoriti). Me|utim, ako je iko istinski odgovoran za genocid, pri ~emu doma}e u~esnike uop}e ne amnestiram, i ako prihvatimo i ponu|enuminimalisti~ku definiciju genocida, onda su to Ujedinjene nacije. Tek nakonnedvosmislenog odgovora na ovo pitanje moèmo razgovarati o izvedenimproblemima. Na tom tragu sam bio pripremio pitanja za na{e jutro{nje uvodni~are.

Ona se ti~u kalkulantskog odnosa prema Bonskim ovlastima, koje su namnogo na~ina uporedive s onima koja su pobjedni~ke sile koristile u post-nacisti~kom razdoblju. Dakle, preuzimamo pune ovlasti, provodimo denaci-fikaciju, ali zauzvrat preuzimamo punu odgovornost. Onog trenutka kadapokaète i dokaète da ste se oprali od nacisti~kog ludila, apsolutno smospremni da vam u svakom pogledu pomognemo i, naravno, prepustimoupravljanje u punom kapacitetu. Nipo{to prije, ali ni kasnije. Ova toplo-hlad-na varijanta koja je egzercirana u Bosni i Hercegovini o~igledno ne vodinigdje.

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Nedim Ademovi}, Ustavni sud BiH

[ta je to 'me|unarodna zajednica' u BiH?Kao {to je to uvodni~ar pravilno primijetio, pojam 'me|unarodna zajed-

nica' obuhva}a izuzetno {irok spektar aktera na terenu civilne implementaci-je Op}eg okvirnog sporazuma za mir u BiH (DMS), koji se kre}e od raznihsupranacionalnih i me|unarodnih institucija, pa sve do diplomatskih pred-stavni{tava. Danas, nakon 12 godina djelovanja tzv. me|unarodne zajednice,moèmo zaklju~iti da ovako ambiciozno i {iroko postavljen pojam 'me|u-narodne zajednice' komplikuje situaciju na terenu pri konkretnoj imple-mentaciji pojedinih civilnih aspekata DMS. Prema tome, ovaj institutionaloverkill1 djelimi~no je prepreka za djelotvoran rad na stvaranju funkcionalneBiH. Tipi~an primjer komplikovanja situacije jeste segment za{tite ljudskihprava i temeljnih sloboda. Umjesto da se predvide dvije-tri jake i djelotvorneinstitucije, ovim pitanjem bavila se cijela 'me|unarodna zajednica', od me-|unarodnih institucija {to su kao OHR, UNHCR, OSCE, preko doma}ih tijela,sudova, upravnih organa u 4-5 instanci, do eminentnih nevladinih organi-zacija. Obi~an ~ovjek, kao adresant i centralna figura ovog sistema, jednos-tavno nije znao kako da za{titi svoja prava i slobode, zbog ~ega je ~estoostao neza{ti}en, mada su kr{enja ljudskih prava i sloboda bila i ostala me|unajve}im problemima postdejtonske BiH. Upravo se zbog toga OHR – quasidoyen 'me|unarodne zajednice', kako ga je nazvao uvaèni sudija g. Dau-ster - morao bolje pripremiti za svoju ulogu koordinatora, paze}i da se poje-dini segmenti DMS, s jedne strane, djelotvorno {tite, a s druge strane, da seakteri na terenu ne preklapaju u svojim nadle`nostima.2

Pravno definisanje statusa i poloàja 'me|unarodne zajednice' u Bosni iHercegovini.[to se ti~e samog statusa, poloàja i odgovornosti 'me|unarodne zajed-

nice', uvodni~ar je pravilno primijetio da 'me|unarodna zajednica' nije nime|unarodnopravno niti ustavnopravno sama preuzela odgovornost zaBiH. Uvodni~ar, nadalje, smatra da je BiH potpisivanjem DMS dala svojusaglasnost za 'zajedni~ko djelovanje' dràve i 'me|unarodne zajednice' na

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1 Marko, Joseph, Friedenssicherung im 21. Jahrhundert: Bosnien und Herzegowina als europäis-che Herausforderung (Ginther/Benedek/Isak/Kicker, (izd), Völkerrecht und Europarecht. 25Österreichischer Völkerrechtstag, Be~, 2001, str. 55-87 (77)).

2 Dovoljno je analizirati zbunjenost gra|ana kada je rije~ o paralelnoj za{titi ljudskih prava i te-meljnih sloboda u kona~noj instanci pred Ustavnim sudom BiH prema Ustavu BiH i Domom zaljudska prava prema Aneksu 6 DMS.


razvoju BiH. To je ta~no. Me|utim, mislim da je ovdje po~injena velika gre-{ka, jer je u~injen odre|en presedan u me|unarodnom pravu, koji ni danasnema svoju jasnu definiciju. Nedefinisano stanje, s jedne strane, osloba|a'me|unarodnu zajednicu' svake odgovornosti za rezultate njenog rada, a sdruge strane, ru{i njen dignitet u o~ima nacionalnih partnera. Ustavni sudBiH definisao je odnos 'me|unarodne zajednice' spram Bosne i Hercegovi-ne kao tzv. funkcionalni dualizam.3 Zna~i, BiH je potpisivanjem DMS priz-nala da nije u stanju rije{iti sama odre|ene probleme, te je dio svojih su-verenih ovlasti dobrovoljno prepustila me|unarodnim akterima, {to isklju-~uje postojanje bilo kakvog protektorata. Me|utim, Ustavni sud je naglasioda je, uprkos tome, BiH bila i ostala nezavisna, suverena dràva, te da se'me|unarodna zajednica', kada preuzima odre|ene ovlasti, morala pona{atiu skladu s Ustavom BiH, tj. njenim ustavnopravnim principima demokrati-je, pravne dràve, za{tite ljudskih prava itd. Desetine primjera govori o tomeda 'me|unarodna zajednica' nije djelovala na ustavan na~in (razvla{}ivanjedoma}ih politi~ara bez prava àlbe i pravi~nog postupka,4 decertifikacijapolicajaca,5 otmice gra|ana koji su djelovali antidejtonski,6 regulisanje {teteizme|u gra|ana i me|unarodnih institucija itd.). Kona~no, mislim da 'me|u-narodna zajednica', bez obzira {to to nije ni u kakvoj vrsti nadle`nosti BiH,nije uspostavila interni sistem kontrole i odgovornosti. Zbog svega toga,moram priznati da edukativna uloga 'me|unarodne zajednice' nije ispunjenajer je ~esto djelovala autokratski, arogantno, silom, a ne pravno i ustavno.Edukativna uloga trebalo je da bude presudna kada je rije~ o uspostavljan-ju savremenih evropskih standarda, koje bi BiH morala dosti}i bez obzira naposljedice rata. Samim tim, ovo bi trebala biti daljnja kritika OHR-u sobzirom da je ovaj ured bio i jeste glavni tuma~ cjelokupnog DMS.

Osnovni zadaci 'me|unarodne zajednice' u BiH.Zadaci 'me|unarodne zajednice' u BiH su izuzetno te{ki. O tome nema

sumnje. S jedne strane, 'me|unarodna zajednica' u BiH je morala otklonitiposljedice rata, a s druge strane, transformisati dru{tvo prema savremenimevropskim standardima - {to bi BiH morala uraditi i da nije bilo rata. Pri tome,

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3 Vidi u tom smislu predmet broj U 9/00, od 29. septembra 2000. godine, poznatiji kao Zakon odràvnoj slu`bi. Sve odluke Ustavnog suda dostupne su na Internet stranici: www.ustavnisud.ba.

4 Vidi odluku Ustavnog suda BiH, AP 953/05, od 8. jula 2006. godine.5 Vidi Mi{ljenje Evropske komisije za demokraciju kroz pravo (Venecijanska komisija) o ustavnoj

situaciji u Bosni i Hercegovini i ovla{tenjima Visokog predstavnika, usvojenom na 62. plenarnojsjednici (Venecija, 11-12. mart 2005. godine).

6 Vidi odluku Ustavnog suda BiH, AP 696/04, od 23. septembra 2005. godine.


doma}i partner je bio i ostao politi~ki, idejno, religijski izuzetno razjedinjen,{to je dodatno oteàvalo i dan-danas oteàva situaciju na terenu. Zbog kom-pleksnosti zadatka, 'me|unarodna zajednica' u BiH nije se mogla baviti svimi sva~im, ve} je svoje djelovanje ograni~ila na oblasti definisane pojedinimaspektima DMS. To je ujedno bio i pravni okvir djelovanja 'me|unarodnezajednice'. [to se ti~e same mjere do koje je trebalo reformisati dràvu uoblastima kojima se bavi DMS, ta mjera se mogla definisati kao'samoodrìvost'. Zna~i, dosti}i stepen kvaliteta koji moè samostalno nastavi-ti reformu u jednoj mirnoj i demokrati~noj atmosferi.

Rezultati u postupku ostvarivanja ciljeva iz DMS.Kada je rije~ o vojnim ciljevima, oni - {to je uvodni~ar naglasio, a {to ja

tako|er podràvam - imaju sporednu, tj. supsidijarnu ulogu za kona~ni ciljDMS, mada presudnu za po~etak rada na DMS. Bez mira nema civilneimplementacije DMS. Tu je 'me|unarodna zajednica', po vlastitom sudu, odi-grala dobru ulogu: postepeno je stavila vojne snage pod kontrolu i uredila ovuoblast, pogotovo otkako je dràva preuzela nadle`nost za oruàne snage.

[to se ti~e civilnih aspekata, tu su rezultati veoma razli~iti. Ipak, bez ob-zira na segment DMS, 'me|unarodna zajednica' je morala imati u vidu dabez kvalitetnih zakona, institucionalnog okvira, djelotvornih procedura i ma-terijalnopravnih standarda nema reforme. Detaljnom analizom g. Dauster jesecirao segment po segment, te ukazao na odre|ene uspjehe, tj. neuspjeheili djelimi~na ostvarenja 'me|unarodne zajednice'. Tako moèmo zaklju~itida su pitanja me|uentitetske linije ili arbitraè u vezi s Distriktom Br~kouspje{no okon~ana, kao {to uvodni~ar pozitivno ocjenjuje i izborni sistem uBiH prema Aneksu 3 DMS, gdje je upravo {kolskim primjerom izvr{enareforma i predata u nadle`nost Bosni i Hercegovini.

Izuzetak, na koji je uvodni~ar ukazao u vezi s izbornim sistemom, jesunerije{ena pitanja ravnopravnosti konstitutivnih naroda i kategorije tzv. osta-lih (pogotovo kada se radi o jednakopravosti u u~e{}u u vlasti) i odnosa dr-àve kao administrativno-teritorijalne jedinice prema svojim niìm admini-strativno-teritorijalnim jedinicama, tj. entitetima i Distriktu Br~ko. Me|utim,kao {to je pravilno ukazano u uvodnom izlaganju, to je ne{to {to dobrimdijelom proizlazi iz samih ustavnih rje{enja, tj. Aneksa 4 DMS. Ovo jasno go-vori da su pojedini aneksi DMS usko povezani. Ipak, da li se 'me|unarod-na zajednica' moè amnestirati od ovih pitanja i njihovih nerje{avanja. Mislimda ne moè. Upravo ona treba da preuzme sve korake koji su neophodnikako bi se ovo pitanje rije{ilo, uklju~uju}i ustavnu reformu. Ako BiH to nemoè sama u~initi, 'me|unarodna zajednica' mora na}i i nametnuti rje{enja

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za pitanja „individualnog versus kolektivnog”, odnosa kolektiviteta izme|usebe i organizacije dràve u smislu odnosa centralne vlasti prema njenimjedinicama. Bonske ovlasti treba da budu kori{tene kad god postoji prob-lem, ako ga doma}e vlasti u razumnom roku ne rije{e. Pri tome, 'me|u-narodna zajednica' mora da djeluje na edukativan, demokratski na~in, uskladu s principom pravne dràve. To je ispravno tuma~enje odnosa izme|udoma}ih vlasti i 'me|unarodne zajednice', koji je Ustavni sud BiH definisaokao 'fukcionalni dualizam'. Da je ovo ta~no mogu pokazati brojni primjeri.Da li danas samostalno funkcioni{e sistem indirektnog oporezivanja? Da lidanas samostalno funkcioni{e sistem dràvnog sudstva ili dràvne vojske?Odgovor je potvrdan. A ko je rije{io ova pitanja? Naravno, 'me|unarodnazajednica'. U vezi s tim interesantno je spomenuti da bi vrlo brzo nakon in-tervencije 'me|unarodne zajednice' u navedenim oblastima, kritike - uglav-nom iz Republike Srpske - splasnule, da bi se na kraju novo stanje prihvati-lo kao najprirodnije i kao neophodan dio razvitka BiH. A sada postavljampsiholo{ko pitanje: za{to su negativne reakcije zbog nametanja rje{enja odstrane 'me|unarodne zajednice' vrlo brzo nestajale? Odgovor je logi~an: zato{to bi se ovim rje{enjima uspostavljalo prirodno stanje u jednoj zemlji!

Prema tome, politikom pasivnog odnosa 'me|unarodne zajednice' i ne-kori{tenja Bonskih ovlasti zadnjih godina, tj. politikom prebacivanja odgovor-nosti na doma}e vlasti, mislim da je 'me|unarodna zajednica' nanijela vi{e zlanego {to bi bilo negativnih reakcija da je sama nametnula ispravna rje{enja.Da je 'me|unarodna zajednica' rije{ila sva ova pitanja jo{ prije nekoliko go-dina koriste}i se svim ovlastima koje su joj date, danas bismo bili znatno razvi-jeniji, tj. danas bismo bili znatno bliì Evropskoj uniji, a Evropska unija nama.

[to se ti~e Aneksa 7 kao izuzetno bitne pravne osnove za eliminaciju rat-nih rezultata, mislim da je 'me|unarodna zajednica' napravila katastrofalnugre{ku. Aneks 7 podrazumijeva ultimativno vra}anje imovine i imovinsko-pravnih odnosa na stanje iz 1. aprila 1992. godine, a da se pri tome ultima-tivno ne restitui{u radnopravni odnosi u skladu sa stanjem iz 1992. godineu onoj mjeri u kojoj je to mogu}e. 'Me|unarodna zajednica' je dozvolila daRepublika Srpska predvidi 'legalizaciju' diskriminatorski otpu{tenih radnikanesrpske nacionalnosti, kao {to je dozvolila i da Federacija BiH sli~nonapravi sa tzv. institutom 'na ~ekanju'.7 To je znatno doprinijelo 'cementira-nju' etni~kog ~i{}enja u BiH, tj. de facto neuspjehu implementacije Aneksa7. Nemogu}nost ponovnog zaposlenja u prijeratnom mjestu stanovanja jed-nostavno je odvratilo ljude od stvarnog povratka.

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7 ^lan 152. Zakona o radu RS, ~lan 143. Zakona o radu FBIH.


Na kraju bih spomenuo privredni sistem Bosne i Hercegovine. Uvodni~arje jasno naglasio da je op}a ocjena ovog izuzetno va`nog segmenta nega-tivna, s izuzetkom monetarnog, carinskog i jednog dijela poreskog sistema.Prije svega, Aneks 9 DMS, koji reguli{e javne korporacije u BiH, ostao jemrtvo slovo na papiru. Po njegovom mi{ljenju, osnovne javne korporacijekao {to su èljeznice, avionski saobra}aj, energetski i PTT sistem itd., moralisu biti dràvni interes, te ingerencija BiH u smislu Aneksa 9. U vezi s ovimpitanjem 'me|unarodna zajednica' je ostala potpuno pasivna i dozvolila dase entiteti pona{aju kao dràve. Nadalje, BiH i dan-danas nema reformisanprivredni sistem i formirano 'jedinstveno trì{te' na principu trì{ne ekono-mije. 'Me|unarodna zajednica' je zanemarila ovaj segment, mada je, za raz-liku od nekih drugih problema u dràvi, imala jasnu pravnu osnovu u ~lanuI/4. Ustava BiH. Vitalni privredni resursi BiH - turizam, voda, {ume i rude,te energetski sektor - na znatno su nièm nivou nego {to su bili prije rata.Ni 'me|unarodna zajednica', kao ni BiH, nisu razvili osnovu za za{titu, a ka-moli dugoro~ni razvoj ovog dijela privrednog ìvota. Naime, kao {to je g.Dauster naglasio, ve}ina zakona za regulisanje privrednog ìvota, s jednestrane, nije uskla|ena s evropskim standardima, a s druge strane, nije kodi-ficirana na dràvnom nivou. Ne mogu vjerovati da 'me|unarodna zajedni-ca', u posljednjih dvanaest godina, nije na{la za shodno da objasni doma}imvlastima kako je nametanje dràvnih zakona o privrednim dru{tvima, obliga-ciono-pravnim odnosima, ste~aju i likvidaciji, bankovnom sektoru itd. neop-hodno kako bi BiH funkcionisala na principima 'vladavine prava' i 'jedin-stvenog trì{ta' u smislu ~l. I/2. i I/4. Ustava BiH. Pasivnost doma}ih vlastimogu da razumijem, ali ne i da opravdam, ali pasivnost 'me|unarodnezajednice' ne mogu ni da razumijem ni da opravdam.

In conclusio, 'me|unarodna zajednica' mora i dalje koristiti svoje Bonskeovlasti u svim oblastima koje su, u najmanju ruku, obuhva}ene DMS. Na toje obavezuje sam DMS i dogovor sa BiH da joj pomogne u stvaranjufunkcionalne dràve. Kada to radi, me|utim, 'me|unarodna zajednica' moradjelovati demokratski, u skladu s Ustavnom BiH, a ako Ustav BiH predstav-lja prepreku za daljnji razvoj, ona ga mora mijenjati ukoliko doma}e vlastipropuste da to urade. To je imperativ razvoja. Pri tome, edukacija bh. gra-|ana kako voditi dràvu mora biti paralelan odnos. Prema tome, 'me|una-rodna zajednica' moè napustiti BiH onog momenta kada uvidi da je stvo-rena kriti~na masa ljudi koji mogu nastaviti voditi dràvu u pozitivnom prav-cu. BiH je jo{ daleko od toga i BiH treba 'me|unarodnu zajednicu', ali nekao pasivnog posmatra~a i teoretskog tuma~a, ve} kao aktivnog sudionikau procesu reformi.

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DISKUSIJA

Nurija Omerba{i}, direktor Instituta za mir i suìvot civilizacija

Dame i gospodo, imam veliko zadovoljstvo i ~ast da vas li~no pozdra-vim u ime Fondacije Institut za mir i suìvot civilizacija,1 koji je osnovan ujanuaru ove godine. Povod za osnivanje Instituta dao je gospodin Clinton,biv{i predsjednik Sjedinjenih Ameri~kih Dràva, u jednoj izjavi kada je rekaoda je polarizacija me|u civilizacijama do{la do tog stepena da zaista prijetiopasnost od sukoba civilizacija i on smatra da bi Bosna, takva kakva jeste,vjekovima multietni~ka, trebalo da odigra jednu ulogu, jednu sponu na tojrelaciji, da ne{to uradi i zbliì narode.

U vezi sa Aneksom IV i VII koji su ve} spomenuti, èlim postaviti pita-nje odgovornosti me|unarodne zajednice: Za{to ne balansira provodivost ijednog i drugog aneksa? Oni su po svom sadràju, kao sastavni dio Mirov-nog ugovora, iste vrijednosti, istog sadràja. Me|utim, manji entitet se samodrì za pravo da postoji na 49 posto teritorije i forsira samo to svoje pravo.Ali, bjeì od obaveza koje su date u Aneksu VII. Tu me|unarodna zajedni-ca ne moè izbje}i svoju odgovornost. Drugo {to bih rekao ti~e se prebaci-vanja odgovornosti me|unarodne zajednice sa izgovorom: „Eto, vi se dogo-vorite”. Meni je to neshvatljivo, jer uzrok svih problema u ovome cijelomhaosu jeste Dejtonski ustav, u kojem je poro|eno, projektovano pravo vetamanjeg dijela, zna~i pravo veta manjeg entiteta nad cjelinom. I u takvojsituaciji nema govora o tome da se 'dvojica' ikada mogu dogovoriti. Ako je-dan ima pravo veta, kako }e se ovaj drugi dogovoriti, jer ispada da se moèdogovoriti samo ono {to ne dira u ratom ste~ene pozicije ili da se uzme jo{vi{e? Nisu to strane za dogovor. U tom slu~aju, me|unarodna zajednica trebada posegne za onim svojim pravima koje {tite prava gra|ana a koja su ite-kako naru{ena prema svim usvojenim me|unarodnim standardima. Kakoiza}i iz ovoga problema? Pitanje je zapravo kako promijeniti Dejtonski ustavu onom dijelu koji je uspostavio veto. Upornim insistiranjem na dogovor`rtve i zlo~inca, sa datim pravom veta zlo~incu, jeste poraz me|unarodnezajednice, poraz dobra i pobjeda zla. Me|unarodna zajednica mora na}ina~ina da to rije{i. Postavio bih pitanje gospodinu Manfredu Dausteru: kakoeliminisati Dejtonski ugovor? Kako ga promijeniti? Smatram da upori{te trebatraìti u internacionalnom pravu, internacionalnom ugovornom pravu i ustav-nom pravu Bosne i Hercegovine.

Zahvaljujem {to sam dobio priliku za diskusiju.

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1 Vi{e informacija o Institutu moète na}i na web adresi www.ipacc.ba


Mirsad ]eman, Forum parlamentaraca 1991-1996.

Zahvaljujem se i pozdravljam cijenjeni skup. Potpisujem izlaganja kojasam ~uo, i u uvodnim obra}anjima i u komentarima da dràvi Bosni i Her-cegovini - mislim, dakle na dràvni nivo - treba dati ve}e nadle`nosti, poseb-no u nekim oblastima koje su spominjane. Bio sam svojevremeno, i ovo jekratki osvrt na prethodnu sesiju, u @enevi 1993. godine, kada se raspravlja-lo o konceptu Bosne i Hercegovine. Svjedokom sam da su zapravo oni kojisu predstavljali me|unarodnu zajednicu tada navla~ili lu|a~ku ko{ulju Bosnii Hercegovini, jer u poznatom Stoltenbergovom planu - kao i onima prijetog skupa, a i kasnijim - zapravo se razmi{ljalo isklju~ivo na principu na-cionalnog koncepta. Moj komentar poslije toga je bio da, ukoliko ono {tonazivamo me|unarodnom zajednicom uop}e èli Bosnu i Hercegovinu,onda je ne èli ni kao dràvu niti kao dru{tvo, prema onoj metafori o tig-rovoj koì, vi{e je kao koà krave simentalke, a znamo {ta to zna~i: s velikimflekama koje, evo, sada prepoznajemo kao ovaj ili onaj entitet.

Apsolutno sam obradovan glasom stru~ne javnosti, u koju spada profe-sor Grebo, i zalaganjem za Vrhovni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, jer jasno je dabez vrhovnog suda na nivou dràve Bosne i Hercegovine - a za to ne moèbiti nadomjestak Sud Bosne i Hercegovine s obzirom na njegove nadle`nosti- ni za{tita ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini ne}e mo}i biti garantovanana odgovaraju}i na~in. âk ni Ustavni sud, koji ima odre|ene nadle`nosti,zapravo ne moè biti kompenzacija za instituciju Vrhovnog suda.

Manfred Dauster

Koncentrirat }u se na pravna pitanja. Slaèm se da Bosni i Hercegovinitreba Vrhovni sud; no, u datoj ustavnoj situaciji mislim da je nemogu}etrenutno uspostaviti Vrhovni sud i oduzeti tu vrstu nadle`nosti entitetima, jerkako danas izgleda nadle`nost za sudove i tuìla{tva, to je trenutno smje-{teno na entitetskom nivou. Naravno, to treba promijeniti. Ali, dozvolite po-novo da se vratim na ustavnu reformu. Sje}am se Venecijanske komisije,sje}am se kada je trebao biti uspostavljen Sud Bosne i Hercegovine kaojedan upravni sud i sje}am se da su govorili o pravnom okviru Ustava i reklida je nemogu}e objediniti tu dotada{nju podjelu nadle`nosti. Ja sam pomaloskepti~an. Ako pogledam rasprave koje se vode u pogledu reforme policije,o~ekujem i nekako predvi|am da }e biti ista vrsta rasprave i o Vrhovnomsudu ukoliko se krene rasprava voditi o tome. Ponovo }e entiteti izgubitiovo jedno veoma bitno, bitno ovla{tenje, a isto se moè re}i i za policiju.

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Dakle, isto tako sam skepti~an kada je u pitanju ekonomska situacija, jer jed-nostavno mislim da stalno jedan entitet ne}e èljeti prebaciti nadle`nosti nadràvni nivo.

STUDIJA

Manfred Dauster *

Bilans djelovanja me|unarodne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini – od decembra 1995. do marta 2007. godine*

Pravni aspekti

I. Uvod: Na samom po~etku prepreke koje imaju svoj osnov –previ{e neizvjesnih zadataka, previ{e u~esnika kao po~etna neizv-jesnost

'Me|unarodna zajednica' je, na osnovu Mirovnog sporazuma iz Daytona,ve} skoro 12 godina prisutna i aktivna u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ima naznakada postaje umorna i da bi htjela smanjiti svoj anga`man1. „Transition (uzdràvnu odgovornost) remains the goal ”, glasio je kominike {to ga je 26. i27. februara 2007. godine2 izdalo Vije}e za implementaciju mira (PeaceImplementation Council – PIC). Me|unarodna zajednica (putem PIC) od 26.i 27. februara 2007. godine polazi od stava da }e ubudu}e Bosna iHercegovina svoju sudbinu uzeti u vlastite ruke. S aspekta odbrambenepolitike, Bosna i Hercegovina je po~etkom zime 2006. godine primljena uNATO – Partnerstvo za mir. Razgovori s Evropskom unijom o pribliàvanju

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* Dr. jur. Manfred Dauster, sudija na Sudu Bosne i Hercegovine i predsjedavaju}i sudija na Pokra-jinskom sudu u Minhenu, Landgericht München I.

1 Tako su glasile javne izjave sada{njeg Visokog predstavnika neposredno poslije preuzimanjadu`nosti 31. januara 2006. godine u vezi s primjenom tzv. Bonskih ovlasti (Bonn Powers) i o za-tvaranju OHR-a, uklju~uju}i njegovu zamjenu uredom Specijalnog predstavnika EU. 30. izvje{tajVisokog predstavnika Generalnom sekretaru UN (Bericht des Hohen Vertreters an den UN-Gene-ralsekretär) od 15. jula 2006. godine, S. 1). - vrlo kriti~ki, International Crisis Croup, Europe Re-port No. 180 od 15. februara 2007. godine, S. 1; kriti~ki i Süddeutsche Zeitung No. 46 od 24/./25.februara 2007., S. 7; osim toga, Süddeutsche Zeitung No. 50, od 01. marta 2007. godine, S. 8.

2 Moè se pogledati pod www.ohr.int


EU su u toku. Ipak, upitno je da li je sve ovo dovoljno da zemlja ne skrene's pravog puta', a postavlja se i pitanje kako me|unarodna zajednica moèovome doprinijeti a da ne smanji svoj anga`man. Podvla~enje bilansa dosa-da{njeg djelovanja me|unarodne zajednice mo`da moè pomo}i u procjeni{ta se u budu}nosti od nje moè o~ekivati. Moè se preispitati pozadinanaivnog o~ekivanja da }e Bosna i Hercegovina poslije tako dugotrajnogpra}enja ostati na 'pravom putu', i moè izazvati sumnju da takva o~ekiva-nja mo`da ipak stoje na klimavim nogama. Odlazak me|unarodne zajednice}e se desiti prije ili kasnije, tako da se podvla~enje bilansa poslije vi{e odjedne decenije u svakom slu~aju ~ini legitimnim. [to se ti~e 'pravog puta',svaka pomisao o povla~enju neizostavno donosi i to da }e Bosna iHercegovina u budu}nosti imati mnogo ve}u ulogu u odlu~ivanju koji je to'put' i koji je 'pravi'.

Postavimo li sebi zadatak da podvu~emo bilans rada me|unarodnezajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini, u prvom se redu postavlja pitanje kome sepodvla~i bilans – ko je, ustvari, ta 'me|unarodna zajednica' u Bosni iHercegovini?3

Rad Me|unarodnog tribunala za biv{u Jugoslaviju (ICTY) u ovom istra-ìvanju se ne razmatra. Nadle`nost ovog suda nije ograni~ena na Bosnu iHercegovinu, nego on treba da se bavi ratnim zlo~inima po~injenim na teri-toriji biv{e Jugoslavije, ~ak i ako ve}i dio sudskih postupaka ima za predmetgrozote po~injene u Bosni i Hercegovini u periodu od 1992. do 1995. godine.No, to ne treba umanjiti zna~aj rada ICTY na gonjenju zlo~ina, osobito zaBosnu i Hercegovinu. Sudsko razmatranje ratnih zlo~ina je odlu~uju}e zasamopoimanje zemlje i za njenu historijsku percepciju, a time je i sastavnidio poimanja dràve i dràvnosti zemlje. Skoro da se pomirenje izme|urazli~itih naroda ove zemlje ne moè ni zamisliti bez ovog formalnog sud-skog razmatranja i obrade pred ICTY (sada ve} u saradnji i uz podjelu poslo-va sa Sudom Bosne i Hercegovine). Ne}e biti mnogo rije~i ni o odluciMe|unarodnog tribunala Ujedinjenih nacija (ICJ) koji je, presudom done-senom 26. februara 2007. godine, odlu~io ishod pravnog spora izme|uBosne i Hercegovine i Srbije, a koji se zasnivao na povredi Konvencije o geno-

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3 Tako je Vije}e za implementaciju mira (PIC) sastavljeno od 55 zemalja i drugih me|unarodnihorganizacija, te promjenjivog broja promatra~a. Detaljnije se njegov sastav moè pogledati naweb stranici OHR-a = www.ohr.int. Osim njega, postoji i Board of Principals, u kojem su perma-nentno ~lanovi OHR-a, EUFOR-a, NATO HQ Sarajevo, OSCE-a, UNHCR-a, EUPM-a, EvropskeKomisije, te Svjetske banke, MMF-a i UNDP-a. Historijat i zadaci Board of Principals se tako|ermogu pogledati na navedenoj Web stranici OHR-a.


cidu Ujedinjenih nacija donesenoj 9. decembra 1948. godine. ICJ je jedan odglavnih organa Ujedinjenih nacija4, bez posebnog mandata koji bi se ogra-ni~avao na Bosnu i Hercegovinu.5

Informaciju o tome u prvom redu daje Dejtonski mirovni sporazum iintegrisani prilozi dodati Sporazumu. U njima se mogu vidjeti oblasti iz do-mena politike i zadaci koji su dati u ruke odre|enim me|unarodnim orga-nizacijama – pored nacionalne odgovornosti koja je ostala o~uvana, one, unajmanju ruku, vode glavnu rije~. Ne}emo ih ovdje sve nabrajati. Dio togaje aspekt vojne sigurnosti koji je – ma koliko bio i ostao vaàn za obezbje-|enje mira – samo podr{ka kada je rije~ o civilnim aspektima Mirovnog spo-razuma. Vojne zadatke koje je obavljao IFOR preko SFOR-a, do onih kojeobavlja dana{nji EUFOR6 stoga ne}emo detaljnije obra|ivati. Kako je bila iostala rije~ o civilnim aspektima ponovnog uspostavljanja i o~uvanja mirnihokolnosti u Bosni i Hercegovini, u prvom redu treba navesti Visokog pred-stavnika, koji je prema Aneksu 10 Mirovnog sporazuma trebalo da ima, idan-danas ima, odgovornost za ostvarenje ovih civilnih aspekata.7 Oni nisupojedina~no utvr|eni i shvataju se - i shvatani su - veoma {iroko. Obuh-vataju ekonomsku i privrednu rekonstrukciju, omogu}avanje povratka iz-

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4 ^lan 7. stav 1. Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija; ~lan 1. statuta Me|unarodnog tribunala.5 Presuda koju je 26. februara 2007. godine donio ICJ u javnosti u Bosni i Hercegovini izazvala je

razo~arenje jer je negirala neposrednu odgovornost dràve Srbije (ranije Savezna RepublikaJugoslavija) za zlo~ine po~injene tokom rata 1992-1995. godine, a time je odbijena i obavezaBeograda da plati ratne reparacije. Razo~arenje se zasniva na prevelikim o~ekivanjima koja jejavnost Bosne i Hercegovine gajila prema onome {to moè u~initi ICJ. Sama presuda je zna~ajnaza pravnu historiju jer je ICJ po prvi put ustanovio na~elnu odgovornost dràve, a ne samo indi-vidualnu odgovornost (presuda: Urteil, S. 58 i dalje = ~lanovi 155. i dalje), a me|unarodnojzajednici je ova presuda dala obavezuju}u definiciju genocida. Osim toga, prvi put se presudabavi zahtjevima koje treba ispuniti da bi se dokazala odgovornost dràve (Urteil, S. 75 i dalje =~lanovi 202. do 230.) i daje sasvim jasna pravila priznavanja dokaza (strana 135 i dalje = ~lanovi377. i dalje). Tako Bosna i Hercegovina nije potpuno izgubila. ICJ je sasvim jasno utvrdio da seu Srebrenici desio genocid i da je Srbija povrijedila svoju obavezu da sprije~i ovu i druge gro-zote u Bosni i Hercegovini iako je Beograd de{avanja prepoznao kao takva i imao mogu}nostii sredstva da to svojim uplitanjem sprije~i.

6 27 ministara odbrane Evropske unije su se 1. marta 2007. godine u Wiesbadenu dogovorili da uokviru ~etverostepenog plana smanje trupe EU, koje trenutno broje 6.500 vojnika. U okviru pr-vog koraka povu}i }e se 3.500 vojnika. Krajem 2007. godine }e ostati ukupno 2.500 stacioni-ranih vojnika (Süddeutsche Zeitung No 51 od 2. marta 2007. godine, S. 8)

7 Efikasnost Visokog predstavnika u Bosni i Hercegovini i njegovih kompetencija vrijedi podvrg-nuti detaljnijoj analizi i mimo ovog eseja, ako ni zbog ~ega drugog, onda zbog toga {to - slijedeli se prijedlozi za iznalaènje rje{enja koje je dao povjerenik UN za Kosovo - tamo{nja 'me|una-rodna zajednica' treba i na Kosovu da tokom jednog prelaznog perioda uspostavi sli~nu institu-ciju. U tom bi se slu~aju gre{ke napravljene u Bosni i Hercegovini mogle izbje}i.


bjeglica u podru~ja iz kojih poti~u, dogradnju ustava i uspostavljanje ustav-nih institucija. U su{tini, nijedna oblast politike nije unaprijed isklju~ena izrazmi{ljanja. âk jednostavni predmeti u op}inama su u pro{losti izazivalidjelovanje Visokog predstavnika, samo ako su se mogli dovesti u vezu stemeljnim pitanjima obezbje|enja mira. Osim toga, Mirovni sporazum je zaVisokog predstavnika predvidio koordiniraju}u funkciju, izme|u svih drugihcivilnih, me|unarodnih organizacija koje su u okviru zadataka {to ih postav-lja Mirovni sporazum preuzele suodgovornost ili samoodgovornost za odre-|ena polja zadataka. Takore}i, trebalo je da se Visoki predstavnik kao doa-jen me|unarodne zajednice pobrine za to da se ne ra{iri me|unarodni poli-ti~ki atomizam, nego da se obezbijedi jedinstven nastup me|unarodne za-jednice. Uz Visokog predstavnika, OSCE je preuzeo ~itav niz zadataka, naprimjer u oblasti izgradnje i razvoja ustavnog sistema, pored drugih, kao naprimjer Vije}a Evrope, koje je preuzelo oblast za{tite ljudskih prava te demo-kratizaciju i uspostavljanje demokratskog izbornog sistema u skladu sa za-padnim standardima. UNIPTF/UNMIBH je preuzeo zadatke izgradnje de-mokratskog aparata kako bi se u zemlji obezbijedila unutra{nja sigurnost,zadatak koji danas nastavlja Evropska policijska misija. Ovim nabrajanje nijezavr{eno i moè se nastaviti unedogled. Nisu iscrpno prikazana ni podru~jazadataka kojih su se me|unarodne organizacije htjele i trebale latiti poslije1995. godine. Programski, one su ve} poslije potpisivanja Mirovnog spo-razuma pokrile cjelokupan civilni ìvot Bosne i Hercegovine. Izri~ito i saspekta me|unarodnog prava obavezanim ~lanovima me|unarodne zajed-nice, koji su, uz to, bili izvorni pravni nosioci mandata, od samog po~etkasu pristupili drugi, takore}i (samo)izabrani sudionici, ~ija se uloga ne smijepotcijeniti. Tu su bila i ostala diplomatska predstavni{tva, koja su trajno zas-tupala i zastupaju posebne interese svoje zemlje u ovoj regiji zapadnogBalkana. Njihov posao svakako dobiva legitimitet dijelom preko njihovog~lanstva u Vije}u za implementaciju mira (PIC), organu me|unarodne zajed-nice dràva, vije}u koje treba da savjetuje Visokog predstavnika i da mupruà podr{ku. U sjenci diplomatskih predstavni{tava bile su i ostale orga-nizacije za pruànje pomo}i bliske doti~nim vladama, koje su – dijelom zna-~ajnim finansijskim sredstvima – uticale na tok stvari u oblastima koje su zanjih bile interesantne. Njima se mogu dodati nevladine organizacije iz ino-stranstva koje su definisale svoje zadatke u izgradnji zemlje i koje su ih po-ku{avale tokom decenije nakon 1995. godinu provesti, ne uvijek u savr{enojharmoniji s organizacijama koje su obavezne da djeluju u skladu s me|una-rodnim pravom ili barem politi~ki legitimnim drugim sudionicima.

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Muzika koju su zajedno svirali sudionici na koncertu rekonstrukcije uBosni i Hercegovini nije bila ba{ u{timana, mada je uspostavom institucijeVisokog predstavnika i njemu dodijeljenih koordiniraju}ih funkcija bilopredvi|eno da, u idealnom slu~aju, na mjestu dirigenta manifestacije stoji je-dan nosilac odgovornosti koji treba i moè sprije~iti da u koncertnoj dvoraninastane grozna kakofonija.

Me|utim, i najbolji dirigent }e slabo doprinijeti uspjehu ako muzi~ari ve}na probama dobiju samo po~etak partiture, a potom ih nakon generalneprobe uputi da samostalno improvizuju. Ovo je sadràjno bio i ostao klju~niproblem dodjele zadataka po me|unarodnom pravu, zadataka koji su Dej-tonskim mirovnim sporazumom dati razli~itim ~lanicama me|unarodne za-jednice u Bosni i Hercegovini. Razli~ite tematske oblasti su, prilikom gra-mati~ke analize programskih re~enica sa djelomice veoma nejasnim sadrà-jem, prikazane opisno, dijelom se preklapaju, a dijelom su u me|usobnojkonkurenciji. Kako treba da izgleda demokratska dràva predmet je kojiprou~avaju op}a teorija dràve i prava, te politologija, otkad je Demokratiaprvi put primijenjena u anti~kom Polisu. [ta, dakle, zna~i 'demokratizacija'?Naravno, Bosna i Hercegovina bi trebalo da bude pravna dràva, kao {to tonalaè njen Ustav. No, te pravne dràve ima isto onoliko koliko i te demo-kratije. Mirovni sporazum i njegovi prilozi su, stoga, u velikoj mjeri bili ot-voreni za razne teme. Mo`da je to bila gre{ka. S druge strane, nije zadatakjednog mirovnog sporazuma – a pogotovu ne nekog poput Dejtonskog, kojije nastao i morao nastati pod poznatim i izuzetno te{kim politi~kim okolno-stima i pod najve}im politi~kim pritiskom kako bi se prekinulo klanje ljudi– da ponudi nacrt vladinog, do posljednjeg zareza razra|enog programa, natemelju kojeg }e se razraditi i pojedina~ni stepeni narednih konkretnih mjerana koje }e se u~esnici obavezati. Op}enito gledano, ovo nije mogu}e, a1995. godine to pogotovu nije bilo mogu}e u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Tome treba dodati koncept zajedni~kog djelovanja me|unarodne zajed-nice i dràvnih institucija, {to ga je ponudio Dejton. Ni s aspekta me|una-rodnog prava, niti ustavnopravno, 1995. godine me|unarodna zajednica nijepreuzela samoodgovornost za Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Da je Bosna i Hercego-vina bila pod me|unarodnim protektoratom ({to su u nekim periodima nekisvakako predbacivali nekim visokim predstavnicima i me|unarodnoj zajed-nici), nedostatak jednog sveobuhvatnog programa implementacije, koji bitrajao godinama, me|unarodnoj zajednici bi se mogao pripisati kao smrtnigrijeh. Me|utim, me|unarodnopravno i ustavnopravno, koncept Dejton-skog ugovora bio je, i do danas je ostao, zajedni~ko djelovanje me|unarod-ne zajednice s dràvnim institucijama koje su ustavnopravno pozvane za

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tako ne{to. U ovom osnovnom principu konsenzusa ni{ta nisu promijeniletakozvane Bonn Powers (Bonske ovlasti) koje su 1997. godine date Visokompredstavniku. Jer njihova primjena treba da bude izuzetak od konsenzusa.Stoga je princip konsenzusa s obje strane zahtijevao da, na osnovu program-skih na~ela Sporazuma, razviju politi~ke programe neophodne za njihovoprovo|enje. U narednom periodu do toga nije do{lo. Osim toga, Dejton1995. godine nije samo stavio ta~ku na trogodi{nji rat, nego je istovremenopredstavljao po~etak jednog mnogo obuhvatnijeg procesa promjena u Bosnii Hercegovini.8 Zemlju nisu karakterisale samo posljedice rata i propratne{tete nastale zbog ratnih djejstava, poput pitanja izbjeglica, iseljavanja uzro-kovanog etni~kim ~i{}enjem itd. Zemlja je 1995. godine bila na pragu prom-jene sistema iz socijalisti~kog, dràvnog ekonomskog i dru{tvenog poretkau demokratski, dràvnopravni i trì{no orijentisan sistem. Ekonomski se si-tuacija dodatno zao{trila i stoga {to je ekonomija Bosne i Hercegovine zbograspada Jugoslavije izgubila vanjskopoliti~ko zale|e, a 1995. je njegovo po-novno uspostavljanje bilo krajnje neizvjesno. Dejton i zadaci Dejtona se1995. godine s prili~no konkretizovanim pojedina~nim programima nisumogli u dovoljnoj mjeri okrenuti ovim sveobuhvatnim zadacima. Savladatite zadatke bio je naredni zadatak me|unarodne zajednice.

Sada treba ustanoviti je li se sa zadacima od 1995. definisanim u obla-sti pravnih reformi uspjelo. Vjerojatno je sada jasno koje su se prepreke tuisprije~ile.

II. Bitni koraci na reformskom putu Bosne i Hercegovine kojim jepe~at dala me|unarodna zajednica ili ih je sama donijela

Ne mogu se i ne treba ovdje prikazati sve aktivnosti me|unarodne zajed-nice od 1995. godine. Ovaj 'me|ubilans' }e se ograni~iti na zna~ajne i trajnerezultate me|unarodnog djelovanja.

Neposredno po sklapanju Mirovnog sporazuma u Daytonu, u jesen 1996.godine, prvi put je trebalo odràti demokratske izbore na svim nivoimaBosne i Hercegovine. Demokratizacija je bila prioritetni zadatak, koji jepreuzeo OSCE. U godinama koje su uslijedile nakon 1995. godine stvorenje pravni okvir u koji su postavljene institucije neophodne za odràvanje

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8 Ibid. International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 180 od 15. februar 2007, S. 2.


demokratskih izbora. OSCE je pratila ~itavu seriju zakona, od kojih }emoovdje navesti najva`nije:

– (entitetski) zakoni o politi~kim strankama,9

– Op}i izborni zakon,10

– Zakon o finansiranju politi~kih stranaka,11

– Zakon o sukobu interesa u vladinim institucijama Bosne i Hercegovine.12

Sudska provjera izbora u jesen 2000. data je u ruke Dràvnom suduBosne i Hercegovine, koji je uspostavljen odlukom Visokog predstavnika.13

Pored institucionalizacije provjere izbora, ova odluka je bila zna~ajna zadràvu Bosnu i Hercegovinu jer je pomo}u nje na dràvnom nivou usa|enaklica pravosudnih institucija (na druge zadatke koji su kasnije pripojeniDràvnom sudu osvrnut }emo se kasnije).14 Bosna i Hercegovina danas, zahvaljuju}i trajnim nastojanjima OSCE-a, raspolaè (u velikoj mjeri) demo-kratskim izbornim sistemom. Odràvanje izbora je od jeseni 2000. godineisklju~ivo u dràvnoj odgovornosti. Izbori vi{e nisu polu~ili ozbiljne zam-jerke me|unarodnih promatra~a. Dodu{e, izborni sistem jo{ uvijek imaustavnopravne poro|ajne muke, koje se ne mogu otkloniti bez reformeustavnog sistema. U nastojanjima da se odgovori svim etni~kim komponen-tama dràvne nacije Bosne i Hercegovine, Dejtonski ustav je stvorio sistemprepreka i smetnji (kao {to je blokada od strane manjine) koje ni danasnikako ne idu uz na~elo jednakosti izbora ni uz osnovno pravo na jednakpristup svih gra|ana javnim slu`bama. Ovaj nejednak tretman koji je,izme|u ostalog, kritikovala i Venecijanska komisija Vije}a Evrope, i koji je usuprotnosti i sa kriterijima OSCE-a iz Kopenhagena iz 1990. godine – a onisu u procesu pribliàvanja zemalja kandidatkinja Evropskoj uniji od pomo}iprilikom dono{enja odluke – ne moè se staviti na teret OSCE-u i me|una-rodnoj zajednici.15 Me|unarodna zajednica se godinama morala snalaziti udatoj ustavnopravnoj situaciji. Reforma ustava je dugo bila tabu tema i o njoj

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9 Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine, Slu`beni list FBiH 27/91; Slu`bene novine RS 15/96.10Slu`beni list BiH 23/01.11Slu`beni list BiH 22/00.12Slu`beni list BiH 12/02.13Slu`beni list BiH 29/00. U vezi s dana{njim zadacima Suda Bosne i Hercegovine vidi kao pre-

gled Dauster, Das Staatsgericht von Bosnien und Herzegowina, StraFo 2006, 314 ff.14Vidi pod II.15Helsin{ki komitet, Izvje{taj o stanju ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini, januar-decembar 2006.,

str. 2.


se tek posljednjih godina ozbiljnije diskutuje. No, ho}e li se u toku predsto-je}e ustavne reforme otkloniti prepreke koje izazivaju nejednakost kod izbo-ra, i dalje je upitno.16

Na drugim poljima, u oblasti demokratizacije i parlamentarizacijedràvnih institucija, {to je u prvom redu pratio OSCE, ne mogu se zabiljeìtizna~ajni uspjesi. Ovo se u prvom redu odnosi na provo|enje principa pred-stavni~ke demokratije u parlamentarnim institucijama Bosne i Hercegovine,parlamentarno samopoimanje u odnosu na vlade, parlamentarna kontrolaizvr{ne vlasti, osobito u oblasti budèta, javna parlamentarna odgovornostprema medijima, ali i shvatanje uloge politi~kih partija u predstavni~kojdemokratiji. Ovdje se, kao i do sada, u usporedbi s evropskim standardima,mogu primijetiti nedostaci.17 Oni se o~ituju u jedva primjetnoj javnoj kontroliizdataka od strane parlamenata ili u nerazvijenosti politi~kih stranaka, kojase o~ituje u njihovoj sposobnosti dugoro~nog ili dugoro~nijeg planiranjaprograma, te sposobnosti razvijanja i provo|enja programa. Neophodnizakonski okvirni uvjeti za to postoje. Osnova i korijeni deficita i dalje senalaze u shvatanju uloge doti~nih politi~kih institucija i njihovih pojedinaca.Prevazilaènje na~ina razmi{ljanja koje je zarobljeno u granicama klijentakoji radi u korist stranke ili u granicama etni~kog bira~a, na~ina razmi{lja-nja ~ija orijentacija nije na dobrobit cijele dràve, vjerovatno je i generacijskopitanje i te{ko se moè prevazi}i u datom politi~kom poretku. Koliko godda su nakon 1995. godine, u usporedbi s evropskim standardima, stvorenisavr{eni pravni okvirni uslovi za funkcionalnu predstavni~ku demokratiju,utoliko manje se ~ini da su dosad u glave odgovornih politi~ara prodrli idejei principi koji stoje iza toga.18

Jo{ jedan primarni cilj koji je slijedila me|unarodna zajednica nakon 1995.godine u politici koja se odnosila na Bosnu i Hercegovinu bio je povratakizbjeglica i prognanih u prvobitna mjesta boravka. Ova je politika

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16Mo`da pak pomogne samo pritisak izvana (vidi: izvje{taj International Crisis Group o tu`bi Ja-koba Fincija pred Evropskim sudom za ljudska prava, Europe Report 180 od 15. februara 2007.,S. 11).

17Tako je vlada Republike Srpske u zimu 2006/2007. godine objavila bojkot dràvne televizije BHTi u periodu koji je uslijedio odbijala davati bilo kakve informacije i prekinula svaku saradnju jerje, po njihovom mi{ljenju, televizija neprimjereno izvje{tavala o slavljenju nacionalnog praznikaRepublike Srpske.

18Vidi tako|er Helsin{ki komitet, Izvje{taj o stanju ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini, januar-decembar 2006., str. 2, osobito u vezi sa sporo{}u u provo|enju rezultata izbora u formiranjuvlada i drugih institucija.


rezultat, koji je godinama postizan uz velike napore,19 tako|er bila i ostalamanje ili vi{e uspje{na.20 Realizacija povratka u pravnom sistemu Bosne iHercegovine nije ostavila nikakve zna~ajne, nikakve trajne tragove.Napravljen je poku{aj da se ona postigne u okviru datih pravnih uvjeta –ponekad, dodu{e, s umjerenim uspjehom.21 Istina, bilo je neophodnostvaranje povoljnih prate}ih okolnosti. Mo`da to nije vrijedno spomena udrugim zemljama. No, u Bosni i Hercegovini je uvo|enje novog sistemaregistarskih tablica za motorna vozila bilo propratna okolnost koja je,op}enito, uspostavila tek fizi~ku slobodu kretanja u cijeloj zemlji, a osobitoje pogodovala povratku izbjeglica. Ako se prije na osnovu kombinacije slovakoja je ozna~avala mjesto registracije vozila, kao {to je SA bilo za Sarajevo,moglo prepoznati porijeklo nekog vozila, novi sistem je anonimizirao mjestoregistracije, a time i vjerovatno mjesto stanovanja, {to je za svakog vlasnikamotornog vozila predstavljalo slobodu kretanja.

Me|unarodna zajednica je uticala i na formiranje svijesti o dràvnostime|unarodnog pravnog subjekta Bosne i Hercegovine. Zastava i himnazemlje svoje postojanje i dana{nju prihva}enost zahvaljuju pritisku me|unar-odne zajednice. Dràvni simboli Bosne i Hercegovine danas nisu predmetspora;22 ipak, do danas nije bilo mogu}e dogovoriti se o tekstu dràvnehimne. Ovo se ~ini znakovito. I jo{ ne{to pada u o~i kada se vozite krozzemlju. Zavisno od toga koji je narod u kojoj regiji ve}ina, dràvna zastavase ~esto pokazuje sa simbolima koji ukazuju na ve}inski narod. I to se ~ini

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19Mnogo optimisti~niji je 24. izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika Generalnom sekretaru UN (24. Berichtdes Hohen Vertreters an den UN-Generalsekretär) od 13. oktobra 2003., S. 1 - kao posljedicutoga s najavom da }e se, zbog uspjeha, krajem 2003. godine zatvoriti odgovaraju}e odjeljenjeOHR-a. Vidi tako|er izvje{taje: 24. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od13. oktobra 2003., str. 9 f.; 25. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 3.marta 2004., str. 14 f.; 26. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 18.novembra 2004., str. 20; 27. B Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 12.aprila 2005., str. 14 f.; svakako kriti~ki i diferenciran sada i 30. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika zaGeneralnog sekretara UN od 15. jula 2006.,str. 15 f.

20Kriti~ki: Helsin{ki komitet, Izvje{taj o stanju ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini, januar-decem-bar 2006., str. 3 ff. S velikim brojem vrlo zabrinjavaju}ih pojedina~nih slu~ajeva i konkretnim po-dacima u vezi s njima. - Mediji su 2006. godine uvijek nanovo izvje{tavali o napadima na povrat-nike, koji su bili nasilini i etni~ki motivisani.

21Helsin{ki komitet, Izvje{taj o stanju ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini, januar-decembar 2006.,str. 4.

22Druga~ija je situacija s entitetskim simbolima. Godine 2006. Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine jeukazao na protuustavnost istih jer jednostrano reflektuju simbole samo jednog entiteta (vidi od-luku od 31. 03. 2006. [Slu`beni list BiH br. 19/01, 12/98, 14/03]).


znakovito, i moglo bi se tuma~iti u smislu jo{ uvijek postoje}e krhkostidràve.

Za dràvnost Bosne i Hercegovine i za stabilnost njene valute, koja trajedo danas i koja je svakako jedinstvena u regiji, najva`nija je bila odluka – ivjerovatno skoro nezamisliva bez uticaja tada{njeg me|unarodnog guver-nera Centralne Banke Petera Nicholla – o ukidanju i zamjeni dinara, koji jebio tradicionalan na prostoru biv{e Jugoslavije, i uvo|enju konvertibilnemarke kao dràvne valute 1. oktobra 1997. godine.23 Njema~ka marka je uBosni i Hercegovini bila nezvani~na druga valuta jo{ od rata, a u biv{ojJugoslaviji, koja je imala galopiraju}u inflaciju, bila je zamjenski novac. Takoje naziv nove valute u marka i fenig bio isto toliko blizak kao {to je bilo tije-sno vezanje zamjenskog kursa konvertibilne marke za njema~ku marku (oduvo|enja eura 1. januara 2002. za euro). Ovo, kao i nov~ana i monetarnapolitika koju je Centralna banka slijedila nezavisno od dràvnih institucija,sprije~ilo je porast inflacije koji je bio simptomati~na karakteristika jugosla-venskog dinara i stvorilo u Bosni i Hercegovini ostrvo stabilnosti jedinstvenoza Zapadni Balkan.

Na drugim poljima, kao na polju reformi ekonomske politike iliekonomsko-pravnih reformi,24 uticaj me|unarodne zajednice bio je ilimanje primjetan ili, u najmanju ruku, nije bio trajan. Osobito do 2000. go-dine Visoki predstavnik je donosio samo pojedina~ne odluke s ja~im poti-cajima za privrednu reformu. To se u istoj mjeri odnosi na sve oblastiprivrede i ekonomije koliko i na oblast dràvne socijalne politike. Dodu{e,privatni bankarski sektor svoju egzistenciju zahvaljuje posebno politi~kom ifinansijskom uticaju Svjetske banke i Me|unarodnog monetarnog fonda. No,novo regulisanje ovog sektora je u velikoj mjeri bilo u rukama nacionalnihzakonodavaca u entitetima, ~ije su se institucije smatrale odgovornim i zadjelomi~no nezadovoljavaju}u provedbu ove reforme. Pogotovu se moèispitati efikasnost javnog nadzora banaka u oba entiteta, s obzirom na mno-gobrojne bankrote banaka u Bosni i Hercegovini. Uzdràno treba ocijeniti isektor privatizacije javnih preduze}a. Privatizacija se provodi sa zastojima, ai razli~ite je brzine u entitetima. Drugi, odlu~uju}i reformski projekti u oblastiekonomije i privrede i dalje su na ledu, i vjerovatno }e ih se neko latiti teku narednim stadijima pribliàvanja Bosne i Hercegovine Evropskoj uniji.Me|unarodna zajednica ne moè sebi pripisati napretke ostvarene u okviru

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23Slu`beni list FBiH br. 26/98, Slu`beni list BiH br. 10/98.24Vidi uz to i International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 180 od 15. februara 2007., S. 24.


ekonomske reforme – iako je ve} odavno bila i ostala svjesna ekonomskihproblema zemlje. Suzdràni koraci koje ne karakteri{e trajnost, koraci u pre-uzimanju suodgovornosti, mogli su se primijetiti tek u vrijeme visokih pred-stavnika Wolfganga Petritscha i Paddyja Ashdowna.25 Odgovorni predstavni-ci me|unarodne zajednice ne negiraju ni postojanje deficita.26 Tako je i daljenepregledno zakonodavstvo u oblasti nekretnina, nema potpunih podatakau zemlji{nim knjigama ili katastrima, ili se ne prikazuju procesi koji se odvi-jaju izvan zemlji{ne knjige i katastra. O~ito je da to ne pruà osje}aj sigurnos-ti za investicije, ne samo kod stranih investitora. Privatno trgovinsko i ugo-vorno (obligacijsko) pravo i dalje ~eka jedinstvenu kodifikaciju u zemlji imodernizaciju koja je u vezi s njom. I ovaj deficit je ekonomsko-politi~kazapreka, osobito za strane investicije. Pravo privatnih trgovinskih dru{tavakarakteri{u birokratske prepreke i smetnje. Zakon o ste~aju i likvidaciji ta-ko|er ~eka regulativu koja bi bila jedinstvena na nivou zemlje. Sudovi su sprimjenom dosada{njeg Zakona o ste~aju i likvidaciji stru~no preoptere}eni,a Zakon o parni~nom postupku tako|er karakteri{e nedostatak podsticajaza ubrzanje postupka. Sporost parni~nih postupaka vi{e koristi du`nicima,a sprje~ava investicije. Kritiku }emo dopuniti pogledom na gra|anskoizvr{no pravo. Povjerilac koji je kona~no imao uspjeha u sporom parni~nompostupku osje}a se prevarenim zbog birokratskih zapreka i procesnihprepreka koje se pred njega stalno iznova postavljaju.

Mada je me|ubilans ekonomsko-politi~kih reformi vi{e negativan, Bosnai Hercegovina uticaju Evropske unije i njenom programu CAFAO(uklju~uju}i i programe koji su mu slijedili) zahvaljuje zakonodavstvo uoblasti carina i poreza27 koje odgovara evropskim standardima. Procesprovo|enja jo{ nije potpuno okon~an, ali je na pravom putu. Ovo sevjerovatno moè objasniti i time {ta je dio CAFAO programa bila izgradnja

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25Njegova takozvana Buldoèr inicijativa iz 2002. (sudjelovali su USAID, Svjetska banka, Evropskakomisija i Me|unarodni monetarni fond pod rukovodstvom OHR-a) trebalo je da otkloni pre-preke u ekonomskom i privrednom ìvotu i otvori nova radna mjesta, ali je ostala bez trajnogdjejstva (vidi 24. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 13. oktobra2003., str. 4)(vidi uz to i 25. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 03.marta 2004., S. 6; 27. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 12. aprila2005., S. 9 f.; 28. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 17. novembra2005., S. 8 f.). Veoma optimisti~an je i 30. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekreta-ra UN od 30. jula 2006., str. 11 f.

26Vidi intervju s prvim zamjenikom Visokog predstavnika Lawrenceom Butlerom, Bosnia Daily No.1428 od 23. januara 2007., S. 5, koji, dodu{e, krivi dràvne institucije.

2724. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 13. oktobra 2003., str. 5; 25.Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 03. marta 2004., str. 6 f.


moderne carinske i porezne uprave. Ovo je postalo jasno 2006. godine,poslije uvo|enja poreza na promet,28 koji je doveo do jasnog pove}anja jav-nih prihoda i vjerovatno upravo taj porez u potpunosti pla}aju porezni ob-veznici. Mnogo je lo{ija situacija u sektoru javnih rashoda. Deficiti u par-lamentarnoj politici rashoda ve} su nazna~eni. Osim toga, ako posmatramosituaciju sa budètom u Bosni i Hercegovini, moèmo ustanoviti neoprav-dano visoku dràvnu kvotu potro{nje. Ona je rezultat finansiranja preko-mjernih dràvnih struktura koje je zemlji donio Dejtonski ustav. îtavo tuceministarstava unutra{njih poslova i pravde, na primjer, jednostavno je previ-{e za zemlju veli~ine Bosne i Hercegovine koja, uz to, jo{ ima takvu finansij-sku mo} kakvu ima. Ali i unutar sistema dràvnih struktura koje je usposta-vio Ustav, ni dràvne institucije niti me|unarodna zajednica nisu do sada po-~ele trajnu reformu javne uprave koja bi se usmjerila ka racionalizaciji.29

Javna uprava zemlje na svim nivoima se ~ini kadrovski pretrpana i sluì –kao u mnogim zemljama koje su u prelazu iz socijalisti~kog dru{tvenogporetka u trì{ne uvjete – opsluìvanju kadrova, a time i pokrivanju neza-poslenosti. Materijalno pravo javne administracije zemlje do sada nije pod-vrgnuto nikakvoj kriti~koj kontroli, kako bi se vidjelo da li stvarno sluìizvr{enju neophodnih javnih zadataka ili se, pak, proizvoljno stvaraju zadaciza koje je onda potrebna administracija.30 U vezi s tim treba navesti velikibroj zahtjeva koje treba ispuniti za dobivanje dozvola, kod kojih se ne prim-je}uje stvarni administrativni smisao. Nepristrasan posmatra~ ne moè seoteti utisku da se ovih zahtjeva drè samo da bi se legitimirao obim posto-je}e javne slu`be. Smanjenje birokratije u najboljem smislu slobode trgovine,zanatstva, profesija i ekonomije, u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1995. godine nijebilo stvarna tema, mada izme|u ovih nepotrebnih zadataka javne uprave ikorupcije, koji zemlji predstavljaju problem, postoji unutra{nja veza, i ta jeveza poznata svim u~esnicima.

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28Vidi Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 15. jula 2006., str. 12.29Tako skepti~an je bio i 24. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 13.

oktobra 2003., str. 6; vidi dalje 25. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od3. marta 2004., str. 7 f.; 26. Bericht des Hohen Vertreters an den UN-Generalsekretär od 28.novembra 2004., str. 12, 13; 27. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od12. aprila 2005., str. 10; 28. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 17.novembra 2005., str. 10; 30. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 15.jula 2006., str. 13 f.

