Teoria Positiva en Ingles Traducida

8/4/2019 Teoria Positiva en Ingles Traducida

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Teora contable positiva

Dong Gang Ming Gu

Visin general

Contabilidad pretende explicar y predecir las prcticas contables reales positivas. Esto contrasta con

contabilidad normativo que busca obtener y prescribir normas de contabilidad del ptimo.

Economa positiva refiere a la descripcin y explicacin de los fenmenos econmicos, con foco en los hechosy la relacin de causa y efecto e incluye el desarrollo y prueba de las teoras de la economa.Teora de economa evita juicios de valor econmicos positivo. Por ejemplo, una teora econmica positivapodra describir cmo afecta el crecimiento de la oferta de dinero a la inflacin, pero no proporciona ninguna instruccin sobla poltica debe seguir. En principio independiente de cualquier posicin tica particular o normativosentencia y proporciona un sistema de generalizaciones que pueden utilizarse para hacer predicciones de correccin sobrelas consecuencias de cualquier cambio en las circunstancias. [Friedman (1953)]

Del mismo modo, ciencia positiva es un cuerpo de conocimientos sistematizado sobre lo que es; una ciencia normativa

es que un cuerpo de discutir criterios de conocimiento sistematizado de lo que debera ser; el arte es un sistema de normas paconsecucin de un fin determinado. [Keynes (1891)]

En la vista contractual de la empresa, contabilidad es la herramienta para facilitar la formacin y actuacin delos contratos. Bajo este punto de vista, las prcticas contables evolucionan para mitigar los costos de contratacin mediantex-ante de acuerdo entre las diferentes partes. Por ejemplo, el conservadurismo en contabilidad; Sinconservadurismo, acuerdos de compensacin administrativa pueden premiar a gerentes basados en informes actuales quepruebas posteriores indican que eran injustificados.

La vista contractual de contabilidad positiva lo pone en tensin con estudios de pertinencia de valor en contabilidadque sostienen que la funcin principal de contabilidad es valorar la empresa, y por lo tanto son prcticas como el conservadu

no ptima. La escuela de relevancia de valor hace hincapi en la utilidad de la informacin contable a la equidadinversores en contraste con su utilidad en la contratacin de ejercicios.

Preguntas de ejemplo con respecto al concepto de Contadura \"Normativo\" y \"Positivo\" de Jensen (1976):

Contadura normativo Contadura positivo

Cmo se deben tratar concesiones sobre el equilibriohoja?

Deben utilizar los valores de reemplazo\/liquidacin enel balance y declaraciones de renta?

Cmo cambiar los niveles de precios deben

representaron?Cmo deberan ser cambios en los tipos de cambiocontabilizadas por las empresas con intereses extranjeros?

Cmo se evaluarn los inventarios?

Lo que debe indicarse en el anual financieradeclaraciones?

Deben auditar los Estados financieros provisionales?

Cmo deberan ser intereses minoritarios de subsidiariastratada en estado consolidado?

Por qu asignar gastos generales a las empresascentros de rendimiento?

Por qu las empresas cambiar los mtodos contables?

Por qu las empresas siguen utilizando el coste histricodepreciacin para distintos fines fiscales?

Por qu las empresas cambiar cuentas?Por qu estn organizadas como empresas de contabilidlas asociaciones?

Por qu la rea contable coloca nfasis enprofesionalismo y tica?

Para qu necesitamos asociaciones como FASB bastanteque las autoridades se pronuncien sobre GAAP?

Cmo han de Reglamento de la Corte y sentenciasinfluencia prctica contable?

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Teora contable positiva

Teora positiva de la contabilidad pretende explicar por qu las empresas presionan a favor o en contra y elija particularesprincipios de contabilidad. Esta teora podra identificar los motivos econmicos que influyen en los administradorestomar ciertas decisiones y as indicar cmo podran modificarse estos incentivos. Esta teora podra ser tambinutilizados por organismos reguladores contables y otros encargados de predecir cmo empresas y cuentaspodra reaccionar a los cambios propuestos en las normas contables y a su vez predecir el impacto econmico de estas

cambios.

