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Akihiro Yamamoto
Section chiefNuclear Safety Measures division,Fukui Prefectural Government
22‐March, 2018
Local government practice (Strategies for improving Nuclear Safety with the aim of
obtaining public understanding)
1
1. Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (Fukui)– Current status of NPPs– Public survey– Issue for consideration
2. Nuclear Safety Framework in Fukui– History of Safety measures division – Stakeholder involvement– Public relation
3. Benefit of siting NPPs– Job situation – Subsidies related to Nuclear installation and operation– Issues for future
Contents
2
Tomari (Hokkaido)Ohma (Electric Power Development)
Onagawa (Tohoku)
Fukusima Daini (Tokyo)
Hamaoka (Chubu)
Tokai Daiichi･Daini (Japan Atomic Power)
Fukusima Daiichi (Tokyo)
Kashiwazakikariwa (Tokyo)
Sendai (Kyusyu)
Genkai (Kyusyu)
Shimane (Chugoku)
Shika (Hokuriku)
Tsuruga (Japan Atomic Power)
Takahama (Kansai)
Ohi (Kansai)
Mihama (Kansai)
Higashidori (Tokyo)
Higashidori (Tohoku)
Ikata (Shikoku)
Decommissioning 17NPPs Building 3NPPs
In operation 5NPPs Outage 35NPPs Total 60NPPs Under review by NRA 12 NPPs
Approved by NRA 14 NPPsUnclaimed 19 NPPs
Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (As of December, 2017)
4
Osaka
Fukui
Kyoto
Leading actor of Nuclear Safety in Fukui
Pacific ocean
Number of staff for NPP(utility staff + subcontractor staff )
• Tsuruga ：1300• Monju, Fugen ：1300• Mihama ：1700• Ohi ：2900• Takahama ：2900
Utility office• KEPCO ：600• JAPC ：30• JAEA ：70
NRA regional office ：24 Fukui Prefectural Government: 10
5
Utility and subcontractor staff, NRA inspectors, local government staffMore than 10,000 people are working in Fukui
Current Status of NPPs in Fukui
Name Type Status Gross Electrical
Capacity[MW]
First GridConnection
Age
TSURUGA-1 BWRPermanent Shutdown（2015）
357 1970 (45)
MIHAMA-1 PWR 340 1970 (44)
MIHAMA-2 PWR 500 1972 (42)
TAKAHAMA-1 PWR NRA approved restart and 20-year license extension
(It takes 3years for modification work)
826 1974 43
TAKAHAMA-2 PWR 826 1975 42
MIHAMA-3 PWR 826 1976 41
OHI-1 PWR Permanent Shutdown（2017） 1175 1979 38
OHI-2 PWR 1175 1979 38
TAKAHAMA-3 PWR Resume operation 870 1985 33TAKAHAMA-4 PWR 870 1985 32
TSURUGA-2 PWR Under review by NRA 1160 1987 30
OHI-3 PWR Process is ongoing to resume operation 1180 1991 26
OHI-4 PWR 1180 1993 24
MONJU FBR Permanent Shutdown 280 1995 (22)
FUGEN ATR HWLWR Permanent Shutdown (2003) (in decommissioning) 165 1978 (25)
As of December, 2017
6
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
19701971197219731974197519761977197819791980198119821983198419851986198719881989199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016
Early Failure Overcome Overconfidence
(100GWh) (%
)
Electricity generated [100GWh]Availability factor [%]Capacity factor [%]
Operating experience and output (NPPs in Fukui)
7
SG replacement
PWSCC
Equipment replacement, installation, maintenance cost
Age
50 ‐
100 ‐
Knowledge Transfer
Staff number
Knowledge loss risk: Long term operation, Staff ageing , Labor market, Contractors, Electricity market, Organizational effectiveness, … 8
Age compositions of the employed staff in NPPs (Example)
Before Fukushima Dai‐ichi NPPs accident
• NPPs in Fukui Supplied more than 40% of electricity consuming Kansai area before the Fukushima Dai‐ichi NPPs accident and contributed to the economy and to social development in Kansai area
After Fukushima Dai‐ichi NPPs accident
• After the accident occurred in March, 2011, other NPPs in Japan were shut down for refueling outages one by one by May 2012.
• Ohi No.3 and No.4 reactors restarted in July 2012 under the draft safety standard introduced by former regulatory authority (NISA) . The 2 NPPs shutdown again in September 2013 for refueling outages.