30Formiranje dràvne institucije za javnu slu`bu putem Zakona o javnoj slu`bi iz maja 2002.(Slu`beni list BiH 12/02) u svakom slu~aju je obuhvatilo, kao i sam Zakon, samo jedan dio prob-lema, naime, Zakon o javnoj slu`bi i njegovu primjenu. Nije se odnosilo na klju~nu problematikujavnih poslova i zadataka.


Osim toga, me|unarodna zajednica je suodgovorna za postojanje nekon-trolisanih dràvnih struktura. U dobro shva}enom legitimnom interesu ja~a-nja dràvnih struktura, s ciljem unapre|enja nacionalnog jedinstva, me|u-narodna zajednica je na dràvnom nivou stvarala institucije, ali se istovreme-no nije pobrinula da se na niìm, entitetskim nivoima u istom obimu institu-cije gase, odnosno da se zadaci u potpunosti prenesu na vi{i, dràvni nivo.

Problemati~no me|usobno djejstvo preglomazne i lo{e pla}ene javneslu`be, slabo finansiranih struktura institucija i ekonomije koja trpi zbog pre-preka u investiranju – me|unarodnoj zajednici je postalo poznato najkasni-je 1998. godine, kada je osobito CAFAO u javnosti progovorio o fenomenukorupcije, koji se u Bosni i Hercegovini sve vi{e {irio, te od me|unarodnezajednice traìo da pomogne u njenom suzbijanju. Ured Visokog predstavni-ka je osnovao Jedinicu za borbu protiv korupcije31 koja je, s obzirom naobim postavljenog zadatka – da se bori protiv korupcije – od samog po~etkabila kadrovski dosta oskudno popunjena. Ipak se ovoj jedinici ima zahvali-ti spoznaja do koje se do{lo 2000. i 2001. godine: da djelotvorno suzbijanjekriminala u Bosni i Hercegovini zahtijeva sveobuhvatnu reformu sistemakrivi~nog prava. Otprilike u isto vrijeme Ured Visokog predstavnika jepo~eo – dodu{e, nezavisno od truda Jedinice za suzbijanje korupcije da senapravi reforma formalnog i materijalnog krivi~nog prava – sveobuhvatnureformu pravosu|a. Za tu svrhu je 2001. godine u OHR-u osnovanaNezavisna pravosudna komisija, ~iji je zadatak trebalo da bude podno{enjeplanova za sveobuhvatnu reformu zakonâ o slu`bi sudija i dràvnih tuìlacana svim nivoima Bosne i Hercegovine, za sveobuhvatnu reviziju dràvnogsudstva s ciljem da se, po mogu}nosti, smanji sudski aparat, da se institu-cionalno obezbijedi institucionalna i individualna nezavisnost sudija, te da seizvr{i sveobuhvatna reforma Zakona o parni~nom postupku. Cilj reformematerijalnog krivi~nog prava, kako bi se pobolj{alo suzbijanje korupcije, biloje jedinstveno zakonodavstvo na nivou entiteta, uklju~uju}i zakonodavstvoDistrikta Br~ko, jer su se krivi~ni zakoni u razli~itim administrativnim jedini-cama Bosne i Hercegovine ve} godinama sve vi{e razilazili. Istovremeno jekrivi~no pravo trebalo modernizovati, uzimaju}i u obzir nove oblike krimi-

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31Raniji mandat ove jedinice bio je sveobuhvatan. Jedinica je trebalo da savjetuje i podràvadràvne institucije u borbi protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala na osnovu pojedina~nihslu~ajeva. Ovaj poluoperativni zadatak pro{iren je 2001. godine, kada je Anti-Fraud Department(Odjel za borbu protiv korupcije), preuzimanjem Hercegova~ke banke 6. aprila 2001. godine,trebao osujetiti nastavak aktivnosti radikalnih snaga HDZ-a na dràvnom udaru, i zaustavio gaje. Osim toga, od po~etka je zadatak AFD-a bio da se bavi i reformom krivi~nog prava, te dasistematski radi na izgra|ivanju svijesti stanovni{tva o {tetnosti korupcije.


nala poput pranja novca, organizovanog kriminala i trgovine ljudima. Ako jeustavnopravno bilo na ma koji na~in dopustivo, trebalo je napraviti jedankrivi~ni zakon za cijelu Bosnu i Hercegovinu koji je, izme|u ostalog, pred-vi|ao i mogu}nost da se, u skladu s me|unarodnim obavezama Bosne iHercegovine, omogu}i u~inkovito gonjenje ratnih zlo~ina na dràvnim su-dovima. Jer, moglo se primijetiti da }e do}i do podjele poslova izme|u Me-|unarodnog tribunala za biv{u Jugoslaviju i institucija pravosu|a Bosne iHercegovine. U reformi Zakona o krivi~nom postupku kojoj se teìlo, u pr-vom redu se radilo o pove}anju efikasnosti postupka koncentracijom istra-`nih nadle`nosti na tuìla{tvima, uz ukidanje do tada tako|er nadle`nog is-tra`nog sudije, kako bi se stvorila naredbodavna hijerarhija izme|u tuìla{tvai policije, koje do tada nije bilo - uz sve negativne posljedice. Krivi~nopravniglavni postupak je trebalo deformalizovati, istovremeno je trebalo oja~a-ti prava optuènih, poo{triti pravo na pravni lijek i osloboditi ga anahronihformalizama.

Reforma krivi~nog prava i pravosu|a, koja je po~ela u drugoj polovini2001. godine, bila je najobuhvatniji sloèni reformski projekt za koji jeme|unarodna zajednica preuzela vo|enje i odgovornost posredstvomVisokog predstavnika. Dràvne institucije su, dodu{e, signalizovale {irokuspremnost za saradnju, ali su se zadovoljile ulogom u~esnika. Istovremeno,ostvarenje ovog zadatka nije i{lo bez problema. Svojevremeno je Visokipredstavnik Wolfgang Petritsch bio veoma suzdràn kada je rije~ o obavezu-ju}em utvr|ivanju jasnih reformskih ciljeva,32 vjerojatno i zbog toga {to jenjegov mandat isticao u maju 2002. i on nije htio da prejudicira politikusvoga nasljednika Paddyja Ashdowna. No, njegova suzdrànost je izazvalanesigurnost. Jedinica za suzbijanje korupcije i Nezavisna komisija za refo-rmu pravosu|a reformu su pripremile s previ{e otvorenim rezultatom.Predmetna otvorenost i otvorenost ciljne orijentacije je, pak, kod drugih~lanova me|unarodne zajednice pobudila apetit za u~e{}em. Previ{e seenergije moralo utro{iti na kanalisanje raznih struja pomo}i. Tome se pridru-

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32Zna~ajna na~elna odluka pala je u jesen 2000. godine, sa osnivanjem Suda Bosne i Hercegovine(vidi odluku Visokog predstavnika od 12. 11. 2000.[Slu`beni list BiH 29/00.]). Zakonska odlukaVisokog predstavnika je, dodu{e, u prvom redu osnovala Sud kao sud za kontrolu izbora i up-ravni sud. No, ipak je odluka sadràvala regulativu koja mu je i u budu}nosti omogu}avala kri-vi~nopravnu nadle`nost. Narodna skup{tina Republike Srpske je sumnjala u ustavnost Zakona idala ga je na provjeru Ustavnom sudu Bosne i Hercegovine, koji je mu, pak, odlukom donese-nom 28. 01. 2001. (Slu`beni list BiH 32/01) priznao ustavnost. Od tada se s aspekta ustavnoprav-nosti vi{e nije javila sumnja u vezi s tim da dràva Bosna i Hercegovina moè imati na raspolaga-nju vlastite pravosudne organe.


ìlo i pitanje kojim }e se putem krenuti s novim Visokim predstavnikom na-kon odlaska Wolfganga Petritscha.

Reformski proces je znatno ubrzan nakon {to je mandat preuzeo PaddyAshdown. Prestrukturisanje unutar Ureda Visokog predstavnika dovelo je dotoga da je Jedinica za borbu protiv korupcije preobraèna u jednu ~istooperativnu organizaciju za borbu protiv kriminala, pa je izgubila svakunadle`nost u procesu reforme krivi~nog prava.33 Dio nadle`nosti je prene-sen na jednu posebnu jedinicu za reformu tuìla{tva, koja je u jesen 2002.godine dala svoje prijedloge za reformu. Predvi|ali su potpuno ukidanjedosada{njih op}inskih tuìla{tava i koncentraciju njihovih nadle`nosti nanivou tuìla{tava Distrikta i kantona. Kako je Ashdown odlu~io da gonjenjete{kih kriminalnih radnji iz domena organizovanog kriminala koncentri{e naSud Bosne i Hercegovine,34 prijedlozi su predvidjeli i stvaranje tuìla{tva nanivou dràve. Osim toga, uklju~ivali su i pro{irenje sudskih nadle`nostiDràvnog suda za krivi~nopravnu nadle`nost gonjenja te{kih zlo~ina.Prijedlozi Nezavisne komisije za reformu ustrojstva entitetskih sudova, kojisu u jesen 2002. tako|er predo~eni Visokom predstavniku, bili su manjeradikalni. Op}inski sudovi (kao pandan op}inskim tuìla{tvima) nisu u pot-punosti ukinuti, ali je njihov ukupan broj smanjen35 sa 78 na 47. Ukidanjeop}inskih tuìla{tava i smanjenje broja op}inskih sudova ili sudova prveinstance u entitetima bilo je zna~ajno za provjeru broja zaposlenih sudija ituìlaca, koja je kao cilj postavljena jo{ 2002. godine – taj broj se, u uspored-bi s prosje~nim evropskim standardom, ~inio previsokim i smatralo se da gaje vremenom nemogu}e finansirati. Sudska i tuìla~ka vije}a su u jesen 2002.tako|er zaìvjela, s ciljem da garantuju nezavisnost sudova, tuìla{tava, sudi-ja i tuìlaca, a kasnije su provjeravala i sudije i tuìoce s aspektaosposobljenosti i podobnosti za obavljanje posla. Kona~no je broj sudijasmanjen na gotovo polovinu.36 U skladu s odlukom Visokog predstavnikada se krivi~nopravno gonjenje te{kih kriminalnih radnji – osobito organizo-vanog kriminala – koncentri{e na dràvnom nivou u Sudu Bosne iHercegovine, neophodno je bilo izraditi dràvni procesni zakon i dràvnikrivi~ni zakon. Kodifikacije su izra|ene ve} u jesen 2002. godine; izradilo ih

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33Vidi 24. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 13. oktobra 2003., str. 1.3424. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 13. oktobra 2003., str. 2.3524. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 13. oktobra 2003., str. 2.36Ukupan broj tuìlaca je u velikoj mjeri ostao isti, jer je planiranim ukidanjem istra`nog sudije

istra`na nadle`nost trebalo da se koncentri{e na tuìla{tvo. To je zna~ilo ve}i broj slu~ajeva i opravdalo je odluku da se ne smanjuje broj tuìlaca.


je jedno pododjeljenje u Uredu Visokog predstavnika, uzev{i u obzir opisa-ne reformske ciljeve; one su 1. marta 2003. godine stupile na snagu.37

Istovremeno sa stupanjem na snagu dràvnog krivi~nog38 i krivi~no-pro-cesnog prava,39 Dràvni sud40 i Tuìla{tvo41 Bosne i Hercegovine preuzeli susvoj posao. U oblasti gonjenja organizovanog privrednog kriminala i korup-cije, izmjene koje je predvidio Visoki predstavnik su, osim toga, predvi|ale(privremenu) saradnju me|unarodnih sudija i dràvnih tuìlaca.42, 43 Kao do-punu ovim zakonima u oblasti pravosu|a, Visoko sudsko i tuìla~ko vije}eBosne i Hercegovine44 kao dràvni organ sudijske samouprave i samoupravedràvnih tuìlaca je 1. juna 2004. uspostavljeno kao zamjena za dotada{njeSudsko i tuìla~ko vije}e.45 Njegova nadle`nost se usmjerava prema nadle`-nosti vije}a magistrata u drugim evropskim zemljama, ali ih obuhvata46 mno-go {ire. Ono iz uprave pravosu|a potiskuje ministarstvo pravosu|a. U dome-tu svoje nadle`nosti, Vije}e svakako ima karakter evropskog modela.

Po~etkom 2005. godine pravosu|e je na nivou dràve Bosne i Hercego-vine dobilo svoju posljednju bitnu izmjenu. Uz dosada{nje nadle`nosti uoblasti ~uvanja i njege krivi~nog prava, dràvni sud je dobio i koncentrisanu

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37Procesno i krivi~no pravo na nivou dràve je u narednom periodu sluìlo entitetima i DistriktuBr~ko za harmonizaciju njihovog formalnog i materijalnog krivi~nog prava.

38Krivi~ni zakon (Slu`beni list BiH br. 36/03; 3/03; 37/03).39Zakon o krivi~nom postupku (Slu`beni list BiH br. 36/03).40Zakon o Sudu Bosne i Hercegovine (Slu`beni list BiH br. 29/00).41Zakon o Dràvnom tuìla{tvu Bosne i Hercegovine (Slu`beni list BiH br. 24/02).42Saradnja me|unarodnih sudija i javnih tuìlaca zavr{it }e sa zavr{etkom prelaznog perioda 31.

12. 2009. godine. Poslije toga }e i Dràvni sud i Tuìla{tvo Bosne i Hercegovine raditi isklju~ivos doma}im kadrovima.

43Ranije su me|unarodne sudije i dràvni tuìoci imenovani odlukama Visokog predstavnika, naosnovu ~ega su radili u svojstvu sudije, odnosno dràvnog tuìoca. Od 2006. ovu nadle`nost naosnovu me|unarodnopravnih sporazuma izme|u Visokog predstavnika i dràvnog Predsjedni-{tva Bosne i Hercegovine isklju~ivo ima Visoko sudsko i tuìla~ko vije}e Bosne i Hercegovine(Slu`beni list BiH br. 10/02).

44Slu`beni list BiH br. 22/02.45Vidi 25. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 03. marta 2004., str. 1, 4

f.; 26. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 18. novembra 2004., str. 6.46Vidi ~lan 17. Zakona o Visokom sudskom i tuìla~kom vije}u (Slu`beni list BiH br. 62/02; 25/04).

Vije}e imenuje, otpu{ta i disciplinski ka`njava sudije i dràvne tuìoce, te sudjeluje u dono{enjusvih drugih odluka koje se ti~u individualnog statusa. Odgovorno je za planiranje kadrova {iromzemlje, te sudjeluje u materijalnom i finansijskom snabdijevanju sudova i tuìla{tava. Razvijaplanove za edukaciju i permanentno obrazovanje, a u vezi sa svim pitanjima koja se ti~u pravo-su|a mora se barem saslu{ati njegovo mi{ljenje.


nadle`nost gonjenja ratnih zlo~ina.47 I u ovoj oblasti njegovog rada }e, dokraja prelaznog perioda 31. 12. 2009. godine, sudjelovati me|unarodne sudi-je i dràvni tuìoci. Druge reforme pravosu|a, koje bi promijenile situaciju– mada su bile neophodne – me|unarodna zajednica nije ni inicirala niti ihje provodila. Me|unarodna zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini je, pak, finansij-ski sna`no sudjelovala u provo|enju dosada{nje reforme pravosu|a. Beznjenog u~e{}a izgradnja dràvnih pravosudnih institucija bila bi nezamisliva.Do 31. 12. 2006. godine na Dràvni sud i druge pravne institucije utro{enoje ukupno 16 miliona eura.48 Jo{ jedna 'donatorska' konferencija u martu2006. godine je me|unarodnoj zajednici donijela dodatne obaveze u visiniod 7,7 miliona eura za period nakon 31. 12. 2006. godine, do zavr{etkaprelaznog perioda 31. decembra 2009. godine,49 kada dràvne institucijeBosne i Hercegovine treba da preuzmu punu odgovornost i za dràvnepravosudne institucije.

III. Ocjena i perspektive

Vi{e od deset godina sudjelovanja me|unarodne zajednice u reformamau Bosni i Hercegovini ostavilo je traga. Ako se danas u BiH moè govoritio demokratskim okvirnim uvjetima – oni se bez me|unarodne zajednice nebi desili. U oblasti izgradnje pravne dràve napravljeni su pomaci; za{titaljudskih prava putem ustavnopravne nadle`nosti (a nju pomaù ombuds-mani) ~ini se da je obezbije|ena.50 Ipak, nema razloga da se opustimo zbog

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47Postupci koji se protiv vinovnika zlo~ina po~injenih u ratu 1992-1995. na teritoriji Bosne i Her-cegovine vode na Me|unarodnom tribunalu za biv{u Jugoslaviju se, u skladu sa Rule 11 (Pravi-lom 11), do odredaba koje se odnose na postupak ICTY-ja odlukom Suda, prenose na Dràvnisud Bosne i Hercegovine. Ovu mogu}nost ICTY je do 28.02.2007. godine iskoristio u ukupno 5postupaka sa 9 optuènih. Od toga je u me|uvremeno u 2 postupka izre~ena presuda u prvojinstanci. Takozvani 11-bis-postupci obavezno se moraju voditi pred Dràvnim sudom. Za razlikuod njih, Dràvni sud u prvom redu ima nadle`nost za gonjenje ratnih zlo~ina i u svim drugimslu~ajevima, ali se moè odre}i svoje primarne nadle`nosti i entitetima Bosne i Hercegovine pre-pustiti nastavak gonjenja. Vidi i 26. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UNod 18. novembra 2004., S. 8.

4825. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 03. marta 2004., S. 2 u vezi sodlukama o preuzimanju obaveza donesenim 30. oktobra 2003. na donatorskoj konferenciji uHaagu (Verpflichtungsbeschlüsse der Donors' Conference in Den Haag), koje su se, dodu{e, od-nosile na izgradnju tzv. Odjela za ratne zlo~ine pri Dràvnom Sudu Bosne i Hercegovine.

49International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 180 od 15. februara 2007., S. 13.50Helsin{ki komitet, Izvje{taj o stanju ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini - januar-decembar

2006., str. 2. 1 ff sa preporukama za institucionalno ja~anje za{tite ljudskih prava, S. 13.


postignutog napretka i da (istina, ne tako brojne) lovorove gran~ice savije-mo u vijenac na svojim glavama. Mogu se prepoznati51 nedostaci. S obziromna nacionalisti~ku retoriku52 koja se ~ula prije i u toku same izborne kam-panje 2006. godine, svakako ima povoda za razmi{ljanje o krhkosti me|u-narodnog pravnog subjekta Bosne i Hercegovine. Najve}i reformski proje-kt, koji je u znatnoj mjeri proveden u isklju~ivoj odgovornosti me|unarodnezajednice, bila je reforma krivi~nog prava i, dodu{e samo djelomi~no prove-dena, reforma pravosu|a. Reforma odbrane, koja je 2005. godine zavr{ilaspajanjem dvije entitetske armije i formiranjem dràvnih odbrambenih struk-tura,53 nije u tolikoj mjeri nosila me|unarodni pe~at.

Ne uzimaju}i u obzir navedene reforme, razlozi za ~injenicu da jeme|unarodna zajednica ostavila samo sporadi~ne tragove dijelom su uvje-tovani i samim Dejtonskim sistemom, ~iji je cilj bio i ostao saradnja izme|u~lanica me|unarodne zajednice i dràvnih institucija koje su na osnovuustavnopravnih odredaba pozvane na saradnju. Saradnja izme|u me|una-rodne zajednice i dràvnih institucija je u pro{losti bila – iz razli~itih razlogana koje se u ovom okviru ne moèmo posebno osvrnuti – te{ka, djelomi~noneuspje{na. Za slu~aj neuspjeha, Vije}e za implementaciju mira (PIC) 1997.godine je u Bonnu Visokom predstavniku dalo takozvane Bonn Powers(Bonske ovlasti), koje su mu, istina, davale ovla{tenje da vakuum u saradnjipopuni vlastitim odlukama sa zakonskom snagom. No, razni visoki pred-stavnici su, osobito kada se radilo o nametanju zakona, zavisno od indivi-dualnog shvatanja mandata, sami sebi nametnuli uzdrànost. Nije nam na-mjera kritika ove uzdrànosti, jer, po samoj ideji, nije zadatak Visokog pred-stavnika da dràvne institucije drì u stanju politi~ke nezrelosti. Idealni sis-tem dràvno-me|unarodne saradnje u praksi nije mogao funkcionisati iposti}i idealno stanje kakvo je zami{ljao Mirovni sporazum. S dràvnestrane, podjela kompetencija izme|u Bosne i Hercegovine i njenih entitetauvjetovala je, i uvjetuje, da previ{e partnera moè di}i svoj glas i zahtijevati

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51Sposobnost Bosne i Hercegovine za opstanak u budu}nosti je kriti~na. Stoga se nedostaci u vezisa sistemom obrazovanja u zemlji ocjenjuju vrlo negativno. Osobito sistem vi{eg obrazovanja,uklju~uju}i univerzitete, moèmo i dalje opisati kao veoma zaostao (vidi Helsin{ki komitet, Iz-vje{taj o stanju ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini - januar-decembar 2006., str. 12). Visokipredstavnik je 16. februara 2007. godine situaciju s obrazovnim sistemom na univerzitetima oz-na~io kao ‚haoti~nu' (vidi www.ohr.int). Kriti~ki osvrt i International Crisis Group, Europe Re-port No. 180 od 15. februara 2007., S. 1 i S. 17.

52Tako|er Helsin{ki komitet, Izvje{taj o stanju ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini, januar-decem-bar 2006., str. 1, 2.

53Vidi 25. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 03. marta 2004., str. 9 f.


da budu saslu{ani. Njihovi se politi~ki interesi me|usobno nisu podudarali,niti se podudaraju. U pogledu slabih ustavnopravnih kompetencija dràvnevlade Bosne i Hercegovine – njoj je od samog po~etka nedostajala koordi-nativna funkcija, i ona s vremenom, od sklapanja Mirovnog sporazuma, nijepoja~ana. Da li je kod postoje}ih politi~ara i stranaka koje su u njoj u~estvo-vale uop}e bilo volje za tako ne{to – tako|er se, u najmanju ruku, moèispitati. Ali, u vezi s me|unarodnom zajednicom, i uprkos koordinativnojfunkciji koja je dodijeljena Visokom predstavniku, i bez obzira na politi~kekompetencije Vije}a za implementaciju mira, moèmo re}i da su u na~elnimi pojedina~nim pitanjima razli~iti politi~ki interesi i institucionalne ambicijerazli~itih u~esnika sprje~avali ili oteàvali da se govori jednim glasom kojije bio potreban.

Ono {to je zasigurno sprije~ilo ve}i uspjeh me|unarodne zajednicetokom svih ovih godina bila je ~injenica da u oblasti reforme pravne dràvesvakako nedostaju dugoro~niji politi~ki programi, kako kod pojedinih viso-kih predstavnika, tako i kod Vije}a za implementaciju mira. Ovo svakakomoè vaìti i za ekonomske reforme, koje nisu provedene. U svakomslu~aju, u oblasti unutra{nje stabilnosti Bosne i Hercegovine niko nije imaokoncept za politiku sigurnosnog poretka. Ako ikako, me|unarodna zajedni-ca bi djelovala na osnovu povoda koji je postojao, ali nije se doticala struk-tura koje su za to bile odgovorne. Tokom svojih mandata, pojedini visokipredstavnici – od 1995. ukupno pet – nisu, sa svoje strane, bili zaintereso-vani da misle u neophodnim duìm vremenskim periodima, ili da jednomsporadi~no donesene odluke provedu uz dugoro~ne programe i dugoro~neefekte. Politi~ki lomovi izme|u pojedinih visokih predstavnika su, uz to,povremeno bili vi{e nego tek bolni. Politi~ka konzistentnost, u periodimakoji su uobi~ajeni za trajno provo|enje politike, a koje u evropskimdràvama odre|uju na ~etiri ili pet godina doti~nog perioda zakonodavstvaparlamenata – nije se mogla prepoznati. Neka kao primjer za ovo posluìdo tada prili~no uspje{na reforma krivi~nog prava (reforma pravosu|a je, {tose ti~e parni~nog i upravnog sudstva, stala na pola puta). Njeno provo|enje,nakon {to su bili u~injeni neophodni zakonski koraci, pozdravljeno je ipra}eno dosad s mnogo me|unarodnog, a kona~no i finansijskoganga`mana. Taj anga`man vi{e nije obezbije|en,54 i to ~ini razliku u odno-su na reformu odbrane. Ovo posljednje u NATO-u, zbog sigurnosno-politi~kih razloga, ima uza se zainteresiranog mentora, koji garantuje trajnu

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54Kriti~ki i International Crisis Group, Europe Report, No. 180 od 15. februara 2007., S. 12 i 13.


provedbu.55 Tako ne{to nedostaje reformi krivi~nog prava. Ona nema pre-poznatljivog amicus curiae. Zato se, s tog aspekta, svakako smije postavitipitanje trajnosti i odrìvosti.56 Me|unarodna zainteresovanost popu{ta, jer sesmatra da je voz postavljen na kolosijek i da ne}e isko~iti iz tra~nica. Pritome se ~esto ne uzima u obzir stanje pruga u Bosni i Hercegovini. U samojzemlji nisu dobri politi~ki signali za krivi~nopravni sistem ~iji }e nosilac bitidràva. Dràvne institucije zaduène za krivi~no pravo u oblasti gonjenjaorganizovanog i privrednog kriminala imaju de lege lata kompetencije pred-nosti u odnosu na entitetske organe gonjenja. No, politi~ka realnost toignori{e. Republika Srpska je, osim toga, u prolje}e 2006. godine, uz odo-brenje me|unarodne zajednice,57 a tvrde}i da }e obezbijediti najistrajnijekrivi~no gonjenje u oblasti prava prvenstva dràve, osnovala posebnotuìla{tvo i specijalni sud. Tako stvorena konkurentska situacija name}epitanje da li ova 'kra|a' prava prvenstva ima taj smisao da se dràvi Bosni iHercegovini oduzmu dràvne kompetencije koje su joj date zakonom?58

Sli~an razvoj situacije moè se naslutiti i na ne manje zna~ajnom podru~jugonjenja ratnih zlo~ina. I ovdje je primarna nadle`nost za gonjenje koddràvnih organa. Tvrde}i da su ovi organi preoptere}eni – pikanterija je daDràvni sud, koji nosi glavni teret, nije izjavio da je preoptere}en i da nje-gov dosada{nji rad ne pokazuje tako ne{to – predsjednik Visokog sudskogi tuìla~kog vije}a je u ljeto 2006. godine javno zatraìo izradu dràvnestrategije o gonjenju ratnih zlo~ina, koja za cilj treba da ima ja~e uvezivanjekrivi~nih sudova entiteta u gonjenju ovih delikata. Ako se ima na umu dasu zakonske sankcije Dràvnog suda na osnovu prakse izricanja sankcijastroìje od entitetskih sudova, name}e se pitanje da li je zahtijevana ja~aodgovornost entitetskih sudova manje okrenuta navodnoj preoptere}enostidràvnih krivi~nih institucija ili njihovoj praksi izricanja sankcija? Osim toga,sada{nji predsjednik Vije}a ministara Bosne i Hercegovine je u ljeto 2006.godine izjavio da je Sud Bosne i Hercegovine i tako 'samo' sud 'za Srbe'. Sobzirom na ovakav razvoj situacije, svakako se smije razmi{ljati o tome da

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55Vidi 24. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 13. oktobra 2003., S. 7;25. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 03. marta 2004., S. 2;

56Druk~iji je 30. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 15. jula 2006. koji,no{en euforijom, govori o tome da Bosna i Hercegovina sada raspolaè neophodnim zakonskimokvirom i potrebnim institucijama.

57Vidi o tome 30. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 15. jula 2006., S.7, u kojem se ni na koji na~in ne postavlja pitanje ustavnosti ovih mjera.

58International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 180 od 15. februara 2007., S. 7.


li }e dràvne institucije, koje su u po~etku formirane uz velik anga`manme|unarodne zajednice, ostati kada me|unarodna zajednica smanji svojanga`man, ili ~ak zemlju prepusti samu sebi. Dosada{nji me|unarodnianga`man ih odràva funkcionalnim. Paralelno uz to, dràvna se vladadosad brinula o tome da se pla}aju sudski i nesudski kadrovi. Dodu{e, ho}eli to ostati tako i poslije 2009. godine, stoji pod upitnikom.

Kona~no, odgovor na pitanje o stabilnosti zapo~etih reformi, ali i trajnojstabilnosti zemlje i sposobnosti djelovanja njenih organa, svodi se na pita-nje Ustava. Trajan uspjeh reformi na polju krivi~nog prava je, osim toga,nerazdvojiv od reforme policije,59 koja se, pak, moè posmatrati samo saspekta pitanja ustava. Prevencija i represija kriminala dvije su strane istemedalje koja se zove „unutra{nja sigurnosna politika”. Ako jedna stranamedalje ostane nedovr{ena, cijela medalja je bezvrijedna.

Reforma Ustava iz Daytona – nakon {to su se prvih godina pitanja u vezis njegovim izmjenama grani~ila s dogmom tabu teme60 – 26. aprila 2006.godine je propala u dràvnom parlamentu.61 Neka razloge za ovo navedupolitolozi, koji su za to pozvaniji od mene. No, meni se ~ini, ipak ima ne{topozitivno: u su{tini, postoji jedinstven stav da je Ustav iz Daytona ispuniosvoju funkciju uspostavljanja mira i da se, ina~e – s dràvnim strukturamakoje je odredio, njihovom tromo{}u, neu~inkovito{}u kod dono{enja odlu-ka, a jo{ vi{e u njihovoj provedbi i tro{kovima u vezi s tim, te s ostalimekonomskim manjkavostima – vi{e ne pokazuje kao ne{to {to otvaramogu}nost budu}em razvoju. Ovdje se ne mora raspravljati o pojedinosti-ma dosada{njeg nacrta ustava. No, ako je reformski cilj koji je jo{ ostao daljeja~anje pravne dràve, pa`nja se mora posvetiti sljede}oj okolnosti – da nacrtgotovo ne uzima u obzir ~uvanje i njegovanje prava i da mu jedva pokla-nja pa`nju. Zakonodavna vlast, me|utim, nije ni{ta marginalno, ~ije spomi-njanje bi previ{e opteretilo jedan ustav. Posmatra~u nije jasno da li se pripodjeli Bosne i Hercegovine u ~etiri u velikoj mjeri samostalna pravnapodru~ja u najva`nijim oblastima parni~nog, trgovinskog, krivi~nog prava izakona o preduze}ima, treba ostati, i da li }e novi ustav dràvi omogu}iti

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59Vidi uz to 24. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 13. oktobra 2003., S.10 f. o zadacima Evropske policijske misije i o~ekivanjima u vezi s njom. Osim toga, 26. Izvje{tajVisokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 18. novembra 2004., S. 3, 13 f.; vidi uz to i 30.Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 15. jula 2006., S. 9 f.

60 International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 180 od 15. februara 2007., S. 9 f.61Vidi uz to i 30. Izvje{taj Visokog predstavnika za Generalnog sekretara UN od 15. jula 2006., S.

2, 4, 6 f.


mije{anje u dosada{nje pravosudne strukture. Sa ~etiri pravna podru~ja nemogu se uspostaviti pravno jedinstvo i pravna jednakost. Obezbje|ivanjepravnog jedinstva i jednakosti zahtijeva hijerarhijski poredak sistema pravo-su|a, na ~ijem je vrhu Vrhovni sud, koji je simbol jedinstvene primjene pravai razvoja prava. Bosna i Hercegovina ustavnopravno djeluje poput gradili{ta.Me|unarodna zajednica ovo gradili{te ne moè tek tako napustiti, osim akose ne preuzmu rizici za unutra{nje jedinstvo zemlje, kao i rizici za regional-nu stabilnost, pri ~emu su ove dvije stvari me|usobno povezane. Jo{ jemanja mogu}nost da se proglasi pobjeda i da se zemlja onda tiho prepustisvojoj sudbini. Sumnje u to da }e se ono {to je postignuto odràti, da }e senastaviti ono {to je zapo~eto i da }e formirane institucije nastavitifunkcionisati, i dalje su prevelike.62

Vije}e za implementaciju mira je 26. i 27. februara 2007. godine razma-tralo nastavak puta Bosne i Hercegovine i pra}enje zemlje od straneme|unarodne zajednice, osobito od strane Visokog predstavnika. ZatvaranjeUreda visokog predstavnika 30. juna 2007. godine, s obzirom na otvorenareformska pitanja, vi{e nije predmet aktuelnih razmatranja. Ovaj }e se ciljpoku{ati ispuniti 30. juna 2008. godine, ali nije donesena definitivna odlu-ka. Naprotiv, Vije}e za implementaciju mira zadràlo je pravo provjere ovogpostavljenog cilja u oktobru 2007. godine i u februaru 2008. godine. Sobzirom na jo{ otvorenu politi~ku agendu, koju samo Vije}e opisuje u svomkominikeu, ~ini se da je opcija zatvaranja Ureda visokog predstavnika 30.juna 2008. godine optimisti~na. U kominikeu se izri~ito nagla{avaju dvava`na teì{ta zadataka: s jedne strane ustavna reforma (kao prvi korakBosne i Hercegovine ka dràvi koja }e funkcionisati u skladu s evropskimstandardima na putu pribliàvanja Evropskoj uniji), s druge strane reformapolicije (kao evropski zahtjev u okviru istog ovog procesa). Imaju}i u vidudoga|anja tokom najnovije historije u vezi s ove dvije zna~ajne reforme, ~aki ako bi one narednih mjeseci postale zakon, kriti~na ta~ka je njihovoprovo|enje. Ova stvarnost po{tivanja zakona, koja se jo{ treba uspostaviti –zbog same kompleksnosti materije koju treba regulisati – iziskivat }e vri-jeme, vjerovatno vi{e vremena nego {to ga je ostalo do 30. juna 2008.godine. Stoga bi pretijesni vremenski rokovi za ispunjenje ciljeva u vezi sUredom Visokog predstavnika mogli biti {tetni. Jo{ jedna godina je krajnjekratak period. Vije}e je, osim toga, Visokom predstavniku dalo zadatak dapodnese plan rada; on treba da sa`me zahtjeve koji nisu ostvareni nakon

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62International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 180 od 15. februara 2007., S. II.


ostvarenja dejtonskih kriterija i nakon konsolidacije reformi na dràvnomnivou koje su neophodne za stabilnost zemlje. Pored reforme ustava i poli-cije, ovaj plan rada }e u znatnoj mjeri uticati na dalje aktivnosti me|unaro-dne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini. Nadamo se da }e pri izradi ovog planarada, koji }e uticati na odluke, me|unarodna zajednica imati neophodnumjeru samokritike i da }e na svjetlo dana iznijeti i vlastite propuste. Kakokrhke mogu biti inicirane reforme ve} sada se vidi po reformi pravosu|a, au budu}nosti }e se vidjeti po ustavnoj reformi i reformi policije, koje jo{ nisuostvarene. Mo`da }e ovaj prilog pomo}i izo{travanju ovog kriti~kog pogle-da. To mu je u svakom slu~aju bio cilj. Odluke Vije}a za implementaciju miradonesene 26. i 27. februara 2007. godine pokazuju da jo{ postoje tamnemrlje. I dalje je nejasan odnos kompetencija Visokog predstavnika iSpecijalnog predstavnika EU.63 Prema objavljenim odlukama, Visoki pred-stavnik je taj koji }e narednih mjeseci odre|ivati intonaciju.

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63Süddeutsche Zeitung, No. 50 od 01. marta 2007. godine, S. 8.



3. REFLEKSIJA PRISUTNOSTI ME\UNARODNE ZAJEDNICE U

BOSANSKOHERCEGOVA^KOM DRU[TVU



UVODNO IZLAGANJE

Dino Abazovi}, Fakultet politi~kih nauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu

Zahvaljujem i srda~no pozdravljam sve u~esnike skupa. Ako govorimo ome|ubilansu, i kada je bosanskohercegova~ko dru{tvo u pitanju, biljeìmonajmanje dvije razli~ite i bitne faze razvoja u odnosima me|unarodne zajed-nice prema na{em dru{tvu: fazu do 2000. godine i ne{to poslije 2000. go-dine, a o tome }u ne{to kasnije konkretnije govoriti.

Dozvolite mi prethodno dvije-tri kratke refleksije na ono {to smo ve} ~uli.Prije svega, govorim kao sociolog i osvrnut }u se na ono {to je Visoki pred-stavnik govorio o svom posljednjem metodu rada u prethodnom periodu, ionom kada je rekao da eksperimenti{e s pitanjem Bonskih ovlasti. Kao so-ciologa, kada neko govori o eksperimentisanju uìvo u dru{tvenim okolno-stima, mene obuzme strah, jer s ljudima se naprosto ne eksperimenti{e.Stvari su suvi{e ozbiljne da bi se radio eksperiment in vivo. Da podsjetim,~ak su se neke vrlo zna~ajne stru~ne rasprave vodile nakon odre|enih eks-perimenata uìvo, naro~ito sa stanovi{ta psihologije i sociologije, po{to sepokazalo na {ta su ljudi spremni kada uzimaju druge ljude za pokusne ku-ni}e. Ne èlim zao{travati stav do te mjere da kaèm da je ta nesretna sin-tagma ”eksperiment in vivo” koju je izrekao Visoki predstavnik trebalo dazna~i da se oni poigravaju s nama, ali se bojim da veliki broj na{ih sunarod-njaka koji ìve u ovoj dràvi ponekad zaista doìvljavaju ulogu me|unaro-dne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini kao eksperiment. I to moète ~uti ujavnom diskursu, to moète ~uti kada razgovarate s ljudima, kao da se nekou odre|enim stvarima upravo poigrava s nama.

Re}i }u i jednu drugu dilemu, koja je bila prisutna dok sam pisao ovajprilog. Ja }u dijelom referirati na dostavljeni pisani prilog, uz napomenu danisu isklju~ivo sve stvari koje se de{avaju u dana{njem bosanskohercego-va~kom dru{tvu proizvod rada ili nerada me|unarodne zajednice. Kolokvi-jalno bismo rekli: ”I do nas je puno toga”. Ali ovo je prilika da govorim malovi{e o aspektu uloge me|unarodne zajednice.

Budu}i da smo imali njegovu ekselenciju ambasadora [munka kao uvod-ni~ara, posebno me zainteresirala jedna od njegovih sintagmi koja je izre~e-na na engleskom: ”Learning by doing”; odnosno, ambasador [munk kaèda je me|unarodna zajednica u odre|enim fazama ovdje u~ila rade}i. Znate,jedno je u~iti, a drugo je nau~iti, i meni se ~ini da su to one stvari koje se,kada je u pitanju me|unarodna zajednica, ne razumijevaju. Ako se kaè dase ne{to eventualno u~ilo, pitanje je da li se nau~ilo i kako se nau~ilo. Ja }u

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Refleksija prisutnosti me|unarodne zajednice u bosanskohercegova~kom dru{tvu


poku{ati dati sociolo{ko razumijevanje takvih stvari, tako da }u prethodnogovoriti o dràvi, jer mi je bitno da napravim distinkciju u odnosu na dru{-tvo, i po pitanju dràve sam mnogo, mnogo radikalniji u svojim stavovimanego po pitanju bosanskohercegova~kog dru{tva.

Jedna od relativno malog broja priznatih autorica izvana, Sumantra Bose,a koja je pisala o ovim na{im problemima, vrlo efektno kaè da je ova drà-va dràva me|unarodnog dizajna, koja egzistira na me|unarodnom dizajnu.Ovakva postdejtonska Bosna i Hercegovina (ovo post odnosi se samo na~injenicu da je Dejtonski sporazum ustanovio kao takvu dràvu), s ovimsvojim strukturama kakve jesu, zapravo je dràva me|unarodnog dizajna, ijednostavno ne vidim da bi se moglo diskutovati ikako druga~ije. Za nave-denu tvrdnju postoji vi{e nego obilje dokaza, ali tako|er ne smijemo zabo-raviti da je sve ovo vrijeme, od Dejtona pa nadalje, figurirala jedna jako bitnastvar kada je u pitanju refleksija na dru{tvo - sada prelazim na ovaj kontekstdru{tvenosti.

Postoji u me|unarodnoj zajednici (u tekstovima, u analizama) elementkoji se zove 'lokalna saglasnost'. Lokalna saglasnost za ulazak me|unarodnezajednice da radi ovdje to {to ve} radi... I to je taj Dejtonski sporazum.Lokalna saglasnost zapravo dijeli onu tanku liniju poluprotektorata od pro-tektorata. U tom kontekstu, zapravo, niko ne moè tvrditi da je Bosna pro-tektorat, u me|unarodno-pravnom smislu poput, recimo, Isto~nog Timoraili Kosova, sada ovakvih kakvi jesu. Bosna i Hercegovina se razlikuje po ele-mentu lokalne saglasnosti, a tako|er je bitno da su unutar te lokalne saglas-nosti u~estvovale i dvije susjedne dràve. îni mi se da se po~esto zaboravikoliki je zapravo uticaj Srbije i Hrvatske i danas na Bosnu i Hercegovinu.Bitno je i pitanje kako se razli~ite dru{tvene manifestacije i de{avanja u timdràvama prelijevaju preko granice, odmah, u Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Dakle,imate istozna~nu reakciju na de{avanja u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj, u dru{tvenomsmislu, i na Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Naravno, kada to politi~ari uviju u oblan-de odre|ene politi~ke zainteresiranosti ili konkretnog politi~kog interesa, stvari postaju mnogo bitnije.

Ali, evo {ta su op}e odrednice Bosne i Hercegovine u smislu dejtonskogdizajna, odnosno dejtonske tvorevine. Nedavno smo u Bosni i Hercegovini,u javnosti, imali prisutne diskusije o onome {to je postala kao neka vrstamantre - ja se moram izviniti {to koristim taj izraz uop}e jer nam je javni dis-kurs bio pretrpan tim pitanjima - dakle, radi se o diskusijama o konsocijaci-ji, tj. konsocijativnoj demokratiji. Bosna i Hercegovina je de facto konsocija-cija. Dakle, svako ko vas pita, odnosno ako pro~itate u novinama da li jekonsocijativni model rje{enje, taj ili ne zna {ta vam govori, ili vam govori

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stvari tako da ih pogre{no razumijete. Ne radi se o primjeni ne~eg novog;model konsocijacije je ve} primijenjen.

Kada govorimo o konsocijaciji, treba ista}i da se radi o prijelaznim mode-lima ure|enja dràve. Vrlo kratko }u objasniti tu pojavu i u teoriji. Ona jed-nostavno podrazumijeva neke osnovne principe – prvi je tzv. velika koali-cija, koja pretpostavlja i na{e Predsjedni{tvo, pa sve do strukture Doma naro-da, bikameralne zastupljenosti, etni~ke proporcionalnosti, izbor sudija, daklepo pitanju Bosne i Hercegovine navedeni primjeri odraàvaju princip velikekoalicije. Zna~i, imate predstavnike svih zainteresiranih strana koji treba dase dogovaraju oko odre|enih pitanja. Konsocijacija, potom, podrazumijevaprincip proporcionalnosti. Proporcionalnost, po meni, nije ni{ta drugo do sviovi sastavi, ono {to smo nekad zvali nacionalni klju~ - to se zapravo zoveproporcionalnost u konsocijativnom govoru. Pitanje tre}eg principa, princi-pa veta, nije ni{ta drugo nego nacionalni interes. Mi imamo ugra|en meha-nizam 'vitalnog nacionalnog interesa' - iako malo ko zna {ta on podrazumi-jeva, ali se zna da postoji. âk su mi kolege pravnici rekli da nema nigdjedefinicije 'vitalnog nacionalnog interesa', ali postoji, dakle, to vam je pravoveta. I, kona~no, element autonomije segmenata je struktura autonomijakroz institucije politike, kulturu, kantone, entitete, Distrikt Br~ko i tako dalje.Dakle, mi imamo konsocijaciju u Bosni i Hercegovini par exellence, i ona jetek jedan od mogu}ih modela.

A sada }u postaviti pitanje: {ta je u tom smislu po{lo krivo? I to je onasociolo{ka analiza koja }e dijelom zahvatiti ono {to usko odre|ujemo kaopoliti~ku sociologiju jer je to, ~ini mi se, sasvim legitimna disciplina za razu-mijevanje ovog problema.

Prvo, mislim da je vi{e nego jasno da na dràvnom nivou imamo pret-postavljenu situaciju power sharinga (podjele vlasti), no podjela vlasti nefunkcioni{e u institucijama zasnovanim na etni~kom principu, na principuproporcionalnosti. Za{to? Zato {to umjesto pozitivnog konsenzusa, za koji sepretpostavlja da }e se dobiti proporcionalno{}u, i power sharingom, mi uBiH zapravo imamo negativan konsenzus. U na{im zajednicama, u na{empoliti~kom sistemu odlu~ivanja, na snazi je sistematsko blokiranje odlukakoje bi omogu}ile da se krene u rekonstrukciju. Ja ne èlim naga|ati koblokira, u kojem momentu, koje odluke, ali problem je u negativnom kon-senzusu. Dakle, power sharing i proporcionalnost nisu doveli do toga da segradi pozitivan konsenzus, nego obratno.

U kontekstu autonomije segmenata, bar ondje gdje dolazimo do ovih{irokih kulturnih politika, bojim se da je, naprimjer, pitanje segregacije uobrazovanju ne{to {to nam tako|er pokazuje da takva vrsta insistiranja na

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autonomiji segmenata zapravo vodi upravo i samo segregaciji, podvojenos-ti, a ne integriranju i pribliàvanju razlika, da ne nabrajam neke stvari kojesmo ve} ranije ~uli. Naro~ito je bitno da se u polju ponovne izgradnje me-|usobnog povjerenja i pomirenja prakti~no nije do{lo dalje od perioda od-mah iza rata, i nemojte da ~udi retorika doma}ih politi~ara i nekih analiti~arakoji kaù da Bosna danas vi{e li~i na onu iz 1991. nego 2001. godine. Dakle,toliko o ovom institucionalnom dizajnu, ako ho}ete konsocijativnom, koji jeprakti~no dejtonska tvorevina i tvorevina onih koji su donosili odluke usamom Daytonu.

Naredni bitan element je element centralnih institucija, ja ih zovem insti-tucije 'vladara-koji-to-nije' i OHR-a, koji je prakti~no trebalo, shodno svimrelevantnim dokumentima i dejtonskom sporazumu, da u~initi da se odre-|ene stvari deblokiraju, odnosno, da proces krene naprijed. Neki su sklonitvrditi da su odre|eni intervencionizmi, pogotovo u kontekstu pravne regu-lative, bili ne{to veoma dobro za ovu dràvu. Ja se slaèm da je to u nekimoblastima bilo neophodno i naro~ito bitno da bi se krenulo dalje. Ali, sdruge strane, tako|er moèmo vidjeti da se postkonfliktna obnova i strate-gija ne mogu graditi mimo volje stanovni{tva, u smislu da pravni idealizamnu`no ne mora dovesti do tranzicije ka samoupravi. Osnovna je pretpostavka,i to nam je poznato, da me|unarodna zajednica nije ba{ mnogo sara|ivalasa doma}im ekspertima u oblasti reforme pravog sektora, pogotovo nenakon 2000. godine. Tu postoji ~itav niz analiza koje kaù da je do 2000.godine proces usagla{avanja zakonske regulative i{ao jako sporo; pa, opros-tite mi na ne{to malicioznosti, ali eto, do tog perioda su formalno figuriraliponekad i doma}i pravnici u pravljenju legislative. Od 2000. pa nadaljenema ~ak ni formalnog konsultovanja sa doma}im stru~njacima, nego senapi{e zakon koji treba da se izglasa. Takav pravni idealizam u kontekstuovakve zajednice, u kontekstu ovakvog dru{tva, ne pomaè samoupravi, nepomaè tranziciji ka local ownershipu ili kako nas ve} bombarduju svim tim'va`nim' rije~ima. Posebno mi se bitnim ~ini naglasiti da dejtonska logika inakon 1997. godine, od te klju~ne ta~ke uvo|enja Bonskih ovlasti, nastav-lja proizvoditi paradokse. Kako ih proizvodi? Zato {to i sami eksponenti me-|unarodne zajednice smatraju da je dejtonska struktura dovoljno fleksibilnada se s njom moè ~initi sva{ta. Ovo je sada ve} analiza izvanjskog faktora,a ne unutra{njeg. A {ta ta fleksibilnost podrazumijeva? Ona je zapravo pod-razumijevala 'isisavanje', taj izraz je malo nezgodan, ali 'isisavanje' doma}ihkapaciteta iz procesa dono{enja odluka. I doista, nakon 2000. godine ta~nomoète uvidjeti da se ~ak ni formalno ne traì saglasnost doma}ih aktera zabilo koju odluku me|unarodne zajednice. Doma}e organizacije jesu, dodu-

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{e, formalno slale zahtjeve Evropskoj uniji da umjesto IPTF-a do|e EUPM,evropska policija... Oni jesu formalno pozvali Evropsku uniju da po{aljesvoje vojnike u operaciju ALTEA, ali to je tek formalni zahtjev, zapravo suodluke donesene mnogo ranije, i prije formalnih zahtjeva, s obzirom da seznalo kako }e Brisel preuzeti ovlasti unutar PIK-a u smislu pribliàvanja BiHEvropskoj uniji. Dakako, niko nikoga u Bosni i Hercegovini nije pitao {ta otome misli. Stoga te pri~e oko ”manje Va{ingtona, vi{e Brisela” ne treba uvi-jek najnu`nije shvatati kao pozitivni razvoj stvari kad se radi o Bosni iHercegovini.

[ta dalje ̀ elim naglasiti u ovom kontekstu pri~e oko me|unarodne zajed-nice? Centralna institucija, Ured Visokog predstavnika, vra}am se na 1997. iBonske ovlasti, postaje jedna vrlo specifi~na institucija aktuelnog sistema vla-davine u Bosni i Hercegovini. Dakle, ona postaje umje{teni centar mo}i vla-davine u Bosni i Hercegovini, a do 1997. godine to nije bila ni pribli`no natakav na~in, i to je jedina institucija u Bosni i Hercegovini koja nije formal-no zasnovana na principu power sharinga. Kolega Ademovi} je govorio otome s pravnog aspekta. Me|unarodni predstavnik u smislu institucije zaistane dijeli mo} u Bosni i Hercegovini ni sa kim. Ne moète ga pozvati naodgovornost, a formalno-pravno je dio strukture mo}i i vlasti u Bosni iHercegovini, ponavljam naro~ito od dobivanja Bonskih ovlasti. I to je onajelement koji je od tada pa nadalje u Bosni i Hercegovini otvorio dva vrlonezgodna procesa. Jedan je proces o kojem smo ve} ~uli: pitanje odgovor-nosti, a drugi je pitanje transparentnosti. I u jednom i u drugom slu~aju seradilo veoma lo{e.

No, samo jedna kratka digresija vezana za prethodni kontekst, o tome {tasu doma}i akteri, izuzev politi~ara i politi~kih stranaka, mogli eventualnoo~ekivati. Me|unarodna zajednica je prakti~no gradila strategije mijenjanjastanja u dràvi i dru{tvu preko civilnog dru{tva. Ja znam da }e profesoricaLer govoriti vi{e od mene o tome, a i sam sam pisao o tom problemu, alitek da spomenem: poraàvaju}e je da se me|unarodna zajednica, kad jecivilno dru{tvo u pitanju, samo i isklju~ivo oslonila na nevladin sektor, samona nevladine organizacije kao takve. I gledajte sada paradoksa: od nevla-dinih organizacija kao nepoliti~kih aktera se traì da djeluju politi~ki na iz-mjeni situacije! Naravno da se nevladine organizacije bave i politikom, alitraìti od njih politi~ko djelovanje poput politi~kih stranaka, to je doista ap-surd. Da ne spominjem kakve su pritom bile strategije pomo}i zasnovanena donor driven strategijama, i tako dalje.

Tako|er, èlim dodatno naglasiti bitno pitanje koje se ti~e odnosa premapoliti~koj situaciji u Bosni i Hercegovini. Spomenuti su izbori, spomenuti su

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zakoni i tako dalje u tom smislu. Pazite, Dejtonski sporazum je zahtijevao dase ne kasnije od devet mjeseci nakon potpisivanja Sporazuma proveduizbori u Bosni i Hercegovini. To se i desilo. Molim vas, kome je moglo pastina pamet da u situaciji razbijenog dru{tva, potpuno podijeljene zajednicekao rezultata rata, govorim uop}e i o dru{tvu, sa medijima koji su ispod bilokakvog nivoa profesionalizma u materijalnom i svakom drugom smislu, sacivilnim dru{tvom koje ne moè da ostvari svoje osnovne funkcije i takodalje, dakle, kome je moglo pasti na pamet da }e bilo ko drugi pobijediti naizborima osim onih koji su u ratu vodili politike? Ali, to mo`da i nije najve}iproblem – problem je {to su oni dobili izbore na demokratski na~in! TimeDejton zvani~no legitimira etnokratiju, koja }e se pretvoriti u partitokratiju,a tada vi{e niko nema pravo, nema mogu}nost argumenta da kaè: ”Pa~ekajte, mo`da bi ljudi glasali za nekog drugog”. [ta ovo zna~i? Ti ljudi kojisu 1996. godine glasali nisu imali mogu}nost da izaberu ikoga drugog izuzevonih koje su izabrali – dakle nacionalne stranke. I to je paradoks demokrati-je: ako izbori do|u prerano, mogu biti dio problema a ne dio rje{enja. Tose desilo u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Pored toga, pitanje gra|enja demokratije nedemokratskim sredstvima jeono {to primje}ujem kao specifi~an aspekt na{e realnosti, tako da se me|u-narodna zajednica doista nije nimalo potrudila da objasni i javno artikuli{esvoje odluke. Javnost, htjeli oni to priznati ili ne, ima pravo da zna za{to sedonose odre|ene odluke. U tom smislu, zatvoreni sastanci s nominalnimoffice holdersima, onima koji sjede u izabranoj vlasti, nisu dovoljni za javnuartikulaciju demokratskih politika. Javnost ima pravo da zna. Transparent-nost je apsolutno izostala kada je u pitanju mehanizam dono{enja odlukaunutar me|unarodne zajednice. Zapravo, mi ne znamo ni{ta o tome ko, ka-da i kako donosi odluke koje se ti~u nas samih. O tome se zapravo zna jakomalo; me|utim, to {alje odre|enu poruku dru{tvu kao takvom, koje trebada se o~ituje i o tim pitanjima.

Ako mi iz BiH to i kaèmo pa nas ne slu{aju, to nekako i mogu da razu-mijem. Ali, ako se ve} 1996. godine - sada }u se dijelom osvrnuti na radMe|unarodne krizne grupe sa sjedi{tem u Briselu (ICG) - ako ICG 1996.godine kaù sljede}u stvar: ”U~iti demokratiji i toleranciji, dobroj vladavini -nema boljeg na~ina nego po~eti s primjerom.” - dakle, ako je to tada primi-je}eno, a danas je 2007. godina, mislim da donosioci odluka u me|unarod-noj zajednici, ako ni{ta drugo, treba da ponude neke odgovore. Odgovori ido dan danas nisu do{li, a nekad vas znaju proglasiti za arogantnog akouop}e postavljate takva i sli~na pitanja.

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Kona~no, idu}i dalje kroz ovu cijelu strukturu, ostat }u na jo{ dva bitnapitanja za dru{tvo. Jedno je pitanje takozvanog hard sektora i soft sektorarazvijanja politika u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ponovo dejtonski paradoks; tako-zvani problemi hard sektora ili hard politika rje{avali su se veoma brzo: kose uop}e moè sjetiti koliko je malo vremena trebalo da vojske koje su rato-vale u Bosni i Hercegovini u roku od {est mjeseci po potpisivanju mirovnogsporazuma demilitariziraju i rastjeraju po kasarnama? To je onaj takozvanihard sektor, ta tvrda pitanja. A {ta je me|unarodna zajednica u smislupomo}i uradila u takozvanom soft sektoru, koji nisu smatrali tako bitnim:{kolstvo, zdravstvo, pitanja socijalne pomo}i itd.? Ukoliko izuzmemo donaci-je nevladinim organizacijama - apsolutno ni{ta. Sa stanovi{ta dru{tva, sma-tram da su segregirano {kolstvo u Bosni i Hercegovini, te famozni eufemiz-mi tipa ”dvije {kole pod jednim krovom” i drugo, zapravo mnogo, mnogoozbiljnije pitanje od nekih drugih pitanja, recimo od vanjske politike Bosnei Hercegovine. Da se razumijemo: me|unarodna zajednica, iz meni nejasnihrazloga, ni{ta nije uradila u podru~ju soft sektora i zato, izme|u ostalog,danas nove generacije odrastaju u Bosni i Hercegovini zapravo na rezultati-ma etnopolitike i etnokratije.

I kona~no, pitanje ustavnih reformi u Bosni i Hercegovini. Prvo, nije mijasno kako oni koji su doveli do zaklju~ivanja Me|unarodnog sporazuma uDejtonu smatraju da je mogu}e taj sporazum mijenjati bez njihovog u~e{}a?Za{to misle da ga je mogu}e promijeniti tek tako, jednostavno, samo da sedoma}i akteri dogovore? Naravno da je nemogu}e! Pogotovo {to je frazakoja se ~esto ~uje u Bosni i Hercegovini, ~ini mi se, i dalje ilustrativna: Onikoji su 1995. bili najve}i protivnici Dejtonskog sporazuma danas su njegovinajgovorljiviji zagovornici. Pa valjda to nekome ne{to treba da zna~i, tonekome ne{to treba da kaè, gdje i kako su stvari krenule pogre{no. Ali eto,ostaje Ustav kao ustav, i ostaje jedno klju~no i bitno pitanje: javni interes zapitanje Ustava. Mi znamo kako su prethodne ustavne debate i{le i kako se{ta de{avalo, ko je o tome odlu~ivao i kako je odlu~ivao. Kao dràvljaninove zemlje, namjerno izbjegavam ove politi~ki 'opasne' koncepte. Ali, kaodràvljanin koji ima paso{ ove zemlje, imam problem: ko, kako, kada i s kimodlu~uje o ustavu i moje dràve, tim prije ako predano radim i gradim svojui budu}nost svoje porodice ovdje? Gdje je u tim procesima artikulacija javnihpolitika? Gdje je artikulacija javnog interesa? Gdje su pripadnici kakvog--takvog reduciranog nevladinog sektora? Na kraju krajeva, bilo je ovakvihkonferencija jo{, ali kome mi to sve pri~amo? Nije dovoljno pri~ati, bitno jeda neko i slu{a. U tom smislu, ~ini mi se da ta i{~a{enost, taj nedostatakustavnog patriotizma, taj pravni idealizam ne}e puno pomo}i zajednici,

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naro~ito zbog pitanja da u ovoj dràvi ne postoji saglasnost o pro{losti,sada{njosti i budu}nosti. Vi moète nametnuti zakon kakav god ho}ete, alipitanje konsenzusa i o pro{losti i o sada{njosti i o budu}nosti je ne{to {to~eka na nas da se s tim suo~imo. Me|unarodna zajednica, ko god to bio,naprosto mora artikulisati javni forum da se o tim pitanjima javno progo-vori. A re}i }u vam {ta sam ja, prate}i literaturu, uspio primijetiti. Najmanjeje me|unarodna zajednica bila uklju~ena u projekte koji su odre|eniznakom suo~avanja s pro{lo{}u. Imate strane vlade koje podràvaju projek-te suo~avanja s pro{lo{}u, ali institucije me|unarodne zajednice, eksponen-ti me|unarodne politike u Bosni i Hercegovini uglavnom bjeè, kako na{narod kaè, ”kao |avo od krsta” kad se govori o suo~avanju s pro{lo{}u.Tamo nemate predstavnike ni OHR-a, ni OSCE-a. Mislim da je to jedno odklju~nih pitanja kako bi briselska faza u koju idemo bila izvjesna. Ina~e, jane znam na ~emu se zasniva pri~a o nekom konsenzusu da u na{oj dràvi,oko ~ega se navodno slaù svi, jeste jedina njena evropsku perspektiva. Pomeni, u pitanju je ne{to {to o~igledno ne stoji. Ili mi ba{ nismo za Evropskuuniju, ili neko ne govori istinu. Samo pri~a o tome kako su i Srbi, i Hrvati iBo{njaci - prepoznajte ~iji su to termini - zajedno i ujedinjeni na putu kaEvropskoj uniji, meni ne govori puno. Znate za{to? Zato {to }emo mi bitiEvropska unija tek onog momenta kad taj moto Evropske unije, zvani~nimoto Evropske unije – ”Ujedinjeni u razlikama”- postane zapravo stvarnodoma}i moto.

KOMENTAR

Nada Ler Sofroni}, izvr{na direktorica Centra „@ena i dru{tvo”, Sarajevo

Po{to se ovdje svi manje-vi{e sapli}emo o pojam {ta je to zapravo'me|unarodna zajednica', ja ne vidim drugi na~in za izbjegavanje nesporazu-ma nego da svako za sebe defini{e {ta pod tim konkretno podrazumijeva.Ja, dakle, pod ulogom 'me|unarodne zajednice' ovog puta podrazumijevamme|unarodnu podr{ku promociji demokratizacije postsocijalisti~kog, pos-tratnog tranzicijskog dru{tva Bosne i Hercegovine, koja je izme|u ostalogbazirana i na sasvim odre|enoj politi~koj teoriji.

U svom kratkom, i stoga nu`no redukovanom i simplifikovanom komen-taru poku{a}u da analiziram dijalektiku odnosa izme|u 'me|unarodnog fak-tora' i onoga {to nazivamo civilnim dru{tvom u Bosni i Hercegovini.

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To zna~i da se odmah ogra|ujem od lamentiranja nad tim {ta nam je 'me-|unarodna zajednica' uradila, {ta nam nije uradila, {ta nam je trebala uradi-ti, a {ta mi kao '`rtve' ili 'eksperimentalni kuni}i' u cijeloj ovoj stvari trpimo.