Incentivos de gestin del conocimiento es la condicin previa importante de teora positiva de la norma-configuracin. Estos factores incluyen impuestos, Reglamento, plan de compensacin, contabilidad econmica y polticaactitudes de la direccin de la influencia de examen sobre normas de contabilidad.

Watts y Zimmerman (1978)

Algunos factores importantes que influyen en la decisin de los administradores en cuanto a la eleccin de contabilidad:

Impuestos: en la medida en que la administracin espera una propuesta poltica contable financiera para influirfiscal futura, su comportamiento cabildeo se ve afectada por los efectos de la ley de impuestos futuros.

Reglamento: una nueva norma de contabilidad que reduce una empresa regulada como una empresa de servicios pblicoproporcionar su gestin con una excusa para argumentar en favor de mayor velocidad.

Costo poltico: administracin quiere evitar la atencin de altos ingresos debido a la opinin pblicaAsociacin de altos beneficios y rentas monoplicas y para reducir la probabilidad de riqueza adversoredistribucin.

Costo de produccin de informacin: los cambios en las normas contables no son sin coste alguno para la contabilidadoperaciones.

Plan de compensacin de gestin: un cambio en las polticas contables que aumentar los ingresos de la empresaconducir a mayores ingresos incentivos, todo lo dems es igual. Esto tambin reduce la tesorera y la participacin de lalos precios podran caer. Sin embargo, que durante mucho tiempo como el valor actual del impuesto despus incentivoque la disminucin de la cartera de cada manager, administracin se espera favorecer esas cuentas

cambiar.

Como indican estos factores, los administradores pueden ofrecer mayores incentivos para elegir las normas de contabilidadmenores ingresos (lo que aumenta su bienestar, tesorera y firme valor) debido a impuestos, poltica, yconsideraciones reglamentarias que al elegir las normas de contabilidad que informan de mayores ganancias y, con ello,Aumente la compensacin de su incentivo. Sin embargo, esta prediccin est condicionada a la firma estregulada o sujetos a presiones polticas. Pequeos, (es decir, bajos costos polticos) sin reglamentar las empresas, los directotienen incentivos para seleccionar las normas de contabilidad que informan de mayores ganancias, si ganan los esperados encompensacin de incentivo es superior a la palestra-ido esperado consecuencias de impuestos. Gestin tambinexaminar la contabilidad estndar s impacto en los costos de contabilidad de la empresa (y por lo tanto su propio bienestar).

Figura 1: Un modelo de las presentaciones de la empresa a la FASB [Watts y Zimmerman (1978)]

GB: la contabilidad propuesta estndar s valor actual gestin incluyendo el impuesto, regulador,polticos y los efectos de la indemnizacin en funcin del tamao de las empresas.IC: curva de los costos de produccin informacinNB: las beneficios netos curva, la diferencia entre los beneficios brutos, GB y la informacin adicionalcostosENB: el esperado valor actual de la curva de beneficios netosCS: costo de la presentacin

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ENB-CS: Una empresa har una presentacin si ENB -CS es positivo.

Por ejemplo, una empresa incurrir negativo beneficios de valor presente neto de 100.000 dlares si se adopta el estndar.Creen que la probabilidad de adopcin es.60. Haciendo una presentacin negativa a la FASB laprobabilidad cae a.59. El valor actual neto esperado de los beneficios de la presentacin es entonces + $1000.Las empresas de mayores tamao b enfrentan beneficios netos positivos si se adopta el estndar. Consideran apoyel estndar para la FASB, aumentando la probabilidad del estndar de adopcin.

