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No one will cry over Karadzic, Mladic or Arkan, but one ofthe conditions which Milosevic will have to fulfil to become

part of the normal world is to hand over the three of them andthus take advantage of the opportunity to kill two flies with

one blow.

EDITORIAL

IKARUS FLIES TO AMERICA

by VETON SURROI

Greek mythology refers to the case of Ikarus, who waxed the

feathers of the birds on his arms and started flying.

Somewhere up, wishing to come as closer to the sun, the waxmelted, the feathers started falling one after another, andIkarus lost, tragically, his artificial capability to observe theland from the sky.

I remembered Ikarus last week, as the last possible metaphoron the Serb-Croat-Muslim talks in Dayton, Ohio. There, inthe beginning of the century, the Wright brothers tried to

realize Ikarus's dream from their bicycle workshop, andconstruct the first successful aircraft. Later, in this sametown, a training pilot called Patterson, tried Ikarus's fate, thevertiginous crash with the ground being the last event in hislife.

The impetuous flight and landing.

The flight and its symbols.

President Tudjman arrived in Dayton on the Croatian

presidential plane, a luxurious "lear jet" which was bought intimes when, as I was hearing Croat soldiers coming from thefront to Zagreb, the defenders of Vukovar couldn't chargetheir automatic weapons not even with thirty bullets. The

plane which symbolizes the appetites of the "father of thenation".

President Milosevic, on the other hand, arrived on a plane ofthe former Yugoslav airline company "JAT". Many symbols:Milosevic's nostalgia for the Yugoslavia he destroyed, his

pragmatism to introduce Serbia and Montenegro into thecontinuity of Yugoslavia through a small door, theidentification of Milosevic with the failures (JAT is probablyone of the Belgrade companies which owes the largest amount

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of money to the world...), his affinity to consider the societalproperty as statal, i.e. as personal property (Milosevic ownsSerbia, and a considerable part of Montenegro)...

The last one to arrive to these conversations was the Bosnian-Muslim delegation, in the American state plane. Only onesymbol: the identification of the Bosnians with the only powerwhich has helped them survive complete extermination andwhich can help them live on.

Landing will come, at the end of the conversations, as the keydiplomatic circles hope. Dayton, in a way is meant to be a sunwhich melts the wax.

BBC INTERVIEW - ACADEMICIAN REXHEP QOSJA

"AUTONOMY IS THE ONLY FEASIBLE TODAY"

Interviewed by MUHARREM NITAJ / Prishtina

* The Albanian political subject is preoccupied with the future

status of Kosova. I will not ask you which is the best solution

for Kosova, because you have said it so many times so far,

but which is the most feasible now?

QOSJA: I believe that the most feasible solution right now isthe one offered by the USA and the EU. The internationalfactors call this "broad autonomy", meanwhile the spokes-

persons of our parties, who believe that people can be fooledforever, call it "Palestinian autonomy" or "a state within astate". Regardless of how is it called by any of the sides,regardless of the broadness it would have as determined bythe international factors or how restricted it would be asdetermined by Serbia, this is the solution we are referring to.

This is the solution which said in political vocabulary isknown to be the "real solution"; this is the possible solutionwhich would make our free, democratic and human lifeimpossible and, second, it will make the realization of ourhistorical and national purpose, the independence of Kosovaand , naturally, unification with Albania impossible.

*Where is the key to the solution, according to you?

QOSJA: The Kosova issue is a matter to be solved betweenAlbanians and Serbs. Since Albanians make 90% of thepopulation and Serbs and Montenegrins the other 10%, thenlogically it would be to say that Albanians hold the key in

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their hands and only a small portion is in the hands of theSerbs. The role of the international factor in the solution ofthis issue, would have to depend, as it does ultimately, on theinfluence of the Albanian and Serbian domestic factors. The

politics lead in the past five years, actually lead by the LDK,as a politics of the disintegration of our national movementand its conversion into bureaucracy; as presenting the nationalissue as an exclusively matter of external policy, as a policyof denial of the active role of the people in determining itsfate; as a policy which gave up on the active resistance and alltypes of civil disobedience; as a policy which was fullydepending on propaganda and money, as if independence weregained by these two; as a policy of our right to national self-determination which has deprived it from the moral strengthgiven to it by the idea of sacrifice - with this non-historical

policy. If fact, our political parties have made the key pass inthis largest part in the hands of Serbia - which continuesruling Kosova beastly- and in the hands of the internationalfactors, which continue proposing autonomy. It is not strange,therefore, why our well known friends throughout the worldare now suggesting that a solution for Kosova would be thereinstallation of the 1974 Autonomy - as if that autonomywould be the same in Greater Serbia, as it was in the FormerYugoslavia! What I mean is that we have let go the key fromour hands. But, in order to get it back in our hands, we must

give up on the LDK policy, give up on the politics andautonomists in the LDK presidency and other parties withoutpolitical identity and which act and talk as LDK, we must getrid of this kind of policy which has encouraged Serbia and theSerbian rule on us and on the other hand, it has discouragedthe support of the international factors.

* Maybe you are not so, but you are classified as one of the

harshest criticizers of the policy conduced in the Albanian

spaces so far. If you would be the first man of this politics,

what would you do?

QOSJA: Many things must change... First, I would requestfor the determination of the historical goal of the Albanians asa people, and depending on this, a national politic would bedetermined - the politics that the non-liberated Albanians aremaking and the politics in Albania. It wouldn't happen thatKosova would ask for independence, meanwhile the regime inAlbania requests restoration of autonomy for Kosova, orhuman rights.

Second, I would request the creation of a all-national councilwhich would create the strategy to defend the interests of thewhole people and to reach to the just solution of the Kosovanand Albanian issues, regardless of how much time it would

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take. The principle which would be applied would be thatregardless of the fact that Albanians are forced to liveseparated, the interests remain unique. Thirdly, I wouldrequest the renovation of the national movement, on all

Albanian lands. This would mean the organization of protests,demonstrations and general strikes, in Kosova, Macedonia,Montenegro and Eastern Kosova. There would be meetings of

protest for Kosova in Albania. I would do this to dramatizethe Kosovan issue as much as possible, meanwhile theinternational factor would be conveyed the message that therewill not be any peace in the Balkans, if the issue of the mostaffected people in the Balkans - the Albanian - is not justlysolved.