Danas se u politolo{koj literaturi ve} otvoreno govori o 'razo~aravaju}imuvidima' (Charoters, 2000)1 - da ve}ina postsocijalisti~kih dru{tava (a to seodnosi i na Bosnu i Hercegovinu) nije nakon vi{estrana~kih izbora i pro-mjene reìma umar{irala u demokratiju, ve} su se mnoga od njih na{la upoliti~koj sivoj zoni pseudodemokratije, 'fasadne' ili 'formalne' demokratije.Politi~ka i teorijska euforija do koje je do{lo nakon pada Berlinskog zidabrzo je splasnula i zamijenjena je skepsom pred neizvjesno{}u i, kako kaèVuka{in Pavlovi}: „...zapadna politi~ka teorija koja se tradicionalno bavilasocijalizmom... kao da se jo{ jednom nasukala na novu i nepoznatu obalu”.2

Iako prevladavaju}e shvatanje demokratizacije tranzicijskih dru{tava stavljaekonomske, politi~ke i institucionalne, dakle dràvne atribute demokratiza-cije na prvo mjesto, me|unarodna zajednica je od samog po~etka djelova-nja u Bosni i Hercegovini deklarisala svoju sklonost prema akterima civilnogdru{tva kao bitnim promotorima demokratije (zasad }emo ostaviti po stranida su se pod tim naj~e{}e, ne sasvim ispravno, podrazumijevale uglavnomnevladine organizacije).

[tavi{e, ~ini se da su zapadni promotori demokratije u postsocijalisti~kimzemljama ra~unali da }e civilno dru{tvo biti njihova glavna socio-kulturnaupori{na snaga, jer su ~esto bili u uvjerenju ili da se zami{ljeno civilnodru{tvo u prethodnom sistemu nalazilo u 'ilegali', u nekoj vrsti disidentskihoaza undergrounda, ìve}i svoj skriveni paralelni ìvot, ili su se nadali da}e materijalnom pomo}i osnaìti nevladin sektor kako bi ga osposobili dabude {to mo}niji faktor demokratizacije.

Umjesto toga, na sceni se ukazala jedna veoma slaba{na verzija civilnogdru{tva. Naravno, uzroci slabosti civilnog dru{tva kod nas su vi{estruki, alija bih ukazala na onaj koji se meni ~ini najzna~ajniji u sociolo{kom smislu.Mislim da je manjak civilnog dru{tva jedan od neposrednih rezultata margi-nalizacije, ili ~ak i{~ezavanja njegove glavne socijalne baze koju predstavlja-ju progresivni urbani i gra|anski srednji intelektualni slojevi.

Retradicionalizacija, repatrijarhalizacija i revitalizacija tribalnih i etni~kihsocijalnih veza gotovo su sasvim zbrisale ove socijalne slojeve s bosansko-

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1 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, Carnegie Endoewment for international Peace,Washington, 2000.

2 Vuka{in Pavlovi}, Civilno dru{tvo i demokratija, Politeia, Beograd, 2004.


hercegova~ke dru{tvene i javne scene, a invazivna dominacija etnonacional-nih politika i retrogradnog konzervativizma sve suverenije zauzima na{ sva-kodnevni javni i privatni ìvot.

U nedostatku stvarnog civilnog dru{tva, me|unarodne politike pomo}idemokratizaciji i nevladinim organizacijama u zemljama u tranziciji ve} su sesrele s problemom podr{ke ”virtuelnom civilnom dru{tvu”, neselektivnompomo}i nevladinim organizacijama koje realno ne promovi{u ni autenti~niposebni interes socijalnih grupa niti op{ti javni interes.

U postsocijalisti~kim dru{tvima, nastalim na razvalinama na{e biv{e zajed-ni~ke dràve, vrlo je te{ko oìvjeti samoregulativnu funkciju civilnog dru{tvakoje bi se u socio-kulturnom smislu imalo na {ta osloniti. Samoregulativnufunkciju civilnog dru{tva mogu}e je uspostaviti samo uz velike strukturnereforme i samo uz neophodnu internacionalnu potporu.

Direktan i indirektan pozitivni uticaj me|unarodnog faktora na izgradnjucivilnog dru{tva, koji ono, po mom dubokom uvjerenju, ne koristi ni izdale-ka onoliko koliko bi trebalo, manifestuje se, izme|u ostalog, u sljede}em:

* me|unarodnom priznanju legitimiteta civilnog sektora;* promovisanju institucionalnih kanala i zakona koji zahtjeve civilnog sek-

tora ~ine legalnim i legitimnim (ènska ljudska prava, pravo na pristupinformacijama, sloboda izraàvanja, zabrana diskriminacije i govora mr`-nje, autonomija univerziteta, sloboda sindikalnog organizovanja i zabranasankcija za sindikalni aktivizam, me|unarodno priznata i ustavima BiHzagarantovana prava na ìvot bez nasilja i ugroàvanja okoli{a, itd.);

* afirmaciji kori{tenja mehanizama i akcija javnog zalaganja za dru{tvenepromjene koje su od posebnog i od op{teg javnog interesa;

* promociji mogu}nosti stvaranja koalicija i alternativnog organizovanja;* promociji nezavisnog monitoringa i pozivanju zakonodavne i izvr{ne

vlasti na odgovornost;* podr{ci animiranja javnosti i kori{tenju slobodnih medija za formiranje

demokratske javnosti;* afirmaciji globalnog i internacionalnog zalaganja civilnog dru{tva za

pozitivne dru{tvene promjene, posebno onih u oblasti ljudskih prava.

Na potezu je, dakle, civilno dru{tvo!

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\or|e êkrlija, Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Banjoj Luci

Po{tovane dame i gospodo, drago mi je {to vas mogu pozdraviti i pris-ustvovati konferenciji, ali isto tako moram re}i da mi je, kao psihologu, ào{to je ovo na{a realnost i {to tako mnogo energije moramo tro{iti na ovakveteme. Ono ~ime se ja uglavnom bavim u posljednjih nekoliko godina skolegama na Filozofskom fakultetu u Banjoj Luci na Odsjeku za psihologi-ju su razli~ite vrste grupnih identiteta, i to smo identifikovali kao vrlo bitnou odre|enju pona{anja, zna~i u dru{tvenom kontekstu, kao ne{to {to jefakti~ki nemogu}e presko~iti. Ovo je jedna od prilika da te identitetepogledamo s drugog aspekta, odnosno kao neku vrstu rezultante koja nas-taje ne samo djelovanjem faktora koji su prisutni na ovom podru~ju, a kojesami proizvodimo, nego i koji su u odre|enoj mjeri rezultat djelovanjarazli~itih uticaja koji dolaze van okvira na{e zemlje.

Ovdje je nekoliko puta pomenuto pitanje {ta je me|unarodna zajednica,i postoji vi{e mogu}nosti da se me|unarodna zajednica defini{e ili stavi uneki kontekst. Ukoliko ovo pitanje izaziva ovakve dileme ili nejasno}e u triposto u~enih glava u Bosni i Hercegovini, sa zavr{enim fakultetom, onda jeprili~no jasna situacija kakve nedoumice se javljaju u glavama obi~nog ̀ ivlja,odnosno onih koji nisu imali priliku ili nisu stekli fakultetsko obrazovanje.

[to se ti~e identiteta, kroz razli~ite empirijske studije smo ustanovili pos-tojanje tri osnovne vrste identiteta koje se isprepli}u, odnosno koje suprisutne kod pojedinaca. To su identiteti koji se mogu vezati za etni~ku pri-padnost, pa za dràvnu pripadnost, a i tre}i koji je ispitivan - to je evropskiidentitet. Zna~i, to su identiteti koji su bazirani na etni~koj pripadnosti,odnosno na odre|enoj vrsti geografske lokacije. [to se toga ti~e, u prvomredu moram ista}i da je, vjerovatno, jedna od najteìh stvari ta {to grupniidentiteti na na{em podru~ju uglavnom dominiraju nad individualnim iden-titetima, odnosno, vrlo ~esto etni~ka pripadnost dominira nad profesional-nom, da ne kaèm i nad polnom ili bilo kojom drugom orijentacijom kojuosoba sebi nastoji da postavi ili u kojoj nastoji da se afirmi{e. Naravno darazlog leì u de{avanjima u zemlji u kojoj ìvimo, a {to se ti~e uticaja koji midobivamo, zna~i onaj dio koji nismo sami proizveli, on se moè svesti nanekoliko razina. U prvom redu zna~i nepoznavanje ideje, odnosno samogkoncepta ili vrste me|unarodne zajednice; javlja se kao neka vrsta reakcije,najprimitivniji mehanizam odbrane, okupljanja u neku primalnu, kakokolegica maloprije re~e ‘tribalnu’ skupinu na nivou etni~ke pripadnosti. Ipored svih de{avanja koja su doma}eg porijekla, odre|ene nejasno}e ili ne-razumijevanja inostranih uticaja tako|er dovode do toga da se krug u kome

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ìtelji na{e dràve nastoje da se na|u ili da se osje}aju sigurnije sve vi{e su-àva. Samim tim, na neki na~in, obi~an gra|anin ove dràve sebi sije~e mo-gu}nost nekih {irih vidika i ostvarenja kontakata koji }e prevazi}i graniceove dràve. Ono {to je u vezi s tim tu`no je da se, kao psiholo{ki konstruk-ti, i stavovi ove nabrojane tri vrste identiteta me|usobno ne sukobljavaju.Mogu}e je da sva tri oblika ova tri identiteta budu prisutna kod iste osobe,zna~i da imaju razli~ite domene u kojima se ostvaruju i da je osoba fakti~kiispunjena na sva tri fronta tako da se oni me|usobno ne sukobljavaju. Ali,s jedne strane, to se, zna~i, de{ava prvo zbog nerazumijevanja same stvarno-sti u kojoj ìvimo i uticaja koji do nas dolaze, a zatim i zbog ~injenice damahom oni koji nas usmjeravaju ili oni koji nas vode poti~u iz istih strujakoje su i dovele do ovih nesretnih doga|anja. Zna~i, jednostavno dovodedo toga da ovaj prvi pomenuti - etni~ki identitet ostaje najintenzivniji.

Ukoliko se stvar jo{ razloì, moèmo svakog ~ovjeka posmatrati kaonekoga ko je vezan za svoju grupu, s jedne strane, a s druge strane je otvo-ren prema nekim drugim grupama. Upravo veliki broj ovih faktora dovodido toga da se mnogo vi{e pa`nje poklanja onome {to nazivamo svoje ilina{e, odnosno da dolazimo u poziciju da pravimo podjelu na ‘na{e’ i ‘njiho-vo’. Zna~i, samim tim svaki pojedinac dolazi u poziciju da pod ‘njihovim’ nesmatra samo pripadnike druga dva konstitutivna naroda koja ìve u Bosni iHercegovini fakti~ki, ve} pripadnika bilo kojeg drugog naroda za koji onkaè da nije pripadnik ‘njegovog’. Jo{ jednom bih ponovio da je ovakvavrsta okupljanja u neke grupe stvarno posljedica djelovanja najprimitivnijihmehanizama i traènja neke osnovne egzistencijalne za{tite, gdje }e jedno-stavno pripadnost jednoj grupi biti okvir u kojem }e se osoba kretati i gdje}e osje}ati izvjesnu sigurnost.

[to se ti~e tri vrste identiteta koje moèmo ustanoviti kod svakoga, na-ravno da je najizraèniji etni~ki identitet. Me|utim, mnogo je zanimljivija ~i-njenica da je evropski identitet gra|ana Bosne i Hercegovine, prema mjere-njima koja se vr{e, tri do ~etiri puta izraèniji nego dràvni identitet. Ova~injenica u prvom redu vaì za hrvatski i srpski ìvalj u Bosni i Hercegovini,odnosno, bo{nja~ki ìvalj - sude}i prema onome {to se dobija u empirijskimpotvrdama - jedini izjedna~ava etni~ki i dràvni identitet, dok druge dvijeskupine u potpunosti razlaù ovu komponentu, odnosno dràvni identitettraè van granica BiH. Ja bih jo{ jednom ponovio da sve studije, sva razma-tranja pokazuju da ove tri vrste identiteta nisu nu`no suprotstavljene i da sene moraju sukobljavati. Me|utim, i dalje ostaje ~injenica da se mnogo vi{epa`nje poklanja vlastitoj grupi. U okviru iskustava s mla|im skupinama, usrednjim {kolama ili na fakultetima gdje se moè dobiti neka korist, shvatili

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smo da treba raditi na nekim olak{icama koje }e omogu}iti na{im mladimkoji se {koluju da steknu ve}i broj iskustava koja ne dolaze iz ove zemlje,odnosno koja dolaze van njenih okvira. To, drugim rije~ima, zna~i da sefakti~ki me|unarodna zajednica, ~ak i najgrublje, iskoristi da bi se na{i mladipro{irili, u stvari da bi pogledali na koji na~in oni mogu imati koristi od ovesilne zbrke i od velike koli~ine me|unarodnih faktora koji su ovdje prisu-tni. Zna~i da iskoriste sve mogu}e potencijale, od njihovih stipendija do pri-lika da u~estvuju u razli~itim aktivnostima, a pri tome bi se, vjerovatno,doma}em politi~kom tkivu zadala zada}a da im u tome pomognu. Ono {tose nalazi u okviru otvorenosti prema drugima, u ovom slu~aju, moèmo re}ida predstavlja problem u prvom redu iz vlastitog straha. Ukoliko se po~nepretraìvati taj strah i njegova realna osnova, u prvom redu dolazimo dode{avanja koja su iza nas desetak-petnaest godina; njihov identitet je i daljeisti i onemogu}ava nas da se maknemo naprijed, a pripadnici me|unarodnezajednice nemaju pretjerano sluha za ove komponente koje se mogu sma-trati subjektivnim, odnosno koje se ne pokazuju u objektivnom svijetu kaoekonomija, politi~ko djelovanje ili tome sli~ni aspekti. To fakti~ki zna~i da jepotrebno mnogo vi{e angaòvanja da se upravo na ovaj dio koji se ti~ementalnog zdravlja i mogu}nosti ìtelja BiH prevazi|e i da se i pripadnicime|unarodne zajednice upoznaju s takvim stvarima. Jedna od njih je fakti-~ki stalno lobiranje i guranje, da kaèm, pod nos njima onoga {to ne spadai {to trebaju da rade, ali u svakom slu~aju je nu`na njihova saradnja.

Koja je indirektna najve}a dobit iz toga? To {to bi se izgradnjom dràv-nog, odnosno ja~anjem evropskog identiteta upravo razvijao i dràvni iden-titet. Zna~i, {irenjem pogleda na ve}i broj stvari Bosna i Hercegovina bivjerovatno i svim gra|anima bila neka blià vrsta realnosti, tako da bi ondadràvni identitet dobio svoju snagu i na{ao svoje mjesto i svoju zasnovanostu ovom trilingu identiteta o kojima sam pri~ao.

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DISKUSIJA

Tarik Haveri}, Evropski centar za liberalnu demokratiju (ECLD)

Iznijet }u dva razmi{ljanja potaknuta vrlo nadahnutim uvodnim izlaga-njem gospodina Abazovi}a. Ona }e mo`da biti nekoherentna, utoliko {to ihvadim iz teksta koji je prelomljen i pripremljen za {tampu, i ~ista je koinci-dencija {to sada imam da kaèm ne{to {to sam koliko prekju~er jo{ jednompro{ao.

Prvo razmi{ljanje ti~e se eksperimenta in vivo. Jasno je da moè povri-jediti ve} kad me|unarodna zajednica samo evocira to u~enje, 'obrazova-nje kroz rad', kako mi to kaèmo. Me|utim, u sociologiji postoje eksperi-menti in vivo, naravno, ne u tolikoj razmjeri, i preduzimaju ih akteri ilidru{tva, okvirna dru{tva koja su u stanju da ih kontroliraju i da se u svakomtrenutku - kada vide da eksperiment nije uspio - bez velike {tete povuku iprobaju ne{to drugo, tako da to ne izaziva slom socijalne strukture (politicaldecay, kako vole da kaù autori od kojih to preuzimam).

Me|utim, ono {to uvijek moèmo u~initi jest takozvani misaoni eksperi-ment. I ja sam se (upravo na stranicama koje su mi pred o~ima) u takaveksperiment upustio, a povezan je s drugim elementom o kojem ste vi go-vorili. Aktuelnost, naravno, ne moèmo izbje}i. Recimo da je mantra kojuste spominjali samo jedna od supsidijarnih tema ukupnih razgovora u trans-formaciji dràvno-pravnog prostora, a zovemo je nepopularnim (ili, za neke,popularnim) imenom konsocijacija.

Misaoni eksperiment sastoji se u sljede}em: ako konstatiramo da je kon-socijacija model u vezi s kojim nema saglasnosti dru{tvenih aktera, upitajmose da li postoji jedan model ili element u vezi s kojim takva saglasnost pos-toji. Naprimjer, ne vidim da bi se iko usprotivio bruto nacionalnom dohotkuper capita od 23.000 eura u Bosni i Hercegovini. Oko toga }e se uvijekposti}i saglasnost. Da li mislite (ovo je, naravno, retori~ko pitanje) da jedovoljno da se dru{tveni akteri (isti oni koji ne mogu da se usaglase o kon-socijaciji) usaglase u vezi s ovim ciljem, pa da Bosna sutra postane bogatodru{tvo? Onaj ko postavi takvu tezu vrlo brzo }e biti izvrgnut ruglu, zato {toi djeca znaju, a ne samo politi~ki teoreti~ari, da nije dovoljno usaglasiti se uvezi s nekim ciljem pa da se samim time on i ostvari.

Moje pitanje (koje ovoga puta nije retori~ko) glasi: za{to mislimo da jejednu takvu dubinsku politi~ku transformaciju mogu}e posti}i pukim dogo-vorom? I vjerovati da je nama tako lo{e samo zato {to dogovor izostaje?

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To me vodi do jo{ jedne teze potaknute izlaganjem kolege Abazovi}a:nikada nije ustanovljeno, nikad retori~ki konstatirano da, zapravo (i tu pre-uzimam tezu ameri~kog autora Immanuela Wallersteina), postoji svjetski sis-tem koji djeluje, kojeg mi moèmo a i ne moramo biti svjesni, ali koji se nanas odraàva. Ljudi koji su hodali po krovu padali su s krova a da nisu znaliza zakon gravitacije, koji je bio 'na snazi' i prije nego {to su ga Galilej iNewton formulirali. Postoje neke sile koje oblikuju ìvot dana{njih dru{tavaa nalaze se izvan tih dru{tava. Da li je Bosna i Hercegovina dio tog sistemakojeg moèmo a i ne moramo biti svjesni, sistema koji, u krajnjemu, presu-|uje o svim strukturama na{eg politi~kog i dru{tvenog ìvota, htjeli mi to iline? Drugim rije~ima, koliki postotak svega {to se doga|a ili svega {to }e sedogoditi ne zavisi od nas? 80%? 90%? Nije li prepotentno pona{ati se kao dasvi parametri na{e transformacije zavise samo od nas?

[ta ho}u da kaèm? U tom svjetskom sistemu, Wallersteinovom (koji jekapitalisti~ki sistem, naravno, uza sve korektive), zna se do posljednje pojedi-nosti kako se odnosi rad prema kapitalu, kako se osiguravaju vozila, kakoposluju banke i ko daje nare|enja policiji, kakav }e sistem zdravstveneza{tite na kraju prevladati, znaju se ekonomski, ekolo{ki, higijenski, tehni~kistandardi… Ho}e li iko povjerovati u mogu}nost da se ovda{nji akteri do-govore, na primjer, da se to sve na nas ne odnosi, i da se Bosna i Herce-govina iz toga izuzima? Odnosno, koji je procent onoga {to zavisi od nas, ionog drugog {to ne zavisi od nas, ali ~ega mo`da nismo svjesni? I tu je mojajedina ozbiljna primjedba na zaklju~ak kolege Abazovi}a, naime, da ne pos-toji saglasnost o pro{losti, sada{njosti i budu}nosti - za ovo tre}e ne bih sesloìo. U na{em dru{tvu, saglasnost o budu}nosti mo`da ne postoji, ali to nabudu}nost ne}e mnogo djelovati, jer ona nije stvar volje lokalnih aktera.Na{a budu}nost zavisi od historijskih sila koje su uspostavljene, globalnihpravaca i tokova, kretanja kapitala, modela raspodjele, modela ovladavanjaenergijama itd. Mi te trendove moèmo a ne moramo raspoznati ili voljeti,ali ih ne moèmo izbje}i, kao {to neoprezan hoda~ pada s krova, znao onili ne znao kako glasi zakon gravitacije.

Iznijet }u jo{ jednu poluopasku uz supsidijarnu tezu gospodina êkrlije,koji izjedna~ava pametne, umne ljude u Bosni i Hercegovini sa onih 3% kojisu zavr{ili fakultet. S tim se ne slaèm: ljudi koji su zavr{ili fakultet nisunu`no umni i pametni.

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Zdravko Grebo

Na kraju, ova ogromna koli~ina rezignacije koja je ovdje demonstriranas moje strane, vjerovatno i pretjerana, trebala bi rezultirati naporom da sepoluprazna ~a{a u~ini polupunom, i ~iju bi formu na{i dragi i nedragi privre-meni sustanari mogli ispuniti nekim sadràjem i posti}i cilj. Prvo pitanje kojevalja postaviti velikim igra~ima, ~iji smo mi taoci, a na{i ìvoti u njihovimrukama, glasi brutalno: da li je Bosna i Hercegovina odrìv projekt? tj. jed-nostavno: treba li da postoji ili ne? Mo`da i ne treba, ne bih znao! Moj pred-loàk za ovako glupo pitanje jeste: ako odgovori glase da su se nakon ras-pada Jugoslavije sve dràve sljednice formirale kao nation state, a budu}i daBiH to nije u stanju u~initi, ne treba ni da postoji. Ako bismo uloìli nat-~ovje~ansku energiju i uposlili svoje najbolje talente, ne moèmo biti nacio-nalna dràva ili nacija koja ima svoju dràvu. Dakle, da li smo u 'njihovim'planovima, ako smo uop}e u ne~ijim planovima, izvodljiv projekt? Ili ni podkakvim uslovima nismo? Jednostavno, da se ne mu~imo i da beskrajno neproduàvamo rat drugim sredstvima, jasno i glasno: Vi niste mogu}i!

A sada skromni komentar na izlaganje kolega Haveri}a i Abazovi}a, kojasu se odnosila na konsocijacijsku debatu. Ta pri~a stoji i ima osnova. Ali, jabih sasvim druga~ije ~itao ono {to je kolega Abazovi} htio da kaè. êmupri~a o konsocijaciji na kub? Po{tenije bi bilo razgovarati da i novopro-bu|eni interes za tu temu potajno zna~i zagovaranje i dovr{avanje procesapodjele BiH i u kona~nici njen nestanak. I onda, ponovljeno pitanje o smi-slu Bosne i Hercegovine: da li ona uop}e ima supstancu? Mo`da je jo{ uvi-jek dru{tvo, ali nije odrìva dràva, ili ni jedno ni drugo. Nakon toga, logi~nokaè{: Hajde da se rastajemo, kao u scenariju neuspje{nog braka. Za{tokonsocijacija kao {ifra? Ako ne postoji teorija zavjere, onda je i to model kojivalja po{teno ispitati. Uostalom, u svim elementima teorije ve} je imamo nadjelu. âk i u onom 'nenarodnom' narodnom reìmu, uz malo ironije, imalismo djejstvuju}u formulu: drugovi Hamdija, Branko i Milanko. âk su i ko-munisti imali tu vrstu senzibiliteta o potrebi da u okviru jednomisle}e ideo-logije valja respektovati razlike i dati im mogu}nost politi~ke reprezentacije.Ali, ako ta toboè teorijska debata, koju simbolizuje zahtjev za 'tre}im' entite-tom a koju zdu{no podràvaju stranke sa hrvatskim predznakom i energi~nopodupire g. Dodik, onda treba razgovarati u jasno formulisanim terminima:to zna~i kraj Bosne i Hercegovine.

êtvrti kratki komentar odnosi se na konstataciju da mi nismo tek post-konfliktno dru{tvo; mi smo poslijeratno dru{tvo i, uz izvinjenje za patetiku,postgenocidno dru{tvo. Ja sam nekada napisao da me ne interesuje toliko

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je li Republika Srpska genocidna tvorevina, ali znam da je BiH postgenoci-dna tvorevina, dakle, cijela zajednica koja nije rije{ila svoje traume i te{koda ih moè rije{iti.

Kako nastaviti ìvjeti zajedno i planirati zajedni~ku budu}nost akonismo u stanju dosegnuti momentum i izgovoriti jednostavnu re~enicu:Ja sam dràvljanin Bosne i Hercegovine. Sve ostalo, uklju~uju}i pred-stavljanje kolektivnih identiteta, dogovorljivo je, i institucionalno i pro-ceduralno provodljivo. Ja, dakle, nemam nikakvu sumnju o potrebi ras-pravljanja o identitetima, bili oni koncentri~ni ili preklapaju}i ili bili kak-vi... Ali me u toj pri~i ponovno intrigira uloga me|unarodne zajednice.Presko~it }u cijeli niz argumenata; zaklju~ak jeste da je cijeli ZapadniBalkan crna rupa. Ako je nekome istinski stalo do mira, saradnje, pro-speriteta, sprje~avanja trgovine drogom, ljudima, oru`jem, onda je jedi-ni na~in da se to postigne, zarad op}e dobiti, da se olak{aju i ubrzajuprocesi integrisanja u Evropsku uniju, ne mjere}i strogo da li smo svi mi'zapadni Balkanci' do kraja uradili doma}u zada}u.

Jasno je da u dogledno vrijeme, imaju}i u vidu visoke standarde, tone}emo biti u stanju da postignemo. Uzgred, ni mnoge, sada stalne ~laniceEU, nisu bile ni blizu postizanja uobi~ajenih standarda. Za{to je to va`no?Podsje}anja radi, cijela jugoisto~noevropska kataklizma je po~ela zato da bisvi Srbi ìvjeli u jednoj dràvi, da bi svi Hrvati, svi Albanci, svi Bo{njaci (i oniiz Sandàka) ìvjeli u jednoj dràvi. Budu}i da preovla|uju}i etnonaciona-lizam jo{ uvijek jeste in, svi oni }e ìvjeti ponovo i zauvijek u jednoj dràviako postanu punopravni ~lanovi evropske porodice. Pri tome, nije nu`nopostavljati bolno pitanje: za{to smo se morali krvavo rastajati da bismo sadao~ajni~ki èljeli da budemo zajedno? âk i pragmati~no, rje{enje za dodatneprobleme koji su danas spominjani: plja~ka, privatizacija, korupcija, negati-van resor o ljudskim pravima, vladavina prava, nezavisni mediji, neefikasnosudstvo i dràvna uprava... jedino su rje{ivi onda kada ste on board ili ste~lan kluba. Tada pravila bespogovorno vaè i nema prostora za tipi~nobalkanske politi~ke ekstravagancije i kaprice. Ako je ta~no da }ete na ovimprostorima te{ko prona}i politi~ara koji }e, bez obzira na iskrenost, re}i danije za ulazak u Evropu, molim vas da mu pomognete da izvr{i svojaobe}anja. Traìli ste, izvolite se pona{ati. Drugog izlaza nema.

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Tarik Haveri}

@ao mi je ako }e neke stvari ostati nedore~ene, ali nisam mislio da trebada se izja{njavam o stvarima koje su evidentne. To {to sam rekao da na{abudu}nost ne zavisi od toga ho}e li se neki akteri ovdje dogovoriti da li }eBosna biti konsocijacija ili ne, ne zna~i da gajim ikakve simpatije prema tomprijedlogu - iz prostog razloga {to on nije u duhu vremena, i {to je protivonih silnica na koje mi ne moèmo utjecati, a kojima smo izloèni. Me|utim,ta~no je, i to je kolega Abazovi} konstatirao, da je Bosna i Hercegovina defacto konsocijacija. Ako treba da budem |avolov advokat, ja }u re}i osuprotnoj strani, kojoj ne pripadam, da je mo`da ~ine ljudi koji su toga svjes-ni pa kaù: kad ve} postoji de facto, divlje, na|imo na~in da je legaliziramo,tako da to na ne{to li~i.

Ja to razumijem, iako se s time ne slaèm. Me|utim, ono {to je ovdjeklju~no — a i najkorisnije inicijative propadaju kada se dnevnopoliti~kerasprave uguraju u luda~ku ko{ulju ve} gotovih koncepata — jeste ko se ujavnosti predstavlja kao nosilac suprotnog koncepta i koga javnost kao tak-vog identificira.

Kao suprotnost konsocijaciji isti~e se gra|anska (~ak liberalno-demokrat-ska) dràva, ali kao njezini zagovornici ne raspoznaju se Zdravko Grebo iTarik Haveri}, koji su prije 18 godina traìli od Skup{tine da prizna Dekla-raciju ZAVNOBiH-a o pravima gra|ana Bosne i Hercegovine, ve} ljudi kojisu posljednjih 16-17 godina sve u~inili da do|e do situacije kakva sada jeste.Nisam nikakav ekstremist ako kaèm: ja tim ljudima ne vjerujem. I ne znamza{to bi im vjerovali dana{nji 'zagovornici konsocijacije'. Oni su pristajali uz'dogovor naroda' (dakle, fakti~ku konsocijaciju!) dok se sve nije podijelilo iprivatizovalo, a sada bi htjeli 'jedan ~ovjek jedan glas'!

Ta~no je, u pravu je profesor Pobri}, 'jedan ~ovjek jedan glas' je uni-verzalno na~elo. Me|utim, bili smo protiv njega u Milo{evi}evoj Jugoslaviji,jer ga je Milo{evi} zagovarao iz podlih namjera. I mo`da se danas neko pro-tivi na~elu 'jedan ~ovjek jedan glas' ne zato {to osporava njegovu vrijednost,ve} stoga {to ne vjeruje u iskrenost namjera onih snaga koje se za njegazalaù.

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Zlatko Hadìdedi}

Potaknut sam izlaganjima gospodina Haveri}a i profesora Grebe, i poku-{at }u kratko izloìti svoju diskusiju. Mislim da je zaista bilo neophodno re}iovo {to je gospodin Haveri} spomenuo, a to je da postoji jedan globalni sis-tem koji name}e odre|eni poredak, odre|ene sistemske vrijednosti. Osimtoga {to je to kapitalisti~ki poredak, to je tako|er poredak nacionalnih drà-va. Profesor Grebo je i to spomenuo, na izvjestan na~in. Me|utim, potaknutsam da se javim jer je on rekao: „Mi da se svi upnemo, ne moèmo bitinacionalna dràva”. Ja bih podsjetio na samo jednu ~injenicu kada je u pita-nju anga`man me|unarodne zajednice. Mi se svi pitamo {ta je to me|una-rodna zajednica, a ta me|unarodna zajednica to pitanje nikada nije samasebi postavila. Ona se angaòvala u Bosni i Hercegovini, ja to moram re}i,i prije nego {to je izbio rat.

Obi~no se popularno kaè da je me|unarodna zajednica u{la da ovdjesprije~i konflikt, da nam pomogne da iza|emo iz sukoba i tako dalje. Jaodgovorno tvrdim da se me|unarodna zajednica prvi put u Bosni i Herce-govini umije{ala 1991. i 1992., prije izbijanja rata, s konferencijom kojom jepredsjedavao Lord Karington, unutar koje je bila organizovana konferencijakojom je predsjedavao portugalski diplomata Kutiljero. Na toj konferenciji jeprvi put promovisan obrazac podjele Bosne i Hercegovine. Zbog ~ega?Zbog toga {to je ve} tada Bosni i Hercegovini bila planirana lu|a~ka ko{uljakoja je podrazumijevala da Bosna i Hercegovina treba da se podijeli na et-ni~ke teritorije, kako bi onda mogla biti podijeljena na etni~ke dràvice – pabi se onda ve}i nacionalni projekti mogli zadovoljiti. Meni je fascinantno ka-ko niko u Bosni i Hercegovini ne primje}uje da je Bosna i Hercegovina, kojaima sasvim sigurno tri ili ~ak i vi{e razli~itih etno-religijskih i kulturnih iden-titeta, izloèna svemu ovome – jo{ od Lisabonske konferencije, do dana da-na{njeg – zbog toga {to se grupe koje posjeduju te identitete, moram takore}i, la`no nazivaju nacijama. Naravno, niko im ne moè osporiti pravo dasami sebe nazivaju nacijama, ali grupe koje pretenduju na to da se naziva-ju nacijama, sve dok sebe nazivaju nacijama, one automatski imaju pravounutar tog sistema – a tu se uklju~uje globalni sistem o kojem je gospodinHaveri} govorio – da stvore vlastitu dràvu. To je jednostavno aksiom iz me-|unarodnog prava. Isto tako, paradoksalno opet, u Bosni i Hercegovinipostoji velika grupa ljudi koji bi se rado nazivali Bosancima i Hercegov-cima, pa im se to pravo jednostavno – od strane me|unarodne zajednice,koja je projektovala i Lisabonsku konferenciju, i sve dalje pregovore, iDejtonski ustav ovakav kakav je – ne dopu{ta, i do dana dana{njeg im se

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ta mogu}nost osporava, iako bi se vjerovatno empirijski dalo utvrditi da bibarem tre}ina ili ~etvrtina stanovni{tva ve} u ovom trenutku bila spremnaprihvatiti taj identitet.

Dakle, mi permanentno imamo jedan pritisak me|unarodne zajedniceda se upravo ovako, na etno-religijskom principu, dijelimo i da zaokruù-jemo nacionalne projekte. U tom smislu pitanje profesora Grebe je apsolut-no opravdano, samo ne treba biti nama upu}eno; zapravo, to pitanje nije„Da li mi èlimo Bosnu i Hercegovinu?” nego „Da li nam me|unarodna zajednica dopu{ta da imamo Bosnu i Hercegovinu koja ne bi bila etno-nacionalna tvorevina?” Ona moè postati nacionalna dràva onog momen-ta kada se svi gra|ani u Bosni i Hercegovini, ili velika ve}ina, budu iden-tificirali s tim identitetom. Tada }e se to tako|er zvati nacionalnomdràvom. Postoji podjela na etni~ki i na gra|anski nacionalni identitet, takoda ja tu ne vidim nekakav strukturalni problem, osim {to je strukturalniproblem unutar me|unarodne zajednice, koja je prihvatila ovaj aksiom daBosna i Hercegovina treba da se raspadne – ali, eto, samo moramo na}ineki elegantan na~in za to.

Dino Abazovi}

Naprosto, bilo je dosta dobrih teza i diskusija, ali ja bih ipak volio, upra-vo zbog eventualnih nedore~enosti, kao {to gospodin Haveri} re~e, pojas-niti neke stvari. Prvo, koncept pri~e o konsocijaciji koji sam u dana{nji raz-govor ja uveo, bio je jednostavno koncept me|unarodnog dizajna. Ja samhtio naglasiti da je konsocijativno ure|enje Bosne i Hercegovine rezultatonoga {to sam nazvao me|unarodna dràva me|unarodnog dizajna. Dakle,u tom smislu sam govorio o tome. I nisam mislio dalje o tome govoriti, alikad je ve} spomenuto, prakti~no smatram kako ta pitanja treba razmatratina nivou deskripcije, a bojim se da ova diskusija koju vodimo ulazi u pita-nje normativnog karaktera dràve. Konsocijativni modeli, i u teoriji i u prak-si, nisu normativnoga karaktera, jer kad su normativnoga karaktera, oni selegaliziraju, a kad se legaliziraju, oni su pri~a o tre}em entitetu, oni su pri~ao svim ovim stvarima; onda, na kraju krajeva, mislim da veliki broj gra|anamoè imati problem sa takvom vrstom legitimizacije, legalizacije, jer onda nepreostaje ni{ta drugo do aklamacijski prihvatiti rezultate rata, ako ve} govo-rimo o nekom legalisti~kom konsocijativnom pristupu. To su, ipak, nekadruga pitanja. Ja sam, dakle, govorio, ~isto da se razumijemo, o deskrip-tivnom karakteru.

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Drugo pitanje je pitanje koje se spomenulo nekoliko puta, pitanje nationstate, ili nacije-dràve. I opet, bojim se da ni to nije jednozna~no odre|eno.Onako kako ja to razumijevam, razli~ite su teorije danas prisutne u struci, aprakti~no mo`da su jedine dvije evropske dràve koje opstaju na principi-ma nation statea Francuska i Gr~ka. Nijedna druga dràva Evrope nije vi{eklasi~na nation state. Da se razumijemo i oko toga, dakle: ovo o ~emu jegospodin Haveri} govorio, u izvjesnom smislu, ja razumijevam izvan okviranation statea. Ali za{to ovo pitanje spominjem? Zato {to je ostalo ne{to ne-izre~eno. Izvinjavam se, ali èlim da to jasno naglasim. Gospodin Schwarz-Schilling je jutros u diskusiji sa kolegicom [a~i} govorio o imperijalizmu. Jaupravo mislim da taj stari koncept nation statea jeste imperijalisti~ki duh vri-jednosti. I u tom smislu nisam htio koristiti ovaj podij da govorim o tome,ali u tekstu izlaganja kolegice [a~i} razumijem da se govori o imperijalnimvrijednostima koje se nama name}u kao nekome izvan Evrope, nekomeizvan evropskog koncepta, ali ne kao pitanja geografije nego pitanja Evropekao vrijednosti tako da, naàlost, moram primijetiti kako toga u me|unarod-noj zajednici ima jako mnogo.

Evo jedna kratka digresija, jedan kratak dokaz u prilog tome: posljednjeantropolo{ke studije, koga interesuje moè na}i reference u tekstu koji sampriloìo, pokazuju da se, recimo, ve}ina predstavnika me|unarodne zajed-nice, one koje mi popularno zovemo internacionalci, ili stranci, ili kako godho}ete - citiram: „... se naj~e{}e isklju~uju iz doma}e zajednice bilo dobro-voljnim samoodvajanjem od bosanskohercegova~kih dràvnih institucija ilibilo kojih institucija, bilo isklju~ivanjem Bosanaca i Hercegovaca iz zami{lje-nog europejstva”, bez obzira {ta oni podrazumijevaju pod tim. Dakle, ovoje antropolo{ka studija jedne vrsne mlade antropologinje koja, eto, nijeBosanka. Dakle, vi imate i tu jednu vrstu imperijalnog vrijednosnog odnosaprema nama, gdje su ~ak one famozne kartice oko vrata ID kartice, stranetablice, parkiranje automobila tamo gdje Bosanci ne smiju parkirati po glav-nim ulicama, i tako dalje, jedna vrsta tog sindroma, sarajevskog aerodroma.Kad slete na Sarajevski aerodrom, oni zaborave da dolaze iz Be~a, da dolazeiz Bona i ne znam kojih evropskih gradova i dràva, i po~inju se pona{atiimperijalno ovdje, na na~in koji ne prili~i njihovim mati~nim dràvama. Dak-le, i to je jedno od pitanja o kojem se moè raspravljati. I, kona~no, da zavr-{im s konceptom jedan ~ovjek jedan glas. Ja sam mo`da posljednji ~ovjekkoji bi trebao o tome da govori, jer su tu moji stavovi prili~no jasni. Molimvas, nemojte zaboraviti: Bosna i Hercegovina na izborima 1991. godine jeimala koncept jedan ~ovjek jedan glas, i nacionalne stranke su trijumfalnopobijedile.

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Dakle, pitanje jedan ~ovjek jedan glas nije nu`no pitanje majorizacije iliminorizacije ve}ine i manjine. Koliko se sje}am rezultata iz 1991. godine, poprincipu glasanja jedan ~ovjek jedan glas, zna se ko je ubjedljivo dobioizbore. Zna~i, ne radi se o na~inu glasanja. Radi se o tome da neki drugimodeli diskriminiraju jedan odre|en broj ljudi u kontekstu zakona. I akogovorimo o tim principima, dajte, molim vas, da se drìmo toga da je nepri-hvatljivo po bilo kojem evropskom me|unarodnom standardu da suodre|eni gra|ani ove dràve sistematski diskriminirani samo zato {to nisuovog ili onog etni~kog porijekla. Ja ne znam za{to je nekima problem tokonstatovati. Na kraju krajeva, malo sam uzbu|en, eto i ja sam taj neki nes-retni 'ostali' ako ho}ete. I {ta sad? Hvala lijepo.

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STUDIJA

Dino Abazovi}

O me|ubilansu u~inka rada me|unarodne zajednice uBosni i Hercegovini – od decembra 1995. do marta 2007.godine

Sociolo{ki aspekti

Dru{tvo u kojem nema ni~ega izme|u 'hipertrofirane dràve' i 'beskrajnog broja neorganiziranih pojedinaca'

prava je sociolo{ka ~udovi{nost, jer kolektivna aktivnost suvi{e je kompleksna da bi se mogla izraziti

samo jednim organom – dràvnim. 1

(E. Durkheim)

Silna energija koju me|unarodna zajednica ulaè na racionaliziranjeiracionalnog politi~kog koncepta ne vodi nikud. Ima li za bilo koji

geopoliti~ki entitet gore tragedije nego da nestane umi{ljen da raste; da umire polagano uvjeren u ozdravljenje! 2

(N. ]urak)

I. Uvod

U onom tragi~nom periodu kada se proces dezintegracije biv{e Socija-listi~ke federativne republike Jugoslavije pretvorio u agresiju, rat i krvopro-li}e, ”me|unarodni odgovor” bio je doista ozna~en – kao {to to sugerira Ale-xandros Yannis – nedostatkom jedinstva i odlu~nosti (Yannis, 2002). Jednaod prominentnih figura me|unarodnih centara mo}i upravo u tom klju~nomperiodu, David Owen, medijator Evropske unije za biv{u Jugoslaviju, tvrdida

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1 E. Durkheim, "The division of labour in society", Free Press Glencoe, str.11; vidi i ProfessionalEthics and Civil Morals, Rotledge Kegan Paul, 1957, str. 20-23. (navedeno prema: Robert Pinker,Socijalna teorija i socijalna politika, hrestomatija, FPN, Sarajevo, 2000.)

2 Nerzuk ]urak (2004): Dejtonski nacionalizam, Sarajevo, Buybook, str. 106.


ono {to se ~inilo da je Clintonova administracija èljela do 1994.godine, kada su se po prvi put po~eli pozitivno izja{njavati se oBalkanu, bila je mo} bez odgovornosti [...] Zemlje ~lanice Evropskeunije i ministri vanjskih poslova tih zemalja prihvatili su odgovor-nost [...] ali nikada nisu primijenili silu (Owen, 1995: 366 -7).3

Bilo kako bilo, sila je bila prijeko potrebna da bi se zaustavio rat, {to sei ostvarilo krajem 1995. godine. Dejtonski mirovni sporazum – kompromiskoji je doveo do zavr{etka ratnih sukoba – udahnuo je ìvot dana{njojdràvnoj strukturi Bosne i Hercegovine, toj „dràvi me|unarodnog dizajnakoja egzistira na me|unarodnom dizajnu” (Bose, 2005: 232).

Me|utim, treba naglasiti da pozicija tzv. me|unarodne zajednice4 u Bo-sni i Hercegovini i oko nje nije svodiva na manje ili vi{e formalne odnoseprotektorata (poput, recimo, Isto~nog Timora ili Kosova). Me|u autorimakoji ukazuju na ulogu „lokalne saglasnosti” za Sporazum, kao i na implikaci-je koje proizlaze iz njega, nalazi se i David Chandler, koji smatra da

...prije negoli vanjsko nametanje, Dayton se formalno doima kaosporazum koji su postigle lokalne sile – BiH i njeni susjedi, Hrvatska i krnja biv{a Savezna Republika Jugoslavija. Nisu me|unarodniakteri pozvani da nadgledaju Dayton i da instaliraju privremenipostkonfliktni administrativni mehanizam Ureda Visokog pred-stavnika (OHR) na osnovu rezolucije Savjeta bezbjednosti UN-a,ve} na osnovu prisilne fikcije 'lokalne saglasnosti'. Tako je to ured samo 'konzistentan odgovaraju}im rezolucijamaSavjeta bezbjednosti UN-a', ali njime formalno ne upravlja UN nitiUred za svoj rad odgovara UN-u.” (Chandler, 2005: 337).

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3 Navedeno prema Yannis (2002: 264).4 Ovdje, i dalje u tekstu, koristim prefiks 'takozvana' ispred odrednice 'me|unarodna zajednica'

èle}i afirmisati stav i podràti nastojanja Johna B. Allcocka, koji rezonuje na sljede}i na~in: "Nedopada mi se termin 'me|unarodna zajednica' jer konfiguracija dràvnih i nedràvnih strukturana koje se on obi~no odnosi ne posjeduje atribute koje sociolozi obi~no podrazumijevaju podrije~ju 'zajednica'. Pa ipak, potencijalne zamjene za ovaj termin na koje sam nai{ao bez izuzetkasu ili jednako zavaravaju}e ili daleko nezgrapnije. Stoga protestujem, ali taj termin i dalje ovdjekoristim s iskrenom nadom da }e uskoro biti smi{ljeno ne{to bolje" (Allcock, 2005: 24).


Kako god, upravo pitanje odgovornosti mora biti jedno od klju~nih mjes-ta za analizu u~inka tzv. me|unarodne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini od1995. godine do danas.

No, prethodno nekoliko manje-vi{e op}ih mjesta o samoj postdejtonskojBosni i Hercegovini.

Ukratko kazano, postdejtonska Bosna i Hercegovina sastoji se od dvaentiteta (Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine i Republike Srpske), od kojih svakiuìva visok stepen autonomije. Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine kao entitetsastoji se od deset kantona. Grad Br~ko, koji je bio predmet me|unarodnearbitraè, danas ima status distrikta, i jo{ uvijek je pod direktnom supervi-zijom posebnog me|unarodnog predstavnika.

Imaju}i na umu da je institucija formirana mirovnim sporazumom, s ci-ljem implementacije dogovorenog, a naro~ito zarad odrànja mira, „Ured Vi-sokog predstavnika (OHR) je ad hoc me|unarodna institucija odgovorna zanadgledanje implementacije civilnih aspekata sporazuma. (...) Visoki pred-stavnik, koji je tako|er i specijalni predstavnik Evropske unije u BiH,sara|uje sa gra|anima i institucijama BiH i me|unarodnom zajednicomkako bi osigurao da se BiH razvije u mirnu i odrìvu demokratsku zemlju,na putu ka integracijama u evroatlantske institucije.”5 Ostale me|unarodneorganizacije „izvorno su namjeravale olak{ati posao doma}im donosiocimaodluka tako {to }e osiguravati odgovaraju}u bezbjednost gra|ana (SFOR,IPTF), stvarati ekonomski okvir za uspje{nu upravu (EU, UN) i promovisatidemokratske i vi{e tolerantne institucije i procese (OSCE).” (Bieber, 2002:213).

Kompleksna struktura dràvnog ure|enja takve Bosne i Hercegovine ukona~nici se (bez obzira na me|unarodni intervencionizam s ciljem posti-zanja mira) moè podvesti pod one modele koji se u savremenoj literaturiodre|uju kao konsocijacijski modeli.

S ciljem smirivanja konflikta, stabilizacije i izgradnje demokratije, klju~nielementi konsocijalizma – velika koalicija, proporcionalnost, uzajamni vetoi segmentalna autonomija (Lijphart, 1977) – na taj su na~in ve} implementi-rani; dakle, postdejtonska Bosna i Hercegovina mora se smatrati oblikomkonsocijacijske demokratije.

Kao {to sam na drugom mjestu {ire pisao,6 {to se Bosne i Hercegovineti~e stvari su o~igledne – velika koalicija odre|ena je izbornim zakonom

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5 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=385286 Vidi {ire u (Abazovi}, 2007).


(napose rezultatima svih dosada{njih izbora) i procesom formiranja izvr{nevlasti klju~nih partija zasnovanih na etni~kom principu reprezentacije, pro-porcionalnost nije ni{ta drugo do tro~lano Predsjedni{tvo, potom izbor zas-tupnika u Parlament (i po etni~kom i entitetskom kriteriju, da ne spominjemDom naroda), sastav Suda BiH, itd.; mehanizam za{tite vitalnog nacionalnoginteresa koji se primjenjuje u na{oj parlamentarnoj praksi jeste uzajamniveto, i kona~no, autonomija segmenata o~ituje se, prije svega, kroz institu-cije i politike (u {irem smislu rije~i) entitetskih struktura dràve, odnosnokroz kantone Federacije BiH (~etiri kantona s ve}inskim bo{nja~kim sta-novni{tvom plus ~etiri kantona s ve}inskim hrvatskim stanovni{tvom plusdva tzv. mje{ovita kantona).

II. [ta je sve po{lo krivo?

Ve} je postalo bjelodano jasno da podjela vlasti i mo}i institucionalizaci-jom etni~kih razli~itosti ne dovodi nu`no do ̀ eljenih rezultata, bar ne u smis-lu funkcionisanja dràve i stvaranja povoljne klime za ekonomski rast i opo-ravak ratom razru{ene i opusto{ene zemlje. Na dràvnom nivou situacija jetakva da koncept power-sharinga ne funkcioni{e u institucijama zasnova-nim na etni~koj (proporcionalnoj) zastupljenosti – umjesto pozitivnog kon-senzusa o kooperaciji kako bi se obnovile institucije, na snazi je nagativnikonsenzus oli~en u sistematskom blokiranju usvajanja odluka neophodnihda bi se krenulo u rekonstrukciju. Na entitetskim nivoima, naro~ito do 2000.godine, nije bilo zna~ajnijeg povratka 'manjina' u entitete; u sistemu obrazo-vanja vlada segregacija, ako ni po ~emu drugom a ono u vezi s pitanjem„maternjeg jezika i jezika izvo|enja nastave”, odnosno pitanjem plana i pro-grama iz tzv. grupe nacionalnih predmeta (maternji jezik, knjièvnost, his-torija, geografija); presporo je preno{enje ovlasti s entitetskog na dràvninivo – da spomenem samo neke od karakteristika.

âk ni na polju ponovne izgradnje me|usobnog povjerenja, a o~ekiva-nja su se kretala u pravcu toga da }e upravo proporcionalna zastupljenost iprincip rotacije (shodno pretpostavljenom dogovoru elita) biti temelj zatakvo {ta – nisu postignuti zna~ajniji rezultati.

Pokazalo se da su ~ak i strategije koje je tzv. me|unarodna zajednica(napose kroz Ured Visokog predstavnika) forsirala kao deblokiraju}e, prijesvega izvanjskim nametanjem zakonskih preduslova - skromnog u~inka.

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Zakoni su nametnuti protiv volje stanovni{tva s uvjerenjem da jepravni okvir osnova na kojoj se moè graditi postkonfliktna obnovai strategije nation-buildinga (kurziv D. A.). Bosanska iskustva suge-riraju da takav pravni idealizam potkopava politi~ke procese, zna-~aj prava i tranziciju ka samoupravi. (Chandler, 2004: 589).

Sasvim na~elno moè se praviti periodizacija me|unarodnog u~e{}a uBosni i Hercegovini kroz prizmu de{avanja sa „institucijom institucija”,Uredom Visokog predstavnika, i to za period od 1995. do 2000. godine, teod 2000. godine do danas.

U vezi s pitanjem „izvanjskog” faktora, tj. donosioca odluka unutar tzv.me|unarodne zajednice, a prije svih Vije}a za implementaciju mira, ono {toje karakteristi~no za prvi period jeste „malo jasnih politi~kih smjernica ilikrajnjih ta~aka za ad hoc me|unarodnu administraciju.” (Chandler, 2005).

Drugi period bio je - i jo{ je - period usmjeravanja ka Evropskoj uniji, pasamim tim i pregrupisavanje snaga ka „Briselu” kao ishodi{tu za dono{enjeodluka.

Tako je Vije}e Evropske unije po~etkom 2002. godine izrazilo spremnostda Visokog predstavnika u BiH imenuje i na funkciju Specijalnog predstani-ka EU za Bosnu i Hercegovinu. Te iste godine UN-ovu policijsku misiju uBiH (IPTF) naslijedila je EU policijska misija (EUPM), dok }e dvije godinekasnije EU uvesti i vojnu operaciju (Operacija Athea) koja }e EUFOR-omzamijeniti prisutne me|unarodne vojne snage za stabilizaciju (SFOR).

Va`no je ista}i da su se svi ovi va`ni procesi odvijali bez formalnih kon-sultacija s onima kojih se to najvi{e i ti~e, dakle s javno{}u u Bosni iHercegovini. Dakako, zvani~ni organi dràve su, volens-nolens, formalnoupu}ivali zahtjeve Evropskoj uniji (npr. pozivanje EU da preuzme odgo-vornost za misiju koja }e naslijediti UNIPTF), ali, kao i u Daytonu, izuzevuskog kruga establishmenta nije bilo onih koji bi zastupali {ire zaintereso-vanu javnost. Pitanje odnosa civilnog dru{tva i tzv. me|unarodne zajednicebit }e razmatrano ne{to kasnije u tekstu.

Ipak, ve}ina analiti~ara kao jedan od klju~nih momenta u me|unarod-nom anga`manu isti~e Samit Vije}a za implementaciju mira iz 1997. godine,koji je odràn u njema~kom gradu Bonnu. Iako su zaklju~cima sa Bonskogsamita ovlasti Ureda Visokog predstavnika (a kasnije i Specijalnog pred-stavnika EU u BiH) dobile sasvim druga~iji karakter, i umnogome u~vrstilapoziciju i implementacijsku mo} „vladara-koji-to-nije”, dejtonska „logika” na-stavila je proizvoditi paradokse. Tako je, naprimjer, „fleksibilnost vanjskihmehanizama regulacije bila centralni faktor u 'isisavanju' kapaciteta bosan-

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skohercegova~kih politi~kih institucija i podrivanju legitimiteta bosansko-hercegova~ke dràve” (Chandler, 2005: 337).

Iako su bonske ovlasti Visokog predstavnike bile u funkciji ubrzanjaprocesa implementacije mirovnog sporazuma, Visoki predstavnik je bio poz-van i da koristi svoja krajnja ovla{tenja i smijeni svakog lokalnog du`nosni-ka, uklju~uju}i izravno izabrane politi~are, za kojeg Ured smatra da vr{e ops-trukciju mirovnog procesa.

Nakon 1997. godine Visoki predstavnik je opremljen dodatnimovlastima, {to ga je transformiralo iz facilitatora u integralnu insti-tuciju aktualnog sistema vladavine u Bosni. Opremljen i zakono-davnim i izvr{nim ovlastima, Visoki predstavnik pojavio se kaonajuticajnija institucija u Bosni – i jedina koja nije formalno zas-novana na principu power-sharinga. (Bieber, 2002: 213).

Do danas je Visoki predstavnik smijenio ili suspendovao vi{e od stotinuosoba, me|u kojima su bili i ~lan dràvnog Predsjedni{tva, gradona~elnici,guverneri, zamjenici ministara, ministri i premijeri na svim nivoima, pred-sjednik entiteta, {ef obavje{tajne slu`be entiteta, sudije, javni slu`benici, menadèri kompanija itd. Izuzev kratkoro~nih efekata, dakako izuzev{i konkretne pojedina~ne diskvalifikacije, sistemski se promijenilo malo ili nijeni{ta.

Tek jedan od nusproizvoda bilo je stvaranje dodatne ovisnosti doma}ihzvani~nika o tzv. me|unarodnoj zajednici i njenim eksponentima mo}i, a neo onima koji su ih izbornim procesom doveli na pozicije koje obavljaju7 –stanovni{tvu Bosne i Hercegovine.

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7 âk je i Wolfgang Petritsch (visoki predstavnik u periodu od 1999. do 2002. godine) u vi{e svo-jih javnih nastupa ukazivao na "sindrom ovisnosti" doma}ih zvani~nika, koji se razvija u nega-tivnom pravcu usljed pove}ane frekvencije kori{tenja {irokih ovla{tenja Visokog predstavnika.Nadalje, Petritsch je izjavio i ovo: "Svjesni mo}i Visokog predstavnika da name}e zakone i smje-njuje zvani~nike opstrukcioniste, i jedni i drugi… bosanskohercegova~ki intelektualci i me|una-rodni posmatra~i… zahtijevali su od mene da ekstenzivno koristim takve ovlasti… Ali, po mommi{ljenju, 'nametanje' demokratije i civilnog dru{tva doima se kao kontradiktorno. Me|utim, uprvih godinu i po mog mandata doista sam morao djelovati kao visoki predstavnik koji je imaonajvi{e intervencija do sada." Navedeno prema: (Bose, 2002:322).


III. Demokratiziranje nedemokratskim snagama i (ne)civilno dru{tvo!?

Stoga je pitanje izbora sljede}e va`no pitanje 'ba{tine' tzv. me|unarodnezajednice u BiH. Prenagla{avanje demokratizacije u BiH u ranoj postkonflik-tnoj fazi je, po svoj prilici, bilo pogre{no – izbori koji su do{li prerano,8 bezjakih slobodnih medija i obnovljenog civilnog dru{tva koji bi nadomjestiloetni~ku 'polarizaciju', nu`no su rezultirali time da su nacionalisti~ke eliteponovo utemeljene i demokratski legitimisane.9

Neèljeni rezultat zapadnog ishitrenog, apoliti~kog pristupa politi~kom iekonomskom razvoju ogledao se u tome da umjereni politi~ari nisu dobilipriliku da razviju bira~ko tijelo, a nacionalisti~ki politi~ari ostvarili su kon-trolu nad oskudnim radnim mjestima […] Ne samo da su nacionalisti profi-tirali financijski, pa i po tome {to ih je me|unarodna zajednica prihvatilakao legitimne lidere, ve} im je njihov uticaj na izbor kompanija koje }e bitiodabrane za me|unarodne projekte rekonstrukcije pomogao da steknulojalne politi~ke prista{e. Me|unarodna pomo} ima duboke politi~ke efekte, arezultat rada sa doma}im izabranim zvani~nicima bez obzira na njihovupoliti~ku orijentaciju jeste dru{tvo koje se i dalje zasniva na vezama i podje-lama po etni~kim linijama, a ne dru{tvo jednakih mogu}nosti i vladavineprava. (McMahon, 2004-05: 581).

I umjesto da prihvate posljedice takvih kontradiktornih politika, kako toprimje}uje McMahonova, tzv. me|unarodna zajednica, kako se ~ini, prepu-{ta izazove transformacije dru{tva malobrojnim javnih li~nostima kriti~ki ori-jentisanim prema vladaju}im elitama, rijetkim neovisnim medijima (naro~ito{tampanim) i nevladinim organizacijama.

Ali, s obzirom da se u postdejtonskoj Bosni i Hercegovini civilno dru{tvoreducirano razumijeva kroz prizmu nevladinih organizacija, {to u ovomdru{tvu uglavnom i jeste slu~aj, sti~e se dojam da su nevladine organizacije– gotovo paradoksalno – u funkciji o~uvanja ovako lo{eg stanja jer kompen-ziraju funkcije koje dràva ne}e ili ne moè da ispunjava.10 Naravno, vjero-

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8 Dejtonskim mirovnim sporazumom precizirano je da se izbori moraju odràti najkasnije devetmjeseci od potpisivanja sporazuma!

9 Vidi {ire u (Marko, 2002).10Sli~no je i u kontekstu neoliberalnih dràva; vidi {ire u (Mo~nik, 2003).


vatno nijedna nevladina organizacija u BiH ne djeluje s tim ciljem, a situaci-ja u kojoj se nalaze zorno svjedo~i da dràva gotovo elementarno ne funkcioni{e – pojedincima stoga ne preostaje ni{ta drugo nego da se organi-zuju na ovaj na~in i poku{aju ublaìti posljedice takvog stanja.

Me|utim, ukoliko pri svemu tome imamo u vidu ~injenice koje govoreda je ve}ina nevladinog sektora najzna~ajnijim dijelom potpomognuta dona-torskim sredstvima izvana – a kako vrijeme odmi~e strategije doma}ih nevla-dinih organizacija zasnivaju se sve vi{e na donor-driven strategijama, a svemanje na realnom stanju i potrebama – situacija postaje jo{ pesimisti~nija.Tim prije {to tzv. me|unarodna zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini i daljeuporno insistira na tome da su nevladine organizacije centralni segmentcivilnog dru{tva11 za „nepoliti~ko” djelovanje s ciljem promjene politi~kogstanja.12

Gotovo kolonizatorski karakter pomo}i dirigovane izvana izgleda kao daje unaprijed i nepovratno sahranio mogu}nosti razvoja ve}ine drugih vido-va gra|anskog anga`mana, dakle svakog drugog koji nije sveden na nevla-dine organizacije!

Problem me|unarodnog anga`mana u Bosni i Hercegovini bio je i ostaoproblem intervencije koja (je) ima(la) za cilj o~uvanje i garanciju mirovnogsporazuma, ali u isto vrijeme institucionalni okviri ustanovljeni tim sporazu-mom favorizuju one politi~ke opcije koje su najmanje sklone njegovoj im-plementaciji. Tako, kada su u pitanju doma}i akteri, ju~era{nji najzagriènijiprotivnici Dejtonskog sporazuma postaju njegovi najsmjerniji po{tovaoci.

Me|unarodni akteri, pak, nikada dovoljno pa`nje nisu poklanjali pitanji-ma transparentnosti i odgovornosti. Ve} 1996. godine Me|unarodna kriznagrupa je u jednom od svojih izvje{taja ukazala na pitanje transparentnosti,napominju}i da „po{tovanje prema bosanskohercegova~kim institucijama iosnovno razumijevanje reciprociteta zahtijevaju barem najmanji stupanjtransparentnosti koji je neophodan e da bi bh. vlasti i ljudi razumjeli osnoveza odlu~ivanje i za proces dono{enja odluka koji tako sna`no uti~u na njih.[...] u~iti o demokratiji, toleranciji i dobroj vladavini [...] nema boljeg na~inanego po~eti s primjerom”.13

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11Vidi vi{e o tome u (Sali-Terzi}, 2001).12Tako je i nekoliko mjeseci prije posljednjih izbora u BiH (op}i izbori 2006. godine) na regio-

nalnoj konferenciji o civilnom dru{tvu u organizaciji Fondacije Heinrich-Boell (mart 2006.godine) aktuelni Visoki predstavnik Christian Schwrtz-Schilling pozvao predstavnike civilnogdru{tva i NVO da p(r)ozivaju politi~ke partije na odgovornost!

13International Crisis Group (1996: 16).