Consecuencias: Las empresas ms grandes (empresas de mayores tamao c en la figura 1) har las presentaciones favorablesus ingresos se reducen por el estndar de contabilidad y las presentaciones desfavorables si sus ingresos son

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aument. Las empresas ms pequeas (las empresas de menores tamao c en la figura 1) no presentar o hacer desfavorabpresentaciones.

Se han realizado dos tipos de pruebas de la teora contable positivo: contabilidad pruebas de eleccin yprueba de precio de las acciones.

Pruebas empricas de las opciones de contabilidad

Pruebas de eleccin de contabilidad intentan estudiar dos conjuntos de fenmenos de contabilidad, los procedimientos de coutilizados por las grandes corporaciones U.S. y la posicin adoptada por los directivos de estas empresas propuestasnormas de contabilidad.

Tres principales hiptesis acerca de las opciones de procedimiento de los gerentes han sido probados: la hiptesis del plan bola hiptesis de la deuda y equidad y la hiptesis de tamao.

Watts y Zimmerman (1978)

Por qu las empresas gastan recursos tratando de influir en la determinacin de normas de contabilidad?

Una posible respuesta a esta pregunta es proporcionada por el argumento de intervencin del Gobierno; contabilidadlas normas pueden afectar su tesorera futuro desalentador accin de Gobierno a travs de los informes demenores ingresos netos.

El factor ms importante explicar comportamiento gerencial de votacin sobre nivel de precios GeneralContabilidad es el tamao de las empresas (despus de controlar por la direccin del cambio en los ingresos).

Hiptesis de tamao:

Las grandes empresas tienen ms probabilidades a favor GPLA (si la disminucin de ingresos).Este hallazgo es consistente con el argumento de intervencin del Gobierno ya que estn ms probables que las empresas m

ser objeto de injerencias gubernamentales y, por lo tanto, tienen ms que perder que las empresas ms pequeas.

Pruebas empricas

Datos

FASB emiti el memorando de discusin \"informar de los efectos de General precio nivel cambios (GPLA)en los Estados financieros\"y programada una audiencia pblica sobre el tema en 1974. Uno doscientos treinta y tresempresas de contabilidad, las corporaciones pblicas, organizaciones de la industria y organismos de Gobierno presentadoscomentarios.

Las presentaciones se supone para indicar la posicin del Gobierno corporativo. 49 de 53 empresaslas presentaciones realizadas son las empresas de la bolsa de Nueva York. De las restantes cuatro empresas, uno fue listada ela bolsa estadounidense, uno fue traspasado en el mostrador, y los otros dos no fueron negociados. De la53 empresas, 18 presentado comentarios expresando opiniones favorables sobre ajustes de nivel general de precios, mientrase opone a GPLA.

Tabla 1: Las empresas haciendo presentaciones a la FASB sobre ajustes de nivel de precios General [Watts yZimmerman (1978)]

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Pruebas de la teora

Basado en el modelo, hacen predicciones acerca de la relacin entre el tamao de activos y las presentaciones de la empresa.Las empresas cuyos ingresos se incrementan por GPLA se opondr a GPLA independientemente de su tamao (es decir, habno ser ninguna asociacin entre tamao y presentacin). Sin embargo, para las empresas cuyos ingresos se reducen enGPLA, ellos predicen que soportar ya sea GPLA o no har una presentacin dependiendo de dndetamao de activos C (figura 1) se produce en su industria. La prueba es slo de la prediccin de que es un positivorelacin entre el tamao de los recursos y la presentacin para las empresas con ingresos disminuye.

Las empresas haciendo presentaciones fueron clasificadas de acuerdo con la direccin del cambio en sus ingresos netos yclasificados por su tamao de activo (cuadro 2). De las 26 empresas con ingresos disminuye, ocho no votado s y 18.

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The eight yes votes came from the larger firms, thus supporting the prediction. To test the null hypothesisthat the eight firms which voted yes are drawn from the same population of firms (with respect to size) asthe 18 that voted no, they performed a Mann-Whitney U test. Their tables indicate that they can reject thenull hypothesis at the .001 level.