Fourth, I would do everything to stop the exodus of the

Albanian youth, spreading the conscience that this exodusendangers the essence of our people.

Fifth, I would de-monopolize the media. Before all theAlbanian satellite TV, because I believe that the independenceof media, especially of the TV Tirana is essential in the aspectof the national interest.

And sixth: I would request the end to political and ideologicalpersecution in Albania. I would do this (national

reconciliation) convinced that only in this way would thehuman energy be concentrated in the realization of our twogoals: the solution of the Kosova issue, i.e. the Albanianquestion and the democratization of Albania and our nationallife.

* Demai proposed your active involvement in politics, along

with some others. Your comment on this, please?

QOSJA: In this interview, of great political value, intelligent,honest, and responsible, there are two things that I can't agree

with: I can't agree to the creation of a consultatory body,which is known among our parties as Presidency. And thisorgan is not acceptable first because of the name and then

because of its composition. Second, I don't agree with theaddress this suggestion was sent to. The ones who havecreated a politic which is justly qualified by Demai ascatastrophic, which has turned our resistance into subjugation;which has turned the moral strength of the people into lack ofmorale; which have indifferently looked at the emptying ofKosova, they can't be suggested anything, they should be

required responsibility. It is clear: to have our questionmoving, our policy must move as well.

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BBC INTERVIEW - RIZA SAPUNXHIU, Former member of the SFRY Presidency

"INDEPENDENCE - KOSOVA'S MORAL RIGHT"

* What was your position in the former presidency, and howdid it achieve it's tasks?

SAPUNXHIU: That period was one of the hardest that Irecall, from WWII to the moment Yugoslavia disintegrated.In fact, the ruin started in the Presidency and was caused init. The consequences are obvious. I was there, and I could seewhat was going on and where we were heading to. I am gladI had the chance to evaluate the events and oppose them.

* For a long time, there were comments on a meeting of the

Presidency in which the state of emergency was implemented.The rumors were that you had voted in favor of the

implementation?

SAPUNXHIU: I really don't understand why is it so. I didn'tvote, and this was the reason why I was discharged. Not onlythat I didn't vote, but I also presented the explanation of whyI didn't vote.

* Your former colleagues are involved in politics, and it seems

that you are the only one, after you mandate was interrupted,who has decided to withdraw from politics, Why?

SAPUNXHIU: I am not member of any party. I haven'trefused, nevertheless, any conversation if someone asked fora counsel. I don't evade consultations, but I have no politicalambitions.

* After a solution for Bosnia is found, it seems as if the next

topic on the agenda will be Kosova.

SAPUNXHIU: I believe that the requests we have in Kosovafor an independent state are moral and rational. I believe thatwe shan't give up the initiative. We must not allow Milosevicto take the initiative. Even more, Milosevic shouldn't beallowed to chose the counterparts. It is normal to have the

present legitimate leadership of Kosova to consult with people,but it is the only authorized to participate in negotiations.

* Were you ever pressured in the Presidency of the SFRY?

SAPUNXHIU: Quite a lot. I was pressured on the phone, athome... in the meetings.

* Could it happen that the possible negotiators from Kosova

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would be pressured by the police and army, as you were in

your time?

SAPUNXHIU: I am convinced that pressure will start now.

But we must be ready, we must be well prepared, becauseMilosevic will use his harshest pressure till the end. He isshrewd: he changes his mind and attitude anytime. He will

play any game just to force people to accept the option that hefeels is the best.

KOSOVA

GUARDS OF THE COULOIRS' FOG

by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

After the starting bang promoted by some Belgrade media,about the new Albanian "Hasbulatovs" which were "suitable"to start dialogue with Belgrade, Kosova started a new roundof distancing and differentiation... First came the reactions inthe news broadcast of Albanian TV, then the topic wasdiscussed in the meeting between the Democratic Party (ofAlbania) and LDK Switzerland, which was finally closed with

the attachment of the reactions of the different political partiesto the train. Hydajet Hyseni said in Gjakova that the "formerservants" can't speak on behalf of the people, meanwhile hisLDK colleague Rexhep Gjegrgji said that "puppets" aresought by Belgrade among Albanians. Basri Musmurati, alsofrom the largest party, in the Second Convention of the LDKin Gjilan (covered by BUJKU and titled "Collocutors of EvilBelgrade" and it also published a comment on the "Usedcards"...) stated that the vote of the people was given to thePresident, that the parliament of Kosova was elected, andadded, "it is not the individual right on any person to wander

around in Belgrade on our behalf, and eventually offer himselfas a collocutor in the negotiations about Kosova". In thisregard, the Chairman of the Parliamentarian Party, BajramKosumi said that former officials of the Communist Leaguehad the "chance to do something" for thirty years, but didn'tmanage to even defend the autonomy...

I. "VLLASI, BRITISH MEDIATOR, WITH RUGOVA'SCONSENT"

On the other hand, Mahmut Bakalli appeared only once lastweek, stating for KOHA that he had no contacts withBelgrade whatsoever, and if he would, he would direct themto Rugova. He also said that the demarkation line is Kosova's

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independence... Vllasi qualified these reactions as"disqualifications Made in Belgrade", regardless of the factthat he was the one mentioned most often!

The couloirs elaborated the topic in many variants: that Vllasiwas proposed to be a liaison by the Brits, and an official ofthe embassy had even asked for Rugova's permission.The rumour is that Rugova was not in a mood to accept sucha request, and that finally, in his "neither `yes' nor `no'"style, suggested that he could be liaison only in theconversations about education.