Sr` pitanja odgovornosti danas jeste pitanje odnosa prema stanovni{tvuteritorije u ~ijem 'upravljanju' u~estvuju. Ovdje se, dakle, ne radi o odgo-vornosti prema tijelima koja ih imenuju ili formiraju (npr. Vije}e za imple-mentaciju mira ili Vije}e Evropske unije), ve} o odgovornosti kao konceptukoji se zasniva na javnoj artikulaciji, obja{njavanju i opravdavanju politika~ije posljedice ipak najbolje osje}aju sami gra|ani Bosne i Hercegovine.Nedostatak odgovornosti doma}ih aktera ne smije biti olakotna okolnost zanedostatak odgovornosti tzv. me|unarodne zajednice u BiH.

Stanovnici Bosne i Hercegovine predugo su (bili) suo~eni s praksom„prebacivanja odgovornosti”. Mislim na onu praksu po kojoj sve {to doma}idonosioci odluka ne znaju, ne èle ili ne}e da u~ine, proglase za sferuodgovornosti me|unarodne zajednice u BiH. Izgovori su uglavnom na lini-ji osjetljivosti i sloènosti pitanja, a u principu se radi o nu`nosti povla~enjanepopularnih poteza koji bi bili negativno interpretirani unutar homogeni-zovanog bira~kog tijela, koje upravo za njih i glasa po principu za{tite vlasti-tih, mononacionalnih interesa.

Tzv. me|unarodna zajednica, tako|er, kad god je suo~ena s pitanjima zakoja ne postoji {iri konsenzus me|u njenim klju~nim akterima, odgovornostdelegira doma}im vlastima.14 Odgovornost koja levitira, reklo bi se!

Stoga se, naàlost, u mnogo situacija do sada pokazalo se da je DavidChandler u pravu kada tvrdi da je

...dejtonska fleksibilnost bila klju~ni faktor koji je omogu}io vanj-skim silama da permanentno odga|aju svaku tranziciju ka bh.ownernshipu. Jedina tranzicija koja se desila bila je da se ad hocpolitike ownershipa samoizabranih ~lanova Vije}a za implemen-taciju mira usmjere ka nadzornoj kontroli pod egidom Evropskeunije. Odluka o toj tranziciji donesena je kroz neformalne i ne-odgovorne mehanizme vanjskih odredbi, i bila je nametnuta odoz-go, bez ikakve debate i istinskog u~e{}a stanovnika BiH ili njihovihizabranih predstavnika. (Chandler, 2005: 337).

Kako god, postignuti rezultati mogli bi se tretirati kao pozitivni znaci za umjereni optimizam, a prije svega ukoliko se analiziraju u~inci u vezi spitanjima integracije entitetskih vojski u jedinstvene oruàne snage, kakve--takve uspostave dràvne grani~ne slu`be ili djelimi~no uspje{ne reformepravosu|a.

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14Vidi vi{e o tome u (Abazovi}, 2003).


Sva ostala eventualna postignu}a, po~ev{i od strukture i obima Vije}aministara u BiH, preko reformi sektora bezbjednosti, pa do uspostave dràv-nog javnog radio i televizijskog sistema, ovise o (prethodnom) pitanju – re-formi Ustava BiH i garancijama za njenu implementaciju.

Iako su u prethodnom periodu intervencijama u ustavni sistem u~injenipoku{aji da situacija promijeni, {to je dovelo do toga da Ustavni sud BiH(2000. godina) donese Odluku o konstitutivnosti, ve} naknadni amandmanina entitetske ustave iz 2002. godine (sljedstveno tzv. Sporazumu Mrakovica- Sarajevo) ponovo pro{iruju etnifikaciju politi~kog sistema i smanjuju slobo-dan prostor pojedincu za neetni~ku identifikaciju.15 Podsje}anja radi, dodono{enja Odluke o konstitutivnosti na~elno se smatralo da jednakost grupazamjenjuje nediskriminaciju pojedinaca:

Trenutni ustavni sistem Bosne i Hercegovine ni u normativnom,niti u pogledu prakse u primjeni i tuma~enja nekih njegovih odred-bi, ne pruà mogu}nosti za daljnji dru{tveni napredak Bosne i Her-cegovine. Evidentno je postojanje vi{e nepremostivih nedostataka utekstu Ustava Bosne i Hercegovine, ali i problema u primjeni us-tavnih principa. Ipak, mogu se izdvojiti tri su{tinska problema: (1)nerazumijevanje temeljnih ustavnih principa i njihovo pravilnovrednovanje; (2) nedostatak politi~ke volje u prihvatanju zajed-ni~kih ustavnih vrijednosti; (3) pogre{na praksa u primjeni ustav-nih odredbi. Dodatna {teta nanesena je (namjernim!?) pogre{nimtuma~enjem ionako malih mogu}nosti koje pruà sam njegov tekst,potpuno zanemaruju}i nesumnjiv legitimni interes svake dràveda osigura da njen institucionalni sistem normalno funkcionira,po{tuju}i principe transparentnosti djelovanja i vlasti kao servisagra|ana. (Vehabovi}, 2006: 61).

Stoga su, uz reformu ustavnog sistema, odnosno veoma konkretne izmje-ne Ustava BiH, zajedno sa doma}im akterima ({to otvara posebno pitanjenovog partnerstva koje bi uvaàvalo obaveze i odgovornost partnerskih stra-na), kriti~ne oblasti za djelovanje i reforma obrazovnog sistema, reforma po-licijskih snaga i, dakako, hap{enje optuènih za ratne zlo~ine (prije svihRadovana Karadì}a i Ratka Mladi}a).

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15Vidi {ire u (Bieber, 2005).


IV. Zaklju~na razmatranja

„Samrtno prolje}e” Visokog predstavnika, koje izgleda poprili~no izvje-sno stiè najkasnije sredinom naredne godine, nadamo se, nu`no }e otvoritipitanje bilansa u~inaka me|unarodnog anga`mana u postkonfliktnom bosan-skohercegova~kom dru{tvu i kod onih faktora koji su bili klju~ni donosiociodluka i de facto i de iure, a sa adresom stanovanja izvan Bosne i Hercego-vine. Nadamo se i da ono {to bi takav jedan bilans morao bar akceptirati jeste”da takva rje{enja ne mogu kreirati zemlju zami{ljenu na mirovnom ugovoruzato {to ih postoje}i institucionalni okvir spre~ava da to u~ine. Nation-build-ing napori u BiH, kako se to trenutno shvata, ne mogu reintegrisati zemlju ilitransformisati njeno dru{tvo zato {to su takve strategije, u stvari, u suprotnos-ti sa vladaju}im strukturama…” (McMahon, 2004-05: 583).

Me|unarodni dizajn kakav poznajemo i ìvimo danas u Bosni i Herce-govini (po)odavno je dostigao svoju ta~ku kulminacije i potencije, te je jedi-no rje{enje – redizajn. Ono sa ~ime se slaù i 'vanjski' i 'unutra{nji' zaintere-sovani jeste da je put 'uspjeha' put evropske integracije, a da ova zemlja nijesposobna i}i tim putem bez vodi~a.

Stoga je nastavak umije{anosti me|unarodnog elementa ne samo izvjes-tan ve} i neophodan, i doista je to tako. Budu}i vi{egodi{nji anga`manSpecijalnog predstavnika EU za Bosnu i Hercegovinu na njenom putu kaEvropskoj uniji 16 (sa Bonskim ovlastima ili bez njih) ovisit }e o spremnosti dase suo~i s akutnim problemima zaostav{tine dejtonske tvorevine, ali jednakotako i o sposobnosti da artikuli{e strategije koje }e omogu}iti posao za pot-puno novu generaciju doma}ih dràvnih slu`benika, politi~ara i eksperata.

Kako doma}i intelektualni potencijal moè pomo}i me|unarodnojzajednici u BiH? Tako {to }e se onaj sluganski dio bh. inteligencijeapsolutno i bez zadr{ke otkazati svoje pritajene i transparentneusluge vladaju}im nacionalnim strankama, prestati lagati sebe idruge, te proizvodnjom intelektualnih uradaka koji nisu zavisni odstrana~kih sehara oja~ati blok nezavisnog mi{ljenja. Kona~no je vrijeme da inteligencija u BiH prestane proizvoditi zablude ukori-jenjene u starim i novim mitovima nove klase. To bi otvorilo prostorza dijalog izme|u stvarnih ljudi BiH i me|unarodne zajednice.Ovako, me|unarodna zajednica se razvija kao zaseban, oktroirani bosanski entitet koji pored tri nacionalne birokracije

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16Posljednje procjene pokazuju da }e Hrvatska, dràva iz kontingenta biv{ih jugoslavenskih repu-blika koja je najdalje oti{la na putu pridruìvanju EU, dobiti ~lanstvo u toj evropskoj porodicinaroda najranije 2009. godine. Bosna i Hercegovina jo{ nije potpisala ni Sporazum o stabilizacijii pridruìvanju (SAA) i, kako svari stoje, bit }e jedna od posljednjih evropskih dràva koja }e toformalno i u~initi.


razvija i svoju, ~etvrtu birokraciju, ~etvrti e{alon uzalud potro{enognovca. (]urak, 2004: 155).

Me|utim, iako bi „put u Evropu” mogao donijeti mnoge pozitivne re-zultate i odre|eni napredak, klju~ni problem i dalje glasi (te se ne smije ski-dati s agendi, ni doma}ih ni me|unarodnih) – u bosanskohercegova~komdru{tvu izostaje (odnosno ne postoji) fundamentalni konsenzus njegovih~lanova (naro~ito onih uokvirenih u kolektivne identitete) o pitanjima pro-{losti, sada{njosti i budu}nosti.

Tzv. me|unarodna zajednica nikada se nije ozbiljno suo~ila s tom ~injeni-com – a razli~ita vi|enja uzroka i rje{enja „bosanskog problema” koji neri-jetko isklju~uju jedni druge, otvara pitanje ne samo 'lokalnog', ve} i'me|unarodnog' nesuglasja. Suo~ena s ovim pitanjima, tzv. me|unarodnazajednica doslovno ne postoji. Ono {to preostaje su konkretni interesikonkretnih vlada dràva zainteresovanih za BiH na ovaj ili onaj na~in.Mo`da je najo~itiji primjer za to tek jedva simboli~no u~e{}e institucija tzv.me|unarodne zajednice u onome {to se naziva „suo~avanje s pro{lo{}u”.

Internacionalci (pojednostavljeno, osobe koje rade u Bosni i Hercegoviniu me|unarodnim organizacijama, me|unarodnim vladinim i nevladinimorganizacijama, agencijama i slu`bama) ipak su zna~ajno prisutni u bosan-skohercegova~koj svakodnevici kao „ambivalentni graditelji”:17 od vojnika ipolicajaca, preko stu~njaka za ljudska prava, pravnu reformu ili izbore,menadèra u sektoru bankarstva, savjetnika u reformi privatnog sektora i mi-krokreditnih organizacija, pa sve do edukatora, trenera, istraìva~a, huma-nitaraca... Dakako, tu su i diplomate.

Ali, svojim anga`manom, koji ima za cilj ujedinjavanje i integracije(odnosno misiju bringing democracy), u kontekstu bosanskohercegova~kogdru{tva, sami sebe naj~e{}e isklju~uju iz doma}e zajednice: bilo dobrovoljn-im samoodvajanjem od bosanskohercegova~kih (dràvnih) institucija, biloisklju~ivanjem Bosanaca i Hercegovaca iz zami{ljenog evropejstva (odnosno{ta ve} ko od njih pod evropejstvom podrazumijeva).18 Takve lekcije'doma}i' u~enici najbrè savladavaju, i to je dio problema a ne rje{enja.

Jedno je neosporno: ako ova dràva i dru{tvo doista krenu putem„Brisela”, zahtjevi }e biti teì, a potrebne promjene radikalnije. Pokazatelj daje ova zemlja sve bliè i bliè onima koji su ve} „ujedinjeni u razlikama”moè biti tek to da taj isti oficijelni moto EU prethodno zaìvi upravo u BiH– na istim onim principima i vrijednostima koji vrijede upravo u EU!

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17Vidi {ire u (Coles, 2007) .18Dobri polazni primjeri za prvi proces jesu famozne me|unarodne ID kartice oko vrata ili auto-

mobili s posebnim registracijskim oznakama, a za drugi dio tvrdnje ilustrativno je pitanje viza iprocedura za njihovo dobivanje. Tako|er vidi {ire u ibid.


Reference:

Dino ABAZOVI] (2003): „Socio-kulturni kontekst BiH kao determiniraju-}i faktor implementacije mehanizama za za{titu ljudskih prava”, u Vla-davina prava, sigurnost u regiji i ljudska prava, Fondacije Heinrich Böll,Regionalni ured u Sarajevu, Sarajevo

Dino ABAZOVI] (2007): „O konsocijaciji: Konsocijacijom protiv kon-socijalizma”, Puls demokratije, FODBiH, Sarajevo, http://www.pulsde-mokratije.net/clanak.php?sifra=070221002&lang=bh

John B. ALLCOCK (2005): „Daytone vrati se! Sve ti je opro{teno”, u Bosnai Hercegovina na putu ka modernoj dràvi? Perspektive i prepreke,Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Regionalni ured u Sarajevu

Florian BIEBER (2002): „Bosnia-Herzegovina: Developments towards aMore Integrated State?”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1

Florian BIEBER (2005): „S vi{e kompleksnosti ka boljem vr{enju vlasti”,u: Bosna i Hercegovina na putu ka modernoj dràvi? Perspektive i prepre-ke, Fondacija Heinrich Böll, Regionalni ured u Sarajevu

Sumantra BOSE (2005): „The Bosnian State a Decade after Dayton”,International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.3, Autumn 2005, pp. 322–335.

David CHANDLER (2004): „The Problems of 'Nation-Building': ImposingBureaucratic 'Rule from Above'”, Cambridge Review of InternationalAffairs, Volume 17, Number 3, October

David CHANDLER (2005): „From Dayton to Europe”, InternationalPeacekeeping, Vol. 12, No. 3, Autumn 2005, pp. 336–349.

Kimberley COLES (2007): „Ambivalent Builders: Europeization, the Pro-duction of Difference, and Internationals in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, u Bou-garel, X. – Helms, E. – Duijzings, G.: The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities,Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society, Ashgate, UK

Nerzuk ]URAK (2004): Dejtonski nacionalizam, Sarajevo, Buybook

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Arendt LIJPHART (1977): Democracy in Plural Societies: A ComparativeExplanation. 1977, New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.

Joseph MARKO (2000): „Bosnia and Herzegovina – Multi-Ethnic orMultinational?”, in: Council of Europe (ed.), Societies in Conflict: TheContribution of Law and Democracy to Conflict Resolution (Council ofEurope Publishing, Strasbourg, 2000), 92–118.

Patrice C. McMAHON (2004-05): „Rebuilding Bosnia: A Model to Emulateor to Avoid?”, Political Science Quarterly Volume 119, Number 4

Rastko MO^NIK (2004): „Nevladine organizacije, sluge neoliberalne dr-

àve”, Sektor, br. 3-4

Sevima SALI-TERZI] (2001): „Civilno dru{tvo”, u: @arko Papi} (ur.), Me-

|unarodne politike podr{ke zemljama jugoisto~ne Evrope: Lekcije (ne)na-

u~ene u BiH, Müller, Sarajevo

Faris VEHABOVI] (2006): „Analiza Ustava BiH i prijedloga novih teksto-va Ustava”, u: Centar za ljudska prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu: ”Procesustavnih promjena u BiH: Analiza izvje{tavanja u {tampanim medijima,komparativna analiza teksta Ustava i prijedloga izmjena teksta, analizame|unarodnih standarda, analiza stavova pravnih profesionalaca u BiH”

Alexandros YANNIS (2002): „The Creation and Politics of InternationalProtectorates in the Balkans: Bridges over Troubled Waters”, Journal ofInternational Relations and Development , 5, September

International Crisis Group (1996): Aid and Accountability: Dayton Imple-mentation, ICG Bosnia Report, No. 17, 24 Nov. 1996, p. 16, www.crisis-web.org/home/index.cfm?id?1566&l?1

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ZAVR[NA RIJE^

Dragoslav Dedovi}, direktor Regionalnog ureda Fondacije Heinrich Böll za Jugoisto~nu Evropu, Beograd

Dame i gospodo, dragi prijatelji!

Dan je bio dug i ja sam tokom njega dosta nau~io, mada sam odrastaou ovoj zemlji. Fondacija Heinrich Böll je postavila pitanje koja do sada iz ne-utvr|enih razloga nije pre~esto postavljano. Postavili smo pitanje koje tokomjednodnevne rasprave nije moglo dobiti kona~an odgovor, naro~ito ako uz-memo u obzir da je pro{lo toliko godina a ono nije postavljano.

No, jednom postavljeno pitanje ima neugodnu osobinu da se, ukoliko gaignori{emo i ne odgovorimo na njega, vra}a u sve o{trijoj formi. Tako da seja nadam povratku ovog pitanja i unutar na{ih aktivnosti tokom sljede}e go-dine i u drugim formama. Mislim da ovo nije kraj potrage ve} njen po~etak.

Dana{nje interesovanje je pokazalo i da su oni koji su egzistencijalno,ìvotno vezani za odgovore na to pitanje ostali do kraja na skupu. To je od-govor na pitanje Zdravka Greba za{to su drugi oti{li. Pretpostavljam zato {tonisu su{tinski vezani za dana{nju potragu za odgovorima na neugodna pi-tanja. Mislim da je pokretanje procesa dijaloga s me|unarodnom zajedni-com, koji bi uklju~io refleksiju njenih stranputica, ne{to {to je neminovno.

Na skupu je pokrenuto i pitanje definisanja me|unarodne zajednice.Meni pada na pamet da me|unarodnu zajednicu moèmo ozna~iti kaoprivremenog suverena Bosne i Hercegovine, jer suveren je, po Karlu [mitu,onaj ko moè da uvede vanredno stanje. Na kraju krajeva, me|unarodnazajednica }e i kao takav suveren biti prisiljena da uklju~i i doma}u pamet uproces refleksije sopstvenih zabluda i dobrih rje{enja, kako bi uz doma}upamet eventualno razradili neki alternativni scenariji budu}nosti ove zemlje.Ako vam se to ~ini preambicioznim, onda kratkoro~ni cilj moèmo fokusira-ti ne{to skromnije: va`no je da se progovori o alternativnim scenarijima. Patpozicija, ali i strategija „jo{ vi{e istoga” kao strategija kojom se traì rje{enjeza Bosnu i Hercegovinu ne moè vi{e nigdje odvesti.

Govorili smo danas i o drugim bitnim stvarima. Na primjer, spomenutaje kategorija traume. Mislim da me|unarodna zajednica nije zasluìla imetraume, ali jeste dio te traume, izvedene traume, sekundarne traume, jer pri-marna trauma nije rije{ena, jer se u ovoj zemlji desio genocid, jer odgovorninisu izvedeni pred sud, jer je zemlja raskomadana, jer je dru{tvo razoreno.Mislim da se na nivou dijagnostike moèmo sloìti da ta primarna trauma

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proizvodi tako|e refleks sekundarne traume. Da li su ovda{nja velika o~eki-vanja da se golema nepravda koja je u~injena ovim ljudima ovdje donekleispravi ~arobnim {tapi}em drugih dodatno pove}ala nezadovoljstvo? S jednestrane, mogu razumjeti ta o~ekivanja. S druge strane, ima tu i prebacivanjaodgovornosti na druge. Nemojmo zaboraviti kulturno-povijesne uslove uBosni i Hercegovini, u kojima su strani administratori iz austrougarske epohenazivani kufera{i - to sam na{ao u jednom tekstu Maka Dizdara. Zna~i,ksenofobi~ni odnos prema drugome makar on bio 'imperijalan', sve je dodanas dio odnosa prema strancima, nepovjerenje samo pronalazi drugiobjekat.

Na{ cilj je kriti~ki dijalog Bosne i Hercegovine s onim dijelom svijeta kojije preuzeo dio odgovornosti za budu}nost ove zemlje. Me|unarodna zajed-nica ne bi smjela biti izgovor doma}im politi~kim akterima za vlastite gre{ke,kao {to gre{ke doma}e politi~ke elite ne smiju biti izgovor me|unarodnojzajednici za nedovr{avanje zapo~etog posla i nedovoljno kriti~ko preispiti-vanje vlastitih nedostataka. Za sada mi nisu poznate evaluacije, autorefleksi-je, monitorinzi i tako dalje, koji bi sveobuhvatno ustanovili {ta jeste a {ta nijedobro ura|eno. Ako tako ne{to ne postoji ili nije dostupno javnosti, onda bidalji koraci u tom smjeru zaista bili nu`ni. Drugo, da li postoji ikakvo sustav-no znanje o tome {ta gra|ani ove zemlje misle o svom suverenu, bez obzi-ra kako se do tih podataka dolazi? Ja o tome tako|e ne znam mnogo. Postojisamo poneko parcijalno istraìvanje. Sve su to poslovi koje treba obaviti.Posao refleksije nije lak, a vidjeli smo danas da ima dovoljno kontroverzi.Mene to raduje jer, ~ini mi se da jedno nekreativno klimanje glavom kojeponekad prati ovakve skupove nije njihov smisao.

Ovo pitanje }emo mi, kao Fondacija, postavljati u ovoj zemlji sve dokono ne postane suvi{no. To bi trebalo da bude na{ zajedni~ki cilj. Ovaj put}emo poslati na{e zaklju~ke tamo gdje oni treba da budu pro~itani – na sto-love suverenima ove zemlje - a drugi put }emo napraviti radne grupe prijedolaska predstavnika me|unarodne zajednice na skup, pa }emo prezenti-rati to pred njima, kako bismo izbjegli situaciju da se dijalog zaustavi na pro-tokolarnoj ljubaznosti. Na}i }emo metode da u|emo u taj dijalog, da u|emou taj proces refleksije i da uklju~imo regionalnu evropsku i njema~ku kom-ponentu u sve to.

Tako ne{to nije zadatak koji se moè obaviti od danas do sutra. Ovazemlja je, na osnovu svega {to se zbilo, izgubila dosta vremena i, ~ini mi se,nalazi se mentalno, ali i de facto, u pat poziciji. Kako iza}i iz te pozicije? Toje drugo lice istog pitanja: {ta je me|unarodna zajednica propustila, a {ta jedobro uradila? Ovdje su se ~uli i neki prijedlozi kao {to je onaj da se pre-

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sko~e neki doma}i zadaci i da Bosna i Hercegovina kao povla{tena zem-lja bude ubrzano integrisana u Evropsku uniju. Time bi se mo`da sprije~ilaprijete}a ideolo{ka regresija na etni~ki i konfesionalno shva}en 'sudar kul-tura'. Tako bi i bosanski pogledi bili permanentno pro{irivani evropskomdimenzijom. Onda bi Bosna, nepovratno smje{tena u veliki evropski kon-tekst, kona~no mogla da bude domovina svih ljudi koji tu ìve.

Evropska kontekstualizacija Bosne i Hercegovine jeste od pomo}i - to jeproces koji na individualnom planu poznajemo svi mi koji smo decenijamaìvjeli vani. Komparativni pristup, pamet koja stalno dovodi sopstvenustvarnost u odnos s ve}om cjelinom, jesu potrebniji no ikada.

Pritom ne treba upasti u zamku idealizacije. Nema pre~ice do idealnogstanja. [to si dalje od predmeta ~e`nje, ~e`nja je ve}a. Ali to je mogu}e samouz grubu stilizaciju predmeta ~e`nje. Nije mogu}a, a nije ni potrebna pre~icado Evropske unije, niti idealizacija evropskog ili bosanskog konteksta. Netreba se odati ni rezignaciji u te{kim periodima. Stoga nam je namjera da{irom otvorimo o~i pred stvarno{}u i da nastavimo ovaj proces kriti~kogpromi{ljanja pretpostavki za kona~no stabilizovanje Bosne i Hercegovine uEvropi, kao i vrijednosno afirmisanje Evrope u Bosni i Hercegovini.

Mislim da je na{ Ured u Sarajevu dobro postavio pitanje i sjajno organi-zovao prvi korak. Jo{ samo da dodam, da postavljanje neugodnih, kriti~kihpitanja dobro stoji Fondaciji Heinrich Böll, s cijelim njenim istorijatom, kao iistorijatom i duhom Zelenih. Uostalom, ugodna pitanja su dosadna.

Zaklju~ci i preporuke

U pripremama za Konferenciju izra|ena je studija koja s politolo{kog,pravnog i sociolo{kog aspekta nudi bilans u~inka rada me|unarodne zajed-nice u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ova studija ~inila je polaznu osnovu za diskusi-ju na Konferenciji, na kojoj su diskutirali predstavnici me|unarodne zajed-nice, civilnog dru{tva i politi~kog ̀ ivota u BiH. U radu Konferencije u~estvo-valo je oko 90 sudionika, a cjelokupan rad pratili su akreditirani predstavni-ci medija.

S obzirom na ~injenicu da su ovakvu vrstu konferencije, a naro~ito temeo kojima se diskutiralo, svi u~esnici ozna~ili kao veoma rijetko de{avanje ujavnom ìvotu Bosne i Hercegovine, napose veoma va`no i potrebno de-{avanje, zaklju~ci i preporuke koje slijede nu`no su odre|eni ne{to vi{imstepenom poop}avanja, iako se to ne bi trebalo razumjeti kao nedostatakkonkretne argumentacije i/ili prijedloga u~esnika Konferencije. Naravno, iz

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same studije, odnosno autorskih priloga proizlaze veoma konkretne ocjenei preporuke.

Jasno je, me|utim, da praksa organiziranja ovakvih i sli~nih konferenci-ja, simpozija i konsultativnih savjetovanja treba postati stalna s obzirom daje evidentan izostanak dijaloga izme|u predstavnika me|unarodne zajed-nice i {ire zainteresirane bosanskohercegova~ke javnosti u vezi s klju~nimpitanjima budu}nosti ove dràve.

Sama Konferencija bila je, zapravo, prvi ozbiljniji javni forum za „verbali-ziranje” (a u odre|enom smislu i artikuliranje) doma}eg stava o fenomenuzvanom 'me|unarodna zajednica'. Konferencija je tom nastojanju poka{aladati odre|enu vrstu forme, a to je zapravo fenomen umje{tenosti me|una-rodne zajednice i mogu}e kriti~ke refleksije njene zaostav{tine, odnosnonjene tradicije ovdje u Bosni i Hercegovini. Uz to, radni dio Konferencije bioje kriti~ka refleksija u vezi s dosada{njim u~incima me|unarodne zajedniceu BiH, {to je izvjestan specifikum imamo li u vidu vremenski period u kojemje me|unarodna zajednica prisutna u BiH. U isto vrijeme, iako ne u istomintenzitetu i obimu (naprosto zbog toga {to se zna~ajan broj pozvanih pred-stavnika me|unarodne zajednice nije odazvao pozivu), predstavnici me|u-narodne zajednice imali su priliku iznijeti svoja mi{ljenja i analizu stanja ve-zanu za ulogu me|unarodne zajednice u BiH.

Da dva odijeljena „svijeta” (doma}a percepcija i percepcija unutar krugo-va me|unarodne zajednice) i dalje postoje – nije potrebno dodatno poja{-njavati; ali treba naglasiti da je Konferencija ponudila model premo{}avanjapraznog prostora i djelimi~no uspjela u tim namjerama. Stoga je jedan odzaklju~aka Konferencije da se budu}i doga|aji ove vrste poku{aju organi-zirati i u druga~ijem organizacijskom formatu (npr. kroz rad radnih grupa sprezentiranjem zaklju~aka na panelima i tome sli~no). U tom smislu ~ini segotovo o~iglednim da se me|unarodna zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini tre-tira kao jedna vrsta traume. I zbog toga je veoma va`no da su ova pitanjaotvorena; ali nismo mogli da se otmemo utisku da sli~na stvar postoji i nadrugoj strani, kod onih koji nisu ba{ tako zdu{no do{li da razgovaraju snama. Nismo ba{ sigurni da i oni nisu traumatizirani zbog tako lo{ih iporaàvaju}ih rezultata ili eventualno zbog vlastitih o~ekivanja u Bosni iHercegovini.

Zna~ajno je naglasiti da na Konferenciji nisu dominirala pitanja tzv. dnev-nopoliti~kog sadràja; pa`nja prisutnih bila je usmjerena na klju~na pitanja iprocese u bosanskohercegova~koj dràvi i dru{tvu: demokratizacija post-konfliktnog dru{tva, izgradnja demokratskih institucija, vladavina prava, iz-borni sistem i ustavni okvir, civilno dru{tvo i politi~ke strukture, pitanje do-ma}e odgovornosti i ownershipa za klju~ne procese u dràvi i dru{tvu,

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suo~avanje s pro{lo{}u... Iako neka od ovih pitanja imaju predominantno„doma}i / unutarnji” karakter, izgleda da je bilo potrebno otvoriti raspravuo „izvanjskom” faktoru kako bi se o tim pitanjima argumentirano raspravlja-lo. Dakako, sa stanovni{ta struke, kompleksnost fenomena zahtijeva inter-dis-ciplinarnost u pristupu, a to se doista i pokazalo u toku radnog dijelaKonferencije.

Treba naglasiti da je u toku Konferencije za diskusiju ponu|ena zaistaargumentirana refleksija na u~inak me|unarodne zajednice. Kona~no, biloje vi{e formuliranih pitanja nego ponu|enih odgovora, ali to nikako nijenedostatak samog skupa – naprotiv, dojam koji smo stekli jest da tek jasnoi nedvosmisleno identificirani problemi, pa i u formi pitanja, mogu poticaj-no djelovati na izlazak iz stanja intelektualne konfuzije, i na ponudu strategi-ja za uspje{niju budu}nost dràve i dru{tva.

I, na kraju, nadamo se da }e bar ova forma otvorenih pitanja, problemakoje smo ovdje otvorili, forma ovakve kriti~ke refleksije, koja se mo`da prviput jasno atrikulira na bosanskohercegova~koj sceni, biti izvjestan korektivza budu}i anga`man me|unarodne zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini – kakavgod on mogao biti.

Kratke biografije autora studija

Nermina [a~i} vi{i je asistent na Odsjeku ùrnalistike Fakulteta poli-ti~kih nauka. Ro|ena je 1974. godine u Vi{egradu. Zavr{ila je Fakultet poli-ti~kih nauka, Odsjek ùrnalistike, 1994. godine, nakon ~ega je na istomfakultetu magistrirala 2003. s temom Uloga medija u politi~koj socijalizacijiu Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine. Na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka 2006. godineodbranila je doktorsku disertaciju Politi~ki konflikti i javno mnijenje u pos-tratnoj BiH. Svoj anga`man na Fakultetu politi~kih nauka po~ela je 1998.godine kao asistent na predmetima Tehnike i praksa novinarstva i Metodenovinarstva. Uz ve} spomenute predmete od 2003. godine asistira i na pred-metu Javno mnijenje u zvanju vi{eg asistenta. Radila je kao novinar i ured-nik na RTVBiH, a kasnije i kao glavni i odgovorni urednik TVSA. Autorskimprilozima sara|ivala je u Odjeku, Zeni~kim sveskama, Kriminalisti~kim te-mama, Godi{njaku i drugim ~asopisima. U~estvovala je u radu vi{e okrug-lih stolova, kolokvija i skupova koji su se bavili politi~ko-medijskom proble-matikom. Stalni je saradnik Internewsa u Bosni i Hercegovini, i povremeniSoros centra u projektima razvoja medija u BiH.

Autorica je knjige Politi~ka de/resocijalizacija i mediji. Tako|er je priredi-la knjige: Novinarstvo u funkciji ljudskog napretka – printani mediji, Inter-

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news, Bemust, Sarajevo, 2003. i kooprire|iva~ (s prof.dr. Besimom Spahi-}em) knjige Novinarstvo u funkciji ljudskog napretka – elektronski mediji,Internews, DES, Sarajevo, 2004.

Manfred Dauster diplomirao je pravo na Univerzitetu u Saarlandu(Saarbrücken). Doktorirao je 1983. godine na ustavnom i komparativnomustavnom pravu i radio {est mjeseci kao vanredni profesor ustavnog pravana Dràvnoj akademiji za dràvne slu`benike u Hofu (Bavarska).

Radio je kao javni tuìlac u Tuìla{tvu grada Münchena i u Odjelu op}egkriminala i u Odjelu privrednog kriminala. Imenovan je za sudiju na Regio-nalnom sudu I u Münchenu 1989. godine. Bio je vi{i tuìlac u Tuìla{tvu od1990. do 1997. godine, kada je postao predsjedavaju}i sudija na Regio-nalnom sudu I u Münchenu. U augustu 2000. godine postao je rukovodilacAntikorupcijskog odjela u Uredu Visokog predstavnika (OHR) u Bosni iHercegovini. Od jula 2002. godine radio je kao rukovodilac OHR-ove Je-dinice za reformu tuìla{tava i krivi~nih institucija. Potom se vratio u Nje-ma~ku i od januara 2003. do 2005. godine radio je kao predsjedavaju}i sudi-ja na Regionalnom sudu I u Münchenu. Dvadeset godina je bio ~lan Dràv-ne komisije Bavarske, koja je radila u okviru Dràvnog ministarstva pravde,za polaganje diplomskog ispita studenata prava, a bio je i ~lan Dràvnekomisije Bavarske za polaganje pravosudnog ispita. Imenovan je za sudijuSuda BiH 29. 9. 2005. godine.

Dino Abazovi} ro|en je u Sarajevu 1972. godine. Magistar je sociolo{kihznanosti, radi kao vi{i asistent na Odsjeku sociologija Fakulteta politi~kihnauka Univerziteta u Sarajevu, na predmetima Sociologija religije i Soci-ologija saznanja i morala, a angaòvan je i kao stru~ni saradnik u Centru zaljudska prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu. ^lan je redakcijskog kolegija revije zaumjetnost, nauku i dru{tvena pitanja Odjek. Dodatno obrazovanje sticao jena American Institute on Political and Economic Studies – Georgetown Uni-versity & Univerzita Karlova v Praze, na Raoul Wallenberg Institute for Hu-man Rights and Humanitarian Law, University of Lund, kao i na InstitutD'Etudes Europeennes, ULB Brussels. U~estvovao je kao istraìva~ u vi{e me-|unarodnih istraìva~kih projekata i bio gostuju}i predava~ na nekoliko uni-verziteta u regiji, Evropi i SAD-u. Autor je knjige Za naciju i Boga: Sociolo{koodre|enje religijskog nacionalizma i kourednik dva zbornika radova (Reli-gija i europske integracije i Confronting with the Past: Consequences for theFuture). Radovi su mu objavljeni u vi{e doma}ih i inostranih ~asopisa, zbor-nika radova i knjiga, na ju`noslavenskim, kao i na engleskom jeziku.

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Primjer BiH odrzivi koncepti prelom engleska 23.08.07_korektura.qxd 21.9.2007 15:00 Page 153

Impressum

Publisher:Heinrich Böll FoundationOffice for Bosnia and Herzegovina

For the publisher:Mirela Grünther-\e~evi}

Edited by:Mirela Grünther-\e~evi}Amela Sejmenovi}

Translating:Nermana Mr{o (German Language)Svjetlana Pavi~i} (English Language)Amira Sadikovi} (English Language)

Layout: JORDAN Studio, Sarajevo - Amer Ekmi}

Copies: 1.000

Printed by: Tipografija d.o.o., Sarajevo


Proceedings from the conference:

EXAMPLES OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:SUSTAINABLE CONCEPTS OR LOST WAYS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY?

Sarajevo, 2007



C O N T E N T S

Introduction161 Mirela Grünther-\e~evi}

Welcome remarks163 H.E. Christian Schwarz-Schilling168 H.E. Michael Schmunk

1. INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BIH

Introduction175 Nermina [a~i}

Commentary182 H.E. Christian Schwarz-Schilling184 Zlatko Dizdarevi}

Discussion193 Du{anka Majki}195 Miro Lazovi}197 Senad Pe}anin 199 Nurko Pobri}200 Jerko Ivankovi}-Lijanovi}

Study202 Nermina [a~i}: The International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina

- December 1995 – March 2007 - A Political Science View

202 I. Introduction

204 II. Philosophy of a 'peace process'

205 III. Ethno-party pluralism – false political plurality

208 IV. Controversies in practice

212 V. Reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. reforms

in the International Community?

218 VI. Assessment and analyses

157

Contents


2. LEGAL REFORMS IN BIH AND INFLUENCEOF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Introduction223 Manfred Dauster

Commentary227 Zdravko Grebo232 Nedim Ademovi}

Discussion238 Nurija Omerba{i}239 Mirsad ]eman240 Manfred Dauster

Study241 Manfred Dauster: Taking Stock of the International Community’s Actions

in Bosnia and Herzegovina – December 1995 – March

2007 - Legal Aspects

241 I. Introduction

246 II. Important steps on the path of reforms of Bosnia and Herzegovina

taken under the international community’s pressure or which

the international community took them alone

257 III. Assessment and prospects

3. REFLECTION OF THE PRESENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE BIH SOCIETY

Introduction265 Dino Abazovi}

Commentary 273 Nada Ler Sofroni} 275 \or|e êkrlija

Discussion279 Tarik Haveri}281 Zdravko Grebo283 Tarik Haveri}284 Zlatko Hadìdedi}285 Dino Abazovi}

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Contents


Study287 Dino Abazovi}: Tallying the Balance of Effects of the International

Community in BiH – December 1995 – March 2007 -

Sociological Aspects

288 I. Introduction

290 II. What has gone wrong?

293 III. Democratisation by undemocratic forces and the (non)civil society!?

296 IV. Final considerations

Final remarks301 Dragoslav Dedovi}

304 Conclusions and recommendations

306 About the authors

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Contents



INTRODUCTION

The international community has tried to contribute to the developmentof a functional state and to support the political forces capable of continu-ing and completing the process of political reforms. However, activities ofthe international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina so far have beenmarked by both success and failure. In view of the current political situationand the pressure by the international community on the political elites inBosnia and Herzegovina to take full ownership over its own state and socie-ty as soon as possible, and in view of the ongoing, yet very slow process ofEuropean integration, there is a need to look at the effects of the interna-tional community’s presence and to assess its role for the future.

In view of this, on 17 April 2007, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, Officefor Bosnia and Herzegovina, organized in Sarajevo a conference entitledThe Example of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Sustainable Concepts orLost Ways of the International Community? As part of conference prepa-rations, a study was prepared, offering a tally of effects of the internationalcommunity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, from the point of view of politicalscience, law and sociology. The study was prepared by Nermina [a~i}(Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo), Manfred Dauster (Courtof BiH), and Dino Abazovi} (Faculty of Political Science, University of Sara-jevo), and served as the starting point for the conference debate. The confe-rence brought together representatives of the international community, civilsociety and political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the basis of its acti-vities and experiences amassed in post-Yugoslav countries, and following itsfundamental premise that political education is the necessary preconditionof a truly democratic society, the Heinrich Böll Foundation wants thus tocontribute to a truly democratic political dialogue.

Both the conference and the study are aimed at tallying the effects of theinternational community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as at triggeringa debate on what the presence of the international community meant andcontinues to mean for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The public in Bosnia andHerzegovina often discusses the pending closure of OHR and a re-definitionof the international community’s role. In simple terms, ”the foreigners’ de-parture” is discussed more and more across Bosnia and Herzegovina, andwe thought it was time to intensify public dialogue between the internation-al community and political and civic stakeholders in Bosnia and Herzegovi-na, on present and future concepts, but also on the lost ways of the interna-

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Introduction


tional community and its partners in the Bosnia and Herzegovina politicalarena. At that, one should observe the rules of preservation of things thatproved to be good, overcoming, at the same time, obstacles for furtherdevelopment of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs help from the international commu-nity. However, the international community, Europe in particular, need a sta-ble and prosperous Bosnia and Herzegovina – as a clear sign of a success-ful peace policy. That is why the presence of a concept of acceleratingBosnia and Herzegovina’s effective accession to the EU is indeed one of themost important measures of the overall success rate of the internationalcommunity.

In this publication that is in front of you, you will find the introductoryspeeches, comments and extracts of the discussion from the aforementionedconference, as well as the study which you will find at the end of each the-matic chapter of this publication. The Heinrich Böll Foundation wishes toexpress its sincere gratitude to the authors of the study and to the partici-pants of the conference for their contribution and engagement in the prepa-ration of the conference as well as to the very precious comments, discus-sions and recommendations which you will read on the following pages.

Mirela Grünther-\e~evi}

Head of the Heinrich Böll Foundation,Office in BiH

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Introduction


WELCOME REMARKS

H.E. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, High Representative to BiH and the European Union Special Representative in BiH

Excellency, ladies and gentlemen,

Thank you for inviting me to this conference. This is a very interestingtopic which comes at the right time. Let me also thank you for your excel-lent materials you have sent in advance. This is a study which is extremelyhelpful as it repeats, reiterates and re-evaluates the developments since theend of the war, since the time when all those horrible things took place, inthe early 1990s.

First of all, I would like to thank the Heinrich Böll Foundation for theirextraordinary work and useful discussions and ideas that help improve thesituation. The Foundation has done so since I came to Bosnia andHerzegovina. I cannot remember how many times so far I met with repre-sentatives of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. Once more I would like toemphasize how important this topic and this conference is, since we haveto enhance the understanding of the political situation and the transitionprocess in this country.

This is why I believe that it is extremely important to organize such con-ferences and it seems to me – I apologize for saying it – that there is a habitin this region of identifying the one to blame for some things so quickly.However, in this case the situation is much more complex. The approachimplying guilt is not the proper approach to the future. At the outset of thediscussion I would like to ask the following question: how did we reach thismoment? How did the countries of the former Eastern Bloc make progresstowards Europe?

The process of transition in South-East and Central Europe was difficult.However, on the other hand, we saw the wars waged by Milosevic andnationalist policies aiming at genocide and ethnic cleansing. However, firstof all, I want to share with you one basic opinion about this. It is not veryeasy to say that all the difficulties we went through here were solely the diffi-culties caused by the international community.

Of course, there is room for criticism. However, the region of the formerYugoslavia has shown to be different from other places. It was extremelydifficult to take action in this region because of numerous people of diffe-

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rent religions and history. That was an aggravating circumstance in whichtransition is much more difficult. We have to say that what happened herewas the failure of politicians of this country in the first place, who createdthe situation we are facing right now.

Thus, first of all, I think that every national politician has to accept that itwas not the international community that made mistakes, but that it was ne-cessary to have the international community present here, and that simplythere was no such need in other East European countries which went thro-ugh transition after a communist era, going down the road of democracy.

Indeed, it was so tragic to see, for example, the movements in Hungary,Poland, the movements of liberalization, while at the same time the regionof the former Yugoslavia was ruled by a backward leader and the SecretaryGeneral of the Communist Party who was simply heading towards natio-nalism and ethnic-oriented thinking. That was the reality by the end of 1980sand in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, we have always known, since the verybeginning, that many mistakes were made by the international community.

We, on our part, did not manage to stop the war in Croatia; we did notmanage to prevent genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina because theinternational community’s policy was too fragmented. However, on theother hand, the situation was such that nobody absolutely believed a warwas going to happen. Some believed that at the end of the Cold War therewould be no more wars. However, the reality proved different. Eventually,it was the United States of America that put an end to the war in Bosnia andHerzegovina and created conditions for the Dayton Peace Agreement.

But that was not for the first time that Europe saw a failure. Europe sawthe war coming in the beginning. We all knew that the United States want-ed to get involved right in the beginning, but at that time Europe was notwilling to support the US’ interference in the war and this was precisely thereason why I was struggling against my government at that time. At that timeI was a minister and I resigned because my assessment of the situation wascompletely different.

At that time Europe believed that the situation had not matured yet, afterthe Cold War, for taking over responsibility. The US did notice however thatEurope was not prepared to take its own responsibility, and the US did thatinstead and eventually put an end to the war. This is a sheer fact. This is nolonger just an opinion.

This is why you should know that the Dayton Peace Agreement was nota defeat of either Milosevic or Tudjman, but a political compromise whichsimply set the sides apart. An important difference between that peace ag-

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reement and the end of the World War Two is that during the peace talksthe actors of the war and war criminals were sitting at a negotiating table to-gether. This was something completely different from what we had after weconquered neo-Nazis, and after Germany capitulated.

Here, first of all, we had a compromise with the war criminals, whichmeans that we should not be surprised at all by the fact that the Daytonrules are not the rules for a new liberal, democratic beginning. By the endof 1995 a devastating war was going on for the fourth year and the futurewas uncertain. More than 5 percent of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzego-vina were killed, more than 20 percent of citizens were forced out of theirhomes, more than one million soldiers were armed, we had numerous re-fugees, and also the economy throughout the country was devastated andreplaced by the black market.

The Dayton Peace Agreement and its vision of Bosnia and Herzegovinadepended on the support coming from what used to be the warring fac-tions. And expectations and the future also depended on that. However, theDayton Peace Agreement only put an end to the war although there weregreat expectations about the future. But the main function and the main goalof the Dayton Peace Agreement was to put an end to the war.

The priority of Bosnia and Herzegovina is to accept at least the minimumcompromise along with several logical consequences. Also, that period wasabused and at that time we still had the legacy of a three-and-a-half-yearwar. The international community was present here to defend the countryagainst that war legacy. In other words, the international community tried toestablish peace.

IFOR was present here, and was firm in its purpose. Then, the Office ofthe High Representative was established. The donor agencies and govern-ments also tried to force the former warring factions – beyond reconciliationover the agreement - to ensure the right of refugees and displaced personsto return and to ensure the full political representation of all citizens.

The other reason for the Dayton success was a change of the regions in1995. Many Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to dividethe country, join Serbia and Croatia respectively. However, such attemptsdisappeared. Now, for instance, those who support Dodik do not supporthis calls for referendum.

What about the Bonn powers? During the first year of the Dayton imple-mentation, it became clear that it was no longer possible to implementpeace without much stronger powers, which would be invested in the HighRepresentative. So the decision was made to provide the High Representa-

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tive with the so-called Bonn powers. I have to say that already at that time,in 1993/1994, I was a mediator in BiH.

I was traveling across the country, from one municipality to another, fromone town to another and I realized indeed that there were mayors still inoffice who simply did not want to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement.What they did was to put property repossession claims somewhere in thecorner; they did not process the claims; they ignored court decisions andrulings. They rejected court rulings and decisions.

However, this was impermissible. Eleven years later, Bosnia and Herze-govina is on the road towards signing a Stabilization and Association Agree-ment with the European Union and establishing first contractual relationswhich will eventually lead to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s membership in theEuropean Union. Bosnia and Herzegovina joined Partnership for Peace andCEFTA, and more than one million people have returned to their homes.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the fastest growing economies in theBalkans; it has a political system which was established in Dayton and pro-gress is indeed constant, as a compromise for the inability of Bosnia andHerzegovina to escape the trap of poverty resulting from the war destruc-tion and a poor management by the nationalist policies.

This means that the Bonn powers are still needed in this country. They are needed because of a delicate situation in the region, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and without them, this country would not be able tomove forward. Some people say that the international community took over the role of political parties and that we are implementing politically difficult reforms, while political nationalist leaders are ignoring their ownresponsibility.

Let me tell you: I am aware of criticism coming from both sides. On theone hand, the criticism says: why did you not use the Bonn powers? Whyhave you not used them all the time? You may recall that the internationalcommunity made a firm decision to close the OHR by the end of June of this year. Me too, I counted on that date as I had believed that the mission should be accomplished by the end of 2006 or in the first or second quarter of this year.

This was firm position of all international community member-states andI think that it was good to allow a transitional period while the OHR wasstill present, instead taking decisions which should be made by the respon-sible people, responsible politicians in this country, while the OHR, as aninstitution, would no longer have the same powers.

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After this change was introduced to our policy, right in the beginning ofmy term in office, I wanted to show how important it is for politicians to bemature and take over our role. Bosnia and Herzegovina is on the road tothe European Union, and this country is already participating in this prepara-tory process. The Stabilization and Association Agreement will be signed assoon as all requirements are met.

Here we have the President of the Council of the European Union,German Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina. I think that nobody canimagine how many hours we spent together in an attempt to solve the situ-ation caused by current political rhetoric here and define clearly the require-ments before October 2006. The European Union will continue to take part and be involved in the promotion of the society in the countries, future members of the European Union and this is indeed a phase in which comprehensive reforms should be completed and all existing obs-tacles overcome.

The challenge for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a post-conflict society, ispolitical integration in the European Union, and at the same time it is theonly model for durable peace in this part of the West Balkans. Associationwith the European Union has changed political agitation in this country andthe synergies in the whole West Balkans region should be used for all thecountries to move forward to the European Union. It is also a necessary toinvest resources to assist the West Balkan countries in becoming the Euro-pean Union members as soon as possible.

However, all this will depend on the will and wish of the local stakehold-ers to participate in these processes and Bosnia and Herzegovina will jointhe convoy of the countries getting prepared for the European Union.Montenegro is getting prepared. Regarding Kosovo, a solution is no longera big problem there, as we know, and it will not be good if only this coun-try, which suffered most in the last war, becomes the last country to join theEuropean Union. Now it is the task of the political leaders to assist Bosniaand Herzegovina.

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H.E. Michael G. Schmunk, Ambassador of Federal Republic of Germany and current Presidency of the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Mr. High Representative, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me first thank theHeinrich Böll Foundation for having arranged this timely workshop withsuch distinguished experts. I feel very honored to have been invited tospeak to you this morning. The topic and the central question of this con-ference remains crucial: Has the International Community’s contribution tothe peace-, nation- and state-building (PNSB) process in Bosnia and Herze-govina (BiH) been truly appropriate, effective, and sustainable? I will try togive an answer from my experience in this country, as well as from the prac-tical ”lessons learned” in my five post-conflict society engagements world-wide. I will also try to draw from my related PNSB research as a HarvardUniversity scholar in 2005/2006. Regarding the analysis of the current politi-cal situation, there is, of course, not much to be added to what has beenelaborated on today by our friend Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling—I fullyshare his views.

Since the early 1990s, we have seen an important paradigm shift in theinternational security agenda. Peace-, nation- and state-building assistance tofailed states and post-conflict societies has become both a duty and a priori-ty for Western foreign and security policies. Increasingly, so-called ”coali-tions of the capable and politically willing” have been trying to cope withthe problem of failed states and collapsed societies. These stabilization andreconstruction efforts followed a new type of international interventionaimed at stopping brutal attacks on innocent civilians, including genocide,and massive violations of human rights. When we entered such endeavors,we commanded only little experience of what to contribute, and how to doit right. Our PNSB manuals did not provide much advice, and our tool boxeswere lacking efficient instruments. I have to admit that we, altogether, werenot really sufficiently prepared for such a demanding task. Twelve yearsago, it was actually Bosnia and Herzegovina, which became our first PNSB”case”—the ”mother” of our later engagements in Kosovo, East Timor, Ma-cedonia, Afghanistan and in the Middle East. Over the years, we have ma-naged to adjust our concepts, to improve our manuals, and to create bettertools.

It has been in Bosnia and Herzegovina, though, where we have alsobeen confronted with the limits of international, of ”external” PNSB assis-tance. Initially, our interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina had two goals:

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To stop the ethno-nationalist bloodshed and end large-scale violations ofhuman rights and, secondly, to reunite and reintegrate the divided Bosniansociety after the conflict—introducing human and civil rights, the rule of lawand democracy. The basic concepts with which we started this process werethe Dayton and Washington Agreements. Both did a good job—the violentconflict was brought to an end successfully and sustainably.

The postwar order however, proved to be insufficient to establish a re-conciled, democratic society immune to failing again, and ready to meet EUvalues and standards, so that a future membership of Bosnia and Herzego-vina was within reach. The PNSB cooperation between Bosnians and Inter-nationals produced many good results—stabilization, reconstruction andreform progress have been more than obvious. In particular, the process ofphysical reconstruction, jump starting the economy, and institution-buildinghas been very successful. However, we have come to realize our PNSB limi-tations where the more basic problems of the failed Bosnian society are con-cerned. Still to be tackled are: religious-ethnic divisions, the undefinedrights of the individual, and the insufficiently developed role of civil societyin BiH. Both this society and the International Community have failed sofar, when it comes to confidence building and starting a truth and reconcilia-tion process.

Here, our PNSB manuals and our PNSB tool boxes have not offered uswhat was needed on the ground. Moreover, much more creativity is calledfor—a creativity that both the Bosnians and the Internationals have unfortu-nately been lacking so far. This does not relieve us from our responsibilityto still do better. One thing has to be very clear in this context, though—theforemost responsibility in this regard lies with Bosnian and Herzegoviniansociety. The wide elbowroom of ownership and self-responsibility grantedby the High Representative over the past one and a half years has practica-lly not been used at all.

The International Community has not been perfect, when it comes to thejob of putting a failed society on its feet again. The IC has never been andwill never be a homogeneous one. Do not blame us for our diversity—rather recognize our willingness to help considerably, and over a long time.The IC has made mistakes, and will continue to make mistakes in the future.However, and here again I agree with the High Representative, Bosniansmake their life easier by simply blaming everything on the Internationals.We have been permanently reevaluating and adapting in an attempt toimprove our concepts, our instruments, and our overall PNSB performance.Much more important, though, is the effort coming from the post-conflict

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society itself. Real nation-building should be the job of both the politicalleadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the citizens of this country.Yes, the electorate must also bear responsibility—a resigned withdrawal into the private sphere and into family life is politically dangerous and undemocratic.

I would agree that the so-called ”top down” approach, when it comes toreforms in this country, has failed in large part. It looks as if the IC may havefocused its efforts and its support over the past twelve years too much onpolitical party leaders and senior officials. The result has been, more or less,a self-blockade on the Bosnian side, paralyzing BiH for quite some timenow. One of the most negative results of this self-blockade has beenBosnia’s failure to join the SAA process in time—risking that it may be ”by-passed” by some of its neighbors in the competition to become a full mem-ber of the European Union one day. If we look at the results of recent pollsin BiH, it is very obvious what the clear goal of the large majority of the peo-ple of this country is—full integration of BiH into the EU as soon as possi-ble. Thus my impression since I came here last year has been that the so-called ”bottom up” approach, when it comes to PNSB, should be given muchmore priority on our part. This has already born results on the municipallevel where pragmatic, non-ideological work has demonstrated how thecountry could potentially have moved ahead in the right direction. It hasbeen encouraging to see that on the municipal level the idea of multi-eth-nic cooperation has progressed much further than on the entity and statelevel. Speaking for Germany, but also for the EU, I can say that we havecome to the conclusion that much more political, expert, and financial sup-port should be provided to the cities, towns and villages in Bosnia and Her-zegovina, so that these municipalities, acting in an integrated, non-nationa-list fashion, could become the ”yeast” in the political reform process of BiH.

To reiterate, nation-building is first and foremost the essential duty of thecountry, of the society concerned. The international, the external nation-builder should never forget this. The external nation-builder should concen-trate her or his assistance on those areas where the post-conflict society can-not manage without help from the outside. This ”red line” should never becrossed. PNSB self-restraint is of the essence. Unfortunately, the IC’s engage-ments in many stabilization and reconstruction efforts have shown that this”iron rule” has not always been observed.

In my recent address at the ceremony organized to mark the fiftieth anni-versary of the European Union, I mentioned that there are two key areas inparticular where Bosnians have to take much more initiative themselves.

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One is the creation of the ”social glue” that is needed in each and every soci-ety to form a country, if not a nation. This includes developing a much mo-re vital civil society than the one we see today. The other necessary ingre-dient is an effective, democratic, EU standards oriented basic law and politi-cal order for BiH. It is more than time to replace the by now ineffectiveDayton order with a modern, less complex and less costly constitution. TheInternational Community, above all Germany and the EU, have pledged to provide the framework for the constitution writing process, be it with experts or with financial support. It is now up to Bosnia and Herzegovi-na’s parliament and to the political parties to agree on the path and the substance.

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1. INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BIH



INTRODUCTION

Nermina [a~i}, Faculty of Political Science, Sarajevo University

Would you, please, allow me to warmly greet all of you and say that itis really my pleasure to be present at this meeting because I think that thetopic we are discussing today is extremely important for the future anddevelopment of Bosnia and Herzegovina's democracy.

First of all, let me explain briefly my methodological approach. In my textI have tried to rely on an empirical argumentation in the first place, withoutany major theoretical narration. Still, right in the beginning I would want toshare with you some theoretical dilemmas, after which I will draw onlythose conclusions which I drew from the empirical argumentation. Here ismy first dilemma.

As we are talking about the notion of the International Community, firstof all I want to say that it is the notion which is in public use but its aca-demic definition, at least the one in literature dealing with these issues, hasnot been fully identified. This is why I would like to raise the followingquestion: What is the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina?Who is it represented by? By the United Nations? Is it primarily the EuropeanUnion member-states and the Russian Federation? Is it the United States ofAmerica and NATO; SFOR, etc.? Or the OHR, OSCE, EUPM, and some otherorganizations, both governmental and non-governmental? Is it the IMF, theWorld Bank, WTO, Embassies, or the world’s corporations and others?

Of course, I have tried to define this term and now I can only make thefollowing observation: when I say the ”International Community”, I refer toan aggregate of diverse Anglo-Saxon and European Continental politicalarrangements in addressing Bosnia and Herzegovina’s problem, amongwhich – I hope all of you will agree – there are indeed some theoretical con-troversies when it comes to democracy, nation, state and we shall refer tothat during the discussion.

But the political participation and decisions made about the future ofBosnia and Herzegovina, especially those made in Dayton, raise the issueof whether Bosnia and Herzegovina is a semi- or the full protectorate of theInternational Community and is it the mirror of the fundamental tensionsbetween European and American policies? In this regard, we can say thatthe major specific feature of the International Community is its ‘action on

others’. Let me reiterate ‘action on others’, under the dictate of relocated cen-ters of geo-political and geo-economic powers, the representatives of which

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Influence of the international community on the political development in BiH


are directly or indirectly involved in the Bosnia and Herzegovina politicallife, gives the International Community legitimacy to help develop the insti-tutions of equal citizens, and the mechanisms for the protection of basicrights and freedoms of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but those whichcorrespond to the world’s standards.

From the aspect of international relations, the globalization processes andthe policies of the major powers, the International Community can be seenalso as a kind of an experiment, the aim of which is to begin to build a prac-tical model of the world's society through the system of the global manage-ment in the local community. I mean the political engagement of differentinstitutions of the International Community in the world's local communityof Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are opinions in theory that Bosnia andHerzegovina is a first authentic state of the European Union, primarilybecause of the European Union institutions which operate outside their ori-ginal national frameworks – I am talking about EUFOR, EUPM etc. This re-duces the International Community to the implementation of national inter-ests of imperialistic powers. During the first phase of post-Dayton Bosniaand Herzegovina there was a stronger American influence and the secondphase of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is marked by the final pre-sence and vigilance of Europe.

Generally, the International Community has invested huge efforts in tran-sition, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, I would say, not in a clas-sic transition through which other countries have gone – transition to the fullmarket economy, parliamentary state, and civil society in general, but in thetransition from war to peace, which I want to stress. Although the transitionlasts longer than it was expected, I most sincerely welcome this conferenceand I think that it is legitimate to discuss this topic. It is legitimate to tallythe balance of effects of the International Community over the last twelveyears in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Let me now pass onto an empirical argumentation. I have analyzed seve-ral political segments of the society within which the reforms were imple-mented with the support by the International Community. Those were leg-islative, judicial, media reforms and the reforms within the political partiesand the civil society. These are the conclusions which I have made: with theaim to overcome the blockades in the legislative authorities caused by(which we know) the ethnic political parties, special powers were investedin the High Representative, the so-called Bonn powers. He imposed a seriesof laws in different areas and decision; let me remind you of the decisionson a single currency, license plates, the anthem, flag and so on. However,

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the making of the new legal arrangements contained some weaknesses,which mainly lie in the fact that the legal arrangements were being madewithout consultations with the broader public. The same is true for theDayton. An illustrative example is the Draft Election Law which was sup-ported by all major figures of the International Community in BiH. Still, itwas almost unanimously rejected by the national legal experts two times.The opposition parties were not represented and did not participate in draft-ing of the election rules, something that we can recall, thus, the key mech-anism for the development of the democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina –the election system – remained discriminatory for the citizens of Bosnia andHerzegovina, and as such, in my opinion, it made the ethnic political socialorder legitimate, in which ethnic elites and not peoples they represent, havethe monopoly over Bosnia and Herzegovina and its citizens.

The major priority of the International Community in the reforms referredto the establishment of independent judiciary and the building of the rule oflaw. A major progress has been made in the development of institutions,especially in the introduction of information technologies. The InternationalCommunity also enabled and ensured the formation and unimpeded func-tioning of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which shouldalso be mentioned here, and assisted the formation of various judicial train-ing institutes and the formation of some legal associations. We shall hearmore about that during the second panel discussion; however, what I aminterested in here (which is also stressed in the study) is the following: doespoliticizing come from the International Community? Independent andimpartial judiciary and its de-politicization was the requirement set by theCouncil of Europe for Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the Council ofEurope. However, under the international standards, it means the elimina-tion of any influence on the judiciary from outside, while ‘outside’ refers toanyone outside the judicial authority. Although today there is a legal frame-work which should eliminate political pressure on the judiciary, we couldspeak about its exposure to the pressure from the International Community.

Some words about the media reform. The International Community wasdeeply involved in the media reform after the Dayton Peace Accords weresigned. Under the influence of ethnic oligarchies during the war on the terri-tories they had occupied or preserved under their control, three broadcast-ing systems were formed, all of them different in technical terms, progra-mme and status-wise. We know that the media from Serbia and Croatia we-re spreading their influence and interests across BiH. The International Co-mmunity supported the media expansion in the first phase of its assistance,

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primarily by its huge donations to the media which claimed they were inde-pendent. The purpose of the international intervention was to create the me-dia pluralism. But the question is whether they really contributed to the pro-fessionalization and democratization of the media in Bosnia and Herzego-vina. Despite a good financial will of the International Community, the firstpost-war period was marked by the ‘verbal war’ waged through the media.In 1998 the process of transformation of the state broadcasters to public ser-vices began. It was imposed by the decisions and laws of the High Repre-sentative after failed attempts to have that job done by the domestic authori-ties, management and editorial staff of the existing broadcasters. As a result,there are two entity broadcasters and a Public Broadcasting Service for thewhole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is how, in my view, the media spacein BiH was entitized formally when the continuity of the Sarajevo Radio andTelevision, established in 1945, was disrupted. Last year we marked here inSarajevo the fifth anniversary of the Federation Television and the fifth anni-versary of the Public Broadcasting Service of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Within the legal arrangements, the media reform has reached an enviablelevel in comparison to two other countries in the region, and even in com-parison to our neighbors, Serbia and Croatia. Let us take the example of theFreedom of Access to Information Act. But if we look at practice, there is anobvious lack of strategy, the law implementation. It is in fact just a dead let-ter, lacking practical implementation.