Table 2: Asset size, direction of earnings effect and corporate position on GPLA [Watts and Zimmerman(1978)]

In summary, these tests confirm the relationship between size and management attitudes on GPLA. Theywould point out that most of the firms submitting are large, and the likelihood of submission increaseswith asset size.

Discriminant analysis

The preceding tests were based on the direction of the earnings change, not the magnitude of the change.A discriminant analysis is conducted including management compensation, depreciation, and netmonetary assets as independent variables, and using data on 49 of the 53 submission firms making,


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Table 2: Discriminant analysis [Watts and Zimmerman (1978)]

SALES x CHG is proxy for political cost.


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The sign on SALES x CHG is as predicted, positive, and in addition has the highest t-statistic of all theindependent variables. It proves that firm size is the most important variable. The discriminant functionsindicate that the political cost factor is more important than the tax factor in affecting management'sattitudes.

The major empirical problem in the discriminant analysis is the rather small sample size which

precludes using a hold- out sample and, furthermore, does not allow more sophisticated econometric

techniques to control for the multicolinearity.

Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981)

This is the first large-scale study using the bonus plan, debt/equity, and size hypotheses. They investigatefirms four accounting policies:

Inventory method

Depreciation method

Treatment of investment tax credit

Amortization period for past service pension costs

Two possible choices associated with each policy:

Income increasing

Income decreasing

Given four policies and two choices, there are 16 different combinations or portfolios of choices that firmscan follow. To test the effects of political cost and contracting cost on the choice of portfolio, the effectsof these 16 portfolios on the present values of earnings must be determined. Assuming the relative effecton earnings of a given portfolio is the same for all firms, the authors selected three major test cases:

All four policies have equal effect on reported earnings. This assumption reduces the 16 portfoliosto 5 different effects on earnings. For example, under Classification of Strategies , code 1represents the most earnings decreasing portfolio; code 5 means the most earnings increasingportfolio. All portfolios with one earning increasing policy are coded with 2; two earningincreasing with 3.

Pension and investment tax credit policy have half the effects on earnings than the depreciationmethod and inventory method. This assumption produces 7 different effects on earnings. Forexample, either pension or investment credit policy with increasing earnings is coded as 2; if afirm has earning increasing policy for both pension and investment credit, or an earning increasingpolicy for either depreciation method or inventory method, they are coded as 3.

Pension and tax credit policies have less than one-half the effects than the depreciation method andinventory method. This assumption results 9 different earning effects.

All 16 portfolios of choices are ranked by their earning effects under three different assumptions. Theempirical test will reveal which earning effect is chosen using the relative political and contracting costs.

Hypothesis

The higher the political costs, the less likely the firm is to choose a portfolio of procedure that increasesreported earnings. Four independent variables are used to proxy for political costs:

Size: log of net sale: Political costs increase with corporate size, managers of large firms are morelikely to choose an earnings decreasing portfolio of accounting policies.


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Beta: the systematic risk. High risk firms are likely to choose an earnings decreasing portfolio ofpolicies to offset its high earning volatility.

Capital Intensity (CI): gross fixed assets/sales. Capital intense firms are subject to relatively morepolitical costs and are more likely to reduce reported earnings. Usually earnings are not adjustedfor the opportunity cost of capital by politicians, voters and bureaucrats, due to information costs.

Concentration Ratio (Conc): eight firms revenue concentration.Two independent variables are used to proxy for contracting benefit.

Earning-based management compensation plan (MGTC): 1=yes, 0=no. Managers of firms with acompensation plan are more likely to use earnings increasing accounting policies. This is a test ofbonus hypothesis.