But, since Vllasi hasn't received a clear "yes", he didn't evencontinue with the effort - he travelled to the other side of theAtlantic, where he is right now! On the other hand, still based

on unconfirmed sources, it is said that Belgrade turned thepage and that the "reliable info" same first from anindependent newspaper, in an article written by a Kosovan,and were later enforced with the "wrong" pronunciation of thevice-chairman of Nova Demokratija, interpreted so manytimes in this whole story.

II. "RUGOVA DOESN'T ACCEPT SECRET TALKS WITHMILOSEVIC"

The stamp on these articles was stamped after the storypublished in one of our weeklies: that Milosevic, apart fromwanting to talk to the former Kosovan officials, will depart toOhio with the Kosova package. And this suggested the ideathat Kosova will be discussed in Ohio without the presence ofAlbanians!

Here is another story of our couloirs. We shall start it as afairy tale. Some two months ago, Rugova was visited by theApostolic Nuncio, Vatican's delegate, Monsignior Pala, whooffered Rugova a secret meeting with Milosevic, in any

neutral place (Sunday's issue of "Nasa Borba" mentionedItaly, Hungary, etc...)

Vatican's man had the approval of the Serbian president, butsince Rugova didn't accept, the whole idea failed. And thishas annoyed Milosevic very much - this is the end of thestory...

EASILY MANIPULATED PUBLIC

In all these stories, with so much pyrotechnical fog and somany unverified semi-information, only one things seems tobe clear: the truth that it is so easy to manipulate with theAlbanian public. This becomes illustrative in our case - when

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an article about the "Hasbulatovs" could mobilize the attentionof the whole population to that extent that special meetingswith branches and sub-branches of the largest party with

personalities which must convince the membership that there

is no place for "servants", "puppets" "Esat Pasha Toptanis",etc. And, instead of having these high ranked and actualpoliticians clear up the dilemmas with logical explanations,instead of influencing the masses - they accept the influenceof the masses, the source of information remains any articleof a Belgrade newspaper, full of unverified information....

And if it were true that some of these politicians, or any otherhas tried to contact Belgrade, then precisely the way to ignitethe reaction of the public proves another clear thing: that onlya newspaper article, or a public reproach is enough to

eliminate the mentioned personalities from the ring! If this isso, then why all this fear from these personalities, from theirinfluence? The reply may rely on another logic, that this may

be known also to those who reprimand the others in public,but are using the affair to regulate the internal affairs of theparties.

The other logic is the clear demonstration that there will be nowithdrawal from the requests for independence and theRepublic of Kosova. Nevertheless, all these options have only

one source; the one who launched this "thesis" - achievedwhat he was after! He managed to have people talk aboutdialogue, but not to hear say how should dialogue start. Hemanaged to prove that there are several "types" of collocutorsamong Albanians, since there are so noisy divisions (althoughnone of the personalities stated that he is against theindependence of Kosova). Further on, he managed to provethat the problem why the dialogue didn't start relies on theAlbanian side, and not only the Serb side. Then, he managedto give a dimension of the quarrels among the Albanians aboutthe negotiators... Finally, he managed to do all of these

without holding any real responsibility and even beforedialogue started, not to say that he managed to postpone it!

III."MILOSEVIC IS BARGAINING KOSOVA INDAYTON"

Let's go back to the other information - that the Kosovapackage will open up in Ohio and even by Milosevic proper!The ones who know this information, must have real goodconnections with the Serbian establishment. But, before all it

should be known that the schedule of the conversations inOhio is not determined by Milosevic, but by another one, whobesides playing the saxophone, differing from the Serbianpresident, is the president of the only superpower in the

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world. Therefore, if Kosova will be on the agenda, then theinformation should be sought from the Americans. The logicis that Ohio is organized for Bosnia exclusively, even thoughthe Eastern Slavonia issue could be expected as a supplement,

which could be considered as a part of the Serb-Croatcomplex in these conversations. Also, another logic would bethat it would suit Milosevic to clarify all issues, so therewouldn't be any obstructions towards the lifting of thesanctions, for the normalization and the integration of Serbiain the international structures. The removal of Kosova fromSerbia's back, would imply the elimination of any newconditions imposed to Milosevic from the world. This idea,the opening of the Kosova package, was heard from anotherSerbian politician last spring, Dragoljub Micunovic, in thefamous conference where the LDK and SPS representatives

participated. Nevertheless, if these conversations would beaccepted, at least the contours in the Ohio meeting, thenKosova will be discussed with the absence of the Kosovans!

We are repeating this opinion several times because of the factthat the American Charge D' Affaires, Rudolph Perina, whovisited Rugova because of the negotiations in Dayton, assuredhim of the American posture that "there will be no talk aboutKosova without Kosovans!" This was an original American

posture to Rugova's satisfaction, who, according to our

reliable sources, in this meeting, considered the idea on thedialogue conversing with the Americans - as the path towardsindependence! Americans had smiled to this remark andreplied to President Rugova that "independence is somethingrelative, as it will be in the case of the Serbian ethnicity inBosnia..."!

What is important, aside from these gesticulations, is thattruth that the American diplomats from Belgrade assuredRugova that they will inform him about the results of the Ohiomeeting as soon as it ends. If something can be sorted out

from all of this is that is the truth that if the postures onKosova are adopted elsewhere, then they should beaccomplished through dialogue, with the presence of theKosovans.

IV. "AMERICANS IN TREPA"

This posture can be further analyzed, elaborated, interpreted.As, for example, Perina's visit to Kosova can be linked toanother episode which can be part of our story on semi-

information and interpretation. Approximately in the sametime when Perina was visiting Rugova, another official of theAmerican Embassy, Harvey Lee, visited Trepa and it'sforcible manager Novak Bijelic, known to the public from

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Milosevic's noisy visit to this combine!

If this is the end of our story, then it can be understood inonly one way... If we add that we have contacted the

American Embassy and Lee himself to comment on thisinformation, then we can put the following: "I visited thiseconomic enterprise to get an impression about the Kosovaneconomy" and added that this visit was a follow up on thevisit that he made to Albanian private businessmen some timeago. Based on this, maybe it is that Americans are interestedin the Kosovan economy - from both the Albanian and Serbaspect...