A few words about the civil society. Under the term 'the development ofthe civil society' the International Community meant in most cases the grant-ing of support to the development and work of non-governmental organi-zations, often overlooking the fact that the civil society is much broader thanthe non-governmental sector. The experiences of other countries show thatdemocratization is implemented – at least this is what theory says – by someother civil groups: trade unions, youth organizations, associations of pen-sioners and others. Over the past years after the war we are seeing interna-tional aid to BiH drying up and shifting to other places and crisis spots asKosovo, for instance. This was the reason why the development of manynon-governmental organizations stopped. It seems to me and the theoryalso says that they failed to develop the development strategy following thecessation of international aid. Critics are saying that many non-governmen-tal organizations are rather distant from the society and citizens, which is akind of a paradoxical consequence of support to the civil society. Zarko Pa-pic is warning that the method of support covers an extremely small elite.

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In the end, and this is perhaps the key problem which prevents the In-ternational Community from being more efficient: the International Commu-nity tried to democratize nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It takes agreat effort to realize that the political elites in BiH remain in power thanksto their encouraging, let me reiterate, encouraging insecurity, conflicts andinstability. As such, they will not produce stability as they remain in powerthanks to the conflict. When the three national parties in BiH, SDA, HDZand SDS, were forced under the international pressure to reduce their natio-nalist rhetoric, rivals within national blocks – Party for BiH, HDZ 1990 andSNSD – accepted that vocabulary, which paid well at the elections. There isbelief that the last year’s elections did not show at all that the most radicalparties became moderate but that the most radical parties are, in fact, mode-rate parties. For a number of reasons we could claim that nationalism in BiHbecame radicalized instead of reduced.

The International Community seems to have lacked the information thatthe war in BiH was not a product of an ancient hatred in the region but thatit came from outside BiH and did not have direct causes in the country. Eth-nic cleansing was the aim of the wars and not their consequence. Returnswere not possible without defeating the policy which had envisioned eth-nic cleansing. The returns were not safe because political architects of eth-nic cleansing were not removed from positions, let alone the apprehensionof war criminals Radovan Karadì} and Ratko Mladi}. This is why I believethat the International Community is ignoring completely the issue of consti-tuent minorities, considering the returns to Bosnia and Herzegovina to becompleted. There are indications, and this is what we already heard, that theInternational Community will shrink its engagement further: some authorsare saying that the international community is in fact tired. Despite that, thePeace Implementation Council decided in Brussels that the OHR and theBonn powers should remain in place until June 2008 as the progress in theEU integration process has not been sufficient. The mandate of the OHR wasextended because, I would say, the International Community became fullyaware that BiH needs the constitutional reforms. Thanks to the ethnicizedConstitution, and thereby to the ethnicized law, which was given a longspan of time for its own promotion, the promotion of individual rights lostmomentum, I think that the distinguished participants know which consti-tutional provisions I am referring to and there is no need to repeat them.

I would stress that unfortunately, ethnic/collective rights prevailed inBosnia and Herzegovina’s society – which were most loudly advocated bythe national elites, leaders of national parties in BiH. As the international

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partnership with national ethno-political elites lasted for too long, each ofthem had enough time to advocate the ”peace process” as a purpose of thepolitical life in Bosnia and Herzegovina and not peace as a political value.Ethnic politicians are today the lords of the peace process and in this waythey are controlling both war and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whichis at the same time the negation of democratic principles and a latent des-truction of the Bosnian state.

This is how it looks like in the post-Dayton political practice, or how theethno-elites see the peace process, and thereby the International Commu-nity: the Bosniak political public firmly believes that the International Co-mmunity forced the citizens of BiH to accept the division into two entitiesand that such a structure of BiH does not have any historical, economic oreconomic and geographic justification and that the only foundation of sucha BiH is aggression and genocide. Serb political public believes that the Re-publika Srpska acquired its territorial and legal continuity in 1992 and hasmaintained it ever since and that it was not created by the Dayton PeaceAccords, what is claimed by Bosniaks and Croats, but that it was verified bythe Accords, which is why the future of the Republika Srpska cannot bechallenged. Croat political public believes that the Dayton Agreementopened up a Croat ethnic issue by regulating inter-ethnic relations to thedetriment of the Croat people. There is an attempt to solve the current dis-satisfaction by requests for a third ethnic entity which should be consideredas a ”logical, justified and just goal of the Croat people in BiH as long as itis composed of the entities and as long as there is the Republika Srpska.

In a politically disoriented system of values such centrifugal, divergent,reduced publics - which are the consequence of the political conflict in BiHover a territorial, administrative and legal and political organization of Bosniaand Herzegovina - are leaving devastating effects on the BiH politics in ge-neral and on the BiH political freedoms.

If we are to judge by controversies surrounding the constitutionalreforms, particularly those which were defeated in the Parliament of Bosniaand Herzegovina, then the citizen equality is largely left to the pressure fromoutside the country. Such political conflicts which we have in Bosnia andHerzegovina certainly reduce the effectiveness of the International Co-mmunity. One should be frank and honest and say that the Dayton limitedits role. In the present Constitution, the BiH society (as a perceived holderof sovereignty) is not envisaged as a whole, but as a mechanical sum ofthree constituent peoples, projected in a way as holders of sovereignty. Con-stituent peoples are envisaged as three separate ethnic wholes, which, under

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the logic incorporated in the Constitution, function in the prospect as a sepa-rate society with its own sovereignty.

The constitutional restrictions have also prevented the InternationalCommunity from developing mechanisms for human rights and freedomsprotection. So it seems to us that the OHR is now a new political institutionof Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The International Community took the role of a state by assuming therole of a new patron; as it was expected in socialism that the almighty statewould resolve all the problems of citizens, companies and local communi-ties, the same is now expected from the International Community. Theimposition of many laws by the High Representative reduces the confidenceof citizens in the competences of the authorities which is why it has oftenhappened that some groups are protesting, seeking assistance not from thenational institutions but from the OHR, for instance. The cul-de-sac of anethnically monolithic identity which is legalized by the Constitution made itimpossible to work on the citizenship identity, even for the InternationalCommunity in BiH. Moreover, only a very small number of international offi-cials attached importance and rarely expressed a unanimous belief that itwould be necessary to contribute to a contemplative alternative to an iden-tity on the basis of citizenship. It seems to me that the concept of the citi-zenship identity could perhaps restore the lost confidence of citizens in thestate which is obliged to protect all of its citizens equally.

Frequent removals of politicians by the High Representative to BiH haveencouraged some segments of the population to increase their trust in theInternational Community which was lost at war – I hope that you will agreewith me – on all sides.

Some political parties – their leaders, who were targeted by the HighRepresentative, began to feel a stronger fear, resulting in the shift of theiraccountability from the citizens, who elected them, to the OHR. Some politi-cal parties used those removals for their own election campaign purposes,so that the removed politicians barred from public offices were favored onlybecause they were disliked by internationals.

The International Community has helped Bosnia and Herzegovina a lot,there is no doubt. However, it has not always been functional and in orderfor the International Community to be functional, in my view, it should re-solve the structural problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is the finaldefeat of the ethnic cleansing policy, and all policies which generate conf-lict, uncertainty and instability. Then, I think, it would be possible to workon building not common beliefs but common institutions, as it is the com-mon institutions that can solve accumulated political conflicts and politicalproblems at both individual and collective levels and this is the only way forthe citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to have equal rights.

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COMMENTARY

H.E. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, High Representative to BiH and the European Union Special Representative in BiH

Ms. Sacic, first of all, let me thank you for your good presentation focus-ing on different issues. You may not be surprised, but if you are aware ofmy career here, in this region, you will know that I have always had criticalopinions about the international community, too, so it is not difficult for meto agree with you on many things you have discussed.

The first question, ”Who is the international community?” is a very goodquestion. I have to tell you that in the capacity of the High Representative,I am learning new things about the international community every day.When we are talking about the international community, we have to havea broader picture of the Anglo-Saxon, European and Continental conceptsof states and nations in mind. All that is a very interesting composition ofdifferent organizations. However, there are different pictures of the interna-tional community, depending on different states and different conflicts.

Here we have a broad picture, a broad perspective. However, even I findit sometimes too difficult to see where the basic sources of power lie, wherethey are formulated and where the policies of the international communityare implemented. It is difficult to analyze that and to know what comes fromBrussels, what comes from Washington, London, Berlin etc. I have to saythat your question, what is the international community, is a very complexquestion and I will not dare answer that question.

Secondly, you have said in your study that it is the implementation of national interests of imperialistic powers. Here I can see some crucialpoints. I think that the politicians of Bosnia and Herzegovina see the international community as a community with its own interests, its own tra-dition, and history.

However, there are some major differences between different nationswhich are a part of this international community. For instance, I try, and Iwill dare, to make a difference: in the beginning, by the end of 1980s andin the early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, Europe was not prepared totake the responsibility for this region, as the United States of America did.

But it was also the first time in history that Europe, as a union of sover-eign nations, and as a European Union, should have taken that responsibi-lity. However, we have to consider that in a historical context. For example,Germany had a different position. You cannot avoid mentioning nationalism

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which was present in that country and you cannot say that we did not havean impetus for assuming the responsibility at the right time.

The same is true for the Great Britain. Britain had its interest as Yugosla-via’s experience was similar to theirs after the World War One. France, on theother hand, had a completely different position which was a real nationalposition of France, which concerned the formation of an anti-German fascistalliance with Serbs. Here too there is a historic link, a historic context. Ger-mans were somehow tempted to disappear from the scene completely, asthey had been involved in some horrible things during World War Two.

On the other hand, we had a constitutional problem to be involved invarious activities. But I do not think these were the real reasons. The realreasons were the excuses we were trying to find for what we failed to do.As you said – you have mentioned national interests of different powerfulstates and I have to say that you are right and that is something which I criti-cized a long time ago: that the law enforcement in this country was donethrough a top-down approach, and not vice versa, which resulted in the lackof a debate in this country which would have helped develop the societyand I think this was the real mistake of the international community.

But there were some good things as well, and there were some criticalissues. However, we are aware that different electoral systems are in placein the US and in Europe, and here there is an attempt to create a mixtureof what is present in other states. Also, you have mentioned the Constitutionand quoted what I had said and what Ambassador Schmunk had mentio-ned. The Constitution is one of the basic things and I have to say that I amnot happy about the current situation in that regard, and yet again this is afailure by Europe. It was not until two or three years ago that the fundamen-tal discussions about the constitutional changes began. The role was assig-ned to the US.

When I asked at the beginning of my term, ”What is Europe going todo?” I realized that I was not mandated to talk about that at all, let aloneassist in that process. In Brussels I was trying hard to have that issue includ-ed in my mandate, which did happen in the end, and as of early March weare also involved. We too shall be working on it, of course, together withthe United States of America.

Of course, now you cannot erase the fact that they started the discussion.And we cannot say, ”Well, we shall take it from you and run the show fromnow on”. We shall be doing it together, within the mandate of the EU SpecialRepresentative, coordinated with the US mandate, and with the politiciansof this country. But we do know what happened here. It would be extreme-

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ly difficult to start constitutional reforms if the police reform is not possible.The United States of America said that we should start upon completion ofthe police reform.

However, now we can see that it will not be possible and that everythinghas to be done in parallel. Otherwise, we shall not achieve any success. Ithink that the constitutional reform is one of the most important elementsand I think that we all shall invest joint efforts in that. But I really believeEurope failed to recognize how important it was to commence negotiations,to give the same rights to all citizens and to exclude the domination of anethnic vote.

All these are the elements which will change the situation in Bosnia andHerzegovina substantially. We simply have two different things and we haveto find a way of combining them together. In the end, let me tell you thatyou have really encouraged me with your paper and I am pleased to seethat the local people are doing this and that the people from this countryare involved in these processes. There are as many international studiesabout all these issues as you want. This is why it is important for me to seethe intellectuals of this country, people like you, engaged in these issues.My request to all of you is that you, the intellectuals of this country, are tak-ing over a more important role in the political discussions which are under-way. It is in this combination that we can see how it is possible to put influ-ence on the political parties through pressure by the civil society and itsorganizations. And I am pleased to say that we can hear more and morevoices from that side and see more and more activities which you havetaken to produce your study. Let me congratulate you all.

Zlatko Dizdarevi}, journalist and diplomat

As I am not here today in the capacity of a representative of any organi-zation or community, and as I do not belong to any academic communitydealing with this issue, everything I am going to say will be presented froma slightly different perspective, probably from a rather political angle. Rightin the beginning I would like to say that I trust that this Conference is veryimportant and this is the issue the discussion of which is possible for somany reasons.

When I say 'we', I mean also the internationals, international representa-tives, as much as I am talking about national representatives. For, one day,and I have no illusions that it is going to happen soon, the complete truth

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will be known about what the international community – whatever it maymean – has done in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for Bosnia and Herzego-vina, and equally for itself. I am sure that the truth will be largely differentfrom what we know now and what we are saying now. The time will sheda different light on some issues and it will be interesting to see which kindof the truth about everything will be relevant in the future.

Let me tell you right in the beginning that I am not one of those who be-lieve that the international community is to blame for everything which hap-pened here. I personally believe that our ”right to guilt” for everything whichhappened here is rather exclusive. This right refers to all of us who live inthis region. I am not putting the blame on the international community foreverything which happened to us. I have a much more rigorous opinion abo-ut us than about the international community, but the fact is that the interna-tional community is our topic today and I think that this time we should focuson what we think and know about the international community.

From today's perspective – when we talk about the responsibility of theworld for what happened and is still going on – I firmly believe that theworld did not know or did not want to know the way in which it couldhave helped this country. Among other things, because the internationalcommunity – when it was necessary – did not have a concept for a solutionto the crisis in the region. Likewise, it did not have clear responses to itsown internal relations and capabilities. At that time it was not clear how toimplement everything which was declared international standards and va-lues in the situation which was created during and after the war. We can dis-cuss that today from the perspective of the story which is known to youabout the glass and the dilemma as to whether it is half empty or half full.Of course, everyone will be talking from his or her own perspective and onthe basis of one's own interest and the interests of those represented hereall these years.

It is true that today we can say that Bosnia and Herzegovina has achieveda significant progress in the Euro-Atlantic integration processes and that it ison the road to Europe, but it is also true that this country is the last countryin this region on that road, that we shall sign a Stabilization and AssociationAgreement which will open new roads to Europe certainly after it is signedby all of our neighbors and all the countries in the region.

The situation is similar in the area of economy: Bosnia and Herzegovinahas made a progress indeed and according to some parameters, consideredin isolation, we can say that it has made a very good progress. The econo-mic growth of the state is, say, very dynamic, but in comparison to what

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benchmarks? The fact is that, say, in 1990 the export of Sarajevo's Energo-invest, one of the companies in the country, was almost equal to the over-all export of Bosnia and Herzegovina over the past several years. We canalso say that we have achieved a great success in education and we can alsosay that in 1991 the number of the illiterate in the country was 5 percent,while we can now hear a drastic increase by 20 percent. Before the war,nearly all children received primary education, while today, children fromvillages, even regions, do not go to school at all nor are they receiving amainstream primary education.

These are all perspectives that allow us to analyze the present situation.What I am telling you now is only my own view, and it is based on every-thing which I have seen and experienced over the last fifteen years andwhat I have done. Some of those stories have a very strong, even perma-nent impact, and I cannot forget them whenever I am to put together a ge-neral picture about what happened and what is happening to us today,especially about what we refer to as the 'international community' in ourreality. Also, I have to say that I am thinking from the perspective of some-one who is from Sarajevo, someone whose views about the world and theinternational policy were completely affected by the war. I am also speak-ing as a journalist, who in that capacity, as a reporter and a correspondentfrom abroad, witnessed many wars across the world and is in a positionnow to draw a parallel with the wars in Afghanistan, Lebanon, in the MiddleEast and so on. I am also speaking as an active diplomat. I was ambassadorto our neighbor, Croatia, the country which is an inseparable part of theBosnian war story. Let me tell you that I am not talking about the roles play-ed by the international community in this country from the position of thecitizen who acquires the knowledge about the world and its attitude towardsus solely on the basis of the information from the media. Perhaps this is thereason why in a way I have no euphoric feelings over this issue.

Well, in this regard, let me share with you a few private stories which Iwould like to tell you and which – at least this is my opinion – are veryimportant for the understanding of my assessment. At first sight it might notseem to be the case but I will try to tell my stories in the way in which youwill understand them.

So, the first story goes back to the 1992/1993 winter. The British GeneralRose, UNPROFOR Commander, organized the reception in his headquarters,where a group of journalists, among them myself, were invited. There wasnothing at that time in Sarajevo – it was dark all the time, pitch dark every-where, there was no electricity, water, food... Even the initial illusion that

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everything was going to end in a few weeks and that life would start fromwhere it stopped disappeared. The city was under an iron siege, and it wasclear that the military intervention, which they had been promising so much,was not going to happen. The depression was complete. When I saw in theGeneral’s residence wine, meat, cheese and cakes, I could not believe thatit existed in Sarajevo at all. While talking to the General, I was full of emo-tions and slightly pathetic: I asked him, believing naively that my questionwas going to upset him: ”Do you understand, General, that if what is goingon here ends without a minimum of justice you will have dozens of Bosnianyoung men planting bombs and explosives in Europe’s capitals?” The Ge-neral looked at me with his cold eyes and said: ”Mister Dizdarevi}, I agreewith you that we can be faced with dozens of Bosnian young men plantingexplosives. But do you know what can be much worse than having dozensof Bosnian young men with bombs? It would be much worse to have thou-sands of Serb young men able to do the same thing”.

Quite frankly, I did not sleep that night because I started discovering anew world which had been unknown to me. The world of the so-calledreal-politik, which has absolutely nothing to do with the issues and justiceand even less with fairness. Many people here have not yet understood thatdimension of the so-called international community, and usually it is crucial.Look at that shocking focus on Serbia in connection with Kosovo, and thefull ignorance of all other issues in the region only because of the attitudetowards Serbia and Kosovo.

Another story is no less important for understanding of the character ofour society, the story which the so-called international community has neverunderstood, which was a huge mistake. All the people from Sarajevo, wholived here at the beginning of the war, while we still watched television, willknow the story. A sniper shooter hit a young girl in the head, from up thesurrounding hill. Let me remind you that a sniper is different from a shell:sniper is waiting, selecting, targeting, it sees and shoots. We should keep inmind all that when we are talking about a four-year old girl who was thevictim. She was in hospital dying, and her father, a worker of a Sarajevo-based company, crushed with pain, all in tears, said to a TV reporter: ”Iwould like to have a cup of coffee with the man who shot my girl and askhim why he did that”!?

Nowhere in the world would a reporter ever get that response from thefather of a dying girl. He would invite the killer to a cup of coffee and askhim why he did that!? That coffee was at that time a part of the age-long cul-ture of relationships in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 'real-politik of the in-

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ternational community has never been interested in that. In order to under-stand fully the situation here, and to understand fully the final effects of theso-called international community, it is, in my view, a very important dimen-sion. The third story has now a special place in my attitude towards thisissue and everything which happened to us over the last fifteen odd years:after the war, at one of the many seemingly important but rather senselessconferences on the ”geo-strategic future of the Balkans” held in luxurioussummer resorts across Europe, I met with Sir Marrack Golding. At the begin-ning of the war he was the chief of operations and an adviser to BoutrosBoutros Ghali, then the UN Secretary General. He was an old, experienceddiplomat. His position was crucial for the UN decision on whether the bluehelmets should be deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on their man-date; whether the so-called safe havens, among them Srebrenica, should beestablished or not. At that time I was a journalist and used the opportunityto interview him. I asked him, among other things, believing that my ques-tion was provocative: ”Mr. Golding, do you have peaceful dreams after eve-rything which happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina and after the decisionwas made to deploy the blue helmets in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whichwas quite an ineffective deployment in the end?” I thought of Srebrenica inthe first place and genocide which happened there before the eyes of theUN troops, and not only of that. To my great surprise, he said: ”You are right.You question is right. I do not have peaceful dreams. Let me tell you why.Because back in 1992, when I was suggesting to Boutros Ghali that the bluehelmets should be deployed in Bosnia, I knew that their mission would notand could not be successful. I knew that the United Nations did not havetheir army, system, mandate, the capabilities and resources required for areal military operation and I knew that they would not be able to opposethe military machinery ravaging the country. I knew that it would be thearmy capable of making fake threats. But still, because of various threats andthe ‘real’ politik, I proposed the deployment of the blue helmets. You knowthe consequences. This is why I do not have peaceful dreams.”

And finally, from that perspective, from the perspective of those threestories – and there are many other stories – it would not be serious to ignorean important fact: we are talking about a small Bosnia amid a great geo-strategic space. That is all we are discussing today. Bosnia and Herzegovinais still primarily a small part of a big global picture. And I claim with fullresponsibility that Bosnia and Herzegovina – regardless of all internal prob-lems and people of small caliber who are on top – is the hostage of every-thing which is going on around, in Serbia in the first place, what is going

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on to happen in Kosovo tomorrow or elsewhere. It is a hostage of the preju-dices about Islam in Europe. It is a hostage of some 'real-politik' in the so-called international community; it is a hostage of the absence of a long-termstrategic solution for the non-member-states. It is a hostage of a pragmaticcaution towards the possibilities of multi-culture and the contact of civiliza-tions opposite to the theories about the conflict of civilizations. We are hard-ly discussing that. Internationals are attempting to copy some foreign mo-dels of democracy, economy, politics, culture, sociology, and they neverthink of going deeper into the local authenticity with much deeper roots,which is much more vital than they may ever think. Everyone here is deal-ing with the state, the constitution, the form, and hardly anyone thinks thatthe drama of Bosnia and Herzegovina lies in the subversion of the societyand not in the subversion of the state.

In this context I have to tell you one more story. Perhaps the most dra-matic story and the most indicative story, again from the war. That war isthe paradigm for all the worst which happened to the society here, and theso-called international community has failed to recognize it, because of the'real-politik' and the decision to be persistent in implementing an impossi-ble scheme: here nobody is a criminal and nobody is the victim, here, allare equally crazy and equally responsible, here, there is no winner and noloser. A perfect result of that approach is the Dayton Agreement, the DaytonConstitution. That code formed an ideal forbidden ground for the war crimi-nals and all wrong concepts underlying the past and the present BiH drama.

The story goes like this: I was present at an incredible dialogue betweena high official from the ‘other side’who is at The Hague right now, and some-one who is still present in politics here. The shell had fallen on the residen-tial area of Alipa{ino polje, here in Sarajevo, and nine children were killed. Itwas winter and the information reached the airport where the two delega-tions were discussing technical issues, about power and water supplies to thecity. The representative of the Sarajevo side, having heard what had hap-pened, desperate, asked the representative of the ‘other side’ (Boutros Bou-tros Ghali called them in an interview to the Rome’s ‘La Repubblica’ side Aand side B) who is now in The Hague: ”How long will you be killing ourchildren?” His reply was cold: ”So long as you believe that we can live togeth-er.” His reflex response was very precise and coldhearted. That is very im-portant but totally ignored. Everybody keeps silent about it in Bosnia andHerzegovina. The society in Bosnia and Herzegovina is fragmented, destroy-ed in its substance far more brutally and far more dramatically than the state.And that society has in this region always been far more important than the

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state. Bosnians and Herzegovinians have never been occupied with the state.Unlike Croatia and Serbia, where one’s own identity was found in the statewithin its borders, the people in Bosnia proved their identity with their rela-tionships with their neighbors and those their neighbors have with them. Thecoffee which I have mentioned: quite precisely, in Bosnia and Herzegovinayour neighbor is more important than whether you have the state or nor. Thisis why an ethnic division in the schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina is for mea much more dramatic and bigger problem than the development or aboli-tion of the entities, cantons etc. In other words, the lack of will to understandthis reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lack of will to recognize the objec-tive enemies to Bosnia and Herzegovina in this context is the cardinal failureby the so-called international community. Functioning on the basis of per-spectives of their own 'perfect states' which they wanted to copy here, theinternational protectors in Bosnia were unable to do anything more. Theyhave never understood that the destruction of the spiritual multi-cultural andmulti-religious substance of the society here is in the long run much morefatal blow to the possibility of the new organization of the state than the cons-titutional amendments which have not yet been made. Personally, that is mymajor objection to the so-called international community which, in fact, couldnot reach that level of understanding of the reality here, with the bureaucratsof a low caliber on which BiH (with few exceptions) relies.

We could be talking about this for hours, even days; the magnitude ofthe Bosnian tragedy enables us to do so, but there is no time and no suchinterest. So let me give you a few indications of the mistakes the world hasmade in BiH. Some of the mistakes will never be undone, and some couldpossibly be corrected. The order does not reflect the importance:

The nature of the previous society has been ignored. Some solutionswere imposed as if nothing had ever existed here. As if there had been norather consistent system of values which was rather similar to the Europeansystem of values. Some arrangements were imposed, as well as the solu-tions, which required the elimination of everything which existed before, inorder to build something which would never correspond to the local reali-ty and the social and historical genetic codes.

Even beyond the war, economy was destroyed fully in the name of the'new system' and new interests. The 'elimination of the ‘old and outdated'was insisted on, although it had functioned and provided the result in thename of the 'new and modern' which has never been established. The crimeof privatization and the return to absolute values and indicators which con-tinue, for decades, to be below the pre-war ones, won.

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The existing high standards in culture, education, media, have been eli-minated in the name of something which has not yet been seen in practice.When it comes to the promotion of the public media in Bosnia and Herze-govina, I am the witness of an attempt to promote the projects and stan-dards with the medical captains of the British army, named leaders of thereform, and they were dealing with the so-called reform in the mannerwhich is totally contrary to the local needs, capabilities and the mentality.By the end of the 1990s 'instructors' were coming from the U.S. to lectureus on the bilingual programs while we had a simultaneous coverage of theOlympic Games on the Sarajevo Television in 1984 in more than ten langua-ges. Most of the people who worked at that time live in Sarajevo now andare able to take part in the development of the television system, but theirprofessional freedom of thought did not fit the ideals of the captains.

Because of the lack of knowledge about the reality, and also because ofan overbearing behavior and the vain feeling of 'elitism' towards the 'Bal-kans' on the one hand, and because of fear of competition felt by the localworthless men in power, on the other, the local resources are usually igno-red. Quality resources are being rejected, and young and educated peopleare discouraged from returning to the country and engaging in its develop-ment. Some are boasting that democracy is in place and that everything thatwe have is the 'result of the democratic choice of the voters'. Cynicism is sobig: how can one speak of democratic elections when there are no demo-cratic institutions, free and independent media, the elimination of the keyrole played by the church and mosque in politics, education and at least amodicum of a serious non-governmental sector and the civil society? Theperception of politics is still only the government and nothing else. Formally,the circle gets closed with three statements: The Dayton put an end to thewar and this is why it should remain unchanged; democracy is now in placein the former communist country and this is proven at the elections – theresult is democracy. And thirdly, the houses were repainted in the towns,there are coffee bars and restaurants, old socialist factories were sold, whichmeans that the reconstruction is over! And in all those three segments, thereis a big illusion, to say the least. Mr. Schwarz-Schilling has compared our situation to that in Germany in 1945. I have recently read a statement by aWestern diplomat who wonders: ”How it was possible for Germany andFrance to create the EC ten years after the war, while BiH has not movedfrom the deadlock yet”. I have to say that this annoys me. The gentlemendo not want to say that in 1945 fascists, war criminals, enemies, Nazis, colla-borationists were wiped off the historical scene over night, practically. Here,many of them are still in power. Winners and losers were identified. But he-re it is a taboo. All are the same. Can you find in any book of history that

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Hitler was a great leader and fascism a good thing? And look: what the child-ren are learning in schools about the events 15 years ago. What the worldinvested in Germany in order to raise it back on its feet and which part ofeconomy was destroyed here after the war in order for criminals and profi-teers, both local and international, to amass their wealth. The court in Nurn-berg removed in summary procedures the leaders of the fascist movement,and Karadzic and Mladic are making fun of the whole world, 12 years afterthe end of the war, still at large, and have, quite certainly, the deals andsecret arrangements with the world. Even their younger pawns are escap-ing prisons with the full logistical support by the prison guards, their friendsfrom the war, who wear uniforms of officials of a 'new state'. But this is notthe way in which things are described in Bosnia, in the name of 'real-poli-tik'. Serbia and Kosovo might get angry!

In short, instead of a conclusion, here is an indication about fourunavoidable things which must be kept in mind when we speak about therole played by the international community (whatever it might mean) in thepast decade in BiH.

First of all, a constructive mistake was made in the beginning. Mr.Schwarz-Schilling said that the peace agreement was made as a compromi-se with the war criminals who continue to be present in politics. We are allpaying the price for that. Secondly, we cannot avoid the strategic fact thatthe European Union is the community of nation states and is constructed onthe basis of that fact. Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a nation state in thoseterms, and the European Union, or the so-called international community,has no response to that fact. They are trying to apply in Bosnia and Herze-govina the same rules which are applied in their states, although they can-not be applied here.

Thirdly, the current issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina is how to changeonly those standards which do not apply in any other country of the world,and how some concrete arrangements which are in place elsewhere shouldbe avoided here. Tolerance of the criminal projects cannot be called real-politik nor is the policy in that name possible.

Fourthly, someone will have to take care of the fact that the collectivePTSP, produced over the last decade in BiH, has its limits within which itcan be controlled. The failure to deal with and solve the key civilizationproblems in BiH on the foundations of international standards which applyto all others will become one day a big, new problem for all those who aretrying to push Bosnia under the carpet.

I did not get the impression that the representatives of the so-called inter-national community are fully aware of this.

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DISCUSSION

Du{anka Majki}, House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH

Dear Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. I come from the ParliamentaryAssembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I come from the highest legislativeauthority of this country and I belong to the political party which has so farbeen mentioned so many times, the Union of Independent Social Democrats(SNSD).

I would like to thank the organizers for this opportunity as I believe thatthe conferences like this one help us come together and hear different opi-nions and views and try to bring them into harmony. In this country we for-got communication a long time ago, and if the dialogue is the key word,then it is definitely something that we need now. Not only will we learn tocommunicate but also we will learn to reach an agreement. I am not one ofthose who are criticizing the international community a lot, although I amindeed fully aware of its past failures, because I am simply of the view thatit is not polite to criticize a lot those who gave us assistance and whom youexpect to assist you in the future. I fully appreciate the huge strength andenergy invested here and as an individual, as a human being in the firstplace, I am aware of many results which the international communityachieved here; this is why I cannot be too critical although there are somany things that I could criticize in the country in which I live. It would be logical for me, as a parliamentarian, to say something which is referredto as parliamentary democracy, or whether Bosnia and Herzegovina hasachieved enough in the development of the parliamentary democracy. Tobegin with, while thinking about that issue, the responses were not difficult.We are the country on which a constitution was imposed. In this country,most of the laws continue to be made and approved under the influence ofor in cooperation with the international community. We are the country inwhich the problem regarding the implementation of the law is obvious,which means that it is a question when or how the laws which we havemade will be implemented. We are the country in which neither the parli-ament nor the executive branch has the capacity needed for the decision-making crucial to this country. What is the oversight over the governmentby the parliament, especially when it comes to the budget? What do audi-tor reports say and how much is this country susceptible to fraud and cor-ruption? What kind of an election law do we have and is it not a mistake

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by the international community – that we have the unique election law,which does not exist anywhere, while it should be a good law and applica-ble only here? These are some of the questions which are mutually relatedand all of us individually can answer them.

But the key question which I think we should ask is the following: dowe know at all what kind of a state we want? What kind of a state do citi-zens of this country want? Today, during this conference, it is clear whichgroup, which people the individual speakers belong to. I mean the localspeakers, those who come from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our speeches arerecognizable by our conviction that there are more problems on the otherside of the fence than in our own yard, although problems exist everywhere.And we have to be realistic. What kind of a state do we want? Have we dis-cussed that? Is there any sense in talking about anything before we agreeon the kind of a state we want to live in?

We have just heard: if we ask Bosniak representatives, most of them willpromote strongly a ‘one citizen one vote’ principle, which means a unitaryBosnia and Herzegovina with which the other two peoples will not be ha-ppy. If we ask Croat representatives, they will unanimously say that theirhuman rights are not protected in the part which is referred to as the Fede-ration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that they would like most to live intheir own political community. And if you ask Republika Srpska, you knowthe answer. A response to the issue of a referendum is not an unprovokedissue. Politicians from Republika Srpska have said: everyone who falls onthe Dayton Peace Agreement, and thereby on the Republika Srpska, will geta rap on the knuckles – a referendum.

Let is behave in a correct way, and let us change things, let us have theconstitutional reforms as we arrange them in an agreement. In this countrywe shall never get everything and this is the rule which we have to be awareof. All of us can get something, but that something has to be agreed on.

As a parliamentarian in my previous term in office, I firmly believed thatmany things could change in this country for the better until the constitu-tional reforms began. When there were fourteen Ambassadors sitting at theParliament session, the whole set of the constitutional amendments wasdefeated by two votes only. I asked myself where I was, in fact, where Ilived, what this country should become one day. Regardless of it all, I domy job as a Member of Parliament in a correct way, wholeheartedly and Iwill continue to do so with the same zeal but I will allow – and I think thatthis position is shared by many politicians from the Republika Srpska – thatthe question of how we shall live and how this country should look like be

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asked before the police reform and many other questions which are beingasked; that is the most crucial question to which a response should besought.

This means that we need the international community’s support in thefuture, especially in the area of the constitutional reform, which is the issuethat we will have to discuss together. In the end, this dialogue in Bosnia andHerzegovina is something that I am also expecting the international commu-nity’s support to. It will help us move from the present paralysis of our ener-gy to the road of the future.

Miro Lazovi}, The Forum of Parliamentarians 1991-1996

I will try to be short because of other participants who would also liketo take the floor and in view of the importance of this Conference and theconclusions which will probably be made at the end. Let me tell you rightat the beginning of my speech that myself and Ms. Majkic belong to the sa-me ethnic group, the Serb people, but our stories are different. As someonewho has lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the last fifteen or sixteen years– and as one of the few Serbs who remained in the Parliament of Bosniaand Herzegovina and voted in favor a referendum, and as someone whowas involved in all peace talks about Bosnia and Herzegovina, I have somany things to say. I am not going to share my impressions with you norshall I be talking about all the processes enabled by the international com-munity’s most crucial role, albeit its frequent hesitation. That it was hesitantin the period 1992-1995 is proven by the fact that five or six peace talks onBosnia and Herzegovina were organized. I still remember 1994 when theWashington Agreement was being discussed. As a participant of the talks, Iasked Charles Redman: ”Why is only one part of Bosnia and Herzegovinanamed the ‘Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’? What about the otherpart?” He said to me that in the second phase the territory controlled by Serbforces would join the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when thewhole of Bosnia and Herzegovina would become the Federation of Bosniaand Herzegovina – which was logical and acceptable to our delegation. Iam telling you this because the processes took a different direction andeventually Republika Srpska was formed, which Muhamed [a}irbegovi}accepted in his capacity of a Foreign Minister on September 8, 1995, and thetwo entities were formed before the Dayton talks. Thus, it was not theDayton Agreement that created Republika Srpska; it was he who agreed to

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it. I am stressing this as I am one of those who believe that the internatio-nal community has played a crucial role in Bosnia and Herzegovina regard-less of its hesitation and lack of resolve and I am also among those politicalforces which are promoting the continued presence of the internationalcommunity here because of the fact that we have a constitutional order andthe territorial organization here which are, in fact, wrong. We can certainlybe talking about some things, here, and about improved economic stan-dards in both Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzego-vina – but we shall not solve the problem. The problem was ill-defined rightin the beginning. Bosnia and Herzegovina will never be able to build its safeand stable structure with two entities in place, with the Federation of BiHand Republika Srpska, and it is precisely this fact that hurts most and thathas to be changed. All other issues are nothing but cosmetics.

We cannot say that the people here do not need to hear the truth. HereI do not agree with Mr. Schwarz-Schilling who has said that we have beenidentifying the one to blame for some things, for fifteen years. No, we arenot trying to identify the one to blame. We are looking for the truth. Whatabout the truth? Is justice possible without the truth? Are reconciliation andforgiveness possible without justice? Can the future of this state be stable andsafe without forgiveness and reconciliation? I am sure, it cannot. I want mychildren to live in a safe Bosnia and Herzegovina, a reintegrated Bosnia andHerzegovina and I do not want them to live in the state of Bosnia andHerzegovina in which one part has an ethnic prefix – Republika Srpska. Solong as that name exists, it will be affecting the future of this state. If it is notpossible to change the territory, let us change its name. Can the internatio-nal community change the name of the Republika Srpska? Rest assured thatall citizens, including Serbs, and primarily Bosniaks and Croats, will embraceBosnia and Herzegovina wholeheartedly and will build it together. So longas there is an ethnic ‘prefix’, the problem in Bosnian and Herzegovina willpersist; and the problem will also persist here in Sarajevo and in the Fe-deration for the Serbs. There is no guarantee or the protection of our humanrights which will give us an equal status, to Bosniaks and Croats, so long asthe name of Republika Srpska exists. Rest assured that I am telling you thison the basis of my experience. Thus, gentlemen from the international com-munity, please think in that way. A new Constitution is ahead of us, the talksabout a new Constitution are ahead of us, and please, take into considera-tion those facts. No cosmetic changes contained in the pervious constitutio-nal amendments, which were once defeated, will – if brought back to thedebate - solve the problem. Only the talks about a new Constitution and a

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completely different constitutional and territorial organization of Bosnia andHerzegovina can result in stability and future of this state.

Senad Pe}anin, Dani independent magazine

I have to tell you that I am quite disappointed by what we have heardfrom Mr. Schwarz-Schilling. I think that the level of the discussion heremakes the title a bit too pretentious: I believe that the discussion about veryspecific issues could be practically useful.

Yesterday I interviewed Mr. Gregorian, Principle Deputy High Represen-tative. During the interview I said something which shocked him badly. Myintention was not to hurt him, although I may have indeed hurt him in theend. Still, let me say the same thing also to Mr. Schwarz-Schilling. For yearswe have had the same story, which has become a mantra, about the mis-takes made by the international community during the war in Bosnia andHerzegovina. Unfortunately, we had a classical pattern: three warring fac-tions, centuries-long hatred and the international community, present herein the form of UNPROFOR, the United Nations Force, equally distant fromall ”warring factions”. This is nothing new: everyone can talk about thistoday, including Mr. Schwarz-Schilling and especially Ambassador Schmu-nk, because of his academic references. The United Nations engagement inthe war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. UNPROFOR’s engagement, hasbeen taken for many years in theory and in professional literature as anexample of a disastrous failure with tragic consequences. However, what dowe have now? Mr. Schwarz-Schilling's position is exactly like the position of UNPROFOR during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina! Let me illustratethat by one example only – the current discussion about the police reform.After two international tribunals delivered their judgments, most notablyafter the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment which says thatthe Republika Srpska police, together with the Republika Srpska Army, com-mitted genocide, on the one hand, there are those who claim that now thatthe judgment was delivered there should be the minimum of somethinghumane, moral... and that such institutions should no longer exist, especi-ally in the context of the ongoing police reform. On the other hand, thereis the position of the Serb leaders who simply do not see any problem inhaving the institution which committed genocide continue to exist in the fu-ture. And now, we have you, Mr. Schwarz-Schilling, you who have been”neutral” in the dispute which is blocking the progress of Bosnia and Herze-

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govina on the road to the EU, the dispute over the question whether theinstitution which committed genocide may exist and be allowed to functionin a reformed, European Bosnia and Herzegovina!? Are you aware of theconsequence of your neutrality? The consequence of your neutrality is thatwe have precisely what Ms. Majkic has just talked about: that we know pre-cisely everyone’s ethnic identity in the Parliament and in the media. That isthe biggest problem. And the problem is not the police reform. With yourposition you are directly destroying those few oases remaining withinBosnia and Herzegovina, what we call non-nationalist or civil sector or the sector, which arose and fostered hopes of the people living together inBosnia and Herzegovina. It is so sad if the positions of those who think thatfollowing the International Court of Justice genocide judgment it is no longerpossible for the institution called 'the Republika Srpska police' to exist areconsidered to be 'Bosniak positions' and 'Bosniak demands' – it is sad andit is a shame that those positions are not also your positions, Mr. Schwarz-Schilling. You are behaving just as UNPROFOR did, in precisely the sameway, I mean, you in person: we know that you talked differently about thesame issue when genocide was being committed. Here you act as a leaderof a non-governmental organization, although you are aware of your po-wers. The consequence of your behavior is that what is left of multi-ethnic-ity in this country – which survived genocide, war crimes, religious commu-nities and nationalist leaders – will succumb to you.

For instance, the Social Democratic Party of BiH was practically the onlyrelevant multiethnic political party. But its opposition to the continued exis-tence of the 'Republika Srpska Police' and your 'neutrality' turned that partyinto the Bosniak political party in the eyes of the vast majority of Serbs.Regardless of what we may think about the SDP – I myself do not haveabsolutely the best opinion about it – it is damaging for Bosnia and Herze-govina. And this is a catastrophic effect of your policy, the policy of equidis-tance, which you were once willing to recognize in UNPROFOR actions andthe international community's engagement during the war and even con-demn it, while practicing and demonstrating the same equidistance now.Luckily, we are no longer targeted by shells and missiles, which makes yourresponsibility smaller in the public eye.

With your positions and those of your colleagues who represent theinternational community and the Western countries in Bosnia and Herze-govina we are losing the opportunity of having anonymous media, whichwould not be recognized by ethnicity only, depending on the area theycome from.

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Before I heard your position, I was too naive to believe that if I think thatthere should be no 'Republika Srpska police' under the same name in thefuture, this was not my 'Bosniak position'. I thought this was a European,our, my and your shared demand. I thought that nobody with a modicumof morals and respect for the genocide victims could deny it. However, no!You say: ”Let Dodik and Silajdzic reach an agreement”. If you have no prob-lem with morals, do you not understand that your position is doing nothingbut fostering both Dodik and Silajdzic and their nationalist policies?!

In the end, please, do not underestimate the possibility that, unfortunate-ly, such roundtables, in a few years time, thanks to such positions of yours,take place with far less representatives of different ethnic groups and manymore security checks and X-rays in front of the conference rooms.

Nurko Pobri}, Law School, ”Dèmal Bijedi}” University, Mostar

Mr. Zlatko Dizdarevic has already said that the Dayton Agreement con-tains some constructive or constitutional mistakes which resulted in politicaland social practices and developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina in thepost-Dayton period. I would like to make a brief statement in this regard: fir-st, the legal qualification of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is wrong: inthe Preamble to the Dayton Agreement it is described as a ”tragic conflict inthe region”. Although it was tragic indeed, (at least for now) the fact aboutthe nature of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is generally known. Secon-dly, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Annex IV to the DaytonAgreement, was imposed indeed and it is true that the Constitution, as some-one has already said, should not have resulted from a compromise with thewar criminals, and here I would add that the Constitution, as least partly, wasindeed the result of the compromise of the war criminals, which, clearly,should not have been allowed to happen. The Constitution of Bosnia andHerzegovina was de facto made by those international factors who are re-ferred to in the Dayton Agreement as 'witnesses' so that the 'witnesses' to theDayton Agreement, if there was consent among them, could impose on('present to') Bosnia and Herzegovina just any constitution, even a democra-tic one, in terms of its content, a 'normal' constitution so to speak. However,Bosnia and Herzegovina got the Constitution which is probably the onlyConstitution in the world which contains discriminatory provisions (the Con-stitution both allows and prohibits discrimination), so that its consequence isthe political and any other practice in Bosnia and Herzegovina's society.

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Thus, any partial constitutional reforms (revisions), no matter how suc-cessful they may be, do not seem to be sufficient for making substantialchanges to the political and social reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It isonly a new Constitution, which would be considerably different from theDayton Constitution that may produce a different, inevitably positive politi-cal and social reality in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the time being, unfor-tunately, there is no consensus over the changes to the Constitution ofBosnia and Herzegovina. Why is there no consensus? Because there is noconsensus over the existence of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina assuch. In other words, some citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not con-sider themselves to be nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina and do notidentify themselves with BiH.

Of course, we can say that there is the lack of the phenomenon whichis referred to in the German legal theory as the 'constitutional patriotism'. Of course, there is a lack of patriotism as well, in its usual sense. As a consequence, there is no so-called 'constitutional moment' (the term fromthe U.S. legal theory). In other words, there is the lack of will and conscienceof the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina that they need a new Constitution.Let me also respond to Ms. Du{anka Majki}. You have said the principle of'one man one vote' is something which does not fit Bosnia and Herzego-vina. Is it possible at all for a man to have two or three voices (votes) at all?The political groups which are promoting the concept different from Bosniaand Herzegovina having a 'one man one vote' concept are abusing the right which exists in every democracy as one man can have only one vote.For, the time of plural votes has long been the past. The protection of different minorities and of human rights etc. is another issue; there are theappropriate constitutional and legal arrangements which govern the protec-tion of minority rights and human rights in general, which are independentfrom the 'one man one vote' principle.

Jerko Ivankovi}-Lijanovi}, House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina

We, in the Working for Prosperity People's Party, are trying to deal withthe causes rather than conseqences, which we believe is far more effective.In our view, the causes to all the problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina arethe political organization and the vote along ethnic lines. If this were a mo-no-ethnic state, that would be quite all right and quite normal; but as it is amulti-ethnic state, the political organization and vote along ethnic lines are

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in contradition with the state. The solution to that situation is a multi-ethnicpolitical organization, when there would be no etnnic vote any more – itwould be eliminated automatically. It is possible to have a multi-ethnic poli-tical organization in two ways. That is an extremely difficult process, but inorder for this country to be successful, it will have to implement thatprocess. Before that the High Representative will have to be here; no goodplan or strategy will be possible, its implementation will not be possibleeither. To corroborate this, let me give you an example of the EuropeanUnion Parliament. In the European Union Parliament there are parties fromall the states, there are social-democratic, liberal, green and people's partiesand many more, and it was first the European parties that were created andonly then was the European Parliament formed; the process continues todevelop in a normal, natural way. And we did it the other way round: first,we got the Parliament while there is no political party represented in theParliament which covers the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina and is sup-ported by voters from all three peoples, except, perhaps, to a small extent,my own party. And this is strongly felt in the Parliament and its everydaywork. My colleague from the SNSD said that her party had had a very goodelection result; they have a proposal for the constitutional amendments, forthe police reform; still, they are unable to implement it as they do not havea partner in the Federation who would support it. The same problem existsin the Federation: the political parties in the Federation have their propo-sals for the police reform, for the constitutional amendments as well, butthey are unable to implement it as they do not have partners in the Repub-lika Srpska. If the SNSD and the SDP merged into one party, they would beable to take the sovereign lead in and implement both the constitutionalreform and the police reform, without anyone's mediation, quickly and effe-ciently, as there would be no obstacles which exist now. Or, if HDZ, SDAand SDS merged into one party, it would be a strong, capable party to thesame effect. Or, if there were a completely new party which would receivesupport in both Entities, that would be a success in the end. In the absenceof that, we are trying hard to do it alone, within our own ranks. We knowthat the road is too difficult. Our party is our front runner. We tried to getthe parliamentary majority throughout BiH but we know that it is a difficultand heavy road and we are not sure whether we shall ever reach an end ofthat road. Still, we will be trying hard. What I would ask the internationalofficials here is that they grant their support to dealing with the causes, forif the causes are dealt with and eliminated successfully, the manner of poli-tical organization, there will be no need for dealing with the consequences,as the practice has so far been to deal only with the consequences.

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STUDYNermina [a~i}

The International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(December 1995 - March 2007)

A Political Science View

1. Introduction

What is the International Community in BiH? Who is it represented by?By the United Peoples or Nations? Is it primarily the European Union mem-ber-states plus the Russian Federation? Is it the United States of America plusNATO; SFOR, IFOR, KFOR etc.? Or the OHR, OSCE, IPTF and some otherorganizations, both governmental and non-governmental? Is it the IMF, theWorld Bank, WTO, Embassies, or the world's corporations? Is Bosnia andHerzegovina a semi- or full protectorate of the International Community?How much is that "Community" really and truly in favour of BiH, and whatkind of BiH would it like to see - divided into three parts, a civic sate, anda sustainable or unsustainable country?

It would be difficult to define the International Community from a poli-tical science perspective, as it is a notion which is used in public, and thereis no academic definition of the International Community in a political sci-ence literature. Nevertheless, based on the International Community'sengagement in the crises in the Balkans, and in BiH in particular, we cansay that the IC is an aggregate of diverse Anglo-Saxon and EuropeanContinental political views on how the problems in BiH could and shouldbe addressed.

In broadest terms possible, we could say that the InternationalCommunity's institutions were expected to help this country ensure a safeenvironment to all citizens, develop its own institutions which would pro-tect their fundamental freedoms and rights and implement a democratictransition in the country. Unfortunately, after a twelve-year long engagementof various international institutions of which we can say broadly that theyrepresent the IC in BiH, we can conclude that the engagement of theInternational Community in BiH comes down to the implementation ofnational interests of imperial powers. The International Community actsthrough networked institutional structures with a view to beaming outpower, interests and needs of major powers.

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The International Community's policy in BiH is a mirror of the fundamen-tal tension existing between the European and Anglo-Saxon views ondemocracy, nations and state.

Not only does a state of statehood at different levels in Europe serve thepurpose of ensuring security and implementation of social tasks, but thestatehood is a structure of the social order and political system in general. AEuropean state exceeds a horizontal social contract, which is specific forAmerica. In Europe, "national sovereignty" once played an important role.The European democratic tradition is familiar with the parliamentary policyas a score-settling arena. Debates over the distribution of powers take placein a political process in which the parliaments are central political arenas.Fight is waged over the laws.

The purpose of the US Constitution has never been to replace anabsolute ruler with a sovereign people. Rather, it promotes the creation ofminimal structures to ensure future existence of the American nation. In theUnited States of America, democracy is much stronger linked to judiciary?The courts of law are of the highest ranking and are the final warrant of indi-vidual safety and civic recognition. The US democratic tradition attachesimportance to articulation of interests of individuals and minorities. Debatesover the distribution of powers are direct - horizontal, and in Senate to asmall extent only. The rights are in the focus of disputes in the US.1

"Europeans were grateful to the United States for their efforts to put anend to the war in Bosnia, but European officials were confused over theneed to engage the U.S." (Holbrooke, 1998; 318) said Richard Holbrooke inhis book To End a War. In this regard, the major specific feature of theInternational Community is its 'action on others' which may be illustrated bya ceremonial inauguration of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Paris, althoughit was previously initialled at the Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, "TheInternational Community handed over the size of its power to France whichin turn seized it as its own, for the needs of a contrived pretence of an impe-rial power and de-Americanization of peace in Bosnia, assessing correctlythat the United States would not react in order to confirm an internationalcharacter of the Dayton Agreement". (]urak, 2002; 126). Such actions on others, under the dictate of relocated centres of geo-political and geo-eco-nomic powers, place the International Community within the framework ofan institution void of a special concept.

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1 For more details see: Haller Gret, Granice solidarnosti: Evropa i SAD u opho|enju sa dràvom,

nacijom, i religijom, Buybook, Sarajevo, 2006. (Limits of Solidarity: Europe and the US in com-munication with the state, nation and religion)


II. Philosophy of a 'peace process'

According to some views, the International Community is also "a multi-lateral product of the US, a symbiosis of the US national interests and theUS ethos as the world's" (Ibid, 129) which put an end to the "simulation offalse sympathies and to Bosnia's journey to a final agony" (Ibid, 130), whichwere coming permanently from many 'democratic' policies of the Europeanpowers which lacked an ethical imperative.

According to some other views described in academic literature, theInternational Community is a kind of an experiment the purpose of whichis to start, in practice, building the world's society through the system ofglobal management in a local community. After the war, or more precisely,after the Dayton Peace Accords were signed in 1995, that practicism formal-ly began in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a local community, which the poli-tical science view will focus on in this paper.

The International Community in BiH promoted more the category of a"peace process" than peace as a value political/democratic orientation. Apolitical philosophy of the 'peace process' is in fact the tool of theInternational Community to control the war and peace through permanentproduction of what is neither a war nor peace. That is the form of politicalrule of the International Community in post-conflict countries. "The peaceprocess (…) proves in the case of Bosnia that Europe is much closer to thepeace process than it is to peace. A Post-Dayton Bosnia is characterized bya peace process as a negation of democratic principles and a latent destruc-tion of the Bosnian state which is denied to have peace and its elements,that is, democracy" (Ibid, 157). "The Dayton"2 as the Peace Accords or as theguardian of the "peace process" is not only the International Community'stool for conflict and violence management in this area. Its major weaknessis that it was imposed as a norm, a Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina(Annex IV to the Dayton Agreement is the Constitution of BiH, which isabsurd), based on the given situation on the ground, and an insufficientrespect for cultural and historical background of Bosnia and Herzegovina.This will be elaborated further in this paper.

After the Dayton was initialled, "the peace process" began to be imple-mented first through the presentation of what had been agreed on outsideof Bosnia, far from the eyes of the Public, and the Parliament (BiH has aConstitution which was not approved by its Parliament, which is nonsense).

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2 The term 'Dayton' means the Dayton Peace Agreement.


It was agreed in Dayton that BiH was indeed a state, but consisted of thetwo entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and RepublikaSrpska. The status of Brcko remained unsolved in the Dayton. But furtherto the earlier agreements, it was decided that a final decision on a status ofthis town would be made by an Arbitral Tribunal for Brcko, established inthe summer of 1996. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was seenas a state of Bosniaks and Croats, and the Republika Srpska as a state ofSerb people. Brcko was given a Supervisor pending a final arbitrary awardfor "the Brcko District" (March 2000) by which Brcko was given to both theFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, and there-by to all citizens of BiH.

Anyone with at least some knowledge of the political science will knowthat the existence of a Republic in a state is a novelty indeed, which shouldbe analyzed in detail. This political scandal prevented the implementationof a well-known goal of the International Community - "the building of asociety and a war-torn state". The first problem which prevents the imple-mentation of this goal lies in the constitutional discrimination of the politicalrights of the citizens of BiH. Ethnic identities are fixed in constitutional andinstitutional terms, and all individuals within the BiH society are forced toalign himself or herself with one of the three defined and fixed ethnic iden-tities; not a single individual may implement his or her political rights (norcan he or she count on a practical social promotion) outside those identi-ties. Moreover, in a political sence, a person is not functioning as a citizenor as an individual in a social sense, yet only as a member of one of thethree strictly determined ethnic identities.

III. Ethno-party pluralism - false political plurality

As the international partnership with national ethno-political elites lastedfor too long, each of them had enough time to advocate the "peace process"as a purpose of the political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the rea-son why the Dayton is seen in the post-Dayton political practice as follows:The Bosniak political public firmly believes that the InternationalCommunity forced the citizens of BiH to accept the two entities and thatsuch a structure of BiH does not have any historical, economic or econo-mic and geographic justification and that the only foundation of such a BiHis aggression and genocide. Serb political public believes that the RepublikaSrpska acquired its territorial and legal continuity in 1992 and has main-

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tained it ever since and that it was not created by the Dayton Peace Accords,what is claimed by Bosniaks and Croats, but that it was verified by theAccords, which is why the future of the Republika Srpska cannot be chal-lenged. Croat political public believes that the Dayton Agreement 'openedup' a Croat ethnic issue by 'regulating inter-ethnic relations to the detrimentof Croat people'. There is an attempt to solve the current dissatisfaction byrequests for a third ethnic entity which should be considered as a "logical,justified and just goal of the Croat people in BiH as long as it is composedof the entities and as long as there is the Republika Srpska" (@epi}, 2002;27). In a politically disoriented system of values such centrifugal, divergent,reduced publics (which are the consequence of the political conflict in BiHover a territorial, administrative and legal and political organization of BiH)are leaving devastating effects on the BiH politics in general and on politi-cal freedoms.

The problem imposed by the Dayton, which limited the role of theInternational Community concerns the structure of the BiH society. In sim-ple terms, it comes down to the question as to whether the BiH societyexists as a whole or it is irreversibly divided into three separate ethnicwholes. In the present Constitution, the BiH society (as a perceived holderof sovereignty) is not envisaged as a whole, but as a mechanical sum ofthree "constituent peoples" (an undefined term, note by the author), project-ed as holders of sovereignty. "Constituent peoples" are envisaged as threeseparate ethnic wholes, which, under the logic incorporated in theConstitution, function in the prospect as a separate society with its own sovereignty.

The cul-de-sac of an ethnically monolithic identity which is legalized bythe Constitution made it impossible to work on the citizenship identity, evenfor the International Community in BiH. Moreover, "only a very small num-ber of international officials working in BiH attached importance and rarelyexpressed a unanimous belief that it would be necessary to contribute to acontemplative alternative to an identity on the basis of citizenship" (GretHaller, 2006; 38). Haller notices that the Dayton Agreement in the area ofhuman rights consists of some major contradictions. The EuropeanConvention of Human Rights applies directly in this country, however, thepublic is not familiar enough with its provisions. Otherwise, it would havebeen known that the state of BiH should establish the Constitutional Court'for civil and criminal matters', prescribed as mandatory by the Convention.'The European Commission for Democracy Through Law', the so-calledVenice Commission, within the Council of Europe, supported the formation

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of such a court. It was not before May 2002 that the High Representativeappointed seven judges to the Court, thereby eliminating a crucial failure ofthe Dayton Agreement. The international judicial inspection of such issuesdid not exist either, since the European Convention for Human Rights wasnot verified internationally before BiH became a member of the Council ofEurope (in April 2002). According to Haller, the concept of a citizenshipidentity would restore a lost confidence of citizens in the state which isobliged to provide equal protection to its citizens who may take part andparticipate in the public authorities. Thanks to the ethnicized Constitution,and thereby to the ethnicized law, which was given a long span of time forits own promotion, the promotion of individual rights lost momentum.Unfortunately, ethnic/collective rights prevailed - which were most loudlyadvocated by the national parties in BiH. They were considered as local,representative partners to the International Community (the opposition wasoften disregarded). Let us take the Election Law as an example.

The opposition parties were not represented in the OSCE's ProvisionalElection Commission nor did they participate in the drafting the electionrules since the Head of OSCE Mission has chosen to work only with ethnicpolitical parties in power. It can be assumed that this is about the IC inte-rests (as the monitoring and implementation of elections is a profitable job)and about exclusively ethnic and religious interests of national parties,which are, essentially against civic BiH.

Different experiences of the war differentiated the electorate in BiH alongethnic and religious lines, which remains, unfortunately, focused on votingin favour of the candidates from their own ethnic community.

In order to win candidates on the voting lists solicited votes only of theirethnic community members as they have never been encouraged to counton votes of the other two communities. Bosniaks were elected by Bosniaksonly, and not by Serbs and Croats. Serbs are also elected without supportof Bosniaks and Croats, while Croats are elected without support by Serbsand Bosniaks. Ethno-political parties have never taken an action to changethis practice and try to win the votes of other ethnicities. The key battle hasalways been waged over voter registration. More Serbs registered in parti-cular constituency means more votes in favour of the SDS, more Bosniaksare registered, the more votes in favour of SDA; the more Croats are regis-tered the more votes in favour of HDZ.

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IV. Controversies in practice

Since the region here lives on contradictions, as Predrag Matvejevi} said,the International Community was lucky to fit well into this concept of life.That is how a paradox happened: thanks to the International Community,the constitutional reform is being seriously discussed over the last few years.In addition to local experts, the debate over the need to revise the DaytonConstitution was also encouraged by different international institutions. Onthe occasion of marking the eighth anniversary of the signing the DaytonAgreement a declaration was made - 'To ensure peace in BiH through build-ing on the Dayton Accords" - which was supported by many Europeanpoliticians. In their opinion, "the Dayton construction of Bosnia has reachedits limit" (December 2003). The constitutional reorganization of BiH was alsorequested by the ESI initiative (European Initiative for Stability) in early 2004.In April of that same year the Political Affairs Committee of the ParliamentaryAssembly of the Council of Europe, approved a resolution 1384 on'Strengthening of democratic institutions in BiH' under which the Daytonconstitutional arrangements were 'complex and contradictory, and as suchare unable to ensure an effective functioning of the state in the long run'. Inthe end, a contribution to the debates over constitutional reforms was givenby the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (The VeniceCommission) which believes that the 'constitutional reform is unavoidable".3

If we are to judge by controversies surrounding the constitutionalreforms, particularly those which failed in the BiH Parliament, then citizen

equality is largely left to the pressure from outside the country. In the opinion of the majority of citizens of BiH, the International

Community took the role of a state by assuming the role of a new patron.As it was expected in socialism that the almighty state would resolve all theproblems of citizens, companies and local communities, the same is nowexpected from the International Community.

The imposition of laws by the High Representative reduces the confi-dence of citizens in the competences of the authorities which is why it hasoften happened that some groups are protesting seeking assistance not fromthe national institutions but from the OHR, for instance. On the other hand,without the interventions, BiH would have lagged far behind in the reformsat the social and political levels, which lead eventually to the European inte-

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3 See: Slavo Kuki}, "Postdejtonske ustavne kontroverze" (Post-Dayton constitutional controver-sies) in: Analiti~ki pogled: ùrnal dru{tvenih nauka, (Analytical review: journal of social sci-

ences) No. 2, "Dayton Project - program for civil dialogue in BiH", Sarajevo, 2007, 41-57


gration. Today it can be said that BiH began to negotiate the transition fromthe Dayton to the Brussels phase. The Dayton phase marked BiH as a coun-try of collective rights without any room left for individual rights and free-doms because of favouring ethnic principles at the cost of civic principle.The Brussels phase should encourage the presence and influence of Europein the region, the building and strengthening of the state of BiH, and its cen-tral institutions. In this context one should inquire whether a stronger EUand closer relations between BiH and the EU mean a kind of de-Americanization of the Dayton Bosnia. Because, still when we refer to theInternational Community in BiH we continue to imply the policy of the U.S.Embassy, USAID, and Washington etc.