• Takahama No.3 and No.4 reactors passed examination done by new regulatory authority (NRA) in February 2015 and The No.3 reactor restarted in February 2016 however Otsu district court issued a provisional injunction ordering to shutdown the 2 NPPs.
• Osaka high court reversed the decision in March 2017 and the No.3 unit restarted in May and No.4 unit restarted in June 2017.
Impact of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPPs accident
9
77.4
37.7
16.7
35.9
4.1
25.2
1.8
1.3
Before 1F accident （Sep.
2010）
After 1F accident （Nov.
2011）
Yes Neither No Not sure
Before FukushimaDai‐ichi accident（Sep.2010）
AfterFukushimaDai‐ichi accident（Nov.2011）
Question: Do you think Nuclear Power Plants are necessary in Japan?（According to survey by Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO) at Nov. 2012）
Public survey
10
Takahama town（site located area）
Osaka city（consuming area）
37.2 31.9
47.9 61.4
14.86.7
高浜町 大阪府
status quo, orIncrease
Reduce, orAll abolishment
Don’t know,etc.
Question: What do you think the utilization of NPPs in Japan in the future?（according to survey by NHK at Oct. 2015）
Takahama Osaka
Public survey
11
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
HLW disposal methods
Fukushima accident
Economics of nuclear powergeneration
Safety of nuclear power generation
Need for nuclear power generation
Q : What information do you want to know on nuclear power generation?
11
A survey of internet public opinion mining
Presented by Mr. Hirose from Nuclear Risk Research Center, CRIEPI at the 7th Vietnam/Japan Research/HRD Forum on Nuclear Technology (November 24th, 2016) 12
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Expert
Power company
IAEA
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Local government
Government
Q : Which organization do you trust as a source of information on nuclear power generations?
Very reliable Some reliable Little reliable Not reliable
12
A survey of internet public opinion mining
Presented by Mr. Hirose from Nuclear Risk Research Center, CRIEPI at the 7th Vietnam/Japan Research/HRD Forum on Nuclear Technology (November 24th, 2016) 13
14
Lack of operating experience after Fukushima Daiichi accident Many NPPs have shutdown for outage ‐ facing difficulties to train young staff
(e.g. On‐the‐Job Training) Less opportunity to accumulate operating and event data and knowledge
Beyond 40 years operation (up to 60 years) Need to reflect past operating experience includes Fukushima Dai‐ichi accident Need to take into account ageing management, obsolescence (design), public
acceptance
More difficulty in constructing new plants Loss of public confidence for nuclear safety Enormous increase of construction cost to meet the condition of new
regulatory standard Loss of chance transferring knowledge from first generation to new generation
Issues for consideration in Japan
Takahama NPP
Sendai NPP
Fukui district court・April 2015・December 2015
Otsu district court・March 2016
Kagoshima district court
・April 2015
NPP
Fukui
Kyoto
Biwa Lake
30km
Shiga
Fukuoka High court
・April 2016
Court judge lead to serious confusion
15
Osaka high court・March 2017Ikata NPP
Hiroshima high court・March 2017
Hiroshima district court・December 2017
16
‐ Provisional disposition
Temporary measures that a court decides based on the civil affair maintenance method
‐ Plaintiff(Standing to Sue) residents living within A km of the NPP
Definition of A → depending on the judge
‐ Evaluation criteria of the judge
Whether personal rights* of the residents people protected or not
*Person's daily life, living, health and reputation
High Court(8)
District court(50)
Supreme court
Provisional disposition order seeking an injunction against the operation of NPPs
Points in Dispute
Fukui District Court (2015.12.25)
Otsu District Court(2015.3.9)
NewRegulatoryStandards
Reasonable, as specialized expertisewas utilized in their creation andreview
It is not completely clear cause of theFukushima Dai‐ichi accident
BasicEarthquakeGroundMotion
Sufficient time for assessment hasbeen given and safety has beenensured
Not enough materials have beenprovided for a judgement.
Facility SafetySufficient safety is ensured for allanticipated eventualities
Not enough evidence and materialsprovided to clearly pronounce on thereasonableness of the claims
District Court Rulings Relating to Plant Restart
17Osaka high court reversed the decision of Otsu district court in March 2017
Stakeholder
Government Continue with restart of nuclear power plants which have been determined to be safe by the Nuclear Regulation Authorityrity
Nuclear Regulation Authority
Will watch the power company's response, as we are not one of the parties in this case
Kansai Electric Extremely unfortunate that the court did not understand the arguments we put forward. We cannot accept this and will be appealing the decision
Fukui Prefecture
How many of these provisional injunctions against the nuclear reactor are there going to be? It is extremely unfortunate that, despite the sincere manner in which we are addressing nuclear power issues and working to earn the trust of prefectural residents and their understanding with regard to the restarting of the reactor, fear and mistrust have produced this result
Takahama Town
Local governments are at the mercy of the inconsistent rulings made by different district courts. This is an extremely unfortunate situation
Go? No?