KOSOVA

"OPTIMISM IS OPIUM FOR THE PEOPLE"

by ASTRIT SALIHU / Prishtina

In his last press conference, in the third day of theconversations in Dayton, President Rugova's well known

posture was repeated: "Things should be taken more open-heatedly, I am optimistic". On the other hand, in the last

interview published in the students' magazine "Bota e Re",replying to one of the questions that referred to his optimism(even though the British government and the other decision-making center stated their posture in favor of the autonomy),Rugova said: "In regard to the political solutions youmentioned, all I can say is this much - they are not true. I amoptimistic, I will be and we are working in this direction".

The president's reply, which is repeated following everyquestion regarding the solution of Kosova's problem,linguistically expresses the neutralization of any political

content of questions. His reply is not political at all. Thepresident relativizes the political references with psychologicalones. Optimism, same as pessimism, are psychological statesor psychological reactions towards real processes of life and(also) of politics. Replying to any political process in theBalkans and Kosova with optimism or pessimism is not givinga political reply and as psychological answers, pessimism andoptimism can confront one-another thanks to the politicalarguments.

Optimism and pessimism as a reply in political processesresult with the same thing: giving up on any furtherengagement. Even though, at first sight it seems that

pessimism leads towards resignation meanwhile optimism

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towards the hope for political happy-end, they neverthelessdon't differ, for they don't even touch the essence of the

political processes.

Many will remember the satisfaction the new generations feltby reading Milan Kundera's "Joke" at the beginning of theeighties

His main character, sends a post card to his sweetheart, aparticipant of a voluntary working action, full of energy forshe was contributing to the development of socialism, inwhich he writes: "Optimism is opium for the people".

Naturally, this activated the mechanisms of socialistpersecution - from differentiation, up to dismissal and threatsfor imprisonment. Does this mean that the pessimism of

Kundera's character is to be blamed for the down-fall ofsocialism? On the other hand, does this mean that theoptimism of his sweetheart lead towards the triumph ofsocialism? The answer is known, neither optimism or

pessimism have not built or ruined socialism.

What is the relation between socialism and Kosova? Themessage of Kundera's summary comprises only psychologicaldispositions: pessimism and optimism. The characters of theKosovan drama have same dispositions, but have no political

strategy. Therefore, neither pessimism nor optimism realizethe Republic of Kosova. Psychological dispositions can'tinfluence the conversations on the former Yugoslavia,Kosova's status or it's eventual liberation. The President ofthe Republic of Kosova still remains optimistic, "that's all hecan say".

INTERVIEW

ZORAN DJINDJIC, CHAIRMAN OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF SERBIA

"AUTONOMY LEADS TO WAR TOO"

Interviewed by ARBR VLLAHIU / Belgrade

KOHA: Cease-fire is in force in Bosnia. Do you believe thatit should solve Bosnia's problem?

DJINDJIC: I believe that the offered proposal is mature

enough to be accepted by all sides, because it contains theelements which are logical and reasonable. On one hand thepreservation of B&H as an internationally recognized stateeven by the UN and on the other hand, the administrative

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division inside the two states. This state is given the chance tostay as such, and at the same time opens the possibility of

peaceful separation of these two administrative units whichcompose the state. I believe that this is a realistic approach,

and I believe that the chances to reach durable peace are alsobig, and if anytime there is another crisis in that state, Ibelieve that it wouldn't be an armed conflict - but the twounits, the Serb Republic and the Muslim/Croat Federationwould separate peacefully.

KOHA: What did the Bosnian Serbs gain and lose with thiswar?

DJINDJIC: The Serbs gained Republika Srpska, The Muslimshad B&H recognized by the UN and right now it exists as a

state. The fact that they will remain in a joint state is a lossfor the Serbs, and it is not certain whether they'll stay theretemporarily or permanently. Muslims have lost the integrityof their state: it is divided administratively and the chances forit to be a unique state again are small. This means that we arereferring to a compromise which could have beenaccomplished if there would have been some wisdom andcalmness on both sides, and if there wouldn't have beenextremists on both sides, this compromise could have beenreached without any victims in 1990. Unfortunately, these

four years of war cost too much. The current solution,according to the Democratic Party is fully acceptable for bothsides. It is not acceptable for the way it was achieved inethnic cleansing, millions of refugees, destroyed villages andtowns, a totally destroyed economy, including Serbia, becauseof the war in Bosnia. If this solution would have beenaccomplished in 1990, we would have been quite satisfiedtoday. Since it is being accomplished after four years ofterrible war, it proves how much did the leaders then lackwisdom, for the solution offered today is not a result of thecompromise in the field, but a result of the intervention of the

international community.

KOHA: Will someone be held responsible - including theopposition parties in Serbia, since we can't blame it all onBosnian Serbs - for this ethnic cleansing and the war which isstill lasting?

DJINDJIC: I believe that the opposition parties are excludedfrom all responsibility, for they were only commentators andobservers of the situation. Both in Croatia and Serbia, the

parties which had voters, couldn't participate in taking any ofthe decisions. We in Serbia, and in Croatia too, have totallynon-democratic regimes in which one man or a certain groupof people decides about everything, regardless of the

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percentage that the parties have obtained in the elections. Thequestion is whether we can refer to the penal definition of

political responsibility: I believe that we can't and I believethat , unfortunately, the most responsible for this tragedy will

not be punished, because there are no institutions in the worldwhich can persecute the guilty political figures. History willbe the only judge, if this can serve as consolation to anyone,it will say its opinion about the guilty, for the tragedy thathappened to our people in the past five years.

KOHA: Several days ago, yours and other opposition partiesin Serbia signed a Declaration for the solution of the Serbiannational question, i.e. the creation of a unique Serbian state.Does this mean the creation of "Greater Serbia"?