In addition to collective, Brussels is also suggesting individual rights."Entry into the Brussels phase marks the end of crisis-management processand the beginning of transition, departure of IPTF and SFOR, preparationsfor departure of the OHR and the closing down of other Dayton structures"(Hadìkaduni}, 2005; 17). The European Union is intensifying its relationsand is becoming through various forms of cooperation, ever more presentin BiH. The International Police Task Force of the UN (IPTF) and Sta-bilization Force of NATO (SFOR) have already left BiH. The closure of theOHR will be discussed below.

Frequent removals of politicians by the High Representative to BiH(especially during the term of Wolfgang Petritsch) have encouraged somesegments of the population to increase their trust in the InternationalCommunity. But, as soon as an ethnically balanced approach was noticedin those removals, confidence began to diminish. Some political parties -their leaders, who were targeted by the High Representative, began to feela stronger fear, resulting in the shift of their accountability from the citizensto the OHR. Some political parties "used" those removals for their own elec-tion campaign purposes, so that the removed politicians barred from publicoffices were favoured only because 'they were disliked by internationals'.

Offering non-political solutions with a view to solving a political crisisand conflicts reminds us of prescribing a wrong therapy to a patient whocannot change the therapy and a doctor. If the doctor tries to modify thetherapy in the course of illness a few years later, he cannot return the lostmoney, lost time or alleviate the patient's sufferings. Let us refresh out poli-tical memory.

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During the term of the first High Representative to BiH, Carl Bildt4, theburning issue was not how to remove the consequences of the war or howto repair devastated infrastructure. He 'asked the question of how to trans-form a communist economy in to a modern market economy" (Petritsch,2002; 77). The creation of conditions conducive to free trade across thewhole region would certainly ensure a faster integration of the country hadan economic factor been the cause of the war in BiH. "To me, an econo-

mic integration is the key of the reintegration of the country and it is also thekey to a long-term integration in the EU structures… In the name of that Iam going to shift my views from political to social and economic problemsof BiH (Petritsch, 2002, 78 -emphasis added by N.[).

Carlos Westendorp5 had also formal conditions at his disposal to react topolitical blockades set mainly by national parties. In fact, due to politicalobstructionism the Peace Implementation Council session held at ministeri-al level on 9-10 December in Bonn empowered the High Representativewith a final say in the peace implementation policy. The High Repre-sentative was invested with powers to impose laws, which remained inforce until they were approved by the legislative authority. The High Re-presentative could also, within his Bonn powers, remove the representativesof parliamentary parties from office on the ground of their opposition to thepeace implementation but had no power to ban national parties whichplayed a major role in the conflict in BiH, according to the opinion of theacademic public.

On January 1, 1998 Westendorp set limits to political blockades. BiH gotits national/political symbols. Westendorp was supported by some media, ashe was the first High Representative to remove politicians who had obstruct-ed the Dayton implementation.6 Removals, which were a novelty, in com-parison to the first High Representative, took away some powers from the

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4 Carl Bildt, was the first High Representative to BiH and a representative of the EU in the for-mer Yugoslavia. Bildt took over in the climate of distrust toward the IC. Bosniak political pub-lic was angry because the International Community did not prevent heinous crimes over non-Serbs. Serb political public was also skeptical and showed lack of trust. Most of the Serbs sawIFOR troops as allies of their 'enemies'. The Croat political public believed that the war was wonby Croats although the dream about annexing one part of BiH to Croatia died in Dayton.

5 Carlos Westendorp took over on 18 June 1997. Before that he was the Spanish Foreign Ministerin the government of F. Gonzales. Soon after he took over, post-war elections were held in BiHand national parties won again. When he came there were three currencies in Bosnia andHerzegovina (Croatian kuna, YU dinar and Bosnian dinar - a coupon). YU dinar and kuna weresymbols of a common economic space of Yugoslavia and the RS and the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia and Croatia.

6 Westendorp removed 12 politicians in BiH.


forces of obstruction. In case of repeated obstructions, the High Repre-sentative could deny 'social assistance' which is an ethical problem. Ethnicpoliticians used such decisions for their argumentation that the InternationalCommunity was working against 'the people they represented'.

Wolfgang Petritsch7 was assured that the problem of BiH was the lack of awareness of one's own responsibility. He believed that politicians andcitizens of BiH should take their country, its problems and needs as theirownership. "The acceptance of ownership by political leaders in Bosnia whoheld positions of power during the war and whose opinions are still a pre-vailing ideology requires a full turn" (Petritsch, 2002; 125). "When I tookover as the High Representative in 1999 I set a goal to myself - to take BiHto the road of self-responsibility and I requested politicians and citizens toaccept the ownership as the future of their country" (Petritsch, 2002; 5) - saidPetritsch in his book From Dayton to Europe. It is obvious that unlike others, Petritsch had a political strategy for BiH - to democratize nationalists.

Shortly after he took over he began to receive support by the public afterhis first decision to remove 22 officials. Among them were cantonal govern-ments, ministers, mayors, and heads of housing commissions. 9 Serbs, 7Bosniaks and 6 Croats were removed. However, the parties were replacingthe removed officials with equally obstructive successors, and the removedones were often promoted or given an important position in economy.

While Petritsch promoted the policy of partnership with the domesticgovernment - along with sanctions for obstructions, Paddy Ashdown demon-strated at the outset of his mandate his tendency toward an executive, deci-sion-making option8 with the aim to see BiH sign a Stabilization andAssociation Agreement with the EU. In the course of 2002, the HighRepresentative imposed 32 laws, one year later 14 laws, and before mid 2004only 3 laws. As soon as he took over as the HR, his priority task was thejudicial reform, in three directions: the first segment was the reform of thejudicial branch of government, second, selection of judges and prosecutors9

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7 Wolfgang Petritsch took over in 1999. He was a Special Representative of the European Unionfor Kosovo and a head of the negotiating mission in Rombouillet and Paris. In 2001 his mandatewas extended and remained in office for 3 years.

8 Paddy Ashdown took over as the HR on 27 March 2002.9 The other form of reform is the selection of judges in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The HR estab-

lished High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils which are made up of national judges and pro-secutors and international experts with a view to appointing new judges and prosecutors. Thecouncils have had a sufficiently critical position when selecting judges and prosecutors and theypaid attention to ethnic balance. Selected judges and prosecutors were selected for life for thefirst time.


and third, legal reform.10 All three segments of the reform are taking place at the same time, and all three have reached a final stage of implementation.

V. Reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. reforms in

the International Community?

The recent political theories remind us of the fact that political democra-tization of a country is monitored through its legislative, judicial, media andcivil spheres. Classic theories mainly focused on the first three, but the recentones are telling more often that politics takes a large place in the media andcivil society. If we are to show the effects of the International Communityin BiH from December 1995 to March 2007, we have to limit the discussionon those five political segments of the society, while some other activities ofthe International Community, which certainly deserve attention and analy-sis, will not be mentioned in this context.

V.a Legislative authorities

On national level, the legislative authority resides in the hands of abicameral Parliamentary Assembly which is responsible for approving laws,budgets of the institutions of BiH and ratifying international treaties. As itwas blocked until a new parliament was formed, after the 2000 elections,many laws, required for a normal functioning of the state, either were notapproved by the Parliament, or were imposed by the High Representative.

At the Bonn Conference held on 10 December 1997 the High Repre-sentative was invested with huge powers with the aim to overcome theblockades in the legislative authorities caused by the then officials of natio-nal/nationalist parties.

From today's perspective we can be pleased with the imposition of sym-bolic democratic symbols of the state of BiH by the High Representativewhich the national parties could not reach consensus about.

However, there is a whole series of other positive legal solutions, theweaknesses of which lie in the fact that they were made without consulta-

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10The legal reform is almost completed with the adoption of new laws: the Criminal ProcedureCode and the Law on Litigation, and new Criminal Codes in the entities which are almost iden-tical to the BiH Code.


tions with a broader public. An illustrative example is the draft election lawwhich was supported by all major officials of the International Communityin BiH (it was drafted under the auspices of OSCE and was supported bythe OHR; the Council of Europe, UNMIBH). Still, it was almost unanimous-ly rejected by the national legal experts two times.11

The other weakness concerns the fact that a strategy for changes in thelegislative authorities did not often exist (e.g. Freedom of Information Act).

V.b Judicial reform

The highest priority of the International Community in the area ofreforms referred to the establishment of independent judiciary and the ruleof law. Independent and impartial judiciary and its de-politicization was therequirement set by the Council of Europe for BiH to join the Council ofEurope. Under international standards it means the elimination of any influ-ence on the judiciary by any outside individual or institution, while 'outside'refers to anyone outside the judiciary. Judging by the results so far, it seemsthat the BiH judiciary eliminated 'domestic' authorities and became depen-dent on the international authorities.

Although there is a legal framework which should eliminate politicalpressures on the judiciary, we could discuss pressure from the InternationalCommunity. On the one hand, the existing control leads to frustrations thatthe work of Bosnian judges and prosecutors will be subjected to examina-tion and review, under the supervision of the International Community, witha possibility of the High Representative to use his powers.12

A major progress has been made in the development of institutions andtheir modernization, especially after information technologies were intro-duced. A good example is also the efforts toward establishing the judicialauthorities at the level of the state, in accordance with the Venice Commi-ssion recommendations. The obstructions of that process were coming from'inside'. The International Community enabled and ensured the formationand smooth functioning of the BiH Constitutional Court and the Federation

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11"The major objection to the law was confirmation of discrimination. especially in the election ofmembers of the Presidency, which is discriminatory and limits the right to vote " - said SevimaSali-Terzi} in her study, "Legal System", in: International Policies of Support to the SEE Countries:

lessons (not) learned in BiH, (editor @arko Papi} ), Muller, Sarajevo, page 16112The manner and procedure for removal of judges and prosecutors are regulated by the laws

imposed in both entities by the High Representative.


Constitutional Court, and assisted in establishing the Judicial Training Cent-res, and some legal associations.

In addition to the activities which concern the legislation, which havebeen numerous, the International Community, for the purpose of attainingits own goal, offered training programmes for lawyers, including judges andprosecutors. However, some things were ignored, which eventually chal-lenged the results. It often happened that domestic lawyers, especially jud-ges and prosecutors, saw the programmes as an attack on their competenceand identity.

Particularly confusing and inefficient was the mixture of common lawand civil law tradition. (Sali-Terzic, 2001; 172). However, the programmeshelped restore broken relations and contacts among colleagues across the'inter-entity boundary line'.

In view of the funds invested in the reform and a large participation ofinternational experts the results do not correspond to the invested effortsand funds. A poor political climate, unwillingness of the legal community inBiH to accept a huge inflow of international assistance has contributed tosuch condition. On the other hand, opposition to the proposals of theInternational Community is most often described as 'blocking of the reformprocesses or 'the lack of will to move BiH toward Europe'. Within the pro-motion of independent judiciary and its de-politicization, independence andde-politicization were called in question.

V.c The media reform

The Agreement and Constitution of BiH said almost nothing about themedia. The BiH Constitution does not refer to the media in the sectionsregarding the state responsibilities, even not to those which ensure the iden-tity of the state - the state or public broadcasters. The media were left to theentities. In the Federation of BiH, the media are even pushed down to thecantonal level.

The Peace Implementation Council often discussed at its sessions themedia. In Sintra in May 1997 a response was given for the first time to thequestion of what should be done with the war-mongering media. It was saidthat "the High Representative could suspend any media network the pro-grammes of which were in continued and deep contravention of the letterand spirit of the Peace Agreement" (www.ohr.int). In December of the sameyear it was ordered at the Bonn Conference to establish an Independent

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Media Commission in charge of regulating the broadcasters. The December1998 Madrid Conference adopted a strategy for the media reform, whichsupported the High Representative and his activities on turning the statemedia into public services. The donor countries were requested to supportthe Independent Media Commission and to encourage the adoption of themedia laws in both entities. The OSCE and IMC were asked to develop clearelection rules for the media conduct.

The International Community was deeply involved in the media reformafter the Dayton Peace Accords were signed. Under the influence of ethnicoligarchies during the war on the territories they had occupied or preservedunder their control, three broadcasting systems were formed, all of them dif-ferent in technical terms, programme and status-wise. The media fromSerbia and Croatia were spreading their influence and interests across BiH.Most of the media were used for propaganda purposes, and only few mediamanaged to preserve their independence. The International Communitysupported the media expansion in the first phase of its assistance, primarilyby its huge donations to the media which claimed they were independent.The purpose of the international intervention was to create the media plu-ralism which in the end failed to contribute to the democratization of themedia. Despite a good financial will of the International Community, the firstpost-war period was marked by the 'verbal war' waged through the media.The media space was divided along ethnic and religious lines, and the hatespeech dominated the media content.

Before the first post-war elections in the autumn of 1996 numerous localmedia independent from the local authorities were established with the sup-port of the world's media. OHR and OSCE in BiH installed two major inter-national projects - OBN television13 and Radio Fern, with the aim to put acrucial influence on the creation of an environment conducive to the elec-tions. However, the media from the neighbouring countries continued to airtheir programmes here, which made the 'media democratization' difficult.The domestic authorities declared the media funded by the InternationalCommunity as non-patriotic and hostile, among other things, because of thefact that 'money was not actually spared' when it came to media.14

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13Known as 'Bildt Television'.14The major donors to the media were the European Union, Soros and USAID. The European

Union donated to the development of the media in BiH 33 million and 249 thousand GermanMarks, from 1995 to 2000. USAID allocated 74 million marks. During seven years (from 1993 to1999) Soros supported the media with 7 million and 583 thousand marks. In 2000 Soros with-drew from the program of direct support to the media and chose regional programs for commu-nication. There is no doubt that the funds are still huge.


In 1998 the process of transformation of the state broadcasters to publicservices began. It was imposed by the decisions and laws of the HighRepresentative after failed attempts to have that job done by the domesticauthorities, management and editorial staff of the existing broadcasters.15 Asa result, there were two entity broadcasters and a public broadcasting ser-vice for the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is how the media spacein BIH was entitized formally.

After the Independent Media Commission was established, an illegallyestablished system of the Croatian broadcaster in the Federation of BiH wasshut down (it was a branch of the Croatian Broadcaster in Zagreb) and thehate speech began to disappear from the media space. As the Commissionwas formed by the High Representative's decision, it was considered by vari-ous domestic groups as 'a para-state institution with the internationalresponsibilities' as it was chaired mainly by international experts. The localexperts noticed some weaknesses in its functioning as it was responsible forthe issuance, monitoring of the rules of conduct and punishments. They alsocomplained about the transparency of the Commission and about theappeals procedure before the Commission without a higher administrativebody or a court. Its incorporation in the Regulatory Communications Agencycaused dissatisfaction among local experts, and eventually their denial ofsuch a procedure.

In the early 2000 the media saw a major change in the InternationalCommunity's assistance. The International Community gave up the supportit used to provide to international projects - OBN and FERN. It left the OBNto the local staff to cope with it as best as they could, and incorporated theradio FERN with its staff and technical equipment in the BiH public radio(BH Radio 1). In that phase the priority was given to the transformation ofthe state to public broadcasters. This phase saw a silent obstruction by anda complete lack of interest of the authorities in BiH.

In the absence of the political will of the authorities to propose theappropriate laws, OSCE drafted the Freedom of Information and Libel Act.

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15The High Representative tried to obtain support from three national leaders - the then membersof the Presidency. As the Serb member of the Presidency Mom~ilo Kraji{nik refused to sign aMemorandum of Understanding, HR imposed several decisions in July 1999 by which the pub-lic broadcasting service was established at the state level and in the Federation of BiH, while theSerb RTV was ordered to change its name to RTV of Republika Srpska.


V.d Civil society

The Constitution of BiH and the Constitutions of both entities guaranteethe right to freedom of association which is the basis for the civil society andits institutions in general. As the constitutional legal framework in BiH issuch that the central authorities have very limited responsibilities, and as theentities have a huge autonomy, the issue of the right to freedom of enjoy-ment is different in the entities. In the Federation of BiH there are three lawswhich define the activities of the non-governmental community: the Law onCivic Associations, the Law on Humanitarian Organizations and the Law onFoundations. In the Republika Srpska the issue is regulated by the Law onCivic Organizations, which was taken over from the former Yugoslavia.While the freedom of association in the world exceeds national borders, inBiH the association remains at the entity level because of the Constitution,lack of political will and passiveness of the International Community.

The 'development of civil society' meant for the International Communityprovision of support to the development and work of non-governmentalorganizations. The experiences of other countries show that democratizationis also implemented by other civic groups. Despite this, international donorsbelieved that non-governmental organizations were the core of the civil soci-ety, believing they were strengthening the civil society as a whole. The assis-tance was provided and directed in this way most often by UNDP, UNHCR,UNICEF, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Over the past few years we are seeing international aid to BiH drying upand shifting to other crisis spots (Kosovo). This was the reason why thedevelopment of many non-governmental organizations without a sustai-nable development strategy stopped. "Instead of responding to the needsand requirements of beneficiaries, the situation was created in which thebeneficiaries responded to the needs and requirements of donors" (Sali-Terzic, 2001; 183).

The critics say that many non-governmental organizations are too farfrom the society and citizens which is a "paradoxical consequence of theassistance to the civil society". @arko Papi} is warning that the method ofproviding support 'covers' a very small elite (Papi}, 2001; 28). 'Elite' in so-called civil society is being 'professionalized, and departs from the problemsof the 'grassroots' and 'social realty' which means that a fictitious image isbeing created about major efforts.

The other problem is that numerous non-governmental organizations arenot coordinated. Although there have been some attempts to coordinate

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their activities, they, in fact, boosted the number of coordinating bodies.'Networking' and 'coordination' were magic words for long, and it wasbelieved that they could open many doors to new sources of funding.

Domestic non-governmental organizations continue to lack knowledgeand skills and sometimes motives for their attempts to influence the govern-ment and the decision-making processes. Regarding the election results, thepolitical affiliation of citizens changed mainly in the areas in which the mostimportant and most active non-governmental organizations were located. Inthe areas in which their presence was minimal, results were far from initialexpectations.

With a few exceptions, a serious question which can be asked refers tothe legitimacy and credibility of non-governmental organizations.

VI. Assessment and analyses

What has been positive in the activity of the International Community inBiH is the assistance in transition, but not in a classic transition throughwhich other countries have undergone - transition to the full market eco-nomy, parliamentary state, and civil society. The International Communityhas invested huge efforts in the transition from war to peace, and financedit. Although the transition lasts longer than it was expected, in political termsit enabled BiH to create conditions necessary for Euro-Atlantic integration.

The International Community seems to have lacked the information thatthe war in BiH was not a product of an ancient hatred in the region but thatit came from outside BiH and did not have direct causes in the country.Large-scale returns were not possible without defeating the policy whichhad envisioned relocations of populations. The returns were not ensuredbecause political architects of ethnic cleansing were not removed from posi-tions. Huge sums of money were invested after the Dayton was signedwhen the rate of returns was minimal, and now when the returns havestepped up, there is lack of financial support. The International Communityis ignoring the issue of 'constituent minorities', believing that the returnshave been completed.

The International Community tried to 'democratize nationalists' in BiH.For that reason, it took a great effort to realize that the political elites in BIHremain in power thanks to insecurity, conflicts and instability, which theyare encouraging. As such they will not produce stability as they remain inpower thanks to the conflict. When three national parties in BiH, SDA, HDZ

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and SDS were forced under the international pressure to reduce their nation-alist rhetoric, rivals within national blocks - SBiH, HDZ 1990 and SNSD -accepted that vocabulary, which paid well at the elections. There is beliefthat the last year's elections did not show that the most radical partiesbecame moderate but that the most radical parties are, in fact, moderate par-ties. For a number of reasons we could claim that nationalism in BiH be-came radicalized instead of reduced. If we analyze election rhetoric before,during and after the elections of so-called moderate parties, we shall not beable to conclude that the reformed parties won over non-reformed parties.Democratization of national parties which was supported by the Inter-national Community led to their multiplication, and replication.

The fact that the OHR sometimes behaves as a new political institutionin BiH. Although there is the legal framework which eliminated politicalpressures on the judiciary and media in BiH, we could also speak of theirexposure to the international pressure.

There are indications that the International Community is getting tiredand that it would wish to reduce its engagement in BiH.16 Despite that, thePeace Implementation Council decided on Brussels on 23 February 2007that the OHR and Bonn powers should remain in place before June 2008 asthe progress in the EU integration process has not been sufficient.

Also the mandate of the OHR was extended because the InternationalCommunity became fully aware that BiH needs the constitutional reforms.Although it has not been a taboo for the last two years, the present HighRepresentative to BiH Christian Schwartz Schilling said after his mandate wasextended, "In the coming months I am planning to launch the constitution-al reforms, together with the officials of the United States of America in orderto help develop a constitutional structure needed in this country in order forit to become a modern and effective state. For this reason I have a broadermandate from 1 March and I have additional resources as the EU SpecialRepresentative". (Dnevni Avaz, 2 March 2007).

In an attempt to identify and critically elaborate reforms carried out bythe International Community, we come to the following conclusion: the po-licy of the International Community was reductionist/ non-democratic, incontravention to a democratic spirit as many laws were made without con-sultations with the public at large. This is why it is important to be carefulnot to repeat Bosnian mistakes in other SEE countries.

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16See: International Crisis Croup, Europe Report No 180 of 15 February 2007.



Literature:

Bieber, Florian (2004) Institucionaliziranje etni~nosti, International ForumBosnia.

]urak, Nerzuk (2002), Geopolitika kao sudbina: slu~aj Bosna: postmo-dernisti~ki ogled o perifernoj zemlji, Faculty of Political Science, Sarajevo.

Hadìkaduni} Emir (2005), Od Dejtona do Brisela, ACIPS, Sarajevo.

Haller Gret (2006), Granice solidarnosti: Evropa i SAD u opho|enju sadràvom, nacijom, i religijom, Buybook, Sarajevo.

Holbrook Richard (1998), To End a War, [ahinpa{i}, Sarajevo.

Mujki}, Asim (2006), We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis, Constellations Volume 14,Number 1, 2007,

Paji}, Zoran (2001), „Uloga institucija u izgradnji mira”, u zborniku: Me|una-rodne politike podr{ke zemljama jugoisto~ne Evrope: lekcije (ne) nau~ene uBiH, (ur. @arko Papi}), Muller, Sarajevo.

Papi}, @arko (2001), „Op}a situacija u BiH i politika me|unarodne podr{ke”,u zborniku: Me|unarodne politike podr{ke zemljama jugoisto~ne Evrope: lek-cije (ne) nau~ene u BiH, (ur. @arko Papi}), Muller, Sarajevo.

Papi}, @arko (2002), Bosna i Balkan: mogu}nosti i uslovi oporavka, ForumBosna, No. 17/02, Sarajevo.

Petritsch Wolfgang (2002), Bosna i Hercegovina od Daytona do Evrope,Svjetlost, Sarajevo.

Sali-Terzi} Sevima (2001), „Civilno dru{tvo”, u zborniku: Me|unarodne poli-tike podr{ke zemljama jugoisto~ne Evrope: lekcije (ne) nau~ene u BiH, (ur.@arko Papi}), Muller, Sarajevo.

Sali-Terzi} Sevima (2001), „Pravni sistem”, u zborniku: Me|unarodne politikepodr{ke zemljama jugoisto~ne Evrope: lekcije (ne) nau~ene u BiH, (ur. @arkoPapi}), Muller, Sarajevo.

Sar~evi}, Edin (1997) Ustav i politika: kritika etni~kih ustava i postrepubli~kihustavotvorstava u Bosni i Hercegovini, VKBI, Sarajevo.

[a~i}, Nermina (2005) Etnopoliti~ko koloniziranje RTVBiH, Preporod,Sarajevo.

Udovi~i}, Zoran (2001), „Mediji u BiH - dometi intervencije me|unarodnezajednice”, u zborniku: Me|unarodne politike podr{ke zemljama jugoisto~neEvrope: lekcije (ne) nau~ene u BiH, (ur. @arko Papi}), Muller, Sarajevo.

@epi}, Boò (2002), Enigma Bosne i Hercegovine, Matica hrvatska, Mostar.

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2. LEGAL REFORMS IN BIH AND INFLUENCEOF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY



INTRODUCTION

Manfred Dauster, Judge, Court of BiH

Let me welcome you all. It is my pleasure to open Panel Discussion II.Tallying the balance of effects in the last 11 years in BiH is not simple. Theprevious speakers tried to look back at history and the past developments.I will not do that. In tallying the balance, I will focus on several points whichI think could provide a professional overview. Let me first describe my ownperception of the situation in Bosnia.

I have many Bosnian friends and colleagues in the Court with whom Ioften discuss. I do not claim that their voices are representative, but still theygive a perspective and an evaluation of how a normal citizen sees the pastand the present. Among other things, most of the people are wonderingwhether it is too late and how much time is left.

Even the High Representative admitted this morning that we had lostmuch time and now we have to think about the time left to the internatio-nal community for cooperation with the local authorities. I am slightly worried when I hear that the dates of closure of the OHR are stated in pub-lic. First, we heard that the OHR’s closure date was going to be June 2007,and now there are perhaps some other requirements for its closure, sche-duled to take place in June next year. Absolutely all the people I have talkedto asked: ”Is it possible to talk without discussing the substance?”

I think that my Bosnian colleagues have the point, as substance is sim-ply not clear to us. It has never been clear to us and they are asking aboutthat substance. We have also realized - and we still do - that the internatio-nal community is funding itself and has reached a phase of its own fatigueand thus would like to disengage. But disengagement does cost. Regard-ing the question as to how much money of the international community will remain here for the planned reforms, again, we have to ask about thesubstance.

I am again coming back to the same question, the question asked by thecitizens, the question about the substance, the substance of the internatio-nal community and domestic authorities. What is there response, and whatdo they want to be reformed? In view of everything which has happenedso far, I am still unable to see that substance. One formula has been used –the constitutional reform. What does it stand for? What is that? Also, thereare so many constitutional models in the world that myself, as a judge, so-meone from the legal profession, have to ask the following question: if the

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Legal reforms in BiH and influence of the international community


reform is successful in the end, what kind of a constitution is it going to be?The police reform is another issue. Why is the discussion so non-transpa-rent, I wonder. There are so many police models in the world, on this pla-net, and how the police will look like in the end? Which model is it goingto be? Does the police reform depend on the constitutional reform and viceversa?

The third trick I realized is the following: because of the presence of theinternational community and certain positions maintained by the interna-tional community, we have to admit that the Dayton system of cooperationbetween the international community represented by the High Representa-tive, and domestic representatives, has failed. Mistakes have been made byboth sides.

I am certainly not the one who could qualify or disqualify domestic andinternational politicians, but I can certainly say – now I am talking about theinternational community – that I have seen so many High Representativescoming to and leaving this country, except one High Representative so far,and I noticed that some of them did not have any perspective, any program.Some of them had only ad hoc programs and did not focus on the imple-mentation of the laws they had imposed.

This is what should be changed at least during the remaining period.Regarding the achievements, I am not going to deny them nor am I goingto say that they have not been made. This morning we heard the word‘democratization’. Of course, democratic elections are taking place, whichmeans that they are taking place under the national supervision. The Electi-on Law is perhaps not perfect, but elections have been almost democratic.But what is going to happen in the next four-year term in the Parliament?

I think that there will be a kind of a campaign for parliamentary demo-cratization. Because, I can see that the Parliament exists, it passes the laws,but without a substantial discussion, and it is not done in a transparent way.Also, the Parliament does not oversee the government. Let me tell you ananecdote, something which has recently happened. It was an OSCE semi-nar. The representatives of the Parliament’s Budget Committee came to theseminar to learn how the budget should be overseen.

As the largest portion of the national budget goes to defense, the OSCEofficials said to the participants that the funding of defense does not referonly to the payment of soldiers but also to the payment of the defense po-licy and that they, as the controllers of the government, should ask the go-vernment to show them the defense policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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Nobody knew anything about it. When a representative of the Defen-se Ministry came to the seminar, the Members of Parliament asked her: ”Could you, please, explain the substance of the four-year defense policy of the government? What we are specifically interested in is the finan-cial segment”.

Then the Ministry’s representative said: ”You know, the financial segmentis not the responsibility of the Defense Ministry. You should ask the Ministryof Treasury”. Then, the same Members of Parliament had the same questionfor the Ministry of Treasury. Let me tell you what the representative of theMinistry of Treasury said. ”Well, it is not our responsibility, you should askthe Defense Ministry.” The Members of Parliament simply concluded thatnobody is responsible.

This is bad and this should change, and we shall help you in making tho-se changes. On the other hand, we have the judicial reform. It is an achieve-ment indeed, but only in one part. Under the pressure by the internationalcommunity in 2002 and through the imposition of laws, then-High Repre-sentative Paddy Ashdown assigned to the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovinajurisdiction in criminal matters.

We also have the constitutional reform, which was initiated by the Ame-ricans. Does it mean that they initiated it and nobody else should getinvolved? During the criminal law reform, the Americans said: If you, theOHR, seek our assistance and if you want us to assist you in establishing thestate court, we want to see at least some parts of our procedural system in-troduced here. And then a ”small America” was introduced without any se-cond thoughts.

But now we have it in the law and in law enforcement. However, whenI look at the state prosecutor’s office and the state court from this perspec-tive, I am slightly scared for the self-sustainability of those two institutions.The state jurisdiction in criminal matters is not full, as I heard some politi-cians, who were invited to this conference but did not come, saying duringthe election campaign that the state court was the court for Serbs. Thisleaves room for interpretation.

I can also see some developments in Banja Luka. The state Court ofBosnia and Herzegovina clearly has jurisdiction in criminal prosecution oforganized crime cases. It is the court of BiH’s jurisdiction. If the state courttransfers that jurisdiction to lower courts, the entities and the entity courtswill take it over from the state court. What happened last year? The interna-tional community welcomed that.

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In Banja Luka, the RS National Assembly established special courts fororganized crime cases, and special prosecutor’s office. The constitutionalityof such institutions is, of course, subject to debate. But nobody has organi-zed a debate yet. The High Representative, without knowing the law andthe constitutional situation, congratulated the Prime Minister for his effortsto fight organized crime.

In reality, the Republika Srpska entity has silently stolen one half of thenational jurisdiction and this has to be said clearly. The international com-munity got largely involved in the establishment of the Court of BiH, butonly during the so-called period of transition and will remain involved untilthe end of that period, by the end of 2009. After that, the first risk could bethe funding of the state institutions.

So far I have not heard a clear statement by the Government that it willtake over the funding of the state judicial institutions after 2009, and that thegovernment will take over from the international financial arrangement.Those are the failures and mistakes which you can certainly recognize, justlike me. I also know that this conference will initiate a debate about thisclumsy situation. Of course, everything depends on the constitutionalreform.

So far, both sides, the international community on the one hand, and thenational authorities on the other, may be blamed for their positions andbehavior in the past. All of them spoke about the constitutional reform. Butthe citizens did not know anything about the constitutional reform. Why?

Why was it kept a secret before it ended up in the Parliament? Thisshould no longer be the case. The same is true for the ongoing criminal lawreforms. You know that the new criminal law system was introduced, orwritten in such a haste which I had never seen before. Paddy Ashdownordered in June 2002 that new laws should be drafted no later than October1 of that same year. That was really a huge task. And the laws are not per-fect because of that haste.

There are certainly mistakes, flaws and weaknesses in those laws. Andnow the analysis is necessary for the purpose of defining the next steps asthe international community was so much focused on the criminal law sys-tem in the past and had to do its homework and come to an agreement withthe local authorities. However, I myself do not see anyone working on thatissue any more. This is precisely the fact that could lead both the state andits entities, and their criminal law systems, to collapse.

Besides, the legal reform is not just the criminal law reform. I came tothis country for the first time as a head of the Anti-Fraud Unit in the OHR.

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It was in August 2000. In was in the OHR’s Anti-Fraud Unit that I realizedthat the civil law in this country is old and that it does not fit into moderntimes. Some steps have been taken indeed, however, we do not have amodern Law on Obligations or a modern Law on Real Estate, nor do wehave a new Commercial Law on paper, and so on.

How could we sort this out? How would it be possible to attract foreigninvestors when they would face the remaining socialist laws in the firstplace? They will never come under such conditions. On the other hand, theenforcement of judicial decisions and rulings in the civil law procedures issimply driving both foreign investors and citizens crazy, because, as youknow, it is a very difficult procedure. It takes time for a decision to be madeand then it takes time to have it enforced.

A civil procedure in this country lasts usually several months, even seve-ral years, even if it concerns a minor issue. Thereafter, investors, once theyhave finally got the decision, have to run around and ask for their money.The same is true for the Law on Liquidation, and the Law on Bankruptcy. Ihave mentioned only some laws, and some issues, but this is not the endof the list. The same is also true for civil service. But nobody has so far iden-tified the issues which can and should be privatized and liberalized.

There are no licenses for this reason, and licenses, required by the law,are subject to corruption in most cases. I for one believe that there is thewhole list of things which the international community could have done andthe international community can do it in cooperation with the local authori-ties. But a clear definition of that can be done in the years to come, in twoor three years. It is needed. I think this is urgent.

COMMENTARY

Zdravko Grebo, Law School, Sarajevo University

While working on my assignment for this Conference, I thought that Ishould design and make my presentation as a complete provocation, whileat the same time offering arguments in support of everything I was going tosay. But before that I have to say that, as usual, people to whom I intend-ed my 'poisonous arrows' have already left. First of all, I mean the HighRepresentative and the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, asI desperately wanted to try, with their support, to get rid of my nightmares.However, it always happens that I am talking to the 'wrong' people. Bad

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students always escape lessons, while those disciplined ones stay behindand will have to suffer my torture in the next few minutes.

Thus, the first question goes to the speaker who introduced us to thistopic: has he ever asked himself, most sincerely, why he is here and whatis the real sense and meaning of the job he is doing here? Of course, I ammuch grateful to him for what he is doing. My thoughts will not stray awayif I share with you a kind of a show-biz quip. When someone has asked mea while ago what I think about the international community's role in BiH, I thought of a love song and its verse: ”My life is so hard with you, and even harder without you”. I think that this is a good diagnosis of ourambivalent position when we are talking about the role of the real or virtual, precisely or vaguely defined 'international community', about ta-llying the balance, the current situation and possible prospects and prog-noses. That is my first thesis.

The second thesis is based on a careful reading of the study we allreceived and as a lawyer by my fundamental training, I would share withyou several routine observations and then I would return to those 'hotissues'. Mr. Dauster, who was the key-note speaker, gave a correct descrip-tion of the current situation and listed both the success and failed expecta-tions of international actors in the area of the law and judicial reforms. Theseare already commonplaces. What has been a success indeed is, for exam-ple, an anthem (without the text though), the coat-of-arms and the flag, apassport, license plates, Convertible Mark; a successful criminal law reformand not so successful criminal procedure law reform, a disastrously failedattempt to carry out the constitutional reform and so on, and this assessmentis absolutely accurate. A smaller number of issues (or problems) remainunsolved, there was a failure in dealing with the slightly bigger number ofissues and the same number of issues saw inaction. This is why my ques-tion is the following one: does our distinguished key-note speaker, whocomes from the German legal and political tradition, have any comment onmy statement that the discussion about the issues we should attempt to dis-cuss today is completely senseless? Such a question, in a situation in whichthe state has no Supreme Court and has all attributes of the state, is the mostfundamental one; the first year law students who do not have an answerto the question whether the state without the legal unity may function in itsfull capacity never reach a second year. This state – Bosnia and Herzegovina– or this mosaic, to put it nicely (although the more precise word would bea quarry) with a geographic (and without any state) identification in its offi-cial name, with a shocking number of its components: the entities, cantons,

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towns, municipalities – has all the institutions (grotesquely put together andstill not functioning though) but does not have a Supreme Court. There isthe Constitutional Court at the state level but –obviously for the Dayton andpolitical reasons – we do not have the highest judicial instance which shouldensure the legal unity. All the reasons and causes which led to the funda-mental elimination of normal lives of the people in this country cannot beuprooted at the entity level. And there they end. It is more than clear thatthe outcomes of the judicial ruling against permanent and large-scale funda-mental human rights and freedoms end up inevitably at the entity level,while there is simply no possibility for filing appeals.

Another, seemingly professional question is: does the engagement of theinternational community in all the forms of government (EUFOR, EUPOL,international judges, the Central Bank Governor until recently, plus theOHR's huge Bonn powers) in all sorts of ways that we have listened to, notpose an additional problem? Probably out of the best intentions – in the statewhich is by the composition of its citizens and by its constitutional organi-zation a 'unique' state in a negative sense – there is an attempt to implementhere – here I am following the line of the Anglo-Saxon proverb 'one num-ber fits all' – a unified model regardless of whether people live in Canada,Bangladesh, Pakistan, Ireland, or Bosnia and Herzegovina. Take it or leaveit. Above all, regarding the sphere of law: how is it possible that we are re-ceiving from The Hague, Strasbourg, and Sarajevo (and also from BanjaLuka) the ingredients of an odd mixture of two different legal traditions andtwo different legal systems, which are simply not consistent? It is not possi-ble to mix together, without having a contradiction in the end, the Anglo-Saxon and European Continental legal systems (even before communismand during communism and after communism we belonged to the Continen-tal law system), without causing turbulences? If I am to be pathetic, I wouldsay that from the point of view of sensibility of the public, it is absolutelyproblematic to introduce here the witness protection or plea bargain in thewar crimes trials. This is something that the victims cannot understand anddo not accept. And other people in BiH who are expecting to see moral sa-tisfaction in the first place, cannot understand it either, and they do notaccept it.

A third important question also from the area of law concerns the charac-ter of our Constitution. My colleague Pobric made a good comment. But Iask whether a response to that question is absolutely possible and I wouldlike the key-note speaker to offer us a response like Mr. Pobric and not assomeone who can affect the solution to the constitutional dilemmas. The

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Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is Annex IV, is indeed a partof the peace agreement. To my best knowledge of the constitutional histo-ry, it has never happened that the constitution of a country is a part of thepeace accords. Peace agreements cannot be changed. Our Constitution,which is a part of the Dayton Peace Agreement, envisages the possibility ofmaking amendments. How can something which is a part of somethingwhich cannot be revised be changed? Or, has the one who made the deci-sions – who was authorized and primarily powerful to verify in Dayton orParis, it does not matter, a tragic situation which we all faced later – everthought of his own responsibility? Or it will happen like in the joke aboutthe washing machine which was rotating laundry at high speed endlesslylong as there was nobody to press the stop button: we shall conclude thatthey have forgotten us and began to think about Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran orother places. There is no need to remind you of the commonplaces. Still,it is quite clear that our Constitution falls under the category of imposed con-stitutions. It was signed in a military base of another country. It was signedand guaranteed by three co-signatories of whom one died in The Hague,and the other two were prevented by death, caused by other reasons, fromending up in The Hague. Two of them – president Milosevic and presidentTudjman – were the heads of the states which carried out an aggressionagainst another state (Republic of BiH) to a different extent, and they werethe guarantors of the document which contains the future (the current)Constitution of that state. This is not a sustaining structure in legal, moral,metaphysical even divine law, if you will. If that is so and if that not quitebright person (Richard Holbrooke) used a cynical phrase of a ”straitjacketput on Bosnia and Herzegovina”, then all the subsequent and derived ques-tions are rather senseless. Thus, that same 'international community' whenwe are discussing its role in paving the right way for BiH (if we know at allwhat the 'international community' mantra means) cannot be understoodbecause it is imposing the frameworks within which we, running around incircles, should, as stakeholders, solve definitely the problems which areabsolutely vital to us.

The fourth question, along the same lines (and regretfully, it will remainunanswered because Mr. Schwarz-Schilling and Mr. Schmunk left the Con-ference too early) concerns one fundamentally insulting pedagogical lessonwe heard this morning. Let me paraphrase: ”We are here because you needus and you need us because you are incapable”. I have absolutely no dilem-mas about the political and moral competencies of the present elites in BiH,but I think that it is a cheap argument which is used to justify permanent

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presence of the ruling powers of the so-called international community andmake them legitimate. On the other hand, the whole story which is basedon such terms as ownership and stakeholders, 'it is up to you', 'you shouldreach an agreement, and we shall accept it' – is not honest as it forgets aboutthe powers which those institutions have (the so-called Bonn powers in thefirst place) and such thinking and action suggest the death sentence toBosnia and Herzegovina. If we say that the national politicians are unableto reach an agreement about anything (for the time being, about the consti-tutional reforms, the police reform, higher education, the public administra-tion reform), then you have to say who in that political circus is responsiblefor the situation in which no agreement is possible. My intention is not toexculpate anyone but you can no longer be shifting the responsibility to thelocal politicians. To illustrate the responsibility of the international commu-nity, let me use a strong argument from Jeffrey Nice's statement to The NewYork Times in connection with the International Court of Justice judgment,which is a masterpiece in the legal profession but a scandal in moral terms.The conclusion that it was a 'municipal genocide which lasted three days'caused deep frustrations to the people in this country. I am so sorry forusing this fact, impolitely probably, to describe the negative role of the inter-national community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The height of cynicism is that it is not possible to identify the perpetratorof such a poorly defined genocide. One of the banners at the recent Sarajevodemonstration read, ”Aliens from the planet Mars committed genocide”! Theinternational community did nothing to prevent at least what was happeningover those three days in Srebrenica, which was a safe haven, controlled byUNPROFOR. Of course, genocide began in 1992. According to the interna-tional law and the United Nations Charter about the collective safety, an ele-mentary interpretation indicates the obligation of the Security Council to pre-vent aggression on a sovereign state, which resulted in the end in genocide!

The story about the harmonized approach of the international commu-nity to the horror and pains we went through is of a different nature. Thatis simply a lie. With good reason can we say that in all Balkan wars (let meuse this neutral term) it was known in advance that Germany and Austriawould support Slovenia and Croatia. There was no reason to have doubtsthat Russia and Greece would certainly support Serbia and that Bosniakswould be waiting for assistance from their Arab and generally Muslim bro-thers. In synchrony, there is no indication of a unified action of the 'interna-tional community'. Those are only pure interests and unabridged policies,traditional and ideological differences.

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In the end, it is clear that the judgment of the International Court ofJustice, which is one of the most important institutions of the United Nations,the highest judicial institution on the planet – regardless of whether blameshould be put on Carla del Ponte's inaction or on Judge Hastings' action –showed that the so-called international justice is absolutely ashamed in Bos-nia and Herzegovina. If we are talking about the shameful 'gentle' verdictunder which Serbia is responsible for its failure to prevent and punish thecrime of genocide, a cynical logic could take us to a conclusion that all thestates in the world, including Lithuania, Macedonia, Peru and Zimbabwe, areresponsible for the same crime. Naturally, all nice and honest people doknow that the state committed genocide in Srebrenica (if we can speak ofgenocide in Srebrenica any more). However, if there is anyone who is trulyresponsible for genocide, while I am not amnestying local figures at all, andif we accept the offered minimalist definition of genocide, then it is the Uni-ted Nations. Only after we get an unequivocal response to this question shallwe be able to discuss the problems. I prepared questions along the same li-nes for the key-note speakers this morning.

Those questions concern the calculating attitude towards the Bonn po-wers, which can in many ways be compared to those which the winningpowers used in the post-Nazi period. In other words, we take the full autho-rity, we implement denazification, but in return we take the full responsibili-ty. The moment you have shown and proven that you have get rid of theNazi frenzy, we are absolutely willing to assist you in all the ways possibleand, of course, hand over the management in its full capacity. No way be-fore or later. This lukewarm option tested in Bosnia and Herzegovina ob-viously leads to nowhere.

Nedim Ademovi}, Constitutional Court of BiH

What is the 'international community' in BiH?As the key-note speaker observed correctly, the notion of the 'interna-

tional community' covers a very broad range of actors involved in the imple-mentation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (GFAP),ranging from different supranational and international institutions to diplo-matic missions. Today, 12 years after the engagement of the so-called inter-national community, we can conclude that this ambitious and broadlydefined notion of the 'international community' makes the situation compli-cated in the implementation of individual aspects of the GFAP. This, this

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institutional overkill 1 is a partial obstacle to an effective work on building afully functioning BiH. A typical example of making the situation complicat-ed is the segment which concerns the human rights and fundamental free-doms protection. Instead of having two or three strong and effective institu-tions, the whole 'international community' has been involved, from suchinternational institutions as the OHR, UNHCR, OSCE, local bodies, courts,bodies of administration at 4 or 5 different levels, to the eminent non-gov-ernmental institutions. An ordinary man, as an addressee and the central fig-ure in the system, simply does not know how he could protect his rightsand freedoms, which is why they are left unprotected, although the humanrights violations remain one of the biggest problems of the post-Dayton BiH.This is the reason why the OHR – a quasi doyen of the 'international com-munity', as the distinguished Judge Dauster called that institution – shouldhave prepared better for its role of a coordinator, making sure that some seg-ments of the GFAP are protected effectively on the one hand, and that thereis no overlapping in the field, on the other.2

Legal definition of the status and position of the 'international communi-ty' in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Regarding the status, position and responsibility of the 'international com-munity', the key-note speaker observed correctly that the 'international com-munity' has not taken the responsibility for BiH in terms of international lawand the constitutional law. The key-note speaker also believes that by sign-ing the GFAP, BiH gave its consent to a 'joint action' by the state and the'international community' on developing BiH. That is true. However, I thinkthat a big mistake was done as it is a kind of a precedent in international lawwhich has never been given a clear definition. An undefined situation, on theone hand, relieves the international community of any responsibility for itswork and results, while on the other, it damages its dignity in the eyes of itsnational partners. The BiH Constitutional Court has defined the relationsbetween the 'international community' and Bosnia and Herzegovina as theso-called functional dualism.3 This means that by signing the GFAP, BiH

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1 Marko, Joseph, Friedenssicherung im 21. Jahrhundert: Bosnien und Herzegowina als europä-

ische Herausforderung (Ginther/Benedek/Isak/Kicker, (izd), Völkerrecht und Europarecht. 25Österreichischer Völkerrechtstag, Vienna, 2001, page 55-87 (77)).

2 It would be sufficient to analyze the confusion of citizens over the parallel protection of humanrights and fundamental freedoms at the Constitutional Court of BiH, under the Constitution ofBiH, and the Human Rights Chamber, under Annex 6 to the GFAP.

3 See case No. U 9/00, of 29 September 2000, known as the Civil Service Act. All ConstitutionalCourt decisions are available at www.ustavnisud.ba.


admitted that it is unable to solve some problems alone, and voluntarilytransferred some of its sovereign powers to international actors, which ex-cludes the existence of any protector. However, the Constitutional Court em-phasized that despite that fact, BiH was and still is an independent, sove-reign state and that the 'international community', when it is taking somepowers, had to act in compliance with the Constitution of BiH and its cons-titutional principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights protectionetc. Dozens of examples show that the 'international community' has not ac-ted in a constitutional way (removal of local politicians without the right toappeal and without due process,4 decertification of police officers,5 kidnap-ping of citizens who acted against the Dayton,6 citizens' damage claims dis-bursement by international institutions, etc.). Finally, I think that the 'inter-national community', regardless of the fact that it falls outside of the scopeof responsibility of BiH, failed to establish an internal system of control andaccountability. This is the reason why I have to admit that the educationalrole of the 'international community' has not been fulfilled as it has oftenacted in an autocratic, arrogant way, with force, instead of acting in a cons-titutional manner. The educational role should have been crucial to the es-tablishment of modern European standards which BiH should reach regard-less of the consequences of the war. For this reason, this should be furthercriticism of the OHR as that Office was and still is the main institution withthe main authority to interpret the overall GFAP.

The main tasks of the 'international community' in BiH.The tasks of the 'international community' in BiH are extremely difficult.

There is no doubt about that. On the one hand, the 'international commu-nity' in BiH had to remove the consequences of the war, while on the other,it also had to transform the society under modern European standards –which BiH should do regardless of the war. In doing so, it has the local part-ners who are largely fragmented in political, ideological and religious terms,which has made the situation in the field even more complex. Because ofthe complexity of the tasks, the 'international community' in BiH could notdeal with all sorts of things: rather, it restricted its actions to the areas definedin the GFAP. This was a legal framework for the action of the 'international

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4 See the BiH Constitutional Court decision AP 953/05, of 8 July 2006.5 See the Opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)

about the constitutional situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and powers of the High Represen-tative, adopted at the 62. plenary session (Venice, 11-12 March, 2005).

6 See the BiH Constitutional Court decision AP 696/04, of 23 September 2005.


community'. Regarding the extent at which the state should be reformed inthe areas covered by the GFAP, it could be defined as 'self-sustainability'.This means that it was necessary to reach the level of the quality at whichit would be possible to proceed with the reforms in an independent way,in a peaceful and democratic environment.

Results in the achievement of the goals from the GFAP.When it comes to military objectives, as the key-note speaker stressed,

which I agree with, they have a subordinate or subsidiary relevance in re-gard to the overall objective of the GFAP, although crucial for the beginningof the GFAP implementation. There is no civilian implementation of theGFAP without peace. Here the 'international community' played a good roleby its own judgment: gradually, it put the military under control and regu-lated this field, especially after the state took the responsibility for the armedforces.

Regarding the civilian aspects, the results are different. Still, regardless ofthe GFAP segment, the 'international community' had to be aware that with-out good law, an institutional framework, effective procedures and materialand legal standards there would be no reforms. In his detailed analysis, Mr. Dauster ramified each segment and stressed both success and failures orpartial achievements of the 'international community'. So we can concludethat the issues of the inter-entity boundary line and the Brcko District arbi-tration were completed successfully. The key-note speaker also gave a po-sitive assessment of the election system in BiH under Annex III to the GFAP,in which the reform implementation and the BiH taking the ownership is atextbook example.

An exception which the key-note speaker stressed in regard to the elec-tion system concerns the issue of equality of constituent peoples and thecategory of the so-called Others (especially regarding their equal participa-tion in the government) and the relations between the state as an adminis-trative and territorial unit and its lower-level administrative and territorialunits, i.e. the entities and the Brcko District. However, as he righteously ob-served, it largely arises from the constitutional arrangements, i.e. from AnnexIV to the GFAP. This shows clearly a close link between some Annexes. Still,can the 'international community' be amnestied from those issues and inac-tion? I do not think it can. It is the international community that should takeevery step possible which is necessary to solve that issue, including the con-stitutional reform. If BiH is unable to do it alone, the 'international commu-nity' has to find and impose a solution to the issue of an 'individual versuscollective', the relations between collectives and the organization of the state

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in terms of the relations between the central authorities and their units. TheBonn powers should be used whenever there is a problem, which the localinstitutions fail to resolve within a certain time line. The 'international com-munity' should act in an educational, democratic way, in accordance withthe principle of the rule of law. This is a proper interpretation of the rela-tions between the local authorities and the 'international community', whichthe BiH Constitutional Court defined as a 'functional dualism'. That this istrue is proven by numerous examples. Is the indirect taxation system func-tioning in an independent way? Is the state judicial system or the state armyfunctioning in an independent way? The answer is yes. And who made itpossible? Of course, 'the international community'. In this regard, it is inte-resting to mention that soon after the intervention by the 'international com-munity' in the above areas, the criticism which comes mainly from theRepublika Srpska would begin to fade away and eventually, the new situa-tion would be accepted as the most natural situation and as a necessarysegment of the development of BiH. Now let me ask a psychological ques-tion: why did negative reactions to the impositions by the 'internationalcommunity' disappear so soon? The response is logical: because the impo-sitions helped establish a natural situation in the country!

Thus, with its passive policy and the failure to use Bonn powers over thepast years i.e. with the policy of handing the ownership over to the localauthorities, I think that the 'international community' has caused more da-mage than it would have produced negative reactions by its proper impo-sitions. Had the 'international community' solved all those issues a few yearsbefore with all the powers it has, we would be a much more developedcountry today, and would have moved forward to the European Union andthe European Union to us much more.

Regarding Annex 7 as an extremely important legal basis for the elimina-tion of the results of the war, I think that the 'international community' hasmade a catastrophic mistake. Annex 7 means an unconditional restorationof the property-related issues to that as on April 1, 1992 while the labor rela-tions were not brought back to the level from 1992, which should have beenbrought back to the extent possible. The 'international community' allowedRepublika Srpska to 'legalize' discriminatory dismissals of non-Serb workers,and also the Federation of BiH to do the same through the 'laid-off worker'phenomenon7. This largely contributed to the 'cementing' of ethnic cleans-

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7 Article 152 of the RS Labor Law, Article 143 of the FBIH Labor Law.


ing in BiH, i.e. to the de facto unsuccessful implementation of Annex 7. Theinability to get re-employed in the pre-war place of residence was simply astrong deterrent to sustainable returns.

In the end, I would like to mention the economic system of Bosnia andHerzegovina. The key-note speaker stressed that the general assessment ofthis extremely important segment is negative, with the exception of the mo-netary, customs and a part of the taxation system. First of all, Annex 9 to theGFAP, about public corporations in BiH, remained a dead letter. In his opi-nion, the basic public corporations such as railways, air traffic, energy andpostal and telecommunications system and so on, should have been treatedas a state interest and the responsibility of BiH in terms of Annex 9. Regar-ding this issue, the 'international community' remains passive and allowedthe entities to behave like separate states. Further, BiH does not yet have areformed economic system and a formal 'single market' based on marketeconomy. The 'international community' has ignored this segment, altho-ugh, unlike some other problems in the country, it has a clear legal basis inArticle I/4. Vital economic resources in BiH – tourism, water, forests, minesand energy – are at a much lower level than before the war. Neither the'international community' nor BiH developed the basis for protection, letalone a long-term development of this segment of economy. As Mr. Dausteremphasized, most of the laws in the area of economy are not harmonizedwith the European standards, on the one hand, while on the other, this areais not codified at the state level. I cannot believe that the 'international com-munity' has never thought over the last 12 years that it would be necessaryto explain to the local authorities that the imposition of the state-level lawson business companies, obligations, bankruptcy and liquidation, the bank-ing sector etc., is necessary for BiH to function on the principles of the 'ruleof law' and 'single market', in terms of Articles I/2 and I/4 of the Constitutionof BiH. The passive attitude of the local authorities is something which I canunderstand but cannot justify. The passiveness of the 'international commu-nity' is something which I cannot understand nor can I find a justificationfor their inaction.

In conclusion, the 'international community' has to continue to use itsBonn powers in all areas, at least those covered by the GFAP. It is obligedto do so by the GFAP and the agreement it has with BiH that it will assistthis country in building a functioning state. In doing so, however, the 'inter-national community' has to act in a democratic way, in accordance with theConstitution of BiH. If the Constitution of BiH poses an obstacle to furtherdevelopment, it has to change it if the local authorities fail to do so. This is

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an imperative of the development. Education of BiH citizens in how thestate should be run has to be a parallel process. Thus, the 'international com-munity' may leave BiH the moment it sees that a critical mass has beendeveloped, which will be able to continue to lead the state in a positivedirection. BiH is still too far from it and BiH needs the 'international commu-nity', but not as a passive observer and a theoretical interpreter, but as anactive participant in the reform processes.

DISCUSSION

Nurija Omerba{i}, Director, Institute for Peace and Co-Existence of Civilizations

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure and honor to greet you onbehalf of the Foundation, Institute for Peace and Co-Existence of Civilizati-ons8, which was formed last January. The Institute was initiated by Mr. Clin-ton, former President of the United States of America, when he said that po-larization among civilizations had reached such a level that there was a seri-ous threat of the conflict of civilizations; thus he believed that Bosnia, as itis, multi-ethnic for centuries, should play its role and be the link; Bosniashould do something and bring peoples closer together.

Regarding Annexes IV and VII which have already been mentioned here,I would like to raise the issue of the responsibility of the international com-munity: why should we not tally the balance of the effects of the implemen-tation of both Annexes? In terms of their content, and as parts of the PeaceAgreement, they have the same value, and the same content. However, thesmaller entity puts the fact that it covers 49 percent of the territory beforeanything else and is forcing only that right. But at the same time it escapesthe obligations arising from Annex VII. In this regard, the international com-munity cannot avoid its own responsibility. The other thing which I wouldlike to mention concerns shifting the responsibility of the international com-munity, under the following excuse: „You should reach an agreement.” Icannot understand this, as the cause to all the problems in this entire chaosis the Dayton Constitution, which envisages and creates for the smaller enti-ty the right of veto over the whole. In this situation there is no possibility

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8 For more information about the Institution, see www.ipacc.ba


for the 'two' to reach an agreement. If one has the right of veto, how will itbe possible for the other one to reach an agreement? It turns out in the endthat it is possible to reach an agreement only over the issues beyond thepositions created by war or that the aim is to take even more. Those are notthe parties which could make an agreement. In this case, the internationalcommunity should invoke its powers which protect the rights of citizens,which have been seriously violated under all international standards. Howcould we solve this problem? The question is, in fact, how could we changethe part of the Dayton Constitution which created the veto? Persistent insist-ing on the agreement by and between the victim and the criminal, underthe right of veto given to the criminal, is the defeat of the international com-munity, the defeat of the good and the victory of evil. The international community has to find a way to solve that. I have a question for Mr. Man-fred Dauster: how could we eliminate the Dayton Accords? How could we change the Accords? I think that we should rely on the international law, international contractual law and the constitutional law of Bosnia andHerzegovina.

Thank you for giving me an opportunity to join the discussion.

Mirsad ]eman, The Forum of Parliamentarians 1991-1996

Thank you. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, first of all let me tell youthat I fully agree with all the presentations by key-note speakers, other spee-ches and commentaries that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina – I meanthe level of the state – should be given more responsibilities, especially insome areas which have been mentioned at the Conference so far. Let memake a short reference to the morning session – I was in Geneva in 1993when the concept of Bosnia and Herzegovina was being discussed. I bearwitness to the fact that, in fact, those who represented the international com-munity were putting a straitjacket on Bosnia and Herzegovina as the well-known Stoltenberg's Plan – as well all previous and subsequent plans – we-re based exclusively on an ethnic concept. My comment after that was thatif what we refer to as the international community wants Bosnia and Herze-govina, then it does not want to see it as a state or a society, according toa tiger's skin metaphor, it is rather the skin of the cow which – as we allknow – has large patches which we now recognize as the entities.

I am absolutely pleased to hear the voice of the academic communityincluding professor Grebo, promoting the Supreme Court of Bosnia and

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Herzegovina, since it is clear that without the Supreme Court at the level ofthe state of Bosnia and Herzegovina – which cannot be substituted by theCourt of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of its jurisdiction – there can beno protection of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina nor will the hu-man rights be guaranteed as they should be. Even the Constitutional Court,with some responsibilities, cannot be a compensation for the SupremeCourt.

Manfred Dauster

Let me focus on legal issues. I agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina needsa Supreme Court but under the given constitutional order, I think that forthe time being it is not possible to have a Supreme Court and take thatresponsibility from the entities, just like the jurisdiction of the courts andprosecutor’s offices, which is at the entity level. Of course, this should bechanged. But let me come back to the constitutional reform.

I remember the Venice Commission. I remember when the Court ofBosnia and Herzegovina was to be established as an administrative courtand I remember that they talked about the legal framework of the constitu-tion and said that it was not possible to unite divided jurisdiction. I am slight-ly skeptical.

When I look at the discussions about the police reform, I am expectingand I anticipate that it will be the same kind of discussion about the Supre-me Court, if it begins. The entities will again lose a very important jurisdic-tion and the same is true for the police. I am equally skeptical about theeconomic situation for I simply believe that one entity can always say thatit does not want to transfer its responsibility to the state level.

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STUDY

Manfred Dauster*

Tallying the Balance of Effects of the International Community

in Bosnia and Herzegovina, December 1995 – March 2007*

Legal aspects

I. Introduction: Obstacles right in the beginning - too many

uncertain tasks, too many participants as an initial uncertainty

«The International Community» has been present and active in Bosniaand Herzegovina on the basis of the Dayton Peace Agreement for almost 12years. There are some indications of its fatigue and that it would wish toreduce its engagement.1 Transition (along with the state ownership) remainsthe goal», reads the Communiqué issued on 26-27 February 20072 by thePeace Implementation Council (PIC). Since 26 and 26 February 2007 theInternational Community via PIC starts from the perspective that Bosnia andHerzegovina will take over the ownership in the future. From the aspect ofthe defence policy, in early winter of 2006 Bosnia and Herzegovina becamea member of the NATO's Partnership for Peace. The talks with the EuropeanUnion about Bosnia's moving toward the European Union are underway.Still, the question remains whether all this is enough for the country toremain on the track and there is also a question of how the InternationalCommunity can contribute to that, without reducing its engagement. Takingstock of the actions of the International Community may help make anassessment of what can be expected in the future. It is possible to examinethe background of this naive expectation that Bosnia and Herzegovina

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* Manfred Dauster, Ph.D. Judge, Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, presiding judge, land court inMunich, Landgericht München I

1 Public statements of the present High Representative immediately after he took over as the HRon 31 January, 2006 regarding the implementation of so-called Bonn Powers and the closure ofOHR, including the replacement by the Office of the EU Special Representative 30th report ofthe High Representative to the UN Secretary General /Bericht des Hohen Vertreters an den UN-Generalsekretär/, 15 July 2006 S. 1). - Very critically, International Crisis Croup, Europe ReportNo 180 of 15 February 2007, S. 1; critical also Süddeutsche Zeitung No. 46 24/./25. February2007., S. 7; besides Süddeutsche Zeitung No. 50 of 01 March 2007, S. 8

2 See www.ohr.int


will remain on the track after such a long monitoring period, and this couldcause scepticism that such expectations are shaky. The International Co-mmunity will disengage and withdraw, sooner or later, so that taking stockafter more than one decade seems to be legitimate. Regarding «Bosnia'sremaining on the track», any idea about withdrawal inevitably means that inthe future Bosnia and Herzegovina will play a much stronger role in choos-ing the «path», even the «right» path.

If we are to tally the balance of the effects of the International Commu-nity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first question to be asked is whose stockshould be taken, what is the International Community in Bosnia andHerzegovina.3

The work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosla-

via (ICTY) is not considered in this research paper. The jurisdiction of the

tribunal is not limited to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which should be deal-

ing with war crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia,

although most of the trials have been conducted in connection with the

atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995.