Regarding Otsu District Court Decisions
18
19
Nuclear Safety Framework in Fukui
Tsuruga Peninsula (1962) On the way to Tsuruga Peninsula (1965) Installation of a reactor container （Tsuruga-1) (1967)
Initial Phase (Installation of NPPs)
Expectation to new energy Expectation of infrastructure development to village of peninsula
• The prefecture and local municipalities expanded their efforts to entice nuclear power plants to be built in the prefecture
1960 Fukui Prefecture Nuclear Energy Council examine an entice the research reactor1962 Change an entice of Japan Atomic Energy Agency to Tsuruga peninsula 1964 Monitoring of environmental radioactivity begins1966 The construction work of Tsuruga power plant start
(Condition of the location)1) Strong bedrock 2) Cooling water 3) Low population area
20
Timeline (Execution of Resolutions from siting NPP to commercial operation)
NPPUnit
1960’s 1970’s 1980’s 1990’s 2000～ Time(Year)
Tsuruga
1 7.52 9.934
Mihama
1 8.1
2 9.73 6.3
Ohi
1 102 10.73 10.24 11.3
Takahama
1 82 93 8.94 9.2
Decision by town （1976）Commercial operation （1985.1）
Commercial operation （1985.6）
Decision by city（1962） Commercial operation（1970）
Commercial operation （1987）Petition (Ward to city)（1977）
Decision by city (Adoption of request)（1993）Construction start（2004）
Commercial operation （1970）
Commercial operation （1972）
Request (Town to KEPCO)（1970） Commercial operation （1976）
Commercial operation （1979.3）
Commercial operation （1979.12）Decision by town （1969）
Decision by town to accept preliminary investigation by KEPCO（1981）
Commercial operation （1991）
Commercial operation （1993）
Commercial operation （1974）
Commercial operation （1975）Request from town to Prefecture (1965）
Decision by city（1962）
21
Significant influence to Japanese society
• KEPCO did not consider the accident to be worth reporting officially and kept it a secret
• A famous journalist pointed out in his book that "there is a serious accident on the fuel of Mihama Unit 1 and that is hidden" and this was also discussed in the Diet.
• Movement against the nuclear power plant expanded from distrust constitution of KEPCO.
Boosting Local Government's presence
• The National Government visited the Local Government and explain the cause of the accident
• This is the first case that a resumption of operation is no longer possible without the consent of the Local Government.
Fuel rod breakage accident (Mihama-1, 1976)
22
A radioactive waste storage tank overflowed and leaked into Urasoko Bay.
• The plant operator kept the incident secret but the Fukui prefectural government founded it through their own environmental radiation monitoring system
• The regulatory authority held a press conference in the very early in the morning (called Daybreak Conference) without notifying it to the Fukui Prefectural Government
A media circus ensued
(News heading)a. “A lot of information still have not been disclosed”,
“Strongly suspicious toward the plant operator from a subcontractor”
b. “The price of fish continue to dropped”, “The fish market open for business, but are doing virtually none at all” ‐damage caused by rumor
c. Need to strength position of the local government
Tsuruga NPP - Release of radioactivity into sea (1981)
On‐site inspection by the prefectural governor
a b c
Collect sea sample (gulfweed) at the Urasoko bay
23
Nearly 700kg of sodium to leak out onto the floor below the pipe
• The sodium was not radioactive, however there was massive public outrage in Japan
Scandal involving a cover‐up of the scope of the accident
• This cover‐up included falsifying reports and the editing of a videotape taken immediately after the accident
• This was revealed by inspection carried out by Fukui prefectural government
• Technical staffs of the Fukui prefectural government also identified technical problems in advance to regulatory authority and the utility
Monju sodium leak from secondary cooling pipe (1995)
24
Secondary pipe rupture accident of Mihama-3 (2004)
Basic understanding
• Hot water and steam leaking from a broken pipe killed five workers and resulted in seven others being injured