DJINDJIC: No it doesn't. We believe that it is our nationalinterest to create strong state links between territories orstates or administrative units inhabited mainly by the Serbian

people. In the same way that Germany sought for itsunification for 45 years, with the agreement of the world, andnot its opposition. Thus, we believe that me must aim towardsthat purpose, not violently and not by using prohibited means,

but only peacefully and with the agreement of its neighbors.It wouldn't be Greater Serbia, because people who live inMontenegro, a part of those people who don't feel themselves

as Serbs, i.e. it wouldn't be grounded only on the nationalbasis, but it would be a strong link between states or republicsmainly inhabited by the Serbian people, but which, accordingto the Democratic Party, must be civic states, orientedtowards Europe and the contemporary world and not turnedtowards the past and the East, i.e. Asia. If this would lead toan integration, we believe that thus would the Serbian nationalquestion would be solved in the best possible way.

KOHA: There have been quite some rumors about the meetingof the opposition leaders with Milosevic prior to his departure

to Dayton. There had been talk about Kosova too, how toinaugurate that issue in Ohio. What is the purpose of thisagreement?

DJINDJIC: In regard to the Democratic Party, there had beenno agreement, because there had been no invitation for anyagreement. In regard to Kosova, our posture is clear: the issueof the rights of the ethnic groups, ethnic communities,national minorities can be solved only with the application ofan efficient rule of law, which would be able to guarantee

these rights. This means that the rights guaranteed by lawsand the Constitution would be really accomplishable. Theexistence of rights on paper are not valid if in fact they don'texist. Right now we live in a non juridical state, which can't

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guarantee the rights to its citizens, nor groups of citizens, nornational minorities. The first condition to have an agreementwith the Albanian national minority is to create a systemwhich would guarantee their rights. And, if we agree to what

these rights are, and if the Albanian national minority acceptsthe agreement, then there will be an unbiased mechanism forthe application of these rights and this is the independent

judiciary, and finally, - the rule of law. This is the first stepthat would lead us to solving the issue of human rights, thecitizens and the rights on national minorities.

KOHA: How would the Albanians be forced to become part ofthe system in Serbia?

DJINDJIC: The sole fact that Serbia would become a state

where law reigns, would include them in the system. Thiswould mean that their rights would be defended regardless ofwhether they really on them or not. We are in favor ofcollective and personal rights. This means that nationalminorities, even if they are large as the Albanian nationalminority, or small as the Hungarian, or extremely small as theRumanian or Slovaks, should have collective, personal; rights,i.e. the rights that derive from their national identity. Theseare religion, education, the right to be present in the media,the right of organizing themselves on national grounds. These

are not territorial grounds. To reach the latter, there should bea series of levels and rights which are very important andwhich can't be accomplished because there is no juridicalsystem. The members of the Albanian minority would enjoythese rights even if they wouldn't agree to them. This meansthat if you change the environment in which you live, then theother will enjoy the changes even if he/she doesn't participatein the process of those changes. But this implies a deep andstructural change in Serbia.

KOHA: Albanians on the other hand, claim to have expressed

their will in a referendum, in which they have declared theirindependence. How would Kosova' independence reflect onSerbs and in Serbia?

DJINDJIC: We are again referring to the issue ofcompromise, or the lack of compromise. In the same way theKrajina Serbs expressed their will in a referendum anddeclared their state, but having in mind that life is somethingdifferent and that the reaction of the other party is necessary,we all saw how things ended. There are two possibilities: one,

to lack compromise and the other is to try and find acompromise. If it is the first option, then there are again twooptions: to have both sides, Serbs and Albanians reject thecompromise. In both sides we would have problems, because

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this lack of compromise aims at ruining the other side. We asa party, are in favor of compromises, we would try to find asolution which wouldn't break either side. If Albanians seekindependence, then the constitution of Serbia states that Serbia

is a unique state. But then, we would have a conflict andcompetition and then we will see who will be stronger andwho will win. We are in favor of compromise, which wouldevade the conflict.

KOHA: Regarding the term "national minority". Albaniansbelieve that they are not a minority but people and that theyused to be a constituent of the former Yugoslav federation withthe right to secede.

DJINDJIC: This is an issue that belongs to juridical

scholastics. Another issue is political reality. Naturally,Albanians are a national minority within Serbia, as long asthis issue doesn't change politically in the field. As far as Ican see, it can change only by force. Until the existing factivesituation in Serbia doesn't change by force, Albanian nationalminority in Serbia will exist, and numbers are not important,it will still continue being a minority. On the other hand, theissue of the continuity could be important in some politicaldebates, but in real life, it has no role at all. It was anargument that Belgrade's regime was trying to justify the

name of Yugoslavia and the existence of Yugoslavia as theheir to the old Yugoslavia. However, it was clear that in thepast five years it was not successful in this, that this was atransparent trick, that there is no continuity, but in fact we arereferring to a state which disintegrated, that new states werecreated and that this was being done based on a politicalrelation of the forces along with the efforts to reach politicalcompromise with all factors. This means that it would berealistic to reach a compromise with the Albanian nationalminority, but insisting on the secession of Kosova, insistingon having a territory for the Albanian national minority is no

compromise at all, it is a maximalism which if appliedconsequently would lead to a new war in the FormerYugoslavia, but this time war would happen in Serbia. I don'tsee that the majority is willing to make concessions to theminority, therefore these aspirations can be achieved only byforce. If the representatives of the Albanian minority insist ontheir postulates, this will then mean the continuation of theconflict.

KOHA: It was published, after the internal conversation with

Milosevic that all conversations or negotiations with Rugovaare excluded and that a Hasbulatov is sought to talk aboutAlbanians. If you were the head of Serbia's negotiating team,who would you talk to from the Albanian side?

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DJINDJIC: I would talk to anyone who represents themajority, or who represents a relevant organized group. Theaim is to talk to someone who represents a force, and notchoose your collocutor, for then no talks would make sense.