But this should not diminish the importance of ICTY in prosecuting crimes,

especially those committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The judicial prose-

cution of and eventual trials for war crimes is crucial to the country's self-

awareness and its historical perception, and thereby it is an integral part of

comprehension of the state and its sovereignty. Reconciliation of different

groups in the country is almost inconceivable without a formal judicial

consideration and procedures at ICTY (now in cooperation with the Court

of Bosnia and Herzegovina with which the tribunal has already begun to

share the work). There will be no discussion about the judgment of the

International Court of Justice of the United Nations (ICJ) which decided in

its judgment of 26 February 2007 about the outcome of the dispute between

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia regarding violations of the United

Nations Genocide Convention, adopted on 9 December 1948. ICJ is one of

the main bodies of the United Nations4 without a special mandate which

would be restricted to Bosnia and Herzegovina only.5

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3 Peace Implementation Council consists of 55 states and many international organizations and avarying number of observers. See OHR web www.ohr.int. There is also the Board of Principleswith permanent members: OHR, EUFOR, NATO HQ Sarajevo, OSCE, UNHCR, EUPM; EC, theWB, IMF and UNDP. The history and tasks of the Board of Principles can also be seen on theOHR web site.

4 Article 4, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter; Article 1 of the ICTY Statute.


The information about that is given first of all in the Dayton PeaceAgreement and its Annexes. They cover the areas of politics and tasksassigned to various international organizations – in addition to the nationalresponsibility which was preserved – they have the final say. We shall notname them all here. A part of that is the aspect of military security which –no matter how it was and remains important for peace – is only support tocivilian aspects of the Peace Agreement. The military tasks carried out byIFOR, then by SFOR and finally by EUFOR6 will not be discussed in detailin this paper. Since this paper concerns civilian aspects of restoration ofpeace and peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we should mentionfirst of all the High Representative who under Annex 10 of the PeaceAgreement should be and has been ever since the Agreement was signedresponsible for the implementation of those civilian aspects.7 They are notspecified and they have been understood in very broad terms. They includeeconomic recovery, refugee returns, improvements of the constitution andestablishment of new institutions, in fact, each area of politics is included.Even the simple cases at the municipal level required actions by the HighRepresentative if they were related to the fundamental issues of ensuringpeace. In addition, the Peace Agreement envisages a coordinating role ofthe High Representative between all other civilian, international organiza-

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5 The Judgment of ICJ of 26 February 2007 caused disappointment in the public in Bosnia andHerzegovina as it denied the direct responsibility of the state of Serbia (former Federal Republicof Yugoslavia) for the crimes committed during the war 1992-1995, whereby rejecting the obli-gation of Belgrade to pay war reparations. The disappointment is based on great expectationsof the public in Bosnia and Herzegovina over what ICJ could achieve. The judgment is impor-tant for the legal history as it is for the first time that ICJ established the responsibility of a statein principle, and not only an individual responsibility (judgment: Urteil, S. 58 and further arti-cles 155 and onwards), while the international community received a binding definition of agenocide (Urteil, S 75 and further articles 2002-230) and the judgment gives clear rules of re-cognition of evidence (page 135 and further, articles 377 and onwards). Bosnia and Herzegovinadid not lose the case completely. ICJ clearly established that genocide had happened in Srebre-nica and that Serbia had violated its obligation to prevent this and other atrocities in Bosnia andHerzegovina, although Belgrade had recognized the events as such and had the possibility toprevent it by its involvement.

6 27 ministers of defense of the European Union agreed on 1 March 29007 in Wiesbaden to reducetroops of the EU within a four-layer plan. The current size of the troops is 6500. Within the firststep 3,500 troops will withdraw. By the end of 2007 a total of 2500 troops will remain (Süddeut-sche Zeitung No 51 of 02 March 2007, S. 8)

7 The efficiency of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and his responsibilityshould be analyzed in detail also beyond this paper, because if we follow the proposals for solu-tions provided by the UN envoy for Kosovo, the 'international community' there should also es-tablish a similar situation during an interim period. The mistakes made in Bosnia and Herzego-vina should be avoided in Kosovo.


tions which are co-responsible or have the sole responsibility under thePeace Agreement for certain tasks. So to speak, as a doyen of the Interna-tional Community, he should take care of that, in order to prevent the inter-national political atomism. He should ensure unified approaches of theInternational Community. Along with the High Representative, OSCE tookover many tasks, for instance in the area of building and developing a constitutional system; the Council of Europe took the responsibility for hu-man rights, democratization and establishment of a democratic election sys-tem in accordance with Western standards. UNIPTF/UNMIBH took over thetask of building a democratic apparatus, in order to ensure security and safe-ty in the country, the task which is now carried out by the European UnionPolice Mission. The list is not exhaustive and it is much longer. There is noexhaustive list of the tasks which the international organizations wanted toand should deal with after 1995. Immediately after the signing of the PeaceAgreement they covered the whole civic life in Bosnia and Herzegovina.Exclusively and from the aspect of the international law, the mandatorymembers of the International Community who were also mandated to carryout those tasks were joined since the very beginning by other, self-selectedstakeholders whose role should not be underestimated. Those were and stillare diplomatic missions which represent special interests of their countriesin this region of the West Balkans. Their job became legitimate through theirmembers in the Peace Implementation Council, the body of the Interna-tional Community which provides the advice to the High Representative andsupport. The organizations which provide support and which remain closeto the governments are in the shadow of diplomatic missions. With their sig-nificant donations they affected the developments in the areas of their inter-est. There are also non-governmental organizations from abroad which de-fined their tasks in the development of the country and which tried to im-plement their tasks in the decade after 1995 not always in a perfect harmo-ny with the organizations which are obliged to act in accordance with theinternational law or at least politically legitimate stakeholders.

The music played by all players at the concert of the reconstruction inBosnia and Herzegovina was not harmonized well, although the institutionof the High Representative and his coordinating roles should have ensuredthat, ideally, there was one conductor with the full responsibility and whoshould and could have prevented the worst disharmony possible in a con-cert hall.

However, even the best conductor will hardly make any contribution tosuccess, if musicians get only parts of scores during rehearsals while they

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are allowed to improvise after the general rehearsal. This was and remainsthe key problem to the allocation of the tasks under the international law,the tasks given by the Dayton Peace Agreement to different members of theInternational Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a grammaticalanalysis of the program sentences with some unclear clauses, different the-matic areas were described descriptively, they are overlapping partly, andthey are vying in part. How a democratic state should look like has beenstudied by the general theory of the state and law and political science sinceDemokratia was applied for the first time in antic Polis. What does ”demo-cratization” mean? Of course, Bosnia and Herzegovina should be the rule oflaw, as it is requested by its Constitution. But there is as much of the rule oflaw as there is democracy. The Peace Agreement and its Annexes were opentopics. This was perhaps a mistake. On the other hand, it should not be thetask of a peace agreement – and especially not of an agreement such as theDayton Agreement, which was created and had to be created under known,extremely difficult political circumstances and under the greatest politicalpressure ever in order to put an end to slaughtering people – to offer a fullyelaborated, detailed draft of the government agenda, which should serve asa basis for elaboration of the specific actions, and which would becomebinding. Generally, this is not possible and it was not possible in 1995 inBosnia and Herzegovina.

We should add to this a concept of a joint action by the InternationalCommunity and state institutions offered by the Dayton. Neither from theaspect of the international law nor from the aspect of the Constitution didthe International Community take over its own responsibility for Bosnia andHerzegovina in 1995. Had Bosnia and Herzegovina been under the interna-tional protectorate (which was said during some periods and for which so-me High Representatives and the International Community as a whole werereproached) the lack of a comprehensive programme of implementationwhich would last for many years could be attributed to the International Co-mmunity as its fatal sin. However, in international law and constitutionalterms, the concept of the Dayton Agreement remains a joint action of theInternational Community together with the state institutions which shouldbe involved on the basis of the Constitution. Nothing has been changed inthis main principle of the consensus by so-called Bonn Powers invested withthe High Representative in 1997. For, their implementation should be an ex-ception from the consensus. This is why the principle of consensus reques-ted both sides to develop on the basis of the Agreement political program-mes necessary for their implementation. This did not happen in the period

245



which followed immediately thereafter. Besides, not only did the Dayton putan end to the three-years long war but also represented the beginning of amuch more comprehensive process of changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina.8

The country was not only characterized by the consequences of the war anddamages resulting from the war, such as refugees, expulsions as a result ofethnic cleansing etc. In 1995 the country was at the threshold of changingits system from a socialist centralized, economic, and social order to a demo-cratic, sovereign, and market-oriented system. In economic terms, the situa-tion became even more tense and strict, because the economy of Bosniaand Herzegovina lost its foreign policy background after the dissolution ofYugoslavia and its restoration in 1995 was quite uncertain. The Dayton andthe Dayton tasks with specified individual programmes could not turn in1995 to these comprehensive tasks. To cope with these tasks was the nextassignment of the International Community.

Now we should establish whether this was the case with the tasksdefined in 1995 in the area of judicial reforms. Now it should be clear whichobstacles prevented that.

II. Important steps on the path of reforms of Bosnia and

Herzegovina taken under the International Community’s

pressure or which the International Community took alone

Not all activities of the International Community since 1995 should bepresented here. Nor can they all be presented. This ‘interim’ stock will belimited to the important and permanent results of the international actions.

Immediately after the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed in the autumnof 1996 democratic elections at all levels of Bosnia and Herzegovina tookplace. Democratization was a priority task which was taken by the OSCE.In the years following 1995 a legal framework was created for the institu-tions required for democratic elections, the OSCE monitored a whole rangeof laws, of which we shall mention the most important:

The (entity) laws on political parties,9

The general election law,10

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8 Ibid. International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 180 of 15 February, 2007, page 2.9 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of FBiH, 27/91; RS Official Gazette 15/9610BiH Official Gazette 23/01


The law on funding of political parties,11

The law on conflict of interest in the government institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.12

The judicial review of elections was assigned in the autumn of 2000 tothe Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina established by the High Representati-ve’s decision.13 In addition to institutionalization of review of elections, thedecision was also important for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as theseed of judicial institutions was sowed at the state level (we shall focus onother tasks assigned to the state court further below).14 Bosnia and Herzego-vina now has (largely) democratic election system thanks to the permanentefforts of the OSCE. The elections have been the national responsibility since2000. There are no grave objections by international observers of elections.True, the election system is still going through constitutional and legal earlythroes which will not be removed without the constitutional reform. In anattempt to respond to all ethnic components of the nation of Bosnia andHerzegovina, the Dayton Agreement created a system of obstacles and hurd-les (such as the blockade by the minorities), which run counter to the prin-ciple of equality or the basic right to an equal access by all citizens to pub-lic services. This unequal treatment which was criticized, among others, bythe Council of Europe's Venice Commission, which is also in contraventionof the OSCE Copenhagen criteria from 1990, which may help the EU makea decision for a candidate country moving closer toward the EuropeanUnion, should not be attributed to the OSCE and the International Commu-nity.15 The International Community had to cope for years in the given cons-titutional and legal situation. The constitutional reform was a taboo for manyyears, and serious talks began only a few years ago. But whether the obsta-cles which bring about inequality in elections will be removed in the com-ing constitutional reform remains a question.16

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11BiH Official Gazette 22/0012BiH Official Gazette 12/0213BiH Official Gazette 29/00. Regarding the current tasks of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

see Dauster, Das Staatsgericht von Bosnien und Herzegowina, StraFo 2006, 314 ff.14See II15Helsinki Komitee, Human Rights Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina - January-December 2006,

page 2.16Perhaps pressure from outside the country could help (see: International Crisis group Report in

Jakob Finci's application to the European Court for Human Rights, Europe Report 180 of 15 Feb-ruary 2007., page 11).


Elsewhere, in the area of democratization and parliamentization of thestate institutions, monitored by OSCE in the first place, there has been hard-ly any success. This primarily concerns the implementation of the principleof a representative democracy in the parliaments in Bosnia and Herzegovi-na, parliamentary self-awareness in regard to the government, parliamentaryoversight over the executive authorities, especially in the area of the bud-get, parliamentary accountability to the media, and also the understandingof the role of political parties in representative democracy. Some deficits canbe noticed here, in comparison to the EU standards.17 They concern a hard-ly perceivable public control of expenditures by the parliaments or under-development of political parties which is manifested in their ability of long-term or short-term planning, the ability to develop and implement pro-grammes. Necessary legal frameworks exist. Deficits continue to be basedon the comprehension of the role of political institutions and their indivi-dual members. Overcoming of the manner of thinking deeply rooted in theclient who works in favour of the party or in an ethnic voter, the manner ofthinking which is not in favour of the whole country is probably the issueof generations and can hardly be overcome in the present political environ-ment. No matter how the legal frameworks developed after 1995 are per-fect in terms of the fully functioning representative democracy in compari-son to the EU standards, the ideas and principles behind them do not seemto have reached the politicians.18

Another primary goal which the International Community was imple-menting in its policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina concerned returns ofrefugees and displaced persons to their pre-war homes. This policy - theresults were achieved with strong efforts over many years19 - remains only

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17The Republika Srpska Government announced in the winter of 2006/2007 a boycott of the statetelevision BH TV and refused to provide any information and cooperation as in its opinion te-levision had released untimely and inadequate reports about the Republika Srpska national ho-liday celebration.

18See also Helsinki Committee, Human Rights Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina - January-De-cember 2006, page 2, especially in regard to slow implementation of the election results in theformation of the governments and other institutions.

19Much more optimistic is the 24 High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General (24.Bericht des Hohen Vertreters an den UN-Generalsekretär) of 13 October 2003., page 1 - as aconsequence of that, announcing that due to the failure, by the end of 2003 the apporpriate de-partment of the OHR would be closed. Also see the reports: 24. High Representative's Report tothe UN Secretary General of 13 October 2003., page 9 f.; 25. High Representative's Report to theUN Secretary General of 3 March 2004, page 14 f.; 26. High Representative's Report to the UNSecretary General of 18 November 2004, page 20; 27. B High Representative's Report to the UNSecretary General of 12 April 2005, page 14 f.; and a critical and differentiated report, 30. HighRepresentative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 15 July 2006, page 15 f.


partly successful.20 Its implementation in the legal system of Bosnia and Her-zegovina did not leave any important or durable effects. Attempts were ma-de to achieve it within the existing legal framework – with variable successthough.21 True, it was necessary to create the favourable conditions. Thismay not be worth mentioning in other countries. But in Bosnia and Herze-govina the introduction of a new system of license plates was a side effectwhich generally established only physical freedom of movement across thecountry and was conducive to refugee returns. If the origin of a vehiclecould earlier be recognized on the basis of a combination of letters stand-ing for a place of registration of the vehicle, as SA stood for Sarajevo, a newsystem made the place of registration anonymous, and the time and proba-bly the place of residence and thus gives all owners of cars freedom ofmovement.

The International Community affected also the creation of awareness ofBosnia and Herzegovina's international legal personality. The flag and theanthem of the country exist and were accepted thanks to the pressure of theInternational Community. The state symbols of Bosnia and Herzegovinaare no longer a matter of dispute.22 Still, up until this date they could notagree on the text of the anthem. This seems to be indicative. There is onemore thing which catches your eye when driving through the country.Depending on which ethnicity forms a majority, the state flag is often dis-played next to the symbols of the majority group. This is further indicativeand could be interpreted as a continued fragility of the country.

Crucial to sustainability of Bosnia and Herzegovina and stability of its cur-rency up until this date, which are unique in the whole region, was – andprobably inconceivable without the influence of the then international go-vernor of the Central Bank, Peter Nicholl – the abolition and replacement ofa dinar, a traditional currency in the former Yugoslavia, by a Convertible

Mark throughout the country23 ..... The German Mark was an unofficial cur-

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20Critical: Helsinki Committee, Human Rights Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina - January-December 2006, page 3 ff. With many quite worrying individual cases and specific data aboutthem. - The media in 2006 always reported about the attacks on returnees, which were violentand ethnically motivated.

21Helsinki Committee, Human Rights Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina - January-December2006, page 4.

22The situation regarding entity symbols is different. In 2006 the Constitutional Court of Bosniaand Herzegovina found that they were contrary to the Constitution as they symbolize ethnicityof one entity only (see the decision of 31 March 2006. Official Gazette of BIH, Nos. 19/01, 12/98and 14/03).

23Official Gazette of FBIH, 26/98, BiH Official Gazette 10/98,


rency in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the second currency since the war and itsaw a galloping inflation in the former Yugoslavia. This is why the name ofa new currency was a mark and a pfennig, the names close to the people,and it was pegged to the German Mark (and later to Euro as from 1 January2002). This and financial and monetary policy which the Central Bank follo-wed independently from the state institutions, prevented an inflation whichwas a symptomatic characteristic of the YU dinar and created an island ofstability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is unique in the West Balkans.

Elsewhere, in the area of reforms of economic policy or economic

reforms24, the influence of the International Community was either less no-ticeable or least to say, was not durable. Before 2000, the High Represen-tative used to make precise decisions stimulating economic reforms; thisequally refers to all areas of economy, and to social welfare. True, a privatebanking sector exists primarily thanks to the political and financial impact ofthe World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. But a new regulationof this sector was largely in the hands of the entity legislators, the institu-tions of which were considered responsible for partly unsuccessful imple-mentation of the reforms. The effectives of the public oversight over thebanks in both entities could be examined, in view of numerous cases ofbankruptcy of the banks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The sector of privati-zation of public companies should also be examined with some reserva-tions. Privatization is being implemented with delays, and under differentpace in the entities. Other decisive reform projects in the area of economyremain on thin ice and will probably be addressed in the next stages ofaccession to the European Union. The International Community cannot becredited for the progress made in the economic reform – although it is awareof the economic problems of the country since long ago. Restrained stepswhich are not characterized by continuity, the steps taken toward co-respon-sibility, could be noticed only during the term of High RepresentativeWolfgang Petritsch and then Paddy Ashdown.25 The responsible representa-

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24Also see International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 180 of 15 February 2007., S. 2425His so-called "Bulldozer Initiative" from 2002 (which involved USAID, the WB, EC and IMF under

the auspices of OHR) should remove the obstacles in economic life and create jobs but did nothave long term effects (see 24. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 13October 2003., page 4)(see also 25. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary Generalof 03 March 2004., page 6; 27. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 12April 2005., page 9 f.; 28. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 17 No-vember 2005, page 8 f.). Very optimistic was the 30 High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 30 July 2006, page 11 f.


tives of the International Community do not deny deficits.26 The legislationpertaining to real estate has not been reviewed, there is no complete datain the land registers and the processes taking place outside the land regis-ters are not shown. This obviously does not create a feeling of insecurityamong investors only. Private trade and contractual (obligation) law conti-nues to wait for a national code and modernization. This deficit too is aneconomic and political obstacle, especially for foreign investors. The right ofprivate trade companies is characterized by bureaucratic obstacles. The Lawon Bankruptcy and Liquidation is also waiting for adoption at the state level.The courts are overloaded with the cases arising from the Law on Bankru-ptcy and Liquidation and the Law on Litigation is characterized by the lackof incentives for faster procedures. Slow litigation is in favour of debtors, andprevents investments. This criticism will be broadened in a review of thecivil enforcement law. A creditor, who won a procedure in the end, after along time, feels cheated because of new bureaucratic and procedural obsta-cles he is facing time and again.

Although the interim stock of economic and political reforms is rathernegative, Bosnia and Herzegovina has the customs and tax legislation inplace thanks to the European Union and its CAFAO programme (includingthe subsequent programmes)27. The legislation is in accordance with the Eu-ropean standards. The implementation process has not been completed yet,although it is on the right track. This can probably be explained by the factthat one part of CAFAO programme concerned the construction of moderncustoms and tax authorities. This became clear in 2006 after the sales taxwas introduced28 which resulted in a clear increase of public revenues andthis is probably a kind of tax which is fully paid by tax payers. The situa-tion is by far less satisfactory in the area of public expenditures. Deficitsin the parliamentary policy of expenditures are already mentioned above.Besides, in considering the situation with the budget in Bosnia and Herze-govina, an unjustified high consumptive national quota may be established.It is the result of financing of excessive numbers of state structures as a resultof the Dayton Constitution. Dozen of ministries of the interior and justice aretoo much for a country as Bosnia and Herzegovina with such financial abili-

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26See an interview with the Principle Deputy High Representative Lawrence Butler, Bosnian Daily,No. 1428 of 23 January 2007, page 5, who put the blame on the national institutions.

2724. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 13 October 2003, page 5; 25.High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 03 March 2004, page 6 f.

28See The High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 15 July 2006, page 12


ties on top. But within the system of state structures established by theConstitution the state institutions and the International Community have notlaunched a permanent public administration reform, which would beoriented to rationalization.29 Public administration at all levels is overstaffedand serves – as in many other countries who are in transition from socialistsystem to the market economy – the purpose of the staff and their employ-ment, substantive law of the public administration has not been criticallyreviewed, in order to see whether it serves the purpose of executing thenecessary public services or the tasks are arbitrarily created which in the endrequire administration.30 In this regard, we should mention numerous appli-cations which need to be filled out for licenses and permits, which do notshow a real administrative purpose. An impartial observer cannot help theimpression that the applications are required only to make the size of thepublic services and their numbers legitimate. Smaller bureaucracy in well-understood terms of free trade, crafts, professions and economy in Bosniaand Herzegovina has not been a real topic since 1995, although there is aninternal link between these unnecessary tasks of public administration andcorruption, which is a problem to the country, and the link is known to allstakeholders and participants.

Besides, the International Community is co-responsible for the existenceof uncontrolled state structures. In a well-understood legitimate interest ofstrengthening state structures with the aim to improve national unity, theInternational Community created institutions at the state level, without tak-ing care of closing institutions at entity level, proportionately, and of trans-ferring tasks fully to the state level.

A problematic mutual link exists between oversized and poorly controlledpaid public administration, poorly financed structures of institutions and eco-nomy which is suffering due to obstacles to investments – the InternationalCommunity has been aware of this at least since 1998 when CAFAO spoke

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29The formation of the State Border Service on the basis of the Law on Public Service from May2002 (BiH Official Gazette 12/02) included, just as the law did, only one part of the problem,the Law on Public Service and its implementation. It did not refer to the key problem of publicaffairs and tasks.

30The previous mandate of the Unit was comprehensive. The Unit provided advice and supportto the state institutions in their efforts to fight corruption and organized crime, in individual ca-ses. This semi-operative task was broadened in 2001 when Anti-Fraud Department after theHercegovacka Banka was taken over on 6 April, 2001 should prevent actions leading to coupd'etat by radical elements in HDZ, and was successful in that. Besides, the task of AFD was sincethe beginning to deal with the criminal law reform, and to work systematically on buildingawareness of people about damages inflicted by corruption.


publicly about the phenomenon of corruption which was spreading acrossBosnia and Herzegovina more and more, and asking the International Co-mmunity to assist in its suppression. The Office of the High Representativeestablished an Anti-Fraud Unit31 which, in view of the size of the task – tofight corruption – was understaffed since the beginning. But this Unit is cred-ited for the clear knowledge grasped in 2000 and 2001 that an effective sup-pression of crime in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires a comprehensive

reform of the criminal law. Around the same time the Office of the HighRepresentative began, independently from the efforts of the Anti-Fraud Unit,to reform the formal and substantive criminal law – a comprehensive

reform of the judiciary. For that purpose, in 2001 an Independent JudicialCommission was formed within the OHR with the task to make plans for acomprehensive reform of the laws on judicial and prosecutorial service witha view to reducing the judicial apparatus, if possible, ensuring an institution-al and individual independence of judges and implementing a comprehen-sive reform of the law on litigation. The purpose of reforming substantivecriminal law in order to improve suppression of corruption, the same legis-lation was made at the entity level, including the legislation in the BrckoDistrict, as the criminal law in different administrative units in Bosnia andHerzegovina was getting ever more different over the years. The criminallaw had to be modernized at the same time, and a new development ofcrimes such as money laundering, organized crime and human traffickinghad to be taken into consideration. If it is permissible in terms of law andconstitution, a single criminal code was required for the whole of Bosniaand Herzegovina which, among other things, envisaged the possibility,under international commitments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of effectivelyprosecuting war crimes cases by the domestic courts. For, it was noticed eas-ily that the tasks would be shared between the ICTY and the judicial insti-tutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The criminal law reform primarily con-cerned an increased efficiency of the trials, through the concentration of

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31An important decision was made in the autumn of 2000 regarding the formation of the Court ofBosnia and Herzegovina (see the High Representative's decision of 12 November 2000 (BiH Offi-cial Gazette 29/00). The decision of HR established the court for review of elections and an ad-ministrative court. But the decision also contained a clause which would later give the court ju-risdiction in criminal matters. The Republika Srpska National Assembly had doubts over the lega-lity of the law and filed an application with the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina,which issued a decision on 28 January 2001 and recognized constitutionality of the law (BiHOfficial Gazette 32/01). There was no doubt over the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina havingits own judicial institutions ever since.


investigative powers in the offices of prosecutors, along with the abolitionof an investigative judge, with the aim to create an order-issuing hierarchybetween the prosecution and the police, which had not existed before, withall negative consequences. The criminal procedure had to be de-formalized,the rights of the accused had to be strengthened, the right to a legal reme-dy had to be made stricter, and freed from anachronistic formalism.

The criminal law reform and judicial reform which began toward the endof 2001 were the most complex reform project in which the InternationalCommunity took the lead and responsibility via the High Representative.The state institutions signalized their broad will to cooperate, but in the endwere pleased with the role of participants. At the same time: implementa-tion was not problematic. The former High Representative Wolfgang Pet-ritsch remained restrained about a clear definition of reform goals32 proba-bly because his term was expiring in May 2002 and he did not want to pre-judge the actions of his successor Paddy Ashdown or his policy. But hisrestraint caused insecurity. The Anti-Fraud Unit and the Independent JudicialCommission prepared reforms with too an open result. The broadness ofthe matter and goals made other members of the International Communityinterested in getting engaged. Too much energy had to be invested in chan-nelling various paths of assistance. The question was raised about the direc-tion to be taken by Wolfgang Petritsch’s successor.

The reform process was largely speeded up after Paddy Ashdown tookover as the High Representative. The reorganization of the Office of theHigh Representative led to a situation in which Anti-Fraud Unit became anoperational unit fighting crime and lost responsibility for the criminal lawreform.33 One part of the responsibility was transferred to a special unit incharge of reforming prosecution which made its proposals for the reform inthe autumn of 2002. It proposed the abolition of municipal prosecution andtransfer of their jurisdiction to the cantonal prosecutors and those of theBrcko District. As Ashdown decided to assign prosecution of serous crimesincluding organized crime to the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina34 the pro-posals also envisaged the formation of the Office of the Prosecutor at thestate level. They also contained the enlargement of jurisdiction of the statecourt to include prosecution of serious crimes. The proposals of the Inde-pendent Judicial Commission regarding the reform of entity courts were pre-

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32See 24. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 13 October 2003, page 13324. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 13 October 2003, page 23424. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 13 October 2003, page 2


sented to the High Representative in the autumn of 2002, and they were lessradical. The municipal courts (as counterparts to the municipal prosecution)were not abolished fully, although their number was largely reduced35 from78 to 47. The closure of municipal prosecution and reduction of the num-ber of judges and prosecutors which was set as a goal in 2002 – the num-ber, compared to an average EU standard – seemed too high and it wasbelieved that it would not be possible to fence the whole apparatus. TheJudicial and Prosecutorial Councils which began to operate in the autumnof 2002 in order to guarantee independent judiciary, prosecution, judges andprosecutors, vetted judges and prosecutors to judge their skills. Finally thenumber of judges was reduced by almost one half.36 Under the HighRepresentative’s decision that serious crimes including organized crime willbe prosecuted and tried at the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was ne-cessary to draft a state-level Criminal Procedure Code and the state-levelCriminal Code. The codes were drafted in the autumn 2002 by a sub-unit inthe Office of the High Representative, which focused on the above-men-tioned reform goals, and they came into force on 1 March 200337; simulta-neously with entry into force of the state Criminal38 and Criminal ProcedureCodes39 the State Court40 and the Office of the Prosecutor of Bosnia andHerzegovina41 began to work. Regarding prosecution of organized, econo-mic crime and corruption, the changes envisaged by the High Representati-ve also envisaged (temporary) cooperation between international judgesand state prosecutors.42 43 To supplement the Codes, the High Judicial and

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35The overall number of prosecutors remained largely the same, as the planned abolition of an in-vestigative judge the jurisdiction for investigations was transferred to prosecutors. This meantmany more cases and made the decision not to reduce the number of prosecutors legitimate.

36Procedural and criminal codes at the level of the state were used by the entities and the BrckoDistrict to harmonize their procedural and substantive criminal law.

37Criminal Code (BIH Official Gazette, 36/03, 3/03, 37/03).38Criminal Procedure Code ( BiH Official Gazette, 36/03)39The Law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH Official Gazette, 29/00)40The Law on the Office of the Prosecutor of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH Official Gazette, 24/02)41Cooperation between international judges and public prosecutors will end at the end of the in-

terim period on 31 December, 2009. The state court and prosecution of Bosnia and Herzegovinawill remain solely national institutions.

42Earlier international judges and state prosecutors were appointed by the High Representative,on the basis of which they would work as judges and prosecutors. Since 2006 this is the respon-sibility of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the basisof an international agreement between the High Representative and the Presidency of Bosniaand Herzegovina (BiH Official Gazette 10/02).

43BiH Official Gazette 22/02.


Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina44, as a state body of judi-cial self-rule and autonomy of the state prosecutors was formed on 1 June2004 instead of the Judicial and Prosecutorial Council.45 Its responsibility isbased on the responsibility of the councils of magistrates in other Europeancountries and is even much broader.46 It eliminated the Justice Ministry fromthe judicial management. As for its scope of responsibility, the Council hasthe character of a European model.

In the early 2005 the judiciary at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina sawa final important change. Along with the jurisdiction in the area of protec-tion of the criminal law, the state court was also given the jurisdiction forprosecution and trial of war crimes.47 International judges and prosecutorswill be involved in this area of its work by 31 December, 2009. Other re-forms of judiciary, which would change the situation, although they werenecessary, were not initiated by the International Community, nor were theyimplemented. The International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovinainvested crucial funds in the judicial reform so far. Without that, the build-ing of state judicial institutions would have been inconceivable. Before 31December 2006 the total of 16 million euro was invested in the state courtand other judicial institutions.48 Another donor conference in March 2006brought to the International Community additional 7,7 million euro for the

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44See High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 03 March 2004, page 1, 4 f.;26. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 18 November 2004, page 6

45See article 17 of the Law on High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (BIH Official Gazette 62/02,25/04). The Council appoints, dismisses, and punishes in disciplinary procedures judges andprosecutors and participates in making all other decisions regarding an individual status. It is re-sponsible for planning of the staff throughout the country and participates in ensuring financialand other resources to the courts and prosecution. It develops plans for initial and continuedtraining in judiciary and in all matters concerning judiciary its opinion has to be paid attentionto.

46The procedures against war crimes perpetrators in the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovinaare conducted at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and may be trans-ferred under Rule 11 and provisions regarding ICTY procedures to the court of Bosnia and Her-zegovina, if ICTY approves the referral. ICTV referred until 28 February 2007 the total of 5 indict-ments against 9 individuals. Of that number in 2 cases a first instance decision has been reached.So - called 11 bis procedures have to be conducted before the state court. Unlike them, the Courtof BIH has jurisdiction over prosecution of war crimes in all other cases although it can refer itsprimary jurisdiction to the entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See 26. Bericht des Hohen Vertre-ters an den UN-Generalsekretär of 18 November 2004., S. 8

4725. HR Report to the UN Secretary General of 3 March 2004, regarding the decisions on takingthe responsibilities made on 30 October 2003 at the donor conference in the Hague (Verpflich-

tungsbeschlüsse der Donors' Conference in Den Haag), which referred to the construction of theWar Crimes Chamber within the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

48 International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 180 of 15 February 2007., S. 13


period after 31 December 29006, and until the completion of an interimphase on 31 December 200949 when the national institutions of Bosnia andHerzegovina should take the full responsibility for their functioning.

III. Assessment and prospects

More than 10 years of the presence of the International Community inthe reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina left an impact. If we can speak ofdemocratic framework requirements – it would not be possible without theInternational Community. In the area of the building of the rule of law,progress was made, human rights seem to be protected through constitu-tional and legal jurisdiction (and it is also supported by the ombudsmen)50.Still, there is no reason for being relaxed over the progress made nor shouldwe be laurel-crowned with not so many bay leaves. Deficits are still pre-sent.51 In view of nationalist rhetoric52 which we heard before and during the2006 election campaign, we should think about fragility of the internationalpersonality of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The largest reform project which haslargely been implemented by the International Community was the criminallaw reform and the judicial reform, which has been implemented only part-ly. The defence reform which was completed in 2005 by the merger of twoentity armies and the formation of the armed forces at the state level53 doesnot have so strong international imprint.

Regardless of the above reforms, the reasons for the fact that theInternational Community left sporadic impacts are also partly caused by theDayton system the purpose of which remains cooperation between theInternational Community and the state institutions invited to cooperate by

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49Ability of Bosnia and Herzegovina to survive in the future is critical. This is why deficits regard-ing the system of education in the country are assessed negatively. Higher education includinguniversities may be described as very old (see Helsinki Committee, Human Rights Report forBosnia and Herzegovina - January-December 2006, page 12). The High Representative said thesituation regarding the system of education at the universities was chaotic, 16 February 2007 (seewww.ohr.int). A critical review and International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 180 of 15February 2007, pages 1 and 17.

50Also Helsinki Committee, Human Rights Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina - January-December2006, page 1, 2.

51See 25. HR Report to the UN Secretary General, of 3 March 2004, page 9,f.52International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 180 of 15 February 2007, pages 12 and 13.53See 24 HR Report to the UN Secretary General of 13 October 2003, page 7; 25. High Represen-

tative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 3 March, 2004, page 2;


the Constitution. Cooperation between the International Community and thestate institutions was in the past difficult and only partly successful for thereasons which we can not describe in this paper. In case of a failure, thePeace Implementation Council invested the High Representative in 1997with the so–called Bonn powers which created the possibility of filling thegap of cooperation with the HR’s decisions with legal effect. But differentHigh Representatives defined their constraints, especially when it came tothe imposition of laws, depending on their individual understanding of amandate. The intention here is not to criticize restraint because the idea wasnot to allow the High Representative to keep the state institutions in the stateof a political immaturity. An ideal system of the national/international co-operation in practice could not function and achieve an ideal situation envis-aged by the Peace Agreement. Nationally, responsibilities are divided bet-ween the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its entities, which means thattoo many partners may raise their voice and request that they should be lis-tened too. Their political interests remain different. Regarding poor constitu-tional and legal competences of the state government of Bosnia and Herze-govina, it has lacked since the beginning the coordinating role and that rolehas not been strengthened since the signing of the Peace Agreement.Whether the politicians and parties involved wanted that should be exami-ned, least to say. Regarding the International Community and despite the ro-le of a coordinator assigned to the High Representative and regardless of po-litical competences of the Peace Implementation Council, we can say that inprinciple and in individual issues divergent political interests and institutio-nal ambitions of various participants prevented or made it difficult to speakwith much needed one voice.

What certainly prevented a bugger success of the International Commu-nity over the last years was the fact that in building the rule of law there isno political pragmatism on the part of some High Representatives and onthe part of the Peace Implementation Council. This is also true for the eco-nomic reforms which have not been implemented yet. In any case, it is alsotrue for internal stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina as no one had a con-cept of a safe order policy. The International Community acted on causesbut did not touch upon the structures which were responsible. During theirmandates some High Representatives – of the total of 5 since 1995 – werenot interested in thinking in the long run or in implementing a sporadic deci-sion under a long-term pragmatics predicting long-term effects. Political cla-shes among some High Representatives were more than just painful. Politi-cal inconsistency in some periods which are common for long policy imple-

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mentation, which lasted four or five years in the European countries, couldnot be recognized here. An example could be the then rather successful cri-minal law reform (the judicial reform stopped halfway, when it comes to thelitigation and administrative procedures). Its implementation, after the nece-ssary legal steps were taken, were welcomed and supported by internatio-nal engagement and financially. This engagement has not been secured54

which makes difference in regard to the defence reform. Due to security andpolitical reasons the defence reform has an interested mentor in NATO,which guarantees permanent implementation.55 Something similar is missingin the criminal law reform. It does not have recognizable amicus curiae. Thus,from this aspect, the issue of sustainability and continuity can be raised.56 Theinternational interest is fading away as it is believed that the train is put onthe tracks and will remain on the track. But the condition of the tracks inBosnia and Herzegovina is often ignored. Political signals for the criminal sys-tem, which will be the responsibility of the state, are not good in this coun-try. The state institutions have de lege lata responsibility for prosecutingorganized and economic crime, as opposed to the entity prosecution autho-rities. But the political reality ignores it. In the spring of 2006, with theapproval of the International Community57, claiming to ensure the most con-sistent prosecution of the crimes, the Republika Srpska established specialprosecution and the court. This competing institution raises the issue of whe-ther this ”theft” of the priority right means the deprivation of the state respon-sibilities, given to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the state.58 A simi-lar development is being noticed also in no-less important area of war crimesprosecution. The primary responsibility for prosecution rests with the stateinstitutions. Claiming that these institutions are overloaded – although in-terestingly the state court, which has the prime responsibility, has never saidit is overloaded and its work so far does not show it – the President of the

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54Different is 30. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 15 July 2006 which,carried with euphoria, tells that Bosnia and Herzegovina now has the necessary legal frameworkand institutions.

55See 30. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 15 July 2006, page 7 inwhich the constitutionality of the measures is not called in question.

56International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 180 of 15 February 2007, page 7.57See 24. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 13 October, 2003., S. 10 f.

On the tasks of the EUPM and expectations. Besides, 26. High Representative's Report to the UNSecretary General of 18 November 2004, pages 3, 13 f.; see also 30. High Representative's Reportto the UN Secretary General of 15 July 2006, page 9 f.

58International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 180 of 15 February 2007, page 9 f.


High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council requested publicly in the summer of2006 that a state strategy for war crimes prosecution be developed with theaim to bring the entity criminal courts closer to each other in prosecution. Ifwe keep in mind that the legal punishments of the state court are stricterthan the punishments of the entity courts, the question is whether an incre-ased responsibility of the entity courts, as requested, is less directed to thealleged overload or the practice of sentencing. Besides, the current Chair ofthe Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina said in the summer of2006 that the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the court for ‘Serbs on-ly’. In view of this, attention should be given to the fact whether the stateinstitutions which were formed with a strong engagement of the Internatio-nal Community will remain after the International Community disengages orwill disappear. The international engagement so far keeps them functioning.The state government has taken care of payments of judicial and non-judi-cial staff. It is a question whether it will remain the same after 2009.

Finally, the answer to the question about stability of reforms and perma-nent stability of the country and capability of its institutions comes down tothe issue of Constitution. Permanent success of criminal law reform is be-sides an inseparable part of the police reform59 which can be consideredonly from the aspect of the constitution. Prevention and repression of crimeare the two sides of the coin which is called ‘internal security policy’. If oneside of the coin remains unfinished, the coin is invalid.

The reform of the Dayton Constitution, after the issue of the changes wason the verge of a dogmatic taboo during the first years,60 failed on 26 April2006 at the state parliament.61 Some reasons for the failure are given by poli-tical scientists who are more competent than I am. But it seems to me thatthere is something positive, in fact, there is a unified position that the DaytonConstitution fulfilled its function by establishing peace and is no longer cre-ating conditions for the future development with the state structures it cre-ated, their slowness, inefficiency in making decisions and their implementa-tion and costs. We do not have to discuss the details of the draft Constitution,but if the reform goal remains the same, i.e. to strengthen the rule of law,

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59See 24. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 13 October, 2003., S. 10 f. Onthe tasks of the EUPM and expectations. Besides, 26. High Representative's Report to the UN Sec-retary General of 18 November 2004, pages 3, 13 f.; see also 30. High Representative's Report tothe UN Secretary General of 15 July 2006, page 9 f.

60International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 180 of 15 February 2007, page 9 f.61See 30. High Representative's Report to the UN Secretary General of 15 July 2006, pages 2, 4, 6 f.



attention must be given to the fact that the draft does not cover the protec-tion and fostering of law and hardly focuses on it. A third branch of govern-ment is nothing marginal the reference to which would be too much for aConstitution. An observer does not understand whether the division ofBosnia and Herzegovina into four and largely independent legal areas in themost important spheres of litigation, commercial, criminal, and companylaw, and whether a new Constitution will allow interference with the judi-cial structures. With four legal areas it is not possible to establish a legal unityand equality. Insurance of legal unity and equality requires a hierarchy in thejudiciary with a Supreme Court on top, as a symbol of a unified applicationof law and development of law. Bosnia and Herzegovina looks like a con-struction site in constitutional and legal terms. The International Communitycannot leave the site just like that unless it will take the risks for internal unityof the state and for regional stability, where these two things are mutuallylinked. It is even less possible to declare victory and to leave the country si-lently to its own fate. Strong doubts over sustainability of which has beenachieved, over continuity of the reforms which have already started and overthe continued functioning of institutions continue to persist.62

The Peace Implementation Council considered on 26-27 January 2007the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina and monitoring of the state by theInternational Community, especially by the High Representative. The clo-sure of the Office of the High Representative on 30 June 2007 is no longerdiscussed because of still pending reforms. Another attempt to implementthis goal will be made on 30 June 2008 although there is no definite deci-sion yet. On the contrary, the Peace Implementation Council retained theright to re-examine the goal in October 2007 and in February 2008. TheCommuniqué explicitly emphasizes two important tasks: constitutional re-form on the one hand (as a first step of Bosnia and Herzegovina toward be-coming a state which will be functioning in accordance with the EU stan-dards on the path to the European Union) and the police reform on theother (as an EU requirement within the same process). Keeping in mind theevents in the recent history of those two crucial reforms, even if theybecome the law in the months to come, critical point is their implementa-tion. Respect for the law, which still needs to be built, will require some timebecause of the complexity of the issue, certainly more time than is leftbefore 30 June 2008. This is why too tight deadlines for the Office of the

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62International Crisis Group, Europe Report No 180 of 15 February 2007., S. II




High Representative could be damaging. One more year is too short a dead-line. The PIC assigned a task to the High Representative to present a workplan with the requirements which were not implemented after the Daytoncriteria were implemented and after consolidation of the reforms at the statelevel which are necessary for the stability of the country. In addition to theconstitutional reform and the police reform, the work plan will largely affectfuture activities of the International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.It is hoped that in developing the work plan which will affect the decisions,the International Community will be self-critical and that it will describe itsown failures. How fragile reforms can be is seen in the judicial reform, andwill be seen in the future in the constitutional and police reforms whichhave not been implemented yet. This paper may help sharpen a criticalview. It is its purpose, anyway. The PIC decisions made on 26 and 27 Feb-ruary 2007 show that there are still dark blots. The responsibilities of theHigh Representative and the EU Special Representative remain unclear.63

According to the decisions, it is the High Representative who will be givingthe tone in the next months.

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63Süddeutsche Zeitung No 50 of 01 March 2007, page 8.


3. REFLECTION OF THE PRESENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

IN THE BIH SOCIETY



INTRODUCTION

Dino Abazovi}, Faculty of Political Science, Sarajevo University

Thank you, and warm greetings to all participants. When talking aboutthe tallying of balance and when it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s soci-ety, there are at least two different and important phases in the treatment ofour society by the international community: the phase before 2000 and after2000, which I will describe later.

First of all, I would like to make two or three short reflections about whatwe have already heard. To begin with, I am talking as a sociologist and Iwill refer to what the High Representative said about his most recentmethodology and about experimenting with the Bonn powers. As a socio-logist, when I hear someone talking about in vivo experiments in the soci-ety, I become full of fears as people should never be subject of an experi-ment. The things are too serious for an in vivo experiment. To remind, evensome very important professional discussions were held after some in vivo

experiments were carried out, even from the aspect of psychology and so-ciology, as it became clear what people were ready to do with their guineapigs. My intention is not to go that far and say that the unfortunate phase ofan 'in vivo experiment' which was used by the High Representative shouldmean that they are playing with us, although I am afraid that many of ourcompatriots, people who live in this country, sometimes see the role playedby the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an experi-ment. This is something that you can hear in a public discourse, when youare talking to other people; they all say that their impression is that some-one is playing with us regarding certain issues.

There is one more dilemma, which was present while I was writing thispaper. I am going to refer slightly to my paper. But first of all, I want to men-tion that not all things which are taking place in the society of Bosnia andHerzegovina are necessarily the product of the action or inaction by theinternational community. Colloquially, we would say: „Blame us”. But thisis an opportunity for me to speak a bit more about the role played by theinternational community.

As His Excellency Ambassador Schmunk was delivering his presentation,I was interested very much in one of his phrases which he said in English:„Learning by doing”. Ambassador Schmunk has said that the internationalcommunity is learning by doing here. You know, to learn is one thing, andto acquire knowledge is another thing and it seems to me that those are the

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Reflection of the presence of the international community in the BiH society


things which are not understood as they should, when it comes to the inter-national community. If we say that one was learning, the question is whe-ther he or she acquired knowledge and if so, how much knowledge. Let metry to give you a sociological understanding of such things. First, I am goingto speak about the state, as it is important to me to make a distinctionbetween the state and the society; regarding the state, my positions are farmore radical than those about Bosnia and Herzegovina's society.

One of the relatively small number of recognized female authors fromabroad, Sumantra Bose, who wrote about our problems, says effectively thatthis state is the state of an international design and exists on an internatio-nal design. This post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (this post refers onlyto the fact that the Dayton Agreement established BiH as such a state) withits structures as they are is, in fact, the state of an international design andsimply I do not think that it would be possible to have any other discussion.There is ample evidence to support this but we should not forget that allthis time, from the Dayton onwards, there has always been one importantfact regarding the reflection on the society – now I am going to talk aboutthe society.

In the international community (in the papers and analyses) there is anelement which is called the 'local consent'. The local consent for the engage-ment of the international community here to do what it is doing... and thatis the Dayton Agreement. The ‘local consent’ is a fine distinction betweenthe semi-protectorate and full protectorate. In this regard, in fact, nobodycan claim that Bosnia is a protectorate, in international legal terms like, forexample, East Timor or Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina is different by theelement of the local consent, and it is also important that the two neighbo-ring states were also involved in the local consent. It seems to me that weoften forget the influence of Serbia and Croatia on Bosnia and Herzegovinaeven today. Another important question is how different social manifesta-tions and developments in those states spill over into Bosnia and Herzego-vina, immediately. Thus, you have the same reaction to the developmentsin Serbia and in Croatia, in social terms, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ofcourse, as politicians are wrapping it all in the frame of politician interest ora concrete political interest, things become much more important.

But these are the main features of Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms ofthe Dayton design and the Dayton construct. We have recently had discus-sions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which became a kind of mantra – pleaseforgive my using that term as our public discourse was abundant in thoseissues - about consociation, i.e. the consociative democracy. Bosnia and

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Herzegovina is de facto a consociation. If anyone asks you, and if you readin the newspapers whether the model of consociation is a solution, that oneeither does not know what he is talking about or he is telling you some-thing in order to mislead your thoughts. This is nothing new; the model ofconsociation has already been applied.

Regarding consociation, we should underscore that those are interim mo-dels of the organization of a state. Let me explain briefly that phenomenonalso in theory. It simply implies some basic principles – the first is the so-called grand coalition, which also includes our Presidency, the structures ofthe House of Peoples, bicameral representattion, ethnic proportionality, theselection of judges - all these issues reflect in Bosnia and Herzegovina theprinciple of grand coalition. You have the representatives of all interestedparties who should reach an agreement on some issues. Consociation alsoimplies the principle of proportionality. Proportionality, in my view, is noth-ing but all those compositions, what we referred to in the past as an ethnicquota – that is in fact proportionality in terms of consociation. The issue ofa third principle, the principle of veto, is nothing else but an ethnic interest.We have the mechanism of the ‘vital national interest’ – although hardly any-one will know what it means, but everyone knows that it exists. Even mycolleagues, lawyers, have told me that there is no definition of the ‘vital natio-nal interest’, but it exists and that is the right of veto. And finally, the seg-mental autonomy is the structure of autonomies through political institu-tions, culture, cantons, entities, the Brcko District and so on. Thus, we haveconsociation in Bosnia and Herzegovina par excellence, and it is one of thepossible models.

Now let me ask you a question: what went wrong? That is the sociolo-gical analysis which will partly include what we narrowly define as politicalsociology as it is, in my view, quite a legitimate discipline for the full under-standing of this problem.

First, it is becoming abundantly clear that we have the situation of powersharing at the state level, but the power sharing is not functioning in the insti-tutions based on an ethnic principle, and on the principle of proportionality.Why? Because instead of a postive consensus believed to result from propor-tionality and power sharing, we in BiH have, in fact, a negative consensus.In our communities, in our political system of decision making we have asystemic blocking of decisions which would allow reconstruction. I will notguess now who is blocking them, at any moment, or which decisions, butthe problem is the negative consensus. Thus, power sharing and proportio-nality did not lead to the building of a positive consensus, but vice versa.

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In the context of the autonomy of segments, at least where we come tobroad cultural policies, I am afraid, for example, that the issue of segrega-tion in education is something which also tells us that such a type of insist-ing on the autonomy of segments, in fact, leads to segregation itself, ratherthan to integration and bringing the differences closer to each other, and soon, and I will not repeat the things we have already heard. It is particularlyimportant that in the area of restoring mutual confidence and reconciliationwe have not gone any further from the period immediately after the war andthe rhetoric by local politicians and some analysts who say that Bosnia looksmore the 1991 Bosnia than the 2001 Bosnia, should not be strange. So muchabout this institutional design, the consociative one, if you will, which ispractically the Dayton construct and the construct of those who made thedecisions in Dayton?

The next important element is the element of central institutions, whichI call the institutions of the 'ruler who is not a ruler' and OHR which shouldhave, under all the relevant documents and the Dayton Agreement, helpedunblock some things, and the process to move forward. Some tend to claimthat some interventions, especially those in the area of law, were very goodfor this state. I agree that in some areas it was necessary and especiallyimportant for any progress to be made. But on the other hand, we can alsosee that the post-conflict reconstruction and strategy cannot be built beyondthe will of the people, which means that the legal idealism does not havenecessarily to lead to transition to self-rule. The major presupposition, whichwe also know, is that the international community has not cooperated muchwith local experts in the area of the legal reform, especially after the year2000. There is a whole series of analyses which say that before 2000 theprocess of making the legislation was very slow; please, forgive my mali-cious remark, but prior to that, some local lawyers were involved, formally,indeed on occasions in making the law. From 2000 onwards, there is noteven a formal consultation with the local experts. Instead, a law is writtenand should be approved. This legal idealism in the context of this local com-munity, in the context of this society, is not conducive to self-rule, to transi-tion to local ownership or something else, all those 'big' words they areshowering us with. It is especially important to stress that the Dayton logicafter 1997, since the key moment of instruction of the Bonn powers, con-tinued to produce paradox. How? Even the exponents of the internationalcommunity believe that the Dayton structure is flexible enough to do withit whatever one wants to do. This is the analysis of the external factor andnot of the internal one. What does that flexibility imply? It implies 'sucking

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out', the term is a bit inconvenient, the 'sucking out' of the local capacitiesfrom the process of decision-making. After the year 2000 we can see thatthe consent by the local actors has not been sought even formally for anydecision made by the international community. Domestic institutions havebeen sending formal requests to the European Union to send the EUPM, theEU police, in place of IPTF... They have formally invited the European Unionto deploy its troops to the ALTEA operation, but it was only a formal re-quest, while the decisions were made much earlier, even before the formalrequests were made, as it was known that Brussels was going to take thelead within PIC in the BiH integration processes. Of course, nobody has everasked anybody in Bosnia and Herzegovina what he or she thinks about that.This is why the story about 'less of Washington and more of Brussels' shouldnot always be taken as a positive development in Bosnia and Herzegovina.What else would I wish to emphasize in relation to the international com-munity? The central institution, the Office of the High Representative, I havereturned to 1997 and the Bonn powers, has become a very specific institu-tion of the system of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Prior to 1997it was far from that, and that is the only institution in Bosnia and Herzego-vina which is not formally based on the power-sharing principle. Mr. Ade-movi} has spoken about that from the legal aspect. The international repre-sentative in terms of an institution is not sharing powers in Bosnia andHerzegovina with anyone. He cannot be held accountable, and formally, heis a part of the structure of power and government in Bosnia and Herzego-vina, especially after he was invested with Bonn powers. This is preciselythe element which has ever since opened two quite unpleasant processesin Bosnia and Herzegovina. One is the process about which we have alrea-dy heard: the issue of accountability and the other one is the issue of trans-parency. In both cases the work has been poor.

Let me refer briefly to the previous context, about what the local actors,except politicians and political parties, could expect. The international com-munity has practically developed strategies for changing the situation in thestate and the society through the civil society. I know that professor Ler willbe talking more about that, and I have also written about that problem. Buthere I have to mention that it is a defeating fact that the international com-munity, when it comes to the civil society, has relied only on the non-go-vernmental community, only on the non-governmental organizations. Andlook at the paradox: the non-governmental organizations, as non-political ac-tors, are demanded to act in political terms towards changing the situation!Of course, the non-governmental organizations are dealing with politics, but

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it is really absurd to ask them to engage in a political action, like the oneperformed by the political parties. Let alone the strategies for support basedon the donor-driven strategies, etc.

Also, let me stress another important issue which concerns the attitudetowards the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have heardthe elections, the laws and so on in that sense. Look: the Dayton Agreementrequests that no later than nine months following the signature, electionsshould take place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And this happened. Whocould even think of seeing other parties - except those which were in powerduring the war - win the elections in the situation of a fragmented society,the fully divided community as a result of the war – I am also talking aboutthe society in general – and the media beyond the level of professionalismin material and all other terms, with the civil society unable to perform itsmain functions, etc.? If this is not the major problem – the problem is thatthey won the elections in a democratic way! Thereby the Dayton officiallylegitimized ethnocracy which would later turn into partitocracy, whennobody has the right or possibility to offer arguments and say, 'Wait, peo-ple might want to vote in favor of someone else'. What does this mean?Those people who voted back in 1996 did not have a possibility to choosesomeone else, but those whom they elected – the national parties. This isthe paradox of democracy: if elections take place too early, they can be apart of the problem and not a part of the solution. This happened in Bosniaand Herzegovina.

In addition, the issue of building democracy by non-democratic meansis what I have noticed as a specific aspect of our reality, so that the interna-tional community has not made an effort to explain some of its decisions inpublic. The public, willy-nilly, has the right to know the reason why somedecisions have been made. In this regard, closed meetings with nominaloffice-holders, elected officials, are not sufficient for the purpose of a pub-lic explanation of democratic policies. The public has the right to know.Transparency does not exist in the decision-making mechanism within theinternational community. We know nothing about who makes decisions,when and how, although those decisions concern us. Very little is known:however, this sends out a message to the society as such, which shouldpresent its opinion on those issues as well.

If we from BiH say that and they do not listen to us, that I can under-stand somehow. But if in 1996 – let me refer briefly to the work of theInternational Crisis Group in Brussels (ICG) – if ICG said in 1996 the follow-ing: ”Teach democracy, tolerance and good governance then there is no bet-

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ter way to start than by example”. If that was noticed back at that time andnow it is 2007, I think that the decision-makers in the international commu-nity should, if nothing else, offer some response. The response has not beenheard yet and sometimes they say that you are arrogant if you ask suchquestions.

Finally, going further through the whole structure, let me focus on twomore issues which are equally important for the society. One issue concernsso-called hard sector and soft sector of developing policies in Bosnia andHerzegovina. And again, the Dayton paradox: the so-called problems of thehard sector or hard policies were addressed quickly: who can rememberhow little time was needed for the armies which had waged war in Bosniaand Herzegovina to be demilitarized and pushed back into the barrackswithin six months only? That is the so-called hard sector, those hard issues.And what did the international community do and how did it assist the so-called soft sector which it did not think was so important: education, health,social welfare etc? Except the donations granted to non-governmental orga-nizations – absolutely nothing else. From the aspect of the society, I thinkthat segregated education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and those famouseuphemisms such as 'two schools under one roof' and so on is far moreimportant issue than some other issues, say, foreign policy of Bosnia andHerzegovina. Let me be clear: the international community, for the reasonsnot known to me, has done nothing in the area of the soft sector and thisis why, among other things, the new generations are growing up in Bosniaand Herzegovina on the results on ethnic policies and ethnocracy.

And finally, the issue of the constitutional reforms in Bosnia and Herze-govina. First, it is not clear to me how the ones, who led to the signing ofthe International Agreement in Dayton, think that it is possible to changethat agreement without their involvement? Why do they think that it can bechanged so simply, that the local actors can reach an agreement? It is notpossible, of course! Especially the phrase which can often be heard in Bos-nia and Herzegovina seems to be illustrative: Those who were the major

opponents to the Dayton Agreement in 1995 are today its major advocates.

This should mean something and shows that things went wrong. But theConstitution remains the Constitution, and remains one of the key issues,important issues: the public interest in the Constitution. We are aware of theprevious constitutional debates and we know what happened, who madedecisions, which decisions. As a citizen of this country, I am deliberatelyavoiding those politically 'dangerous' concepts. But as a citizen who has apassport of this country I have a problem: who decides on the Constitution

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of my country, how and when, all the more so as I am a committed work-er and I am building my own future and the future of my family here. Whereare the public policies in those processes? What about the public interest?What about the members of a narrowed non-governmental sector? Eventu-ally, there have been similar conferences but who are we talking to? It is notenough to talk, it is also important to have someone to listen to what youare saying.

In this regard, it seems to me that this malformation, that absence of theconstitutional patriotism, that legal idealism will not help the communityvery much, especially because of the fact that this state lacks the consentabout the past, present and the future. You can impose the law, just any law,but the issue of consensus about both the past and the present and thefuture is something that we will have to face. The international community,whoever it may be, will simply have to engage in a public debate. Let metell you what I have noticed in the literature. The international communityhas been least engaged in the projects dealing with the reckoning with thepast. There are foreign governments which support the projects for reckon-ing with the past but the institutions of the international community, theexponents of the international policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are inmost cases running away, avoiding by a large margin, 'the way the devilavoids the cross' as our people say, discussions about the past. There are norepresentatives of the OHR or OSCE. I think that this is one of the key issuesin order for the Brussels phase we are embarking on to have prospects.Otherwise, I do not know what the story about a kind of a consensus thatthe only future of this country is its European prospects, that everybodyagrees on, is based on. In my view, it is something different. Either we arenot ready for the European Union or nobody is telling the truth. They areonly talking about how Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks – you can recognize whoused those terms – are united and are together making progress towards theEuropean Union, but this story is not telling me much. Do you know why?Because we shall be in the European Union the moment the motto of theEuropean Union, the official motto of the European Union – United in Di-versities – becomes our own motto.

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COMMENTARY

Nada Ler Sofroni}, Executive Director of the "Women and the Society" Center, Sarajevo

Since all of us seem to be rather perplexed by the notion of the 'interna-tional community', for me the only way of clearing the confusion would bethat each of us tries to define that notion in his or her own way. So let metry to describe the role of the 'international community': for me, that is theinternational support to the promotion of democratization of Bosnia andHerzegovina's post-socialist and post-war society in transition; among otherthings, its role is based on a specifically defined political theory.

In my short commentary, which I will have to curtail and simplify for thispurpose, I will try to analyze the dialectic of the relations between the 'inter-national factor' and what we refer to as the civil society in Bosnia andHerzegovina.

This means that right at the outset I want to avoid lamenting over whatthe 'international community' has done here and what it has not done, whatit should have done, and what are the consequences for us, the 'victims' or'guinea pigs' in the whole story.

The political literature of today is writing about 'disappointing insights'(Charoters, 2000)1 into the fact that most of the post-socialist societies (inclu-ding Bosnia and Herzegovina) failed to embark on democratic processes fol-lowing multi-party elections and the change of the regimes. Instead, manyof them found themselves in the political gray area of pseudo-democracy,'facade' or 'formal' democracy. The political and theoretical euphoria follow-ing the fall of the Berlin Wall soon went down and was replaced by skep-ticism over uncertainty and, as Vuka{in Pavlovi}2 said, ”the Western politicaltheory which traditionally dealt with socialism... seems to have ended uponce more on unknown rocks.”

Although the prevailing understanding of democratization of the transi-tion societies puts economic, political and institutional, that is, the state attri-butes of democratization, in the forefront, the international community hasdeclared ever since it arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its preference for

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1 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, Carnegie Endowment for international Peace,Va{ington, 2000.

2 Vuka{in Pavlovi}, Civilno dru{tvo i demokratija, Politeia, Beograd, 2004.


the civil society as an important promoter of democracy (let us leave asidefor now the fact that the civil society in this case, not quite correctly, is un-derstood to mean the non-governmental organizations).

Moreover, the Western advocates of democracy in post-socialist countriesseem to have counted on the civil society being their main socio-culturalsupport, as they have often believed that the perceived civil society hadoperated 'in concealment' in the previous system, in a kind of dissident oases of the underground, living its own parallel life, or hoped that the ma-terial support would make the non-governmental sector much stronger andcapable of becoming as powerful a democratization factor as possible.

Instead, a very weak version of the civil society emerged. Of course, thecauses to the weaknesses of the civil society are multiple here, although Iwould emphasize the one which I think is the most relevant in sociologicalterms. I think that the weakness of the civil society is one of the direct resultsof marginalization or even the gradual disappearance of its main social base

which consists of the progressive urban and civic intellectual middle classes.

Retraditionalization, repatriarchalization and revitalization of tribunal andethnic social links almost entirely wiped off those social layers from Bosniaand Herzegovina's social and public scene, while the invasive dominationof ethnic policies and retrograde conservatism has come to govern sover-eignly our everyday public and private lives.

In the absence of the real civil society, the international policies of sup-port to democratization and non-governmental organizations in the coun-tries in transition have already encountered the problem of support to the”virtual civil society”, a non-selective assistance to non-governmental organi-zations which are as a matter of fact not promoting either an authentic spe-cial interest of the social groups or the general public interests.

In the post-socialist societies built on the ruins of our common state it isvery difficult to revive a self-regulating function of the civil society whichwould have something to rely on in the socio-cultural terms. The self-regu-lating function of the civil society can be established only within the sweep-ing structural reforms and with the necessary international support.