• The reactor resumed operation in 2007 after making various changes and obtaining permission from Fukui Prefectural government and the regulatory authority
Actions taken by the Fukui Prefectural Government• Request to the plant operators and regulatory
authority regarding enhancement of Ageing management (accumulate knowledge inside and outside the country concerning ageing)
• Revision of the Safety Agreement (e.g. on‐site inspection at usual circumstances)
Ruptured pipe
Request to the minister of METI
Set up Nuclear Safety Committee
Committee on Ageing management25
Utility Regulator
Local government
“Transparency”, ”Timeliness of information disclosure ” is a key for public confidence
Resident people
Information
26
Local government effort (Before Fukushima Daiichi accident)
Response to Fukushima Daiichi accident
Took immediate action in addressing the necessary safety measures
• Addressed necessary safety measures in advance to the central government
• These responses became the basis for central government decisions regarding the restart of NPPs
Ensure the safety improvement of NPPs• Conducted a plant walk‐down and made
recommendations to the utilities (e.g. demanded investigation of Tsunami‐related sediments (geological survey))
• Addressed the importance of correcting information worldwide with regard to severe accident management and the KEPCO set up a disaster response team in response to the request
Request to the plant operators
Request to the prime minister
On‐site inspection at Ohi NPP
27
Event Public reaction to the NPPs Fukui prefectural Government
1960s Construction of NPPs • Great expectation to the utilization of Nuclear energy
• Limited information from Utilities• No technical staff
1970s Back to back accidents- SG leak (Mihama-1, 1972)- Fuel rod breakage
(Mihama-1,1976)
• Growing concern• Promoting installation of
Nuclear energy due to the oil crisis
• Safety agreement signed with utilities (Matters to be reported was decided)
• Employ technical staff
1980s-
1990s
- Release of liquid radioactive waste to sea
(Tsuruga-1, 1981)- Chernobyl accident (1985)- SG tube rupture
(Mihama-2, 1991)- Sodium leak from
secondary cooling pipe (FBR Monju, 1995)
• Fear and distrust to the NPPs
• Damage caused by harmful rumors
• Social movement to against NPPs
• Revision of safety agreement• Fought against utilities and regulatory
authority and regarding timeliness of information disclosure
• Make clear the facts of events in advance to regulatory authority through investigation and inspection
• Policy recommendation to the national government
2000s - TEPCO scandals revealed (Past inspection, reports
are falsified) (2002)- Secondary pipe rupture
accident (5 workers died)(Mihama-3, 2004)
• Set up Fukui Nuclear safety committee to discuss the technical and safety issues
• Revision of safety agreement• Request to utilities and regulatory
authority regarding enhancement of ageing management
2010s Fukushima Dai-ichi accident (2011)
• Loss of confidence• Social demand ensuring
safety of NPPs
• Required to join the decision process ofresume operation of NPPs
The changes of public confidence to the NPPs
28
NPP operators
NRA
Pubic
Local government
29
Local government effort (After Fukushima Daiichi accident)
Reasons for concern about nuclear power plants
• Because of the Fukushima Dai‐ichi Accident
• Concern of the effect of radiation (radioactivity)
• Awful consequences of radioactive pollution (cannot return to house)
• Do not know what to do in the event of an accident
• Other countries are actively divesting themselves of nuclear power plants
• Cannot trust the national government or power companies
The number one nuclear energy risk which concerns local residents is the release of radioactive material in the event of a nuclear reactor accident and the subsequent evacuation and health effects.
<Key to get social acceptance> Stakeholder involvement (Discuss safety issues) Radiation monitoring
Coexistence with the Public
30
Stakeholder Involvement
Who is a stakeholder?