Milosevic was wrong when he tried to promote Zulfikarpasicinto the competent representative of the Bosnian Muslimsinstead of Izetbegovic. The agreement he reached with him isonly a piece of paper and it has no value. He should havetried to reach a compromise with the real politicalrepresentative of the Muslims, and that was Alija Izetbegovic.It is also a mistake to try and promote or produce an Albanianleader. The reality must be accepted and this reality is that the

person who has the support of the majority is theirrepresentative and only the agreement reached with this personhas the chances to be accomplished. As far as I see, Rugova

is the representative of the majority of the politicallyorganized Albanians, and there is no doubt. If you ever wantto talk with someone, it has to be Rugova.

KOHA: In your opinion , where is Serbia headed to?

DJINDJIC: If nothing is changed in the near future, I fear thatSerbia will drown in decadence and will drown into a crisiswhich is similar to the last years of Brezhnyev's life in USSR,a crisis which ended with the disintegration of that state. If we

make positive changes, and this changes go in direction ofdemocratization, in direction of the creation of the rule of lawand its instruments and institutions which make negotiations,agreements, compromises possible. I believe that Serbia hasa chance, because I believe that, in relation to its neighbors,it has some advantages, for it entered Europe some 20 or 30years earlier. I hope and I struggle for the changes in Serbia.Without changes Serbia has no prospects, while the changesgive an optimistic vision of Serbia in the 21st century.

(The author is correspondent for the Swedish Radio)

DOSSIER

JUSUF ZEJNULLAHU: SERBIA IMPLEMENTED THEPARALLEL SYSTEM IN KOSOVA

Interviewed by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

The beginning of the end of the still opened crisis in the former Yugoslavia made many of theactors of that time to appear with their version of the events. In this continuance, after a long

period - Jusuf Zejnullahu, actor of the critical events of 1990, presents his authentic version

on the key events of the period when he was president of Kosova's government. Zejnullahu

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federal units, to coordinate the economic reform. The reform,which had already gotten the international support, needed the

positive declaration of each federal unit. We had given ourvote of confidence to the reformations and our support had

incited the reactions of the Yugoslav public. I was notconscious that it would cause such a reaction. We actedaccording to the Kosovan interest and this is where we foundthe grounds for support.

This posture came after the change of the Constitution, as thefirst declaration of the Kosova government, several days afterwe came to power. It is important to state that this posturewas contrary to the postures of Serbia and Vojvodina. This

proved that the "three votes of unity" didn't function at all.Yet, there were no reactions from official Serbia.

We had a normal cooperation with the federal government. Iwas member of the federal government in its expandedversion. On the other hand, I knew Markovic from before,and I had a chance to explain him the situation. We used thismeeting to talk about the situation in Kosova, for the federalgovernment had no posture in this regard. After speakingopenly about the situation, Markovic who rarely remainsspeechless, was stunned, and said that he never believed thatthe situation was so difficult...

KOHA: What were the relations of the former Yugoslavrepublics in relation with Kosova?

ZEJNULLAHU: Several republics were concerned about thedifficult situation. Those were the times of the penetration ofthe new waves of democratic changes and all minded theirown problems. Kosova had only the verbal support... In myopinion, the republics used Kosova to prove that they couldn'tcontinue living in an association where there are so many

problems of the kind. Only Kosova suffered violations of

human rights and repression and they couldn't remain all thatindifferent because of the internal pressures. Practically,Kosova as a problem was used by these republics to fulfiltheir own aspirations and afterwards, Kosova was forgotten.

KOHA: What was the role of the Yugoslav Army towardsKosova and did you suffer any pressures?

ZEJNULLAHU: Since Kadijevic came to his post, and I knewhim from before, I tried to open the problem of the Albanian

soldiers in the YPA. Unfortunately, this conversation nevertook place. When I became premier of Kosova, I presentedthis issue to the government. In fact, I wrote and official letterwhere I was asking for explanations for the trials and killing

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of the Albanian soldiers in the Army. Our posture was to havethe army inside the barracks and not get involved in internalaffairs. Apart from these issues, I didn't want to have anyother relations with them, but in special cases. But, the army,

nevertheless, came out on the street when the demonstrationsoccurred, without our consent. The army was commanded bythe federal presidency. Two cases of when the armydemonstrated its force can be mentioned: the shooting inJanjeva and the killing of a young man in Podujeva. I reactedimmediately asking Gen. Andreja Silic how come the army iskilling innocent civilians. Discretely he warned me that thiswas a serious accusation, but I told him that killing young

people was even more serious.

KOHA: Were there any threats for the introduction of martial

law?

ZEJNULLAHU: The things were always done in the way thatmartial law could be introduced any time in Kosova. It wasconcrete, and it was a request which also came from a part ofKosova's leadership. This official request, unknown to me,was also opened in the so called "Markovic's headquarters forKosova", with the participation of some federal officials, bothmilitary and civilian. The decision was postponed in the lastmoment...

KOHA: Another interesting episode is the introduction of thestate of emergency and the curfew. What were the reactionsof the Serbian and federal organs for this situation, especiallyafter the protesting reactions in Kosova?

ZEJNULLAHU: The extraordinary measures wereimplemented previously by the federal organs and thePresidency of Yugoslavia and these continued. Our posturewas that the situation in Kosova will be calmed down with theimplementation of the emergency measures and their measures

in the institutions, but the elimination of the causes and theend of the repression caused by the federal police which wasactive in Kosova. But since the state of emergency was notlifted, the situation became more tense with the manifestationsand demonstrations and, at one stage, it became so serious,especially in schools, university and enterprises. That waswhen the application of the curfew was requested. Asgovernment, we had the competency to implement it, and wehad the experience from the past. The federal presidencyimplemented the curfew, but we didn't undertake a thing to

put it in force. During curfew, people acted according to theirprevious experience... then, different forms of protest started:candles, noise... All of this converted the curfew intosomething ridiculous. In a meeting, Milosevic himself

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admitted this to me. In fact, all of this made the curfew lastshorter than ever...

KOHA: In this period you had a conversation at the Rectorate

of the University of Prishtina, The problems in education wereeach time more serious. There was a segregation of pupils,then came the expulsion from the dormitories, the close-downof the University... At the same time (March 16, 1990), youalso spoke about these problems with Serbia's governmentdelegation headed by Radmilovic, in Grmia. Was Serbiareally so much interested in the hostels, or was it that youwished to solve the problems jointly?