The international factor's both direct and indirect positive influence onthe development of the civil society which, in my deep conviction, has hard-ly used anything of that support, is manifested, among other things, in:

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* The international recognition of the civil society legitimacy,

* Promotion of institutional channels and laws which make the civil sectorrequirements legal and legitimate (women's human rights, the right ofaccess to information, freedom of expression, right to non-discriminationand prohibition of hate speech, autonomy of universities, freedom of tra-de unions and prohibition of punishment of trade union activism, inter-nationally recognized and constitutionally guaranteed right to life freefrom violence and environmental harm, etc.),

* Encouragement of the use of mechanisms and actions of the public pro-

motion of the social changes which are of special and general publicinterest,

* Promotion of the creation of coalitions and alternative organization,

* Promotion of independent monitoring and holding legislative and execu-

tive authorities accountable,

* Support to encouragement of awareness campaigns and use of the free

media for the creation of democratic public,

* Promotion of global and international advocacy by the civil society ofthe positive social changes, especially those in the area of human rights.

The ball is now in the civil society's court!

\or|e êkrlija, Faculty of Philosophy, Banja Luka University

Dear ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to greet all of you and tobe present at this conference. I have to say that I, as a psychologist, regretvery much that this is our reality and that we have to waste so much ener-gy on these topics. What I and my colleagues from the Department of Psy-chology at the Faculty of Philosophy in Banja Luka have been doing for thelast few years is the research into different types of group identities, whichwe have identified as something very important for determination of one'sbehavior in the social context, something which we cannot ignore. This isan opportunity for us to look at those identities from a different angle, as a

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kind of a resultant of not only the operation of the factors which are prese-nt in this region, which we produce, but also of the impact of the influencescoming from outside the framework of our country.

The question of what is the international community has been repeated-ly asked here. The international community can be defined or placed in acontext in different ways. If this question causes such dilemmas or obscuri-ty in three percent of learned people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who havea university degree, then it is pretty clear how obscure it may be in theheads of ordinary people, those who did not have an opportunity to studyand do not have a university degree.

Regarding the identity, we have established in different empirical studiesthree main types of identity, which are interwoven, and are present in indi-viduals. Those are the identities which can be linked to ethnicity, nationali-ty and the third identity which we have examined is the European identity.Those are the identities which are based on ethnicity and on a certain geo-graphic location. In this regard, first and foremost, in all likelihood, one ofthe most difficult things is that the group identity in this region is put beforethe individual identity. In other words, someone's ethnicity dominates a pro-fessional identity, even the sexual and any other orientation which an indi-vidual has and in which he or she is trying to develop fully. Naturally, thereason lies in the developments in the country in which we all live, and theinfluences on us, those which we have not produced, can be reduced toseveral different levels. First of all, it concerns the absence of knowledgeabout an idea, about the concept of the kind of the international communi-ty; it appears as a kind of reaction, the most primitive defense mechanism,coming together within a primal, or – as our colleague has just said – 'tri-bal' group at an ethnic level. In addition to all the developments which ori-ginate from inside the country, the lack of clarity or misunderstanding of for-eign influences also leads to the situation in which the circle in which the ci-tizens of our country are trying to find themselves or to feel safer is becom-ing ever smaller. Thereby, in a way, an ordinary citizen of this country isdepriving himself or herself of an opportunity to have broader views andestablish contacts outside the borders of this country. In this regard, it is ne-cessary to say that those three types of identity, as psychological constructsand positions, are not conflicting. It is possible that all three types of thosethree identities are present in one individual, when they have different do-mains in which they are realized and that the individual is, in fact, fulfilledin all three fronts so that there is no conflict among them. But on the onehand, this happens first because of the lack of understanding of the reality

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in which we live and the influence which reaches us, and then because ofthe fact that mainly those who set our direction or those who rule the peo-ple come from the same forces which led to those unfortunate develop-ments. This means that they simply lead to the situation in which the firstmentioned – ethnic identity – remains most intensive. If we elaborate fur-ther this issue, we can consider every individual as someone who is linkedto his or her group, on the one hand, while on the other, he or she is opento some other groups as well. A huge number of those factors lead to thefact that much more attention is given to what we refer to as ‘mine’ or ‘ours’,and we came to divide everything into 'ours' and 'theirs'. Thereby, everyindividual comes to the situation in which he or she does not consider as'his or hers' the members of the other two constituent peoples who live inBosnia and Herzegovina and also the members of any other people ofwhom he or she says that they do not belong to 'his or her' group. Let merepeat that this type of forming a group is a real consequence of the opera-tion of the most primitive mechanism and search for some basic protectionof existence where one's belonging to a group is a framework within whichthe individual will be moving and feeling safe, in a way.

Regarding the three types of identity which we can establish in everyindividual, the most pronounced is the ethnic identity. However, much moreinteresting is the fact that the European identity of the citizens of Bosnia andHerzegovina, according to the ongoing research, is three or four times moreconspicuous than the national identity. This fact is true for Croat and Serbcitizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the first place, while Bosniak citizens– judging by the results of an empirical research – are the only group of citi-zens who equate ethnic and national identities, while the other two groupshave broken down this component, or, in other words, they look for thenational identity outside the BiH borders. Let me reiterate that all the studi-es, all considerations show that these three types of identity are not neces-sarily conflicting and that they do not have to be necessarily conflicting.However, the fact remains that much more attention is given to one's owngroup. Within our experiences with younger groups, in high schools or atcolleges, where some benefits can be obtained, we have understood thatsome privileges and relaxations would be necessary to allow the young peo-ple to receive education and acquire more experiences in other countries,outside the borders of their country. In other words, this means that theinternational community should be used, as much as possible, even aggres-sively, to help young people broaden their views and see the benefits fromthe huge chaos and a huge size of the international presence. In other wor-

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ds, the entire potential should be used, from scholarships to participation indifferent activities, while the national political tissue should be requested tosupport them. What falls within the openness to others in this case repre-sents the problem which arises from fears. If we analyze the fears and thegrounds, we shall discover that they come from the past ten or fifteen years;their identity remains the same and prevents us from moving forward, whilethe members of the international community do not show much responsi-bility for these components which may be regarded as subjective and whichdo not appear in objective shapes, such as economy, political actions orother similar aspects. In fact, this means that much more engagement isneeded to overcome this segment which concerns mental health and abili-ties of citizens of BiH and to make it possible for the international commu-nity members to get to know such things. One of them is constant lobby-ing for what they should be doing, and forcing them to thrust it down theirthroats, so to speak. In any case, their cooperation is necessary.

What is the biggest indirect benefit from it? By building the national orby strengthening the European identity, the national identity would getstronger. This means that by raising awareness about many more things,Bosnia and Herzegovina would probably become a closer reality to all citi-zens, and the national identity would become stronger and have its place,and would also be based on the thrilling set of identities which I havedescribed.

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DISCUSSION

Tarik Haveri}, European Center for Liberal Democracy (ECLD)

Let me share with you two different thoughts inspired by Mr. Abazovic'spresentation. They may be incoherent as I will take them out the text thelayout of which is prepared for printing, and it is a pure coincidence that Iwant to repeat now what I already discussed the day before yesterday.

My first thought concerns an in vivo experiment. It is clear that the inter-national community's evoking 'on the job training' may hurt. But sociologyknows of an in vivo experiment, which, of course, is not carried out sooften. It is carried out by the actors or societies, the framework societieswhich are able to control it and that at any moment – as soon as they seethat the experiment is successful – without causing much damage, they areable to give it up and try something else, which is why it does not cause apolitical decay, as the authors from whom I have taken this, say.

However, what we can always do is the so-called thought experiment. Itoo embarked on that experiment (on the pages in front of me). It is rela-ted to the other element which you discussed. Topicality, of course, cannotbe avoided. Let us say that the mantra which you have mentioned, only oneof the subsidiary topics of the overall debate amid the transformation of thestate and legal area, and if we refer to it by an unpopular term (popular tosome though), consociation.

The thought experiment consists of the following: if we say that conso-ciation is the model which lacks an agreement by the social actors, let usask ourselves whether there is one model, or an element, which has anagreement. For example, I do not think that anyone would be against thegross national income of 23,000 euros per capita in Bosnia and Herzegovina.This will always receive an agreement. Do you think (this is, of course, arhetoric question) that it would be sufficient for the social actors (the sameones who are unable to come to an agreement over consociation) to cometo an agreement over this goal for Bosnia to become a rich society? Thosewho think so will soon be held up to ridicule because even children, andnot only political theoreticians, know that the attainment of a goal does notdepend solely on an agreement. An agreement is no guarantee that the goalwill be attained.

Let me ask you a question (which is not rhetoric): why do we think thatsuch an in-depth political transformation is possible through an agreementonly? And to believe that it is so bad here only because there is no agreement?

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This leads me to yet another thesis inspired by the presentation by mycolleague Abazovic: it has never been established, it has never been rhetori-cally stated that (here I will take the U.S. author Immanuel Wallerstein's the-sis) there is the world's system which operates, which we can and do not ha-ve to be aware of, but which has an impact on us. The people who werewalking up on the roofs were falling down from those roofs without beingaware of the gravitation law, which was 'in force' even before Galilei andNewton formulated it. There are some forces which shape the life of today'ssociety and are placed and operating outside those societies. Is Bosnia andHerzegovina a part of that system which we can and do not have to be awa-re of, the system which, eventually, willy-nilly, makes a judgment on all thestructures of our political and social lives. In other words, what percentageof what is taking place or what is going to take place in the future does notdepend on us? 80%? 90%? Is it not too a bearing behavior to pretend that allthe parameters of our transformation depend solely on us?

What do I want to say by this? In that world's system, Wallerstein's sys-tem (which is capitalist system, of course, with all the correctives, of course)the minute detail of the treatment of capital, car insurance, banking opera-tions and who gives orders to the police, the health care system which willprevail, economic, environmental, hygiene, technical standards.... areknown. Will anyone trust the possibility of the local actors to come to anagreement over, say, all which does not concern us, and that Bosnia andHerzegovina is exempted from that? Or, what is the percentage of what de-pends on us, and of the other part which does not depend on us, and whichwe are perhaps not aware of? This is my only serious objection against theconclusion of my colleague Abazovic, that there is no agreement about thepast, the present or the future – as for the future, I would agree. In our socie-ty the agreement about the future does not perhaps exist, but this fact willnot affect the future very much as it is not a matter of the will of the localactors. Our future depends on the opposing historical forces, the globaldirections and trends, the movement of capital, the distribution models, andthe models of controlling energy and so on. We can and we do not have torecognize or love those modes, but we cannot avoid them. Just as an incau-tious walker falls down from the roof, whether he knows of the gravitationlaw or not.

Let me make another semi-remark on Mr. Cekrlija's subsidiary thesis inwhich he equates the knowledgeable, wise people in Bosnia and Herzego-vina with those 3 percent who have a university degree. I disagree: the peo-ple who have a university degree are not necessarily knowledgeable andwise.

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Zdravko Grebo

In the end, this huge, probably excessive quantity of resignation demon-strated here by myself should result in the effort to make a half-empty glasshalf-full and its form could be filled by our darling and not so darling co-tenants with some content, and achieve the goal. The first question whichshould be posed to the big players, whose hostages we are, with our livesin their hands, is brutal: is Bosnia and Herzegovina a sustaining project?Simply: should it exist or not? Perhaps, it does not have to, I do not know!The reason why I am asking this silly question is the following: if a responseis that after the fall of Yugoslavia all the successor states were formed asnation states, and since BiH is unable to do the same, it should not exist atall. If we invest supernatural energies and employ out best talents, we can-not be a nation state or a nation which will have its state. Are we an imple-mentable project in 'their' plans if we are at all included in anyone's plans?Or, it is absolutely out of question. Simply, let us not bother any more andlet us not prolong the war by different means into the future, please, sayclearly and loudly: you are not possible!

And now my modest comment on the presentations by Haveric andAbazovic, about the consociation debate. That story is true and has itsgrounds. But I have a different interpretation of what my colleague Abazovicwanted to say: what is the purpose of such a big story about consociation?It would be better to say that the newly born interest in that issue bears asecret meaning: advocacy and completion of the process of dividing BiHand eventually its disappearance. And then a repeated question aboutBosnia and Herzegovina: does it have any substance at all? It may still be asociety, but it is not a sustaining state or it is neither of these. After that youlogically say: let us get separated, like in a failed marriage. Why consocia-tion as a code? If there is no conspiracy theory, this is the model whichshould be carefully examined. Anyway, we already have it in place in all theelements of the theory. Even in that 'non-popular' popular regime, withsome irony, we had an effective formula: comrades Hamdija, Branko andMilanko. Even the communists had the same kind of sensibility about theneed to respect within a one-track ideology the diversities and give themthe possibility to be represented in political terms. But in that seeminglytheoretical debate, which is symbolized by the request for a 'third' entitywhich is wholeheartedly supported by the Croat parties and strongly backedby Mr. Dodik, we should be discussing in clearly defined terms: that meansthe end of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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My fourth, short comment refers to the statement that we are not a post-conflict society; we are a post-war society, and – pardon my pathetic remark– post-genocidal society. Once I wrote that I was not interested so much inwhether Republika Srpska was a genocidal construct, but I do know thatBiH is a genocidal construct; the whole community which has not resolvedits traumas will hardly be able to resolve them.

How can we continue to live together and plan our common future ifwe are unable to reach the momentum and say a very simple sentence: Iam the citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina? All the rest, including the repre-sentation of collective identities, can be agreed and implemented institutio-nally and procedurally. I for one have no doubts about the need to discussthe identities whether they are concentric or overlapping, just any identity.... But the role of the international community in that story intrigued meagain. I will skip the whole range of arguments; the conclusion is that thewhole West Balkans is a black hole (a cloacae, let me use an impolite term).If someone truly cares about peace, cooperation, prosperity, prevention ofillicit trade in drugs, human trafficking, trafficking in arms, the only way inwhich this can be achieved for the sake of the general good is that theprocess of integration to the European Union is made easier and speededup, without strictly measuring whether we all, 'West Balkan' people, havedone our homework fully.

It is clear that in the foreseeable future, having in mind high standards,we shall not be able to achieve that. By the way, many EU member stateswere not even close to achieving the usual standards. Why is that so impor-tant? Let me remind you that the whole Southeast European cataclysmbegan over all Serbs living in one state, all Croats living in one state, all Al-banians living in one state, and all Bosniaks (including those from Sanjak)living in one state. Since the prevailing ethnic nationalism is still in, all ofthem will live again and for ever in one state if they become the full mem-ber of the European family. There is no need to ask a painful question: whydid we have to separate in such a bloody manner in order to desperatelywish to be together? Even a pragmatic solution to the additional problemswhich have been mentioned today: privatization, corruption, human rights,the rule of law, independent media, ineffective judiciary and the publicadministration...is possible if you are on board or you are a member of theclub. Then the rules clearly apply and there is no room for typical Balkanpolitical extravagance and caprice. If it is true that you will hardly find apolitician in this region who would say, regardless of how honest he is, thathe does not support accession to the European Union, please help him carry

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out his promises. You asked for it. And please, behave yourself. There is noother way out.

Tarik Haveri}

I am sorry that some thoughts will remain incomplete, but I did not thinkit was necessary to speak about obvious things. What I said – that our futuredoes not depend on whether some actors here will agree on whetherBosnia will be consociation or nor – does not mean that I am in favor ofthat proposal – for a very simple reason that it is not in the spirit of the pre-sent time, and that it is against those forces which are beyond us, our influ-ence, but that we are exposed to. However, it is true – and my colleagueAbazovic has also said that – that Bosnia and Herzegovina is de facto aconsociation. If I am to be the devil's advocate now, I will say of the oppo-site side which I do not belong to, that perhaps it consists of the people whoare aware of that and they say: if it already exists, de facto, without permis-sion, let us find a way to legalize it, so that it gets some shape.

I understand it although I disagree. However, what is key here – and themost useful initiatives are failing when the daily political debates put on astraitjacket of ready-made concepts – is who presents himself or herself inthe public as the leader of the opposite concept and who is identified assuch by the public.

Opposite to consociation is the civic (even liberal democratic) state,although Zdravko Grebo and Tarik Haveric, who requested 18 years agothat the Assembly should recognize the ZAVNOBIH Declaration on therights of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina; rather, those are people whohave done everything they could over the past 16 – 17 years to create thesituation we have. I am not an extremist if I say: I do not trust those peo-ple. And I do not know why the present 'advocates of consociation' shouldtrust them at all. They accepted 'the agreement of the peoples' (factualconsociation) until such time as everything got divided and privatized andnow they would like to have 'one man one vote'!

It is true, and professor Pobric is right, 'one man one vote' is a universalprinciple. However, we were against it in Milosevic's Yugoslavia since Milo-sevic promoted it out of ill intentions. Perhaps today, someone is against the'one man one vote' principle not because he is denying its values but be-cause he does not trust the frankness of intentions of those forces which arepromoting that principle.

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Zlatko Hadìdedi}

I find the presentations by Mr. Haveric and professor Grebo quite inspir-ing and I will try to be short. I think that it was really necessary to say whatMr. Haveric has mentioned – that there is a global system which imposes acertain order, and certain systemic values. In addition to its being a capitalis-tic order, it is also an order of nation states. Professor Grebo has mentionedthat, in a way. However, I wanted to take the floor after he said: ”Even if allof us do our utmost, this cannot be a nation state.” Let me remind you ofonly one fact when it comes to the engagement of the international com-munity. All of us are asking what the international community is, while theinternational community has never asked that question. It got engaged inBosnia and Herzegovina, I have to say this, even before the war broke out.It is usually said that the international community came here to prevent theconflict, to help us put an end to the war and so on. I claim with full respon-sibility that the international community got involved in Bosnia andHerzegovina for the first time in 1991 and 1992, before the conflict brokeout, with the conference chaired by Lord Carrington, and the other confer-ence within that one, which was chaired by Cuttiliero, Portugal's diplomat.The model of dividing up Bosnia and Herzegovina was promoted for thefirst time at that conference. Why? Because already at that time a straitjack-et had already been tailored for Bosnia and Herzegovina, according towhich Bosnia and Herzegovina should be divided into ethnic territories andfurther into ethnic statelets – which would allow free space for the fullimplementation of the major ethnic projects. It is fascinating that nobody inBosnia and Herzegovina has ever noticed that Bosnia and Herzegovina,with three or even more different ethnic, religious and cultural identities, hasbeen exposed to all that – ever since the Lisbon Conference – because thegroups which possess those identities – I will take the liberty to say - false-ly refer to themselves as ‘nations’. Of course, nobody can deny their right torefer to themselves as ‘nations’, but the groups which prefer to call them-selves ‘nations’ will have the automatic right within that system – includingthe global system that Mr. Haveric referred to – to create their own states.That is simply an international law axiom. Likewise, which is another para-dox, there is a large group of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina who wouldbe willing to be called Bosnians and Herzegovinians and that right is sim-ply denied to them by the international community which was the architectof the Lisbon Conference and all subsequent talks and the Dayton Constitu-tion, and that possibility has been denied ever since although in all likeli-

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hood it would be possible to establish in empirical terms that at least onethird or one fourth of the population would be willing, already now, toaccept that identity. Thus, we are under permanent pressure from the inter-national community to be divided along ethnic and religious lines and fullyethnic projects. In this regard, professor Grebo's question is absolutely legiti-mate, although we should not border too much; in fact, the question is not”Whether we want Bosnia and Herzegovina?” but ”Whether the internatio-nal community allows us to have Bosnia and Herzegovina which would notbe an ethnic-national construct”. It can become a nation state the momentall citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the vast majority of them, use thatidentity. Then it will also be a nation state. There is a division into an eth-nic and civic national identity, so that I do not see any structural problemhere, except that the structural problem lies within the international commu-nity which has accepted the axiom that Bosnia and Herzegovina should fallapart – well, we just need to find an elegant way.

Dino Abazovi}

Simply, we have heard a good number of good theses and discussions,but still I would like, because of incomplete thoughts, as Mr. Haveric said,to clarify some issues. First, the concept of the story about consociationwhich I have introduced into today’s discussion, was simply the concept ofan international design. I wanted to stress that consociative organization ofBosnia and Herzegovina is the result of what we refer to as the internatio-nal state of an international design. This is the context in which I have dis-cussed that. Although I did not plan to elaborate on that any further, as ithas already been mentioned here, I think that the same issue should be con-sidered at the level of description, and I am afraid that this discussion isentering the area of a normative nature of the state. Consociative models, inboth theory and practice, are not normative in nature because when theyare, they become legalized and once they are legalized, they become a storyabout a third entity, about some new issues; then, eventually, I think, thatthe vast majority of citizens may have a problem with that kind of legitima-cy, legalization, as there is only one thing left: to vote by acclamation infavor of the results of the war, if we are talking about a legalistic consocia-tive approach. There are some different issues. Let me clarify: I have spo-ken about a descriptive character only. The other issue is the issue whichhas been mentioned several times, the issue of a nation state. Again, I am

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afraid that it has more than one meaning. According to my understanding,there are different theories, and practically there are only two states in Eu-rope which exist on the principle of a nation state, France and Greece. Noother state in Europe is any longer a classic nation state. Let me be clear:what Mr. Haveric spoke about, in a way, I understand to fall outside thenation state frame. Why did I mention this? Because it was not clear enough.I am so sorry, but let me stress it clearly. Mr. Schwarz-Schilling talked aboutimperialism this morning in the discussion with our colleague Sacic. I thinkthat the old concept of a nation state is an imperialistic spirit of values. Inthis regard, I did not want to use this opportunity for that issue, but myunderstanding of Ms. Sacic's presentation is that she talks about imperialis-tic values which are being imposed on us who are outside Europe, outsidethe European concept, but not as an issue of geography but as an issue ofEurope as the value; so, unfortunately, I have to observe that there is plen-ty of it in the international community. Let me give you a quick observationand proof: the latest anthropological studies – if you are interested, you canfind references in my paper – show that, say, most of the representatives ofthe international community, whom we refer to as 'internationals' or 'for-eigners' in everyday communication, quote «....usually simply exclude them-selves from the local community: either by voluntary self-separation fromBiH state or other institutions, or by exclusion of Bosnians and Herzegovi-nians from the imagined Europeanism” (end quote) whatever it is they per-ceive as Europeanism. This is an antropological study by an excellent youngantropologist who, well, is not a Bosnian. Thus, you have also that kind ofimperialistic value-based attitude towards us where even those famous IDsaround the neck, foreign license plates, parking of vehicles where Bosniansare not allowed to park their cars, on the main streets etc., is a kind of asyndrome of the Sarajevo Airport. As soon as they land at the Sarajevo Air-port, they forget that they have flown from Vienna, Bonn or other Europe’scities and states and begin to behave in an imperialistic way, in the waywhich is different from the ways known to their countries of origin. This toois one of the issues that could be discussed. And finally, let me concludewith the one-man-one-vote concept. I may be the last man who should dis-cuss that, as my positions are quite clear. Please, do not forget: Bosnia andHerzegovina had a one-man-one-vote concept at the 1991 elections and thenatio-nal parties saw a triumphant victory. Thus, the issue of one-man-one-vote is not necessarily the issue of ethnic domination or minorization of themajority or the minority, respectively. As far as I can recall the 1991 electionresults, according to the one-man-one-vote principle, we know who saw a

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sweeping victory. Thus, this does not concern the manner of vote. It israther that some other models are discriminating against a certain numberof people in the context of the law. And if we discuss those principles, letus, please, stick to the fact that it is unacceptable under any European inter-national standard that some citizens of this country are being systematicallydiscriminated against only because they do not have this or that ethnic ori-gin. I do not know why some people find it difficult to say that. Eventually,I am slightly excited, I too belong to the unfortunate 'Others', if you will.And what now? Thank you.

STUDY

Dino Abazovi}

Tallying the Balance of Effects of the International Community

in Bosnia and Herzegovina (December 1995 - March 2007)

- sociological aspects -

"Society in which there is nothing in between 'hypertrophied state' and

'endless number of disorganized individuals' is really sociologically mon-

strous, since collective activity is far more complex just to be expressed solely

by one institution - the State one" 1

E. Durkheim

"All the enormous energy the international community invests in the

rationalization of an irrational political concept leads nowhere. Is there

greater tragedy for a geopolitical entity than to vanish while thinking it's

growing; to whither away while believing to be healed!" 2

N. ]urak

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1 E. Durkheim, "The division of labour in society", Free Press Glencoe, p.11; see also "ProfessionalEthics and Civil Morals", Routledge Kegan Paul 1957, pp. 20-23. (cited from: Robert Pinker: "So-cijalna teorija i socijalna politika", Hrestomatija, FPN Sarajevo, 2000)

2 Nerzuk ]urak (2004): "Dejtonski nacionalizam", Sarajevo, Buybook, p. 106.


I. Introduction

During the tragic period when the process of disintegration of the formerSocialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was turning into aggression, warand bloodshed, the ”international response” was indeed marked by a lackof unity and determination, as suggested by Alexandros Yannis (Yannis,2002). David Owen, the EU mediator for former Yugoslavia and a truly pro-minent figure of international power bases at the key period, stated that

”…what the Clinton Administration seemed to want until 1994, whenthey first began asserting themselves positively in the Balkans, was powerwithout responsibility [...] The member states of the European Union andtheir Foreign Ministers did accept responsibility [...] but they never exercisedpower.” (Owen, 1995:366 -7)3

In any case, force was necessary to stop the war and that is what hap-pened in late 1995. The Dayton Peace Agreement, the compromise whichled to cessation of hostilities, gave life to the present state structure of Bosniaand Herzegovina, this ”internationally designed state which functions ininternational design” (Bose, 2005:232).

However, it should be noted that the position of the so-called interna-tional community4 in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be redu-ced to the more or less formal relationships of a protectorate (such as, forexample, East Timor or Kosovo). One of the authors indicating the role of”local consent” for the Agreement as well as implications arising from it isDavid Chandler, who believes that

”[r]ather than an external imposition, Dayton formally appears to be atreaty made by the local powers – BiH and its neighbours, Croatia and therump former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It was not by UNSecurity Council resolution but by the coercive fiction of ‘local consent’ thatinternational actors were invited to oversee Dayton and to install the tem-porary post-conflict administrative mechanism of the Office of High Repre-

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3 Cited from Yannis (2002:264)4 Throughout the text, I will use the prefix "so-called" before the phrase "international communi-

ty", wishing to affirm the view and support the efforts by John B. Allcock, who offers the follo-wing reasoning: "I dislike the term 'international community', because the configuration of stateand non-state structures to which it normally refers does not possess the attributes that sociolo-gists normally understand by the word 'community'. Nevertheless, the potential replacementsthat I have encountered for it are invariably either equally misleading, or far more clumsy. Underprotest, therefore, I continue to use it here in the fervent hope that something better might bedevised soon." (Allcock, 2005:24)


sentative (OHR). This was an office only ‘consistent with relevant United Na-tions Security Council resolutions’, not formally run by or directly accountab-le to the UN.” (Chandler, 2005:337)

The very question of responsibility must, in fact, be one of the key fociof analyses of effects of the so-called international community in Bosnia andHerzegovina since 1995 until today.

Prior to that, one should refer to several general features of the post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In brief, the post-Dayton BiH comprises two Entities (Federation BiH andRepublika Srpska), each with a very high level of autonomy. In itself, theFederation BiH comprises 10 cantons. The town of Brcko, which was thesubject of international arbitration, now has the status of a district and is stillunder direct supervision of a special international envoy.

As the state was established through an international agreement, for thepurpose of implementation and particularly in view of maintaining peace,”Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an ad hoc international institu-tion responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of theaccord […] The High Representative, who is also EU Special Representative(EUSR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is working with the people and institu-tions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community to ensurethat Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracyon course for integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.”5 Other internatio-nal organisations ”were originally intended at facilitating the domestic deci-sion-making process by insuring adequate security for citizens (SFOR, IPTF),creating the economic framework for successful governance (EU, UN) andby promoting democratic and more tolerant institutions and processes(OSCE).” (Bieber, 2002:213)

The complex structures of state organisation of BiH can (irrespective of international interventionism aimed at achieving peace) ultimately be subsumed under those models which contemporary sources define asconsociational.

In order to accommodate conflict, stabilisation and democratic develop-ment, key elements of consociationalisim – a grand coalition, proportiona-lity, mutual veto and segmental autonomy (Lijphart, 1977) – have alreadybeen implemented. The post-Dayton BiH must therefore be considered aform of consociational democracy.

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5 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38519


As I have alredy elaborated elsewhere,6 as far as BiH is concenred, thingsare quite clear – a grand coalition is determined by election legislation (andresults of all the elections thus far) and the process of establishment of theexecutive comprising key parties and based on the principle of ethnic rep-resentation, proportionality is simply the three-member Presidency, as wellas election of members of Parliament (following ethnic and entity criteria,let alone the House of Peoples), composition of the Court of BiH, etc.; themechanism of protection of vital national interest used in our parliamentarypractice is, in effect, the mutual veto, and finally, the segmental autonomy

is reflected, first and foremost, through institutions and policies (in thewidest sense) of entity structures of the state, i.e. through cantons of theFederation BiH (four with majority Bosniak population, four with majorityCroat population and two so-called mixed cantons).

II. What has gone wrong?

It is becoming abundantly clear that division of power and authority byinstitutionalising ethnic difference does not necessarily lead to the desiredresults, at least not in terms of a functional state and a climate susceptible toeconomic growth and recovery of a war-torn and devastated country. Thesituation at the level of the state is such that the concept of power-sharing

does not funciton within instutions based on ethnic (proportional) represen-tation – instead of a postive consensus on cooperation in order to rebuildinstutioins, there is a negative consensus, manifested through systemic blo-ckage of adoption of decisions necessary for reconstruciton to commence.At entity levels, particularly until 2000, there was no major return of ”minori-ties”, the education system remained segregated, at least in issues of ”moth-er tongue and language of instruction”, i.e. the issue of curricula of the so-called national subjects (mother tongue, literature, history, geography), thetransfer of powers from entity to state level is too slow – to mention but afew features.

Despite expectations that proportional representation and the principleof rotation (pursuant to the supposed agreement of the elites) would serveas the basis for it, even the process of rebuilding mutual trust has notattained any major results.

As it turned out, even the stategise promoted by the so-called interna-tional community (particularly the Office of the High Representatve) as de-

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6 For more, see (Abazovi}, 2007)


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blocking, primarily by imposing legal preconditions from the outside, ren-dered modest results.

”The law has been imposed against the will of the population in the be-lief that the legal framework is the basis on which post-conflict reconstruc-tion and nation-building can be shaped and guided. The experience of Bos-nia would suggest that this legal idealism undermines the political process,the standing of the law and the transition to self-government.” (Chandler,2004:589)

A general outline of periods of international participation in BiH can bepresented through the prism of developments with the ”instituon of instu-tions”, the Office of the High Representative, namely from 1995 to 2000 andfrom 2000 until today.

As for the ”external” factor, i.e. the decision-makers within the so-calledinternational community, primarily the Peace Implementaition Council, oneof the key features remains ”but with little clear policy direction or end pointfor the ad hoc international administration.” (Chandler, 2005:337).

The second period was and remains the period of alignment towards theEuropean Union, and thus the realignment of forces towards ”Brussels” asthe focus of all decision-making.

Thus, in early 2002 the Council of the Europena Union expressed its will-ingness to appoint the High Representative in BiH as the EU Special Repre-sentative to BiH. During the same year, the UN Police Mission in BiH (IPTF)was suceeded by the EU Police Mission (EUPM), and two years later, EUintroduced a military operation (Operation Athea) replacing all the remain-ing international military stabilisation forces (SFOR) with EUFOR.

It should be underscored that all these key processes took place with noformal consultations with those they relate to the most, i.e. the BiH public.Formal bodies of the state did, however, volens nolens, send formal requeststo the European Union (e.g. inviting EU to assume responsibility for themisssion succeeding the UN IPTF), but just like in Dayton, except for thenarrow circle of the establishment, there were no representatives of the ge-neral public. The issue of relations between civil society and the so-calledinternational community will be considered below.

Still, most anylists agree that one of the key moments in the internatio-nal engagement was the 1997 conference of the Peace ImplememtnationCouncil held in Bonn, Germany. Although the conclusions of the Bonn con-ference gave the powers of the Office of the High Representative (and laterthe EU Special Representative to BiH) a totally new character and solidifiedconsidrebaly the position and implementation powers of the ”ruler-who-is-


not-a-ruler”, the Dayton ”logic” continued to generate paradoxes. Thus, forexample, ”the flexibility of external mechanisms of regulation has been acentral factor in ‘sucking-out’ the capacity of BiH’s political institutions andundermining the legitimacy of the Bosnian state.” (Chandler, 2005:337)

Although the Bonn powers of the High Representative served the pur-pose of acelleration of the peace agreement implementation process, theHigh Representative was also called upon to use his ultimate powers to re-move from office any local official, including directly elected politicians,whom the Office held to be obstructing the peace process.

”[A]fter 1997 the High Representative was equipped with additional po-wers, which transformed him from a facilitator to an integral institution ofthe current system of government in Bosnia. Equipped with both legislativeand executive powers, the High Representative (HR) has emerged as themost influential institution in Bosnia—and the only one not formally basedon power-sharing.” (Bieber, 2002:213)

Until today, the High Representative has removed or suspended morethan one hundred persons, including a member of the state Presidency,mayors, governors, deputy ministers, ministers and prime ministers at all le-vels, one entity president, one head of entity intelligence service, judges,civil servants, company managers, etc. Except for short-term effects and ex-cluding the specific individual disqualifications, this has generated few or nosystemic changes.

Creation of additional dependence of local officials on the so-called inter-national community and its proponents of power, rather than on those whoelected them to the offices they hold,7 the population of Bosnia andHerzegovina, was merely a by-product.

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7 Even Wolfgang Petritsch (High Representative from 1999 to 2002) indicated in several publicaddresses the "syndrome of dependency" of local officials, developing negatively due to incre-ased frequency of utilisation of the wide powers of the High Representative. Petritsch has alsosaid the following: "Aware of the powers of the High Representative to impose laws and removeobstructive officials, both . . . Bosnian intellectuals and international observers . . . demandedthat I extensively use such powers . . . 'You have to impose the right solutions', I heard overand over again. But to my mind 'imposing' democracy and civil society seemed a contradictionin terms. However, during the first one-and-a-half years of my mandate I indeed had to act asthe most interventionist High Representative ever." Cited from (Bose, 2002:322)


III. Democratisation by undemocratic forces and

the (non)civil society!?

That is why the issue of elections is the next important issue of ”heritage”of the so-called international community in BiH. Overemphasizing democ-ratisation of BiH in the early post-conflict phase was evidently too soon –elections which came too soon,8 with no strong media and a revived civilsociety to compensate for ethnic ”pillarisation”, inevitably resulted inrenewed establishment and democratic legitimacy of nationalist elites.9

”The unintended result of the West's rushed, apolitical approach to politi-cal and economic development was that moderate politicians were notgiven an opportunity to develop a constituency and nationalist politiciansgained even more control over scarce jobs and housing. Not only did na-tionalists profit materially from aid monies and the international communi-ty's recognition of them as legitimate leaders, but their ability to influencewhich companies were chosen for internationally funded reconstructionprojects helped them gain loyal political followers. International assistancehas profound political effects, and the outcome of working with nationalelected officials regardless of their political orientation is a society that still relies on connections and remains divided along ethnic lines, rather than one based on equal opportunity and the rule of law.” (McMahon, 2004-05:581)

And instead of accepting the consequences of such contradictory poli-cies, as noted by McMahon, the so-called international community seems tohave handed the challenges of transforming a society over to the few pub-lic figures with critical attitudes towards the ruling elites, a handful of inde-pendent media (print in particular) and non-governmental organisations.

However, in view of the fact that in post-Dayton BiH there is reducedunderstanding of civil society as non-governmental organisations, whichcurrently is indeed the case, it seems that NGOs, albeit paradoxically, servethe purpose of preserving this bad situation, as they are the ones to com-pensate for the functions the state will not or cannot perform.10 Naturally, noNGO in BiH actually works with this objective in mind, but the situationthey are in duly demonstrates that the state is hardly performing its basic

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8 The Dayton Peace Agreement specified that elections were to be held no later than nine monthsfollowing its signing!

9 For more, see (Marko, 2002).10This is similar in the context of neo-liberal states. For more, see (Mo~nik, 2003).


functions -- individuals are thus left with no option other than to organisethemselves in that way and try to alleviate the consequences.

Bearing in mind the facts which indicate that most of the NGO sectormainly operates with donor funds from abroad, and as time progresses thestrategies of local NGOs are donor-driven, and far less driven by the real si-tuation and needs, the situation becomes even more pessimistic.

More so since the so-called International Community in BiH continues toinsist that NGOs are the central segment of civil society11 which is to act”non-politically” in order to change the political state of affairs.12

The almost colonising nature of assistance directed from the outsideseems to be aimed at advanced and irrevocable inhibition and developmentof most other forms of civic engagement, i.e. any other which is not reducedto non-governmental organisations!

The problem of international engagement in BiH has been and is still theproblem of intervention which has strived (and continues to do so) to pre-serve and guarantee the peace agreement, and yet at the same time the insti-tutional framework established through that agreement favours the politicaloptions which are the least supportive of its implementation. Thus, when itcomes to local players, yesterday’s bitter opponents of Dayton become itsmost dignified supporters.

International players have never afforded sufficient attention to issues oftransparency and accountability. As early as 1996, the International CrisisGroup underscored in a report the issue of transparency, stating that”respect for Bosnian authorities and basic notions of reciprocity argue for atleast the degree of transparency necessary for the Bosnian authorities andpeople to understand the basis for decisions, and the decision-makingprocesses, that so affect them […] to ‘teach’ democracy, tolerance and goodgovernance […] then there is no better way to start than by example.”13.

The core issue of accountability is the issue of attitude towards the po-pulation in the territory which they ”govern”. This is not a matter of accoun-tability towards the bodies which establish or appoint them (such as thePeace Implementation Council or the Council of the EU), but rather a mat-

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11For more, see (Sali-Terzi}, 2001).12Thus, several months after the last elections in BiH (2006 general elections), at a regional con-

ference on civil society organised by the Heinrich-Boell Foundation (March 2006), the currentHigh Representative, Christian Schwrtz-Schilling, invited the representatives of civil society andNGOs to call political parties to account!

13International Crisis Group, (1996:16)


ter of accountability as a concept based on public articulation, explanationand justification of policies whose consequences are felt first and foremostby the citizens of BiH. Absence of accountability of local actors must not bea mitigating element in the deficit of accountability of the so-called interna-tional community in BiH.

For too long, the inhabitants of BiH have been faced with the practice of”transferring accountability”. By this I mean the practice whereby whateverlocal decision-makers do not know, do not or will not do they declare it theresponsibility of the international community in BiH. Excuses mainly runalong the lines of sensitivity and complexity of issues, but in principle it isalways a matter of necessity to make unpopular moves which may be nega-tively interpreted by the homogenised electorate, which votes for them pur-suant to the principle of protection of their own, mono-national interests.

Whenever faced with issues which lack a wide consensus among keyactors, the so-called international community also delegates responsibility todomestic authorities.14 Levitating responsibility, one may say!

That is why in many situations David Chandler has unfortunately beenproven right when he says that

”Dayton’s flexibility has been the key factor enabling external powers topermanently postpone any transition to Bosnian ‘ownership’. The only tran-sition which has taken place has been from the ad hoc policy-ownership ofself-selected members of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) to directregulatory control under the aegis of the European Union (EU). This transi-tion has been brought about through informal and unaccountable mecha-nisms of external regulation, and has been imposed ‘from above’ withoutany debate or genuine involvement of the people or elected representativesof BiH.” (Chandler, 2005:337)

Still, the results achieved could be interpreted as positive signs of mode-rate optimism, primarily through analyses of effects in issues such as inte-gration of entity armies into a single armed force, establishment of a stateborder service, however good or bad, and the partially successful judicialreform.

All other achievements, starting from the structure and size of the Councilof Ministers of BiH, reforms of the security sector, and the establishment ofa public broadcasting system, depend on the (preliminary) issue of reformsof the BiH Constitution and guarantees for their implementation.

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14For more, see (Abazovi}, 2003.)


Although all the previous interventions into the constitutional systemtried to influence a change, which led to the Constitutional Court of BiH(2000) issuing its ”Decision on Constituent Status”, all the subsequentamendments to entity Constitutions in 2002 (following the so-called ”Mra-kovica-Sarajevo Agreement”), further expanded the ethnification of the poli-tical system and shrunk the free space left to the individual for non-ethnicidentification.15 By way of reminder, until the adoption of the ”Decision onConstituent Status”, the principal belief was that equality of groups are thereplacement of non-discrimination of individuals.

”Neither in terms of norms, nor in terms of practice in application andinterpretation of some of its provisions, the current constitutional system ofBiH does not provide possibilities for further societal development of BiH.There is evident presence of insurmountable shortcomings in the text of theBiH Constitution, but also of the problem of application of constitutionalprinciples. Still, three essential problems may be identified: (1) lack of under-standing of basic constitutional principles and its adequate valuation; (2)lack of political will to accept common constitutional values; (3) wrong prac-tice in applying constitutional provisions. Additional damage was caused bythe (deliberate!?) wrong interpretation of the already limited possibilities pro-vided by the text itself, totally ignoring the clearly legitimate interest of anystate to ensure normal functioning of its institutional system, respecting theprinciples of transparency of action and government as a service for the citi-zens.” (Vehabovi}, 2006:61)

Therefore, along with reforms of the constitutional system, or rather, veryspecific changes to the BiH Constitution, together with local actors (open-ing a separate issue of new partnership, which would respect both theduties and the responsibilities of the parties), critical areas of action includereforms of the education system and of the police, as well as, certainly,arrests of indicted war criminals (first of all, Radovan Karadì} and RatkoMladi}).

IV. Final considerations

”The dying spring” of the High Representative, which seems to beapproaching clearly, no later than mid-next year, may open the issue of tally-ing the balance of effects of international engagement in the post-conflict

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15For more, see (Bieber, 2005)


society of BiH, and of those factors who were instrumental in decision-mak-ing processes both de facto and de jure, but who continued to reside out-side BiH. One can only hope that such a balance may acccept that ”thesesolutions cannot create the country envisioned by the peace agreement be-cause the existing institutional framework prevents them from doing so. Na-tion-building efforts in Bosnia, as currently conceived, cannot reintegrate thecountry or transform its society because such strategies are, in fact, at oddswith the country's governing structure”. (McMahon, 2004-05:583)

The international design we know and live in BiH has long achieved itspeak, and the only solution is – redesign. The ”external” and the ”internal”stakeholders seem to agree in one thing, that the only path to ”success” isthe path of European integration, and that this country cannot take that pathwithout a guide.

That is why, continued involvement of the international element is notonly certain but also necessary, and that is indeed so. The future lengthyengagement of the EU Special Representative for BiH on its path towardsthe EU16 (with or without the Bonn powers) will depend on the readinessto face the accute problems of legacy of the Dayton construct, but it willequally depend on the ability to articulate strategies which would providework for a completely new generation of local civil servants, politicians andexperts.

”How can the domestic intellectual potential help the international com-munity in BiH? By ensuring that the servitude-prone part of BiH intelligentsiacancels absolutely and irrevocably its hidden and transparent services to theruling national parties, stops lying to itself and others, and by producingintellectual services which do not depend on party coffers, thus strengthen-ing the independent thinking block. It is high time for the intelligentsia inBiH to stop generating deception rooted in old and new myths of a newclass. In this way, the international community continues to develop as aseparate and imposed BiH identity which develops, in addition to the threenational bureaucracies, its own, fourth bureaucracy, the fourth echelon ofmoney wasted for nothing.” (]urak, 2004:155)

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16Recent estimates indicate that Croatia, a state belonging to the group of former Yugoslav repub-lic which has gone further than others in acceding to the EU, will become a full member stateno earlier than 2009. BiH has not yet signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)and as things are at the moment, it is likely to be one of the last European states to completethis formal step.


However, although the ”road to Europe” may engender numerous posi-tive results and some progress, the key problem is still (and must not betaken off the agenda, local or international) -- the BiH society lacks (or doesnot exist) the fundamental consensus of its members (particularly thoseframed within collective identities) on issues of the past, the present and thefuture.

The so-called international community has never seriously faced this fact– and different views of the causes and solutions to the ”Bosnian problem”,which are often mutually exclusive, raise the issue of ”local” as well as ”inter-national” discord. Faced with these issues, the so-called international com-munity literally does not exist. What is left is a set of specific interests ofspecific goverments interested in BiH in one way or anohter. Perhaps themost illustrative example is the symbolic participation of institutions of theso-called international community in what is called ”confronting the past”.

Still, the internationals (or, in simple terms, persons who work in BiH, ininternational organisations, international governmental or non-governmen-tal organisations, agencies and services) maintain a significant presence ineveryday life in BiH, as the ”ambivalent builders”.17 Soldiers and policemen,experts in human rights, legal reform or elections, banking managers, advi-sors in private sector reform and micro-credit organisations, educators, trai-ners, researchers, aid workers… And diplomats, of course.

However, their engagement aimed at unifying and integrating (or rahter,in the mission of ”bringing democracy”), within the context of BiH society,usually simply exclude themselves from the local community: either by vo-luntary self-separation from BiH (state) Institutions, or by exclusion of Bos-nians and Herzegovinians from the imagined Europeanism (or whatever itis they perceive as Europeanism).18 These lessons are mastered superbly bytheir ”local” students and that is part of the problem, not of the solution.

One thing remains undisputed – if this state and society are indeed onthe road to ”Brussels”, demands will be harder and changes required will bemore radical. The progress of this country towards those who are already intheir ”unity of diversity” can only be measured by the fact that the same offi-cial EU motto must first come to life in BiH – with the same principles andvalues applicable in the EU!

298


17For more, see (Coles, 2007)18Good starting examples for the former process are the famous international ID cards carried

around the neck, or cars with special registration plates, and for the latter, a good illustration isthe issue of visas and the procedure for obtaining them. For more, also see ibidem.


References:

Dino ABAZOVI] (2003): „Socio-kulturni kontekst BiH kao determinira-ju}i faktor implementacijemehanizama za za{titu ljudskih prava”:, in Vla-

davina prava, sigurnost u regiji i ljudska prava Heinrich Böll Foundation,Regional Office in Sarajevo, Sarajevo.

Dino ABAZOVI] (2007): O konsocijaciji: Konsocijacijom protiv konsoci-

jalizma, Puls demokratije,OSF BiH, Sarajevo, http://www.pulsdemokra-tije.net/clanak.php?sifra=070221002&lang=bh

John B. ALLCOCK (2005): „Daytone, vrati se! Sve ti je opro{teno!”, inBosna i Hercegovina na putu ka modernoj dràvi? Perspektive i prepreke,Heinrich Böll Foundation, Regional Office in Sarajevo.

Florian BIEBER (2002): ”Bosnia–Herzegovina: Developments towards aMore Integrated State?”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 22, No.1, 2002

Florian BIEBER (2005): „S vi{e kompleksnosti ka boljem vr{enju vlasti”,in Bosna i Hercegovina na putu ka modernoj dràvi? Perspektive i

prepreke, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Regional Office in Sarajevo.

Sumantra BOSE (2005): ”The Bosnian State a Decade after Dayton”,International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.3, Autumn 2005, pp.322–335

David CHANDLER (2004): ”The Problems of 'Nation-Building': ImposingBureaucratic 'Rule from Above'”, Cambridge Review of International

Affairs, Volume 17, Number 3, October 2004

David CHANDLER (2005): ”From Dayton to Europe”, International

Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.3, Autumn 2005, pp.336–349

Kimberley COLES (2007): ”Ambivalent Builders: Europeization, the Pro-duction of Difference, and Internationals in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, in Bou-garel, X. – Helms, E. – Duijzings, G.: The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities,

Memories and Moral claims in a Post-War Society, Ashgate, UK.

Nerzuk ]URAK (2004): Dejtonski nacionalizam, Sarajevo, Buybook.

299

References


Arendt LIJPHART (1977): Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative

Explanation. 1977, New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.

Joseph MARKO (2000): ”Bosnia and Herzegovina – Multi-ethnic or Multi-national?”, in Council of Europe (ed.), Societies in Conflict: The Contribu-

tion of Law and Democracy to Conflict Resolution (Council of EuropePublishing, Strasbourg, 2000), 92–118.

Patrice C. McMAHON (2004-05): ”Rebuilding Bosnia: A Model to Emulateor to Avoid?”, Political Science Quarterly Volume 119 Number 4 2004-05

Rastko MO^NIK (2004): „Nevladine organizacije, sluge neoliberalne dr-àve”, Sektor, vol. 3-4, 2004.

Sevima SALI-TERZI] (2001): ”Civil Society”, in @arko Papi} (ed.) Interna-

tional Policies of Support to Countries of Southeast Europe: Lessons (not)

learnt in BiH, Muller, Sarajevo.

Faris VEHABOVI] (2006): „Analiza Ustava BiH i prijedloga novih teksto-va Ustava”, u Centar za ljudska prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu: ”Procesustavnih promjena u BiH: Analiza izvje{tavanja u {tampanim medijima,komparativna anliza teksta Ustava i prijedloga izmjena teksta, analiza me-|unarodnih standarda, analiza stavova pravnih profesionalaca u BiH”.

Alexandros YANNIS (2002): ”The Creation and Politics of InternationalProtectorates in the Balkans: Bridges Over Troubled Waters”, Journal of

International Relations and Development 5(September 2002)3

International Crisis Group (1996): Aid and Accountability: Dayton Imple-mentation, ICG Bosnia Report, No.17, 24 Nov. 1996, p. 16, www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id?1566&l?1.

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References


FINAL REMARKS

Dragoslav Dedovi}, Director, Heinrich Böll Foundation Regional Office for South-East Europe, Belgrade

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends!

This has been a long day and although I grew up in this country, I havelearnt a lot today. The Heinrich Böll Foundation has asked the questionwhich, for unknown reasons, has not been asked so often. We have askedthe question which could not receive a definite response during a one-daydiscussion and after so many years in which it has never been asked.

The question which is asked once, and is ignored, and remains unan-swered, will be coming back to us in an ever sharper form. So I hope thatthis question will be asked again within our activities next year and also inother forms. I do not think that this is the end of the quest; rather, this is justits beginning.

Your interest today shows that those who have a vital, existential con-nection to the responses to this question have remained with us until theend. This is a response to the question asked by Zdravko Grebo why oth-ers had left. I presume that they left because they have no substantial linksto this quest for responses to unpleasant questions. I think that the launchof the process of having a dialogue with the international community, whichwould include a reflection of the international community's lost ways, isbadly needed.

During the roundtable, the issue of the international community's defini-tion has also been launched. I would say that the international communitycould be defined as an interim sovereign of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as asovereign is, according to Carl Schmitt, the one who may declare a state ofemergency. Eventually, the international community, even as a sovereign,will be forced to engage the domestic wisdom in the process of reflectingon its own misconceptions and good arrangements, in order to develop,together with the domestic wisdom, an alternative scenario of the future ofthis country. If you think that this is too ambitious, then we could focus ona short-term goal of something more modest: raising the issue of alternativescenarios is crucial. The stalemate, but also the 'more than that' strategy asthe strategy which serves the purpose of looking for a solution for Bosniaand Herzegovina, has reached the limit and will not take us anywhere fromhere.

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Final remarks


We have discussed today some other important issues as well. For exam-ple, the category of trauma has been mentioned. I think that the internatio-nal community does not deserve the name of 'trauma', the secondary trau-ma, as the primary trauma has not yet been solved after genocide was com-mitted in this country, as the responsible ones have not yet been brought tojustice, as the country remains fragmented, as the society has been wrecked.The primary trauma is producing the secondary trauma reflex, which is thediagnosis that I believe all of us agree with. Have the great expectations thata huge injustice done to the people here could have been partly undone bya magic wand of others had an additional impact of dissatisfaction? On theone hand, I can understand those expectations. On the other hand, there isthe phenomenon of shifting the responsibility: we should not forget the cul-tural and historical developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which for-eign administrators from the Austro-Hungarian epoch were called the ‘car-pet-baggers’ – the term which I found in Mak Dizdar's work. This meansthat a xenophobic attitude towards others, even the 'imperialistic' one, hasremained ever since, with an object changing over time.

Our goal is a critical dialogue between Bosnia and Herzegovina and thepart of the world which has assumed some responsibility for the future ofthis country. The international community should not be the source of thenational political actors' own mistakes, just as the mistakes of the nationalpolitical elite should not be used by the international community as anexcuse for its failure to do the job fully and to examine critically its ownweaknesses.

For the time being, I am not aware of any comprehensive evaluation,auto-reflection, monitoring and so on, which would analyze in detail theachievements and failures. If they do not exist or they are not available tothe public, further steps would be necessary. Secondly, is there any systemicknowledge about what the citizens of this country think about their sover-eign, regardless of the source of that information? I do not know much aboutthat. There have been only few partial researches done so far. All that needsto be done. The reflection is not an easy job, and we have seen today thatthere are enough controversies. I am pleased because it seems to me that anon-creative nodding at such roundtables is not their purpose.

We, the Foundation, will be asking this question in this country time andagain until such time as it becomes redundant. That should be our sharedgoal.

This time we shall distribute our conclusions to the institutions whichshould read them – directly to the sovereigns of this country – and the next

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time, we shall form the working groups before the international communi-ty officials come to the conference and present the conclusions to them inorder to avoid a situation in which a dialogue ends with a protocolar cour-tesy. We shall find methods for engaging in the dialogue and joining theprocess of reflection, and engaging the regional European and Germancomponents in that process.

This is not something which can be done quickly. This country has lostmuch time after all which happened, and it seems to me that it has reacheda deadlock - mentally and de facto. How will it break the deadlock? That isthe other side of the same question: what has the international communityfailed to do and what has it done well?

We have also heard some proposals such as the one that some domes-tic tasks should be skipped and that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a privilegedcountry, should be integrated into the European Union in an expedientprocess. This would, perhaps, prevent a threatening ideological regressionon an ethnically and religiously understood 'clash of cultures'. Bosnian viewswould also be permanently broadened by the European dimension. ThenBosnia, irreversibly placed in the European context, would finally be thehome country of all the people who live here.

The European contextualization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is indeedhelpful – that is the process which we all, who have lived abroad fordecades, are aware of individually. A comparative approach, the wisdomwhich is constantly bringing its own reality in relation to a larger whole, ismore needed than ever before.

In doing so, we should not allow ourselves to be trapped by idealization.There is no shortcut to an ideal situation. The further the object of your long-ing, the stronger the longing. But this is possible only with a rough styliza-tion of the object of one's longing. The shortcut to the European Union isnot possible, not needed, nor is possible or needed idealization of theEuropean and Bosnian context. One should not succumb to resignation indifficult times. This is why our intention is to grasp the reality and to keepour eyes wide open and continue this process of critical thinking about the presuppositions necessary for the final stabilization of Bosnia andHerzegovina in Europe, and of promoting Europe's values in Bosnia andHerzegovina.

I think that our Sarajevo Office has formulated the question quite welland organized this very first step perfectly well. Let me add one more thing:The Heinrich Böll Foundation likes unpleasant, critical questions, in the lightof its history and the history and the spirit of the Green. After all, pleasantquestions are boring.

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Conclusions and recommendations

In preparing the Conference, a study was made to tally the balance ofeffects of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina from thepolitical science, legal and sociological aspects. The study served as a basisfor the discussion at the Conference at which the representatives of the inter-national community, civil society and politics in BiH discussed that issue.There were about 90 participants, and the Conference was covered byaccredited reporters.

In view of the fact that this type of a conference and especially the the-mes discussed at the Conference was described by all participants as some-thing which happens rarely in the public life in Bosnia and Herzegovina,and as an extremely important and absolutely required event, the conclu-sions and recommendations below are rather general, which should in noway be understood as the lack of arguments and/or proposals by the partici-pants at the Conference. Of course, some very specific assessments and re-commendations are contained in the study and in the speeches and com-mentaries by the participants.

However, it is clear that the organization of such conferences, roundta-bles and consultations should become a practice in view of the obviousabsence of a dialogue between the international community officials and thebroader public in Bosnia and Herzegovina in regard to the key issues of thefuture of this country.

The Conference was the first serious public forum for 'verbalization' (andarticulation in a way) of the local positions on the phenomenon known asthe 'international community'. The Conference tried to give that attemptsome form, and that is, in fact, the phenomenon of the 'inherence' of theinternational community and the possible critical reflection on its legacy andits tradition here in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The working part of the Con-ference heard a critical reflection on the effects of the international commu-nity in BiH, which is perhaps something specific in view of the length of thepresence of the international community in BiH. At the same time, althoughwith a different intensity and scope (because a considerable number of therepresentatives of the international community did not come to theConference), the representatives of the international community had anopportunity to present their views and analyze the role played by the inter-national community in BiH.

That the two groups of the „world” (domestic perception and the per-ception within the groups of the international community) continue to exist

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– does not have to be explained; but it is necessary to emphasize that theConference offered the model of bridging the void and partly succeeded inthat attempt. This is why one of the conclusions of the Conference is thatthe future events of this kind should be organized in a different format (forexample, in the form of working groups and presentation of conclusions ata plenary session, etc.).

In this regard it is rather obvious that the international community inBosnia and Herzegovina is treated as a kind of trauma, which is why it isextremely important to open those issues; but we could not help getting theimpression that a similar thing also exists on the other side, among thosewho did not come to talk to us. We are not sure that they too are not trau-matized over so bad and defeating results or because of their own expecta-tions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, perhaps.

It is important to stress that the so-called daily politics issues did not do-minate the Conference; the attention during the Conference was given to thekey issues and processes going on in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovinaand its society: democratization of the post-conflict society, the building ofdemocratic institutions, the rule of law, the election system and the consti-tutional framework, the civil society and political structures, the issue of thelocal ownership for the key processes in the state and the society, reckon-ing with the past... Although some of these issues have a predominantly„domestic/internal” character, it seems that it was necessary to open the dis-cussion about the „external” factor as well in order to have a meaningful dis-cussion. Of course, from the professional point of view, the complexity ofthe phenomenon requires an interdisciplinary approach, which emergedindeed during the working part of the Conference.

It is necessary to stress that good arguments were offered about theeffects of the international community. Finally, there were more questionsthan responses, which is not the failure of the Conference – on the contrary,the impression we have is that it is only clearly and unequivocally identifiedproblems, even in the form of a question, that can encourage the way outfrom the intellectual confusion and the development of the strategies for asuccessful future of the state and the society.

In the end, we hope that at least this form of pending issues, problemswhich we opened, the form of this critical reflection, which has perhapsbeen articulated at the scene of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the first time,will be a certain corrective to the future engagement of the internationalcommunity in Bosnia and Herzegovina – no matter what that engagementmay be.

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About the authors

Nermina [a~i} is a senior teaching assistant at the Journalism Depart-ment of the Faculty of Political Science. She was born in 1974 in Visegrad.She graduated from the same department in 1994 and completed her mas-ters degree in 2003, on the topic of Role of the Media in Political Socialisation

in FBiH. In 2006, she defended her doctoral thesis on Political Conflicts and

Public Opinion in Post-War BiH at the Faculty of Political Science. She start-ed teaching at the Faculty of Political Science in 1998, first at courses inTechniques and Practice in Journalism and Methodology of Journalism. Inaddition to these, since 2003 she has also been teaching Public Opinion asa senior teaching assistant. She has worked as journalist and editor at RTBiH,and later on as editor-in-chief of TV SA. Her essays have been published inOdjek, Zeni~ke sveske, Kriminalisti~ke teme, Yearbook and other publica-tions. She has attended numerous round tables, conferences and meetingson the issue of politics and the media. She is a permanent associate ofInternews in BiH and an occasional associate of the Soros Centre on mediadevelopment projects.

She is also the author of the book titled Politi~ka de/re socijalizacija i

mediji. [Political de/re/socialisation and the Media].She was also the editorof: Novinarstvo u funkciji ljudskog napretka-printani mediji [Journalism

Serving Human Development – Print Media], Internews, Bemust, Sarajevo,2003, and co-editor (together with Prof. Dr. Besim Spahic) of Novinarstvo u

funkciji ljudskog napretka – elektronski mediji, [Journalism Serving Human

Development – Electronic Media], Internews, DES, Sarajevo, 2004.

Manfred Dauster received his law degree from the University of Saar-land/ Saarbrücken. In 1983 he completed a PhD-Degree in Constitutionaland Comparative Constitutional Law and spent six months as an extraordi-nary Professor for Constitutional Law at the State Academy for Civil Servicein Hof/Bavaria.

He worked as a Public Prosecutor in the Prosecutor’s Office in Munichboth in the Common Crime Department and in the Economic Crime Depart-ment. He was appointed as a Judge at the Regional Court I in Munich in1989. He was the Senior Prosecutor in the Prosecutor’s Office from 1990 to1997 when he became the Presiding Judge at the Regional Court I in Mu-nich. In August 2000, he became Head of the Anti-Fraud Department of theOffice of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. FromJuly to December 2002 he was Head of the Criminal Institutions and Prose-

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cutorial Reform Unit of the OHR. From Jan 2003 to 2005, he returned asthe Presiding Judge to the Regional Court I in Munich.

He was a Member of the Bavarian State Committee for the Graduationof Law Students within the State Ministry of Justice for twenty years and hehas also been a Member of the Bavarian State Commission on Bar Exami-nations. He was appointed as a judge on 29th of September 2005 on theCourt of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Dino Abazovi}, born in 1972 in Sarajevo, holds a masters degree in soci-ology and works as a senior teaching assistant at the Sociology Departmentof the Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, courses inSociology of Religion and Sociology of Cognition and Morale. He is also anassociate of the Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo. He is amember of the editorial board of Odjek magazine for art, science and socialissues. He has attended The American Institute on Political and EconomicStudies – Georgetown University, Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Raoul Wallen-berg Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, University of Lund,as well as Institut D'Etudes Europeennes, ULB Brussels. As a researcher, hehas worked on several international projects and has visited several univer-sities in the region, Europe and the US as a visiting lecturer. He is the authorof Za naciju i Boga: Sociolo{ko odre|enje religijskog nacionalizma [For

Nation and God: Sociological Determination of Religious Nationalism], andwas the co-editor of two collections of essays (Religija i europske integraci-

je [Religion and European Integrations] and Confronting with the Past:

Consequences for the Future). His work has been published by a number ofdomestic and international magazines, collections of essays and books, inSouth-Slavic languages as well as in English.

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Documents

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