• Stakeholder is generally defined as those who have a specific interest in a given issue or decision
(Specific interest)‐ Siting, construction of NPPs‐ Decommissioning of NPPs‐ Restarting of NPPs (Current interest in Japan)
• Any actor‐institution, group or individual with an interest in or a role to play in the societal decision making process – OECD/NEA Forum on Stakeholder Confidence
31
Stakeholder Involvement
Field Example FukuiPolitical and economic
Government, Local community, Funding bodies
• Prefectural Government• City (Town) Office • Prefectural (city, town) assembly
Social Local community, Media,Business groups, Community groups
• Nuclear Environmental Safety Management Councils
• Local media• Cooperative company
Technical Nuclear regulator, plant operator, R&D institutions, Universities,International organization
• Fukui Nuclear Safety Committee
Table. Stakeholder categories
32
Members (42)
<Main member>‐ Fukui prefecture (Chairman: Vice Governor)‐ Prefectural assembly (13)‐ City (town) mayor‐ City (town) assembly‐ Federations of Agricultural Cooperatives ‐ Federations of Fishery Cooperatives‐ Federation of Societies of Commerce and Industry‐ Agricultural Cooperatives‐ Federation of Labor Unions‐Medical association‐ Federation of Young men's Association‐ Federation of Women's group Association
<Observer>‐ Plant operators, Nuclear Regulation Authority, METI, MEXT
Environmental Safety Management Councils
(Representatives of residents and various stakeholders)
(Regular session)‐ Result of Environmental Radiation Monitoring‐ Result of investigation on cooling water discharge‐ Operational state and event report
(Special session)‐ Current issue e.g. (Situation of safety review of NPPs)
Nuclear Safety & Policy Meeting
33
Fukui Nuclear Safety committee • Established in 2004• Comprised of 12 members (from
academic field – professor)• The committee discuss nuclear safety
issues from a technical point of view
Achievement • Addressed necessary safety measures (e.g.
Development of organizational framework, educational program and training)
• Conducted a plant walk‐down.
• The committee issued a report on evaluation of safety improvement of Takahama (Unit 3,4) in December 2015
Fukui Nuclear Safety committee
This article highlight the result of the 77th nuclear safety committee meeting which was held on January,2014
The committee questioned a countermeasures presented by the KEPCO.
34
Public Relation
Nuclear Public Relation Magazine “At Home”
• Distribution: 100,000 copies, 4 times/year• To all of households where NPPs locates and the neighborhood municipalities• Contents: Science topics as well as nuclear news and information• Includes questionnaires – Feedback is important
35
Public Relation (Science magazine)
35
Nuclear news
Science information
What is Bernoulli's principle ?
Questionnaire(Postcard)
What is Infrared ?
19
Benefit of siting NPPs
・ Kansai Electric Power 509 people ・ Cooperative company 1，865 people
54% 46% 45% 55%
Other regions South part of Fukui（Supply area）
・ North part of Fukui・ Kyoto・ Osaka etc Ohi
MaizuruObama
Tsuruga
Fukui (Population of 0.23 million)・ Ohi・ Obama・ Tsuruga・ Maizuru etc
Jun 2015
Job situation of Ohi nuclear power plant
37
0.0
3.1
0.8
2.7
0.7
3.3
1.9
2.8
0.4
2.0
0.7
0.6
0.7
3.0
1.5
2.2
0.2
2.1
0.7
0.7
0.7
3.3
1.9
2.7
0.0 2.0 4.0
鉱業
建設業
製造業
電気・ガス
・水道業
卸売・小売業
金融・保険・
不動産業
運輸業・通信業
サービス業
全国
福井県
立地自治体
0.07
1.97
0.61
20.01
1.15
2.20
0.85
3.62
0.10
1.34
0.84
2.04
1.11
1.95
1.21
2.96
0.07
1.33
0.82
1.08
1.16
2.28
1.68
3.24
0.00 5.00 10.00 15.00 20.00 25.00
鉱業
建設業
製造業
電気・ガス・
水道業
卸売・小売業
金融・保険・
不動産業
運輸業・
通信業
サービス業
全国
福井県
立地自治体
Services
TransportationCommunicatio
nFinance
InsuranceReal estate
WholesaleRetail trade
Electricity,gas and water
Manufacturing
Construction
Mining
Japan
Fukui PrefectureSiting area
Services
TransportationCommunication
FinanceInsuranceReal estate
WholesaleRetail trade
Electricity,gas and water
Manufacturing
Construction
Mining
Japan
Fukui Prefecture
Siting area
JapanFukuiFukui with NPPs
JapanFukuiFukui with NPPs
Numbers Ratio of Employees 2010/1965Numbers Ratio of Enterprises 2009/1963
Industrial structure of the municipalities with NPPs
38
〇Tax revenue from electric power companies and related companies
・Property tax which is accompanied by the location of the nuclear power plant
・Enterprise tax on corporation・Tax income (from residents)
〇Subsidies for siting of Power Plants
・To balance between benefits in the electricity consuming areas and costs in the generating areas
Financial contributions of NPPs to hosting municipalities
39
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Change of Tax Income per capita in 1976 ‐ 2014
103
Yen
/per
son 1970-
The first NPP in Fukui started operation
1975-9 NPPs
400
300
200
100
0
1985-15 NPPs
2011Fukushima DaiichiNPP Accident
Prefectural Average in Fukui
Municipalitieswith NPP
Higher Tax Income in the siting municipalities
40
The ratio of subsidies and TAX related to Nuclear in the revenue
Fukui Prefecture(Population: 777,000)
Ooi Town(Population: 8000)
FY201647 billion $ (1 yen=100$)
FY20161 billion $ (1 yen=100$)
1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Changes of subsidies 1974‐2014
As more nuclear facilities were constructed and a new system of subsidies for measures against aging NPPs was introduced, the amount of subsidies was increased. It helped the municipalities with better fiscal management.