ZEJNULLAHU: Since the beginning of 1990, the problemswere transferred to schools. At one stage came the request to

separate the morning and afternoon shifts according to thenational appertaining of the students. Later the request cameto have Serbian students concentrated only in one dormitory.Practically, the request was to solve all the issues regardingeducation on national grounds. In a meeting, I told the Serbian

professors that they couldn't decide anything based on thenational principle, e.g. the examination of students. This wasout of the question. Since the situation became harsher, wedecided that there could not be double shifts in schools.Children who were going to school in the morning couldn't go

to school in the afternoon. Having in mind the complicationof the situation, and wanting to finish the school year, wesuggested provisionally that schools which could organizethese shifts go ahead with it until the end of the school year.

This is why the president of Serbia's government was invitedto come and get first hand information, and was asked toconvince the Serbian parents to agree to this provisionaldecision and thus end with this problem.

Conflicts were a permanent issue. Students were mixed in the

dormitories since 1964, when they were constructed, andnow, when the issue became so politicized, Serbs were askingfor separate dormitories. It was not a matter of dormitories,

but it was a matter of the University, which was consideredas the "focus of nationalism" and its close-down was sought.It was a difficult posture, with a bad background, to insist onthis. Especially, after the attack of the federal police againstthe dormitories, and we asked for an explanation in regard toit. It was very important to empty the dormitories and evadea possible conflict. The students were persuaded and

convinced that this was a provisional decision. I don't knowwhy didn't they come back and I don't know whether this wastheir decision. This was maybe the first sign that Albanianscould be deprived from the buildings and this continued with

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the other buildings too.

In fact, the impression was that Serbia didn't want one calmday in Kosova.

KOHA: In the times when segregation appeared, when thefollowing the wish of Serbian students and parents the

buildings were separated for Serbs and the others, somehowat the same time, the massive intoxication of Albanian childrenoccurred. Immediately afterwards came the suspension of theSecretariat of Internal Affairs of Kosova by the Serbianorgans. How do you explain these events?

ZEJNULLAHU: The decision on the take-over of theSecretariat of Interior should not be looked upon isolated from

the decision on the suspension of the autonomy and the changeof the Constitution. Serbia, in fact, was interested to establisha direct control on each vital Kosovan organ, especially thatof Interior. The constitutional changes allowed Serbia toevaluate and undertake any step without prior consultationwith Kosova. Therefore, it was quite clear that this was thegrounds for them to do whatever they wanted only if theythought so... There was a rule... first came the evaluation andthen 40 days had to pass before the decision was enforced.We coordinated everything with the Interior organs without

any problems at all. We kept the command over our units,while the Federation controlled its unit.

It is very important to stress that the decision to take over theSecretariat of Interior of Kosova was taken by Serbia inFebruary 1990. Since the beginning of our mandate, we wereon constant pressure that, allegedly, our organs were notfunctioning the way they should. This decision was notapplied. But, the suspension of these organs occurred in April,after the intoxication of the children. This is why it must besaid that if someone has established the parallel rule in

Kosova, it was Serbia. Thus it followed this logic in the caseof the "emergency measures" in Ferizaj, the University, etc.

KOHA: What were your analyses of the intoxication?

ZEJNULLAHU: When it happened, we requested theorganization of medical assistance and shelter, especially afterwhat happened in Podujev. At that stage, we didn't knowhow massive was the intoxication, and later we visited thehospitals. We also asked for the evaluation of the health

condition of the patients from the federal organs. The FederalMinistry of Health created a commission which wrote a 70pages long analysis, which didn't acknowledge the existenceof the intoxication.

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We didn't accept this evaluation.

There were broadcasts, as the one on TV Belgrade stating theKosova's premier had organized the intoxication, to later,

elegantly, visit the patients. A Serbian doctor, on the otherhand, declared that the whole thing was a circus... Thisproves that they hastened to give evaluations even beforegetting the results of the competent organs. In fact, the federalorgans never gave their final statement, whether there wasintoxication or not!

KOHA: In March 1990, you offered your resignation but thenwithdrew it. Why?

ZEJNULLAHU: My resignation was irrevocable and I didn't

consult anyone. My evaluation was that there were noconditions to accomplish our functions. I didn't want to haveothers take the decisions. We went through big pressuresexerted by the Kosovan leadership and that of Serbia. Thefederation at that time as if didn't exist at all. At that time, theforeign press claimed that the president of the government andthat of the party were in a conflict. Since the beginning, Idecided to separate the executive power from the party, innewly created conditions. The people were not aware of theseclashes, because they were internal. I evaluated that I couldn't

work any longer, and therefore I resigned. Serbian organsstated that this was not their business, it suited them.

KOHA: Is it true that Milosevic requested your resignation?

ZEJNULLAHU: No, it is not true. We have never spoken ofmy resignation, but he didn't insist that I should stay either...The pressure came from another direction, since this issuewas stalled for two months and the issue came to theParliament. The Parliament wanted to know why was Iresigning, and in the meantime all the Albanian members of

the cabinet but four, who resigned later, had offered theirresignations. It was interesting to know that the Constitutionof Kosova was the only one which hadn't foreseen that theresignation of the president of the government "pulls" theresignation of the whole cabinet. They had also askedMarkovic to convince me to withdraw the resignation, becausethe consequences to follow - the loss of the autonomy ofKosova - would be blamed on me.

The Parliament openly requested from us to withdraw the

resignations, and it was not only a matter of the Parliament,but also of the public, the Albanians especially. Finally, theParliament didn't accept our resignations and asked me toconvene the cabinet again. The same pressure came from the

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members of the Government. Afterwards, we came back tothe Parliament session and decided to take another chance andtry to surpass this difficult situation. Practically, it can be saidthat this was the demarkation line in our work.

MACEDONIA

WHO STANDS BEHIND THE ATTEMPT?