Total debt/total assets (TD): The higher the debt/asset ratio, the more likely the manager is to useearnings increasing accounting rules. This is a test of debt/equity hypothesis.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6iStrategy MGTC Conc Beta Size CI TD e = + + + + + + +

Data

Sample data includes 300 CRSP firms for which the 1975 annual reports and SEC 10-K filings disclosedtheir choice of accounting policies, and additional 34 unregulated firms in Watts and Zimmerman (1978).

Results


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The results indicates that the strategy assumptions previously discussed are acceptable and the model isbiased by the choice of a particular set of assumptions regarding the effect of the accounting policies onnet income.

For the five strategy case, 40% of the sample observations were properly classified. The percent correctlyclassified for both the seven and nine strategy cases was 33%.

One way to determine how good these predictions are is to compare them to a nave policy which assumesan equal probability of each strategy. The Chi-squared tests are for the null hypothesis that the model is nobetter than a nave prediction that assumes an equal probability of each strategy (of three). The Chi-squared statistic indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected at 0.1% level under all threeassumptions, meaning the prediction rates of the model are much better than under the nave classificationand the differences are very significant. The estimated R-squared for the five, seven and nine strategy caseare 0.09.

The t-statistic presents strong evidence that management s choice of a portfolio of accounting proceduresvaries with the variables used to represent political and contracting costs. All estimated coefficients have

their predicted signs.

The log of net sales is negatively related to the choice of accounting strategies, supporting the argumentthat larger firms have incentives to reduce accounting profits.

The coefficient of the concentration ratio which is a proxy for the ability a firm to earn monopoly rents aresignification at 5% level under all three assumptions, indicating that firms in more concentrated industriestend to adopt accounting strategies that reducing net income.

The management profit-sharing compensation dummy variable is signification at 5% level under all threeassumptions. The positive sign of the coefficient reveals the fact that managers are more likely to choose

accounting rules that increase earnings. This is consistent with the bonus hypothesis.

The positive coefficient of the debt/asset ratio is significant at the 10% level for the first assumption and atthe 5% level for the other two assumptions. This suggests that firms with more debt financing chooseaccounting standards which tend to increase profits. This is consistent with the debt/equity hypothesis thathigh leveraged firms are constrained by debt covenants and hence attempt to loose these constraints byboosting net income.

The coefficients of beta and capital intensity are not significant although they are of the expected signs.

Overall, the total sample test and subsample test provide strong evidence that the manager s choice of a

portfolio of accounting policies varies with the presence of earning-based compensation plan, the firm sdebt/equity ratio, the firm s size and the concentration ration in its industry. The three simple hypothesesare consistent with the evidence.


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Discussion

The true rank of the combinations of accounting policies, or the true strategies may differ from theproposed strategies:

The assumptions about the magnitude of the effect of the accounting policies on net income across all

firms may not be correct in reality. For example, the rank or the order of 1 to 16 in Table 1 might notbe realistic.

The strategies may be different to real strategies simply because the effects of accounting policies aredifferent for individual firm. For example, the effect of inventory method change for a specific firmcould be larger than, smaller than, or equal to the effect of depreciation method change.

Subsample Test

Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argues that the managers of small unregulated firms have incentives toselect accounting standards which report higher earnings, if the expected gain in inventive compensation

is greater than the forgone tax consequence.

Hypothesis

This is to test the hypothesis that the management compensation variable is more important for firmsfacing low political cost than for those facing high political costs. Likewise, other variables should bemore important for the high political cost firms than for low political cost firms.

Data


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The sample is partitioned into high and low political cost subsamples by ranking the firms on net sales andconcentration ratio.

Results

High political cost subsample partitioned on size: all independent variables except concentration ratio anddebt/asset are significant This indicates that the concentration ratio proxy for political costs provide no

information beyond that provided by the size variable.

Low political cost subsample partitioned on size: concentration ratio and debt/asset ratio are significant.This suggests that concentration ratio provides information beyond that provided by firm size when size isbelow the threshold point, meaning it may well be a proxy variable for political costs. Hence firms withconcentrated industry may be scrutinized by regulators, political activists, etc.