Accumulated total Prefecture 233.7 billion yenCities and Towns 206.7 billion yenTotal 440.4 billion yen
Subsidies forFukui Prefecture
Subsidies forNPP HostingMunicipalities
20
25
15
10
5
0
Bill
ion
Yen
/yea
r
35
30
Subsidies for NPP hosting Municipalities and Fukui Pref.
42
Applicable power sources Grant-in-aids Budget in FY2013
(Budget in FY2012)
Subsidies for initial power plant area measures
5.3 billion yen (5.3)
Subsidies for power plant area promotion measures
6.6 billion yen (7.5)
Subsidies for areas around NPPs 23.4 billion yen (23.9)
Subsidies for prefectures sending power
25.0 billion yen (25.9)
Subsidies for long-term NPP area development measures
21.9 billion yen (21.2) (*)
Subsidies for areas around hydraulic power plantsNote: Up to 40 years from 15 years after commissioning.
5.4 billion yen (5.4)
Subsidies for nuclear fuel cycle facilities (construction stage) 6.8 billion yen (6.8)
Subsidies for nuclear fuel cycle facilities (operating stage)
2.4 billion yen (2.4)
Yea
r afte
r site
fe
asib
ility
stud
y
Con
stru
ctio
n st
art
Yea
r afte
r co
nstru
ctio
n st
art
Yea
r afte
r op
erat
ion
star
t
5 ye
ars a
fter
oper
atio
n st
art
15 y
ears
afte
r op
erat
ion
star
t
Dec
om-
mis
sion
ing(Legend)
：: Atomic (including one in a research/nuclear fuel cycle facility)
：: Hydraulic : Geothermal : Thermal (one in Okinawa)
Any local government having an NPP can receive subsidies for power plant area measures, which continue from the initial stage of the plan to an operation stop.Note: After a reactor is decommissioned, the subsidies stop in principle, but the local government can receive some grants-in-aid according to the volume of spent fuel if it is stored at the plant.
(*) If spent fuel is kept after the reactor is decommissioned, subsidies are granted according to its volume. 43
Outline of the Subsidies for Power Plant Area Measures
Consumer
Electric power
company
Power Source Development Tax
SubsidiesPrefecture & Municipalities
Proj
ects
for
regi
onal
dev
elop
men
t
Subsidies for Siting Area of Power Source
National government
National Tax
Local Tax
Nuclear Fuel Tax (NFT)
Elec
tric
cha
rge
Electricity
¥ 321.1B nationwide in FY2014 ¥172.0B* nationwide/¥ 30.7B for Fukui in FY2014
Nuclear fuel In the case of NFT for Fukui Prefecture
Tax rate: 17%Tax revenue ¥ 6.1B (¥177.7B in total with business tax etc.) in FY2014
*: Nationwide figure includes money granted to other than the prefecture and municipalities.
Subsidies for Siting Power plants
44$ 1 ≒¥ 100 (as of September 2016)
Culture
Medical / Welfare
Education
Children's science museumPrefectural Concert hall
Proton beam cancer treatment center
Social welfare center
Multi‐purpose event hall Wakasa wan Energy Research Center
Comprehensive sports park Football ground
Sports
Recent Use of Subsidies Granted to Fukui Prefecture
45
Benefits
• Power related businesses have been located, local employment and population have been in increase trend compared with neighboring area.
• Not only power generation businesses but also related construction for building power plants and equipment businesses have increased.
• Owing to taxes and grants local government of siting area are financially well off and construction of infrastructures have been Promoted.
Issues
• Industry in siting area is mainly power industry and related construction industry increased but it is difficult to be lead to creation of new industry.
• Because of much dependence on power industry, influence from suspension by accident or inspection become serious for local economy.
Benefits and Issues
46
Thank you for listening
47