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

After October 3, nothing is as it used to be in Macedonia.This, in a way, is the common denominator after the attempt

against President Gligorov's life, and the atmosphere reigningafterwards. And, while the public expects the soon appearanceof Gligorov, because it was announced so by the doctors whohealed him, the President of the Parliament who replaces himand finally by the Minister of Defense. It is still speculatedwhether he will be capable of continuing doing his job

properly and of course, about who stands behind the attempt.Frckovski's statement that a financial-economic grouping froma neighboring country stands behind the attempt, and that theattempt destabilized Bulgaria much more than Macedonia, was

enough for the Greek media to proclaim Sofia as the seat ofthe grouping, and even mention the concrete name of theenterprise, "which is a cover up for the former mafia, theKGB and Russia".

Even Bulgaria presented similar confirmations: daily "24sati", quoting Frckovski, added that the economic-financialgrouping is linked to the KGB and the Russian mafia. Othernewspapers as "Duma" and "Trud", based on "Puls" weekly,which mentioned the "MultiGroup" grouping seated in Sofia,

protested harshly because no Serbian firm was mentioned,

because only the Bulgarian link was looked for.

Another daily "Thessaloniki" published, meanwhile theBulgarian newspapers transmitted new details aboutMultiGroup, a firm established in Bulgaria which has goodconnections with the media, and which has grown rich thanksto the illegal trade with Macedonia and Serbia, by breachingthe embargo against Serbia. Further, the newspapers confirmthat "MultiGroup" is directly linked with the former KGB andthe Russian interests in Bulgaria and conclude that all of this

is connected to Sofia's plan to create Greater Bulgaria.Weekly "Puls" publishes in its last issue new details onMultiGroup, i.e. that it was established five years ago, that itis really a multinational enterprise dominated by Bulgarians,

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Russians and Serbs, but that also has British, etc. The headof the company is called Ilija Pavlov, and the network has atleast 61 vice-chairmen who lead different sectors. One of thekey persons in the corporation is Dimitar Ivanov, public

relations officer, former Bulgarian political police officer, i.e.former Chief of the Political Crime Department.

"Nova Makedonija's" correspondent from Sofia, informed theMacedonian public that Ivanov lost his job and the vice-chairman post, only one day before the attempt againstGligorov, since his past brought nothing good to theenterprise, but that his connection to the attempt is a hugequestion mark. MultiGroup seems to control the wholemetallurgy in Bulgaria, the whole importation of oil, ofaluminum from Rumania and the complete exportation to

Russia. According to an analysis of the Bulgarian banks, 42%of the financial potential of Bulgaria is in the hands ofMultiGroup. If this were true, it is not hard to suppose whatis the political influence of this company. It is stressed that thecompany is bounded to the ruling Socialist party, the formerCommunists. This is how premier Videnov's proposal toreplace the first man of the state bank with a 2,2 billion dollarcapital with a man close to MultiGroup was explained. The

proposal was not accepted by the parliament.

According to the information launched these days, MultiGrouphas also spread its interests to Greece, where it has alsospread its holding companies. Naturally, the links withMacedonia are the most interesting. It is stressed that thecomplete introduction of oil from Bulgaria to Macedonia,regardless of the origin, is done through this company. Themost interesting is that MultiGroup, which is advertised as the"hot-line between the republics of Bulgaria and Macedonia"is also connected to the Balkans Bank, which was placed inthe context of the companies concealing the capital of theformer information agencies which are penetrating in

Macedonia, by Minister Frckovski. Then, Frckovskimentioned some secret services, KOS, UDB, or political

parties like League of Communists - Movement forYugoslavia and some other firms covering for the Serbiancapital. Naturally, the purpose was to promote and establishclose viewpoints to that ideology, and even incite the vicinitywith the national grounds. Naturally, such confirmations arehard to argue, and this is why rumors go as far as proclaimingthis company as that on the former policemen from the oldregime, i.e that the capital is tried to be used to change the

direction of the wished political flows. Weekly "Puls" stressedthat it wrote about such implications two years ago stating thatthe influence of these and other parties connected to theCommunist Party and the secret police - were decisive for the

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change of ministers and the prime-ministers then. It is hard tobelieve therefore that this grouping has also financed thepromotion of controversial Zhirinovski worth 30 milliondollars.

The direct motive for the attempt against Gligorov is thealleged and increased interest of some statal interests for

business contacts of the firms in Macedonia, as well as theinterest of the police to discover the link between the firmsand some political parties.

In an interview published in "Puls", MultiGroup'srepresentative in Macedonia, naturally, denied any connectionof his firm with the attempt. "The confirmations of Greek

journalists about our involvement in the attempt are pure

inventions, and we will sue them for these claims". Someother details about the firm appeared: that it has officesthroughout the world "Washington, Manila, Asuncion,Johannesburg, Moscow, Athens, Thessaloniki...", that it wasestablished as a holding company in 1990, and it gathers 450firms our of which some 42 largest are the founders , that ithas between 4 and 5 thousand employees, and that theiraverage age is around 35...

After the "spectacular" press conference by Minister

Frckovski, it became clear that the details about the initiator,the organizer and perpetrator of the attempt will be hard todiscover, if not impossible.

A bit nervous, the Macedonian media, close to thegovernment, tried to "compensate" the lack of results withcriticism against Frckovski and the indecision of the premierto accept his resignation. The ruling parties deny to havetalked about his possible replacement. This was done by theSocial-Democrats, for they consider this to be a competenceof their member, the premier. One thing is clear: Crvenkovski

must decide. Whatever the decision, there are a series ofconsequences coming behind. If he accepts the resignation, hecould cause problems in the ministry which is currently intransition, and on the other hand, the departure of Frckovski,who is considered to be one of his closest collaborators, heruins the balance of forces in the government. If Frckovskistays, this will be a nightmare for the government and the fallof the credibility of the government. And, all of this, again,who knows for how many times, is connected to the (non)return of Kiro Gligorov to the political scene and his personal

decision on whether Frckovski is responsible or not for theattempt against him. In other words, another proof thatMacedonia stands on one column.