High political cost subsample partitioned on concentration ratio: management compensation and size aresignificant. Large firms in concentrated industries face major political costs, and such cost is a function ofsize, given industry concentration.

Low political cost subsample partitioned on concentration ratio: only capital intensity is significant. Thisis inconsistent with Watts and Zimmerman (1978) s argument that the management profit-sharingcompensation variable should be important for firms facing low political costs. One possible explanationis that smaller firms tend to be owner controlled, making profit-sharing less attractable.

Overall, these results confirm their argument that there is a threshold effect, that is, smaller firms andfirms in less concentrated industries choose accounting policies to report higher earnings, or in otherwords, they do not choose accounting principles as if they considered political cost.


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Healy (1985)

The hypothesis is that bonus schemes create incentives for managers to select accounting policies andaccruals to maximize the value of their bonus compensation.

The results show a strong association between accruals and managers earning-based incentive under theirbonus contracts. Managers are more likely to choose income-decreasing accruals when their bonus plan

upper or lower bonds are binding, and income-increasing accruals when there bounds are not bonding.

Empirical Tests of Stock Prices

Stock price tests attempt to explain stock price changes associated with mandatory and voluntary changesin accounting procedures.

Leftwich (1981)

This paper investigates the stock price changes associated with two accounting changes mandated by APBOpinion 16 Accounting for Business Combinations, and 17, Accounting for Intangible Assets.

The author replies primarily on debt wealth transfer variables, namely debt/equity, public debt/privatedebt, debt callability and debt convertability, plus firm size (log of market value of equity and book valueof debt), to explain stock price effects. The abnormal returns are calculated from five days before theevent to five days after the event. The results show that 9 of 21 events are significant different from zero,with 8 events yielding negative average abnormal returns.


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However, the results only provide partial support for the proposition that accounting standard changesaffect firms share values via their debt contracts. The drop in market value associated with the standard islarger, the larger the debt/equity ratio, and is smaller if the debt is callable. The evidence is generallyconsistent with the proposition that APB Opinion 16 and 17 reduce political costs and hence increasefirms stock prices (if size reflects political costs).

Holthausen (1981)

This research work consider a voluntary change study that examines the stock price changes associatedwith the announcement that a firm is switching back to straight-line depreciation for reporting purpose.Many firms adopted accelerated depreciation method for both tax and reporting purposes in 1950s, andlater in 1960s and 1970s, many of these firms switched back to the straight-line method for reporting butcontinued using accelerated methods for income taxes.

The author relies on debt/wealth transfer variables, namely debt/equity and public debt/private debt, plusearning-based compensation plan and size, to explain many switch stock price effects.

Holthausen s study finds no abnormal returns on announcement and no systematic abnormal returnvariations with contracting, debt/wealth transfer, compensation/wealth transfer, or political cost variables.

References

Friedman (1953), The Methodology of Positive Economics, Essays in Positive Economics, University ofChicago

Healy (1985), The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions, Journal of Accounting andEconomics, 7


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Holthausen (1981), Evidence on the Effect of Bond Covenants and Management Compensation Contractson the Choice of Accounting Techniques: The Case of Depreciation Switch-Back, Journal of Accountingand Economics, 3

Jensen (1976), Reflections on the State of Accounting Research and the Regulation of Accounting,Stanford Lectures in Accounting, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

Keynes (1891), The Scope and Method of Political Economy, University of Cambridge

Leftwich (1981), Evidence of the Impact of Mandatory Changes in Accounting Principles on CorporateLoan Agreement, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3

Siegle, Sidney (1956), Nonparametric Statistics, McGraw-Hill

Watts and Zimmerman (1978), Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standard,The Accounting Review, LIII, 1

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Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981), An Income Strategy Approach to the Positive Theory of AccountingStandard Setting/Choice, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3

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Teoria Positiva en Ingles Traducida